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会计信息失真外文文献译文及原文

封面目录1 绪论 (3)1 Introduction (4)2 会计信息失真的原因 (5)2.1 会计法律法规体系的局限性 (5)2.2 会计工作人员的疏漏 (5)2.3 职业道德的背离 (5)2.4 政府监管机制不完善 (6)2 The reason of the accounting information distortion (7)2.1 The limitation of accountant laws and regulations system (7)2.2 The accountancy fault (7)2.3 Occupational ethics deviating (8)2.4 The imperfect government mechanism (8)3 会计信息失真的对策 (9)3.1 建立标准化的会计准则，加强会计制度的建设 (9)3.2 建立和完善公司内部监管体系 (9)3.3 完善会计人员监管体系，加大违规的惩处力度 (9)3.4 完善职业资格证制度，加大后续教育的力度，提高会计人员的综合素质 (10)3 The Countermeasure of Accounting Information Distortion (11)3.1 Standard accounting guide line and strengthen the construction of accounting system .. 113.2 Establishing and perfecting enterprise internal control system. (11)3.3 Perfecting accountant supervises system, enhancing punishment. (12)3.4 Consummating employed qualifications system, enhancing following education,improving the accountant quality comprehensively. (12)4 结论 (14)Conclusions (15)摘要这些年，会计信息失真已经影响到了社会经济秩序，本文主要分析了我国会计信息失真产生的原因，及其对策。

会计内部审计——外文

THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW American Accounting Association V ol.84,No.3DOI:10.2308/accr.2009.84.3.839 2009pp.839–867Corporate Governance and InternalControl over Financial Reporting:A Comparison of Regulatory RegimesUdi HoitashNortheastern UniversityRani HoitashBentley UniversityJean C.BedardBentley University and University of New South WalesABSTRACT:This study examines the association between corporate governance anddisclosures of material weaknesses(MW)in internal control overﬁnancial reporting.Westudy this association using MW reported under Sarbanes-Oxley Sections302and404,deriving data on audit committeeﬁnancial expertise from automated parsing of memberqualiﬁcations from their biographies.Weﬁnd that a lower likelihood of disclosing Sec-tion404MW is associated with relatively more audit committee members having ac-counting and supervisory experience,as well as board strength.Further,the nature ofMW varies with the type of experience.However,these associations are not detectableusing Section302reports.We alsoﬁnd that MW disclosure is associated with desig-nating aﬁnancial expert without accounting experience,or designating multipleﬁnan-cial experts.We conclude that board and audit committee characteristics are associ-ated with internal control quality.However,this association is only observable underthe more stringent requirements of Section404.Keywords:internal controls;corporate governance;audit committee;ﬁnancialexpertise.Data Availability:Data are publicly available from sources identiﬁed in the paper.For comments on prior versions of this paper,the authors thank Mohammad Abdolmohammadi,Vicky Arnold, Jim Bierstaker,Joe Carcello,Anna Cianci,Jonathan Doh,Karla Johnstone,April Klein,Jayanthi Krishnan,Jim Largay,Johnnie Lee,Mike Peters,Robin Roberts,Heibatollah Sami,Steve Sutton,Jay Thibodeau,participants of the2007Auditing Midyear Conference,the Philadelphia Accounting Research Consortium,and accounting research workshops at Bentley University,University of Central Florida,University of Melbourne,and University of New South Wales.We have also beneﬁted from comments by John Core(editor),Steven Kachelmeier(senior editor), and two anonymous referees.Editor’s note:Accepted by Steven Kachelmeier,with thanks to John Core for serving as editor on a previous version.Submitted:March2007Accepted:October2008Published Online:May2009839840Hoitash,Hoitash,and BedardThe Accounting Review May 2009American Accounting Association I.INTRODUCTIONT his study investigates the association of audit committee and board characteristics with effectiveness of internal controls over ﬁnancial reporting (ICFR).We measure this association using data on internal controls from two provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sections 302and 404)that differ in the requirement that controls be tested by the company’s management and external auditor.Our study ﬁts within a large and diver-siﬁed literature on the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in addressing the agency problem arising from separation of corporate ownership from management.As noted by Sloan (2001)among others,the ﬁnancial reporting system provides a means by which providers of capital can monitor managers.Managers’discretion over the measurement of earnings,along with the effects of earnings on management compensation through effects on stock prices,can combine to exacerbate the agency problem (e.g.,Xie et al.2003).If effective ICFR is imposed by owners,then the agency problem is mitigated.As represen-tatives of owners,corporate boards of directors are responsible for supervising the ﬁnancial reporting function to achieve this goal.The expectation of regulators that corporate governance and ﬁnancial reporting are strongly linked underlies several provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).These pro-visions apply higher standards for the structure and responsibilities of boards and audit committees with regard to ﬁnancial reporting.1For example,with regard to governance structure,SOX Section 407requires disclosure of audit committee members that the com-pany chooses to designate as ‘‘ﬁnancial experts.’’While the SEC initially proposed that only individuals with accounting experience could fulﬁll this role,ﬁnal regulations imple-menting Section 407allow two other categories of experience:‘‘supervisors’’of the ﬁnan-cial reporting function (e.g.,CEOs)and ‘‘users’’of ﬁnancial reports in a professional ca-pacity (e.g.,ﬁnancial analysts and venture capitalists).With regard to governance responsibilities,SOX Sections 302and 404require companies to report information on the effectiveness of ICFR and related disclosures.Because strong ICFR restrict management’s measurement discretion,disclosures made under these sections provide additional measures beyond ﬁnancial reports that can be used to gauge the extent to which corporate governance has succeeded in reducing agency costs.Thus,SOX and its related regulations provide an increased emphasis on corporate governance as well as sources of data through which to measure the linkage of governance to internal control quality.We investigate two research questions related to this linkage.First,we study whether internal control quality,measured as material weaknesses (MW)disclosure,is associated with governance characteristics;i.e.,audit committee ﬁnancial expertise,and board and audit committee structure and activity.Prior research on this issue presents mixed results.2For instance,Zhang et al.(2007)ﬁnd that MW disclosure is negatively associated with audit committee ﬁnancial expertise,but do not ﬁnd an association with other audit com-mittee characteristics.We build on that study by:(1)using a much larger sample enabled by automated collection of data on audit committee ﬁnancial expertise;(2)covering a longer time period (the ﬁrst two years of Section 404implementation);(3)separately analyzing 1Since SOX,external auditors report that the responsibilities and authority of the audit committee have increased,in terms of power over,and impact on,the ﬁnancial reporting process (Cohen et al.2009).2While we investigate internal control quality as an indicator of ﬁnancial reporting quality,some prior research directly investigates the association of corporate governance with characteristics of earnings (e.g.,abnormal accruals or conservatism)or events consistent with poor quality of published ﬁnancial reports (detected fraud or ﬁnancial restatements)(e.g.,Xie et al.2003;Larcker et al.2007;Dhaliwal et al.2007;Carcello et al.2008).Results of these studies also vary in detecting an association of governance with ﬁnancial reporting quality.Corporate Governance and Internal Control over Financial Reporting 841The Accounting Review May 2009American Accounting AssociationMW by source (Section 302or 404)and ﬁnancial expertise by type (accounting,supervi-sory,and user);and (4)studying both qualiﬁcations of all audit committee members,and the board’s decision to designate certain members as ‘‘Section 407ﬁnancial experts.’’Second,we investigate whether the link between governance characteristics and internal control quality holds in both Sections 302and 404regulatory regimes.While both provi-sions require disclosures of internal control quality,they vary in strength.Section 404goes beyond Section 302in requiring both companies and their external auditors to test control effectiveness and in requiring an auditor opinion on control effectiveness.If mandated control testing and auditor involvement are required for process effectiveness,then less well-governed companies with ineffective ICFR may not detect and disclose MW under Section 302.If so,an association between corporate governance quality and internal control quality would not be evident under Section 302reporting.This issue is of great importance,as the extension of Section 404auditor testing to smaller U.S.public companies remains controversial,and regulators in other countries seek evidence on whether less stringent internal control regimes are sufﬁcient for high-quality ﬁnancial reporting.We investigate these issues using a unique method of gathering data on corporate governance quality,speciﬁcally on audit committee ﬁnancial expertise.Prior research ad-dressing audit committee ﬁnancial expertise is limited in obtaining data on smaller com-panies,which is needed to address our second research question.Those studies have either obtained data on audit committee qualiﬁcations from corporate governance databases (which focus on large public companies)or have hand-collected biographical information from proxy statements,resulting in small samples.Instead,we use an automated data ex-traction and parsing routine that builds a database of audit committee qualiﬁcations from background information available from AuditAnalytics.This method produces a sample of 5,480ﬁrm-year observations with complete data on ﬁscal years ending between November 2004to May 2006(including 19,673audit committee members),enabling us to address our second research question by studying the governance/MW association among smaller companies that are subject to Section 302(but not Section 404)as well as larger companies subject to both regulatory regimes.3Our ﬁndings reﬂect a clear difference in the association of corporate governance quality with MW disclosure between these regulatory regimes.We ﬁnd that more accounting and supervisory ﬁnancial expertise on the audit committee is associated with lower likelihood of MW disclosure under Section 404,but not under Section 302.For members with ac-counting qualiﬁcations,this association is evident regardless of whether the individuals are publicly designated as ‘‘Section 407ﬁnancial experts.’’However,among members with supervisory qualiﬁcations,we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant association only for individuals not publicly designated.Given the liability concerns expressed in comment letters to the SEC,some highly effective audit committee members with supervisory qualiﬁcations (e.g.,CEOs or board chairs)may have been willing to serve,but not to be publicly identiﬁed as a ‘‘Section 407ﬁnancial expert.’’In supplemental analysis,we also ﬁnd evidence that these two groups play different roles,consistent with their specialized expertise.Speciﬁcally,only accounting ﬁnancial experts are associated with lower likelihood of disclosing MW related to account-speciﬁc control problems,while only supervisory ﬁnancial experts are associated with lower likelihood of disclosing MW related to more management-oriented issues of personnel and 3The original SEC guidelines in Regulation 12b-2deﬁne accelerated ﬁlers as companies that have at least $75million of common equity ﬂoat,have previously ﬁled at least one 10-K,are subject to the Exchange Act for at least 12months,and do not qualify as a small business under SEC rules.842Hoitash,Hoitash,and Bedard The Accounting Review May 2009American Accounting Association information technology.Examining ‘‘user’’ﬁnancial experts (e.g.,venture capitalists,ﬁnan-cial analysts),we ﬁnd that designating an audit committee member with ‘‘user’’qualiﬁca-tions is associated with greater likelihood of Section 404MW disclosure,relative to des-ignating a member with accounting qualiﬁcations.4Results of this model also indicate that companies voluntarily designating multiple audit committee ﬁnancial experts are more likely to disclose MW.In addition to audit committee ﬁnancial expertise,our models show the expected negative association of Section 404MW disclosure with higher quality cor-porate governance at the board level.The above results are consistent across contemporaneous and lag speciﬁcations,are not sensitive to controlling for selection bias,and are robust to several alternative variable speciﬁcations.While they imply that corporate governance mechanisms are associated with better ﬁnancial reporting quality as measured by Section 404ICFR effectiveness,our mod-els show no evidence of this association using Section 302data.5Taken together,our ﬁndings suggest that in regulatory environments without requirements of mandatory testing and independent auditor attestation that are required under Section 404,corporate gover-nance quality has no observable association with ICFR disclosure.The remainder of this study is organized as follows.Section II presents the study’s background,discusses prior research,and develops our research questions.Section III gives details on the study’s method,and Section IV reports empirical results.Section V concludes the paper and presents limitations of our analyses.II.DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH QUESTIONSIn this section,we discuss the study’s regulatory context and review prior literature related to our research questions.We consider prior research on the association of corporate governance and internal control quality (our ﬁrst research question),focusing especially on studies of audit committee ﬁnancial expertise and internal control effectiveness.Next,we argue why this association might differ when internal control effectiveness is measured using MW disclosed under SOX Sections 302and 404,supporting our second research question.Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting QualityTo address our ﬁrst research question,we consider characteristics of boards and audit committees commonly understood to be associated with good governance,such as com-position,diligence,and independence.The corporate board of directors is responsible for monitoring management to protect the interests of owners.6While prior research has con-sidered both board and audit committees,the most direct responsibility for ﬁnancial re-porting lies with the audit committee.As noted by Xie et al.