The Sources of Soviet Conduct(1947年--苏联外交行为的根源)

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苏联修正主义英语

苏联修正主义英语

苏联修正主义英语The concept of "Soviet Revisionism" emerged as a critical term within the international communist movement, referring to the perceived deviation from the original principles of Marxism-Leninism by the Soviet Union under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev.This deviation was often characterized by a shift towards a more pragmatic approach to governance, which some saw as a move away from the revolutionary ideals that had once defined the Soviet state. The debate over revisionism sparked intense discussions and disagreements among communist parties worldwide.In the 1960s, the term became a focal point ofideological conflict, particularly between the Soviet Union and China. The Chinese Communist Party accused the Soviet leadership of betraying the revolutionary cause, leading to a split within the global communist movement.The implications of Soviet Revisionism extended beyond ideological disputes, influencing foreign policy and military strategy. It raised questions about the nature of socialism and the role of the state in guiding economic and social development.Understanding the nuances of Soviet Revisionism requires a deep dive into the historical context of the Cold War era,where ideological purity was fiercely defended, and any perceived deviation could lead to significant political and social consequences.The legacy of this period continues to shape our understanding of political ideologies and the complexities of power dynamics within and between nations. It serves as a reminder of the importance of maintaining a critical perspective on the evolution of political thought and practice.。

大学英语综合教程4英语单词词汇重点

大学英语综合教程4英语单词词汇重点

____ because of 3. It was a decisive ________ battle — we won the war it. 4. The Philippines had suffered grievously under the campaign Japanese occupation. A highly effective guerilla ___________ controlled sixty percent of the islands, mostly jungle and mountain areas.
CF: crucial, critical & decisive 这三个词都是形容词,都有“紧要的、紧迫的、重要 的”之意 critical 意为“决定性的”,与crucial相似,但表示对缺 乏程度更精确的估计。在转折关头时比crucial表 现出更大的严重性。例如: The patient’s condition is critical. 病人情况危急。 decisive 意思是“决定性的、果断的”,具有重要、特殊 或决定性效果。 例如: Our air forces were decisive in winning the war. 我们的空军对打赢这场战争有决定性的贡献。
retreat: v. move back or withdraw when faced with danger or difficulty After a fierce battle, the troops retreated southward. 我们采取如下策略:敌进我退,敌退我追。 We adopted the following strategies: When the enemy advances, we retreat; when they retreat, we pursue. NB: retreat 的反义词是advance,例如: to advance against (on, to, toward) to retreat from to retreat to 朝„前进 从„撤退 撤退到

丘吉尔著名的铁幕演说

丘吉尔著名的铁幕演说

丘吉尔著名的铁幕演说 1946年3⽉,英国前⾸相丘吉尔在美国富尔顿发表的反苏演说,⼜称铁幕演说。

铁幕演说也被认为是正式拉开了冷战的序幕。

以下是丘吉尔演讲的部分节选。

以下是店铺为⼤家整理的丘吉尔著名的铁幕演说,仅供参考,⼤家⼀起来看看吧。

英⽂原⽂: The United States stands at this time at the pinnacle of world power. It is a solemn moment for the American democracy. For with this primacy in power is also joined an awe-inspiring accountability to the future. As you look around you, you must feel not only the sense of duty done, but also you must feel anxiety lest you fall below the level of achievement. Opportunity is here now, clear and shining, for both our countries. To reject it or ignore it or fritter it away will bring upon us all the long reproaches of the aftertime. It is necessary that constancy of mind, persistency of purpose, and the grand simplicity of decision shall rule and guide the conduct of the English-speaking peoples in peace as they did in war. We must, and I believe we shall, prove ourselves equal to this severe requirement. I have a strong admiration and regard for the valiant Russian people and for my wartime comrade, Marshal Stalin. There is deep sympathy and goodwill in Britain -- and I doubt not here also -- toward the peoples of all the Russians and a resolve to persevere through many differences and rebuffs in establishing lasting friendships. It is my duty, however, to place before you certain facts about the present position in Europe. From Stetting in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia; all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and in some cases increasing measure of control from Moscow. The safety of the world, ladies and gentlemen, requires a unity in Europe, from which no nation should be permanently outcast. It is from the quarrels of the strong parent races in Europe that the world wars we have witnessed, or which occurred in former times, have sprung. Twice the United States has had to send several millions of its young men across the Atlantic to fight the wars,But now we all can find any nation, wherever it may dwell, between dusk and dawn. Surely we should work with conscious purpose for a grand pacification of Europe within the structure of the United Nations and in accordance with our Charter. In a great number of countries, far from the Russian frontiers and throughout the world, Communist fifth columns are established and work in complete unity and absolute obedience to the directions they receive from the Communist center. Except in the British Commonwealth and in the United States where Communism is in its infancy, the Communist parties or fifth columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilization. The outlook is also anxious in the Far East and especially in Manchuria. The agreement which was made at Yalta, to which I was a party, was extremely favorable to Soviet Russia, but it was made at a time when no one could say that the German war might not extend all through the summer and autumn of 1945 and when the Japanese war was expected by the best judges to last for a further eighteen months from the end of the German war. I repulse the idea that a new war is inevitable -- still more that it is imminent. It is because I am sure that our fortunes are still in our own hands and that we hold the power to save the future, that I feel the duty to speak out now that I have the occasion and the opportunity to do so. I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines. But what we have to consider here today while time remains, is the permanent prevention of war and the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries. Our difficulties and dangers will not be removed by closing our eyes to them. They will not be removed by mere waiting to see what happens; nor will they be removed by a policy of appeasement. What is needed is a settlement, and the longer this is delayed, the more difficult it will be and the greater our dangers will become. From what I have seen of our Russian friends and allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness. For that reason the old doctrine of a balance of power is unsound. We cannot afford, if we can help it, to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength. Last time I saw it all coming and I cried aloud to my own fellow countrymen and to the world, but no one paid any attention. Up till the year 1933 or even 1935, Germany might have been saved from the awful fate which has overtaken her and we might all have been spared the miseries Hitler let loose upon mankind. There never was a war in history easier to prevent by timely action than the one which has just desolated such great areas of the globe. It could have been prevented, in my belief, without the firing of a single shot, and Germany might be powerful, prosperous and honored today; but no one would listen and one by one we were all sucked into the awful whirlpool. We must not let it happen again. This can only be achieved by reaching now, in 1946, a good understanding on all points with Russia under the general authority of the United Nations Organization and by the maintenance of that good understanding through many peaceful years, by the whole strength of the English-speaking world and all its connections. If the population of the English-speaking Commonwealth be added to that of the United States, with all that such cooperation implies in the air, on the sea, all over the globe, and in science and in industry, and in moral force, there will be no quivering, precarious balance of power to offer its temptation to ambition or adventure. On the contrary there will be an overwhelming assurance of security. If we adhere faithfully to the Charter of the United Nations and walk forward in sedate and sober strength, seeking no one's land or treasure, seeking to lay no arbitrary control upon the thoughts of men, if all British moral and material forces and convictions are joined with your own in fraternal association, the high roads of the future will be clear, not only for us but for all, not only for our time but for a century to come. 拓展: 丘吉尔铁幕演说的影响 当时美苏两国是世界上最强⼤的两个国家,俗话说“⼀⼭不容⼆虎”,随着战争的结束,共同敌⼈的消失,美苏之间的利益摩擦也就⽇趋剧烈,不只是单独的美苏之间的利益争夺,也是资本主义和共产主义两种截然不⽤的意识形态之间的⽃争,可以说在当时双⽅之间已经有了很多的摩擦,只是还碍于各种各样的原因没有摆到明⾯上来,⽽丘吉尔的这⼀场铁幕演说就是直接的撕开了双⽅的遮羞布,将整件事情挑明了。

