CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

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corporate-governance-principles

corporate-governance-principles

Revised June 9, 2010STARBUCKS CORPORATIONCORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICESFOR THE BOARD OF DIRECTORSPurposeThe Board of Directors (the “Board”) of Starbucks Corporation (the “Company”) is responsible for overseeing the exercise of cor porate powers and ensuring that the Company’s business and affairs are managed to meet its stated goals and objectives and that the long-term interests of the shareholders are served. The Board recognizes its responsibility to engage, and provide for the continuity of, executive management that possesses the character, skills and experience required to attain the Company’s goals and its responsibility to select nominees for the Board of Directors who possess appropriate qualifications and reflect a reasonable diversity of backgrounds and perspectives.CompositionThe Board shall be comprised of up to twelve (12) members, a majority of whom shall meet the independence requirements of the Nasdaq Stock Market then in effect. Upon receipt of the recommendation of the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee, the Board of Directors shall appoint a new member or members in the event that there is a vacancy on the Board that reduces the number of members below nine (9), or in the event that the Board determines that the number of members on the Board should be increased.MeetingsThe Board shall meet at least five (5) times each fiscal year, and may hold additional meetings in person or telephonically as often as may be necessary or appropriate, in the discretion of the chairman of the Board/chief executive officer. One meeting of the Board each fiscal year shall be dedicated primarily to strategic planning for the Company. Prior to each meeting, the chairman of the Board/chief executive officer of the Company or their designee will circulate the agenda for the meeting and appropriate preparatory materials to each member of the Board.Members of the Board are expected to use all reasonable efforts to attend and participate in each meeting. The chairman of the Board/chief executive officer or their designee may also request that members of management, legal counsel, or other advisors attend the meetings of the Board.Minutes of each meeting shall be prepared under the direction of the chairman of the Board/chief executive officer and circulated to each member of the Board for review and approval.Authority and Responsibilities of the BoardThe fundamental responsibility of the Company’s Board of Directors is to promote the best interests of the Company and its shareholders by overseeing the management of the Company’s business and affairs. In doing so, Board members have two basic legal obligations to the Company and its shareholders: (1) the duty of care, which generally requires that Board members exercise appropriate diligence in making decisions and in overseeing management of the Company; and (2) the duty of loyalty, which generally requires that Board members make decisions based on the best interests of the Company and its shareholders, without regard to any personal interest.The Board has the authority to retain, at the Company’s expense, consultants, legal counsel or others to assist the Board in conducting its business and meeting its responsibilities to the Company and its shareholders, and au thority to approve such consultant’s, counsel’s or other firm’s or individual’s fees and other retention terms.Policies and PracticesThe Board is responsible for organizing its functions and conducting its business in the manner it deems most effective and efficient, consistent with its duties of good faith and due care. To meet that responsibility, the Board has adopted a set of flexible policies to guide its governance practices in the future. These practices, set forth below, will be regularly re-evaluated by the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee in light of changing circumstances in order to continue serving the best interests of shareholders. Accordingly, the summary of current practices is not a fixed policy or resolution by the Board, but merely a statement of current practices that is subject to continuing assessment and change. Determination of Independence of Non-Employee DirectorsNo relationship between any non-employee director and the Company should be of a nature that could compromise the independence or judgment of any Board member in governing the affairs of the Company. The determination of what constitutes independence for a non-employee director in any individual situation shall be made by the Board in light of the totality of the facts and circumstances relating to such situation and in compliance with the requirements of the Nasdaq Stock Market’s applicable listing standards and other applicable rules and regulations.CommitteesThe present Board Committees are the Audit and Compliance Committee, the Compensation and Management Development Committee and the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee. All members of all committees shall be non-employee directors of the Company and meet the independence requirements applicable to membership on each committee of the Nasdaq Stock Market applicable law, and the applicable rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission (including, with respect to audit committee membership, Section 10A(m)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended), in each case as may bein effect from time to time. The Board considers its current committee structure to be appropriate but the number and scope of committees may be revised as appropriate to meet changing conditions and needs.Board Membership CriteriaThe Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee is responsible for, among other things, reviewing the appropriate skills and characteristics required of directors in the context of prevailing business conditions and for making recommendations regarding the size and composition of the Board. The objective is a Board that brings to the Company a variety of perspectives and skills derived from high quality business and professional experience.Majority VotingThe Company has adopted majority voting procedures for the election of directors in uncontested elections. In an uncontested election, nominees must receive more “for” than “against” votes to be elected. The term of any director who does not receive a majority of votes cast in an election held under the majority voting standard will terminate on the earliest to occur of (i) 90 days after the date election results are certified; (ii) the date the director resigns; or (iii) the date the Board fills the position.Procedure for Selecting New Director CandidatesThe Board is responsible for selecting its members, subject to shareholder approval, but delegates the screening and nomination process to the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee. The Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee is expected to work closely with the chairman of the Board/chief executive officer in determining the qualifications desired in new Board members and making recommendations of candidates to the full Board. Extending the Invitation to a Potential New Director to Join the BoardUpon concurrence of the members of the Board, invitations to join the Board will generally be extended on behalf of the Board by the chairman of the Board/chief executive officer and the chairman of the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee. Other Board members may participate as appropriate.Board Member Orientation and Continuing EducationAn orientation process is in place to acquaint new directors with the business, history, current circumstances, key issues and top managers of the Company.Directors are also encouraged to participate in external continuing education programs, as they or the Board determine is desirable or appropriate from time to time.Selection of Agenda Items for Board MeetingsThe chairman of the Board/chief executive officer, together with appropriate members of management, shall develop the agenda for each Board meeting. The agenda is circulated in advance to the presiding independent director and Board members may suggest additional or alternative items for consideration.Board Materials Distributed in AdvanceAs much information and data as practical relating to the meeting agenda items and the Company’s financial performance shall be sent to Board members sufficien tly in advance of meetings to permit the directors to review the materials.Executive Sessions of Independent DirectorsEach Board meeting agenda will include time for an executive session with only independent directors present.Role of Presiding Independent DirectorThe independent members of the Board shall select a presiding independent director for a term of two years. The presiding independent director shall serve in that capacity for not more than two consecutive two-year terms or until such perso n’s successor shall have been duly selected by the independent members of the Board.The duties of the presiding independent director shall include but not be limited to, (1) presiding at the scheduled executive sessions of independent directors as well as presiding at all meetings of the Board at which the chairman is not present, (2) serving as a liaison between the independent directors and the chairman, (3) approving the scheduling of Board meetings as well as the agenda and materials for each meeting and executive session of the independent directors, (4) approving and coordinating the retention of advisors and consultants to the Board, and (5) such other responsibilities as the independent directors may designate from time to time. The presiding independent director shall have the authority to call meetings of the independent directors.Qualifications of Presiding Independent DirectorIn order to serve as presiding independent director, a director must meet the independence standards of the Nasdaq Stock Market. Additionally, a director must, (1) be available to work closely with and act as an advisor to the chairman, president and ceo, (2) be available to effectively discuss with other directors concerns about the Company or the Board and relay those concerns, where appropriate, to the chairman, president and ceo or other members of the Board, (3) ensure the effectiveness of the Board of Directors and that it maintains its independence from management, and (4) be familiar with corporate governance best practices.Board Access to Senior ManagementAll Board members have access to senior management, with the expectation that such contact will be minimally disruptive to the business operations of the Company. The chairman of the Board/chief executive officer is encouraged to invite senior managers who can provide additional insight into business matters being discussed and those with high future potential who should be given personal exposure to members of the Board to the meetings.Committee Member AssignmentsThe Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee is responsible for reviewing and recommending to the Board, at least annually, the assignment of directors to various committees. The Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee will also recommend to the Board from time to time changes in committee assignments to ensure diversity of Board member experience and to vary the exposure of the members to the affairs of the Company.No committee member shall serve as chair of a committee for more than two four-year terms.Frequency and Length of Committee MeetingsGenerally, committees meet in conjunction with regular Board meetings. Committee chairs may also call meetings when they deem it necessary or appropriate. Committee meetings may be as frequent and as long as needed.Committee Meeting AgendasThe agenda for each committee meeting is developed by the chair of the committee in consultation with appropriate members of management. The agenda for each meeting shall be circulated or discussed in advance of the meeting and Committee members may suggest additional items for consideration.Independent Compensation Committee ConsultantThe Compensation and Management Development Committee (the “Compensation Committee”) has authority to retain and termin ate compensation consultants that advise the Compensation Committee. Any compensation consultant retained by the Compensation Committee shall be independent of Company management.Board Compensation ReviewBiennially, the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee of the Board will review the compensation of the non-employee directors and committee members in relation to other comparable companies. Any changes in director or committee member compensation will be recommended by the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee and approved by the Board.Stock OwnershipWhile the Board believes that it is important that each non-employee director owns shares of the Company’s stock, the Board also believes the stock ownership requirement should not adve rsely affect the Board’s ability to attract diverse candidates. Accordingly, each non-employee director is required to have invested at least $240,000 to purchase shares of the Company’s common stock as follows:Existing non-employee directors whose deadline for complying with the original$200,000 investment requirement was after October 1, 2007 have an additionaltwo years from his/her original deadline to achieve the additional $40,000investment. The original $200,000 still must be invested by the original deadlineand the additional $40,000 within the following two years.Each newly appointed or elected non-employee director shall have four yearsafter the date of election or appointment to the Board to invest at least $240,000 topurchase shares of t he Company’s common stock. Shares acquired beforeelection or appointment count toward meeting the requirement.Each non-employee director must continue to hold the shares purchased as a result of this investment for so long as such director serves on the Board.Recovery of Incentive CompensationPursuant to the Company’s Recovery of Incentive Compensation Policy, the Company may seek reimbursement with respect to incentive compensation paid or awarded to executive officers (as designated by the Board) where such payment or award was predicated upon the achievement of financial results, which financial results were the product of fraudulent activity or that were subsequently the subject of a material negative restatement.Assessing the Board’s Performanc eThe Board will conduct an annual evaluation of its overall effectiveness and the effectiveness of each of its committees, including the performance of the Board’s and of each committee’s governance responsibilities.Directors Who Change Their Job ResponsibilitiesA Board member who ceases to be actively employed in his or her principal business or profession, or experiences other changed circumstances, in each case that could diminish his or her effectiveness as a Board member, is expected to offer his or her resignation to the chairman of the Board. The Board in its discretion will determine whether to encourage such member to continue to serve as a director for any portion of his or her unexpired term.Outside Board Members Serving on Additional BoardsBoard members who are full-time employees of a publicly traded company may serve on no more than one publicly-traded company’s board in addition to the Company’s Board and hisor her own company board (when applicable). Non-employee directors who are not full-time employees of a publicly traded company may serve on no more than three publicly-traded companies’ boards in addition to the Company’s board.Board members wishing to join the board of another publicly traded company shall first notify the Chair of the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee, the chairman of the Board/chief executive officer, and the general counsel prior to joining the board. The Chair of the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee and general counsel shall review the proposed board membership to ensure compliance with applicable laws and policies. Potential conflicts of interest, if any, shall be referred to the Chair of the Audit and Compliance Committee for review.Term LimitsThere are no term limits for service on the Board of Directors. The absence of term limits allows the Company to retain Board members who have been able to develop, over a period of time, increasing insight into the Company and its operations and, therefore, provide an increasing contribution to the Board as a whole.Mandatory RetirementA Board member must retire immediately before the Company’s annual meeting of shareholders during the calendar year in which he or she attains age 75. No Board member may be nominated to a new term if he or she would be age 75 or older at the end of the calendar year in which the election is held.Selection of the Chairman of the Board/Chief Executive OfficerThe Board appoints the chairman of the Board/chief executive officer in the manner and based on the criteria that it deems appropriate and in the best interests of the Company given the circumstances at the time of such appointment.Evaluation of the Chairman of the Board/Chief Executive OfficerEach year the chair of the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee (based on such committee’s annual review) and the chair of the Compensation and Management Development Committee will conduct a formal evaluation of the performance of the chairman of the Board/chief executive officer based on appropriate quantitative and qualitative criteria. The Board believes that the compensation packages for the chairman of the Board/chief executive officer should consist of three components: (1) annual base salary; (2) incentive bonuses, the amount of which is depen dent upon the Company’s performance during the prior fiscal year; and (3) equity incentive awards designed to align their interests with those of the Company’s shareholders. The independent members of the Board establish the objective performance measure upon which incentive bonuses are based, such as the achievement of an earnings per share target.Succession PlanningThe chair of the Compensation and Management Development Committee, together with the chairman of the Board/chief executive officer, will annually review succession planning practices and procedures with the Board, and provide the Board with a recommendation as to succession in the event of each senior officer’s termination of employment with the Company for any reason (including death or disability).Board Interaction with Institutional Investors, the Media and CustomersThe Board believes that the responsibility lies with management for communications and relationships on behalf of the Company with institutional investors, the media, and customers. Therefore, the Board may participate occasionally in such interaction, but will generally do so only at the request of or with the prior knowledge of management.Board Attendance at Annual Shareholder MeetingsThe Company’s policy requires the a ttendance of all directors at the Annual Meeting of Shareholders, except for absences due to causes beyond the reasonable control of the director.These Corporate Governance Principles and Practices are intended to provide a set of flexible guidelines for the effective functioning of the Board of Directors. The Board may modify or amend these Corporate Governance Principles and Practices and the authority and responsibilities of the Board set forth herein at any time.Revision HistoryApproved by the Board of Directors on November 19/20, 2003(Revised March 26, 2004, September 21, 2004, May 4, 2005, May 3, 2006, October 1, 2007, May 6, 2008, June 9, 2009, September 16, 2009, and June 9, 2010 )。

7A Survey of Corporate Governance

7A Survey of Corporate Governance

B. management discretion 经理人的自由
The methods of managers can discretion the investors' funds
常用的方法:
– – – –
a. expropriate directly 直接抽取法 b. transfer pricing-----low price sell to individual. 转移价格―控股公司中常用
解决的方式:从长远利益上协调投资者和 经理人的不一致
解决的方式: a. marginal value of control vs marginal value of benefit 控制权的边际价值vs 利益的边际价值 vs 代理收 益的边际价值 实践形式:绩效考核+股权,股票期权,收入损 失(dismissal of income)
b. some measures of performance vs share ownership, stock option
有效的激励模式:
c. the optimal incentive system is determined by : manager's risk aversion, the importance of his decisions, his ability to pay for the cash flow ownership up front w=f(manager's risk aversion, importance of his decisions, ability to pay for the cash flow ownership)
投资者的本位动机
C. inventive contracts 激励理论