(2003),the audit committee 4Due to limitations on automated coding,we measure their association with internal control quality by studying companies’choices regarding whom to publicly designate as a ‘‘Section 407ﬁnancial expert.’’5We ﬁnd two results regarding our test variables that are common to both Section 302and 404regimes.First,audit committee size is not associated with MW disclosure under either regime,as also found by prior research (e.g.,Krishnan 2005).Second,companies disclosing MW have signiﬁcantly more audit committee meetings.This association is inconsistent with the notion of number of meetings as a diligence measure,and suggests that rather,audit committees with potential MW disclosures meet more frequently to discuss the problems with management and auditors prior to the public Section 302or 404report.Under both Section 302and 404regimes,we also ﬁnd the expected associations of corporate complexity,ﬁnancial health,and auditor change with MW disclosures.6Relevant responsibilities of the board include member appointments,the designation of ﬁnancial experts,rati-fying audit committee decisions,and inﬂuencing management with respect to resource allocation into the ﬁnan-cial reporting function.Corporate Governance and Internal Control over Financial Reporting 843The Accounting Review May 2009American Accounting Associationhas the responsibility to oversee ICFR,communicating with management,internal and external auditors,and the board of directors to assure that appropriate controls are in place and reporting processes are effective.In order to discharge its responsibility to restrict managers’ability to use the ﬁnancial measurement system to increase their own wealth at the expense of owners,the audit committee must possess the requisite understanding of ﬁnancial reporting (SEC Rule 33-8177;2003),including understanding of controls over that function.7Section 407of SOX addresses this need through a disclosure requirement:at least one qualiﬁed individual must be ‘‘designated’’(i.e.,named in the 10-K),or the company must explain why no such individual is named.In implementing Section 407,the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC 2002)originally deﬁned ‘‘ﬁnancial expert’’narrowly as ‘‘a person who has,through education and experience as a public accountant,auditor,principal ﬁnancial ofﬁcer,controller,or principal accounting ofﬁcer,of a company that,at the time the person held such position,was required to ﬁle reports’’(emphasis added).The SEC received over 200comment letters,many claiming that this deﬁnition was too restrictive and would make it difﬁcult to attract qualiﬁed individuals.Hence,the ﬁnal regulation implementing Section 407(SEC Rule 33–8177;2003)deﬁnes ‘‘audit committee ﬁnancial expert’’as an individual with understanding of ﬁnancial reporting and related internal controls,but not necessarily with direct experience in that function.This rule expands the set of allowed qualiﬁcations to include two additional categories:persons with experience supervising the ﬁnancial function (e.g.,CEOs,board chairs),and those with experience using ﬁnancial information (e.g.,venture capitalists,ﬁnancial analysts).While ‘‘supervisory’’and ‘‘user’’expertise also relate to ﬁnancial re-porting,their experience is less directly tied to the preparation of ﬁnancial reports.8In line with their more relevant experience,prior research consistently ﬁnds that higher ﬁnancial reporting quality is associated with more accounting ﬁnancial experts on the audit committee (e.g.,for characteristics of earnings see Dhaliwal et al.2007;Carcello et al.2008;Be ´dard et al.2004;for internal control MW see Zhang et al.2007;Krishnan 2005).However,few studies separately examine the other two categories.Of those,only Carcello et al.(2008)ﬁnd that user expertise is associated with higher earnings quality,but neither Carcello et al.(2008)nor Dhaliwal et al.(2007)ﬁnd an association with supervisory ex-pertise.9Past studies of MW disclosure do not separately assess the supervisory and user categories,although Zhang et al.(2007)ﬁnd a lower likelihood of MW associated with a 7For example,more knowledgeable audit committee members might have urged management to get an early start on ICFR documentation and testing under SOX 302/404,which would have reduced the likelihood of disclosing a MW at the balance sheet date.8The originally proposed rule would have further required companies to disclose the number and names of all accounting ﬁnancial experts.Many comment letters raised concerns that identifying individuals as ﬁnancial experts would carry a higher liability,and thus it would be harder to ﬁnd qualiﬁed individuals for the task.In reaction,the ﬁnal rule requires companies to designate and disclose the name of only one ﬁnancial expert,or explain why no one is so designated.9Other studies either combine two of the expertise categories or use more narrow deﬁnitions of qualiﬁcations within categories,and most use pre-SOX data.For example,Abbott et al.(2004)use the broad deﬁnition of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (BRC 1999)in a study of restatements during the 1990s,ﬁnding that companies with at least one ﬁnancial expert have lower restatement likelihood.Be ´dard et al.(2004)use a deﬁnition of ﬁnancial expertise more narrow than the BRC’s (i.e.,excluding CEOs),and ﬁnd that this variable is negatively associated with earnings management.Farber (2006),using the BRC deﬁnition,ﬁnds mixed evidence of association between audit committee ﬁnancial expertise and fraud in the pre-SOX period.Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008)ﬁnd that a combined category of supervisor and user experts is not associated with more conservative ﬁnancial reporting during 2000–2002.Xie et al.(2003)ﬁnd evidence of association for both supervisor and user categories,but only use a subset of the qualiﬁcations listed in the SEC regulations:outside corporate directors and outside members from investment banks.844Hoitash,Hoitash,and Bedard The Accounting Review May 2009American Accounting Association combined measure of supervisory and user expertise.In sum,prior research strongly sup-ports the value of including individuals with accounting-related experience on audit com-mittees and boards of directors.However,the value of allowing ﬁnancial experts with less direct ﬁnancial reporting experience remains unclear.Further,very few studies have been performed on post-SOX data.Due to the importance of this issue,regulatory change and variance in prior ﬁndings,further research is called for.In addressing this question,we extend our consideration of audit committee composi-tion related to ﬁnancial expertise,by considering companies’designation decisions.While all committee members likely contribute to discussion of issues brought before the com-mittee,the decision to publicly designate speciﬁc individuals as ofﬁcially fulﬁlling require-ments of SOX 407is an important object of study in itself.Designated ﬁnancial experts might bear the greater responsibility and legal liability (Carcello et al.2006;Carcello et al.2008).While companies may designate the most highly qualiﬁed audit committee members as ﬁnancial experts,highly accomplished audit committee members might not be willing to be designated due to litigation concerns.To investigate this issue,we separately examine designated and non-designated ﬁnancial experts.We also extend prior research by testing whether voluntary designation of more than one ﬁnancial expert is associated with the ICFR effectiveness.As noted by Carcello et al.(2006,357),the likely sign of association is unclear ex ante :‘‘some companies may name multiple experts ...as a means of diffusing the responsibility and potential liability that may fall on one person if only a single ﬁnancial expert is named.Alternatively,some companies may believe that having more than one ﬁnancial expert contributes to audit committee effectiveness.’’The former explanation sug-gests a positive association of multiple experts with ﬁnancial reporting risk,while the latter suggests a negative association.Beyond ﬁnancial expertise,prior research also considers audit committee characteristics such as size and number of meetings as indicators of monitoring quality.10As recommended by the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC 1999),the major stock exchanges in the U.S.require listed companies to include at least three directors on audit committees,implying that larger audit committees are an index of quality.However,prior research tends not to ﬁnd an association of audit committee size with ﬁnancial reporting or internal control quality (e.g.,Abbott et al.2004;Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008;Krishnan 2005;Zhang et al.2007).The number of audit committee meetings is commonly considered a measure of diligence:fewer meetings can indicate lack of commitment and/or insufﬁcient time for effective mon-itoring.McMullen and Raghunandan (1996),Beasley et al.(2000),Farber (2006),and Archambeault and DeZoort (2001)observe fewer audit committee meetings among ﬁrms with restatements,SEC enforcements,fraud,and suspicious auditor switches,respectively.However,in the current environment,the direction of causality implied in an association of audit committee meetings with MW may run in the opposite direction;i.e.,more audit committee meetings may occur as a result of discovering a MW in a given period (Carcello et al.2006,368).Evidence for an association of internal control effectiveness with audit committee size or diligence is inconclusive,as Zhang et al.(2007)do not ﬁnd either variable to be associated with MW disclosure.Prior literature also assesses corporate governance at the board level,considering size,independence,and meeting frequency.Research ﬁndings are rcker et al.(2007)10Another aspect of audit committee governance considered by prior research is the independence of its members from management.For instance,Krishnan (2005)ﬁnds that more independent audit committees are less likely to issue 8-Ks with MW disclosures.However,since SOX Section 301now requires audit committee members to be independent,there is insufﬁcient variance in this measure,and we do not include it in the study.Corporate Governance and Internal Control over Financial Reporting 845The Accounting Review May 2009American Accounting Associationﬁnd varying evidence on the association of board characteristics with abnormal accruals,as do Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008).Xie et al.(2003)and Klein (2002b)both ﬁnd that accruals quality is associated with board independence,and Beasley (1996)ﬁnds that more independent boards have lower likelihood of fraud.However,Bushman et al.(2004)ﬁnd no association of board characteristics with earnings ing composite gover-nance scores that combine board and audit committee composition and activity,both DeFond et al.(2005)and Carcello et al.(2008)conclude that strong corporate governance contributes to ﬁnancial reporting quality.Considering studies of internal control effective-ness,Doyle et al.(2007)do not ﬁnd an association of a corporate governance quality index and the overall likelihood of disclosing MW (but do ﬁnd an association with MW in revenue recognition only).Zhang et al.(2007)ﬁnd that MW disclosure is associated with smaller boards and more board meetings.Neither they nor Krishnan (2005)ﬁnd an association of MW disclosure with board independence.In sum,this study addresses our ﬁrst research question by examining the association of several corporate governance mechanisms with internal quality as measured by MW disclosures.Our corporate governance measures are summarized in Panel A of Figure 1.Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Disclosure of Internal Control EffectivenessOur second research question asks whether there are differential associations of MW disclosure with corporate governance quality in the Section 302and 404regimes.Section 404is more stringent in that it requires registrants to document and test ICFR effectiveness,and their external auditors to independently test those controls and offer a separate opinion on internal control effectiveness.Under Section 302,companies are required to design and maintain appropriate controls over the ﬁnancial reporting and disclosure functions.11Man-agement must assert the effectiveness of ‘‘disclosure controls’’in the 10-Q,as well as report any detected MW.Control testing is not required under Section 302,nor is a separate auditor opinion.12Section 404was initially required only for certain companies meeting certain criteria set by the SEC (termed ‘‘accelerated ﬁlers’’),with the intention of eventual application to all public companies.However,expansion beyond accelerated ﬁlers was delayed several times due to outcry from the business community regarding the high cost of testing controls,and few other countries have implemented regulations as stringent as Section 404.13However,if a Section 404-type process (with required controls testing by auditors)is not in place,then the markets must rely more on corporate governance to impose the discipline of effective ICFR.If corporate governance is effective in monitoring man-agement,detecting and disclosing internal control problems without Section 404’s testing and auditor involvement requirements,then better governance mechanisms should be as-sociated with higher internal control quality (less likelihood of a MW)in Section 302as well as Section 404disclosures.However,a key difference between these provisions is that Section 302testing is vol-untary.While prior research shows that corporate governance mechanisms are associated 11Bedard and Graham (2008)note that over 70percent of internal control problems detected under Section 404activity are not documentation problems,but rather are due to missing,ineffective or insufﬁciently tested controls.This implies that without mandatory testing,many problems will be missed.12While both Sections 302and 404require companies to disclose MW that are detected in ICFR,they differ somewhat in the scope of controls considered.We describe this difference in a following section,and consider it in our analysis.13No country other than Japan has adopted a mandatory internal control testing regulation similar to Section 404.However,other jurisdictions (including the European Union,Canada,and Australia)have regulations similar in spirit to Section 302.。