containment of George F. Kennan

containment of George F. Kennan

乔治•凯南(George F. Kennan)遏制政策(containment)始创人。

他的八千字电报及其在《外交》季刊上以X署名发表的《苏联行为的根源》使其获得了“冷战之父”的称号。

下面是其“X论文”的英文全文。

The political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances: ideology inherited by the present Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had their political origin, and circumstances of the power which they now have exercised for nearly three decades in Russia. There can be few tasks of psychological analysis more difficult than to try to trace the interaction of these two forces and the relative role of each in the determination of official Soviet conduct. Yet the attempt must be made if that conduct is to be understood and effectively countered.It is difficult to summarize the set of ideological concepts with which the Soviet leaders came into power. Marxian ideology, in its Russian-Communist projection, has always been in process of subtle evolution. The materials on which it bases itself are extensive and complex. But the outstanding features of Communist thought as it existed in 1916 may perhaps be summarized as follows: (a) that the central factor in the life of man, the factor which determines the character of public life and the "physiognomy of society," is the system by which material goods are produced and exchanged; (b) that the capitalist system of production is a nefarious one which inevitably leads to the exploitation of the working class by the capital-owning class and is incapable of developing adequately the economic resources of society or of distributing fairly the material goods produced by human labor; (c) that capitalism contains the seeds of its own destruction and must, in view of the inability of the capital-owning class to adjust itself to economic change, result eventually and inescapably in a revolutionary transfer of power to the working class; and (d) that imperialism, the final phase of capitalism, leads directly to war and revolution.(《国际关系经典选读》这本书里省略了以下黄色的两段)The rest may be outlined in Lenin's own words: "Unevenness of economic and political development is the inflexible law of capitalism. It follows from this that the victory of Socialism may come originally in a few capitalist countries or even in a single capitalist country. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and having organized Socialist production at home, would rise against the remaining capitalist world, drawing to itself in the process the oppressed classes of other countries." [see endnote 1] It must be noted that there was no assumption that capitalism would perish without proletarian revolution. A final push was needed from a revolutionary proletariat movement in order to tip over the tottering structure. But it was regarded as inevitable that sooner or later that push be given.For 50 years prior to the outbreak of the Revolution, this pattern of thought had exercised great fascination for the members of the Russian revolutionary movement. Frustrated, discontented, hopeless of finding self-expression -- or too impatient to seek it -- in the confining limits of the Tsarist political system, yet lacking wide popular support for their choice of bloody revolution as a means of social betterment, these revolutionists found in Marxist theory a highly convenient rationalization for their own instinctive desires. It afforded pseudo-scientific justification for their impatience, for their categorical denial of all value in the Tsarist system, for their yearning for power and revenge and for their inclination to cut corners in the pursuit of it. It is therefore no wonder that they had come to believe implicitly in the truth and soundness of theMarxian-Leninist teachings, so congenial to their own impulses and emotions. Their sincerity need not be impugned. This is a phenomenon as old as human nature itself. It has never been more aptly described than by Edward Gibbon, who wrote in The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire: "From enthusiasm to imposture the step is perilous and slippery; the demon of Socrates affords a memorable instance how a wise man may deceive himself, how a good man may deceive others, how the conscience may slumber in a mixed and middle state between self-illusion and voluntary fraud." And it was with this set of conceptions that the members of the Bolshevik Party entered into power.Now it must be noted that through all the years of preparation for revolution, the attention of these men, as indeed of Marx himself, had been centered less on the future form which Socialism [see endnote 2] would take than on the necessary overthrow of rival power which, in their view, had to precede the introduction of Socialism. Their views, therefore, on the positive program to be put into effect, once power was attained, were for the most part nebulous, visionary and impractical. Beyond the nationalization of industry and the expropriation of large private capital holdings there was no agreed program. The treatment of the peasantry, which according to the Marxist formulation was not of the proletariat, had always been a vague spot in the pattern of Communist thought; and it remained an object of controversy and vacillation for the first ten years of Communist power.The circumstances of the immediate post-revolution period -- the existence in Russia of civil war and foreign intervention, together with the obvious fact that the Communists represented only a tiny minority of the Russian people -- made the establishment of dictatorial power a necessity. The experiment with "war Communism" and the abrupt attempt to eliminate private production and trade had unfortunate economic consequences and caused further bitterness against the new revolutionary regime. While the temporary relaxation of the effort to communize Russia, represented by the New Economic Policy, alleviated some of this economic distress and thereby served its purpose, it also made it evident that the "capitalistic sector of society" was still prepared to profit at once from any relaxation of governmental pressure, and would, if permitted to continue to exist, always constitute a powerful opposing element to the Soviet regime and a serious rival for influence in the country. Somewhat the same situation prevailed with respect to the individual peasant who, in his own small way, was also a private producer.Lenin, had he lived, might have proved a great enough man to reconcile these conflicting forces to the ultimate benefit of Russian society, though this is questionable. But be that as it may, Stalin, and those whom he led in the struggle for succession to Lenin's position of leadership, were not the men to tolerate rival political forces in the sphere of power which they coveted. Their sense of insecurity was too great. Their particular brand of fanaticism, unmodified by any of the Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise, was too fierce and too jealous to envisage any permanent sharing of power. From the Russian-Asiatic world out of which they had emerged they carried with them a skepticism as to the possibilities of permanent and peaceful coexistence of rival forces. Easily persuaded of their own doctrinaire "rightness," they insisted on the submission or destruction of all competing power. Outside of the Communist Party, Russian society was to have no rigidity. There were to be no forms of collective human activity or association which would notbe dominated by the Party. No other force in Russian society was to be permitted to achieve vitality or integrity. Only the Party was to have structure. All else was to be an amorphous mass.And within the Party the same principle was to apply. The mass of Party members might go through the motions of election, deliberation, decision and action; but in these motions they were to be animated not by their own individual wills but by the awesome breath of the Party leadership and the over-brooding presence of "the word."Let it be stressed again that subjectively these men probably did not seek absolutism for its own sake. They doubtless believed -- and found it easy to believe -- that they alone knew what was good for society and that they would accomplish that good once their power was secure and unchallengeable. But in seeking that security of their own rule they were prepared to recognize no restrictions, either of God or man, on the character of their methods. And until such time as that security might be achieved, they placed far down on their scale of operational priorities the comforts and happiness of the peoples entrusted to their care.Now the outstanding circumstance concerning the Soviet regime is that down to the present day this process of political consolidation has never been completed and the men in the Kremlin have continued to be predominantly absorbed with the struggle to secure and make absolute the power which they seized in November 1917. They have endeavored to secure it primarily against forces at home, within Soviet society itself. But they have also endeavored to secure it against the outside world. For ideology, as we have seen, taught them that the outside world was hostile and that it was their duty eventually to overthrow the political forces beyond their borders. The powerful hands of Russian history and tradition reached up to sustain them in this feeling. Finally, their own aggressive intransigence with respect to the outside world began to find its own reaction; and they were soon forced, to use another Gibbonesque phrase, "to chastise the contumacy" which they themselves had provoked. It is an undeniable privilege of every man to prove himself right in the thesis that the world is his enemy; for if he reiterates it frequently enough and makes it the background of his conduct he is bound eventually to be right.Now it lies in the nature of the mental world of the Soviet leaders, as well as in the character of their ideology, that no opposition to them can be officially recognized as having any merit or justification whatsoever. Such opposition can flow, in theory, only from the hostile and incorrigible forces of dying capitalism. As long as remnants of capitalism were officially recognized as existing in Russia, it was possible to place on them, as an internal element, part of the blame for the maintenance of a dictatorial form of society. But as these remnants were liquidated, little by little, this justification fell away; and when it was indicated officially that they had been finally destroyed, it disappeared altogether. And this fact created one of the most basic of the compulsions which came to act upon the Soviet regime: since capitalism no longer existed in Russia and since it could not be admitted that there could be serious or widespread opposition to the Kremlin springing spontaneously from the liberated masses under its authority, it became necessary to justify the retention of the dictatorship by stressing the menace of capitalism abroad. 《国际关系经典选读》这本书里省略了以下黄色的两段)This began at an early date. In 1924 Stalin specifically defended the retention of the "organs of suppression," meaning, among others, the army and the secret police, on the ground that "as long as there is a capitalist encirclement there will be danger of intervention with all the consequences that flow from that danger." In accordance with that theory, and from that time on, all internal opposition forces in Russia have consistently been portrayed as the agents of foreign forces of reaction antagonistic to Soviet power.By the same token, tremendous emphasis has been placed on the original Communist thesis of a basic antagonism between the capitalist and Socialist worlds. It is clear, from many indications, that this emphasis is not founded in reality. The real facts concerning it have been confused by the existence abroad of genuine resentment provoked by Soviet philosophy and tactics and occasionally by the existence of great centers of military power, notably the Nazi regime in Germany and the Japanese Government of the late 1930s, which did indeed have aggressive designs against the Soviet Union. But there is ample evidence that the stress laid in Moscow on the menace confronting Soviet society from the world outside its borders is founded not in the realities of foreign antagonism but in the necessity of explaining away the maintenance of dictatorial authority at home.Now the maintenance of this pattern of Soviet power, namely, the pursuit of unlimited authority domestically, accompanied by the cultivation of the semi-myth of implacable foreign hostility, has gone far to shape the actual machinery of Soviet power as we know it today. Internal organs of administration which did not serve this purpose withered on the vine. Organs which did serve this purpose became vastly swollen. The security of Soviet power came to rest on the iron discipline of the Party, on the severity and ubiquity of the secret police, and on the uncompromising economic monopolism of the state. The "organs of suppression," in which the Soviet leaders had sought security from rival forces, became in large measure the masters of those whom they were designed to serve. Today the major part of the structure of Soviet power is committed to the perfection of the dictatorship and to the maintenance of the concept of Russia as in a state of siege, with the enemy lowering beyond the walls. And the millions of human beings who form that part of the structure of power must defend at all costs this concept of Russia's position, for without it they are themselves superfluous.As things stand today, the rulers can no longer dream of parting with these organs of suppression. The quest for absolute power, pursued now for nearly three decades with a ruthlessness unparalleled (in scope at least) in modern times, has again produced internally, as it did externally, its own reaction. The excesses of the police apparatus have fanned the potential opposition to the regime into something far greater and more dangerous than it could have been before those excesses began.But least of all can the rulers dispense with the fiction by which the maintenance of dictatorial power has been defended. For this fiction has been canonized in Soviet philosophy by the excesses already committed in its name; and it is now anchored in the Soviet structure of thought by bonds far greater than those of mere ideology.So much for the historical background. What does it spell in terms of the political personality of Soviet power as we know it today?Of the original ideology, nothing has been officially junked. Belief is maintained in the basic badness of capitalism, in the inevitability of its destruction, in the obligation of the proletariat to assist in that destruction and to take power into its own hands. But stress has come to be laid primarily on those concepts which relate most specifically to the Soviet regime itself: to its position as the sole truly Socialist regime in a dark and misguided world, and to the relationships of power within it.The first of these concepts is that of the innate antagonism between capitalism and Socialism. We have seen how deeply that concept has become imbedded in foundations of Soviet power. It has profound implications for Russia's conduct as a member of international society. It means that there can never be on Moscow's side any sincere assumption of a community of aims between the Soviet Union and powers which are regarded as capitalist. It must invariably be assumed in Moscow that the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime, and therefore to the interests of the peoples it controls. If the Soviet government occasionally sets its signature to documents which would indicate the contrary, this is to be regarded as a tactical maneuver permissible in dealing with the enemy (who is without honor) and should be taken in the spirit of caveat emptor. Basically, the antagonism remains. It is postulated. And from it flow many of the phenomena which we find disturbing in the Kremlin's conduct of foreign policy: the secretiveness, the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the wary suspiciousness and the basic unfriendliness of purpose. These phenomena are there to stay, for the foreseeable future. There can be variations of degree and of emphasis. When there is something the Russians want from us, one or the other of these features of their policy may be thrust temporarily into the background; and when that happens there will always be Americans who will leap forward with gleeful announcements that "the Russians have changed," and some who will even try to take credit for having brought about such "changes." But we should not be misled by tactical maneuvers. These characteristics of Soviet policy, like the postulate from which they flow, are basic to the internal nature of Soviet power, and will be with us, whether in the foreground or the background, until the internal nature of Soviet power is changed.This means that we are going to continue for a long time to find the Russians difficult to deal with. It does not mean that they should be considered as embarked upon a do-or-die program to overthrow our society by a given date. The theory of the inevitability of the eventual fall of capitalism has the fortunate connotation that there is no hurry about it.(《国际关系经典选读》这本书里省略了以下黄色的部分)Meanwhile, what is vital is that the "Socialist fatherland" -- that oasis of power which has been already won for Socialism in the person of the Soviet Union -- should be cherished and defended by all good Communists at home and abroad, its fortunes promoted, its enemies badgered and confounded. The promotion of premature, "adventuristic" revolutionary projects abroad which might embarrass Soviet power in any way would be an inexcusable, even a counterrevolutionary act. The cause of Socialism is thesupport and promotion of Soviet power, as defined in Moscow.This brings us to the second of the concepts important to contemporary Soviet outlook. That is the infallibility of the Kremlin. The Soviet concept of power, which permits no focal points of organization outside the Party itself, requires that the Party leadership remain in theory the sole repository of truth. For if truth were to be found elsewhere, there would be justification for its expression in organized activity. But it is precisely that which the Kremlin cannot and will not permit.The leadership of the Communist Party is therefore always right, and has been always right ever since in 1929 Stalin formalized his personal power by announcing that decisions of the Politburo were being taken unanimously.: S2 y( l& H, uOn the principle of infallibility there rests the iron discipline of the Communist Party. In fact, the two concepts are mutually self-supporting. Perfect discipline requires recognition of infallibility. Infallibility requires the observance of discipline. And the two together go far to determine the behaviorism of the entire Soviet apparatus of power. But their effect cannot be understood unless a third factor be taken into account: namely, the fact that the leadership is at liberty to put forward for tactical purposes any particular thesis which it finds useful to the cause at any particular moment and to require the faithful and unquestioning acceptance of the thesis by the members of the movement as a whole. This means that truth is not a constant but is actually created, for all intents and purposes, by the Soviet leaders themselves. It may vary from week to week, month to month. It is nothing absolute and immutable -- nothing which flows from objective reality. It is only the most recent manifestation of the wisdom of those in whom the ultimate wisdom is supposed to reside, because they represent the logic of history. The accumulative effect of these factors is to give to the whole subordinate apparatus of Soviet power an unshakable stubbornness and steadfastness in its orientation. This orientation can be changed at will by the Kremlin but by no other power. Once a given party line has been laid down on a given issue of current policy, the whole Soviet governmental machine, including the mechanism of diplomacy, moves inexorably along the prescribed path, like a persistent toy automobile wound up and headed in a given direction, stopping only when it meets with some unanswerable force. The individuals who are the components of this machine are unamenable to argument or reason which comes to them from outside sources. Their whole training has taught them to mistrust and discount the glib persuasiveness of the outside world. Like the white dog before the phonograph, they hear only the "master's voice." And if they are to be called off from the purposes last dictated to them, it is the master who must call them off. Thus the foreign representative cannot hope that his words will make any impression on them. The most that he can hope is that they will be transmitted to those at the top, who are capable of changing the party line. But even those are not likely to be swayed by any normal logic in the words of the bourgeois representative. Since there can be no appeal to common purposes, there can be no appeal to common mental approaches. For this reason, facts speak louder than words to the ears of the Kremlin; and words carry the greatest weight when they have the ring of reflecting, or being backed up by, facts of unchallengeable validity.But we have seen that the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposesin a hurry. Like the Church, it is dealing in ideological concepts which are of long-term validity, and it can afford to be patient. It has no right to risk the existing achievements of the revolution for the sake of vain baubles of the future. The very teachings of Lenin himself require great caution and flexibility in the pursuit of Communist purposes. Again, these precepts are fortified by the lessons of Russian history: of centuries of obscure battles between nomadic forces over the stretches of a vast unfortified plain. Here caution, circumspection, flexibility and deception are the valuable qualities; and their value finds natural appreciation in the Russian or the oriental mind. Thus the Kremlin has no compunction about retreating in the face of superior force. And being under the compulsion of no timetable, it does not get panicky under the necessity for such retreat. Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them. The main thing is that there should always be pressure, unceasing constant pressure, toward the desired goal. There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that that goal must be reached at any given time.These considerations make Soviet diplomacy at once easier and more difficult to deal with than the diplomacy of individual aggressive leaders like Napoleon and Hitler. On the one hand it is more sensitive to contrary force, more ready to yield on individual sectors of the diplomatic front when that force is felt to be too strong, and thus more rational in the logic and rhetoric of power. On the other hand it cannot be easily defeated or discouraged by a single victory on the part of its opponents. And the patient persistence by which it is animated means that it can be effectively countered not by sporadic acts which represent the momentary whims of democratic opinion but only by intelligent long-range policies on the part of Russia's adversaries -- policies no less steady in their purpose, and no less variegated and resourceful in their application, than those of the Soviet Union itself.In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward "toughness." While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to political realities, it is by no means unamenable to considerations of prestige. Like almost any other government, it can be placed by tactless and threatening gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated by its sense of realism. The Russian leaders are keen judges of human psychology, and as such they are highly conscious that loss of temper and of self-control is never a source of strength in political affairs. They are quick to exploit such evidences of weakness. For these reasons, it is a sine qua non of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige.In the light of the above, it will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the free institutionsof the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence. (《国际关系经典选读》这本书里省略了以下黄色部分)The Russians look forward to a duel of infinite duration, and they see that already they have scored great successes. It must be borne in mind that there was a time when the Communist Party represented far more of a minority in the sphere of Russian national life than Soviet power today represents in the world community.But if ideology convinces the rulers of Russia that truth is on their side and that they can therefore afford to wait, those of us on whom that ideology has no claim are free to examine objectively the validity of that premise. The Soviet thesis not only implies complete lack of control by the west over its own economic destiny, it likewise assumes Russian unity, discipline and patience over an infinite period. Let us bring this apocalyptic vision down to earth, and suppose that the western world finds the strength and resourcefulness to contain Soviet power over a period of ten to fifteen years. What does that spell for Russia itself?The Soviet leaders, taking advantage of the contributions of modern technique to the arts of despotism, have solved the question of obedience within the confines of their power. Few challenge their authority; and even those who do are unable to make that challenge valid as against the organs of suppression of the state.The Kremlin has also proved able to accomplish its purpose of building up in Russia, regardless of the interests of the inhabitants, an industrial foundation of heavy metallurgy, which is, to be sure, not yet complete but which is nevertheless continuing to grow and is approaching those of the other major industrial countries. All of this, however, both the maintenance of internal political security and the building of heavy industry, has been carried out at a terrible cost in human life and in human hopes and energies. It has necessitated the use of forced labor on a scale unprecedented in modern times under conditions of peace. It has involved the neglect or abuse of other phases of Soviet economic life, particularly agriculture, consumers' goods production, housing and transportation.To all that, the war has added its tremendous toll of destruction, death and human exhaustion. In consequence of this, we have in Russia today a population which is physically and spiritually tired. The mass of the people are disillusioned, skeptical and no longer as accessible as they once were to the magical attraction which Soviet power still radiates to its followers abroad. The avidity with which people seized upon the slight respite accorded to the Church for tactical reasons during the war was eloquent testimony to the fact that their capacity for faith and devotion found little expression in the purposes of the regime.In these circumstances, there are limits to the physical and nervous strength of people themselves. These limits are absolute ones, and are binding even for the cruelest dictatorship, because beyond them people cannot be driven. The forced labor camps and the other agencies of constraint provide temporary means of compelling people to work longer hours than their own volition or mere。