g International Corporate Governance and Corporate Cash Holdings

g International Corporate Governance and Corporate Cash Holdings

Corporate Governance and Cash Holdings: Listed New Economy versusOld Economy FirmsYenn-Ru Chen*ABSTRACTManuscript Type:EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue:This study examines the impact of corporate governance on the cash-holding policies offirms with different investment opportunities.It is difficult to determine the optimal level of cash holdings for“listed new economy”firms(firms in the computer,software,Internet,telecommunications,or networking industries),which require large amounts of capital for investment opportunities with high return potential.Unlike in“old economy”firms,for which investment opportunities are relatively limited,corporate governance in listed new economyfirms may create shareholder protections that make investors willing to accept higher levels of corporate cash holdings.Research Findings/Results:By examining American Standard and Poor1,500companies,the evidence shows that CEO ownership and board independence affect the cash holdings in listed new economy and old economyfirms differently. Specifically,higher managerial cash holdings tend to reduce cash holdings in old economyfirms and higher board independence tend to increase cash holdings in listed new economyfirms.Theoretical Implications:This study provides empirical support for the association between agency theory and cash theories.Given differentfirm characteristics,the impact of corporate governance on cash holdings verifies the implication of agency theory in explaining corporate cash policy.Practical Implications:Whilefirms in new economy industries may be eager for moreflexible governance codes in order to maintain the freedom of decision making,the evidence from this study suggests that establishing effective governance mechanisms may,in turn,effectively enlarge the degree of freedom for thesefirms to make timely business decisions.Keywords:Agency Theory,Takeover Defenses,Corporate Control Market,Board of Directors Issues,Ownership IssuesINTRODUCTIONT wo economic theories explain why corporations retain excess cash:trade-off andfinancial hierarchy theories. These two theories differ mainly in the relationship between investment and cash holdings and in the existence of an optimal level of cash holdings(Kim,Mauer and Sherman, 1998;Opler,Pinkowitz,Stulz and Williamson,1999; Dittmar,Mahrt-Smith and Servaes,2003;Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004).In addition,corporate cash holdings can also be explained by agency theory,in relation to these two economic theories.Because a company’s cash-holding policy is a matter of managerial discretion,the level of cash holdings raises con-cerns about the agency cost of cashflow when managers do not act in the best interests of shareholders,especially in companies that have broad shareholder bases and low man-agerial ownership(Papaioannou,Strock and Travlos,1992; Myers and Rajan,1998).When companies hold excess cash, managers are able to pursue their own interests by spending on unnecessary expenses and unprofitable investments, without market discipline(Jensen,1986).This,in turn, implies that the agency literature effectively assumes that trade-off theory dominatesfinancial hierarchy theory in explaining corporate cash policy.Corporate governance therefore mitigates this agency problem of free cashflows by lowering the level of cash holdings.It is reasonable to wonder whether trade-off theory is always dominant in explaining corporate cash policy,or*Address for correspondence:Department of Accountancy and Graduate Institute ofFinance and Banking,National Cheng Kung University,1University Road,Tainan,701,Taiwan.Tel:+886-6-2757575ext53425;Fax:+886-6-2744101;E-mail:yrchen@.tw430CORPORATE GOVERNANCEVolume16Number5September2008©2008The AuthorJournal compilation©2008Blackwell Publishing Ltddoi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2008.00701.xwhether corporate governance has a similar impact on cash holdings whenfinancial hierarchy theory dominates.After all,for capital-intensivefirms with high-return investment opportunities,it is difficult to determine an optimal level of cash.Because of their higher business risk,thesefirms face more difficulty obtaining externalfinancing,which could force them to forgo valuable investment opportunities.Thus, they have strong incentives to retain high levels of cash in order to pursuefirm value creation through intensive capital investments,which serves their shareholders best.Accord-ingly,trade-off theory may not explain cash policies in these firms.Effective corporate governance in this case does not necessarily reduce the level of cash holdings.Instead,share-holders may be willing to accept high levels of cash holdings for capital investments if effective corporate governance can protect their interests.This raises the question of whether the effect of corporate governance on cash holdings differs forfirms with and without an abundance of investment opportunities.To understand this aspect,it is necessary to study the relation-ship between corporate governance and cash holdings for firms competing in the computer,software,Internet,tele-communications,or networking industries–companies referred to as listed new economyfirms by Ittner,Lambert and Larcker(2003)and Murphy(2003).The success of listed new economyfirms depends highly on the success and unique-ness of their innovations.Thus,they tend to devote capital to research and development(R&D)activities.This requires that listed new economyfirms hold more cash.The evidence of Bruinshoofd and Haan(2005)further encourages such investigation of the effect of corporate gov-ernance on cash holdings.These authors comparefinancing behaviors and cash-holding determinants between Informa-tion and Communication Technology(ICT)firms and non-ICTfirms.They show that the former group tends to be smaller,less profitable,and riskier.Suchfirms use less long-term debt but more short-term debt,and they face higher costs of borrowing and spend more on R&D activities. However,they do not spend more on acquisition activities. Even thoughfinancing behavior differs significantly between these two types offirms,Bruinshoofd and Haan(2005)find similar economic determinants of cash holdings between them.We posit that the effect of corporate governance on cash holdings should explain this phenomenon of different financing behavior despite similar economic determinants of cash holdings,given the impact of corporate governance on cash holdings demonstrated in the literature(Ozkan and Ozkan,2004;Harford,Mansi and Maxwell,2005).Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether the effects of corporate governance on cash holdings differ between listed new economyfirms and traditional manufacturingfirms–referred to as old economyfirms by Ittner et al.(2003). Empirical results indicate that the investment environ-ments thatfirms face influence how corporate governance affects corporate cash holdings.Effective governance mechanisms tend to affect cash holdings positively in listed new economyfirms but negatively in old economyfirms. This is especially evident when evaluating managerial ownership and board independence.In addition to being thefirst study to examine the rela-tionship between corporate governance and cash holdings for listed new economy and old economyfirms,this study also contributes to the literature in two ways.First,it pro-vides a new perspective on the effect of corporate gover-nance on cash holdings in relation to economic cash theories (trade-off andfinancial hierarchy).Whenfirms rely on capital-intensive high-growth opportunities to increasefirm value,it is difficult to determine the optimal level of cash holdings.In this case,effective corporate governance ensures investor protection and sufficient funds for invest-ment opportunities.Second,this study offers a solution to the inconsistent behaviors related to corporatefinancing and cash holdings reported in Bruinshoofd and Haan(2005).The inconsistencies in the evidence in that study are attributable to a concentration on the effects offinancial variables,rather than on the impact of corporate governance on cash hold-ings.This study shows that different characteristics in the two types offirms(new economy and old economyfirms) lead to divergent corporate governance,which affects major corporate policies,including cash holdings.The study now reviews the existing literature and devel-ops hypotheses on the effect of corporate governance on the cash holdings of listed new economyfirms.Research design and data are described,followed by analysis of results.Conclusions are presented in thefinal section.THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL HYPOTHESES Corporate cash-holding policies can be explained by eco-nomic and behavioral theory.The former includes trade-off theory andfinancial hierarchy theory,and the latter is essen-tially agency theory.The trade-off theory of cash holdings posits thatfirms have two motives for holding cash:transaction cost and the precautionary motive.The transaction-cost motive suggests thatfirms hold cash because raising funds in capital markets is more costly than retaining existing cash(because external financing involvesfixed costs and variable costs related to the amount of capital raised).The precautionary motive sug-gests thatfirms may reduce their investments when they face cash shortages(Kim et al.,1998;Opler et al.,1999;Ozkan and Ozkan,2004).The size of cash shortages is proportionate to cost becausefirms must cut investment or raise extra funds.Thus,there will be an optimal level of cash holdings when the marginal cost of cash shortage equals the marginal cost of cash holdings(Opler et al.,1999).Thefinancial hierarchy theory of cash holdings,however, suggests that there is no optimal level of cash holdings. Because of information asymmetry,the cost of external financing for investment projects is higher than the cost of internalfinancing.Thus,firms tend to use internally gener-ated cash before they seek externalfinancing.This suggests that keeping as much cash as possible on hand is preferable forfirms with many investment opportunities,especially for those facing greater challenges in obtaining external financing.According to the agency literature,a higher level of cash holdings provides managers with greater discretion. Papaioannou et al.(1992)suggest that managers tend to retain more cash as a privilege,and Myers and Rajan(1998) argue that managers can obtain more private benefits fromCORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CASH HOLDINGS431Volume16Number5September2008©2008The AuthorJournal compilation©2008Blackwell Publishing Ltdliquid assets.Opler et al.(1999)also document that managers prefer the control that comes with holding cash rather than paying dividends to stockholders.A key difference between two economic theories(trade-off andfinancial hierarchy)is the relationship between investment and cash holdings(Dittmar et al.,2003).Simi-larly,how agency theory relates to these two economic theo-ries depends on the extent of investment opportunities. Whenfirms(particularly old economyfirms)have limited investment opportunities,retaining a high level of cash increases the likelihood of asset expropriation by managers because excess cash may effectively force managers to overinvest and thus damage the interests of shareholders (Easterbrook,1984;Jensen,1986;Dittmar et al.,2003).Paying dividends decreases cash holdings and the agency cost of overinvestment(Jensen,Solberg and Zorn,1992;Kalcheva and Lins,2004).The level of cash holdings is thus a trade-off between the expected agency costs of overinvestment and the expected return of holding cash for profitable invest-ments.Accordingly,the objective of corporate governance forfirms with limited investment opportunities is to ensure thatfirms maintain appropriate levels of cash,which is more consistent with the trade-off theory of cash holdings.On the contrary,whenfirms(particularly listed new economyfirms)have many investment opportunities avail-able,cash is essential.The success of thesefirms depends highly on the uniqueness of their business innovations,and thus they tend to devote cash to R&D activities.With special patents,they can commercialize their innovations and maintain competitive positions in dynamic environments (Bahrami and Evans,1987;Wasserman,1988).Boyle and Guthrie(2003)argue that holding a high level of cash is necessary for potential investments.Without sufficient inter-nal funds,firms with higher external-financing costs may forgo investment opportunities,loweringfirm value and shareholder wealth.To avoid such losses,firms that need more capital for their investment opportunities must retain more cash,especially those facing challenges obtaining externalfinancing.Thus,there may not be an optimal level of cash holdings;cash needs may instead depend on capital needs for investment opportunities.This idea is more con-sistent withfinancial hierarchy theory(Opler et al.,1999).To benefit from the high returns of these investment opportu-nities,shareholders would accept high level of cash holdings infirms with an abundance of investment oppor-tunities if effective corporate governance protects their inter-ests.Therefore,the impact of effective corporate governance on cash holdings will be negative forfirms with limited investment opportunities(such as old economyfirms),and positive forfirms with an abundance of investment oppor-tunities(such as listed new economyfirms).Proposition1:Effective corporate governance mechanisms reduce the level of cash holdings for old economyfirms but increase the level of cash holdings for new economyfirms. Managerial ownership indicates the level of the interest alignment between managers and outside shareholders,and thus its effect is the mostly investigated in the agency and governance literature.The board of directors is a key internal mechanism of governance,and its independence affects the functions of the board of director in protecting shareholder interests.Furthermore,external takeover threats play the role of external mechanism disciplining self-interested man-agers.Thus,this study investigates the effect of corporate governance on corporate cash holdings,particularly with respect to managerial ownership,board independence,and takeover.Managerial Ownership and Cash HoldingsThe conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders are mainly due to the separation of ownership and control. Increasing managerial ownership can better align the inter-ests of managers and shareholders(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).A high level of cash reserves provides managers with the discretion to pursue their own interests at the expense of shareholders.Jensen(1986)argues that a high level of mana-gerial ownership reduces the agency problem of cashflows. Therefore,the impact of managerial ownership on cash holdings should be negative.The evidence from UK firms studied by Ozkan and Ozkan(2004)supports this hypothesis.In addition,Opler et al.(1999)employ three dummy variables of managerial ownership to examine the effect of managerial ownership on cash holdings based on the U-shape relationship between managerial ownership and firm value in the literature(Morck,Shleifer and Vishny,1988; McConnell and Servaes,1990)for USfirms.Theyfind that firms with insider ownership lower than5per cent tend to keep more cash,andfirms with insider ownership higher than5per cent tend to keep less cash.They conclude that the positive relationship between insider ownership and cash holdings forfirms with less than5per cent managerial own-ership is due to managerial risk aversion.Thus,their study suggests that the effect of managerial ownership on cash holdings should be positive forfirms with low managerial ownership,and negative forfirms with high managerial ownership.However,this hypothesis may not have consistent support because old economyfirms possess limited invest-ment opportunities and listed new economyfirms have an abundance of them.In addition,listed new economyfirms often involve shorter product life cycles and more capital investments than old economyfirms(Bahrami and Evans, 1987;Wasserman,1988),implying that the managers of listed new economyfirms are more likely to undertake risky investments than those of old economyfirms.That is,man-agers of listed new economyfirms may not be as risk averse as those of old economyfirms.Rather,they will take more risks to yield higher returns.Therefore,the impact of mana-gerial ownership on cash holdings for listed new economy firms should be different from that of old economy firms.As contended earlier,effective governance mechanisms are likely to increase cash holdings of listed new economy firms.When the interests of shareholders are protected by effective governance mechanisms,managers of thesefirms can keep more cash for investment opportunities that in turn increasefirm value and shareholder wealth.When manage-rial ownership aligns the interests of shareholders and man-agers,the impact of managerial ownership on cash holdings432CORPORATE GOVERNANCEVolume16Number5September2008©2008The AuthorJournal compilation©2008Blackwell Publishing Ltdshould be positive forfirms with higher managerial owner-ship in new economyfirms.Hypothesis1:Higher managerial ownership suggests better interest alignment,and thus the relation between CEO owner-ship and cash holdings should be negative in old economyfirms and positive in new economyfirms.Board Independence and Cash HoldingsThe board of directors is the key internal governance mecha-nism,and its main functions are to monitor management decisions on behalf of shareholders and to verify the accu-racy of information released to shareholders.Independent boards reduce managerial domination,increase the quality of monitoring on managerial opportunisms,and increase the effectiveness of boards in advising business operations (Chahine and Filatotchev,2008).The impact of board independence on cash holdings has two alternative hypotheses.First,board independence enhances the quality of information disclosure and reduces information asymmetry(Chahine and Filatotchev,2008). Based on the trade-off theory of cash holdings,higher infor-mation transparency makesfirms more capable of raising external funds for capital investments.Accordingly,firms in this situation would not need to retain much cash.This hypothesis is,however,not supported by the literature (Ozkan and Ozkan,2004).Second,board independence reduces shareholders’concern about insiders pursuing private benefits at the expense of shareholders via board domination.Consistent with thefinancial hierarchy model in Opler et al.(1999),board independence provides better shareholder protection and thus reduces the agency costs of cash holdings.Accordingly,shareholders are more willing to accept higher cash holdings forfirms with more indepen-dent boards.Old economyfirms experience relatively lower cashflow volatility than listed new economyfirms.When the boards of old economyfirms effectively protect shareholder capital, the difficulty of obtaining externalfinancing,especially debt financing,will be lower for thesefirms.Thus,an indepen-dent board can reduce corporate cash holdings for old economyfirms.On the other hand,board independence may not lower the cost of additional debtfinancing for listed new economyfirms because thesefirms possess higher operational complexity and cashflow volatility.Even though independent boards can increase the information transparency,the higher uncertainty of cashflow may still deter creditors.Therefore,listed new economyfirms must retain high levels of cash holdings.An independent board thus ensures that a company invests its cash appropriately. When managers use cash holdings to increasefirm value and shareholder wealth,shareholders are willing to accept higher corporate cash holdings.Hypothesis2:Board independence shows a positive effect on corporate cash holdings for listed new economyfirms and a negative effect for old economyfirms.Takeover Threats and Cash HoldingsExternal takeover threats are considered an external gover-nance mechanism disciplining self-interested managers.Meanwhile,firms with entrenched managers often adopt many antitakeover provisions to prevent from being tar-geted.These antitakeover provisions provide insiders with security of their positions.When managers make self-interested decisions and decrease shareholder wealth,these provisions protect managers from being replaced by external takeover threats.As a result,the literature often considers that adopting more antitakeover provisions indicates lower shareholder protection(Gompers,Metrick and Ishii,2003). Agency theory suggests two alternative hypotheses regarding the impact of antitakeover provisions on cash holdings.Fundamentally,agency theory suggests that exter-nal takeover threats act as a disciplinary mechanism because firms with high cash holdings are likely to become takeover targets(Jensen,1986).To avoid being targeted,firms with higher cash holdings are likely to adopt antitakeover provi-sions.Opler et al.(1999)thus hypothesize a positive relation-ship between antitakeover provisions and cash holdings,but theyfind no empirical evidence.Extensively,agency theory suggests that excess cash holdings likely lead to the agency problem of overinvestment and reduce shareholder wealth. The most significant evidence of this argument is reflected on value-decreasing acquisitions.Harford(1999)find that cash-richfirms are more likely to attempt acquisitions and experience lower postmerger performance.Several studies find thatfirms with high cash holdings are more likely to attempt acquisitions and are less likely to be targeted (Harford,1999;Faleye,2004).Thus,with the takeover-deterrence effect of cash holdings,firms with higher cash holdings are better able to defend against takeover bids. When companies use their cash to defend against takeover bids,there may be a substitution effect between cash holdings and antitakeover provisions.In practice,old economyfirms with sufficient cash hold-ings attempt acquisitions and actively defend against take-over bids.On the other hand,firms with many investment opportunities but fewfinancing resources may seek out mergers with cash-richfirms(Harford,1999).That is,listed new economyfirms may be more willing to merge with otherfirms for the purpose of improving their ownfinanc-ing positions.Cash holdings in listed new economyfirms are more likely for the purpose offinancing good investment opportunities rather than defending against takeover bids. Therefore,the hypothesis thatfirms hold cash to defend against takeover bids is more likely to occur in old economy firms than in listed new economyfirms.Hypothesis3:When antitakeover provisions are considered managerial entrenchment,their effect on cash holdings shall be positive for old economyfirms and negative for new economy firms.When cash is used to defend against acquisitions,old economyfirms are more likely to hold cash than new economy firms and are thus more likely to exhibit a negative relationship between takeover provisions and cash holdings.EMPIRICAL DESIGN AND DATAData and SampleAs stated above,thefirms are classified as listed new economy or old economyfirms based on the studies of Ittner et al.(2003)and Murphy(2003).1The former arefirms in theCORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CASH HOLDINGS433Volume16Number5September2008©2008The AuthorJournal compilation©2008Blackwell Publishing Ltdcomputer,software,Internet,telecommunications,or net-working industries,and the latter are in the traditional durable and nondurable manufacturing industries.Finan-cial data and governance data are collected from Compustat and the Governance Research Service of Risk Metrics Group, respectively.The sample covers American Standard and Poor1,500firms from2000to2004.There are two reasons to choose the sample after year2000.First,before2000,the initial public offering markets were very active,and many new economyfirms were able to raise funds easily through the public markets.As a result,cash holding policies are not critical for them.Second,prior studies concentrate on samples before2000(Opler et al.,1999;Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004),and thus,this study can provide a comparison with prior studies in explaining corporate cash holdings. Initially,4,033firm-year observations are collected from Compustat.By deleting missingfinancial variables,the sample size is reduced to3,163observations.Next,adding the variable of CEO ownership further reduces the sample size to2,751observations.Including the variables of board independence narrows the sample size to1,917observations. Finally,incorporating the variable of antitakeover index finalizes the sample at1,815observations.Research Design and Variable DefinitionSeveral empirical methods examine the effect of corporate governance on cash holdings for listed new economy and old economyfirms.First,the Wilcoxon nonparametric two-sample test investigates differences in key variables between listed new economy and old economyfirms.Second,the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on cash hold-ings arefirst examined by ordinary least squares(OLS) regressions.Third,to mitigate the potential endogeneity problems,fixed-effect static panel and the generalized method of moments(GMM)estimations are performed (Dessi and Robertson,2003;Ozkan and Ozkan,2004).Last, the effect of corporate governance on cash holdings for listed new economy and old economyfirms is examined using GMM estimations.The dependent variable,cash holdings,is defined as the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets.Listed new economyfirms are expected to have greater cash holdings than old economyfirms.Governance Variables.As stated above,corporate gover-nance includes managerial ownership,board independence, and antitakeover provisions.Fahlenbrach(2004)argues that CEOs in high-technologyfirms are more influential in decision making.Thus,the CEO ownership(OWN)variable represents managerial ownership and is defined as the per-centage of shares owned by CEOs(Papaioannou et al.,1992; Dittmar et al.,2003).Board independence is measured by the common factor offive board variables(affiliated directors,independent outside directors,nominating committee independence, audit committee independence,and compensation commit-tee independence).The presence of more affiliated directors on a board increases the likelihood of managerial expropria-tion.On the other hand,a board consisting of more indepen-dent outside directors is beneficial to shareholders(Core,Holthausen and Larcker,1999).Affiliated directors are direc-tors who have certain relationship with thefirm,such as former employees,business partners,financial relationship, interlocking directors,and family members of executives or directors.Independent outside directors are nonemployee directors who are not significantly connected to thefirm. That is,independent outside directors are not former employees,are not family members of current or former executives,are not interlocks,are not recipients of charitable funds,and do not provide any professional services to the firm.The related variables are defined as the percentage of board seats held by affiliated directors(AffDir)and indepen-dent outside directors(IndependDir).Recently,the profession of corporate board committees has increased in that morefirms set up committees within the boards.These committees specialize in nominating executives and directors,ensuring the accuracy offinancial statements,and constructing appropriate compensation con-tracts to executives and directors.Because these committees perform these essential functions that affect shareholder interests directly,their independence becomes critical in protecting shareholder wealth.Following Chhaochharia and Grinstein(2007),we use the proportion of independent directors in these committees.IndependNom represents nominating committee independence and is measured by the proportion of independent directors in nominating com-mittee;IndependAud represents audit committee indepen-dence and is measured by the proportion of independent directors in audit committee;and IndependComp repre-sents compensation committee independence and is measured by the proportion of independent directors in compensation committee.Last,the corporate governance index(gindex)of Gompers et al.(2003)is added to further investigate the effect of antitakeover provisions on cash holdings.A higher gindex indicates more antitakeover provisions and implies higher agency costs.It is important to note of the limita-tions of this proxy.When Gompers et al.created this gov-ernance index,they did not justify how this index would reasonably reflect the relative effects among different pro-visions.By simply counting the number of provisions adopted by corporations,this index may not fairly distin-guish the shareholder protection for any twofirms with the same value of this governance index.This issue induces an idea for further research.Economic Control Variables.To better assess the effect of corporate governance on cash holdings,empirical models contain some economic control variables that influence cash holdings.Following the study of Opler et al.(1999),cash flow(CF)is defined as earnings before interests,taxes, depreciation and amortization,less interests,taxes and dividends;this is then divided by total assets.Tobin’s Q is a common proxy to measure afirm’s invest-ment opportunity(Lang,Stulz and Walkling,1991;Doukas, 1995)and is defined as the ratio of the market value of afirm to the replacement cost of its assets.Because the replacement costs of assets are difficult to measure,we estimate Tobin’s q as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets(MBA)as used in prior studies(Denis,1994;Chen and Ho,1997;Chen,Ho,Lee and Yeo,2000).434CORPORATE GOVERNANCEVolume16Number5September2008©2008The AuthorJournal compilation©2008Blackwell Publishing Ltd。

Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China

Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China

Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in ChinaIssued by:China Securities Regulatory CommissionState Economic and Trade CommissionJanuary 7, 2001(Zhengjianfa No.1 of 2002)Code of Corporate Governance for Listed CompaniesPrefaceIn accordance with the basic principles of the Company Law, the Securities Law and other relevant laws and regulations, as well as the commonly accepted standards in international corporate governance, the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") is formulated to promote the establishment and improvement of modern enterprise system by listed companies, to standardize the operation of listed companies and to bring forward the healthy development of the securities market of our country.The Code sets forth, among other things, the basic principles for corporate governance of listed companies in our country, the means for the protection of investors' interests and rights, the basic behavior rules and moral standards for directors, supervisors, managers and other senior management members of listed companies.The Code is applicable to all listed companies within the boundary of the People's Republic of China. Listed companies shall act in the spirit of the Code in their efforts to improve corporate governance. Requirements of the Code shall be embodied when listed companies formulate or amend their articles of association or rules of governance. The Code is the major measuring standard for evaluating whether a listed company has a good corporate governance structure, and if major problems exist with the corporate governance structure of a listed company, the securities supervision and regulation authorities may instruct the company to make corrections in accordance with the Code.Chapter 1. Shareholders and Shareholders' Meetings(1) Rights of Shareholders1. As the owner of a company, the shareholders shall enjoy the legal rights stipulated by laws, administrative regulations and the company's articles of association. A listed company shall establish a corporate governance structure sufficient for ensuring the full exercise of shareholders' rights.2. The corporate governance structure of a company shall ensure fair treatment toward all shareholders, especially minority shareholders. All shareholders are to enjoy equal rights and to bear the corresponding duties based on the shares they hold.3. Shareholders shall have the right to know about and the right to participate in major matters of the company set forth in the laws, administrative regulations and articles of association.A listed company shall establish efficient channels of communication with its shareholders.4. Shareholders shall have the right to protect their interests and rights through civil litigation or other legal means in accordance with laws and administrative regulations. In the event the resolutions of shareholders' meetings or the resolutions of the board of directors are in breach of laws and administrative regulations or infringe on shareholders' legal interests and rights, the shareholders shall have the right to initiate litigation to stop such breach or infringement. The directors, supervisors and managers of the company shall bear the liability of compensation in cases where they violate laws, administrative regulations or articles of association and cause damages to the company during the performance of their duties. Shareholders shall have the right to request the company to sue for such compensation in accordance with law.(2) Rules for Shareholders' Meetings5. A listed company shall set out convening and voting procedures for shareholders' meetings in its articles of association, including rules governing such matters as notification, registration, review of proposals, voting, counting of votes, announcement of voting results, formulation of resolutions, recording of minutes and signatories, public announcement, etc.6. The board of directors shall earnestly study and arrange the agenda for a shareholders' meeting. During a shareholders' meeting, each item on the agenda shall be given a reasonable amount of time for discussion.7. A listed company shall state in its articles of association the principles for the shareholders' meeting to grant authorization to the board of directors. The content of such authorization shall be explicit and concrete.8. Besides ensuring that shareholders' meetings proceed legally and effectively, a listed company shall make every effort, including fully utilizing modern information technology means, to increase the number of shareholders attending the shareholders' meetings. The time and location of the shareholders' meetings shall be set so as to allow the maximum number of shareholders to participate.9. The shareholders can either be present at the shareholders' meetings in person or they may appoint a proxy to vote on their behalf, and both means of voting possess the same legal effect.10. The board of directors, independent directors and qualified shareholders of a listedcompany may solicit for the shareholders' right to vote in a shareholders' meeting. No payments shall be made to the shareholders for such solicitation, and adequate information shall be provided to persons whose voting rights are being solicited.11. Iinstitutional investors shall play a role in the appointment of company directors, the compensation and supervision of management and major decision-making processes.(3) Related Party Transactions12. Written agreements shall be entered into for related party transactions among a listed company and its connected parties. Such agreements shall observe principles of equality, voluntarity, and making compensation for equal value. The contents of such agreements shall be specific and concrete. Matters such as the signing, amendment, termination and execution of such agreements shall be disclosed by the listed company in accordance with relevant regulations.13. Efficient measures shall be adopted by a listed company to prevent its connected parties from interfering with the operation of the company and damaging the company's interests by monopolizing purchase or sales channels. Related party transactions shall observe commercial principles. In principle, the prices for related party transactions shall not deviate from an independent third party's market price or charging standard. The company shall fully disclose the basis for pricing for related party transactions.14. The assets of a listed company belong to the company. The company shall adopt efficient measures to prevent its shareholders and their affiliates from misappropriating or transferring the capital, assets or other resources of the company through various means. A listed company shall not provide financial guarantees for its shareholders or their affiliates.Chapter 2. Listed Company and Its Controlling Shareholders(1) Behavior Rules for Controlling Shareholders15. During the restructuring and reorganization of a company that plans to list, the controlling shareholders shall observe the principle of "first restructuring, then listing", and shall emphasize the establishment of a reasonably balanced shareholding structure.16. During the restructuring and reorganization of a company that plans to list, the controlling shareholders shall sever the company's social functions and strip out non-operational assets. Non-operational institutions, welfare institutions and their facilities shall not be included in the listed company.17. Controlling shareholders' remaining enterprises or institutions that provide services for the major business of the listed company may be restructured into specialized companies in accordance with the principles of specialization and market practice, and may enter into relevant agreements with the listed company in accordance with commercial principles. Remainingenterprises engaged in other businesses shall increase their capability of independent development. Remaining enterprises not capable to continue operation shall exit the market, through such channels as bankruptcy, in accordance with relevant laws and regulations. Enterprises meeting certain requirements during restructuring may sever all their social functions and disperse surplus employees at one time and keep no remaining enterprises.18. The controlling shareholders shall support the listed company to further reform labor, personnel and distribution systems, to transform operational and managerial mechanisms, and to establish such systems as: management selection through bidding and competition, with the chance for both promotion and demotion; employment of employees on the basis of competitive selection, with the chance for both employment and termination of employment; income distribution scheme that provides sufficient incentive, with the chance to both increase and decrease the remuneration; etc.19. The controlling shareholders owe a duty of good faith toward the listed company and other shareholders. The controlling shareholders of a listed company shall strictly comply with laws and regulations while exercising their rights as investors, and shall be prevented from damaging the listed company's or other shareholders' legal rights and interests, through means such as assets restructuring, or from taking advantage of their privileged position to gain additional benefit.20. The controlling shareholders shall nominate the candidates for directors and supervisors in strict compliance with the terms and procedures provided for by laws, regulations and the company's articles of association. The nominated candidates shall possess certain relevant professional knowledge and the capability to make decisions or supervise. The resolutions made by the shareholders' meetings electing personnel or the board of directors' resolutions appointing personnel shall not be subjected to approval procedures by the controlling shareholders. The controlling shareholders are forbidden to appoint senior management personnel by circumventing the shareholders' meetings or the board of directors.21. The important decisions of a listed company shall be made through a shareholders' meeting or board of directors' meeting in accordance with law. The controlling shareholders shall not directly or indirectly interfere with the company's decisions or business activities conducted in accordance with laws; nor shall they impair the listed company's or other shareholders' rights and interests.(2) Independence of Listed Company22. A listed company shall be separated from its controlling shareholders in such aspects as personnel, assets and financial affairs, shall be independent in institution and business, shall practice independent business accounting, and shall independently bear risks and obligations.23. The personnel of a listed company shall be independent from the controlling shareholders. The management, financial officers, sales officers and secretary of the board of directors of thelisted company shall not take posts other than as a director in a controlling shareholder's entities. In the case where a member of a controlling shareholder's senior management concurrently holds the position of director of the listed company, such member shall ensure adequate time and energy to perform the work for the listed company.24. The assets invested by a controlling shareholder in a listed company shall be independent, complete and with clear indication of ownership. Where controlling shareholders invest non-cash assets into a listed company, ownership transfer procedures shall be completed and explicit boundaries for such assets shall be clarified. The listed company shall independently register such assets, independently set up account for such assets, and independently carry out business accounting and management for such assets. The controlling shareholders shall not misappropriate or control such assets or interfere with the listed company's management of such assets.25. A listed company shall establish sound financial and accounting management systems in accordance with laws and regulations and shall conduct independent business accounting. Controlling shareholders shall respect the financial independence of the company and shall not interfere with the financial and accounting activities of the company.26. The board of directors, the supervisory committee and other internal offices of a listed company shall operate in an independent manner. There shall be no subordination relationship between, on the one hand, a listed company or its internal offices and, on the other hand, the company's controlling shareholders or their internal offices, and the latter shall not give plans or instructions concerning the listed company's business operation to the former, nor shall the latter interfere with the independent operation of the former in any other manner.27. A listed company's business shall be completely independent from that of its controlling shareholders. Controlling shareholders and their subsidiaries shall not engage in the same or similar business as that of the listed company. Controlling shareholders shall adopt efficient measures to avoid competition with the listed company.Chapter 3. Directors and Board of Directors(1) Election Procedures for Directors28. A company shall establish a standardized and transparent procedure for director election in its articles of association, so as to ensure the openness, fairness, impartialness and independence of the election.29. Detailed information regarding the candidates for directorship shall be disclosed prior to the convening of the shareholders' meeting to ensure adequate understanding of the candidates by the shareholders at the time of voting.30. Candidates for directorship shall give written undertakings to accept their nomination, to warrant the truthfulness and completeness of the candidate's information that has been publiclydisclosed and to promise to earnestly perform their duties once elected.31. The election of directors shall fully reflect the opinions of minority shareholders. A cumulative voting system shall be earnestly advanced in shareholders' meetings for the election of directors. Listed companies that are more than 30% owned by controlling shareholders shall adopt a cumulative voting system, and the companies that do adopt such a system shall stipulate the implementing rules for such cumulative voting system in their articles of association.32. Appointment agreements shall be entered into by a listed company and its directors to clarify such matters as the rights and obligations between the company and the director, the term of the directorship, the director's liabilities in case of breach of laws, regulations or articles of association, and the compensation from the company in case of early termination of the appointment agreement for cause by the company.(2) The Duties and Responsibilities of Directors33. Directors shall faithfully, honestly and diligently perform their duties for the best interests of the company and all the shareholders.34. Directors shall ensure adequate time and energy for the performance of their duties.35. Directors shall attend the board of directors meetings in a diligent and responsible manner, and shall express their clear opinion on the topics discussed. When unable to attend a board of directors meeting, a director may authorize another director in writing to vote on his behalf and the director who makes such authorization shall be responsible for the vote.36. The board of directors shall abide by relevant laws, regulations, rules and the company's articles of association, and shall strictly fulfill the undertakings they made publicly.37. Directors shall earnestly attend relevant trainings to learn about the rights, obligations and duties of a director, to familiarize themselves with relevant laws and regulations and to master relevant knowledge necessary for acting as directors.38. In cases where the resolutions of board of directors violate laws or regulations or a listed company's articles of association and cause losses to the listed company, directors responsible for making such resolutions shall be liable for compensation, except those proved to have objected and the objections of whom have been recorded in the minutes.39. After approval by the shareholders' meeting, a listed company may purchase liability insurance for directors. Such insurance shall not cover the liabilities arising in connection with directors' violation of laws, regulations or the company's articles of association.(3) Duties and Composition of the Board of Directors40. The number of directors and the structure of the board of directors shall be in compliance with laws and regulations and shall ensure the effective discussion and efficient, timely and prudent decision-making process of the board of directors.41. The board of directors shall possess proper professional background. The directors shall possess adequate knowledge, skill and quality to perform their duties.42. The board of directors shall be made accountable to shareholders. A listed company's corporate governance framework shall ensure that the board of directors can exercise its power in accordance with laws, administrative regulations and the company's articles of association.43. The board of directors shall earnestly perform its duties as stipulated by laws, regulations and the company's articles of association, shall ensure that the company complies with laws, regulations and its articles of association, shall treat all the shareholders equally and shall be concerned with the interests of stakeholders.(4) Rules and Procedure of the Board of Directors44. A listed company shall formulate rules of procedure for its board of directors in its articles of association to ensure the board of directors' efficient function and rational decisions.45. The board of directors shall meet periodically and shall convene interim meetings in a timely manner when necessary. Each board of directors' meeting shall have a pre-decided agenda.46. The meetings of the board of directors of a listed company shall be conducted in strict compliance with prescribed procedures. The board of directors shall send notice to all directors in advance, at the stipulated time, and shall provide sufficient materials, including relevant background materials for the items on the agenda and other information and data that may assist the directors in their understanding of the company's business development. When two or more independent directors deem the materials inadequate or unclear, they may jointly submit a written request to postpone the meeting or to postpone the discussion of the related matter, which shall be granted by the board of directors.47. The minutes of the board of directors' meetings shall be complete and accurate. The secretary of the board of directors shall carefully organize the minutes and the records of discussed matters. Directors that have attended the meetings and the person who drafted the minutes shall sign the minutes. The minutes of the board of directors' meetings shall be properly maintained and stored as important records of the company, and may be used as an important basis for clarifying responsibilities of individual directors in the future.48. In the case of authorization to the chairman of the board of directors to exercise part of the board of directors' power of office when the board of directors is not in session, clear rules and principles for such authorization shall be stated in the articles of association of the listed company. The content of such authorization shall be clear and specific. All matters related to materialinterests of the company shall be submitted to the board of directors for collective decision.(5) Independent Directors49. A listed company shall introduce independent directors to its board of directors in accordance with relevant regulations. Independent directors shall be independent from the listed company that employs them and the company's major shareholders. An independent director may not hold any other position apart from independent director in the listed company.50. The independent directors shall bear the duties of good faith and due diligence toward the listed company and all the shareholders. They shall earnestly perform their duties in accordance with laws, regulations and the company's articles of association, shall protect the overall interests of the company, and shall be especially concerned with protecting the interests of minority shareholders from being infringed. Independent directors shall carry out their duties independently and shall not subject themselves to the influence of the company's major shareholders, actual controllers, or other entities or persons who are interested parties of the listed company.51. Relevant laws and regulations shall be complied with for matters such as the qualifications, procedure of election and replacement, and duties of independent directors.(6) Specialized Committees of the Board of Directors52. The board of directors of a listed company may establish a corporate strategy committee, an audit committee, a nomination committee, a remuneration and appraisal committee and other special committees in accordance with the resolutions of the shareholders' meetings. All committees shall be composed solely of directors. The audit committee, the nomination committee and the remuneration and appraisal committee shall be chaired by an independent director, and independent directors shall constitute the majority of the committees. At least one independent director from the audit committee shall be an accounting professional.53. The main duties of the corporate strategy committee shall be to conduct research and make recommendations on the long-term strategic development plans and major investment decisions of the company.54. The main duties of the audit committee are (1) to recommend the engagement or replacement of the company's external auditing institutions; (2) to review the internal audit system and its execution; (3) to oversee the interaction between the company's internal and external auditing institutions; (4) to inspect the company's financial information and its disclosure; and (5) to monitor the company's internal control system.55. The main duties of the nomination committee are (1) to formulate standards and procedures for the election of directors and make recommendations; (2) to extensively seek qualified candidates for directorship and management; and (3) to review the candidates for directorship and management and make recommendations.56. The main duties of the remuneration and appraisal committee are (1) to study the appraisal standard for directors and management personnel, to conduct appraisal and to make recommendations; and (2) to study and review the remuneration policies and schemes for directors and senior management personnel.57. Each specialized committee may engage intermediary institutions to provide professional opinions, the relevant expenses to be borne by the company.58. Each specialized committee shall be accountable to the board of directors. All proposals by specialized committees shall be submitted to the board of directors for review and approval.Chapter 4. The Supervisors and the Supervisory Board(1) Duties and Responsibilities of the Supervisory Board59. The supervisory board of a listed company shall be accountable to all shareholders. The supervisory board shall supervise the corporate finance, the legitimacy of directors, managers and other senior management personnel's performance of duties, and shall protect the company's and the shareholders' legal rights and interests.60. Supervisors shall have the right to learn about the operating status of the listed company and shall have the corresponding obligation of confidentiality. The supervisory board may independently hire intermediary institutions to provide professional opinions.61. A listed company shall adopt measures to ensure supervisors' right to learn about company's matters and shall provide necessary assistance to supervisors for their normal performance of duties. No one shall interfere with or obstruct supervisors' work. A supervisor's reasonable expenses necessary to perform their duties shall be borne by the listed company.62. The record of the supervisory committee's supervision as well as the results of financial or other specific investigations shall be used as an important basis for performance assessment of directors, managers and other senior management personnel.63. The supervisory board may report directly to securities regulatory authorities and other related authorities as well as reporting to the board of directors and the shareholders' meetings when the supervisory board learns of any violation of laws, regulations or the company's articles of association by directors, managers or other senior management personnel.(2) The Composition and Steering of the Supervisory Board64. Supervisors shall have professional knowledge or work experience in such areas as law and accounting. The members and the structure of the supervisory board shall ensure its capability to independently and efficiently conduct its supervision of directors, managers and other seniormanagement personnel and to supervise and examine the company's financial matters.65. A listed company shall formulate in its articles of association standardized rules and procedures governing the steering of the supervisory board. The supervisory board's meetings shall be convened in strict compliance with the rules and procedures.66. The supervisory board shall meet periodically and shall convene interim meetings in a timely manner when necessary. If for any reason a supervisory board meeting cannot be convened as scheduled, an explanation shall be publicly announced.67. The supervisory board may ask directors, managers and other senior management personnel, internal auditing personnel and external auditing personnel to attend the meetings of supervisory board and to answer the questions that the supervisory board is concerned with.68. Minutes shall be drafted for the meetings of the supervisory board, which shall be signed by the supervisors that attended the meetings and the person who drafted the minutes. The supervisors shall have the right to request to record in the minutes explanatory notes to their statements in the meetings. Minutes of the meetings of the supervisory board shall be properly maintained and stored as important records of the company.Chapter 5. Performance Assessments and Incentive and Disciplinary Systems(1) Performance Assessment for Directors, Supervisors and Management Personnel69. A listed company shall establish fair and transparent standards and procedures for the assessment of the performance of directors, supervisors and management personnel.70. The evaluation of the directors and management personnel shall be conducted by the board of directors or by the remuneration and appraisal committee of the board of directors. The evaluation of the performance of independent directors and supervisors shall be conducted through a combination of self-review and peer review.71. The board of directors shall propose a scheme for the amount and method of compensation for directors to the shareholders' meeting for approval. When the board of directors or the remuneration and appraisal committee reviews the performance of or discusses the compensation for a certain director, such director shall withdraw.72. The board of directors and the supervisory board shall report to the shareholder meetings the performance of the directors and the supervisors, the results of the assessment of their work and their compensation, and shall disclose such information.(2) Selection of Management Personnel。

丹纳赫企业管治指南Danaher Corporate Governance Guidelines

丹纳赫企业管治指南Danaher Corporate Governance Guidelines

DANAHER CORPORATIONCORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINESThe Board of Directors (the “Board”) of Danaher Corporation (the “Company”), acting on the recommendation of its Nominating and Governance Committee, has adopted these corporate governance principles (the "Guidelines") to promote the effective functioning of the Board and its committees, to promote the interests of stockholders, and to ensure a common set of expectations as to how the Board, its various committees, individual directors and management should perform their functions. These Guidelines are in addition to and are not intended to change or interpret any Federal or state law or regulation, including the Delaware General Corporation Law, or the Certificate of Incorporation or By-laws of the Company. The Board believes these Guidelines should be an evolving set of corporate governance principles, subject to alteration as circumstances warrant.I.The BoardA.Role of BoardThe business and affairs of the Company are managed by or under the direction of the Board in accordance with Delaware law. The Board's responsibility is to provide direction and oversight. The Board establishes the strategic direction of the Company and oversees the performance of the Company's business and management. The management of the Company is responsible for presenting strategic plans to the Board for review and approval and for implementing the Company's strategic direction. In performing their duties, the primary responsibility of the directors is to exercise their business judgment in the best interests of the Company.Certain specific corporate governance functions of the Board are set forth below:•Management Evaluation and Compensation. The Board has the responsibility to select and make decisions about the retention of the Company's Chief ExecutiveOfficer ("CEO") and to oversee the selection and performance of other executiveofficers. The Compensation Committee has the management evaluation andcompensation responsibilities set forth in the Compensation Committee charter.•Management Succession. The Board shall, with such assistance from the Nominating and Governance Committee as the Board shall request, review andconcur in a management succession plan, developed by the CEO, to ensure continuityin senior management. This plan, on which the CEO shall report at least annually,shall address: emergency CEO succession; CEO succession in the ordinary course ofbusiness; and succession for the other members of senior management.•Director Compensation. The Nominating and Governance Committee shall periodically review the form and amounts of director compensation and makerecommendations to the Board with respect thereto. The Board shall set the form andamounts of director compensation, taking into account the recommendations of theNominating and Governance Committee. Determination of director compensationshall be guided by three goals: compensation should fairly pay directors for workrequired consistent with a company of Danaher's size and scope; compensationshould align directors' interests with the long-term interests of shareholders; and thestructure of the compensation should be simple, transparent and easy for shareholdersto understand. Only non-management directors shall receive compensation forservices as a director. To create a direct linkage with corporate performance, theBoard believes that a meaningful portion of the total compensation of non-management directors should be provided and held in equity-based compensation.B.Board SizeThe Board’s size is set in accordance with the Company’s by-laws, to permit diversity of experience without hindering effective discussion or diminishing individual accountability. The Board will periodically review the size of the Board, and determine the size that is most effective in relation to future operations.C.Board Composition and IndependenceThe members of the Board should collectively possess a range of skills, knowledge, expertise (including business and other relevant experience) and backgrounds:•useful and appropriate to the effective oversight of the Company's business, and•appropriate to building a Board that is effective in collectively meeting the Company's strategic needs and serving the long-term interests of the shareholders.The Board shall consist of a majority of directors who qualify as independent directors (the “Independent Directors”) under the listing standards of the New York Stock Exchange (the “NYSE”). The Board shall review annually each director's relationships with the Company (either directly or as a partner, shareholder, or officer of an organization that has a relationship with the Company), if any. Following such annual review, only those directors whom the Board affirmatively determines have no material relationship with the Company (either directly or as a partner, shareholder, or officer of an organization that has a relationship with the Company) will be considered Independent Directors, subject to any additional independence qualifications that may be prescribed under the listing standards of the NYSE from time to time.The Board anticipates that the Company’s CEO will be regularly nominated to serve on the Board. The Board may also appoint or nominate other members of the Company’s management whose experience and role at the Company are expected to help the Board fulfill its responsibilities.D.Selection of NomineesThe Board will be responsible for the selection of all candidates for nomination or appointment as Board members. The Board's Nominating and Governance Committee shall beresponsible for identifying and recommending to the Board qualified candidates for Board membership, based primarily on the following criteria:•personal and professional integrity and character;•prominence and reputation in the candidate's profession;•skills, knowledge and expertise (including business or other relevant experience) useful and appropriate to the effective oversight of the Company's business;•the extent to which the interplay of the candidate's skills, knowledge, expertise and background with that of the other Board members will help build a Board that iseffective in collectively meeting the Company's strategic needs and serving the long-term interests of the shareholders;•the capacity and desire to represent the interests of the shareholders as a whole; and•availability to devote sufficient time to the affairs of the Company.E. Director Elections and ResignationsIn accordance with the Company’s By-laws, if none of our stockholders provides the Company notice of an intention to nominate one or more candidates to compete with the Board's nominees in a Director election, or if our stockholders have withdrawn all such nominations by the tenth day before the Company mails its notice of meeting to our stockholders, a nominee must receive more votes cast for than against his or her election or re-election in order to be elected or re-elected to the Board. The Board expects a Director to tender his or her resignation if he or she fails to receive the required number of votes for re-election. The Board shall nominate for election or re-election as Director only candidates who agree to tender, promptly following the annual meeting at which they are elected or re-elected as Director, irrevocable resignations that will be effective upon (i) the failure to receive the required vote at the next annual meeting at which they face re-election and (ii) Board acceptance of such resignation. In addition, the Board shall fill Director vacancies and new directorships only with candidates who agree to tender, promptly following their appointment to the Board, the same form of resignation tendered by other Directors in accordance with this Board Practice. If an incumbent Director fails to receive the required vote for re-election, the Nominating and Governance Committee will act on an expedited basis to determine whether to accept the Director's resignation and will submit such recommendation for prompt consideration by the Board. The Board expects the Director whose resignation is under consideration to abstain from participating in any decision regarding that resignation. The Nominating and Governance Committee and the Board may consider any factors they deem relevant in deciding whether to accept a Director's resignation.F. TenureWhen a director's principal occupation changes substantially from the position he or she held when most recently elected or appointed to the Board, the director shall tender a letter of proposed resignation from the Board to the chair of the Nominating and Governance Committee and the Company Secretary (which shall be effective only if accepted by the Board). The Nominating and Governance Committee shall review the director's continuation on the Board, and recommend to the Board whether, in light of all the circumstances, the Board should accept or reject such proposed resignation; provided, that in making such recommendation theNominating and Governance Committee shall consider, among such other factors as it deems relevant, that such director was elected by the shareholders of the Company.The Board does not believe that arbitrary term limits on directors' service are appropriate. The Board annually evaluates each director as part of the board and committee self-evaluation process described below.G. Limits on Other Board MembershipsDirectors should not serve on more than four boards of public companies in addition to the Board. Current positions in excess of these limits may be maintained unless the Board determines that doing so would impair the director's service on the Board. Directors should advise the Chairman of the Board (the “Chair”), the chair of the Nominating and Governance Committee and the Company Secretary before accepting membership on another board of directors or audit committee or any other significant committee assignment, or establishing any significant relationship with any business, institution or other governmental or regulatory entity, and should advise the Chair, the chair of the Nominating and Governance Committee and the Company Secretary of any other material change in circumstance or relationship that may impact a director's independence.H. Chairman of the BoardThe Board appoints the Chair. The offices of the Chair and the CEO shall be vested in separate persons.I. Lead Independent DirectorWhenever the Chair is not independent, a majority of the Independent Directors then in office will select a Lead Independent Director from among the Independent Directors. The Nominating and Governance Committee shall provide its recommendation as to which Independent Director should serve as the Lead Independent Director. The Lead Independent Director will:•preside at all meetings of the Board at which the Chair and the Chair of the Executive Committee are not present, including the executive sessions of non-managementdirectors;•have the authority to call meetings of the Independent Directors;•act as a liaison as necessary between the Independent Directors and the management directors; and•advise with respect to the Board’s agenda.J. Pledging of Danaher StockNo director or executive officer of the Company may pledge as security under any obligation any shares of Company common stock that he or she directly or indirectly owns and controls (provided that any shares of Company common stock directly or indirectly owned and controlled by any director or executive officer of the Company that were pledged as of February 21, 2013 (including any additional shares accruing thereto on or after such date as a result of any stock splits, stock dividends or similar transactions after such date) are not covered by this policy (“Permitted Pledged Shares”)). Permitted Pledged Shares shall not be counted toward the stockownership requirements set forth under the Danaher Stock Ownership Requirements for Directors and Executive Officers.II.Board and Committee MeetingsA. MeetingsThe Board has five regular meetings each year, and such special meetings as are deemed necessary, at which it reviews and discusses reports by management on the performance of the Company, its plans and prospects, as well as immediate, material issues facing the Company. The Chair, in consultation with appropriate members of the Board and with management, shall set the frequency and length of each meeting and the meeting agenda. Management will be responsible for ensuring that, a s a general rule absent exigent circumstances, Board members receive information prior to each Board meeting or committee meeting, as applicable, so that they have an opportunity to reflect properly on the matters to be considered at the meeting. Materials presented to Board members should provide the information needed for the Board members to make an informed judgment or engage in informed discussion.The Board welcomes attendance at Board meetings of senior officers of the Company. Invitations shall be extended by the Chair.Each director is expected to attend all scheduled Board meetings and meetings of committees on which he or she serves. Each director is also expected to review the materials provided by management and advisors in advance of the meetings of the Board and the committees on which such director serves.B. Board CommitteesThe Board has delegated authority to six standing committees: Audit, Compensation, Nominating and Governance, Finance, Executive and Science & Technology. Each committee, other than the Executive, Finance and Science & Technology Committees, is comprised solely of Independent Directors. Committee members and chairs will be appointed by the Board upon the recommendation of its Nominating and Governance Committee. There are no fixed terms for service on committees.Each Committee shall have the number of meetings provided for in its charter, with further meetings to occur (or action to be taken by unanimous written consent) when deemed necessary or desirable by the Committee chair. The Committee chairperson, in consultation with appropriate members of the Committee and with management, shall set the frequency and length of each meeting and the meeting agenda (consistent with any applicable charter requirements). Board members who are not members of a particular committee are welcome to attend meetings of that committee. The Committee chairperson shall report matters considered and acted upon to the full Board at the next regularly scheduled Board meeting. The Board believes that as a practice all Board members should receive notice of each Committee meeting and receive a copy of the minutes of each Committee meeting.C. Meetings of Non-Management DirectorsTo ensure free and open discussion and communication among the non-management directors, these directors shall meet in executive session at least twice per calendar year with nomembers of management present. To the extent the group of non-management directors includes any directors who are not independent, the Independent Directors shall meet in executive session at least once per calendar year.Normally, the meetings described in the preceding paragraph will occur prior to or following regularly scheduled board meetings. The Lead Independent Director shall preside at the aforementioned executive sessions.III.Director Orientation and Continuing EducationThe Chief Financial Officer, General Counsel, Chief Accounting Officer and Company Secretary shall be responsible for providing an orientation for new directors, and for periodically providing materials, briefings and other educational opportunities to permit them to become more familiar with the Company and to enable them to better discharge their duties as directors. Each new director shall, within six months of election to the Board, spend a day at corporate headquarters for personal briefing by senior management on the Company's business, strategic plans, financial statements and key policies and practices.IV.Self EvaluationThe Board and each of the Audit, Compensation and Nominating & Governance committees conduct a self-evaluation annually to assess whether it and its committees are functioning effectively. The Nominating and Governance Committee will solicit each director for his or her assessments of the effectiveness of the Board and the committees on which he or she serves, and will report annually to the Board with an assessment of the Board’s performance, which will be discussed with the full Board.The Nominating and Governance Committee’s assessment will focus on the members’ contributions (e.g., attendance, preparedness and participation) to the Board and its committees, the Board’s contributions to the Company and will identify areas for improvement in the performance of the Board and its committees.V.Access to Senior Management and Independent AdvisorsBoard members have full access to senior management and to information about the Company’s operations. Independent directors are encouraged to contact senior managers of the Company without senior corporate management present. In addition, the Board and its committees shall have the right at any time to retain independent outside financial, legal or other advisors, as they deem necessary and appropriate.。