会计舞弊财务舞弊外文翻译文献

会计舞弊财务舞弊外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Global Corporate Accounting Frauds and Action for Reforms1、IntroductionDuring the recent series of corporate fraudulent financial reporting incidents in the U.S., similar corporate scandals were disclosed in several other countries. Almost all cases of foreign corporate accounting frauds were committed by entities that conduct their businesses in more than one country, and most of these entities are also listed on U.S. stock exchanges. Following the legislative and regulatory reforms of corporate America, resulting from the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, reforms were also initiated worldwide. The primary purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to identify the prominent American and foreign companies involved in fraudulent financial reporting and the nature of accounting irregularities they committed; and (2) to highlight the global reaction for corporate reforms which are aimed at restoring investor confidence in financial reporting, the public accounting profession and global capital markets.2、Cases of Global Corporate Accounting FraudsThe list of corporate financial accounting scandals in the U.S. is extensive, and each one was the result of one or more creative accounting irregularities. Exhibit 1 identifies a sample of U.S. companies that committed such fraud and the nature of their fraudulent financial reporting activities.EXHIBIT 1. A SAMPLE OF CASES OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTING3、Global Regulatory Action for Corporate and Accounting ReformsI. U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA 2002)In response to corporate and accounting scandals, the effects of which are still being felt throughout the U.S. economy, and in order to protect public interest and to restore investor confidence in the capital market, U.S. lawmakers, in a compromise by the House and Senate, passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. President Bush signed this Act into law (Public Law 107-204) on July 30, 2002. The Act resulted in major changes to compliance practices of large U.S. and non-U.S. companies whose securities are listed or traded on U.S. stock exchanges, requiring executives, boards of directors and external auditors to undertake measures to implement greater accountability, responsibility and transparency of financial reporting. The statutes of the act, and the new SEC initiatives that followed, are considered the most significant legislation and regulations affecting the corporate community and the accounting profession since 1933. Other U.S. regulatory bodies such as the New York StockExchange (NYSE), the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ) and the State Societies of CPAs have also passed new regulations which place additional burdens on publicly traded companies and their external auditors.The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) is expressly applicable to any non-U.S. company registered on U.S. exchanges under either the Securities Act of 1933 or the Security Exchange Act of 1934, regardless of country of incorporation or corporate domicile. Furthermore, external auditors of such registrants, regardless of their nationality or place of business, are subject to the oversight of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and to the statutory requirements of the SOA .The United States' SOA has reverberated around the globe through the corporate and accounting reforms addressed by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC); the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the European Commission (UC); and authoritative bodies within individual European countries.II. International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) is a private governance organization whose members are the national professional associations of accountants. It formally describes itself as the global representative of the accounting profession, with the objective of serving the public interest, strengthening the worldwide accountancy profession and contributing to the development of strong international economies by establishing and promoting adherence to high quality standards. The Federation represents accountancy groups worldwide and has served as a reminder that restoring public confidence in financial reporting and the accounting profession should be considered a global mission. It is also considered a key player in the global auditing arena which, among other things, constructs international standards on auditing and has laid down an international ethical code for professional accountants. The IFAC has recently secured a degree of support for its endeavors from some of the world's most influential international organizations in economic and financial spheres, including global Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the International Organization ofSecurities Commissions (IOSCO), the World Bank and, most significantly, the European Communities(EC).In October 2002, IFAC commissioned a Task Force on Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting to use a global perspective to consider how to restore the credibility of financial reporting and corporate disclosure. Its report, "Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting: An International Perspective," includes recommendations for strengthening corporate governance, and raising the regulating standards of issuers. Among its conclusions and recommendations related to audit committees are :1. All public interest entities should have an independent audit committee or similar body .2. The audit committee should regularly report to the board and should address concerns about financial information, internal controls or the audit .3. The audit committee must meet regularly and have sufficient time to perform its role effectively .4. Audit committees should have core responsibilities, including monitoring and reviewing the integrity of financial reporting, financial controls, the internal audit function, as well as for recommending, working with and monitoring the external auditors.5. Audit committee members should be financially literate and a majority should have "substantial financial experience." They should receive further training as necessary on their responsibilities and on the company.6. Audit committees should have regular private "executive sessions" with the outside auditors and the head of the internal audit department. These executive sessions should not include members of management. There should be similar meetings with the chief financial officer (CFO) and other key financial executives, but without other members of management.7. Audit committee members should be independent of management .8. There should be a principles-based approach to defining independence on an international level. Companies should disclose committee members' credentials,remuneration and shareholdings.9. Reinforcing the role of the audit committee should improve the relationship between the auditor and the company. The audit committee should recommend the hiring and firing of auditors and approve their fees, as well as review the audit plan.10. The IFAC Code of Ethics should be the foundation for individual national independence rules. It should be relied on in making decisions on whether auditors should provide non-audit services. Non-audit services performed by the auditor should be approved by the audit committee.11. All fees, for audit and non-audit services, should be disclosed to shareholders.12. Key audit team members, including the engagement and independent review partners, should serve no longer than seven years on the audit .13. Two years should pass before a key audit team member can take a position at the company as a director or any other important management position .III. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is a quasi-think tank made up of 30 member countries, including the United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom (UK), and it has working relationships with more than 70 other countries. In 2004, the OECD unveiled the updated revision of its "Principles of Corporate Governance" that had originally been adopted by its member governments (including the U.S. and UK) in 1999. Although they are non-binding, the principles provide a reference for national legislation and regulation, as well as guidance for stock exchanges, investors, corporations and other parties .The principles have long become an international benchmark for policy makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders worldwide. They have advanced the corporate governance agenda and provided specific guidance for legislative and regulatory initiatives in both the OECD and non-OECD countries.The 2004 updated version of "Principles of Corporate Governance" includes recommendations on accounting and auditing standards, the independence of board members and the need for boards to act in the interest of the company and theshareholders. The updated version also sets more demanding standards in a number of areas that impact corporate executive compensation and finance, such as :1. Granting investors the right to nominate company directors, as well as a more forceful role in electing them.2. Providing shareholders with a voice in the compensation policy for board members and executives, and giving these stockholders the ability to submit questions to auditors.3. Mandating that institutional investors disclose their overall voting policies and how they manage material conflicts of interest that may affect the way the investors exercise key ownership functions, such as voting .4. Identifying the need for effective protection of creditor rights and an efficient system for dealing with corporate insolvency .5. Directing rating agencies, brokers and other providers of information that could influence investor decisions to disclose conflicts of interest, and how those conflicts are being managed .6. Mandating board members to be more rigorous in disclosing related party transactions, and protecting so-called "whistle blowers" by providing the employees with confidential access to a board-level contact .4、ConclusionThe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was the U.S. government's response to the wave of fraudulent corporate financial reporting experienced during the 1990s and early 2000s an represented a significant step in regaining investors' confidence in the global financial reporting process. The SOA created new and stricter statutes to avoid a repeat of previous corporate financial disasters. The Act not only applies to U.S. entities but also covers primarily large non-U.S. companies whose securities are listed or traded on U.S. stock exchanges, as well as their non-U.S. external auditors, regardless of their nationality or place of business. Foreign entities have to comply with the SOA by June 2005 .Across the Atlantic, the IFAC, OECD and EU have recognize the recent eruption of corporate scandals in Europe and affirmed the inevitable need forcorporate governance reforms and regulation of the public accounting profession worldwide. The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) has passed the Code of Professional Ethics for international accounting firms. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has passed guidelines for improving corporate governance. The European Union (EU) has proposed a code of conduct for independent auditors, which include a five-year auditor rotation requirement. European countries are also individually involved in improving their corporate laws through governance codes of practice.Sourse: Badawi, Ibrahim M. Review of Business; Spring2005, Vol. 26 Issue 2, p8-14, 7p译文：全球公司会计舞弊和改革行为一、前言随着最近一系列公司虚假财务报告事件在美国发生,类似丑闻也在其他国家被曝光。

会计内部控制中英文对照外文翻译文献

会计内部控制中英文对照外文翻译文献会计内部控制中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)内部控制系统披露—一种可替代的管理机制根据代理理论，各种治理机制减少了投资者和管理者之间的代理问题（Jensen and Meckling，1976； Gillan，2006）。

传统上，治理机制已经被认定为内部或外部的。

内部机制包括董事会及其作用、结构和组成（Fama，1980；Fama and Jensen，1983），管理股权(Jensen and Meckling，1976)和激励措施，起监督作用的大股东(Demsetz and Lehn，1985)，内部控制系统(Bushman and Smith，2001)，规章制度和章程条款(反收购措施)和使用的债务融资（杰森，1993）。

外部控制是由公司控制权市场(Grossman and Hart,1980)、劳动力管理市场（Fama,1980）和产品市场（哈特,1983）施加的控制。

各种各样的金融丑闻，动摇了世界各地的投资者，公司治理最佳实践方式特别强调了内部控制系统在公司治理中起到的重要作用。

内部控制有助于通过提供保证可靠性的财务报告，和临时议会对可能会损害公司经营目标的事项进行评估和风险管理来保护投资者的利益。

这些功能已被的广泛普及内部控制系统架构设计的广泛认可，并指出了内部控制是用以促进效率，减少资产损失风险，帮助保证财务报告的可靠性和对法律法规的遵从（COSO,1992）。

尽管有其相关性，但投资者不能直接观察，因此也无法得到内部控制系统设计和发挥功能的信息，因为它们都是组织内的内在机制、活动和过程（Deumes and Knechel,2008）。

由于投资者考虑到成本维持监控管理其声称的（Jensen and Meckling，1976）,内部控制系统在管理激励信息沟通上的特性，以告知投资者内部控制系统的有效性,是当其他监控机制（该公司的股权结构和董事会）比较薄弱，从而为其提供便捷的监控（Leftwich et等,1981）。

会计行业：监督、审计独立性、财务报告问题【外文翻译】

外文文献翻译原文：Accounting Profession: Oversight, Auditor Independence, andFinancial Reporting IssuesThis letter responds to your recent request that we provide our views regarding what steps the Congress should consider taking to strengthen oversight of the accounting profession, auditor independence, and selected financial reporting matters. The sudden and largely unexpected bankruptcy of the Enron Corporation (Enron) and other large corporations’ financial reporting restatements have raised questions about the soundness of the current self-regulatory and financial reporting systems and resulted in substantial losses to employees, shareholders, and other investors. These events have also raised a range of questions regarding how such dramatic and unexpected events can happen and the role and capacities of various key players under the existing systems.The issues surrounding the accounting profession’s current self-regulatory system for auditors involves many players in a fragmented system that is not well coordinated, involves certain conflicts of interest, lacks effective communication, has a funding mechanism that is dependent upon voluntary contributions from the accounting profession, and has a discipline system that is largely perceived as being ineffective. (Enclosure 1 serves to illustrate the complexity of the current system of regulation and oversight and the stakeholders who rely on the system.)Simply stated, the current self-regulatory system is broken and oversight of the self regulatory system by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has not been effective in addressing these issues to adequately protect the public interest.As a result, given the important role that independent auditor play and various inherent problems in the current self-regulatory system, direct government intervention is needed to statutorily create a new body to oversee the accounting profession’s responsibilities for auditing public companies.This step is necessary in order toincrease the effectiveness of the audit process and to rebuild public confidence.The new body should be independent of the accounting profession, have significant standards-setting, oversight, and disciplinary authority, be adequately resourced to Page 2 GAO-02-742R Accounting Profession Issues fulfill its responsibilities, and have sufficient operating flexibility to attract and retain quality leadership and supporting staff.On the other hand, the concerns relating to the timeliness, relevancy and transparency of the financial reporting model may be best addressed through the SEC working more closely with the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), assuring that the FASB has an adequate and independent source of funding for its operations, and reporting periodically to the Congress in connection with certain FASB matters. If such an approach is not successful in achieving the expected improvements in the financial reporting model in a timely and effective manner, the government can then take further action.The areas of oversight of the accounting profession, auditor independence, and financial reporting are important on their own, but they also represent interrelated keystones to protecting the public’s interest. Failure in any of these areas can place a strain on the entire system.Consequently, potential actions should be guided by the fundamental principles of having the right incentives for the key parties to do the right thing, adequate transparency to provide reasonable assurance that the right thing will be done, and full accountability if the right thing is not done. These three fundamental principles represent a system of controls that should operate in conjunction with a policy of placing special attention on areas of greatest risk.NEW BODY NEEDED TO REGULATE AND OVERSEE THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSIONEnron’s failure and a variety of other recent events have brought a direct focus on the ineffectiveness of the current system of regulation and oversight of the accounting profession. Independent auditors have a key role to play in protecting shareholders and the public’s interest in our capital market system. They hold a public trust and their actions or inactions can have significant implications on investors, creditors andother users of financial reports. In this regard, auditors must place additional emphasis on whether financial statements are “fairly presented in all material respects” in addition to their traditional emphasis on whether such financial statements are prepared “in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.” Fair presentation requires providing reasonable assurance that major value and risk elements are appropriately reflected in the financial statements and related notes in an understandable fashion. It also require s employing an “economic substance” versus “transaction form” approach to important accounting and reporting issues.Many proposals are before the Congress to establish a new body to regulate and/or oversee accounting firms that audit public companies. In our view, the Congress should consider the following key factors or criteria in establishing this new body, each of which is critical to its likely effectiveness.The new body should have direct responsibility and authority for certain critical functions in connection with public accounting firms and their members who audit public companies. These include:• establishing professional standards (independence standards; quality control standards, auditing standards, and attestation standards). The new body should be authorized to issue professional standards. In that respect, the new body should also be authorized to affirmatively adopt, at its discretion, professional standards, in whole or in part, promulgated by another standard-setting body. In the area of new standards, the new body may choose to require auditor reporting on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting in connection with audits of public companies, which is currently not required under existing auditing standards. It may also decide not to affirmatively adopt a standard developed by another standard-setting body but instead issue a modified version of the standard.• monitoring public accounting firms for compliance with applicable professional standards. For efficiency, except for quality reviews of the largest firms and those firms in which the nature of the audits they perform pose a higher level of risk as determined by the new body, the new body should be authorized to use contractors or accounting firms to perform quality reviews in accordance with standards andprocesses set by the new body. However, the new body should have final approval authority in connection with any quality review engagements performed by any contractors or accounting firms.·investigating and disciplining public accounting firms and/or individual auditors of public accounting firms who do not comply with applicable professional standards. Investigations and disciplinary actions of the new body should be in addition to existing investigatory and disciplinary authority that already exists with the SEC and state boards of accountancy.• establishing various auditor rotation requirements for key public company audit engagement personnel (i.e., primary and second partners, and engagement managers). Related to this function, we believe the new body should undertake a study and report to the Congress on the pros and cons of any mandatory rotation of accounting firms that audit public companies before taking any action with regard to establishing requirements for any mandatory rotation of accounting firms.Funding for the New BodyThe new body should have independent sources of funding by virtue of mandatory, not voluntary, payments. Public accounting firms and audit partners that audit financial statements, reports, or other documents of public companies that are required to be filed with the SEC should be required to register with the new body. The new body should have the authority to set annual registration fees and fees for services such as peer reviews of public accounting firms. The fees should be set to recover full costs and sustain the operations of the new body.AUDITOR INDEPENDENCEFor over 70 years, the public accounting profession, through its independent audit function, has played a critical role in enhancing a financial reporting process that has supported the effective functioning of our domestic capital markets, which are widely viewed as the best in the world. The public’s confidence in the reliability of issuers’ financial statements, which relies in large part on the role of independent auditors, serves to encourage investment in securities issued by public companies. This sense of confidence depends on reasonable investors perceiving auditors as independentexpert professionals who have neither mutual, nor conflicts of, interests in connection with the entities they are auditing. Accordingly, investors and other users expect auditors to bring to the financial reporting process integrity, independence, objectivity, and technical competence, and to prevent the issuance of misleading financial statements.Enron’s failure and certain other recent events have raised questions concerning whether auditors are living up to the expectations of the investing public; however, similar questions have been raised over a number of years due to significant restatements of financial statements and certain unexpected and costly business failures, such as the savings and loan crisis. Issues debated over the years continue to focus on auditor independence conce rns and the auditor’s role and responsibilities. Public accounting firms providing nonaudit services to their audit client is one of the issues that has again surfaced by Enron’s failure and the large amount of annual fees collected by Enron’s independent auditor for nonaudit services.Auditors have the capability of performing a range of valuable services for their clients, and providing certain nonaudit services can ultimately be beneficial to investors and other interested parties. However, in some circumstances, it is not appropriate for auditors to perform both audit and certain nonaudit services for the same client. In these circumstances, the auditor, the client, or both will have to make a choice as to which of these services the auditor will provide. These concepts, which we strongly believe are in the public’s interest, are reflected in the revisions to auditor independence requirements for government audits, which GAO recently issued as part of Government Auditing Standards. The new independence standard has gone through an extensive deliberative process over several years, including extensive public comments and input from my Advisory Council on Government Auditing Standards. The standard, among other things, toughens the rules associated with providing nonaudit services and includes a principle-based approach to addressing this issue, supplemented with certain safeguards. The two overarching principles in the standard for nonaudit services are that:• auditors should not perform management funct ions or make management decisions. • auditors should not audit their own work or provide nonaudit services in situations where the amounts or services involved are significant or material to the subject matter of the audit.Both of the above principles should be applied using a substance over form doctrine. Under the revised standard, auditors are allowed to perform certain nonaudit services provided the services do not violate the above principles; however, in most circumstances certain additional safeguards would have to be met. For example, (1) personnel who perform allowable nonaudit services would be precluded from performing any related audit work, (2) the auditor’s work could not be reduced beyond the level that would be appropriate if the nonaudit work were performed by another unrelated party, and (3) certain documentation and quality assurance requirements must be met. The new standard includes an express prohibition regarding auditors providing certain bookkeeping or record keeping services and limits payroll processing and certain other services, all of which are presently permitted under current independence rules of the AICPA. However, our new standard allows the auditor to provide routine advice and technical assistance on an ongoing basis and without being subject to the additional safeguards.The focus of these changes to the government auditing standards is to better serve the public interest and to maintain a high degree of integrity, objectivity, and independence for audits of government entities and entities that receive federal funding. However, these standards apply only to audits of federal entities and those organizations receiving federal funds, and not to audits of public companies. In the transmittal letter issuing the new independence standard, we expressed our hope that the AICPA would raise its independence standards to those contained in this new standard in order to eliminate any inconsistency between this standard and their current standards. The AICPA’s recent statement be fore another congressional committee that the AICPA will not oppose prohibitions on auditors providing certain nonaudit services seems to be a step in the right direction.Source: David M. walker. Accounting Profession: Oversight, Auditor Independence, and Financial Reporting Issues [N].GAO-02-742R Accounting Profession Issues,2002:1-12.译文：会计行业：监督、审计独立性、财务报告问题这封信是对您最近要求我们提供意见的回复，以说明国会应在哪些环节强化会计行业，审计师独立性的监督，并如何选定适当的财务报告等事宜。

会计专业毕业论文外文文献翻译.