关于苏联解体的书

关于苏联解体的书

关于苏联解体的书苏联解体是20世纪最重大、最具影响力的国家事件之一。

苏联解体的原因和影响,一直是历史学界和政治学界一直关注的热点问题。

以下是一些关于苏联解体的书籍,以帮助读者更好地了解苏联解体的历史背景和影响。

1.《苏联解体》(The Collapse of the Soviet Union) 作者:David R. Marples该书是对苏联解体的全面分析。

作者将苏联解体的原因和影响进行了深入探讨,包括苏联的经济、政治、社会和文化因素等。

更重要的是,该书在全球化和后冷战时期的新形势下,对苏联解体的意义进行了深刻的反思。

2.《苏联解体为什么会发生》(Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse?) 作者:Robert W. Strayer该书探讨了苏联解体的原因,从政治、经济、文化和历史等方面进行了分析。

其中,作者特别强调苏联政治体制的缺陷和苏联经济模式的不合理性,成为苏联解体的主要原因。

3.《苏联解体:政治过程分析》(The Political Process of Soviet Union's Collapse) 作者:Jiri Valenta和Frank Cibulka 该书主要分析苏联解体的政治过程,从政治领导层和社会矛盾等方面进行了深入研究。

作者认为,苏联解体是政治领导层的内部斗争和社会矛盾的爆发所导致的。

4.《苏联解体:历史课题的重现》(The Collapse of the SovietUnion: A Revisit of Historical Issues) 作者:James E. Goodby 该书主要探讨苏联解体的历史背景和影响。