Policy Dialogue on Corporate Governance in China

Policy Dialogue on Corporate Governance in China

6
The main privatisation methods in the Italian program - Trade Sale
Pros
Stronger improvement in corporate efficiency expected (conducive to stronger governance structure for the company) Better outcomes in terms of proceedings (price premium embedded for control) Transfer of technology and managerial skills Only minimal restructuring required (weak information asymmetry between buyer and seller and buyer’s risk aversion to be overcome) Conducive of inefficient allocation of resources and potentially prone to corruption if not based on transparent competitive bidding If based on transparent competitive bidding in strategic sectors it cannot prevent foreign investors from acquiring the asset Misses the potential for capital market development.
• The key drivers of the Italian program:

中国公司治理热点问题分析-AsianCorporateGovernanceAssociation

中国公司治理热点问题分析-AsianCorporateGovernanceAssociation
市场
澳大利亚 1. 新加坡 2. 中国香港
2012年 2014年 2016年
69 66 64 65 78 67 65
2014年到2016 公司治理改革方向 年的变化
(+3) 总体来说没有大问题,但也许危机潜伏 行动才会有反应:香港市场的常态
3. 日本
4. 中国台湾 5. 泰国
55
53 58
60
56 58
亚洲公司治理协会
“中国公司治理热点问题分析”
嘉宾:
亚洲公司治理协会秘书长 艾哲明
深圳证券交易所 2017年3月22日
深圳证券交易所 2017年3月22日
1
主要内容
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
亚洲公司治理协会简介 公司治理观察报告2016-概览 公司治理观察报告2016-中国大陆 中国公司治理现状 中国公司治理面临的挑战 中国公司治理热点议题讨论 问答环节
6. Oekom Research
7. Vigeo Eiris 8. Asian Corporate Governance Association
9. Hermes Equity Ownership Services
10. Solaron
深圳证券交易所 2017年3月22日
9
2016年全球责任投资独立研究机构评选结果
12
概览- 2016年市场分类得分
市场
移到严格执法上 北亚地区在此次调查中进步明显 金融市场的监管者与政府官员之间的 意见分歧越趋明显 监管机构不是市场公司治理水平好坏 的唯一责任方—未来的十五年,重心
将会围绕系统中的其他参与者作出他
们应有的贡献
深圳证券交易所 2017年3月22日

Corporate_Governance_Structure公司管理

Corporate_Governance_Structure公司管理

Combined Code (2008)
Some important points made by the Combined Code are as follows: The board should have regular meetings There should be a formal schedule of matters
Dual Board
Members of one board cannot be members of the other board. Shareholders choose the members of the supervisory board and then the members of the supervisory board choose the management board. In a few European countries (Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark) the dual structure is more common
Unitary board
A unitary board is a type of board structure that has one single board of directors. They are responsible for the entire company and all of the company’s activities.
dual boards To have a detailed understanding of the roles, duties, and responsibilities of directors To understand the reasons for key board committees To understand the role of non-executive (outside) directors

Alliances and corporate governance

Alliances and corporate governance

Alliances and corporate governance$Andriy Bodnaruk a,Massimo Massa b,c,n,Andrei Simonov c,d,ea University of Notre Dame,USAb Finance Department,INSEAD,Boulevard de Constance,77305Fontainebleau,Francec CEPR,United Kingdomd Michigan State University,USAe Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy,Moscow,Russiaa r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:Received9April2010Received in revised form10April2012Accepted10May2012Available online27September2012Jel classification:G34G23G32Keywords:AlliancesCorporate governanceAbnormal returnProfitabilitya b s t r a c tWe study the link between afirm’s quality of governance and its alliance activity.Weconsider alliances as a commitment technology that helps a company’Chief ExecutiveOfficer overcome agency problems that relate to the inability to ex ante motivatedivision managers.We show that well-governedfirms are more likely to availthemselves of this technology to anticipate ex post commitment problems and resolvethem.The role of governance is particularly important when the commitment problemsare more acute,such as for significantly risky/long-horizon projects(‘‘longshots’’)orfirms more prone to inefficient internal redistribution of resources(conglomerates),aswell as in the absence of alternative disciplining devices(e.g.,low product marketcompetition).Governance also mitigates agency issues between alliance partners;dominant alliance partners agree to a more equal split of power with junior partnersthat are better governed.An‘‘experiment’’that induces cross-sectional variation in thecost of the alliance commitment technology provides evidence of a causal link betweengovernance and alliances.&2012Elsevier B.V.All rights reserved.1.IntroductionThe question of howfirms determine their boundariesremains central in the economics of organization.Often-times,rather than execute a project internally,afirmacquires it from anotherfirm or cooperates on a projectby forming an alliance.1Why would some projects beconducted within afirm’s boundaries while others involveseveral differentfirms?To answer this question we must recognize thatprojects are not allocated exogenously acrossfirms.Infact,the activities conducted betweenfirms rather thanwithinfirms are endogenous outcomes that reflect howfirms construct their boundaries.We focus on one factoraffecting boundaries:firm governance.In particular,weask whether well-governedfirms,i.e.,firms where man-agerial incentives and corporate actions are aligned well,construct their boundaries in a different way from poorlygovernedfirms.Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirectjournal homepage:/locate/jfecJournal of Financial Economics0304-405X/$-see front matter&2012Elsevier B.V.All rights reserved./10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.09.010$We thank anonymous referee,David Robinson,William Schwert(the editor),Charles Hadlock and seminar participants at University ofNotre Dame,European Finance Association and American FinanceAssociation annual meetings.Simonov acknowledgesfinancial supportfrom Hendrik Zwarensteyn Memorial Endowed ResearchAward.n Corresponding author at:Finance Department,INSEAD,Boulevard deConstance,77305Fontainebleau,France.Tel.:þ33160724481;fax:þ33160724045.E-mail address:massimo.massa@(M.Massa).1Between1990and2007,48,997mergers and acquisitions(M&As)and66,554alliances were concluded in the US.The numbers are basedon data reported by Securities Data Corporation Platinum TM byThomson Reuters.1Between1990and2007,48,997mergers and acquisitions(M&As)and66,554alliances were concluded in the US.The numbers are basedon data reported by Securities Data Corporation Platinum TM byThomson Reuters.Journal of Financial Economics107(2013)671–693We address this question by looking at alliances.Because engaging in alliances is one way to manipulate firm boundaries,and well-governed companies are sup-posed to do this in an optimal way,we would expect variation in governance to be helpful in explaining alli-ance activity.We therefore investigate whether there is a link between the alliance activity of a firm and the quality of its corporate governance.We adopt the view that alliances represent a form of ‘‘commitment technology’’that can be utilized to address agency problems (Robinson,2008).Multidivisional firms face problems in motivating division managers.Value-maximizing headquarters (HQ)would like to commit ex ante to provide ex post payments to division managers even if a project fails;however,this is not dynamically consistent.Once the profitability of a project is estab-lished,HQ has incentives to move resources ex post from low-to high-productivity projects,i.e.,to engage in ‘‘winner-picking.’’Managers,aware that HQ will reallo-cate resources ex post,whatever their efforts,will shirk (Stein,1997;Brusco and Panunzi,2005;Robinson,2008).Engagement in alliances is a commitment technology available to HQ that addresses this problem.In projects undertaken within an alliance,HQ will be less able to reallocate resources ex post,engendering stronger man-agerial incentives ex ante.When the gains from realloca-tion of funds dominate the negative effects of reduced managerial incentives,the company will prefer the inter-nal capital market solution.Conversely,when the costs of reduced managerial effort outweigh the gains from win-ner-picking,alliances are the optimal solutions to the commitment problem (e.g.,Brusco and Panunzi,2005).2In the case of good governance,a value-maximizing CEO chooses the best strategy to execute a project.Sometimes this will be through alliance,sometimes not.The case is different,however,for bad-governance firms.For these firms,the constraints that alliances impose upon the CEO in terms of the ability to transfer resources freely will always be perceived as too binding.Therefore,even if such a commitment may be optimal for the firm,the CEO of a poorly governed firm will not engage in an alliance.He would either execute a project internally,but with little motivation for personnel and hence reduced chances of success,or would not undertake the project at all.In other words,an alliance always involves a commit-ment that ties the hands of the CEO.A good-governance company will accept this commitment when it is the best strategy,while a bad-governance company will never do so.There should thus be a positive correlation between alliance creation and the quality of governance of a firm.The role of governance should be more important when ex ante agency problems are more severe,i.e.,when it is more difficult for the CEO to credibly commit long term.In these cases,the agency costs of managerial shirking are so high that alliances become the undisputedsolution.Therefore,good-governance firms are even more likely to engage in alliances,while bad-governance firms will avoid them.Agency problems can be more acute either because some projects are particularly risky/long-horizon (‘‘longshot’’projects)or firms are more prone to inefficient internal redistribution of resources (e.g.,con-glomerate firms).We would also expect governance to play a larger role when firms are less subject to alter-native (market)disciplining devices (e.g.,firms operating in low-competition industries).As the cases in which alliances are the optimal solutions expand,for example,because of a reduction in the oppor-tunity costs of entering an alliance,the incentives to form an alliance should grow stronger.But again,this will apply only to good-governance firms;bad-governance firms will again avoid them.We thus expect to see a stronger link between governance and alliance creation when the opportunity costs of engaging in alliances decrease.Finally,if alliances are initiated by good-governance firms,we expect these firms to be willing to share power in the alliance only with other equally good-governance firms.That is,a firm should be more willing to form an alliance with another firm that is more similar to it in size —and hence agree to a more equal division of power —if the governance of the potential partner is better.We therefore expect a positive relation between the relative quality of alliance members and their relative size.We test these hypotheses by looking at alliances in the U.S.over 1990–2007.We start with the stylized fact that alliances create value (McConnell and Nantell,1985;Chan,Kensinger,Keown,and Martin,1997;Robinson,2008).We then ask whether this value creation is related to the quality of firm governance.We show that firms with higher quality of governance are better able to reap the benefits of alliances.Firms with better governance (both internal and external)enter more alliances.Firms with a one standard deviation better internal governance (G -index)engage in three times more alliances per year than the sample mean.They also engage in alliances even more if good internal governance is coupled with good external governance,i.e.,there is larger institutional ownership.Moreover,alliances conducted by better-governed firms create more value.A one standard deviation better governance is related to a 73basis points (bp)higher alliance announcement abnormal return (or 22.70%higher return relative to the sample mean of alliance announcements).Both internal and external governance contribute to enhance the return.A portfolio strategy of buying good-governance firms and selling bad-governance ones (conditional on firms undertaking alliances)delivers an abnormal return of 0.57%(0.70%)per month,or 6.88%(8.71%)per year in the case of equal-(value-)weighted portfolios.Most of this abnormal positive performance comes from the out-performance of the good-governance firms rather than the weak performance of the poor-governance ones.All of these results are consistent with alliances being a good avenue of potential value creation,mostly exploited by good-governance firms.2Alliance is not the only mechanism to overcome a commitment problem by HQ.A firm can use other alternatives,e.g.,tracking stock;but,as long as these prove to be either more costly or less efficient or both,alliances may be a preferred solution.A.Bodnaruk et al./Journal of Financial Economics 107(2013)671–693672We then investigate whether good-governancefirms use alliances to address their agency problems,especially when these are acute—i.e.,winner-picking is non-con-tractible—as well as when there are no other disciplining devices.We consider two proxies for agency problems: conglomerate status,and‘‘longshotness’’of a project (Robinson,2008),i.e.,the riskiness of a potential project compared to the riskiness of thefirm’s main line of business.We also argue that in less competitive indus-tries,managers enjoy the benefits of the‘‘quiet life’’and therefore are able to get away with suboptimal decisions. We expect good governance to play a greater role in these cases.Wefind that governance has a stronger positive effect on alliance creation in conglomeratefirms(55.12%stron-ger)and in longshot projects(23.22%stronger).The role of alliances is also related to the availability of other disciplining devices.As expected,the relation between governance and alliances is68.17%stronger in concen-trated industries where the disciplining role of product market competition is weaker.Next,we use a natural‘‘experiment’’to help pin down the direction of causality.We consider situations where the opportunity costs of doing alliances differ for exogen-ous non-firm-specific reasons,and ask how the differen-tial reaction to this variation is related to the quality of governance.To do so,we rely on the differences in corporate income reporting rules across U.S.states.There are two types of corporate income reporting for the purpose of state-level taxation:combined reporting and separate reporting.Under separate reporting rules,a multistate corporate group can reduce its taxable income by isolating highly profitable parts of its business in an affiliate that is not subject to state bined reporting rules,however,requirefirms to report the overall income of the corporate group generated in the United States and pay state corporate income tax on the basis of the proportion of income attributable to activity in the state.This reduces the benefits of non-arm’s-length transactions between the subsidiaries of afirm located in different states and mitigates against the use of internal capital markets to reduce tax burden.This implies that combined reporting,by reducing the opportunity cost of ‘‘ring-fencing’’the assets,makes it less costly to engage in alliances.We expect thatfirms engage in more alliances in states with combined reporting and in these states there is a stronger link between governance and alliances.And indeed,wefind thatfirms in states with combined reporting engage in between26.5%and51.4%more alliances.Even more important,the effect of governance on alliance formation is concentrated in combined report-ing states.That is,better-governedfirms react to the lower cost of alliances by initiating more alliances.Good governance is also helpful in reducing agency issues between alliance partners.The better the govern-ance of junior alliance partners,the larger they are relative to the dominant alliance member.Overall,these results support the view that good governance inducesfirms to engage in alliances to over-come agency problems.In the course of the analysis,we consider alliances as well as compare alliances to M&As and to organic growth.The role of governance appears strong and consistently significant across analyses.Alliances are traditionally seen as intermediate struc-tures that provide an optimal trade-off between coordi-nation and incentive intensity(Teece,1996).Allen and Phillips(2000)show that M&A transactions preceded by alliances or joint ventures between target and bidder firms lead to a better performance of the mergingfirms. Rey and Tirole(2001)point out the trade-off between vertical integration and alliances.The former increases incentives to monitor,but generates biased decision making,while the latter‘‘yields unbiased decision mak-ing,but may provide too few incentives to monitor and generate foot-dragging and deadlocks,especially when the users’objectives are quite divergent.’’Fulghieri and Sevilir(2003)study a spectrum of organizational alter-natives available for research and development(R&D)as efficient responses to the contracting environment. Robinson(2008)argues that alliances help afirm to commit resources better than a divisional structure.Alliances can also be helpful in overcoming incentive problems that arise when headquarters cannot pre-commit to particular capital allocations.The arm’s-length relation with anotherfirm also allows the ring-fencing of resources for a specific project,enabling afirm to commit resources more effectively than a divisional structure (Robinson,2008).Seru(2011)demonstrates that M&A acquirers increase alliance intensity to account for the reduced research incentives in acquired targets.Lerner and Merges(1998),Elfenbein and Lerner(2003),Lerner, Shane,and Tsai(2003),and Robinson and Stuart(2007) focus on the allocation of control rights in strategic alliance agreements between pharmaceuticals and bio-technology researchfirms,and show how formal and informal control mechanisms substitute for one another. McConnell and Nantell(1985),Chan,Kensinger,Keown, and Martin(1997),and Johnson and Houston(2000) study value creation in alliances.Boone and Ivanov (2012)study bankruptcy spillover effects between alli-ance partners.Mathews(2005)and Mathews and Robinson(2008)focus on the entry deterrence role of alliances.We integrate these results from a new and different perspective:corporate governance.We relate the process of engaging in alliances and their ability to create value to the quality of the governance of thefirms involved.Our results provide new insights on the debate on governance.Ourfirst contribution is to extend the analy-sis of governance(e.g.,Gompers,Ishii,and Metrick,2003). Thefinance literature has focused on the corporate governance dimension of M&As.It has been argued that poor governance or CEO overconfidence may dispose firms to M&As(see, e.g.,Roll,1986).The underlying assumption is that good CEOs are less likely to initiate M&As.Theflip side may be that good CEOs are more likely to engage in alliances.Second,we show that better internal governance in the sense of Gompers,Ishii,and Metrick(2003)has direct implications for the waysfirms choose to grow.Poorer governance not only protectsfirms from takeover andA.Bodnaruk et al./Journal of Financial Economics107(2013)671–693673guarantees managers a quiet life,but it also affects the wayfirms grow.Poor governance not only induces more M&As(Cremers,John,and Nair,2009),but also stifles value-creating alliances.Finally,ourfindings have strong implications for the relation between the management of afirm and its investor base.We show that the quality of governance is ameliorated by the shareholder structure of thefirm.The higher the institutional investor ownership—i.e.,the bet-ter the quality of external governance—the more afirm will engage in alliances and the higher the value-enhancing implications.The remainder of the paper is articulated as follows. Section2lays out our main testable hypotheses.Section3 describes the data and the variables.Section4examines governance and value creation in alliances.Section5 studies the link between engagement in alliances and quality of governance.Section6considers the effect of cross-sectional variation in the cost of entering the alliance on the relation between governance and alliance activity.Section7explores the relation between alliances, and M&As and organic growth.Section8studies cross-sectional variation in the cost of alliance technology.A brief conclusion follows.2.Main hypotheses and testable restrictionsWe consider corporate governance as a proxy for the degree to which a CEO maximizesfirm value and look at how it affects afirm’s willingness to engage in alliances. We focus on alliances as a way to reduce agency pro-blems.We rely on Brusco and Panunzi(2005)and Robinson(2008).Both papers build on Stein(1997)and argue that multidivisionalfirms face problems in moti-vating division managers.Division managers exert effort for projects that will either succeed or fail.Managers recognize that head-quarters have incentives to reallocate resources ex post, not as a function of their efforts,but either to maximize ex post efficiency or for some other purposes,e.g.,to derive private benefits for a CEO.Once funds are generated, headquarters would like to exercise‘‘winner-picking’’to the highest extent possible.‘‘However,this ex post(uti-lity)maximizing behavior by headquarters will reduce ex ante incentives at the divisional level,and it may cause a loss of value for the corporation’’(Brusco and Panunzi, 2005).A value-maximizing HQ may want to commit ex ante not to withhold resources from a division ex post even if a project fails.However,this sort of a commitment is not credible if made within thefirm as this‘‘would essentially be a contract between thefirm and itself’’(Robinson, 2008).Such contracts have little enforceability since courts usually refuse to hear disputes arising within a firm as they consider them to be a matter of business judgment(Williamson,1996).Alliances as long-term contracts between legally dis-tinct organizations reduce the ability of HQ to transfer resources ex post.This makes an alliance a viable solution to the commitment problem.What is the link to governance?In the presence of good governance,managers are less entrenched and more likely to be value-maximizers.Therefore,if the losses from reduced managerial effort are larger than the gains from the reallocation of resources across divisions,the HQ commits,and an alliance is the optimal strategy.In contrast,if the gains from winner-picking outweigh the reduced managerial effort,a project will be executed internally.In the presence of poor governance,e.g.,the CEO derives positive utility from the ability to reallocate funds to a favorite project or values the opportunity to divert resources for personal use,the cost of commitment is too high,and an alliance will not be pursued.This implies that in some cases,when the benefits of ex post reallocation are lower than the ex ante agency costs of managerial shirking,good-governancefirms will find it optimal to take ex ante actions to limit the scope of the ex post reallocation and engage in alliances,while bad-governancefirms will never do this.Henceforth,we expect to see alliances more likely to happen in good-governancefirms.3This allows us to formulate thefirst hypothesis:panies with better governance are more likely to form alliances.The trade-off between alliances and internal capital markets depends on the severity of the agency problems. As we have argued,in the presence of good governance, this trade-off will be tilted in the direction of alliances when the agency costs of shirking by division managers outweigh the benefits of internal capital markets.This effect is reinforced when there are greater ex ante agency problems.A higher likelihood of ex post redistribution would discourage a division manager ex ante and requires a stronger long-term commitment from the HQ.Good-governancefirms will recognize this and,thus,engage in more alliances.Bad governancefirms,however,would disfavor stron-ger long-term commitment as it puts more constraints on the CEO.Thesefirms will thus continue to avoid alliances. These considerations suggest that the more severe the agency problems are,the stronger the link between alliances and quality of governance.This leads to the second hypothesis:H2.Alliance creation is more sensitive to governance when agency issues are more severe.Ex ante agency problems may get worse in different cases.For example,it may be because some projects are particularly risky/long-horizon(i.e.,‘‘longshot’’)or because afirm is more prone to inefficient internal redistribution of resources(like conglomerates).We therefore consider two proxies for the severity of agency problems:the riskiness of a potential project compared to the riskiness of thefirm’s main line of business(‘‘longshot projects’’)and whether thefirm is a conglomerate.3In Appendix A1we provide a formal description of this intuition by considering a simple extension of the Brusco and Panunzi(2005)model.A.Bodnaruk et al./Journal of Financial Economics107(2013)671–693 674According to Robinson(2008),‘‘because winner-picking is non-contractible,incentive problems arise for certain types of projects,‘‘longshots.’’Longshot projects have low success probabilities,but high payoffs condi-tional on success.Even though the longshot has the same expected value as its peer project,managers may be unwilling to supply effort:since the probability of success is relatively low for the longshot,the probability that resources will be diverted away from it is relatively high.’’As HQ cannot credibly commit over the allocation of implementation resources,we expect agency problems to be more severe in longshot projects.We also expect to see more severe agency problems in conglomeratefirms.Indeed,managers of good divisions are afraid of ex post poaching by other less successful divisions(e.g.,Rajan,Servaes,and Zingales.,2000)which undermines their incentives to exert effort ex ante.The link between governance and alliances should also be related to the availability of other disciplining devices. Firms in less competitive industries lack the disciplining influence of product market competition,while‘‘firms in competitive industries are under constant pressure to reduce slack and improve efficiency’’(Giroud and Mueller,2010).This implies that competition forcesfirms to make optimal decisions whatever the quality of inter-nal governance;i.e.,competition supersedes governance. This destroys the link between measures of governance andfirms’policies.In non-competitive industries,how-ever,a certain amount of inefficiency is tolerated,and governance has a role to play.The third hypothesis is:H3.Alliance creation is more sensitive tofirm governance in ess competitive industries.As the situations in which alliances are the optimal solutions expand,for example,as a consequence of a reduction in the opportunity costs of engaging in alli-ances,the incentives to engage in alliances get stronger. But again,this will apply only to good-governancefirms. Bad-governancefirms will instead refrain from entering an alliance.We thus expect to see a lower cost of engaging in alliances to affect mostly good-governance firms.This leads to the fourth hypothesis.H4.Good-governancefirms are more likely to initiate alliances if the cost of alliances is lower.Finally,if alliances are initiated by good-governance firms,we would expect thesefirms to be willing to share power within an alliance only with other equally good-governancefirms.That is,the dominant partner should be more willing to form an alliance with afirm that is more similar to it in size(as measured by assets)—and hence agree to a more equal balance of power—if this potential partner has better governance.This suggests that the difference between the size of the dominant alliance partner and the average size of other alliance members should be related to their relative quality of corporate governance.The better the governance of junior alliance partners,the larger they should be relative to the domi-nant alliance member.Hence,thefifth hypothesis is:H5.There is a positive relation between the relative quality of governance of the alliance members and their relative size.What is the counterfactual in the analysis?Either not enter an alliance or engage in a merger or acquisition. Therefore,in our analysis we consider alliances in general, as well as alliances compared to M&As and organic growth.3.DataThe data on alliances come from the Securities Data Corporation Platinum(SDC Platinum)database,from which we extract all alliances involving U.S.firms for the period between1990and2007.We then relate these data to accounting information about thefirms in Compustat.We consider both alliances and joint ventures.We define as alliances all agreements where two or more entities combine resources to form a new,mutually advantageous business arrangement to achieve predeter-mined objectives.These include joint ventures,strategic alliances,research and development agreements,sales and marketing agreements,manufacturing agreements, supply agreements,and licensing and distribution agree-ments.We focus on three alternative sets of alliances.The first considers all the alliances involving afirm(including those formed by subsidiaries).The second excludes alli-ances formed by non-listed subsidiaries.The third is alliances only(excluding joint ventures).In terms of the quality of governance,democracy takes the value of one if G r7,and zero otherwise.Dictatorship takes the value of one if G Z13,and zero otherwise. Institutional ownership(IO)is the fraction of afirm’s shares outstanding owned by institutional investors.High IO(Low IO)is a dummy equal to one if thefirm’s institutional ownership is above(below)the median institutional ownership for allfirms in the current year, and zero otherwise.The main characteristics of the sample are reported in Table1.The variables are defined in Appendix B.On average,firms engage in1.28new alliances per year;but a majority offirms do not form new alliances every year. Most of the alliances are setup on the level of a parent firm or a listed subsidiary.Announcement about the formation of an alliance is,on average,met with a positive abnormal market return of3.10%.Overall,the character-istics of our sample are consistent with those in recent studies(e.g.,Robinson,2008).4.Alliances,value creation,and governanceWe know that alliances in general create value.Appen-dix C reports evidence showing that in our sample as well there is a positive relation between alliance activity and firm value.We consider two measures of value creation: Announcement premium and Long-term return.By both measures there is a consistent pattern of value creation following alliance initiation.We build on this result by linking the value-creation process of alliances to the quality of governance of thefirm.We ask whetherfirmsA.Bodnaruk et al./Journal of Financial Economics107(2013)671–693675。