密级：绝密外文翻译THESIS OF BACHELOR题目：浅析商业银行会计风险控制存在的问题及对策英文题目: Analysis of Commercial Bank Accounting Risk Control Problems and Countermeasures 学院: 系别:专业:班级:学生姓名:学号：指导老师:起讫日期:我国商业银行会计风险成因及防范对策历史资料表明:导致许多国家20世纪以来先后爆发银行危机的主要原因是未能妥善解决银行风险问题。

长期以来,这一问题也困扰着我国，成为威胁我国国民经济持续、健康发展的重大隐患。

几年来国家采取了一系列必要措施：从1994至1995年给银行业立法，1996年后加强金融审慎性监管，1998年为四大银行补充2700亿元资本金,1999年成立资产管理公司并剥离五大行的1。

4万亿元不良资产，2000年以后国务院严令各行降低不良资产率，等等。

但这些措施均没有触及体制不合理这个根本问题，因而无法从根本上控制银行风险增量,提高银行经营绩效。

目前，我国银行潜伏的高风险日益暴露出来.面临2006年银行业全面开放后外资金融机构进入所带来的竞争和挑战,本届政府下决心彻底改革国有银行的体制,去年末央行动用外汇储备向中国银行、中国建设银行注资450亿美元，充实其资本金，使之达到《巴塞尔协议》规定的8%的资本充足率,推动国有银行股份制改革和最终上市，从根本上解决国有银行风险的增量问题。

因此，研究中国银行风险的特点、特殊的制度成因，股份制改革和公司治理结构建立这些被称为治本措施的一系列政策问题，具有重要的理论和现实意义。

本文第一章首先阐述了我国银行风险的表现形式.其中银行信用风险特别是国有商业银行资产信贷质量问题，成为当前最为突出的金融风险；国有商业银行的流动性风险虽未显现（暂时被居民的高储蓄率所掩盖），但潜在的支付困难因素日益增多；财务风险主要表现在国有商业银行资本金严重不足和经营利润虚盈实亏两方面；此外我国银行还存在着较为严重的利率汇率风险、市场风险、犯罪风险。

会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译备课讲稿

会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译(含：英文原文及中文译文)文献出处：Badawi I M. Global corporate accounting frauds and action for reforms[J]. Review of Business, 2005, :26(:2).英文原文Global Corporate Accounting Frauds and Action for ReformsIbrahim BadawiSt. John’s UniversityAbstractThe recent wave of corporate fraudulent financial reporting has prompted global actions for reforms in corporate governance and financial reporting, by governments and accounting and auditing standard-setting bodies in the U.S. and internationally, including the European Commission; the International Federation of Accountants; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; and others, in order to restore investor confidence in financial reporting, the accounting profession and global financial markets.IntroductionDuring the recent series of corporate fraudulent financial reporting incidents in the U.S., similar corporate scandals were disclosed in several other countries. Almost all cases of foreign corporate accounting frauds were committed by entities that conduct their businesses in more than onecountry, and most of these entities are also listed on U.S. stock exchanges. Following the legislative and regulatory reforms of corporate America, resulting from the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, reforms were also initiated worldwide. The primary purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to identify the prominent American and foreign companies involved in fraudulent financial reporting and the nature of accounting irregularities they committed; and (2) to highlight the global reaction for corporate reforms which are aimed at restoring investor confidence in financial reporting, the public accounting profession and global capital markets.Cases of Global Corporate Accounting FraudsThe list of corporate financial accounting scandals in the U.S. is extensive, and each one was the result of one or more creative accounting irregularities. Exhibit 1 identifies a sample of U.S. companies that committed such fraud and the nature of their fraudulent financial reporting activities.Who Commits Financial Fraud and HowThere are three groups of business people who commit financial statement frauds. They range from senior management (CEO and CFO); mid- and lower-level management; and organizational criminals [6,16]. CEOs and CFOs commit accounting frauds to conceal true business performance, to preserve personal status and control and to maintain personal income and wealth. Mid- and lower-level employees falsifyfinancial statements related to their area of responsibility (subsidiary, division or other unit) to conceal poor performance and/or to earn performance-based bonuses. Organizational criminals falsify financial statements to obtain loans or to inflate a stock they plan to sell in a “pump-and-dump” scheme. Methods o f financial statement schemes range from fictitious or fabricated revenues; altering the times at which revenues are recognized; improper asset valuations and reporting; concealing liabilities and expenses; and improper financial statement disclosures.Global Regulatory Action for Corporate and Accounting ReformsIn response to corporate and accounting scandals, the effects of which are still being felt throughout the U.S. economy, and in order to protect public interest and to restore investor confidence in the capital market, U.S. lawmakers, in a compromise by the House and Senate, passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. President Bush signed this Act into law (Public Law 107-204) on July 30, 2002. The Act resulted in major changes to compliance practices of large U.S. and non-U.S. companies whose securities are listed or traded on U.S. stock exchanges, requiring executives, boards of directors and external auditors to undertake measures to implement greater accountability, responsibility and transparency of financial reporting. The statutes of the Act, and the new SEC initiatives that followed [1,4,8,12,15], are considered the mostsignificant legislation and regulations affecting the corporate community and the accounting profession since 1933. Other U.S. regulatory bodies such as NYSE, NASDAQ and the State Societies of CPAs have also passed new regulations which place additional burdens on publicly traded companies and their external auditors.The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) is expressly applicable to any non-U.S. company registered on U.S. exchanges under either the Securities Act of 1933 or the Security Exchange Act of 1934, regardless of country of incorporation or corporate domicile. Furthermore, external auditors of such registrants, regardless of their nationality or place of business, are subject to the oversight of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and to the statutory requirements of the SOA.The United States’ SOA has reverberated around the globe through the corporate and accounting reforms addressed by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC); the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the European Commission (UC); and authoritative bodies within individual European countries.International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)The IFAC is a private governance organization whose members are the national professional associations of accountants. It formally describes itself as the global representative of the accounting profession, with the objective of serving the public interest, strengthening theworldwide accountancy profession and contributing to the development of strong international economies by establishing and promoting adherence to high quality standards [9]. The Federation represents accountancy groups worldwide and has served as a reminder that restoring public confidence in financial reporting and the accounting profession should be considered a global mission. It is also considered a key player in the global auditing arena which, among other things, constructs international standards on auditing and has laid down an international ethical code for professional accountants [14]. The IFAC has recently secured a degree of support for its endeavors from some of the world’s most influential interna tional organizations in economic and financial spheres, including global Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the World Bank and, most significantly, the EC. In October 2002, IFAC commissioned a Task Force on Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting to use a global perspective to consider how to restore the credibility of financial reporting and corporate disclosure. Its report, “Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting: An International Perspective,” includes recommendations for strengthening corporate governance, and raising the regulating standards of issuers. Among its conclusions and recommendations related to audit committees are:1. All public interest entities should have an independent auditcommittee or similar body.2. The audit committee should regularly report to the board and should address concerns about financial information, internal controls or the audit.3. The audit committee must meet regularly and have sufficient time to perform its role effectively.4. Audit committees should have core responsibilities, including monitoring and reviewing the integrity of financial reporting, financial controls, the internal audit function, as well as for recommending, working with and monitoring the external auditors.5. Audit committee members should be financially literate and a majority should have “substantial financial experience.” They should receive further training as necessary on their responsibilities and on the company.6. Audit committees should have regular private “executive sessions” with the outside auditors and the head of the internal audit department. These executive sessions should not include members of management. There should be similar meetings with the chief financial officer and other key financial executives, but without other members of management.7. Audit committee members should be independent of management.8. There should be a principles-based approach to definingindependence on an international level. Companies should disclose committee members’ credentials, remuneration and shareholdings.9. Reinforcing the role of the audit committee should improve the relationship between the auditor and the company. The audit committee should recommend the hiring and firing of auditors and approve their fees, as well as review the audit plan. 10. The IFAC Code of Ethics should be the foundation for individual national independence rules. It should be relied on in making decisions on whether auditors should provide non-audit services. Non-audit services performed by the auditor should be approved by the audit committee.11. All fees, for audit and non-audit services, should be disclosed to shareholders.12. Key audit team members, including the engagement and independent review partners, should serve no longer than seven years on the audit.13. Two years should pass before a key audit team member can takea position at the company as a director or any other important management positionOrganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is a quasi-think tank made up of 30 member countries, includingthe United States and United Kingdom, and it has working relationships with more than 70 other countries. In 2004, the OECD unveiled the updated revision of its “Principles of Corporate Governance” that had originally been adopted by its member governments (including the U.S. and UK) in 1999. Although they are nonbinding, the principles provide a reference for national legislation and regulation, as well as guidance for stock exchanges, investors, corporations and other parties [11,13]. The principles have long become an international benchmark for policy makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders worldwide. They have advanced the corporate governance agenda and provided specific guidance for legislative and regulatory initiatives in both the OECD and non-OECD countries.The 2004 updated version of “Principles of Corporate Governance” includes recommendations on accounting and auditing standards, the independence of board members and the need for boards to act in the interest of the company and the shareholders. The updated version also sets more demanding standards in a number of areas that impact corporate executive compensation and finance, such as:1. Granting investors the right to nominate company directors, as well as a more forceful role in electing them.2. Providing shareholders with a voice in the compensation policy for board members and executives, and giving these stockholders theability to submit questions to auditors.3. Mandating that institutional investors disclose their overall voting policies and how they manage material conflicts of interest that may affect the way the investors exercise key ownership functions, such as voting4. Identifying the need for effective protection of creditor rights and an efficient system for dealing with corporate insolvency.5. Directing rating agencies, brokers and other providers of information that could influence investor decisions to disclose conflicts of interest, and how those conflicts are being managed.6. Mandating board members to be more rigorous in disclosing related party transactions, and protecting soca lled “whistle blowers” by providing the employees with confidential access to a board-level contact.U.S.-EU Cooperation for Corporate Reforms Initially, the European Union resented applicability of U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act reforms to European companies and accounting firms operating in the U.S. However, after a series of negotiations, the U.S. and EU authorities have agreed to cooperate and decided to develop a compatible set of regulations. The regulatory bodies on both continents have undertaken a two-way cooperative approach based on effective equivalence of regulation and oversight authorities. Furthermore, member states of the European Union have proposed a code of conduct on the independent auditors whichincludes a five-year auditor rotation requirement. Furthermore, the national governments of the individual European countries have proposed reforms of their corporate laws. For example, in July 2002, the British government released a white paper proposing changes to the Company Law, which included harsher penalties for misleading auditors; redefining the roles of the directors; and creating standards for boards in accounting supervision and other disclosure issues. The British government is also reviewing the roles of non-executive directors and is considering the regulation of audit committees.中文译文全球企业会计欺诈与改革行动易卜拉欣·巴达维圣约翰大学摘要最近一波企业欺诈性财务报告激发了全球公司治理和财务报告改革，政府和会计和审计机构在美国和国际上的标准制定机构，包括欧盟委员会，国际会计师联合会;经济合作与发展组织;以恢复投资者对财务报告，会计行业和全球金融市场的信心。

会计专业外文文献翻译原文及译文

企业的社会责任：一种趋势和运动，但社会责任是什么，是为了什么？1企业社会责任（CSR ）已成为一个全球趋势，涉及企业，国家，国际组织和民间社会组织。

但这远远不能清楚CSR的主张，有什么真正的趋势，是从哪里开始，在哪里发展，谁是项目的主要行动者。

如果把它作为一种社会运动，我们必须要问：什么运动和谁执行？讨论有助于我们反思形成的趋势和如何管理某些特点来迅速和广泛地在全球各地进行扩展，并增加了以下体制变革,特别是对变化中国家之间、企业法人和民间社会组织关系之间的界限的作用。

企业社会责任的趋势在三个方面：作为一个管理框架，新的要求，地方企业;作为动员企业行为，以协助国家的发展援助;和作为管理趋势。

每一个这些画像表明，中心的某些行为，关系，驾驭团队和利益。

我的例子表明，没有人对这些意见似乎比别人更准确，而是，活动包括规范的不同利益、作用因素、起源和轨迹。

这些多重身份的趋势可以部分描述其成功以及它的争论，脆弱性和流动性。

许多公司现在有具体的计划和小节在其网站上处理企业社会责任。

在过去，软条例和指导网络，国际公认的规则一直是一种重要机制，作用在公司、国家和国家间组织的需求，例如，发布指导方针和条例的公司。

在这背景下，国际组织仍然是重要的行动者，他们正在寻求与跨国公司进行对话，而不是试图通过国家控制企业社会责任。

各国际组织不是对企业的社会责任监管机构;而他们却是监管和自我约束的倡议之间的经纪人的最合适人选。

对社会负责行为和监测这些行为的需求越来越多地以国家以外的这些组织为渠道，并强调赞成高比例的自律。

因此，我们看到了软法律(Morth, 2004)的出现，或者是Knill 和Lehmkuhl (2002) 所说的“被规管的自律”，和Moran (2002)所归纳的“精细”或“非正式”规章。