作者从苏联的历史、国际环境和改革开放的进程等方面进行了分析,强调苏联解体的历史必然性和对全球政治格局的深远影响。

5.《苏联解体:内部和国际因素》(The Collapse of the Soviet Union: Internal and International Factors) 作者:Michael Rywkin该书主要探讨苏联解体的内部因素和国际因素。

cold-war。美苏冷战-英语版。

cold-war。美苏冷战-英语版。

Soviet representative Marshal Zhukov signed the treaty. May 14, 1955 ,the Warsaw Treaty Organization was established.
Arms Race
Cold War tensions increased in the US when the USSR exploded its first atomic bomb in 1949.
Causes of Cold War
• There were deep-rooted ideological, economic and political differences between the United States and the Soviet Union before the Second World War. These differences were intensified as a result of their mutual suspicions immediately after the Second World War.
两大阵营与军事集团
社会主义阵营:苏联为首
华沙条约组织(华约1955)
The socialist camp
资本主义阵营:美国为首
北大西洋公约组织(北约
1949)
The capitalist camp
美苏争霸的过程
阶段划分 第一阶段
50年代中期至60 年代中期 赫鲁晓夫 肯尼迪
第二阶段
60年代中期至70 年代末 勃列日涅夫
Policy
Truman socialist杜鲁门主义
Economy German problem Military

肯尼迪就职演讲历史背景

肯尼迪就职演讲历史背景
In general election, Kennedy proposed the strategy of development of science and economy, and advocated peace in two relationships. Since he was young and prestigious, American voted for him one after another.
Kennedy's peace strategy was based on military strength, proposing the improvement of status of the western Allies by a peaceful way.
In the relationship with the Soviet union and other socialist countries, they would promote the "peaceful e v o l u t i o n " (和平演 变)
world.
The
recovery
and
development of economy in
Western Europe resulted in the
reinforcement of independence
from the United States.
The unity of the western world led by the United States began to split.
Due to the progress of industrialization, a large number of them flowed into cities.

有关国际关系的口译学习材料

有关国际关系的口译学习材料

International Relation英译汉:1.The role of the United Nations has gained increasing importance since the end of the Cold War.冷战结束后的联合国起着越来越重要的作用。

2.The increasing prestige is due in part to the fact that the Security Council has escaped the paral resulted from the US-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War, a period when the two superpowers used their rights against each other, thereby incapacitating the Security Council.联合国地位的上升部分是因为安理会摆脱了冷战期间因美苏对抗而出现的瘫 痪状态,当时两个超级大国各自使用自己的否决权来反对对方,致使安理会 无法正常运作。

3.The West, just as the developing world, h as discovered that i t n eeds the United Nations t o achieve i tsobjectives.西方世界同发展中国家一样也发现它需要联合国以达到自己的目的。

4.In addition, global problems, including t he proliferationof nuclear w eapons, rapidly e xpandinginternational community to pool their populations, the environment, drugs and refugees, call for the entireefforts to find solutions.此外,包括核武器扩散、人口激增、环境污染、吸毒以及难民在内的全球性 问题要求整个国际社会共同努力,携手寻求解决问题的方法。

大学英语(全新版)第三册电子教案

大学英语(全新版)第三册电子教案

(全新版)第三册电子教案Unit Four THE WATERY PLACEI. Teaching objectivesStudents will be able to :1.understand the main idea ( to be found in Part I) and structureof the text ( narration in time sequence);2.appreciate the difference between formal speech andinformation speech;3.grasp the key language points and grammatical structures inthe text;4.conduct a series of reading, listening, speaking, and writingactivities related to the theme of the unit.II. Text SummaryThe text tells of a stupid error which results in a discouraging thing that no extraterrestrials will ever land on the Earth. The story begins with the introduction of he character of Bart Cameron, the Sheriff at Twin Gulch, Idacho, who is a quick-tempered and impatient person. On that special day, April 14, 1956, the author sees the flying saucer. But just because of the extraterrestrials’ too formal English and Bart’s too bad mood that day, Bart Cameron misunderstands the extraterrestrials once and time again . Finally , they fly back to Venus. Therefore we课文概述文章讲述了由于一个愚蠢的错误导致再无外星人光顾地球的故事。

高级英语L5_Speech_on_Hitler's_Invasion_of_the_U.S.S.R

高级英语L5_Speech_on_Hitler's_Invasion_of_the_U.S.S.R

Service in the Army
• 1895, Second Lieutenant (少尉) in the 4th Queen‘s Own Hussars [hə‟zɑː(r)] 轻骑兵 • volunteer soldier & war correspondent • Cuba, India, Sudan, South Africa
Family and early life
• Nickname: “Winnie” • Family • father: a politician mother: the daughter of an American millionaire one brother • He had 1 son and 4 daughters. • Education: • Harrow and Royal Military College, Sandhurst 英国陆军军官 学校(在桑德赫斯特)
• painting • impressionist scenes of landscape(印象派)
Churchill as an artist
World War II
• Aug. 1939 : • Russia-Germany non-aggression pact
• Sept. 1, 1939: • German invasion of Poland • Sept. 3, 1939: • France and Britain declared war on Germany, officially beginning World War II
• • • • • • Dec. 7, 1941: Pearl Harbour Sept. 1943: the Allies conquered Sicily and South Italy. Italy surrendered. May 7. 1945: Germany surrendered unconditionally. Aug. 14, 1945: Japan announced its surrender.

乔治·凯南遏制思想与杜鲁门政府遏制战略的对比

乔治·凯南遏制思想与杜鲁门政府遏制战略的对比

乔治·凯南遏制思想与杜鲁门政府遏制战略的对比作者:张亚伟来源:《大东方》2017年第07期在战后长达四十多年的美苏冷战中,遏制战略一直是美国对苏政策的核心。

乔治·凯南的遏制思想奠定了美国遏制战略的思想基础,杜鲁门政府的遏制战略则是对遏制思想的实践与发展,两者之间既有共同的根基,又存在着明显的差别。

一、相同之处无论是乔治·凯南的遏制思想还是杜鲁门政府的遏制战略,都是为了遏制以苏联为首的共产主义势力的扩张,将其控制在特定的范围之内。

然而在实行的过程中,一方面,实现了既定的目标,维护了美国的国家利益,另一方面也不可避免的对两国的社会发展产生了消极影响。

乔治凯南的“遏制”思想以及杜鲁门政府的遏制战略都是特定时代背景的产物。

它们的产生以及实施结果都在一定程度上使美国取得了地缘政治优势,为美国战后称霸世界提供了便利。

通过实行“马歇尔计划“和建立北大西洋公约组织,一方面加强了美国对于西欧经济的控制与渗透,另一方面也为以后的美苏争霸奠定了军事和势力范围基础。

但与此同时我们也不难发现,无论是乔治·凯南的“遏制”思想,还是杜鲁门政府的遏制战略都存在着明显的不足。

首先,它们都暴露出过分强调意识形态的对立与冲突,夸大对手的威胁,给美国外交政策带来了负面影响。

美国提出遏制战略所要遏制的是苏联的权力,但在现实的实践过程中,却不断夸大苏联政权的危险性,认为与苏联的妥协是根本不存在的,必须对苏采取强硬态度,遏制苏联的对外扩张,甚至是将战略基础建立在对苏联及社会主义阵营国家对外政策的预测之上,这便使得战后美国的外交策略缺乏现实依据,常常带有巨大的盲目性,从而给战后国际关系的演进产生了巨大的不利影响。

其次,遏制战略导致了以美苏为主的资本主义和社会主义两大阵营之间的激烈对抗和军备竞赛,北大西洋公约组织以及华沙条约组织的建立,使得世界长期处于核战争的威胁之下,两大阵营的人们相互对立、相互仇恨,国家之间不在进行正常的往来和合作,不利于国际关系的正常发展。