governance单词的缩写

governance单词的缩写

随着信息技术的不断发展,人们对简洁缩略语的需求越来越迫切。

在政治、商业、教育等领域,缩写词不仅可以提高工作效率,还可以节省时间和精力。

其中,“governance”一词的缩写也备受关注。

下面我们将就这一话题展开讨论。

一、governance的含义1. “governance”一词是“govern”的名词形式,它指的是一种管理和控制的过程,通常用于描述组织、公司或国家的管理方式。

在公共管理领域,governance是指政府、企业或组织如何制定决策,并对其实施和监督的过程。

2. 在全球范围内,governance也被用于描述国际组织或非政府组织之间的协调与合作,以及对全球性问题的管理与解决。

二、governance的常用缩写1. "gov":这是governance的最常见缩写形式,被广泛应用于政府部门、国际组织和非政府组织。

2. "govt":这是governance的另一种缩写形式,多用于书面文档和学术研究中。

3. "govrn":这是governance的不太常见的缩写形式,一般出现在非正式场合或口语交流中。

三、不同的语境中的使用情况1. 在政府机构中,常常用“gov”作为governance的缩写,例如“US gov”指的是美国政府。

2. 在学术研究中,“govt”常用作governance的缩写,例如parative govt”表示比较政府学。

3. 在商业和企业管理中,“govern”通常用于指代公司治理,而“corporate gov”则是公司治理的缩写形式。

四、改革与创新1. 随着全球化和信息化的发展,国际组织和非政府组织在全球事务中扮演着越来越重要的角色。

对governance的缩写形式也在不断创新和改革中。

“g-lo”可以用于表示全球治理,特指国际组织和非政府组织在全球事务中的管理和协调。

2. 在政府机构中,一些国家和地区也在不断探索和尝试新的governance缩写形式以适应新的治理模式和政策。

Corporate Governance, Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Reputation

Corporate Governance, Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Reputation

Corporate Governance, Corporate Social Responsibility andCorporate Reputation1Sun Wen,The Research Center of Corporate GovernanceNankai University, Tianjin,ChinaYang ChangzhiThe Research Center of Multinational CorporationsNankai University, Tianjin,ChinaAbstract:Corporate social responsibility (CSR), corporate governance (CG) and corporate reputation(CR) influence the development of firms mostly. In this paper, a model of dynamic relations among CSR, corporate governance and corporate reputation was constructed in the theoretical framework of stakeholder. The model reflects that corporate reputation is formed in the dynamic relations between firms and corporate stakeholders, and corporate reputation is the synthesized result of corporate governance and CSR. For the purpose of testing the fitness of the model in China, an empirical study is conducted on the relationship between corporate governance, CSR and corporate reputation. The result shows that good CSR has positive effect on firm reputation. It is also indicated that CG and CR doesn‘t have significant relationship, but coefficient of the inter-variable(CG*CSR)is significant and positive, which reflects that good corporate governance alone couldn‘t bring good reputation, but it could when it comes with good social responsibility.Keywords: Corporate Governance, Corporate Social Responsibility, Firm Reputation, Stakeholder 1.IntroductionAt the very beginning of this century, a series of corporate frauds happened in developed country which makes the corporate governance become the focus of these countries. The fraud brought positive effect to the corporate performance and stakeholders‘ interest, and even made some firms go bankrupt. Under such background, many experts thought about the tradition questions about firms again: what is the goal of a firm, who is the firm responsible for, which social responsibility should a firm take. After rethinking of those questions, many experts focus on the effect of and relationship between corporate social responsibility and corporate governance.Corporate governance and corporate social responsibility are often mentioned with firm frauds.1This paper was supported by the Key project of National Natural Science Foundation of China(code:70532001)Especially now, with the modern media, any frauds could have negative and even fatal effect on fame and performance of the firm. Certainly, if a firm does well in the corporate governance and firm social responsibility, it will get good reputation (Lev, Baruch,2006). Good reputation could bring value added ( Asyraf Wajdi Dusuki,Humayon Dar,2006); eventually the firm could benefit its performance and have sustainable development.With competition between firms turning strong in China, corporate reputation is to be a main channel for firms to get competition advantage. At the same time, more and more attention are paid to corporate governance and corporate social responsibility, but it is not clear on the relationship of Corporate governance, corporate social responsibility and firm reputation. This article firstly analyses how the corporate governance and corporate social responsibility affects the firm reputation, secondly describes the relationship with the Chinese data, and thirdly gives results some implications for the Chinese firms.2.The Relationship between corporate governance and corporate social responsibilityCorporate governance and corporate social responsibility are important factors for the long-term development of a firm. Sometime their contents are same, even some academicians think that the only difference between them is the way to speak. Actually, although corporate governance and corporate social responsibility are strongly related, they are different concepts. According to the research on the theory of corporate governance and corporate social responsibility, we find both of them are often put in the same framework of Stakeholder theory.(1)Stakeholder theoryGenerally the proponents of stakeholder theory posit that paying attention to the interests, needs and rights of multiple stakeholders of a business is a useful way of inculcating socially responsible behaviour among corporations (Goodpaster,2001).The focus of stakeholder theory is articulated in two core questions (Freeman, 1994). First, it asks, what is the purpose of the firm? This encourages managers to articulate the shared sense of the value they create, and what brings its core stakeholders together. This propels the firm forward and allows it to generate outstanding performance, determined both in terms of its purpose and marketplace financial metrics. Second, stakeholder theory asks, what responsibility does management have to stakeholders? This pushes managers to articulate how they want to do business—specifically, what kinds of relationships they want and need to create with their stakeholders to deliver on their purpose.As we examine which kind of groups should be included in the stakeholders besides shareholders, we see various explanations being highlighted by stakeholder theorists. Freeman (1984) distinguishes between primary stakeholders (owners, management, local community, customers, employees and suppliers), those whose continuing participation is necessary for the survival of the corporation, and secondary stakeholders (the government and communities that provide infrastructure and markets, trade unions and environmentalists), who are not essential to the survival of the corporation although their actions can significantly damage (or benefit) the corporation. Brenner and Cochran‘s (1991) listing of stakeholders includes stockholders, wholesalers, sales force, competition, customers, suppliers, managers, employees, and government. Donaldson and Preston (1995) diagram investors, politicalgroups, customers, employees, trade associations, suppliers, and governments as stakeholders, which was widely accepted.According to the Stakeholder theory, although shareholders are the most important stakeholder and the profit is the core objective of a firm, when a firm try to meet them it must think of interest of other stakeholders. It is required that corporate managers understand their stakeholder environments and manage more effectively within the nexus of relationships that exists for their companies. The whole point of stakeholder theory, in fact, lies in what happens when corporations and stakeholders act out their relationships (freeman, 2004).(2) Corporate social responsibility and corporate governanceThere are a variety of definitions of CSR and no overall agreement. Generally speaking, CSR is concerned with treating the stakeholders of the firm ethically or in a responsible manner. ‗Ethically or responsible‘ means treating stakeholders in a manner deemed acceptable in civilized societies. Social includes economic responsibility. Stakeholders exist both within a firm and outside. The natural environment is a stakeholder. The wider aim of social responsibility is to create higher and higher standards of living, while preserving the profitability of the corporation, for peoples both within and outside the corporation (Hopkins, 2004). However, from the perspective of stakeholder, corporate social responsibility posits on the issues what should the firm do for the stakeholders, in other words, CSR means ―what to do‖ for the stakeholders.As to corporate governance, the OECD provides the most authoritative functional definition of corporate governance: "Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure through which the company objectives are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance." The significance of corporate governance for the stability and equity of society is captured in the broader definition of the concept offered by Sir Adrian Cadbury (2002): "Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals. The governance framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require accountability for the stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society."2According to the analysis above, we know that the main goal of corporate governance is to design and arrange suitable institution to built good relationship between firms and stakeholders. We also conclude that there is difference between corporate governance and corporate social responsibility, corporate social responsibility pays much attention to ―what to do‖ fo r the stakeholders, corporate governance pay attention to ―how to do‖. So firms must deal well with both of them to benefit stakeholders (see figure 1).2Cited from .au/corporate_governance.htmFigure 1 The relationship between corporate governance and corporate social responsibility3.The effects of corporate governance and corporate social responsibility on firm reputationCorporate reputation is a major and growing concern globally, and it is increasingly being managed from a strategic perspective, because both managers and academicians think the good firm reputation will bring more interest to firms. Fombrun(1990)indicates that high reserves of reputational capital give an organization distinct advantages: first,their products and stock offerings entice more customers and investors – and command higher prices. Second, their jobs lure more applicants – and generate more loyalty and productivity from their employees. Third, their clout with suppliers is greater – and they pay lower prices for purchases and have more stable revenues. Finally, their risks of crisis are fewer – and when crises do occur, they survive with less financial loss(Fombrun, C. and Shanley,1990). Meanwhile, Fombrun‘s (1996) definition of corporate reputation has been more widely used than most. Fombrun defined corporate reputation as ―a perceptual representation of a company‘s past actions and future prospects that d escribes the firm‘s overall appeal to all of its key stakeholders when compared with other leading rivals‖.(1) The source of firm reputationFirm reputation originates from recognition and comment of stakeholders, and stakeholders often judge a firm by its behavior on the product and capital market. These markets are the mail place for firms to produce and manage, and information transfer between firms and stakeholders also happen in the markets. From the performance of firms in the two markets and relationship with firms, stakeholders have their own opinions which would eventually turn to firm reputation.Figure 2 The two sources of firm reputationIn the same way, there are effects of firm reputation to firm performance in the production and capital market. Greenley and Foxall (1997) use a broader approach recognizing firm performance in relation to various stakeholders. They find that companies that do not take account of the interests of their stakeholders , with low reputation, exhibit poor performance. Roger C, Vergin and M.W, Qoronfleh(1998) takes a study on the 400 firms with good reputation. He found not only consumers pay more attention to the production of those firms, but also creditors favor those firms. By further study he concludes that firm reputation has positive effect on the firm‘s stock price.In the capital market, investors prefer to buy the stock of firms with good reputation. And good corporate governance is a token of good reputation. A survey from Mckinsey shows that investor will pay premium for the stock of firms with good corporate governance, which was regarded as having high corporate reputation by investors.Since corporate governance is involved in most of corporate stakeholders especially investors in capital market, so corporate reputation was directly influenced by corporate governance。

The relationship between corporate social responsibility disclosure and corporate governance

The relationship between corporate social responsibility disclosure and corporate governance