我更喜欢“软法律”和“软规章”的说法，因为他们并不总是非正式的。

软规章常常包括正式报告和统筹程序。

还有，从统筹和行政的观点来看，那些规章和精细还是相去甚远的。

会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译教学提纲

会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译(含：英文原文及中文译文) 文献出处：Badawi I M. Global corporate accounting frauds and action for reforms[J]. Review of Business, 2005, :26(:2). 英文原文Global Corporate Accounting Frauds and Action for ReformsIbrahim BadawiSt. John ' s UniversityAbstractThe recent wave of corporate fraudulent financial reporting has prompted global actions for reforms in corporate governance and financial reporting, by governments and accounting and auditing standard-setting bodies in the U.S. and internationally, including the European Commission; the International Federation of Accountants; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; and others, in order to restore investor confidence in financial reporting, the accounting profession and global financial markets.IntroductionDuring the recent series of corporate fraudulent financial reporting incidents in the U.S., similar corporate scandals were disclosed in several other countries. Almost all cases of foreign corporate accounting frauds were committed by entities that conduct their businesses in more than one country, and most of these entities are also listed on U.S. stock exchanges. Following the legislative and regulatory reforms of corporate America, resulting from the SarbanesOxleyAct of 2002, reforms were also initiated worldwide. The primary purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to identify the prominent American and foreign companies involved in fraudulent financial reporting and the nature of accounting irregularities they committed; and (2) to highlight the global reaction for corporate reforms which are aimed at restoring investor confidence in financial reporting, the public accounting profession and global capital markets.Cases of Global Corporate Accounting FraudsThe list of corporate financial accounting scandals in the U.S. is extensive, and each one was the result of one or more creative accounting irregularities. Exhibit 1 identifies a sample of U.S. companies that committed such fraud and the nature of their fraudulent financial reporting activities.Who Commits Financial Fraud and HowThere are three groups of business people who commit financial statement frauds. They range from senior management (CEO and CFO); mid- and lower-level management;and organizational criminals [6,16]. CEOs and CFOs commit accounting frauds to conceal true business performance, to preserve personal status and control and to maintain personal income and wealth. Mid- and lower-level employees falsify financial statements related to their area of responsibility (subsidiary, division or other unit) to conceal poor performance and/or to earn performance-based bonuses. Organizational criminals falsify financial statements to obtain loans or to inflate a stock they plan to sell in a “ pum-pand-dump” scheme. Methods of financial statement schemes range from fictitious orfabricated revenues; altering the times at which revenues are recognized; improper asset valuations and reporting; concealing liabilities and expenses; and improper financial statement disclosures.Global Regulatory Action for Corporate and Accounting ReformsIn response to corporate and accounting scandals, the effects of which are still being felt throughout the U.S. economy, and in order to protect public interest and to restore investor confidence in the capital market, U.S. lawmakers, in a compromise by the House and Senate, passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. President Bush signed this Act into law (Public Law 107-204) on July 30, 2002. The Act resulted in major changes to compliance practices of large U.S. andnon-U.S. companies whose securities are listed or traded on U.S. stock exchanges, requiring executives, boards of directors and external auditors to undertake measuresto implement greater accountability, responsibility and transparency of financial reporting. The statutes of the Act, and the new SEC initiatives that followed [1,4,8,12,15], are considered the most significant legislation and regulations affecting the corporate community and the accounting profession since 1933. Other U.S. regulatory bodies such as NYSE, NASDAQ and the State Societies of CPAs have also passed new regulations which place additional burdens on publicly traded companies and their external auditors.The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) is expressly applicable to any non-U.S. company registered on U.S. exchanges under either the Securities Act of 1933 or the Security Exchange Act of 1934, regardless of country of incorporation orcorporate domicile. Furthermore, external auditors of such registrants, regardless of their nationality or place of business, are subject to the oversight of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and to the statutory requirements of the SOA.The United States ' SOA has reverberated around the globe through the corporate and accounting reforms addressed by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC); the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the European Commission (UC); and authoritative bodies within individual European countries.International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)The IFAC is a private governance organization whose members are the national professional associations of accountants. It formally describes itself as the global representative of the accounting profession, with the objective of serving the public interest, strengthening the worldwide accountancy profession and contributing to the development of strong international economies by establishing and promoting adherence to high quality standards [9]. The Federation represents accountancy groups worldwide and has served as a reminder that restoring public confidence in financial reporting and the accounting profession should be considered a global mission. It is also considered a key player in the global auditing arena which, among other things, constructs international standards on auditing and has laid down an international ethical code for professional accountants [14]. The IFAC has recently secured adegree of support for its endeavors from some of the world 'ms ost influential international organizations in economic and financial spheres,including global Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the World Bank and, most significantly, the EC. In October 2002, IFAC commissioned a Task Force on Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting to use a global perspective to consider how to restore the credibility of financial reporting and corporate disclosure. Its report, “ Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting: An International Perspective, in”cludes recommendations for strengthening corporate governance, and raising the regulating standards of issuers. Among its conclusions and recommendations related to audit committees are:1. All public interest entities should have an independent audit committee or similar body.2. The audit committee should regularly report to the board and should address concerns about financial information, internal controls or the audit.3. The audit committee must meet regularly and have sufficient time to perform its role effectively.4. Audit committees should have core responsibilities, including monitoring and reviewing the integrity of financial reporting, financial controls, the internal audit function, as well as for recommending, working with and monitoring the external auditors.5. Audit committee members should be financially literate and a majority should have “ substantiaflinancial experience. T”hey should receive further training as necessary on their responsibilities and on the company.6. Audit committees should have regular private “ executive sessionsw”ith the outside auditors and the head of the internal audit department. These executive sessions should not include members of management.There should be similar meetings with the chief financial officer and other key financial executives, but without other members of management.7. Audit committee members should be independent of management.8. There should be a principles-based approach to defining independence on an international level. Companies should disclose committee members ' credentials, remuneration and shareholdings.9. Reinforcing the role of the audit committee should improve the relationship between the auditor and the company. The audit committee should recommend the hiring and firing of auditors and approve their fees, as well as review the audit plan. 10. The IFAC Code of Ethics should be the foundation for individual national independencerules. It should be relied on in making decisions on whether auditors should provide non-audit services. Non-audit services performed by the auditor should be approved by the audit committee.11. All fees, for audit and non-audit services, should be disclosed to shareholders.12. Key audit team members, including the engagement and independentreview partners, should serve no longer than seven years on the audit.13. Two years should pass before a key audit team member can take a position at the company as a director or any other important management positionOrganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is a quasi-think tank made up of 30 member countries, including the United States and United Kingdom, and it has working relationships with more than 70 other countries. In 2004, the OECD unveiled the updated revision of its “ Principlesof Corporate Governance ”that had originally been adopted by its member governments (including the U.S. and UK) in 1999. Although they are nonbinding, the principles provide a reference for national legislation and regulation, as well as guidance for stock exchanges,investors, corporations and other parties [11,13]. The principles have long become an international benchmark for policy makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders worldwide. They have advanced the corporate governance agenda and provided specific guidance for legislative and regulatory initiatives in both the OECD and non-OECD countries.The 2004 updated version of “ Principles of Corporate Governance includes recommendations on accounting and auditing standards, the independence of board members and the need for boards to act in the interest of the company and the shareholders.The updated version also sets moredemanding standards in a number of areas that impact corporate executive compensation and finance, such as:1. Granting investors the right to nominate company directors, as well as a more forceful role in electing them.2. Providing shareholderswith a voice in the compensation policy for board members and executives, and giving these stockholders theability to submit questions to auditors.3. Mandating that institutional investors disclose their overall voting policies and how they manage material conflicts of interest that may affect the way the investors exercise key ownership functions, such as voting4. Identifying the need for effective protection of creditor rights and an efficient system for dealing with corporate insolvency.5. Directing rating agencies, brokers and other providers of information that could influence investor decisions to disclose conflicts of interest, and how those conflicts are being managed.6. Mandating board members to be more rigorous in disclosing related party transactions, and protecting socalled “whistleblowers ”by providing the employees with confidential access to a board-level contact.U.S.-EU Cooperation for Corporate Reforms Initially, the European Union resented applicability of U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act reforms to European companies and accounting firms operating in the U.S. However, after a series of negotiations, the U.S. and EU authorities have agreed to cooperate and decidedto develop a compatible set of regulations. The regulatory bodies on both continents have undertaken a two-way cooperative approach based on effective equivalence of regulation and oversight authorities. Furthermore, member states of the European Union have proposed a code of conduct on the independent auditors which includes a five-year auditor rotation requirement. Furthermore, the national governments of the individual European countries have proposed reforms of their corporate laws. For example, in July 2002, the British government released a white paper proposing changesto the Company Law, which included harsher penalties for misleading auditors; redefining the roles of the directors; and creating standards for boards in accounting supervision and other disclosure issues. The British government is also reviewing the roles of non-executive directors and is considering the regulation of audit committees.中文译文全球企业会计欺诈与改革行动易卜拉欣•巴达维圣约翰大学摘要最近一波企业欺诈性财务报告激发了全球公司治理和财务报告改革，政府和会计和审计机构在美国和国际上的标准制定机构，包括欧盟委员会，国际会计师联合会;经济合作与发展组织;以恢复投资者对财务报告，会计行业和全球金融市场的信心。

会计内部控制中英文对照外文翻译文献

会计内部控制中英文对照外文翻译文献n:Internal control is an accounting re or control system ___ policies。

protecting assets。

and preventing fraud and errors。

It is an important component of nal management that includes planning。

methods。

and res used to meet tasks。

goals。

and objectives。

and in doing so。

supports performance-based management。

Internal control is equal to management control and can help managers achieve the expected effective management of resources。

However。

designing and establishing effective internal control is not a simple task and cannot be achieved through quick fixes。

This article discusses the different aspects of the concept of internal control and management.Keywords: internal control。

management control。

control environment。

control activities。

n2.Internal Control Perspective: ___The environment requires new business control variables that are not responsive to any potential ___ control。

会计相关术语中英文对照

会计术语表►AICPA: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 美国注册会计师协会►APB: Accounting Principles Board 会计原则委员会►ASB: Auditing Standards Board (AICPA)(美国注册会计师协会) 审计准则委员会►ARSC: Accounting and Review Services Committee (AICPA) (美国注册会计师协会) 会计与复核服务委员会►ASC: Accounting Standards Codification 会计准则汇编►ASU: Accounting Standards Update 会计准则更新►CA: Chartered Accountant 特许会计师►CAQ: Center for Audit Quality 审计质量中心►CICA: Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 加拿大特许会计师协会►CSEC: Consulting Services Executive Committee (AICPA)(美国注册会计师协会) 咨询服务执行委员会►EITF: Emerging Issues Task Force (FASB) (美国财务会计准则委员会)紧急事务委员会►FAF: Financial Accounting Foundation 财务会计基金会►FASB: Financial Accounting Standards Board 美国财务会计准则委员会►FCA: Fellow of the Institute of Chartered Accountants 特许会计师公众成员►FinREC: Financial Reporting Executive Committee 财务报告执行委员会►FSP: FASB Staff Position (FASB) (美国财务会计准则委员会)工作人员立场公告►GAAP (US): Generally Accepted Accounting Principles （美国）一般公认会计原则►GAAS: Generally Accepted Auditing Standards 一般公认审计准则►IAASB: International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IFAC) 国际审计与可信性保证准则理事会(国际会计师联合会)►IAESB: International Accounting Education Standards Board (IFAC) (国际会计师联合会) 国际会计教育准则理事会►IASB: International Accounting Standards Board 国际会计准则委员会►IAS: International Accounting Standards 国际会计准则►IESBA: International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IFAC) (国际会计师联合会) 国际会计师职业道德准则理事会►IFAC: International Federation of Accountants 国际会计师联合会►IFRIC: International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IASB) (国际会计准则委员会) 国际财务报告解释委员会►IOSCO: International Organization of Securities Commissions 国际公共部门会计准则►IPSAS: International Public Sector Accounting Standards 国际公共部门会计准则►IPSASB: International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (IFAC) (国际会计师联合会) 国际公共部门会计准则理事会►PCAOB: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 公众公司会计监督委员会►PPEC: Public Practice Executive Committee (CAQ) (审计质量中心)公共实践执行委员会►SAB: Staff Accounting Bulletins (SEC) (美国证监会) 首会办会计公告►SEC (US): Securities and Exchange Commission 美国证监会►SEC Regulations Committee (SEC) (美国证监会)监管委员会►SFAS: Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 财务会计准则公告►SIC: Standing Interpretations Committee (IASB) (国际会计准则委员会) 常设解释委员会►SOP: Statements of Position (AICPA) (美国注册会计师协会) 立场公告►SME: Small and Medium Sized Entities (IASB) (国际会计准则委员会) 中小企业►TPA: Technical Practice Aids (AICPA) (美国注册会计师协会) 技术实务支持体系/技术实务指引►VRG (US): Valuation Resource Group (FASB) （美国财务会计准则委员会）估值资源小组。

财务会计中英文.