《全新版大学英语-听说教程第五册》听力原文 College English Listening and Speaking Course 5 - Unit 1

《全新版大学英语-听说教程第五册》听力原文 College English Listening and Speaking Course 5 - Unit 1

R e c o r d e r C o l e W i n G a oUnit One Space ExplorationPart A Pre-listening Task (1)Listen to the facts and opinions about Space Exploration twice and fill in the blanks with the words you hear from the recording. Pay attention to the sentence structures that you might find useful in your discussions.Facts and Opinions1. Space exploration is exciting. But it is very costly and risky.2. The achievement of sending astronauts to the lunar surface and backrepresents the summit of human space flight.3. Since ancient times, people have dreamed of leaving our planet andexploring other worlds.4. Rockets were invented in China in about the 11th century.5. China launched its first artificial satellite on April 24, 1970, but it hasn't putpiloted spacecraft into orbit yet.6. The space age began with the launch of the first artificial satellite by theSoviet Union in 1957.7. The ability to take part in space exploration represents the level of a nation'sscientific and economic development.8. Beginning in 1960 weather satellites have sent back television images ofparts of the earth.9. Satellite systems have enabled us to see what is happening around theworld.10. W ithout satellite services, we wouldn't be able to view a live transmission ofthe Olympic Games.11. C hina is one of the nations that have the ability to conduct large-scale spaceexploration.12. S pace exploration has brought about great changes in our lives, such asweather prediction and environmental monitoring.13. T he cameras on a spaceship or satellite can provide a wealth of useful data. 14. I t is reported that another spaceship, named Ariane, exploded in the airthree minutes after its launch.15. I n the near future, our country will be able to send its first piloted spaceshipinto space.16. S oviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin became the first human in space in 1961. 17. O n July 20, 1969, American astronaut Neil Armstrong and others aboardApollo 11 made a successful landing on the moon.R e c o r d e r C o l e W i n G a o18. A rmstrong left the first human footprint on another world. His famous wordson the moon were, "That's one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind."19. I n the future, commercial flights into Earth orbit may become available andtourists can take a spaceship for sightseeing in space.20. W e are concerned that one day a satellite going out of order may crash ontothe earth and hit us.21. A man-made disaster may occur in the event of a malfunctioning (出故障的) spaceship crashing into a densely populated area.22. T o some extent the ability to carry out a space program is a measure of anation's economic strength.23. T he reusable space shuttles are designed to lower the cost of launchingsatellites into Earth orbit.24. I n 1986 the Soviets launched the first space station that consisted of distinctunits, or modules.Part A Pre-listening Task (1)Pair/ Group Work - Additional question for discussion 1. What are the significance/benefits of space exploration? 2. What are the potential dangers that astronauts face?3. Do you think the day will come when tourists can sit in a spaceship to goaround the world or to visit distant planets?4. Do you know any movie that describes the activities of space exploration?Talk about that movie if possible.Sample1. What are the significance/benefits of space exploration?At the end of the 50s of the last century, the United States and the former Soviet Union carried out space competition (注释:centered on lunar exploration), setting off the first space exploration upsurge (高涨). From 1958 to the end of August 1976, the two countries successfully launched 45 lunar probes (探测仪). In July 1969, the American Apollo spaceship realized the first human moon landing, making epoch-making (掀天揭地) achievement in lunar exploration. Through space exploration, esp ecially lunar probing (探索), we have greatly heightening human understanding of the moon, earth and solar systems, propelling (驱使) and bringing about a series of innovations (一系列的创新) and development in basic science, science and technology, forming a large batch (一批) of high-tech industrial groups and producing remarkable social-economic efficiency. 2. What are the potential dangers that astronauts face?There are many potential dangers involved in space ex ploration. Any mistakes or errors made by the spaceship designers and manufacturers would result a catastrophe (大灾难). Remember the explosion of the space shuttle Colombia? JustR e c o r d e r C o l e W i n G a othe tiny piece of metal broke off from the surface of the ship and that caused an explosion of it when re-entering the earth ’s atmosphere, killing all seven astronauts on board.Of cause there are other potential for the astronauts, such as weightlessness and harmful solar radiation. We know that long-time exposure to theultraviolet radiationwill lead to development of skin cancer .3. Do you think the day will come when tourists can sit in a spaceship to goaround the world or to visit distant planets?Yes. I think the day will soon come. On April 8, 2004, it was reported that the US government has issued the first license for a manned suborbital (亚轨道) rocket, a step toward opening commercial space flight for private individuals for the first time. The vehicle, named SpaceShipOne, will carry three passengers into space on a test flight. And the fare, I guess, will be less than $10 million. Part BListening Task(A)Work BankDennis Tito (人名)NASA abbr. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (美国) 国家航空和航天局cosmonaut n. 字航员,航天员the International Space Station 国际空间站 cosmodrome n. 人造卫星及宇宙飞船发射场 Kazakstan n. (独联体〉哈萨克斯坦 strike a deal 达成协议 Siberia 西伯利亚the Soyuz spacecraft {前苏联〉联盟号宇宙飞船 coupled with 与……联系/连接aerospace engineering 航天工程学Notes1. Background InformationSpace exploration is our human response to curiosity about the earth, the moon, the planets, the sun and other stars, and the galaxies. Manned and unmanned space vehicles venture far beyond the boundaries of the earth to collect valuable information about the universe. Human beings have visited the moon and have lived in space stations for long periods. Space exploration helps us see the earth in its true relation to the rest of the universe. Such exploration could reveal how the sun, the planets, and theR e c o r d e r C o l e W i n G a ostars were formed and whether life exists beyond our own world.the space age began on Oct. 4, 1957. On that day, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik (later referred to as Sputnik 1), the first artificial satellite to orbit the earth. The first manned space flight was made on April 12. 1961. When Yuri Gagarin, a Soviet cosmonaut, orbited the earth in the spaceship Vostok (later called Vostok 1).2. ... the Russian space agency launched him and two Russian cosmonauts aboard a rocket …Tito first took the Soyuz spaceship for a journey to the International Space Station and then backed to the earth by landing in Siberia.3. cosmodrome The Baikonur cosmodrome in Kazakstan. It was built during the time of the Soviet Union and now is well known as a Russian satellite and spaceship launching siteThe World's First Space Tourist (Part One)On May 6, 2001, Dennis Tito, a 61-year-old California millionaire and former NASA engineer, became the world's first paying space tourist when the Russian space agency launched him and two Russian cosmonauts aboard a rocket for a journey to the International Space Station.Tito and the crew blasted off (发射) from the cosmodrome in Kazakstan on time. Tito appeared calm, wearing a space suit and a smile. The trip by the Russian crew was almost delayed due to concerns expressed by NASA that the space station would get too crowded while an American crew did some necessary computer repairs. Fortunately for Tito, NASA said Friday that it had struck a deal (达成协议) with the Russian Space Agency, allowing him to launch on time without interrupting the American crew's work on the ailing International Space Station.Tito paid the Russian space agency $20 million to fly in space, but Russia's partners in the space station -- especially NASA -- objected, saying his lack of training would require additional safety measures.Tito has been training at the Star City, Russia space center, for a year, learning the details of a Soyuz spacecraft and practicing how to survive a landing in Siberia. Just days before the launch, he proclaimed that he was well prepared. He said, "The training is what counts and I've had a significant amount of training. And that, I think, coupled with my aerospace engineering background, puts me in a very strong position, as far as being able to function in space. "Tito has no duties during the mission. He told reporters: "I'm not a fighter pilot, I'm a businessman, and I want to be able to absorb as much of this experience and relate it to as many people as I can." He said he would take pictures and tell people about the experience upon his return. Tito says his launch aboard a Russian rocket and six-day stay on the International SpaceR e c o r d e r C o l e W i n G a oStation demonstrates that anyone can -- and should -- experience space.Questions 1.:Listen to the recording and write down short answers to the following questions.1. Where was Tito born?He was a 61-year-old American millionaire and former NASA engineer. 2. When did Tito first become fascinated with space travel? On May 6, 2001.3. How many cosmonauts were on board the Russian spaceship? There were altogether three cosmonauts on board.4. What did Tito wear?Tito wore a space suit and smile.5. What was the destination of Tito ’s trip? The International Space Station.6. How much did Tito pay the Russian space agency t fly in space? He paid $20 million for the trip.7. Where did Tito receive his training? At the Star City, a Russian space Center. 8. What was Tito ’s duty the mission?He had no specific duties during the mission. 9. How long would Tito stay in space?He would stay in space for about six days. 10. Where would Tito land? In Siberia.Questions 2:Listen to the recording again and complete the following sentences with the information you obtain.1. Tito and the crew blasted off (发射) from the cosmodrome in Kazakstan on time. Tito appeared calm, wearing a space suit and a smile.2. Fortunately for Tito, NASA said Friday that it had struck a deal with theRussian Space Agency, allowing him to launch on time without interrupting the American crew's work on the ailing International Space Station.3. NASA, Russia's partners in the space station objected, saying his lack oftraining would require additional safety measures.4. Just days before the launch, he proclaimed that he was well prepared. Hesaid, "The training is what counts and I've had a significant amount of training. And that, I think, coupled with my aerospace engineeringR e c o r d e r C o l e W i n G a obackground, puts me in a very strong position, as far as being able to function in space. "5. Tito said he would take pictures and tell people about the experienceupon his return. Tito says his launch aboard a Russian rocket and six-day stay on the International Space Station demonstrates that anyone can -- and should -- experience space.(B)Work Bankseamstress n. 女裁缝Queens, N. Y. 纽约市皇后区Sputnik 人造地球卫星{特指前苏联1957年发射的世界第一颗人造卫星〉 Jet Propulsion Laboratory 喷气机推进实验室 Pasadena (美国城市名)Mariner Mars probe 水手号火星探测器 yearn for 渴望,向往 snapshot n. 快照 trillion num. 万亿manor house n. 庄园大厦 Los Angeles 洛杉矶(美国城市) Suzanne (人名) disposable ð. 可任意使用的 put ... on hold 暂时搁置Mir n. (前苏联)和平号宇宙空间站MirCorp joint venture 和平号合资公司 afloat a. 飘浮的Parachute v. 