The relationship between corporate social responsibility disclosure and corporate governance characteristics in Malaysian public listed companiesRoshima Said,Yuserrie Hj Zainuddin and Hasnah HaronAbstract Purpose –The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between corporate governance characteristics,namely the board size,board independence,duality,audit committee,ten largest shareholders,managerial ownership,foreign ownership and government ownership and the extent of corporate social responsibility disclosure.Design/methodology/approach –The content analysis was used to extract the CSR disclosure items from annual report and companies’web sites.Then,a CSR disclosure index was constructed after combining CSR disclosure items disclosed both in annual reports and in companies’web sites.Hierarchical regression analysis was used to examine the relationship between the corporate socialdisclosures index and the independent variables,namely the board size,board independence,duality,audit committee,ten largest shareholders,managerial ownership,foreign ownership and government ownership after statistically controlling the effects of a firm’s size and the profitability of the companies.Findings –Results based on the full regression models indicated that only two variables were associated with the extent of disclosures,namely government ownership and audit ernment ownership and audit committee are positively and significantly correlated with the level of corporate social responsibility disclosure.The most significant variable that influences the level of CSR disclosure is government ownership.Research limitations/implications –The findings are limited to the context of the study and it was limited to Malaysian public listed companies,January to December 2006.The sources of data in this study were companies’annual reports and web sites only.Practical implications –The study is useful to organizations and statutory bodies to take into consideration in identifying the corporate governance characteristics that will enhance CSR disclosure,since it had been shown in previous studies that corporate social responsibility reporting in Malaysia is generally low.The government can determine how important it is that a company should be willing to allocate their costs towards corporate social responsibility activities.Thus,this study will emphasize the level of activities through corporate social responsibility reporting in Malaysian public listed companies and help the government to ascertain the level of corporate social responsibility activities through corporate social responsibility reporting among Malaysian public listed companies.Originality/value –The study reveals the extent of the disclosure of corporate social responsibility to companies web sites and constructed the CSR index based on two sources of data,namely companies’web sites and annual reports.Keywords Corporate social responsibility,Information disclosure,Corporate governancePaper type Research paper1.IntroductionThe Malaysian government’s incentive to further promote corporate social responsibility (CSR)among public listed companies (PLC)is very encouraging in Malaysia.The honorable Dato’Seri Najib Tun Razak,Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia,in his keynote speech at the Corporate Social Responsibility Conference on 21June 2004had made it clear that CSR helps PAGE 212j SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY JOURNAL j VOL.5NO.22009,pp.212-226,Q Emerald Group Publishing Limited,ISSN 1747-1117DOI 10.1108/17471110910964496Roshima Said is based atthe Universiti TeknologiMara,Sugai Petani,Malaysia.Yuserrie HjZainuddin and HasnahHaron are both based at theSchool of Management,Universiti Sains Malaysia,Penang,Malaysia.improvefinancial performance,enhance brand image and increases the ability to attract and retain the best workplace,contributing to the market value of the company.This statement is consistent with the study done by (2006)which is one of UK’s leading CSR consultancies showed that engaging in corporate social responsibility will lead to better financial performance,access capital,reduced operating costs,enhanced brand image and reputation,increased sales and customer loyalty and increased productivity and quality.More recently,in the2007budget speech,the Malaysian Prime Minister,Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi has stressed the importance of corporate social responsibility reporting by requiring companies to disclose their CSR activities in the annual report.Corporate social reporting is one approach how companies published or disclosed their corporate social responsibility activities.One way to reduce the gaps between company and its stakeholders is by reporting the activities to the stakeholders or through additional disclosure.Many studies had used corporate social disclosure as a proxy to corporate social responsibility or corporate social performance(Hackston and Milne,1996;Adebayo,2000;Gray et al.,2001; Manasseh,2004;Shaw Warn,2004;Haniffa and Cooke,2005;Guan Yeik,2006;Mohamed Zain and Janggu,2006).In comparison to other Asian countries such as Singapore, Thailand and South Korea,CSR in Malaysia is lagging far behind.This was highlighted by Dato’Hj Sulaiman Hj Mohd Yusof,Deputy Director1,Commercial Crime Investigation Department,Royal Malaysian Police Force(Accountants Today,2006).He reiterated that there is a need to introduce the system of corporate social reporting for companies.In his opinion companies should introduce a self-disclosure report on CSR activities.In Malaysia,the private sector has come under tremendous pressure to accept social responsibility since the1980s.However,previous studies have found that the level of CSR of Malaysian public listed companies remain low.This could be due to less concerted effort or motivation on the part of top management to ensure that the companies are disclosing this corporate social responsibility activity.Previous studies revealed that Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting in Malaysia is still generally low(Foo and Tan,1988;Manasseh, 2004;Nik Ahmad and Sulaiman,2004;Shaw Warn,2004;Ramasamy and Ting,2004; Mohamed Zain and Janggu,2006).CG that is effective would ensure that the shareholders interest is looked panies should therefore report their economic,social and environmental performance to their stakeholders.Top management should be responsible for ensuring that appropriate systems of control are in place,in particular those that monitor risk,including potential environmental and social liabilities.ACCA(2002)accentuated that among the motivation for the companies to disclosed environmental reporting in Malaysia are the introduction of the Malaysia Code on Corporate Governance listing requirements,the National Annual Corporate Award(NACRA)and ACCA Award named as Malaysian Environmental Reporting Award(MERA),Malaysian Environmental and Social Reporting Award(MESRA).This statement supported by the Malaysian government encouragement and motivations for Malaysian companies to report environmental information as stated in the budget speech2007.It can be seen that the introduction of Malaysia Code on Corporate Governance was one of the drivers for environmental reporting in Malaysia.Thus,this study will look at the specific characteristics of the corporate governors of the company in relation to the disclosure of activities pertaining to corporate social responsibility that the company has undertaken.2.Corporate social responsibility disclosure(CSR disclosure)The Bursa Malaysia CSR framework(Bursa Malaysia,2006)defined corporate social responsibility as open and transparent business practices that are based on ethical values and respect for the community,employees,the environment,shareholders and other stakeholders.This CSR framework was designed to deliver sustainable value to society at large.CSR supports triple bottom line reporting which emphasizes the economic,social and environmental bottom-line wellness.VOL.5NO.22009j SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY JOURNAL j PAGE213Corporate social responsibility disclosure provides information to the public regardingcompanies’activities with community,environmental,its employees,its consumer andenergy usage in the companies.Corporate social disclosure are categorized asvoluntary disclosures since it is not required by anyfinancial disclosure regime,accounting standards,the stock exchange rules and regulations,and the CompaniesAct in Malaysia.Corporate social disclosure can be defined as the provision offinancial and non-financialinformation relating to an organization’s interaction with its physical and social environment,as stated in annual report or separate social reports(Hackston and Milne,1996).Corporatesocial disclosure includes details of the physical environment,energy,human resource,products and community involvement matters.According to Gray et al.(2001),social and environmental disclosure can be typically thoughtof as comprising information relating to a corporation’s activities,aspirations and publicimage with regard to environmental,employee,consumer issues,energy usage,equalopportunities,fair trade,corporate governance and the like.Social and environmentaldisclosure may also take place through different media such as annual report,advertising,focus group,employee councils,booklets,school education and so forth.This study will follow the definition used by Hackston and Milne(1996),because it covers thefive themes that can be found in company’s annual report and websites in Malaysia whichwere environment,human resource,energy,community involvement and products,and alsoused Gray et al.(2001)as the definition for the extent of disclosures through different mediasuch as annual report,advertising,focus group,employee councils,booklets,schooleducation and so forth.Since this study will use the annual report and companies websitesas a medium for CSR disclosure.3.Development of CG in MalaysiaThe beginning of the discussion and eventually the emphasis on CG in Malaysia can beattributed to the Cadbury Report of1992.This had led to the establishment of AuditCommittee as a watchdog.It also functions as the internal control mechanism for everycompany listed on the London Stock Exchange.Consequent to this,accountants inMalaysia began discussing this issue at conferences and seminars while at the sameexpecting such a requirement would be imposed by Bursa Malaysia(then Kuala LumpurStock Exchange).At that time the Audit Committee was perceived as to improve internalcontrol that is also a feature of good management practice.Further,the emphasis on corporate governance and corporate responsibility became amuch-debated topic during the Asianfinancial crisis in the year1997.Scandals,mismanagement,earnings management,widespread retrenchment,and other factorshave further eroded capital investors’confidence.The severe decline in the capital markethas jolted the authorities to do the necessary to revive the confidence of investors.One of theways to do so was to deal directly with corporate governance.The development of corporate governance in Malaysia during the last decade can besummarized as follows:B Section334of the KLSE listing requirement requires all listed companies to establishaudit committee with effect from August1st1994.B The establishment of Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance(MICG)on March10th1998as public company limited by guarantee under the Company Act1965.B On24March1998,the government announced in the Parliament that a committee,knownas High Level Finance Committee,will determine corporate governance framework andestablish good practices for industry.B The Security Commission was empowered to further enforce the laws and regulations toensure compliance.PAGE214j SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY JOURNAL j VOL.5NO.22009B The Finance Committee on Corporate Governance has published the Malaysian Code onCorporate Governance in January2001.The code outlines the principles and the good practice for structures and processes to be used byfirms.B The KLSE Listing Requirement published/dedicate a chapter discussing corporategovernance practices in January2001.B The establishment of Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group on July2nd2001asnon-profit making public company limited by guarantee under the Company Act1965, with the objective to increase activities among minority shareholders(Nasir,2003).4.Hypotheses development4.1Board size and corporate social disclosure(CSD)Board of directors is one of the most important elements of corporate governance mechanism in overseeing the conduct of the companies business is being properly managed by their agents.Past studies proposed that board size effects will increased communication and coordination problems,decreased ability of the board to control management and the spread among a larger group of the cost of poor decision making (Lipton and Lorsh,1992;Eisenberg et al.,1998;Raheja,2003)states that small boards will mitigate agency conflict between managers and shareholders.Jensen(1993)found that large boards results in less effective coordination,communication and decision making and are more likely to be controlled by the CEO.It is predicted that ineffective coordination in communication and decision making will lead to low quality offinancial disclosure since the board of directors are unable carry out their roles efficiently.Thus,it is hypothesized that:H1.There is a negative relationship between board size and the level of CSR disclosure.4.2Independent non-executive directors and corporate social disclosure(CSD)The empirical governance literature suggests that the degree of board independence is related to composition,and the independence will fosters board effectiveness.Webb(2004) had examined the differences between socially responsiblefirms’and non-socially responsiblefirms’board structure and she found that socially responsiblefirms have more outsiders/independent directors as compared to non-socially responsiblefirms. Independent directors have incentives to guard shareholders interest well.From this study,it showed that independent director play an important role in enhancing corporate image and act as a monitoring role in ensuring that the companies is properly managed by its management.Any consequences in not involving in corporate social responsibility will reflect a bad image to the company.Independent directors are perceived as a tool for monitoring management behavior (Rosenstein and Wyatt,1990),resulting in more voluntary disclosure of corporate information.Forker(1992)found that a higher percentage of independent directors on board enhanced the monitoring of thefinancial disclosure quality and reduced the benefits of withholding information.With these literatures,it is hypothesized that: H2.There is a positive relationship between proportion of independent directors and the level of CSR disclosure.4.3CEO duality and corporate social disclosure(CSD)CEO Duality occurs when the same person holds both the CEO and board chairman positions in corporation(Rechner and Dalton,1989).The combination of CEO and chairman positions reflects leadership and governance issues.However,vesting the power of the CEO and chairman of the board in one person creates a strong power base,which could erode the board’s ability to exercise effective control(Tsui and Gul,2000).Therefore,companies with the CEO duality offer greater power to a person,which enable him to make decisionsVOL.5NO.22009j SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY JOURNAL j PAGE215that do not maximize the shareholders wealth and will help improved monitoring quality andreduce benefits from withholding information that may consequently result in enhancingquality of reporting.Therefore,it is hypothesized that:panies which having CEO Duality are more likely to have a lower extent of CSRdisclosure.4.4Audit committee and corporate social disclosure(CSD)Prior researches have proven that audit committee plays an effective role in enhancing thecorporate governance standards.Wright(1996)found that audit committee composition isstrongly related tofinancial reporting.McMullen and Raghunandan(1996)provides supportfor the association between the presence of an audit and more reliablefinancial reporting.The existence of an audit committee was significantly and positively related to the extent ofvoluntary disclosure(Ho and Wong,2001;Bliss and Balachandran,2003).Audit committee roles is providing a mean for review of the company’s processes forproducingfinancial data and its internal control,thus its existence is in producing highqualityfinancial reporting.According to Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance(2000),the board should establish an audit committee with at least three independent directors ormore.The existence of audit committee with a higher proportion of independent directorsshould reduce the agency cost and improve the internal control that will lead to greaterquality of disclosures(Forker,1992).Hence,it is hypothesized that:H4.There is a positive relationship between proportion of independent non-executivedirectors sit in audit committee and the level of CSR disclosure ownershipconcentration and corporate social disclosure.Abdul Samad(2002)found that thefive largest shareholders held in Malaysia were about58.8percent of total equity in the corporate sector.From herfindings,it clearly showed thatthe Malaysian corporate sector has been highly concentrated in terms of ownership.Shecommented that,highly concentrated ownership implied that minority shareholders werepractically powerless to prevent large shareholders from implementing their plans for thecompany.Haniffa and Hudaib(2006)found that the mean percentage of shareholding heldby topfive largest shareholders is about61percent indicating that concentrated ownershipin most Malaysian companies.Thefindings in the study done by Halme and Huse(1997)indicated that there was nosignificant relationship between ownership concentration and corporate environmentalreporting in annual report.Mohd Ghazali and Wheetman(2006)found that ownershipconcentration was not significant in explaining the extent of voluntary disclosure where it isconsistent with Halme and Huse(1997).Mohd Ghazali and Wheetman(2006)found thatownership concentration was not significant in explaining the extent of voluntary disclosure.Alsaeed(2006)discovered that ownership dispersion was found to be insignificant inexplaining the variation of voluntary disclosure.Chau and Gray(2002)found that there is a positive association between wider ownershipand the extent of voluntary disclosure.Wang and Coffey(1992)found that there wasnegative relationship between ownership concentration and corporate philanthropy.Shareholdings in public listed companies in Malaysia are highly concentrated(Claessenset al.,1999).Haniffa and Cooke(2002)found that there was a positive relationship betweendiffusion ownership and voluntary disclosure in Malaysian companies.Thus,it ishypothesize that:H5.There is a negative relationship between ownership concentrations and the level ofCSR disclosure ownership concentration and corporate social disclosure(CSD) PAGE216j SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY JOURNAL j VOL.5NO.220094.5Managerial ownershipThe agency theory predicts that the principal-agent problem between managers and shareholders arises when managers hold little equity in the corporation.This will lead to managers to engage in an opportunistic behavior(Jensen and Meckling,1976).Past studies had showed that an increase in management ownership will reduce the agency problems and improved managers’incentive to provide more disclosure.Mohd Nasir and Abdullah (2004)investigated the influence of ownership structure in explaining the level of voluntary disclosures among the Malaysianfinancially distressedfirms and found that management shareholding levels have a significant and positive association with the level of voluntary disclosures.Coffey and Wang(1998)found that managerial control(percentage of stock owned by insiders)is positively related to charitable giving.The abovefindings were in contrast to Guan Yeik(2006)and Eng and Mak(2003).In his study,he examined the relationship between managerial ownership and corporate social responsibility and he found that managerial ownership was significantly negatively related to corporate social disclosure in Malaysian public listed companies.In his study,he found that managerial ownership level of45percent above will influence the corporate to have lower social disclosure.Eng and Mak(2003)found that lower managerial ownership is associated with increased voluntary disclosures.Hence,it is hypothesized that:H6.There is a negative relationship between the proportions of shares held by executives’directors with the extent of corporate social disclosure.4.6Foreign ownershipPrevious studies revealed that corporate social disclosures in Malaysia is still generally low (Foo and Tan,1988;Nik Ahmad and Sulaiman,2004;Shaw Warn,2004;Ramasamy and Ting,2004).Ramasamy and Ting(2004)examined a comparative analysis of corporate social responsibility awareness among Malaysian and Singaporeanfirms by using levels of corporate social disclosure as a measurement of corporate social responsibility(CSR) awareness.In their study,they used employee perception towards CSR awareness in Malaysian and Singaporeanfirms.The respondents were questioned on their management of CSR within the company,such as awareness of corporate social responsibility,attitudes to CSR in the company,the types of CSR activity and the respondent involvement in CSR.The results show a low level of awareness in both countries,although Singaporean companies tend to exhibit a relatively higher level of awareness.Chambers et al.(2003)investigated CSR reporting in seven countries through analysis of websites of the top50companies in Asia.This study investigated the penetration of CSR reporting within countries;the extent of CSR reporting within companies and the waves of CSR engaged in.Thefindings in Chambers et al.(2003)showed that,there are fewer CSR companies in the seven selected Asian countries compared with UK and Japan companies. The mean for the seven countries studied,show a score of41percent which is under half the score for the UK(98percent)and Japan companies(96percent).Thus by involvement of foreign shareholders in Malaysian Public Listed companies will enhance the extent of corporate social disclosure in Malaysia.Haniffa and Cooke(2005)found a significant relationship between corporate social disclosure and foreign shareholders indicated that Malaysian companies use corporate social disclosure as a proactive legitimating strategy to obtain continued inflows of capital and to please ethical investors.Abdul Samad(2002)found that foreign shareholdings comprise of5.01percent in Malaysian public listed companies.Thus,it is hypothesized that: H7.There is a positive relationship between the proportions of shares held by foreign ownership with the extent of corporate social disclosure.VOL.5NO.22009j SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY JOURNAL j PAGE2174.7Government shareholdingMohd Ghazali and Wheetman(2006)stated that government ownership of shares is aparticular feature of Malaysian companies,largely where the government retains shares inprivatized companies.As at December2000,government ownership in privatized entitieswas49.5percent.In the study,they examined the relationship between governmentownership with voluntary disclosure in Malaysia and found that government ownership wasnot significant in explaining the extent of voluntary disclosure.Government interventions may generate pressures for companies to disclose additionalinformation because the government is a body that trusted by the public.Eng and Mak(2003)found that government ownership was associated with increased voluntary disclosure.MohdNasir and Abdullah(2004)further found that the extent of government-linked shareholdingsinfluences the amount of voluntary disclosures.It is predicted that government shareholdingswill lead to greater corporate social responsibility disclosures,as government should promotetransparency among public listed companies in Malaysia.Thus,it is hypothesized that:H8.There is a positive relationship between the proportions of shares held bygovernment with the extent of corporate social disclosure.5.Research design5.1The samplingThe initial sample of250was drawn from the main board of Malaysian listed companies forthe year ended2006.The proportional stratified sampling method was used in this study todetermine the sample size of each sector of public listed companies in main boardcompanies in Malaysia.Out of250companies selected,only150companies represent thefinal sample after take into consideration the companies that have both sources of data thatis annual report and companies web sites.The study was based on secondary data collected from the annual report and company’swebsites of main board companies.The sample will be selected from non-financialcompanies listed on the main board of Bursa Malaysia in the year2006.This study will selectthe companies that consist in the main board of Bursa Malaysia from ten sectors that isconsumer product,industrial product,trading and services,plantations,properties,construction and other sectors in the panies with both sources of data wereselected in order to come out with thefinal index that is known as combined index.The indexwas constructed after combining both corporate social responsibility items disclosed inannual report and companies websites).5.2Dependent variablesThe study used the content analysis that is a method of codifying the text(or content)of apiece of writing or categories depending on selected criteria(Weber,1988).Content analysishas been widely used in corporate social reporting research(Abbot and Monsen,1979;Ernst&Ernst,1976;Guthrie and Matthews,1985;Haniffa and Cooke,2005).The definition that hasbeen widely used by past researchers was usefully defined by Abbot and Monsen(1979)as:A technique for gathering data that consists of codifying qualitative information in anecdotal andliterary form into categories in order to derive quantitative scales of varying levels of complexity.The disclosure items based on past study,particularly from Ernst&Whinney(1978),Hackston and Milne(1996),Haniffa and Cooke(2005),Manasseh(2004),and Shaw Warn(2004)which covered thefive themes which were environmental,community involvement,human resource/employee information,energy.The CSR disclosure items were extracted from annual report and companies’websites.TheCSR disclosure index was constructed after combining both CSR disclosure items disclosedin annual report and companies websites.The CSR disclosure index were developed byadding all the items covering thefive themes,which were environment,community,humanresource,energy and product.This CSDI was developed by using the dichotomous,which PAGE218j SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY JOURNAL j VOL.5NO.22009the scores of‘‘1’’,if the company disclose the items and‘‘0’’,if it is not.The process will addall the scores and equally weighted.5.3Independent variablesSee Table I.5.4Control variablesThe study used two control variables,i.e.firm’s size(total assets)and profitability(ROE andROA)which had been widely used by past researchers.By controlling these two variables,itwill enhance the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and corporatesocial disclosure.The study used total assets as a proxy tofirm’s size which was widely used by otherresearchers in the area of corporate social responsibility reporting(Hackston and Milne,1996;Ho and Wong,2001;Eng and Mak,2003;Barnea and Rubins,2004;Gul and Leung,2004;Mohd Nasir and Abdullah,2004;Haniffa and Cooke,2005;Wilekens et al.,2005;Barako et al.,2006;Cheng and Courtenay,2006;Mohd Ghazali and Wheetman,2006).The study used ROE as a measurement for profitability.This measurement had been widelyused by other researchers(Ho and Wong,2001;Bliss and Balachandran,2003;Eng andMak,2003;Mohd Nasir and Abdullah,2004;Shaw Warn,2004;Haniffa and Cooke,2005;Willekens et al.,2005;Barako et al.,2006).6.Analysis of dataHierarchical Regression analysis was used to examine the relationship between thecorporate social disclosures index and the independent variables namely the board size,board independence,duality,Audit committee,ten largest shareholders,managerialownership,foreign ownership and government ownership.To determine the appropriateness of the model,several tests underlying the regressionmodel were made which were normality,linearity,homoscedasticity and multicollinearity.Intesting the model,it is involved two fold that are testing the individual independent variablesand testing the overall relationship after model estimation(Hair et al.,1998).The regression model is as follows:CSD¼b0þb1BD SIZEþb2NEDþb3DUALþb4AC CHAIRþb5AC NEDþb6CONCERNþb7SHþb8MGR OSþb9FRGN OSþb10GOVT:OSþb11ROEþb12ROAþb13TAþ ewhere CSD¼CSR disclosure index:B b1BD SIZE:board size.B b2NED¼Percentage of non-executive directors to total directors.Independent variables OperationalizationBoard size Numbers of directors sit on the boardBoard independence Percentage of non-executive directors to total directorsDuality A dichotomous variable will be used for the presence of dual leadership,where it will take the value of‘‘1’’if the CEO is also the Chairman of the board,and‘‘0’’otherwiseAudit committee Percentages of non-executive directors to total of directors sitting on audit committeePercentages of non-executive directors sitting on audit committee to total of directorsOwnership concentration Percentage of shares owned by the ten largest shareholders to total number of shares issuedManagerial ownership Percentage of shares owned by executive directors to total number of shares issuedForeign ownership Percentage of shares owned by foreign shareholders to total number of shares issuedGovernment ownership Percentage of shares owned by government to total number of shares issuedVOL.5NO.22009j SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY JOURNAL j PAGE219。

Topic A-3 The Regulatory Environment and Corporate Governance

Topic A-3 The Regulatory Environment and Corporate Governance

1. The regulatory frameworkAn area of significant change in recent yearsIncreasing emphasis on corporate governance and importance of internal auditTypes of regulatory influences include:Corporate governance requirementsNational legislationIndustry specific regulationsCommon regulations affecting all activities (e.g. Health and Safety)Industry specific regulationsInternational regulationsStatutory framework for internal auditing involves three key areas:Corporate governanceInternational accounting standardsPublic sector requirementsCorporate governanceCOSO Report –Internal Control –Integrated Framework, Committee of Sponsoring Organizations defines internal control as a process, effected by directors, management and other personnel, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives.The objectives include:Effectiveness and efficiency of operationsReliability of financial reportingCompliance with laws and regulationsThe main areas of the model are as follows:Control environmentRisk assessmentControl activitiesInformation and communicationMonitoringThe latest UK requirements (Listing rules)are set out in the UK Stock Exchange combined Code, with guidance on meeting these requirements set out in the Turnbull report. Turnbull requires that listed companies (i.e. public companies whose shares are listed on the London Stock Exchange)‘be required to confirm that there is an ongoing process for identifying, evaluati ng and managing the company’s key risks and that it is regularly reviewed by the board and accords with the guidance’.2. Auditing and company legislationMost audit work involves companies incorporated under national legislation. Over time the purpose of audit has developed.In the 19th century, auditors were expected to prevent or detect fraud and error.In the early 20th century attention shifted to the certifying of accuracy in financial statements.End of 20th century sees a return to the prevention/detection role as the expectations gap is addressed.Company law often does not address the problem of setting auditing standards – this task is delegated to the profession.N.B.The ‘expectations gap’ is the term used to describe the gap be tween what the auditor actually does and whatusers of financial statements believe he does or should do. The auditor believes his job is to gather sufficient appropriate audit evidence to form his audit opinion; users often believe that detection of fraud is a key audit objective. Closing this gap is one of the profession’s most pressing priorities.(A- Q3/J2006)Corporate Governance3. You are the audit manager of Tela &Co, a medium sized firm of accountants. Your firm has just been asked for internationally recognized codes on corporate governance and Jumper & Co has a number of clients where the codes are not being followed. One example of this, from SGCC, a listed company, is shown below. As your country already has appropriate corporate governance codes in place, Jumper & Co have asked for your advice regarding the changes necessary in SGCC to achieve appropriate compliance with corporate governance codes.Extract from financial statements regarding corporate governanceMr Sheppard is the Chief Executive Officer and board chairman of GCC. He appoints and maintains a board of five executive and two non-executive directors. While the board sets performance targets for the senior managers in the company, no formal targets ofr review of board policies is carried out. Board salaries are therefore set and paid by Mr Sheppard based on his assessment of all the board members, including himself, and not their actual performance. Internal controls in the company are monitored by the senior accountant, although detailed review is assumed to be carried out by the external auditors; SGCC does not have an internal audit department.Annual financial statements are produced, providing detailed information on past performance.Required:Write a memo to Jumper & Co which:(a)Explains why SGCC does not meet international codes of corporate governance(b)Explains why not meeting the international codes may cause a problem for SGCC, and(c)Recommends any changes necessary to implement those codes in the company.(20marks)[答疑编号10103101:针对该题提问]Memo3Fsrom: A Manager, Tela & CoTo :Jumper & CoSubject: Corporate Governance in the SGCC CompanyDate: 13 June 2006As requested,I write to explain where your client SGCC does not appear to be following appropriate corporate governance codes and to recommend changes to ensure that the principles of good corporate governance are being followed.Chief Executive Officer (CEO)and ChairmanMr Sheppard is both CEO and chairman of SGCC. Corporate governance indicates that the person responsible for running the company (the CEO)and the person responsible for controlling the board (the chairman)should be different people. This is to ensure that no one individual has unrestricted powers of decision.I recommend that Mr Sheppard is either the CEO or the chairman and that a second individual is appointed to the other post to ensure that Mr Sheppard does not have too much power in SGCC.Composition of boardThe current board ratio of executive to non-executive directors is 5:2. this means that the executive directors can dominate the board proceedings. Corporate governance codes suggest that there should be a balance of executive and non-executive directors so this cannot happen. A minimum of three non-executive directors are also normally recommended, although reports such as Cadbury note this may be difficult to achieve.I recommend that the number of executive and non-executive directors is equal to help ensure no one groupdominates the board. This will mean appointing more non-executive directors to SGCC.Director appointmentAt present, Mr Sheppard appoints directors to the board, giving him absolute authority over who is appointed. This makes the appointment procedure and qualities directors are being appointed against difficult to determine. Corporate governance suggests that appointment procedures should be transparent so that the suitability of directors for board positions can be clearly seen.I recommend that an appointments committee is established comprising three noon-executive directors to ensure there is no bias in board appointments. Formal job descriptions should also be published making the appointment process more transparent.Review of board performanceIt is correct that the performance of senior managers is reviewed, but this principle should also be applied to the board. While Mr Sheppard may undertake some review, this is not transparent and it is not clear what targets the board either met or did not meet.I recommend that performance targets are set for each director and actual performance assessed against these on a regular basis. Reasons for underperformance should also be ascertained and where appropriate, changes made to the composition of the board.Board payAt present, board members’ pay is set by Mr Sheppard. This process breaches principles of good govemance because the remuneration structure is not transparent and Mr Sheppard sets his own pay. Mr Sheppard could easily be setting remuneration levels based on his own judgements without any objective criteria.I recommend that a remuneration committee is established comprising three non-executive directors. They will set remuneration levels for the board, taking into account current salary levels and the performance of board members, remuneration should also be linked to performance, to encourage a high standard of work.Internal controlThe system of intemal control in SGCC does not appear to be reviewed correctly. While extemal auditors will review the control system, this review is based on their audit requirement and cannot be relied on to test overall effectiveness of the system. The system may therefore sill contain weaknesses and errors.I recommend that some more formal review of internal control is carried out, perhaps by establishing an internal audit department, as noted below. The relationship with the company’s auditors must also be reviewed so that the work of the board and the auditors regarding intemal control is understood by both parties.Internal auditSGCC does not have an liternal audit department. Given the lack of formal review of internal control in the company, this is surprising. Good corporate governance implies that the control system is monitored and that and internal audit department is established to carry out this task.I recommend that an internal audit department is established, reporting initially to the audit committee who will monitor internal control and then summarise reports for the board.Financial statementsThere appears to acceptable disclosure in the financial statements regarding the past results of the company. However, the board should also provide an indication of how the company will perform in the future, by a forecast review of operations or similar statement. This is partly to enable investors to assess the value of their investment in the company.I therefore recommend that the annual accounts off SGCC include some indication of the future operations of the company.Audit committeeThere is no mention in the report of an audit committee. Good corporate governance implies that there is some formal method of monitoring external auditors as well as checking that the reports from the extemal auditors are given appropriate attention in the company.I recommend that an audit committee is established-made up from non-executive directors. The committee will receive reports from the external and internal auditors (as mentioned above)and ensure that the board takes appropriate action on these reports.I hope this information is useful. Please contact me again if you require any further assistance.SincerelyAnn C.OutentNote to candidates: An alternative and allowable answer format was to answer sections(a ), (b)and (c)of the question separately. Taking this approach would also allow other valid points in part(b)such as inability to obtain a stock exchange listing.(B6/J2006)IAASB & ISA6 international Standards on Auditing (ISAs)are produced by the international Audit and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), which is a technical committee of the international Federation of Accountants (IFAC). In recent years, there has been a trend for more countries to implement the ISAs rather than produce their own auditing standards.A school friend who you have not seen for a number of years is considering joining ACCA as a trainee accountant. However, she is concerned about the extent of regulations which auditors have to follow and does not understand why ISAs have to be used in your country.Required:Write a letter to your friend explaining the regulatory framework which applies to auditors.Your letter should cover the following points:(a)The due process of the IAASB involved in producing an ISA.(4marks)(b)The overall authority of ISAs and how they are applied in individual countries.(8marks)(c)The extent to which an auditor must follow ISAs. (4marks)(d)The extent to which ISAs apply to small entities. (4marks)(20marks)[答疑编号10103102:针对该题提问]6Flat SG1Community GardensLong RoadAnytown17 June 2006Dear JayneI am pleased you are also thinking about accountancy as a career and understand your concern regarding the use of auditing standards. I will try and explain the need for standards in this letter.The working procedure of the IAASB to produce an ISAThe start of the process of producing an international Standard on Auditing (ISA)is for a subcommittee of the international Audit and Assurance Standard Board(IAASB)to determine appropriate areas for an ISA, or to note where existing ISAs need amendment.The subcommittee produces an exposure draft on that subject, initially for consideration by the IAASBapprove the exposure draft, then it is circulated to the member bodies of the international Federation of Accountants (IFAC)and any other organisations that have an interest in auditing standards and published on the IAASB website.These bodies make comments on the exposure draft. Comments are sent back to the IAASB and the exposure draft is amended as necessary. Finally the exposure draft is re-issued as an ISA or an international Auditing Practice Statement (IAPS).The whole process can take between one and two years.The overall authority of ISAs and how ISAs are applied in individual countriesISAs are designed to be applied in the audit of financial statements and may be applied to the audit of other historical financial information.Each ISA contains the basic principles and procedures to apply to that ISA (identified by bold type in the ISA itself). Other text in the ISA provides guidance on the implementation of the principles. In the words, to apply the ISA, the whole of the text, not simply the parts in bold type, must be read and understood.ISAs are not designed to override the requirements for the audit of entities in individual countries. So if our country did not require and audit of specific entities, then the ISAs would not overrule that requirement.Regarding the detailed requirements of an audit, such as the nature of testing or the issuing of an engagement letter, where our country requirements meet those of the ISA, then the ISA will be sued. It is therefore unlikely that our country would issue a separate auditing standard; the ISA would be sufficient.Where our local codes on audit differ from the ISA, then the local requirements are used. However, we are encouraged to introduce changes in our country so that the requirements of the ISA are met. For example, our country may require an engagement letter to be signed every five years, but the ISA requires one every year. In this case, local change is needed to comply with the ISA.The extent to which an auditor must follow ISAsAn auditor should follow the ISA wherever pollible. However, in some situations an auditor may consider it necessary to depart from the ISA so that the objectives of the audit can be achieved more efficiently. In this situation, the auditor can depart from the ISA, but he or she must be prepared to justify the departure. It is expected that departure from any ISA will be the exception rather than the rule.The extent to which ISAs apply to small entitiesTo be clear, ISAs are meant to be applicable to the audit of any entity, no matter what its size. However, in small entities, the auditor may have to amend the audit approach to fit the circumstances of that business. For example, these will be greater reliance on substantive testing and management representations. However, the appropriate ISAs should be followed.ConclusionI hope that this clarifies your understanding of ISAs. Please let me know if I can be of further assistance to you in your accountancy career.Yours sincerely,Rajit Gry。