报告日（与质量控制相关）Date of report (in relation to quality control)财务报表批准日Date of the approval of the financial statements审计报告日Date of the auditor’s report财务报表日Date of the financial statements设计、执行和维护适当的控制Design, implement and maintain adequate controls (over)检查风险Detection risk可能导致对被审计单位持续经营能力产生重大疑虑的事项或情况Events or conditions that may cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern不符事项Exception存在Existence有经验的注册会计师Experienced auditor专长Expertise信赖程度Extent of reliance函证External confirmation事实错报、判断错报和推断错报Factual misstatements, judgemental misstatements and projected misstatements财务报表Financial statements舞弊Fraud舞弊风险因素Fraud risk factors虚假财务报告Fraudulent financial reporting对财务报表使用者理解财务报表至关重要F undamental to users’ understanding of the financial statements治理Governance集团Group集团项目合伙人Group engagement partner集团层面控制Group-wide controls历史财务信息Historical financial information识别、评估和应对重大错报风险Identify, assess and respond to risk of material misstatement无法获取充分、适当的审计证据Inability to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence后任注册会计师Incoming auditor不一致Inconsistency独立性Independence与财务报告相关的信息系统Information system relevant to financial reporting 审计的固有限制Inherent limitation of audit固有风险Inherent risk首次审计业务Initial audit engagement生成、记录、处理和报告交易Initiate, record, process and report transactions 询问Inquiry检查Inspection中期财务信息或报表Interim financial information or statements内部审计师Internal auditors内部控制Internal control内部控制缺陷Internal control deficiency国际财务报告准则International Financial Reporting Standards调查Investigate财务报表报出日Issuance date of the financial statements信息技术应用控制IT application controls信息技术环境IT environment会计分录和其他调整Journal entries and other adjustments会计分录Journal entry/entries严重程度Level of significance上市公司实体Listed entity管理层Management管理层偏向Management bias管理层凌驾于控制之上Management override of controls管理当局声明书Management representation letter管理层对其自身责任的认可与理解Management’s acknowledgement and understanding of its responsibilities管理层的专家Management’s expert重大类别的交易、账户余额和披露Material classes of transactions, account balances and disclosure重大不确定性Material uncertainty财务报表整体的重要性Materiality for the financial statements as a whole侵占资产Misappropriation of assets错报Misstatement对事实的错报Misstatement of fact非标准审计报告Modified audit report非无保留意见Modified opinion监控Monitoring对控制的监督Monitoring of controls审计程序的性质、时间安排和范围Nature, timing and extent of audit procedures 消极式函证Negative confirmation网络事务所Network firm违反法律法规Non-compliance未回函Non-response非抽样风险Non-sampling risk观察Observation发生Occurrence期初余额Opening balances内部控制的运行有效性Operating effectiveness of internal control其他信息Other information其他事项段Other matter paragraph会计估计的结果Outcome of an accounting estimate超出正常经营过程Outside the normal course of business总体审计方案Overall audit approach总体审计策略Overall audit strategy总体结论Overall conclusion总体应对措施Overall responses合伙人Partner实际执行的重要性Performance materiality人员Personnel广泛性Pervasive计划活动Planning activities总体Population/Overall积极式函证Positive confirmation执业人员Practitioner前任注册会计师Predecessor auditor初步业务活动Preliminary engagement activities与管理层和治理层（如适用）责任相关的执行审计工作的前提Premise, relating to the responsibilities of management and, where appropriate, those charged with governance, on which an audit is conducted编制和列报财务报表Prepare and present the financial statements列报与披露Presentation and disclosure收入确认存在舞弊风险的假定Presumed fraud risks in revenue recognition防止或发现并纠正重大错报Prevent or detect and correct material misstatement专业胜任能力Professional competence职业判断Professional judgment职业怀疑态度Professional skepticism业务执行Provision of service/Delivery of service通常对决定财务报表中的重大金额和披露有直接影响的法律法规的规定Provisions of laws and regulations generally recognized to have a direct effect on the determination of material amounts and disclosures in the financial statements具有适当资格的外部人员Qualified external person保留意见Qualified opinion量化财务影响Quantification of the financial impacts合理保证（针对审计业务和质量控制）Reasonable assurance (in the context of audit engagements, and in quality control)合理性测试Reasonableness test重新计算Re-calculation连续审计业务Recurring audit engagements将认定层次的审计风险降至可接受的低水平Reduce audit risk at the assertion level to an acceptably low level关联方Related parties具有支配性影响的关联方Related parties with dominant influence管理层以前未识别或未向注册会计师披露的关联方关系或关联方交易Related party relationships or transactions that management has not identified or disclosed to the auditor 按照等同于公平交易中通行的条款执行的关联方交易Related party transactions conducted on terms equivalent to those prevailing in an arm’s length transaction （审计证据的）相关性和可靠性Relevance and reliability (of audit evidence)相关职业道德要求Relevant ethical requirements剩余期间Remaining period重新执行Re-performance管理层施加的限制Restrictions imposed by management复核(与质量控制相关) Review (in relation to quality control)权利与义务Rights and obligations风险评估程序Risk assessment procedures重大错报风险Risk of material misstatement财务报表层次和认定层次的重大错报风险Risk of material misstatement at financial statement level and at assertion level样本量Sample size抽样Sampling抽样风险Sampling risk抽样单元Sampling unit选择和运用会计政策Selection and application of accounting policies选取测试项目Selection of items for testing重要组成部分Significant component值得关注的内部控制缺陷Significant deficiencies in internal control重大事项Significant matters特别风险Significant risk重大非常规交易Significant unusual transactions特定的审计程序Specified audit procedures员工Staff统计抽样Statistical sampling存货盘点Stocktake分层Stratification期后事项Subsequent events实质性分析程序Substantive analytical procedures实质性程序Substantive procedure（审计证据的）充分性Sufficiency (of audit evidence)补充信息Supplementary information测试Test控制测试Test of controls细节测试Test of details特定类别的交易、账户余额或披露的一个或多个重要性水平The materiality level or levels for particular classes of transactions, account balances or disclosures 治理层Those charged with governance错报的临界值Threshold for misstatements可容忍错报Tolerable misstatement可容忍偏差率Tolerable rate of deviation趋势分析法、比率分析法、合理性测试法和回归分析法Trend analysis, ratio analysis, reasonableness test, and regression analysis不确定性Uncertainty未更正错报Uncorrected misstatements标准审计报告Unmodified audit report无保留意见Unqualified opinion计价与分摊Valuation and allocation/amortization穿行测试Walk-through test解除业务约定Withdraw from the engagement书面声明Written representation职业道德可接受的水平Acceptable level广告Advertising过度推介Advocacy承担管理层职责Assume management responsibilities鉴证客户Assurance client鉴证业务Assurance engagement鉴证业务项目组Assurance team审计客户Audit client审计业务Audit engagement审计项目组Audit team近亲属Close family密切私人关系Close personal relationship保密Confidentiality利益冲突Conflicts of interest或有收费Contingent fee冷却期Cooling off period现任会计师Current accountant/auditor直接经济利益Direct financial interest董事或高级管理人员Director or senior officer/senior management应有的关注Due care消除或降低不利影响Eliminate or reduce threats项目合伙人Engagement partner项目质量控制复核Engagement quality control review项目组Engagement team外部专家External expert密切关系Familiarity经济利益Financial interests历史财务信息Historical financial information直系亲属/ 主要近亲属Immediate family独立性Independence从实质上和形式上保持独立性Independence of mind, Independence in appearance 间接经济利益Indirect financial interest诚信Integrity外在压力Intimidation/Pressure关键审计合伙人Key audit partner上市实体Listed entity长期存在业务关系Long association (with an audit client)严重虚假或误导性的陈述Materially false or misleading statement非鉴证服务Non-assurance services客观和公正性Objectivity专业服务Professional services拟接受的客户Prospective client公众利益实体Public interest entity关联实体Related entity审阅客户Review client审阅业务Review engagement审阅项目组Review team轮换Rotation防范措施Safeguards自身利益Self-interest自我评价Self-review重要且密切的商业关系Significant and close business relationship 特殊目的财务报表Special purpose financial statements鉴证业务的对象Subject matter of assurance engagement不利影响、威胁Threats税法兼营Also engaged in应计税款Accrued tax从价税Ad valorem tax加计扣除Additional deduction附加税Additional tax/Surcharge所得额调整Adjustment of income税后所得After-tax income准予扣除数Allowable deductions税收可抵免额Allowable tax credit从量定额Amount based on quantity增值额Amount of appreciation/Value added销售额Amount of sales抵免税额Amount of tax credit应纳税所得额Amount of taxable income扣除项目金额Amount of the deductions适用税额Applicable tax amount适用税率Applicable tax rates计税成本Assessable cost核定所得额Assessable income平均成本利润率Average cost-plus margin rate平均销售价格Average sales price营业税Business tax偶然所得Casual income所得项目Category of income组成计税价格Composite taxable price本纳税年度Current tax year所得税申报Declaration of income tax扣除项目Deductible items免税项目扣除Deduction of the tax exemption item契税Deed tax视同销售Deemed sales/sales equivalent免除纳税义务Discharge of tax obligation应税商品Dutiable goods纳税义务Duty of tax payment权益性投资收益Earning from equity investments雇员福利，职工福利Employee benefit企业所得税Enterprise income tax国外所得收入Foreign earned income一般纳税人General taxpayer特许权使用费所得Income from franchise royalty利息、股息、红利所得Income from interests, dividends and bonuses 劳务所得Income from labor service财产租赁所得Income from leasing of property生产经营所得Income from production and business operation转让财产所得Income from property transfer工资薪金所得Income from wages, salaries财产转让收入Income from property transfer所得税抵免Income tax credit申报缴纳所得税Income tax declaration应纳所得税Income tax payable接受捐赠所得Income from donation个人所得税Individual income tax增值税进项税额Input value added tax非正常损失Irregular loss滞纳金Late fee清算所得税Liquidation income tax最低应纳税所得额Minimum taxable income增值税起征点Minimum threshold of value-added Tax混合销售行为Mixed sales activities所得税前净所得Net income before income tax税后净利润Net profit after tax非货币资产Non-monetary asset不征税收入Non-taxable income不计入征税范围Not included in the scope of taxable activities 财产原值Original value of the property/ Cost of property当期销项税额Output tax for the period增值税销项税额Output value added tax滞纳税款/欠税Overdue tax应补缴税款Payment of tax in arrears累进税率Progressive tax rate比例税率Proportional tax rate公益性捐赠Public welfare donations房产税Real estate tax居民纳税人Resident taxpayer资源税Resource tax含税销售额Sales amount including tax所得税征收范围Scope of income tax/Subject to income tax 小规模纳税人Small-scale taxpayer源泉扣缴Source withholding纳税特别扣除项目Special deductible items特殊性税务处理Special tax treatment印花税Stamp tax应征税额Tax accrued税额Tax amounts税基/计税依据Tax base税种Tax category消费税税率Tax computation税收抵免Tax credit抵免限额Tax credit quota纳税期限Tax deadline税前可扣除项目Tax deductible items税收减免Tax deduction or exemption计税差异Tax differences到期应纳税款Tax due漏税/逃税Tax evasion免税Tax exemption纳税申报Tax filing本期税额Tax for the period/year已纳税额Tax paid应纳税额Tax payable纳税期限Tax payment deadline税率Tax rate减税Tax reduction退税Tax refund税收附加Tax surcharge起征点Tax threshold计税价格Tax value/Taxable price减免税额Tax amount deducted应税所得Taxable income应税项目Taxable item纳税期间Taxable period对股息征税Taxation of dividends免税收入Tax-exempt income免税税目Tax-exempt item免税利润Tax-exempt profit含税价格Tax-included price纳税人Taxpayer土地使用税Urban land-use tax增值税Value added tax(VAT)土地增值税Value-added tax on land/Land appreciation tax 增值税减免VAT exemption or reduction车船税Vehicle and vessel tax车辆购置税Vehicle purchase tax扣缴义务人Withholding agent代扣代缴税款Withholding and remitting tax预提所得税Withholding income tax零税率Zero tax rate财务成本管理应收账款周转次数Accounts receivable turnover应收账款周转天数Accounts receivable turnover days取得成本Acquisition cost实际增长率Actual growth rate实际利率Actual interest rate配股后每股价格After-allotment price per share配股权价值Allotment option value配股价格Allotment price预付年金（即付年金、期初年金）Annuity due会计报酬率法Accounting rate of return(ARR)平均交货时间Average delivery time贝塔（β）系数Beta coefficient债券评级Bond rating债券估价Bond valuation每股净资产Book value per share(BPS)盈亏临界点Break-even point保险储备（安全存量）Buffer inventory资本支出Capital expenditure持有成本Carrying cost现金预算Cash budget现金股利Cash dividend现金流量利息保障倍数Cash flow interest coverage ratio 经营活动现金流量Cash flows from operational activities 混合租赁Combination lease佣金Commission普通股Common stock补偿性余额Compensating balance复利Compound interest全面预算Comprehensive budget企业价值评估Corporate valuation成本性态Cost behavior成本中心Cost centre成本的归集和分配Cost collection and allocation资本成本Cost of capital税后债务成本Cost of debt after tax成本差异Cost variance平息债券Coupon bond债券票面利率Coupon interest rate流动资产周转次数Current assets turnover流动资产周转天数Current assets turnover days流动比率Current ratio本期收入乘数Current sales multiplier债务市场Debt market/Bond market资产负债率Debt-to-asset ratio产权比率Debt-to-equity ratio股利宣告日Declaration date财务杠杆系数Degree of financial leverage(DFL)直接租赁Direct leasing折现率Discount rate纯贴现债券（零息债券）Discounted bond (Zero coupon bond)股利支付率Dividend payout ratio经营杠杆系数Degree of operating leverage(DOL)股价下行乘数Downstream price multiplier总杠杆系数Degree of total leverage (DTL)息前税前利润Earnings before interests and taxes(EBIT)经济订货量Economic order quantity(EOQ)每股盈余稀释EPS dilution每股盈余无差别点法EPS indifferent point method(EBIT-EPS break even analysis)每股盈余最大化EPS maximization每股盈余Earnings per share(EPS)权益乘数Equity multiplier股权价值Equity value经济增加值Economic value added(EVA)除息日Ex-dividend date执行价格Exercise price/Strike price外部融资销售增长比External financing needed to sales growth ratio 融资租赁Financial lease/Capital lease财务估价Financial valuation完工产品Finished goods固定预算Fixed budget弹性预算Flexible budget浮动利率Floating interest rate浮动优惠利率Floating prime interest rate债务现金流量Free cash flows of creditors股权现金流量Free cash flows of