用降落伞着陆Notes1. Sputnik On Oct. 4, 1957, the Soviets launched the world's first artificial satellite, called Sputnik (fellow traveler). Although it was only a simple 58-cm (23-in) aluminum sphere containing a pair of radio transmitters, Sputnik's successful orbits around Earth marked a huge step in technology and ushered in the space age.2. Wilshire Associates Wilshire Associates Incorporated is a global investment advisory film that offers investment products and services, including investment consulting, asset management, mutual fund management and analytical tools, to clients in over 20 countries, representing over 400 organizations with assets totaling more than $2.5 trillion.3. The Russians didn't cut any corners... The Russians didn ’t cut back on any necessary training or lower the requirements for Tito.R e c o r d e r C o l e W i n G a oThe World's First Space Tourist (Part Two)Dennis Tito is the oldest child of working-class Italian immigrants whose ancestors came from the town of Tito in southern Italy. His father was a printer , and his mother was a seamstress (女裁缝). While growing up in Queens, N.Y ., Tito became interested in space travel. He says he dreamed of space flight when he saw Sputnik launch as a teenager in 1957. Yes, it was Sputnik that sparked his teenage imagination.Tito earned bachelor's and master's degrees in aerospace engineering and went to work in 1964 for the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, Calif. He charted flight paths for NASA's Mariner Mars probes, earning $15,000 a year . But he yearned for more -- more money.Tito founded his own company Wilshire Associates in the early 1970s, using the mathematical intelligence he developed during his NASA career to analyze the stock market instead. His firm produces the Wilshire 500 Total Market Index, which is watched by Federal Reserve officials as an overall snapshot of U.S. stock markets.By age 40, he had made his first million. The millions kept piling up; the investment firm now manages more than $10 billion in assets and advises on $1 trillion in assets. His personal fortune is estimated at $200 million.Tito's passions include opera, sailing and buying fast cars -- but driving them slowly. Most are housed in the eight-car garage of his 30,000-square-footmanor house with ocean views that he built on top of a mountain in Los Angeles. He and his wife, Suzanne, divorced shortly after the house was completed. His three children are in their 20s.With a large disposable income, Tito toyed with the idea of flying to Mir in the early 1990s. The Russians had just sent up a Japanese journalist and a British chemist for cash, and Tito wanted to be the next guest cosmonaut. But the Soviet Union's collapse forced him to put his dream on hold.The space dream came alive again in April 2000, when the MirCorp joint venture called in April 2000, in hopes of keeping Mir afloat.Tito put millions into an account that the Russian space program could access once he was launched to Mir , and went to the cosmonaut headquarters in the Star City, outside Moscow. There, the 5-foot-5, 140-pound, fit-lookingbusinessman threw himself into training. "The Russians didn't cut any corners," he boasted.When Russia decided to sink its 15-year-old space station, officials offered Tito an alternative destination -- the International Space Station, barely 2 years old. Another Soyuz spacecraft was needed at the space station as a fresh lifeboat, and the third, empty seat was offered to him.Tito was thrilled with the change in travel plans. "They're different star hotels," he said of the two space stations.R e c o r d e r C o l e W i n G a oHe took special delight in launching from the same pad where Sputnik took off on Oct. 4, 1957, and where the world's first spaceman, Yuri Gagarin, took off on April 12, 1961.Tito was the third American to be launched aboard a Russian rocket, but the first to land in a Russian spacecraft. The Soyuz capsule parachutes down into remote Kazakstan.All three of Tito's children were at the Baikonur Cosmodrome for his launch. Tito insisted he was not afraid or even nervous about his flight."If you're going to die of natural causes, does it pay to sit at home and be afraid to cross the street?" Tito said. "The main thing is, I'm not crazy." Questions 1 :Listen to the recording and choose the right answers to each questions you hear.1. Where was Tito born? A. In southern Italy B. In the UK . C . In the U.S .D . The passage does not say .正确答案:D . The passage does not say .2. When did Tito first become fascinated with space travel? A . In 1955 when he took his first f1ight to New York. B . I n 1957 when the Soviets l aunched Sputnik .C. In 1964 when he was on his first job in a jet l aboratory .D. In 1959 when the U.S . l aunched its first sate lli te .正确答案:B . I n 1957 when the Soviets l aunched Sputnik .3. What was Tito's major in university? A. Mathematics. B. Finance.C. Electronic engineering.D. Aerospace engineering.正确答案:D. Aerospace engineering.4. Which of the following may NOT be the business of Tito's firm? A. Manufacturing. B. Financial advisory. C. Investment consulting D. Stock market.正确答案:A. Manufacturing.5. Which of the following is NOT true about Tito's hobby?A. He likes singing.B. He loves sailing boats.C. He likes speeding in fast cars.D. He is fond of big houses.正确答案:C. He likes speeding in fast cars.6. What was the main cause of Tito's abandoning his plan to fly to Mir in the early 1990s?A. The U.S. government prohibited him from paying the Russians.B. The Soviet Union broke up.C. The Russians were not interested in Tito's application.D. Tito was busy with his divorce case.正确答案:B. The Soviet Union broke up.7. What can be inferred about Tito's training?A. The Russians gave him a hard time.B. Tito complained a lot about the strict training.C. Tito received strict training from both Russians and NASA.D. Tito's training was no different from that for Russian cosmonauts.正确答案:D. Tito's training was no different from that for Russian cosmonauts. Questions 2:Listen to the recording again and complete the following statements about Tito’s Personal information.R e c o r d e r C o l e W i n G a oSpeaking Task (1)You have just heart a story about the world ’s first space tourist, Dennis Tito. What is your opinion of him and his flight? Exchange views with your partner. Reflections:You may wish to cover the following points in your discussion.1. What is special about the space tourist Dennis Tito?2. What is the significance of Tito's f1ying in space?3. What are the prospects of the space tourism?4. What do you think: of Tito's courage to fly in space?Dennis Tito, an American millionaire from California, flew into space at his own expense and became the first space tourist in the world. He stayed in space for six days and then landed in Siberia.Dennis was born into a poor Italian immigrant family. From childhood, he had a dream of flying into space. He worked hard and accumulated a large fortune. Though he was a very successful businessman and could fly to anywhere in the world, he never abandoned his youthful dream -- flying into space. He managed to fulfill his dream at the age of 61. Of course, he had to pay a lot of money to the Russians and endure the hardship of strict space training.We should not underestimate the importance of Tito's flying in space. His trip marked the beginning of a new era in space exploration. As the technology of space exploration has matured, ordinary people now can fly in spaceships if they wish and commercial space travel will probably become popular in the next 20 or 50 years.But still, space travel at present involves danger. The recent breakup of the space shuttle "Columbia" is an example. Any minor mechanical fault or mistake could end in a disaster. Dennis Tito surely knew this danger but he demonstrated an exceptional courage in facing the difficulty and danger. He set a good example not only to his three children but also to all who are pursuing their teenage dreams. Speaking Task (2)R e c o r d e r C o l e W i n G a oDebatingAs you probably know, china has been conducting research and experiments that are aimed at sending cosmonauts into space. The successful launch and landing of the unmanned spacecraft Shenzhou IV has pushed China closer to its goal of manned space flight. Of course, to achieve this goal, China has to spend a huge amount of money estimated at 10 billion Yuan. We all know that China is still a developing country and its education still lags behind that of the developed countries. Many young Chinese are denied chances of receiving higher education because of insufficient educational facilities. So why not use this amount of money to build more universities across the country?Suppose you are the policymakers and you have the right to vote either for the space program or for building more universities, which decision would you make? Give your reasons.Topic: Argument for or against “using our limited resources on the manned space program ” Perspectives:1. From the perspective of supporter of the manned spaceship (for)2. From the perspective of those rejecting the space program (against) DemosFrom the perspective of supporters of the manned spaceship (for)If I were a policy maker, I would definitely support our space program. It ’s significance is manifold(有多种用途的).First, the launch of the unmanned spaceship Shenzhou IV is deemed(认为,相信) a symbol of national prestige(威望). This shows that our country is strong both militarily and economically, and China would become the third nation in the world to achieve manned space flight. The manned spaceship would also inspire Chinese people to love, support and defend our country.Second, the spaceship program requires the development of advanced technology, especially in the manufacturing sector. So it would contribute to the economic growth of our country.Third, the space program is an integrated program. It combines many branches of science, such as medicine, aerospace, genetic engineering, biophysics and even agriculture. Many experiments done on the spaceship would prove the quality of our lives. So the enormous amount of money spent would pay off in the end.From the perspective of those rejecting the space program(against)I don't think it's wise to spend so much money on the space program. There would appear to be no direct link between the unmanned or manned spaceship program and the quality of our daily life. As we all know, China is aR e c o r d e r C o l e W i n G a odeveloping country with a large population. We have so many domesticproblems waiting for us to solve and our economy is relatively weak. We cannot compete with the U.S. in space exploration. Besides, education in China lags behind that of the major developed countries. According to some statistic, only about one fifth of youth can receive higher education in China because of insufficient educational facilities. Poverty is still a serious social problem inChina, especially in the western part, which not only deprives many children of opportunities of going to school, but also slows down the process of applying science to production.So why not spend the limited funds available trying to improve the existing educational facilities and to build more universities? If more young people can receive higher education, China would have a better resource of manpower to compete with the U.S. Only science and education will save our country in the long run.Part C Additional ListeningMir's EndMir was a testament to Russian technology. Built to last five years, operational for 13, it's been called an accident waiting to happen, for the space station has survived fires, decompression and problems ranging from mechanical and computer breakdowns to a collision with an unmanned cargo ship.Since its launch in 1986, Mir has been home to over 25 crews from more than a dozen countries. It's been a base for astronomical observations and scientific experiments as well as giving astronauts invaluable experience of long-duration space flight. But Mir's end, though welcomed by many, could affect the pace of future space exploration.Mir really brings to an end, the end of that space race, uh, really closes off space race now. And I think to a certain extent, we won't see the challenge, that ... that competition to push the technology. So I think, we might see the exploration of the space slowing down from now on.Attempts to extend Mir's life by private and commercial funding have failed. So the current crew which includes a French astronaut from the European Space Agency will return inside the Soyuz spacecraft currently attached to Mir .When the last crew leaves Mir , it will be the end of an era. But one final crucial part of the mission is the decommissioning process. An automatic navigational system is already on board for its final descent into the Pacific Ocean next year .Questions 1:R e c o r d e r C o l e W i n G a oListen to the recording and choose the right answers to each question you hear.1. For how many years of operation was Mir designed to last? A. Five years. B. Eight years. C. Ten years.D. Thirteen years.正确答案:A. Five years.2. What happened to Mir during its flight? A. Some astronauts lost their lives.B. It survived fires, computer breakdowns, etc.C. It ran out of control many times.D. It orbited the earth very smoothly.正确答案:B. It survived fires, computer breakdowns, etc.3. What effect would Mir have if it descended onto the earth? A. It would cause a terrible explosion on the earth. B. It would put the astronauts in danger .C. It would have a bad effect on the pace of future space programs.D. It would explode in the air , affecting many countries.正确答案:C. It would have a bad effect on the pace of future space programs.4. What is the crucial part of Mir's last mission? A. It's about the safety of the last crew.B. It concerns the possible explosion of Mir in a densely populated area.C. It is the final descent into the ocean.D. Efforts are made to save the spaceship.正确答案:C. It is the final descent into the ocean.Part C Leisure Time HumorDogsThere was a man who had two dogs, named "Commonsense" and “Trouble". He always brought his dogs to the park every evening. One day, he only brought Trouble to the park, and left Commonsense at home.While the man was so happy playing Frisbee (飞碟) with his friends, TroubleR e c o r d e r C o l e W i n G a odisappeared. The man quickly became sad and panicky. He looked for his dog everywhere but could not find it.A young lady, wishing to help, asked the man: 'What are you looking for?" The man replied: "I'm looking for Trouble ..." "Pardon ...," said the lady.The man replied in a higher tone, "I am looking for TROUBLE."The lady was annoyed and asked:”Where ’s your COMMONSENSE?” The man, his mind only on his dogs ,answered:”At home ” Part C Additional Listening Movie TimeWatch an excerpt of a film and choose the right answer to each of the following questions.Noteschoose v. 决定 Houston 休斯墩 alloy n. 合金stress n. 应力; 重力 precision n.精确propulsion 提涯,推动 untried a. 未经尝试的 celestial a. 天体的 hazardous a. 危险的elllbark (on) v. 登上{船只等} ,开始For All MankindWe choose to go to the moon.We choose to go to the moon…We choose to go to the moon, in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard.We set sail on this new sea because there is new knowledge to be gained, and new rights to be won, and they must be won and used … for the progress of all mankind.We shall send to the moon, 240,000 miles away from the control station in Houston, a giant rocket more than 300 feet tall, made of new metal alloys, some of which have not yet been invented, capable of standing heat and stresses。