corporate governance的定义

corporate governance的定义

corporate governance的定义
公司治理(Corporate Governance)是指一套机制和制度安排,用以确保公司管理层的行为符合股东和其他利益相关者的利益,同时促进公司的长期稳定发展。

这套机制涵盖了公司的内部管理和外部监管,以及公司与各利益相关者之间的关系管理。

首先,公司治理的核心目标是保护股东权益。

股东作为公司的所有者,享有公司的经营成果和承担风险。

因此,公司治理机制应确保管理层以股东利益最大化为目标,避免管理层滥用职权、损害股东利益的行为发生。

其次,公司治理还包括了对公司内部管理层的监督和制衡。

这通常通过设立董事会、监事会等内部机构来实现。

董事会负责制定公司的战略和政策,并对管理层进行监督;监事会则负责监督董事会的决策和管理层的执行情况,确保公司的运营符合法律法规和股东利益。

此外,公司治理还涉及到公司与各利益相关者之间的关系管理。

这些利益相关者包括员工、客户、供应商、债权人等,他们的利益与公司的发展密切相关。

因此,公司治理机制应确保公司在追求自身利益的同时,充分考虑并维护这些利益相关者的权益。

最后,公司治理还强调透明度和信息披露。

公司应及时、准确、全面地披露其财务状况、经营状况和风险信息,以便股东和其他利益相关者做出明智的决策。

总之,公司治理是一套复杂的机制和制度安排,旨在确保公司的管理层以股东和其
他利益相关者的利益为出发点,促进公司的长期稳定发展。

良好的公司治理结构有助于提高公司的竞争力和市场信誉,为公司的长期发展奠定坚实的基础。

欧盟绿皮书《Corporate governance in financial institutions and remuneration policies》

欧盟绿皮书《Corporate governance in financial institutions and remuneration policies》

ENEUROPEAN COMMISSIONBrussels, 2.6.2010COM(2010) 284 finalGREEN PAPERCorporate governance in financial institutions and remuneration policies{COM(2010) 285 final}{COM(2010) 286 final}{SEC(2010) 669}GREEN PAPERCorporate governance in financial institutions and remuneration policies(Text with EEA relevance)1. INTRODUCTIONThe scale of the financial crisis triggered by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in autumn 2008 and linked to the inappropriate securitisation of US subprime mortgage debt led governments around the world to question the effective strength of financial institutions and the suitability of their regulatory and supervisory systems to deal with financial innovation in a globalised world. The massive injection of public funding in the US and Europe – up to 25% of GDP – was accompanied by a strong political will to learn the lessons of the financial crisis in all its dimensions to prevent such a situation happening again in the future.In its Communication of 4 March 20091, effectively a programme for reforming the regulatory and supervisory framework for financial markets based on the conclusions of the Larosière report2, the European Commission announced that it would (i) examine corporate governance rules and practice within financial institutions, particularly banks, in the light of the financial crisis, and (ii) where appropriate, make recommendations, or even propose regulatory measures, in order to remedy any weaknesses in the corporate governance system in this key sector of the economy. Strengthening corporate governance is at the heart of the Commission's programme of financial market reform and crisis prevention. Sustainable growth cannot exist without awareness and healthy management of risks within a company. As highlighted by the Larosière report, it is clear that boards of directors, like supervisory authorities, rarely comprehended either the nature or scale of the risks they were facing. In many cases, the shareholders did not properly perform their role as owners of the companies. Although corporate governance did not directly cause the crisis, the lack of effective control mechanisms contributed significantly to excessive risk-taking on the part of financial institutions. This general observation is all the more worrying because corporate governance has been relied upon as one of the ways of regulating business life. Consequently, there is a need to address the fundamental question of whether the existing corporate governance regime is deficient as far as financial institutions are concerned or whether it has rather been poorly implemented.In the financial services sector, corporate governance should take account of the interests of other stakeholders (depositors, savers, life insurance policy holders, etc), as well as the stability of the financial system, due to the systemic nature of many players. At the same time, it is important to avoid any moral hazard by not diminishing the responsibility of private stakeholders. It is therefore the responsibility of the board of directors, under the supervision 1COM (2009) 114 final.2Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU published on 25 February 2009.Mr Jacque de Larosière was chairman of the group.of the shareholders, to set the tone and in particular to define the strategy, risk profile and appetite for risk of the institution it is governing.The options outlined in this Green Paper are likely to accompany and supplement the legal provisions implemented or planned for the purpose of strengthening the financial system, in particular in the context of the reform of the European supervisory architecture3, the Capital Requirements Directive (the 'CRD')4, the Solvency II Directive5 for insurance companies, reform of the UCITS system and the regulation of Alternative Investment Fund Managers. Corporate governance requirements should also take account of a financial institution's type (retail bank, investment bank) and size. The principles of sound corporate governance referred to in this Green Paper focus primarily on large financial institutions. These principles should be adapted so as to be applied effectively to smaller financial institutions.This Green Paper should be read in conjunction with the Commission Staff Working Paper (COM(2010) XYZ) 'Corporate governance in financial institutions: the lessons to be learnt from the current financial crisis and possible steps forward'. This document takes stock of the situation.It is also important to point out that, since its meeting in Washington on 15 November 2008, the G20 has endeavoured to improve, amongst other things, risk management and compensation practices within financial institutions6.Lastly, the Commission will soon launch a broader review on corporate governance within listed companies in general and, in particular, on the place and role of shareholders, the distribution of duties between shareholders and boards of directors with regard to supervising senior management teams, the composition of boards of directors, and corporate social responsibility.2. THE CONCEPT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONSThe traditional definition of corporate governance refers to relations between a company's senior management, its board of directors, its shareholders and other stakeholders, such as employees and their representatives. It also determines the structure used to define a company's objectives, as well as the means of achieving them and of monitoring the results obtained7.3See the Commission proposals creating three European Supervisory Authorities and a European Systemic Risk Board.4Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast), OJ L 177 of 30.6.2006 and Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions (recast), OJ L 177 of 30.6.2006.5Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) (recast) OJ L 335 of17.12.2009.6It was confirmed at the Pittsburgh Summit of 24 and 25 September 2009 that compensation practices would have to be reformed in order to maintain financial stability.7See, for example, the OECD's Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004, p. 11. The Green Paper focuses on this limited definition of corporate governance and does not deal with some other important aspects, such as separation of functions within a financial institution, internal controls and accounting independence.Due to the nature of their activities and interdependencies within the financial system, the bankruptcy of a financial institution, particularly a bank, can cause a domino effect, leading to the bankruptcy of other financial institutions. This can lead to an immediate contraction of credit and the start of an economic crisis due to lack of financing, as the recent financial crisis demonstrated. This systemic risk led governments to shore up the financial sector with public funding. As a result, taxpayers are inevitably stakeholders in the running of financial institutions, with the goal of financial stability and long-term economic growth. Furthermore, the interests of financial institutions' creditors (depositors, life insurance policy holders or beneficiaries of pension schemes and, to a certain extent, employees) are potentially at odds with those of their shareholders. Shareholders benefit from a rise in the share price and maximisation of profits in the short term and are potentially less interested in too low a level of risk. For their part, depositors and other creditors are focused only on a financial institution's ability to repay their deposits and other mature debts, and thus on its long-term viability. As a result, depositors can be expected to favour a very low level of risk8. Largely as a result of the particularities relating to the nature of their activities, most financial institutions are strictly regulated and supervised. For the same reasons, financial institutions' internal governance cannot be reduced to a simple problem of conflicts of interest between shareholders and the management. Consequently, the rules of corporate governance within financial institutions must be adapted to take account of the specific nature of these companies. In particular, the supervisory authorities, whose mission to maintain financial stability coincides with the interests of depositors and other creditors to control risk-taking by the financial sector, have an important role to play in shaping best practices for governance in financial institutions.Various legal instruments and recommendations at international and European level applicable to financial institutions and in particular banks, already take account of the particularities of financial institutions and the role of supervisory authorities9.However, the existing rules and recommendations are based first and foremost on supervisory considerations and focus on the existence of adequate internal control, risk management, audit and compliance structures within financial institutions. They did not prevent excessive risk-taking by financial institutions, as the recent financial crisis demonstrated.8See Peter O. Mülbert, Corporate Governance of Banks, European Business Organisation Law Review,12 August 2008, p.427.9Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Enhancing corporate governance for banking organisations, September 1999. Revised in February 2006; OECD, Guidelines for insurers' governance, 2005; OECD, Revised guidelines for pension fund governance, July 2002; Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, OJ L 145 of 30.4.2004; Solvency II Directive;Capital Requirements Directive; Committee of European Banking Supervisors, Guidelines on the Application of the Supervisory Review Process under Pillar 2 (CP03 revised), 25 January 2006, /getdoc/00ec6db3-bb41-467c-acb9-8e271f617675/GL03.aspx; CEBS High Level Principles for Risk Management, 16 February 2010, /Publications/Standards-Guidelines/CEBS-High-Level-Principles-for-Risk-Management.aspx3. DEFICIENCIES AND WEAKNESSES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE WITHIN FINANCIALINSTITUTIONSThe Commission considers that an effective corporate governance system, achieved through control mechanisms and checks, should lead to the main stakeholders in financial institutions (boards of directors, shareholders, senior management, etc.) assuming a higher degree of responsibility. Conversely, the financial crisis and its serious economic and social consequences have led to a significant loss of confidence in financial institutions, particularly with regard to the following.3.1. The question of conflicts of interestThe questions raised by the issue of conflicts of interest and management of such conflicts are nothing new. Indeed, the issue arises in every organisation or company. Nonetheless, given the systemic risk, the volume of transactions, the diversity of financial services provided and the complex structure of large financial groups, the issue is particularly pressing in the case of financial institutions. Potential conflicts of interest can arise in a variety of situations (for example, exercising incompatible roles or activities, such as providing advice on investments while managing an investment fund or managing for one's own account, incompatibility of mandates held on behalf of different clients/financial institutions). This problem can also arise between a financial institution and its shareholders/investors, particularly where there is cross-shareholding or business links between an institutional investor (for example through the parent company) and a financial institution in which it is investing.At Community level, the MiFID10 is a step forward for transparency, devoting a specific section to certain aspects of this issue. However, the asymmetric information between investors and shareholders on the one hand, and the financial institution concerned on the other (an imbalance compounded by the ever-increasing complexity and diversity of the services provided by financial institutions), calls into question the effectiveness of market identification and supervision of various conflicts of interest involving financial institutions. Furthermore, as the CEBS, CEIOPS and CESR committees note in their joint report on internal governance11, there is a lack of consistency in the content and detail of the conflict of interest rules to which the various financial institutions are subject, depending on whether they need to apply the provisions of MiFID, the CRD, the UCITS Directive12 or Solvency 2. 3.2. The problem of effective implementation by financial institutions of corporategovernance principlesThe general consensus13 is that the existing principles of corporate governance, namely the OECD principles, the recommendations of the Basel Committee, and Community legislation14, already cover to a certain extent the problems highlighted by the financial crisis. In spite of this, the financial crisis revealed the lack of genuine effectiveness of corporate 10Directive 2004/39/EC on markets in financial instruments, (OJ L 145 of 30.4.2004).11'Cross-sectoral stock-take and analysis of internal governance requirements' by CESR, CEBS, CEIOPS, October 2009.12 Directive2009/65/EC.13See the OECD's public consultation 'Corporate governance and the financial crisis' of 18 March 2009 and in particular the section entitled 'Implementation gap'.14Directive 2006/46/EC obliges financial institutions listed on regulated markets to draw up a corporate governance code to which they are subject, and to indicate any parts of the code from which they have departed and the reasons for doing so.governance principles in the financial services sector, particularly with regard to banks. Several theories have been put forward to explain this situation:–the existing principles are too broad in scope and are not sufficiently precise. As a result, they gave financial institutions too much scope for interpretation. Furthermore, they proved difficult to put into practice, in most cases leading to a purely formal application(i.e., a box-ticking exercise), with no real qualitative assessment.–the lack of a clear allocation of roles and responsibilities with regard to implementing the principles, within both the financial institution and the supervisory authority.–the non-binding nature of corporate enterprise principles: the fact that there was no legal obligation to comply with recommendations by international organisations or the provisions of a corporate governance code, the problem of the neglect of corporate governance by supervisory authorities, the weakness of relevant checks, and the absence of deterrent penalties all contributed to the lack of effective implementation by financial institutions of corporate governance principles.3.3. Boards of directors15The financial crisis clearly shows that financial institutions' boards of directors did not fulfil their key role as a principal decision-making body. Consequently, boards of directors were unable to exercise effective control over senior management and to challenge the measures and strategic guidelines that were submitted to them for approval.The Commission considers that their failure to identify, understand and ultimately control the risks to which their financial institutions were exposed is at the heart of the origins of the crisis. Several reasons or factors contributed to this failure:–members of boards of directors, in particular non-executive directors, devoted neither sufficient resources nor time to the fulfilment of their duties. Furthermore, several studies have clearly demonstrated that, faced with a chief executive officer who is omnipresent and in some cases authoritarian, non-executive directors felt unable to raise objections to, or even question, the proposed guidelines or conclusions due to a lack of technical expertise and/or confidence.–members of boards of directors did not come from sufficiently diverse backgrounds. The Commission, like several national authorities, notes a lack of diversity and balance in terms of gender, social, cultural and educational background.–boards of directors, in particular the chairman, did not carry out a serious performance appraisal either of their individual members or of the board of directors as a whole.–boards of directors were unable or unwilling to ensure that the risk management framework and risk appetite of their financial institutions were appropriate.15The term 'board of directors' in this Green Paper essentially refers to the supervisory role of directors ina company which, in a dual structure, generally falls within the scope of the supervisory board. ThisGreen Paper does not prejudice the roles attributed to different company bodies under national legal systems.–boards of directors proved unable to recognise the systemic nature of certain risks and thus to provide sufficient information upstream to their supervisory authorities Furthermore, even where effective dialogue existed, corporate governance issues were rarely on the agenda.The Commission considers that these serious deficiencies and acts of misconduct raise important questions about the quality of appointment procedures. The basis for quality in a board of directors lies in its composition.management3.4. RiskRisk management is one of the key aspects of corporate governance, particularly in the case of financial institutions. Several large financial institutions no longer exist precisely because they neglected the basic rules of risk management and control. Financial institutions have too often failed to take a holistic approach to risk management. The main failures and shortcomings can be summarised as follows:– a lack of understanding of the risks on the part of those involved in the risk management chain and insufficient training for those employees responsible for distributing risk products16;– a lack of authority on the part of the risk management function. Financial institutions have not always granted their risk management function sufficient powers and authority to be able to curb the activities of risk-takers and traders;–lack of expertise or insufficiently wide-ranging experience in risk management. Too often, the expertise considered necessary for the risk management function was limited to those categories of risk considered priorities and did not cover the entire range of risks to be monitored;– a lack of real-time information on risks. To allow those involved to react quickly to changes in risk exposures, clear and correct information on risk should be available rapidly at all relevant levels of the financial institution. Unfortunately, the procedures for getting information to the appropriate level have not always functioned. Furthermore, it is crucial to upgrade IT tools for risk management, including in highly sophisticated financial institutions, as they are still too disparate to allow risks to be consolidated rapidly, while data are insufficiently consistent to allow the evolution of group exposures to be followed up effectively in real-time. This concerns not only the most complex financial products but all types of risk.The Commission considers that the deficiencies and shortcomings highlighted above are very worrying. They appear to indicate the absence of a healthy risk management culture at all levels of certain financial institutions. On this last point, the directors of financial institutions in particular are responsible, because in order to establish a healthy risk management culture at all levels, it is essential that directors are themselves exemplary in this respect.16See for example Renate Böhm and Hilla Lindhüber, Verkaufen, Druck und Provisionen - Probleme von Beschäftigten im Finanzdienstleistungsbereich Versicherungen Ergebnisse einer Arbeitsklima-Index-Befragung, Salzburg 2008.3.5. The role of shareholdersThe financial crisis has shown that confidence in the model of the shareholder-owner who contributes to the company's long-term viability has been severely shaken, to say the least. The growing importance of financial markets in the economy, due in particular to the multiplication of sources of financing/capital injections, has created new categories of shareholders. Such shareholders sometimes seem to show little interest in the long-term governance objectives of the businesses/financial institutions in which they invest and may be responsible for encouraging excessive risk-taking in view of their relatively short, or even very short (quarterly or half-yearly) investment horizons17. In this respect, the sought-after alignment of directors' interests with those of these new categories of shareholder has amplified risk-taking and, in many cases, contributed to excessive remuneration for directors, based on the short-term share value of the company/financial institution as the only performance criterion18. Several factors can help to explain the disinterest or passivity of shareholders with regard to their financial institutions:–certain profitability models, based on possession of portfolios of different shares, lead to the abstraction, or even disappearance, of the concept of ownership normally associated with holding shares.–the costs which institutional investors would face if they wanted to actively engage in governance of the financial institution can dissuade them, particularly if their participation is minimal.–conflicts of interest (see above).–the lack of effective rights allowing shareholders to exercise control (such as, for example, the lack of voting rights on director remuneration in certain jurisdictions), the maintenance of certain obstacles to the exercise of cross-border voting rights, uncertainty over certain legal concepts (for example that of 'acting in concert') and financial institutions' disclosure to shareholders of information which is too complicated and unreadable, in particular with regard to risk, could all play a part, to varying degrees, in dissuading investors from playing an active role in the financial institutions in which they have invested.The Commission is aware that this problem does not affect only financial institutions. More generally, it raises questions about the effectiveness of corporate governance rules based on the presumption of effective control by shareholders. As a result of this situation, the Commission will launch a broader review covering listed companies in general.3.6. The role of supervisory authoritiesGenerally speaking, the recent financial crisis revealed the limits of the existing supervision system: in spite of the availability of certain tools enabling them to intervene in the internal governance of financial institutions19, not all supervisory authorities, either at national or 17See article by Rakesh Khurana and Andy Zelleke, Washington Post, 8 February 2009.18See Gaspar, Massa, Matos (2005), Shareholder Investment Horizon and the Market for Corporate Control, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 76.19For example, Basel II.European level, were able to carry out effective supervision in an environment of financial innovation and rapid change in the business model of financial institutions20. Furthermore, the supervisory authorities also failed to establish best practices for corporate governance in financial institutions. In many cases, supervisory authorities did not ensure that financial institutions' risk management systems and internal organisation were adapted to changes in their business model and financial innovation. Supervisory authorities also sometimes failed to adequately enforce strict eligibility criteria for members of boards of directors of financial institutions ('fit and proper test')21.Generally speaking, problems linked to the governance of supervisory authorities themselves, particularly the means of combating the risk of regulatory capture or the lack of resources, have never been sufficiently discussed. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly clear that the territorial and substantive competencies of supervisory authorities no longer correspond to the geographical and sectoral spread of financial institutions' activities. This complicates risk management for financial institutions and makes it more difficult for them to comply with regulatory standards, as well as presenting a major challenge for cooperation between supervisory authorities.3.7. The role of auditorsAuditors play a key role in financial institutions' corporate governance systems, as they provide assurance to the market that the financial statements prepared by those financial institutions present a true and fair view. However, conflicts of interest could arise as audit firms are remunerated by the same companies who mandate them to audit their financial accounts.At present, there is no information to confirm that the requirement, pursuant to Directive 2006/48/EC, for auditors of financial institutions to alert the competent authorities wherever they become aware of certain facts which are liable to have a serious effect on the financial situation of an institution, has been effectively enforced in practice.4. I NITIAL RESPONSESIn the context of its Communication of 4 March 2009 and measures taken to boost the European economy, the Commission has undertaken to address issues related to remuneration. The Commission has launched the international debate on abusive remuneration practices and was leading the implementation at European level of FSB and G-20 principles on sound compensation practices. Leaving aside the issue of whether or not certain levels of remuneration are appropriate, the Commission started from two premises:–since the end of the 1980s, the substantial increase in the variable component of listed company directors' salaries raises questions about the methods and content of performance evaluations for company directors. In this respect, the Commission made an initial response at the end of 2004 by adopting a recommendation aimed at strengthening obligations to publish director remuneration policies and individual salaries, and calling on 20On the failings of supervisory authorities in general, see the 'de Larosière' Report, footnote 1.21See, for example, OECD, Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis, Recommendations, November 2009, p.27.the Member States to establish a vote (mandatory or optional) on such director remuneration. For a variety of reasons linked, amongst other things, to the lack of shareholder activism, the explosion of the variable component and, in particular, the multiplication of profit-sharing plans granting shares or stock options, the Commission considered it necessary to adopt a new recommendation on 30 April 200922. The aim of this recommendation is to strengthen governance of directors' remuneration, proposing several principles for director remuneration structures in order to better link remuneration to long-term performance.–remuneration policies in the financial sector, based on short-term profits without taking into account the corresponding risks, contributed to the financial crisis. For this reason, the Commission adopted another recommendation on remuneration in the financial services sector on 30 April 200923. The aim was to align remuneration policies in the financial services with healthy risk management and financial institutions' long-term viability. Taking stock one year after the adoption of the two abovementioned recommendations, and in spite of a favourable climate for tough action on the part of the Member States, the Commission finds a mixed overall picture of the situation in the Member States24.Although there were strong legislative moves in several Member States to achieve greater transparency in remuneration for listed company directors and to empower shareholders in this respect, it was also noted that only 10 Member States have applied the majority of Commission recommendations. A large number of Member States have still not adopted the relevant measures. Furthermore, where the recommendation led to measures at national level, the Commission noted great diversity in the content and requirements of these rules, particularly on sensitive issues such as remuneration structure and severance packages. The Commission is also concerned about remuneration policies in the financial services. Only 16 Member States have applied the Commission Recommendation in full or in part while five are still in the process of doing so. Six Member States have at present taken no action on this front and do not intend to do so in the near future. Furthermore, the intensity (particularly requirements relating to remuneration structure) and scope of application of the measures taken vary depending on the Member State. Thus only seven Member States have extended implementation of the principles of the recommendation to the entire financial sector, as the Commission called on them to do.5. OPTIONS FOR THE FUTUREThe Commission considers that, while taking into account the need to preserve the competitiveness of the European financial industry, the deficiencies listed in Chapter 3 call for concrete solutions to improve corporate governance practices in financial institutions. This chapter considers a variety of ways to respond to these deficiencies and tries to strike the right balance between the need for improved corporate governance of financial institutions and the necessity of allowing these institutions to contribute to economic recovery by providing credit to businesses and households. The Commission invites all interested parties to express their 22 Recommendation2009/385/EC.23 Recommendation2009/384/EC.24For a detailed examination of the measures taken by the Member States, see the two Commission reports on the application by the Member States of Recommendation 2009/384/EC and Recommendation 3009/385/EC.。