equity实体现金流量Free cash flows of firm复利终值系数FV interest factor预付年金终值系数FV interest factor of annuity due终值Future value(FV)管理费用General and administrative expense持续经营价值Going concern value毛租赁Gross lease营业现金毛流量Gross operating cash flows套期保值原理Hedging principle间接成本Indirect cost通货膨胀率Inflation rate利息保障倍数Interest coverage ratio税后利息率Interest rate after tax内含增长率Internal growth rate内部转移价格Internal transfer price内在市销率Intrinsic sales multiplier内在价值Intrinsic value存货周转次数Inventory turnover存货周转天数Inventory turnover days投资中心Investment center内含报酬率法Internal rate of return(IRR) 非相关成本Irrelevant cost发行价格Issuance price租赁期Lease term租赁资产Leasehold property承租人Lessee出租人Lessor杠杆贡献率Leverage contributing ratio杠杆租赁Leverage lease清算价值Liquidation value短期偿债能力比率Liquidity ratios长期债券Long-term bond制造费用预算Manufacturing overhead budget边际贡献率Marginal contribution ratio市场组合Market portfolio市场价格Market price市价稀释Market price dilution市场风险溢价Market risk premium债券到期日Maturity date市场增加值Market value added(MAV)最大最小法Maximin method企业价值最大化Maximization of firm’s value股东财富最大化Maximization of shareholders’ wealth混合成本Mixed cost互斥项目Mutually exclusive projects/events流通债券Negotiable bond净财务杠杆Net financial leverage净租赁Net lease营业现金净流量Net operating cash flows销售净利率Net profit margin净现值法NPV method净现值Net present value(NPV)经营租赁Operating lease经营杠杆Operating leverage机会成本Opportunity cost期权价值Option value订货提前期Order lead time订货成本Ordering cost普通年金（后付年金）Ordinary annuity债券面值Par value/Face value回收期法Payback period method股利支付日Payment date经营资产销售百分比Percentage of operating assets to sales经营负债销售百分比Percentage of operating liabilities to sales 销售百分比法Percentage-of-sales method期间成本Period cost定期预算Periodic budget永久债券Perpetual bond永续年金Perpetuity优先股Preferred stock现值指数Present value index产品成本预算Product cost budget生产预算Production budget生产成本Production cost制造费用Production overhead利润中心Profit center利润最大化Profit maximization项目特有风险Project-specific risk公开增发Public offering复利现值系数PV interest factor预付年金现值系数PV interest factor of annuity due现值Present value(PV)速动比率Quick ratio股权登记日Record date共同年限法Replacement chain (common life) approach 必要报酬率Required rate of return剩余股利政策Residual dividend policy剩余权益收益Residual equity income剩余净金融支出Residual net financial expenditure剩余经营收益Residual operating income责任中心Responsibility center利润留存率Retention ratio权益净利率Return on equity投资报酬率Return on investment收入中心Revenue center无风险利率Risk-free interest rate无风险报酬率Risk-free rate of return安全边际率Safety margin ratio销售预算Sales budget销售费用Sales expense销售预测Sales forecast销售增长率Sales growth rate代销Sales on commission销售数量Sales volume股东权益增长率Shareholders’ equity g rowth ratio短缺成本Shortage cost证券市场线Security market line(SML)标准成本Standard cost股票股利Stock dividend股价最大化Stock price maximization股票回购Stock repurchase股票分割Stock split储存成本Storage cost沉没成本Sunk cost可持续增长率Sustainable growth rate系统风险（市场风险、不可分散风险）Systematic risk (Market risk/Non-diversifiable risk)目标资本结构Target capital structure时间溢价Time premium货币的时间价值Time value of money固定成本总额Total fixed cost标的资产Underlying assets包销Underwrite单位销售价格Unit sales price单位变动成本Unit variable costs股价上行乘数Upstream price multiplier变动成本率Variable cost ratio加权平均资本成本Weighted average cost of capital(WACC)营运资本投资Working capital investment在产品Work-in-progress到期收益率法Yield-to-maturity method(YTM method)公司战略与风险管理低增长—强竞争地位的―现金牛‖业务―Cash cow‖ position : slow growth - high competitiveness低增长—弱竞争地位的―瘦狗‖业务―Dog‖ position : slow growth - low competitiveness 高增长—低竞争地位的―问题‖业务―Question mark‖ position : high growth - low competitiveness高增长—强竞争地位的―明星‖业务―Star‖ position : high growth - high competitiveness放弃战略Abandon strategy竞争环境分析Analysis of competitive environment竞争对手分析Analysis of competitors企业能力分析Analysis of corporate competencies and capabilities企业资源分析Analysis of corporate resources宏观环境分析Analysis of macro-environment市场需求分析Analysis of market demand分析型战略Analytical strategy审计委员会Audit committee平衡计分卡Balanced scorecard基准分析Benchmarking analysis蓝海战略Blue Ocean strategy波士顿矩阵Boston matrix业务单位战略（竞争战略）Business (Competitive) strategy经营目标Business objectives运营风险Business risk业务单元Business unit事业部制组织结构Business unit organization structure战略变革Change management in strategy内部信息传递Communication of internal information全面风险管理Comprehensive risk management收缩战略Contraction strategy控制活动Control activities控制环境Control environment公司治理Corporate governance总体战略Corporate strategy成本领先战略Cost leadership strategy惩治成本Cost of punishment损失成本Cost of total loss风险管理成本与效益Costs and benefits of risk management信用风险Credit risk文化与绩效Culture and performance客户细分或市场细分事业部制结构Customer segmentation/Market segmentation business structure消费动机Customer’s motivation负债和杠杆作用Debt and gearing扁平型结构Decentralized structure决策支持系统Decision support system防御型战略Defensive strategy制定风险管理策略Development of risk management strategy 发展战略Development strategy钻石模型Diamond model差异化战略Differentiation strategy直接投资Direct investment多元化并购Diversified merger and acquisition多种经营战略Diversified strategy垄断优势理论Dominance advantage theory每股盈余或市净率Earnings per share or price to book ratio 效率Efficiency生产要素Elements in production内部控制的要素Elements of internal control创业型组织结构Entrepreneurial organization structure自然环境风险Environment risk股权投资Equity investment评估成本Evaluation cost事项识别Event identification处置成本Execution cost实地查验Field inspection财务风险与经营风险的搭配Financial risk and business risk 内部控制的五大要素Five elements in internal control产业五种竞争力Five forces in the competitive approach集中化战略Focus strategy紧缩与集中战略Focused strategy职能制组织结构Functional organization structure职能战略Functional strategy资金活动Fund-related activities全球化战略Globalization strategy毛利率与净利润率Gross profit margin and net profit margin增长型战略Growth strategy开拓型战略Growth strategy担保业务Guarantee businessH型结构(控股企业／控股集团组织结构) H type organization structure (Holding company/Group organization structure)高经营风险与高财务风险搭配High business risk, high financial risk高经营风险与低财务风险搭配High business risk, low financial risk高长型结构High growth structure横向并购Horizontal merger and acquisition增量预算Incremental budgeting产品生命周期Industry life cycle产业风险Industry risk信息与沟通Information and communication一体化战略Integrated strategy后向一体化战略Integrated strategy - Backward前向一体化战略Integrated strategy - Forward横向一体化战略Integrated strategy - Horizontal纵向一体化战略Integrated strategy - Vertical产业内现有企业的竞争Intensity of industry rivalry密集型战略Intensive strategy内部控制Internal control多国本土化战略International subsidiaries strategy国际战略Internationalization strategy资源的不可替代性Irreplaceable resources合资经营Joint investment business准时生产系统Just-in-time system(JIT)杠杆收购Leveraged buy-out法律风险Litigation risk长期目标Long-term objective维持成本Maintenance cost管理信息系统Management information system市场开发——现有产品和新市场Market development - existing product and new market市场渗透——现有产品和现有市场Market penetration - existing product and existing market重要缺陷Material deficiency矩阵制组织结构Matrix organization structure风险度量Measurement of risk公司战略的现代概念Modern concept of corporate strategy监督Monitoring风险管理的监督与改进Monitoring and improvement of risk managementM型企业组织结构(多部门结构) Multi-divisional organization structure非杠杆收购Non leveraged buy-out内部控制的目标Objectives of internal control风险管理的目标Objectives of risk management现场检查On-site inspection运行缺陷Operating deficiency操作风险Operational risk期权合约Options contracts组织管理能力Organization management ability组织资源Organization resources组织架构Organization structure业务外包Outsourcing信息系统外包Out-sourcing of information system人员导向性People-driven绩效评估Performance evaluation资源的持久性Persistence of the resources ownedPEST分析PEST analysis政治风险Political risk供应者、购买者讨价还价的能力Power of buyers or suppliers预防成本Prevention cost基本活动（又称主体活动）Primary activities内部控制的原则Principles of internal control风险管理基本流程Process of risk management采购业务Procurement activities产品开发——新产品和现有市场Product development - new product and existing market产品／品牌事业部制结构Product/Brand business structure生产流程计划Production process planning生产运营Production and operation生产管理能力Production management ability产能计划Production plan盈利能力和回报率指标Profitability and rate of return measurement质量管理Quality management反应型战略Reactive strategy相关多元化Related diversification研究与开发Research and development研发能力Research and development ability已动用资本报酬率（投资回报率或净资产回报率）Return of capitalemployed(ROCE)/Return of investment(ROI)/Return of net assets(RONA) 转向战略Reverse strategy激励和奖励机制Reward and incentive system风险承担Risk acceptance风险偏好Risk appetite风险评估Risk assessment风险规避Risk avoidance风险补偿Risk compensation风险控制Risk control风险转换Risk conversion风险转移Risk transfer角色导向型Role-driven证券投资Securities investment重大缺陷Significant deficiency稳定战略Stable strategy利益相关者stakeholders企业战略联盟Strategic alliances战略分析Strategic analysis外部环境分析Strategic analysis – External environment战略业务单位组织结构Strategic business unit organization structure(SBU）战略控制系统Strategic control system战略群组Strategic group战略目标Strategic objective国际化经营的战略类型Strategic options for international business业绩计量Strategic performance evaluation战略风险Strategic risk内部环境分析Strategy analysis - Internal environment发展战略Strategy development战略实施Strategy implementation战略管理过程Strategy management process战略选择Strategy selection继任计划Succession planning技术风险Technology risk潜在进入者的进入威胁Threat of new entrants 替代品的替代威胁Threat of substitutes跨国战略Transnational strategy非相关多元化Unrelated diversification战略失效Unsuccessful strategy价值链分析Value chain analysis纵向并购Vertical merger and acquisition零基预算Zero-based budgeting经济法承诺Acceptance收购人Acquirer要约收购Acquisition by offer上市公司收购Acquisition of a listed company 资产收购Acquisition of assets实际出资人Actual capital contributor实际控制Actual control实际控制人Actual controller临时报告Ad hoc report管理人Administrator入伙Admission to a partnership代理/受托人Agent协议转让Agree to transfer合同变更Alter of contract年度报告Annual report关联交易Associated transaction公司章程Association of articles破产财产Bankrupt property破产债权Bankruptcy creditor破产费用Bankruptcy expenses破产法Bankruptcy Law基准日Base date大宗交易Block trading董事会Board of directors监事会Board of supervisors民事行为能力Capacity for civil conducts 董事长Chairperson of the board民事权利能力Civil rights集体所有权Collective ownership公司分立Company demergers公司法Company Law股份有限公司Company limited公司合并Company mergers经营者集中Concentration of operators 一致行动Consistent act合同法Contract Law承揽人/承包人Contractor委托合同Contracts for commission承揽合同Contracts for work控股股东Controlling shareholders可转换公司债券Convertible bond协同行为Coordinated behavior公司债券Corporate bond信用评级Credit rating债权人委员会Creditors’ committee债权人会议Creditors’ meeting违约金Damages for breach of contract债务人财产Debtor’s property破产宣告Declaration of bankruptcy减资Decrease of capital故意Deliberate intention标的物Delivery of the object定金Deposits注销登记Deregistration董事Directors清偿Discharge持股权益披露Disclosure of shareholders’ interest 任意公积金Discretionary reserve fund合同的解除Dismissal of contract处分权Disposal right解散Dissolution新设分立Division by new establishment赠与Donation提存Drawing选举权Election rights发包人Employer股权收购Equities acquisition合同成立Establishment of a contract核准Examination and approval免责条款Exclusion clauses执行董事Executive directors除名Expel临时股东大会Extraordinary general meeting不可抗力Force majeure欺诈Fraud无偿划拨Free allotment股东大会General meeting of shareholders普通合伙人General partners普通合伙企业General partnership enterprises政府债券Government bond重大过失Gross fault保证人Guarantor担保Guaranty担保合同Guaranty contracts保证期间Guaranty period不动产Immovable property/Real estate独立董事Independent directors间接收购Indirect takeover首次公开发行Initial public offering(IPO)内幕交易Insider trading资不抵债Insolvency胁迫Intimidation无效行为Invalid activities出资义务Investment obligation非公开发行Issuance in a non-public manner连带责任保证Joint and several liability guarantee 共同共有Joint co-ownership正当理由Justified reasons土地承包经营权Land contractual operating rights 租赁物Leased property法人财产权Legal person property rights法定代理人Legal representatives违约责任Liability for breach of contract诉讼时效Limitation of action有限责任公司Limited liability company有限合伙人Limited partner有限合伙企业Limited partnership enterprise 限定交易Limited trading清算组Liquidation committee清算义务人Liquidation obligor上市公司Listed company管理层收购Management buyout强制要约Mandatory offer操纵市场行为Market rigging市场份额Market share重大资产重组Material assets reorganization 吸收合并Merger by absorption新设合并Merger by consolidation少数股东权益Minority shareholder rights垄断行为Monopolistic practices垄断Monopoly抵押权Mortgage动产Movable property名义股东Nominee shareholder非货币财产出资Non-monetary contribution 不可替代物Non-substitute善意取得Obtain in good faith要约Offer抵销Offset经营者Operators所有权Ownership有偿出让Paid transfer履行Perform重整期间Period of reorganization定期报告Periodic report配股Placing质权Pledge rights优先清偿Preferential repayment委托人Principal私人所有权Private ownership破产和解程序Procedure of settlement for bankruptcy加工Processing利润分配Profit distribution发起人Promoter发起设立Promotion招股说明书Prospectus公积金Provident fund物权法Real Rights Law注册资本Registered capital重整Reorganization收购报告书Report of acquisition要约收购报告书Reports of acquisition by offer股东会决议Resolution of shareholders’ meeting可撤销合同Revocable contract知情权Right to know提议权Right to propose破产撤销权Right to rescind bankruptcy优先受偿权Right to seek preferential payments of compensation 证券法Securities Law。