太空旅行英语作文

太空旅行英语作文

太空旅行英语作文As the stars twinkle in the vast expanse of the cosmos, the dream of space travel has captivated human imagination for centuries. With the advent of modern technology, this dream has transformed from a mere fantasy into a tangible reality. Space travel, once the domain of science fiction, is now afield of study that is rapidly evolving, opening up new possibilities for exploration, research, and even tourism.The first significant milestone in space travel was thelaunch of Sputnik 1 by the Soviet Union in 1957, marking the beginning of the space age. This was followed by the historic Apollo 11 mission in 1969, where Neil Armstrong and BuzzAldrin became the first humans to set foot on the moon. Since then, space travel has expanded to include the constructionof the International Space Station (ISS), satellite launches for communication and navigation, and the Mars Rover missions for planetary exploration.The language of space travel is a blend of technical jargon and scientific precision. Terms like "orbit," "逃逸速度(escape velocity)," "重力井 (gravity well)," and "宇宙飞船(spacecraft)" are commonplace in discussions about space. Astronauts and cosmonauts undergo rigorous training to learn how to operate within the microgravity environment of space, conduct spacewalks, and handle complex machinery.The future of space travel holds even more exciting prospects.Companies like SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Virgin Galactic are pioneering commercial space travel, aiming to make it accessible to a broader demographic. The goal of establishing a human presence on Mars and the potential for interstellar travel are no longer the stuff of dreams but are activelybeing pursued by space agencies and private enterprises alike.However, space travel is not without its challenges. The physical and psychological toll on astronauts, the high costs of development and launch, and the need for sustainable space practices are all areas that require careful consideration. The international community must also navigate the legal and ethical implications of space exploration, ensuring that itis conducted in a manner that benefits all of humanity.In conclusion, space travel represents the pinnacle of human achievement and our unrelenting quest for knowledge. As we continue to push the boundaries of what is possible, thestars no longer seem as distant as they once were. The language of space travel is becoming more familiar, and the stories of those who journey among them inspire us to reachfor the stars. The cosmos beckons, and with each passing day, we stand on the cusp of a new era of exploration and discovery.。

一场可以避免的战争

一场可以避免的战争

一场可以避免的战争【摘要】本篇论文从各超级大国在朝鲜战争中行为的五个层面来分析它们之间的猜疑和误算,即美国高估了斯大林对战争的热衷、斯大林错误估计朝鲜半岛危机中美国的反应、美国低估了中国人民保卫祖国的决心、美国作出越过三八线这一错误决定以及其对中苏关系的误解。

【Abstract】This paper will analyze the distrust and miscalculation between the superpowers in the Korean War. It will provide five aspects of the superpowers’conduct of the war. At each level, issues such as America’s overestimation about Stalin’s enthusiam of the war, Stalin’s miscalculations of American’s response of the peninsula crisis, Amrica’s underestimation of Chinese determination to safeguard their mother country, U.S.’s decision to advance beyond the 38th parallel, America’s misunderstanding of the Sino-Soviet relationship will be considered.【Keywords】Korean War Distrust Miscalculation Avoidable1.IntroductionKorean War, one of the most destructive conflicts in the 20th century, has left a number of myths to us. Some people say it is a meaningless war, for it ended without a formal peace. The territorial settlement was much the same as at the beginning. But the dams lay gaping; the fertile land was drowned; the hills were seared and blasted; and the corpses piled up, parching under the sunshine. Was the war avoidable? Who was to blame? Was China’s sacrifice worthwhile? Whenever talking about this war, I cannot help thinking about the said questions. It is very hard to say which side should be responsible for starting the war. But one thing is for certain. The Korean War was largely based on the distrust and miscalculation between the superpowers.2.America’s overestimation about Stalin’s enthusiam of the warOne of the most important theories behind the USA and Soviet Union’s involvement in the Korean War must be the balance of power. After the Second World War, the USA and the Soviet Union were the two remaining truly great powers. Their interest began to clash as each wanted to assert its influence over the postwar world. “This competition had a deep ideological tone” (Malkasian, 2001: 1). The States and its allies promoted democracy and capitalism while the Soviet Union and its Communist colleagues sought to expand Communism. The Soviet Union was obviously the most threatening power in Korea. America was resolved to contain Russian influence and prevent threats to peace and independence of other nations in the Capitalist camp. Judging from Stalin’s ambitions, the Americans believed thattheir opponent aimed to global Communist expansion and world domination. “The tale of the Korean War fits the myth of global Communist expansionism and American determination to contain it on behalf of the democratic freedom” (Inglis: 76). It was taken for granted that Stalin was challenging the Western allies through his stooge Kim II-Sung. Unfortunately, Stalin’s ambitions were somewhat exaggerated by the Americans’notorious imagination. America-Russian relations were bad but Stalin had no intention of involving the Soviet Union deeply in the peninsula’s problems. “This is borne out by his decision, evide ntly taken about a week after the Korean War began, to pull out Russian pilots and other advisers from North Korea so as to minimize the dangers of Soviet commitment” (Paterson: 428). Stalin put more focus on the European affairs and only wished to set a steady relationship with America at that difficult time. The Second World War just left the Soviet Union a virtually ruined country. Stalin normally preferred to avoid any large and direct conflict with America, let alone a diversionary war. His cautious international policy determined that the peninsula’s affaires could not become his priority, Korea’s importance notwithstanding. The American decision makers subjectively magnified the Soviet Union’s enthusiasm about starting the war, which escalated their emphasis on the war and finally made them deeply trapped by it.5.U.S.’s decision to advance beyond the 38th parallelWe can learn from above that China would probably not intervene the Korean War if the America-led UN forces had not advance beyond the 38th parallel. Then why America was determined to cross the line? What would happen if they didn’t do so? As a matter of fact, the United States had opportunity to avoid a full-scale war with China. However, advancing beyond the 38th parallel changed everything. Before China sent its troops to North Korea, the Chinese government sent several signals to warn the United States that China would not stand up by if the American troops cross the line. Unfortunately the American leaders didn’t take it seriously. Convinced that the Russians would dare not risk fighting against the American troops in the peninsula, they took it for granted that the Chinese would follow suit for the sake of Mao’s “lean-to-one-side” policy. And it could also be logically argued that it was most unlikely for this poor and weak Communist country to engage in yet another war after so many years’fighting against the National Party. The American leaders paid much attention to the Russians’attitude towards the Korea issue yet they were simply indifferent to China’s response. Douglas MacArthur, the U.S. general who was famous for his arrogance and aggressiveness also contributed to America’s decision to cross the 38th parallel. It was him who promised to President Truman that there was little chance for Chinese interference. He declared, “We are no longer fearful of their (Chinese) intervention. We no longer stand hat in hand…if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang there would be the greatest slaughter…We are the best” (Paterson: 406). Some American military leaders were initially not so confident as their colleague. “They were quite fearful of widening the war and opposedconsideration of offensive action north of the thirty-eighth parallel” (438). Yet MacArthur’s successful landing on Inchon forced them to reconsider their position. Americans suffered from exaggerated optimism after the general’s success in the peninsula. More and more people began to believe that a decisive victory was within easy grasp if the troops would cross the 38th parallel. Unfortunately they not only crossed it, but advanced toward the Chinese border, which ultimately brought China into the war. China believed that America intended to violate its territory yet “crossing the thirty-eighth parallel was then only the prelude to the fulfillment of Truman’s plan for victory in Korea and around the globe” (Paterson: 445). No available evidence could indicate that America’s crossing the line signals its intention to invade China. If the United States had halted at the 38th parallel, the Korean War would probably not escalate into such a destructive war in which both sides suffered great losses.6.America’s misunderstanding of the Sino-Soviet relationshipAnother miscalculation made by the Americans was that they overestimated the loyalty between China and the Soviet Union. Scholars have often argued that the establishment of the new China and the signing of the Sino-Soviet alliance positively affected Stalin’s assessment of the balance of power in Asia and gave him the confidence to confront the United States in Asia. But it could also be logically argued that Stalin perceived the rise of the CCP as a potential threat to Soviet dominance of the international Communist movement. “For Stalin, the success of the CCP was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it enlarged the Soviet Union’s buffer zone and preserved Communist influence in Asia. On the other hand, once it gained military strength, China had the potential to become a rival power in the East” (Malkasian: 9). When it came to the peninsula crisis, Stalin did not discuss the matter directly with Mao, but rather with Kim Il Sung. He asked Kim to tell Mao of the decision to go to war against the South Korea while he himself would rather hide behind the curtain, playing the role of a director. Faced with this fait accompli, Mao could only acquiesce. Apparently Stalin did not trust Mao and the rife between China and the Soviet Union had already existed before the Korea War. “In spite of their ideology, the Chinese Communists did not have close ties with the Soviet Union during the Chinese Civil War. Stalin was not forthcoming with military assistance of political support. He had even signed a treaty with the Nationalists” (Malkasian: 14). If the American decision-makers had known that the Chinese were trying hard to avoid direct confrontation with the U.S and that they only took action when their security was under direct threat rather than follow the Soviet Union’s conduction, probably the American’s response and strategy toward the peninsula would be quite different.7.ConclusionThe Korean War was a sad, tragic war that ended just about where it began. Then why did it occur? Actually responsibility for the outbreak and escalation of the warhas to be widely shared. The basis of the Korean War not only was the miscalculation of the United Sates, the Soviet Union and China but also was fostered by mutual distrust of the superpowers. This war bore a deep ideological tone, which made the superpowers adopt improper strategies in dealing with the international relationship between them. Their mutual suspicions and misallocation ultimately brought themselves into the peninsula struggle. There were all victims of their lack of communication and understanding of each other. At the end of the war, China, the U.S. and the Koreas all suffered huge prices, which could be possibly avoided. Just as Fred Inglis said, “the Second World War has barely touched Korea. That omission had been corrected.”References1 Benson Lee Grayson, ed. The American Image of China: A History Of Sino-American Relations. New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co.2 Thomas G.Paterson, ed. Major Problems in American Foreign Policy, V olume II: Since 1914.Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company.3 Fred Inglis. The Cruel Peace: Everyday Life and the Cold War. A Division of Harper Collins Publishers, Inc.4 Carter Malkasian. The Korean War 1950-1953. Osprey Publishing (UK), 20015 T.R.Fehrenhach. This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History. Brassey’s; Reprint edition, 1994.。