corporate governance的定义

corporate governance的定义

corporate governance的定义
企业治理(corporate governance)是指确保企业有效运作、增加经营者责任和透明度、以及保护股东和利益相关者利益的制度和实践。

它涉及制定和执行决策的框架、监督机制、行为准则和权力分配。

企业治理旨在建立一种透明、负责任和可持续的企业运营模式,以维护股东权益、保护利益相关者利益,并提高企业的管理效能和长期价值。

企业治理关注以下方面:
1.权力和责任:企业治理规定了企业管理者和董事会成员的
权力和责任,确保他们行使权力时不滥用,负责任地履行
职责。

2.企业结构:企业治理规定了企业的结构和组织形式,包括
董事会的角色和职责、管理层和股东的权利与责任、以及
各个利益相关者的参与方式。

3.信息披露与透明度:企业治理要求企业向股东和利益相关
者提供准确、及时和全面的信息,确保信息的公平与透明,减少对关键信息的隐藏和不完整披露。

4.决策和风险管理:企业治理规定了决策过程和风险管理机
制,确保决策过程合理、合法,并包括适当的风险评估和
管理机制。

5.激励和报酬:企业治理制定了激励和报酬机制,以确保管
理层和董事会成员的行为与企业利益一致,并与企业绩效
和长期目标相匹配。

企业治理的实践和规范因国家、行业和企业而异,可以通过法律、制度、监管机构和自律准则来实施和监督。

良好的企业治理有助于提高企业的稳定性、信誉和长期价值,为股东、利益相关者和整个经济体创造持续的利益。

A_Survey_of_Corporate_Governance中文版

A_Survey_of_Corporate_Governance中文版

1、文章写作背景投资者将资金投入到公司,如何能保证收回收益?保证资金不被管理者非理性投资或占用?投资者将资金投入公司后,就与其资本分离。

控制公司的经理就有可能占用投资者的资金。

虽然先进的市场经济解决了公司治理的一些问题,保证大量的资金流向公司,给投资者回报,但这并不意味着公司治理问题就被解决了。

公司治理研究在实践上非常重要。

即使在发达的市场经济中,关于各种公司治理机制孰优孰劣仍有争议。

公司治理机制就是经济和法律制度,并受到政治的影响。

我们虽然同意产品市场竞争可能对经济效率的影响最大,但我们怀疑它能否解决公司治理问题。

产品竞争可能减少资本收益,从而减少可能被管理占用的资金的数量,但这并不能阻止管理者在资本沉没后占用收益。

仅仅竞争理论是无法解决这个问题的,公司治理的研究就尤为必要。

2、研究的主要问题、《公司治理概览》,综述型的文献,1997年以前,关于公司治理研究的情况,侧重点放在投资者法律保护的重要性,以及在世界各国公司治理体系中集中所有权的重要性方面。

3、研究思路第一节: 代理问题的特质,并讨论了一些标准代理模型。

解决代理问题的方案集中在激励契约。

最后得出结论,即使在发达的市场经济中这类问题仍然大量存在.第二到第四节: 公司吸引资本的各种方式。

第二节:企业如何在不给投资者任何真正的权力的情况在筹集资金。

方法一:信誉建设,方法二:投资者对资本市场的过度乐观结论:这些不可能是投资者信任公司并对其投资的唯一原因。

第三节和第四节:解决公司治理问题最常见的两种做法,但都需要赋予投资者一定的权力。

办法一:通过法律保护给投资者一定权力防止管理人员占用。

保护少数民族的权利和法律禁止的管理自我交易的例子,这种机制。

办法二:大投资者所有制(集中所有权):匹配重大控制权的重大现金流的权利。

大多数的公司治理机制,包括大量股权,银行的关系,甚至并购,可视为例子大型机构投资者行使其权力的例子。

我们讨论如何减少大型机构投资者的成本。

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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND STANDING COMMITTEESThe syllabus for Paper F1/FAB, Accountant in Business, requires candidates to understand the meaning of corporate governance and the role of the board of directors in establishing and maintaining good standards of governance. Specifically, the Study Guide refers to the separation of ownership and control, the role of non-executive directors and two of the standing committees commonly established by public companies. This article provides an introduction to corporate governance and some of the basic concepts that underpin it, and explains the roles of the board, the different types of company director and standing committees.WHAT IS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE?The simplest and most concise definition of corporate governance was provided by the Cadbury Report in 1992, which stated: Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled.Though simplistic, this definition provides an understanding of the nature of corporate governance and the vital role that leaders of organisations have to play in establishing effective practices. For most companies, those leaders are the directors, who decide the long-term strategy of the company in order to serve the best interests of the owners (members or shareholders) and, more broadly, stakeholders, such as customers, suppliers, providers of long-term finance, the community and regulators.It is important to recognise that effective corporate governance relies to some extent on compliance with laws, but being fully compliant does not necessarily mean that a company is adopting sound corporate governance practices. Significantly, the Cadbury Report was published in the UK shortly after the collapse of Maxwell Communications plc, a large publishing company. Many of the actions that brought about the collapse, such as the concentration of power in the hands of one individual and the company borrowing from its pension fund in order to achieve leveraged growth, were legal at the time.The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development published its‘Principles of Corporate Governance’ in 2004. These a re:∙Rights of shareholders: The corporate governance framework should protect shareholders and facilitate their rights in the company. Companies shouldgenerate investment returns for the risk capital put up by the shareholders.∙Equitable treatment of shareholders: All shareholders should be treated equitably (fairly), including those who constitute a minority, individuals and foreign shareholders.Shareholders should have redress when their rights are contravened or where an individual shareholder or group of shareholders is oppressed by the majority.∙Stakeholders: The corporate governance framework should recognise the legal rights of stakeholders and facilitate cooperation with them in order to create wealth,employment and sustainable enterprises.∙Disclosure and transparency: Companies should make relevant, timely disclosures on matters affecting financial performance, management and ownership of thebusiness.∙Board of directors: The board of directors should set the direction of the company and monitor management in order that the company will achieve its objectives. The corporate governance framework should underpin the board’s accountability to the company and its members.TO WHOM IS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RELEVANT?Corporate governance is important in all but the smallest organisations. Limited companies have a primary duty to their shareholders, but also to other stakeholders as described above. Not-for-profit organisations must also be directed and controlled appropriately, as the decisions and actions of a few individuals can affect many individuals, groups and organisations that have little or no influence over them. Public sector organisations have a duty to serve the State but must act in a manner that treats stakeholders fairly.Most of the attention given to corporate governance is directed towards public limited companies whose securities are traded in recognised capital markets. The reason for this is that such organisations have hundreds or even thousands of shareholders whose wealth and income can be enhanced or compromised by the decisions of senior management. This is often referred to as the agency problem. Potential and existing shareholders take investment decisions based on information that is historical and subjective, usually with little knowledge of the direction that the company will take in the future. They therefore place trust in those who take decisions to achieve the right balance between return and risk, to put appropriate systems of control in place, to provide timely and accurate information, to manage risk wisely, and to act ethically at all times.The agency problem becomes most evident when companies fail. In order to make profits, it is necessary to take risks, and sometimes risks that are taken with the best intentions – and are supported by the most robust business plans – result in loss or even the demise of the company. Sometimes corporate failure is brought about by inappropriate behaviours of directors and other senior managers.As already mentioned, in the UK, corporate governance first came into the spotlight with the publication of the Cadbury Report, shortly after two large companies (Maxwell Communications plc and Polly Peck International plc) collapsed. Ten years later, in the US, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed as a response to the collapse of Enron Corporation and WorldCom. All of these cases involved companies that had beenhighly successful and run by a few very powerful individuals, and all involved some degree of criminal activity on their part.The recent credit crisis has brought about renewed concern about corporate governance, specifically in the financial sector. Although the roots of the crisis were mainly financial and originated with adverse conditions in the wholesale money markets, subsequent investigations and reports have called into question the policies, processes and prevailing cultures in many banking and finance-related organisations.APPROACHES TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCEMost countries adopt a principles-based approach to corporate governance. This involves establishing a comprehensive set of best practices to which listed companies should adhere. If it is considered to be in the best interests of the company not to follow one or more of these standards, the company should disclose this to its shareholders, along with the reasons for not doing so. This does not necessarily mean that a principles-based approach is a soft option, however, as it may be a condition of membership of the stock exchange that companies strictly follow this‘comply or explain’ requirement.Some countries prefer a rules-based approach through which the desired corporate governance standards are enshrined in law and are therefore mandatory. The best example of this is the US, where the Sarbanes-Oxley Act lays down detailed legal requirements.THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORSNearly all companies are managed by a board of directors, appointed or elected by the shareholders to run the company on their behalf. In most countries, the directors are subject to periodic (often annual) re-election by the shareholders. This would appear to give the shareholders ultimate power, but in most sectors it is recognised that performance can only be judged over the medium to long-term. Shareholders therefore have to place trust in those who act on their behalf. It is rare but not unknown for shareholders to lose patience with the board and remove its members en masse.The role of the board of directors was summarised by the King Report (a South African report on corporate governance) as:∙to define the purpose of the company∙to define the values by which the company will perform its daily duties∙to identify the stakeholders relevant to the company∙to develop a strategy combining these factors∙to ensure implementation of this strategy.The purpose and values of a company are often set down in its constitutional documents, reflecting the objectives of its founders. However, it is sometimes appropriate for the board to consider whether it is in the best interests of those servedby the company to modify this or even change it completely. For example, NCR Corporation is a US producer of automated teller machines and point-of-sale systems, but its origins lay in mechanical accounting machines (NCR represents National Cash Register). As cash registers would quickly become obsolete with the emergence of microchip technology, the company had to adapt very rapidly. Whitbread plc originated as a brewer in the 18th century in the UK, but in the 1990s redefined its mission and objectives completely. It is now a hospitality and leisure provider (its brands include Premier Inn and Costa coffee) and has abandoned brewing completely.The directors must take a long-term perspective of the road that the company must travel. Management writer William Ouchi attributes the enduring success of many Japanese companies to their ability to avoid short-term ‘knee-jerk’ reactions to immediate issues in favour of consensus over the best direction to take in thelong-term.STRUCTURE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORSThere is no convenient formula for defining how many directors a company should have, though in some jurisdictions company law specifies a minimum and/or maximum number of directors for different types of company. Tesco plc, a large multinational supermarket company, has 13 directors. Swire Pacific Limited, a large Hong Kong conglomerate, has 18 directors. Smaller listed companies generally have fewer directors, typically six to eight persons.The board of directors is made up of executive directors and non-executive directors. Executive directors are full-time employees of the company and, therefore, have two relationships and sets of duties. They work for the company in a senior capacity, usually concerned with policy matters or functional business areas of major strategic importance. Large companies tend to have executive directors responsible for finance, IT/IS, marketing and so on.Executive directors are usually recruited by the board of directors. They are the highest earners in the company, with remuneration packages made up partly of basic pay and fringe benefits and partly performance-related pay. Most large companies now engage their executive directors under fixed term contracts, often rolling over every 12 months.The chief executive officer (CEO) and the finance director (in the US, chief financial officer) are nearly always executive directors.Non-executive directors (NEDs) are not employees of the company and are not involved in its day-to-day running. They usually have full-time jobs elsewhere, or may sometimes be prominent individuals from public life. The non-executive directors usually receive a flat fee for their services, and are engaged under a contract for service (civil contract, similar to that used to hire a consultant).NEDs should provide a balancing influence and help to minimise conflicts of interest. The Higgs Report, published in 2003, summarised their role as:∙to contribute to the strategic plan∙to scrutinise the performance of the executive directors∙to provide an external perspective on risk management∙to deal with people issues, such as the future shape of the board and resolution of conflicts.The majority of non-executive directors should be independent. Factors to be considered in assessing their independence include their business, financial and other commitments, other shareholdings and directorships and involvement in businesses connected to the company. However, holding shares in the company does not necessarily compromise independence.Non-executive directors should have high ethical standards and act with integrity and probity. They should support the executive team and monitor its conduct, demonstrating a willingness to listen, question, debate and challenge.It is now recognised as best practice that a public company should have more non-executive directors than executive directors. In Tesco plc, there are five executive directors and eight independent non-executive directors. Swire Pacific Ltd has eight executive directors and 10 non-executive directors, of which six are independent non-executive directors.An individual may be accountable in law as a shadow director. A shadow director is a person who controls the activities of a company, or of one or more of its actual directors, indirectly. For example, if a person who is unconnected with a company gives instructions to a person who is a director of the company, then the second person is an actual director while the first person is a shadow director. In some jurisdictions, shadow directors are recognised as being as accountable in law as actual directors.UNITARY V TWO-TIER BOARDSThe unitary board model is adopted by, inter alia, companies in the UK, US, Australia and South Africa. The company’s directors serve together on one board comprising both executive and non-executive directors.In many countries in continental Europe, companies adopt a two-tier structure. This separates those responsible for supervision from those responsible for operations. The supervisory board generally oversees the operating board.Paper FAB, Accountant in Business, focuses mainly on the unitary board system, though knowledge of both models is required for subsequent studies for Paper P1,Governance, Risk and Ethics.KEY POSITIONSThe chairman of the company is the leader of the board of directors. It is the chairman’s responsibility to ensure that the board operates efficiently and effectively, get the best out of all of its members. The chairman should, for example, promote regular attendance and full involvement in discussions. The chairman decides thescope of each meeting and is responsible for time management of board meetings, ensuring all matters are discussed fully, but without spending limitless time on individual agenda items. In most companies the chairman is a non-executive director. The chief executive officer (CEO) is the leader of the executive team and is responsible for the day-to-day management of the organisation. As such, this individual is nearly always an executive director. As well as attending board meetings in his or her capacity as a director, the CEO will usually chair the management committee or executive committee. While most companies have monthly board meetings, it is common for management/executive committee meetings to be weekly.The secretary is the chief administrative officer of the company. The secretary provides the agenda and supporting papers for board meetings, and often for executive committee meetings also. He or she takes minutes of meetings and provides advice on procedural matters, such as terms of reference. The secretary usually has responsibilities for liaison with shareholders and the government registration body. As such, the notice of general meetings will be signed by the secretary on behalf of the board of directors. The secretary may be a member of the board of directors, though some smaller companies use this position as a means of involving a high potential individual at board level prior to being appointed as a director.SEGREGATION OF RESPONSIBILITIESIt is generally recognised that the CEO should not hold the position of chairman, as the activities of each role are quite distinctive from one another. In larger companies, there would be too much work for one individual, though in Marks & Spencer, a large listed UK retail organisation, one person did occupy both positions for several years.The secretary should not also be the chairman of the company. As the secretary has a key role in liaising with the government registration body, having the same person occupying both roles could compromise the flow of information between this body and the board of directors.STANDING COMMITTEESThe term ‘standing committee’ refers to any committee that is a permanent feature within the management structure of an organisation. In the context of corporate governance, it refers to committees made up of members of the board with specified sets of duties. The four committees most often appointed by public companies are the audit committee, the remuneration committee, the nominations committee and the risk committee.The Syllabus and Study Guide for Paper F1/FAB require students to study only two committees. These are the audit committee and the remuneration committee.AUDIT COMMITTEEThis committee should be made up of independent non-executive directors, with at least one individual having expertise in financial management. It is responsible for:∙oversight of internal controls; approval of financial statements and other significant documents prior to agreement by the full board∙liaison with external auditors∙high level compliance matters∙reporting to the shareholders.Sometimes the committee may carry out investigations and may deal with matters reported by whistleblowers.REMUNERATION COMMITTEEThis committee decides on the remuneration of executive directors, and sometimes other senior executives. It is responsible for formulating a written remuneration policy that should have the aim of attracting and retaining appropriate talent, and for deciding the forms that remuneration should take. This committee should also be made up entirely of independent non-executive directors, consistent with the principle that executives should not be in a position to decide their own remuneration.It is generally recognised that executive remuneration packages should be structured in a manner that will motivate them to achieve the long-term objectives of the company. Therefore, the remuneration committee has to offer a competitive basic salary and fringe benefits (these attract and retain people of the right calibre), combined with performance-related rewards such as bonuses linked to medium and long-term targets, shares, share options and eventual pension benefits (often subject to minimum length of service requirements).PUBLIC OVERSIGHTPublic oversight is concerned with ensuring that the confidence of investors and the general public in professional accountancy bodies is maintained. This can be achieved by direct regulation, the imposition of licensing requirements (including, where appropriate, exercising powers of enforcement) or by self-regulation. As the US operates a rules-based system of governance, these responsibilities are discharged by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, which has the power to enforce mandatory standards and rules laid down by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In the UK, regulation is the responsibility of the Professional Oversight team of the Financial Reporting Council.SAMPLE QUESTIONSCandidates may find it useful to consider questions on this topic identified in examiner’s reports as well as the pilot paper. As past questio n papers are not made available, the following questions are included in this article as examples of typical requirements. It must be emphasised that these questions are not taken from the actual question bank.Sample question 1:LLL Company is listed on its country’s stock exchange. The following individuals serve on the board of directors:Asif is a non-executive director and is the chairman of the company.Bertrand is the CEO and is responsible for the day-to-day running of the company. Chan is a professional accountant and serves as a non-executive director.Donna is the finance director and is an employee of the company.Esther is a legal advocate and serves as a non-executive director.Frederik is the marketing director of a manufacturing company and serves as anon-executive director.Which of the following is the most appropriate composition of directors for LLL Company’s audit committee?A Chan, Donna and EstherB Asif, Bertrand and FrederikC Asif, Esther and FrederikD Chan, Esther and FrederikThe correct answer is D. Executive directors should not serve on the audit committee. This eliminates options A and B. Option D is the best choice, as the audit committee should have at least one director with expertise in finance.Sample question 2:Which of the following is a duty of the secretary of a listed public company?A Maintaining order at board meetingsB Clarifying the terms of reference of the board meetingC Ensuring that all directors contribute fully to discussions at board meetingsD Reporting to the board on operational performance for the last quarterThe correct answer is B. Options A and C are responsibilities of the chairman, while option D is the responsibility of the CEO.Sample question 3:The board of directors of JJJ Company has decided to increase the basic salary of its chief executive officer by 20% in order to bring her pay into line with those occupying similar positions in the industry.This action will achieve which of the following purposes?A Improve the prospect of retaining the chief executive officerB Increase the productivity of the chief executive officer by at least 20%C Motivate the chief executive officer to achieve long-term targetsD Create greater job satisfaction for the chief executive officerThe correct answer is A.The basic pay offered by a company serves as a beacon to attract applicants, and can also deter the present incumbent of a position from seeking opportunities elsewhere, especially if they perceive themselves to be underpaid at present.A substantial pay increase is unlikely to achieve a significant increase in productivity or increase long-term motivation (though pay increases can have a short-term impacton motivation). Job satisfaction is derived from factors other than remuneration, such as challenges inherent in the work and the nature of the tasks performed.Written by a member of the Paper F1/FAB examining team。

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