航空航天科技小作文英语

航空航天科技小作文英语

航空航天科技小作文英语Aerospace technology has been a driving force behind some of the most significant advancements in modern history. It is the field that takes us beyond the boundaries of our planet, allowing us to explore the cosmos and understand our place within it. The development of aerospace technology has not only expanded our horizons but also revolutionized transportation, communication, and scientific research.The journey of aerospace technology began with the dream of human flight. The Wright brothers' first powered flight in 1903 marked the beginning of an era where human ingenuity would conquer the skies. Since then, we have seen the evolution of aircraft from the simple biplanes to the sophisticated jets that crisscross the globe today.One of the most remarkable achievements in aerospace technology is the development of rockets and space exploration. The launch of Sputnik 1 by the Soviet Union in 1957 signaled the start of the space age. This was followed by the historic Apollo 11 mission in 1969, where humans first set foot on the moon. Today, we have space stations like the International Space Station (ISS) where international astronauts conduct scientific experiments in microgravity.Aerospace technology has also played a crucial role in the advancement of satellites. Communication satellites have transformed the way we connect with each other, enablinginstant global communication and providing us with technologies such as GPS and satellite television. Weather satellites help in forecasting and monitoring natural disasters, while scientific satellites explore the universe, sending back invaluable data that expands our understanding of the cosmos.The field of aerospace engineering is constantly innovating, with new materials and designs being developed to make aircraft more fuel-efficient and environmentally friendly. The push for sustainable aviation is leading to the creation of electric and hybrid aircraft, which promise to reduce the carbon footprint of air travel.Moreover, the commercial space industry is booming, with companies like SpaceX and Blue Origin aiming to make space travel more accessible. The prospect of space tourism is no longer the stuff of science fiction, and the potential for humans to live and work in space is becoming increasingly tangible.In conclusion, aerospace technology is a field of immense potential and progress. It has already achieved feats that were once thought impossible and continues to inspire us to reach for the stars. As we look to the future, the possibilities are as limitless as the universe itself, and the ongoing advancements in aerospace technology will undoubtedly play a pivotal role in shaping the course of human history.。

中共中央南方局走出去的共和国外交官(三)

中共中央南方局走出去的共和国外交官(三)

中共中央南方局走出去的共和国外交官(三)作者:来源:《重庆与世界》2021年第11期Diplomats from the Southern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee (3)协助董必武出席联合国大会—陈家康陈家康(1913—1970年),湖北广济人。

全面抗战爆发后,陈家康被调入八路军驻武汉办事处,任周恩来秘书兼英文翻译,并为对外宣传组成员。

中共中央南方局在重庆成立后,陈家康任外事组副组长兼周恩来秘书,与王炳南一起推动中共中央南方局外事工作的开展。

美国历史学家费正清回忆:“抗战时期的重庆,我和陈家康这位才思敏捷、足智多谋的小个子男士谈论了半个小时的明清史,这比整个冬季我同别的人谈得都多”。

皖南事变发生后,陈家康在周恩来的领导下,和外事组人员广泛联系中外记者、外国驻华使馆人员,揭露事变的真相。

1944年6月,在中共中央南方局外事组的推动下,包括美、英、苏等国在内的中外记者参观团访问延安。

因陈家康精通英语,被调回延安,参加中外记者参观团及后来的美军观察组的接待工作。

抗战后期,陈家康又以翻译身份和章汉夫跟随董必武出席联合国制宪大会。

在美国期间,陈家康以熟练的英语,协助董必武广泛接触参会的各国代表和美国各界人士、海外华侨,开展国际统战工作。

1945年11月,陈家康代表中国解放区青年联合会出席在美国举行的世界青年大会。

回国后,他负责中共中央南京局外事委员会联络处的工作,担任中共代表团上海发言人,常面向中外新闻界发表谈话。

在延安的毛泽东对中共代表團在南京、上海的斗争非常关注,他在一次亲笔写发的电报中,专门提到陈家康在上海的发言:“家康发言很好。

”1947年国共谈判破裂,陈家康撤回延安,奉命代表中国解放区青年联合会出席6月在捷克斯洛伐克召开的第一届世界民主青年大会。

会上,他当选为世界青联执行委员,并留在世界青联工作。

1948年春,他参加了世界青联派出的代表团,出访芬兰、瑞典、挪威、丹麦等国,广泛向各国青年介绍中国共产党领导下的解放区情况。

用英语介绍一下火星探测车的作文

用英语介绍一下火星探测车的作文

用英语介绍一下火星探测车的作文英文回答:Mars rovers are remote-controlled vehicles that explore the surface of Mars. They are designed to conductscientific investigations and return valuable data to scientists on Earth. Rovers have been used to explore Mars since the 1970s, and they have made significant contributions to our understanding of the planet.The first Mars rover was the Soviet Union's Mars 2, which landed on the planet in 1971. Mars 2 was a small rover that was able to move around the surface of Mars for a short period of time before it failed. The United States' first Mars rover was the Viking 1 lander, which landed on Mars in 1976. The Viking 1 lander included a rover that was able to explore the surface of Mars for several years.Since the Viking 1 lander, the United States has sent a number of other rovers to Mars, including the MarsPathfinder, the Mars Exploration Rovers Spirit and Opportunity, the Mars Science Laboratory Curiosity, and the Mars 2020 Perseverance rover. These rovers have conducted a wide range of scientific investigations, including:Imaging the surface of Mars.Collecting samples of Martian rocks and soil.Analyzing the composition of the Martian atmosphere.Searching for signs of life on Mars.The data that has been returned by Mars rovers has helped scientists to learn a great deal about Mars. Rovers have discovered that Mars is a cold, dry planet with a thin atmosphere and a rocky surface. They have also found evidence that Mars once had a much thicker atmosphere and a liquid water ocean.The exploration of Mars by rovers is an ongoing process. The Mars 2020 Perseverance rover is currently exploring theJezero crater on Mars, which is thought to have been the site of a lake billions of years ago. The Perseverance rover is equipped with a number of advanced instrumentsthat will allow it to conduct even more detailed scientific investigations than previous rovers.The exploration of Mars by rovers is a vital part of our understanding of the planet. Rovers have helped us to learn about the history of Mars, its present-day environment, and its potential for life.中文回答:火星探测车是用来探索火星表面的遥控车。

美苏反导条约

美苏反导条约

Treaty Between USA And USSR On The Limitation Of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems(《美苏反导条约》,1972.3.26)The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind, Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons, Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms, Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarma-ment, and general and complete disarmament, Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States, Have agreed as follows:Article I1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.Article II1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode; (b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and (c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those which are:(a) operational; (b) under construction; (c) undergoing testing; (d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or (e) mothballed.Article III Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Partys national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and (b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction onthe date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars.Article IVThe limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges.Article V1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, not to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capacity, not to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.Article VITo enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by the Treaty, each Party undertakes: (a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and (b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.Article VIISubject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out.Article VIIIABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.Article IXTo assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.Article XEach Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty.Article XIThe Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.Article XII1. For the purpose of providing assurance or compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere withthe national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. 3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.Article XIII1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will:(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous; (b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed; (c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification; (d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty; (e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty; (f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty; including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty; (g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.Article XIV1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.Article XV1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.Article XVI1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. DONE at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.FOR THE UNITED STA TES OF AMERICA: RICHARD NIXON President of the United States of America FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: L. I. BREZHNEV General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.。

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The Sources of Soviet Conduct
Author(s): X.
Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Jul., 1947), pp. 566-582
Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
Stable URL: /stable/20030065
Accessed: 08/05/2010 04:46
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