会计外文翻译外文文献英文文献新会计准则

附录外文资料：On February 15, 2006, the Ministry of Finance issued 1 item of basic accounting standards and 38 specific guidelines, the new set of accounting standards system. Standards issued, the community gave wide attention, the securities industry, business circles, academic circles gave height the opinion, think this is the second in 1993 accounting reform after another is of great significance to the accounting reform, marking China's convergence with international financial reporting standards of enterprise accounting standards system formally established, to improve the China's socialist market economic system, improve the level of opening up and accelerate China's integration into the global economy has important significance.Also expressed their concerns and worries, mainly reflected in the following aspects: a fair value is difficult to "fair", and is very likely to become the profit manipulation tools; two is the enterprise may to adjust earnings manipulation debt restructuring, debt restructuring will once again become the darling of the securities market; three is the new standard published may induce "fair" phenomenon, which may lead to the end of 2006 enterprises will impairment assault back, at the same time accounts receivable impairment will still give listing Corporation profit adjustment leaves lots of space. These concerns whether it can become a reality? The new standards will become the corporate profits manipulation of the tool? Here we have to this a few worry about one to launch the analysis:A moderate, fair value applicationThe history of our country is a listing Corporation with the fair value of profit manipulation. Fair value appeared in 1998 in "debt recombines", "non monetary transactions" specific accounting standards, after the actual operation in many companies the abuse of fair value and profit manipulation in 2001 revised guidelines by the restriction of the use of. The new criterion system in financial tool, real estate investment, not the combination under common control, debt restructuring andnon-monetary transactions etc. are carefully adopted the fair value accounting standards, thus becoming the one large window. Past episodes of "story" will repeat itself? To this one problem we analyzed from the following aspects:First of all, the fair value of the assets can be achieved by using fair value valuation is the international accounting standards, the United States and most market economic countries accounting standards in general practice. International already crossed the "want" present value and fair value debate stage, and mainly in "how to use" stage; International did not because of "Enron event" appear and delay the study and adopt present value and the fair value of the process. From the beginning of 1975, 30 years, FASB on the fair value measurement system research has not stopped, the fair value in the accounting standards in the United States are used more and more widely. As of 2004, at the end of 12, FASB has released a total of 153 financial accounting standards, fair value accounting standards and related 60 (forever, 2005).Fair value has a profound theoretical basis for the ten, it accords with the economic income concept, the comprehensive income concept, cash flow and market price of accounting assumption, accounting goal, modern relevance and reliability of quality characteristics of accounting elements, essential characteristics, future basic accounting, value and value concept, measurement values and net surplus theory and financial statements of the primitive logic (Xie Sifone, 2005).The use of fair value can effectively enhance the relevance of accounting information for investors, creditors, and other stakeholders to provide more help to the information for decision making. Take the investment real estate, book 20000000 yuan, if the city price rises to $200000000 accounting should reflect 200000000 yuan, such information is really true and useful. If still persist in the statements that the 20000000 yuan, accounting treatment is simple, but this information does not help the decision-making of investors, even misleading. Any reform will not give up eating for fear of choking, accounting reform is no exception. In line with international standards is the direction, is to represent the general trend, this point is in the affirmative.Secondly, suitable for the application of the fair value of the "soil" preliminary already form. Fair value is the product of the market economy. In 2003 the Central Committee made on perfecting the socialist market economic system a number of issues, symbolizes that our country market economy already from start-up to improve, the market economy status of China has been established. The securities market of our country after ten years of development and perfection, to strengthen corporategovernance, improve operational transparency, clear violations, establishing listing Corporation integrated supervision system has made great progress. China Securities Regulatory Commission promoting the share-trading reform pilot, listing and financing program, has issued a number of regulations, strengthen the listing Corporation information disclosure and fraud and strength; the Ministry of finance to increase the quality of accounting information and the CPA audit quality inspection; listing Corporation governance level rises further, CPA, assets assessment division, independent directors such as rational economic choice for listing Corporation irregularities built several "firewall"; the majority of investors in the analysis of accounting information to judge, effective screening capacity is enhanced, the effectiveness of the securities market gradually improve. In addition, after joining the WTO, large amount of foreign capital into China, financial derivatives trading activity, produce a number, different features of derivative financial instruments, such as futures (Futures), option (Options), forward contract (Forwards Contract), swap (Swaps) etc.. As the derivative financial instruments no initial net investment is required, or very few requirements of net investment, the historical cost of its incapable of action, only the fair value to carry on the accurate recognition and measurement..FASl33 stated: fair value measurement of financial instruments is the best measurement attribute, the derivative financial instruments, fair value measurement attribute is the only. Potential of time shift, which contributes to the application of the fair value of the environment is preliminary already implementation. We must adopt the development strategy view ", not" once bitten, twice shy of ten years".In third, the fair value of the criteria in the new application is more cautious, does not lead to abuse. Compared with international financial reporting standards: China accounting standards system in determining the scope of the application of fair value, the more fully consider China's national conditions, the improvement was prudent. The use of fair value must satisfy certain conditions, in the basic guidelines in section forty-third clearly pointed out that the replacement cost, net realizable value of, present value, fair value, should be to ensure that the identified elements of accounting amounts can be obtained and the reliable measurement. In relation to specific standards, the use of fair value measurement, has clearly defined constraints. For example, in real estate investment criteria specified by the fair value measurement model, the following conditions shall be met simultaneously: one is the investmentproperty real estate located in active trading market of real estate; two is the enterprise can from the real estate trading market on the same or similar real estate market prices and other information, thus the investment real estate to make a reasonable estimate of fair value.Visible in the investing real estate standards, ban contains more hypothetical valuation techniques used, only in a certain reliability on the basis that the use of fair value, and not all of the investment real estate can be applied the fair value. So as long as the strictly in accordance with the standards, fair value will really be fair.For instance in non monetary transactions for the use of fair value, the new standards in exchange of non-monetary assets, fair value and change the carrying value of the assets included in the current profits and losses of the difference between the two conditions, namely the exchange must be commercial in nature, and a change of assets or the fair value of the assets surrendered can be measured reliably. Commercial essence refers to, must be changed in the future cash flow of the assets at risk, time and amount of assets surrendered and were significantly different, or substitution of assets and the assets surrendered the present value of estimated future cash flows are different, and the difference between the assets and the change of the fair value of the assets is more significant than the. The new guidelines are also provided to determine whether is commercial in nature, an enterprise shall pay attention to whether or not the transacting parties are related party relationship. Related party relationship may lead to the occurrence of non monetary assets exchange is not commercial in nature. These preconditions, will effectively restricted to non monetary assets exchange way of earnings manipulation behavior. From these rules, we can see that, the application of fair value is strictly restricted conditions, the fair value is not allowed to abuse.The new standards require that the fair value to "reliable" and not "just, fair value estimate" is no longer the eraser ruler. The author thinks, fair value to be profit manipulation tools need to also have three elements: the listing Corporation management deliberate fraud, accounting audit staff lose occupation moral and securities market regulatory failure. In fact with the three elements, any system can effectively play a protective role, therefore, establishing and perfecting accounting standards supporting management system is urgent.Two, the debt restructuring reform from the bottomThe new debt restructuring guidelines stipulated in debt restructuring gains can be included in the current profits and losses. As a debtor's listing Corporation, the new debt restructuring guidelines means that, once the creditor concessions, listing Corporation acquired interests will be directly included in the current income, into a profit report. Debt restructuring is likely to increase profits, improve earnings per share. But this approach achieved with the international convergence of financial reporting standards, reflects the essence of transaction debt restructuring, debt restructuring gains is after all the creditors rather than owners concessions, the past will not pass the profit and loss statement directly included in the capital reserve, it is under the special background of a matter of expediency, now be included in the profit and loss, is not "white" the "black", but the reform from the bottom. The new guidelines on the definition of debt restructuring, made clear only in "the debtor's financial difficulties." the premise condition, can get debt concession confirmed as debt restructuring gains. This condition will be restricted to a certain extent, the new guidelines on abuse, prevent inappropriate acknowledgement of debt reorganization gains.Some people think that some affiliates can also through a remit a debt, a high performance to price manipulation, insider trading, is still small shareholders suffered losses. In fact, this fear is a bit much. This is because, first, for *ST and ST company, fantasy on debt restructuring benefit, reaching for the stars is futile. Because the 2004 amendment of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange rules, one is freed, after deducting non-recurring profits and losses, net profit is positive. Debt restructuring to listing Corporation profits, in actual accountant operation, will be included in operating income, which belongs to the non-recurring profit and loss, thus can in St, the stars are deducted from; second, has experienced more than 10 years of stock market investors' groundless talk, analysis and judgment ability and self protection consciousness had very big rise, debt restructuring guidelines requiring companies to disclose the fair value of the methods and basis for the ascertainment, investors can easily recognize the debt restructuring packaging profits, in order to make a rational choice .Investors blindly follow Zhuang, slaughter age has gone for ever.In three, the impairment of Chinese characteristicsNew guidelines for asset impairment provisions, asset impairment loss is confirmed, in the later period may not be back. It is based on the real situation of our country, last ditch of major change, it is with international accounting standards, with substantial differences in the. New guidelines for asset impairment will effectively curb the use impairment as a "secret reserve" adjusting profit situation. Guidelines for the implementation, use impairment adjusting profit space will become more and more small, the provision of manual adjustment of profits will be more and more difficult. Some people write civil point out new guidelines for asset impairment induced by releasing will "go" phenomenon, cause some "hidden profits" of the industry and Related Companies, possible impairment in 2006 will be ready to strike back, "crow change Phoenix" may reproduce. We analyze, first of all, if the listing Corporation snatches in the new guidelines before the implementation of the 2006 year rushs impairment, we must first examine whether such actions are the reasonable basis, namely the original has provision for the impairment of an asset value now is really picks up, and if so, to adjust the asset value will make the accounting information more real, related; secondly, in 2006 large red back impairment must make appropriate evidence of the original provision for the impairment of appropriateness, otherwise the previous provision is the abuse of accounting estimation results, should be in accordance with the accounting error handling, a reversal of impairment cannot be used as the 2006 annual profit. Moreover, the financial sector has been aware of this problem, and takes positive and effective measures, prevent the assault to adjust profit listing Corporation. In addition, some time ago the market that new guidelines will make A shares listing Corporation in 2006 to increase net profit 20000000000 Yuan hearsay, the survey is author's subjective, concerned media specially clarification.Others receivables and other four impairment expressed worry, think accounts receivable (especially the "shareholders of account") will become the "eight project" of the main means of profit manipulation. In fact, in the new guidelines, receivables is as financial assets, and the depreciation detailed provisions, requires that there must be "objective evidence" of impairment to provision for impairment, such evidence includes the debtor serious financial difficulties, is likely to fail or other financial restructuring. Can be said that the criterion is more and more perfect, then the "this year that cannot take back full provision, next year 'efforts' and back", this "to practice deception" approach, which itself has violated rules, to pass the CPA audit and hidfrom investors eye, I'm afraid some difficulty.Through the above analysis, we can see some people on the new criterion a few concerns, many in reality does not exist, or is in the process of the reform of the price to be paid for, and far from their imagination so serious. But these concerns also remind standards departments in the formulation of standards to the full attention of guidelines for the technical and economic consequences, in the setting of the new guidelines in the process, give full consideration to guideline implementation may arise in the course of the various problems, and further make a specific interpretation and explanation, improving guidelines operation, improve accounting information quality.Also need to point out in particular, accounting standards is a production of accounting information of the specification, it is to solve the problem of "how to do". On the accounting standards of the malicious misuse of guidelines for the implementation of the "people", from the perspective of the listing Corporation is the ecological problems, to strengthen supervision, occupation moral construction, improve the ability of investors screening accounting information system engineering to solve, cannot be attributed to the guidelines themselves. And the new accounting and auditing standards system come on stage; it is to promote the improvement of listing Corporation governance ecology effective measure. Say from this meaning, we are not going to worry about me, but "criteria for the beat and breathe out".Note: ① according to the "Shanghai Stock Exchange Listing Rules (2004 Revision)" provisions, *ST indicated the presence of terminating the listing of special processing and ST risk for other special treatment.Main referencesMinistry of finance. In 2006 accounting standards for business enterprises. Economic Science PressYu Monishing. The 2005 fair value in the United States of America's application research. Financial theory, 9Xie Stiffen, wearing Zili.2005 present value and fair value accounting: financial reform is the important premise of twenty-first Century. Theory and practice of Finance and economics, 9中文资料：2006年2月15日，财政部发布了包括1项基本准则和38项具体准则在内的新的一整套企业会计准则体系。

企业内部的会计监督

企业内部的会计监督英文回答：Internal accounting controls are a crucial aspect of any organization's financial management system. They provide a framework for safeguarding assets, ensuring the accuracy and reliability of financial data, and preventing fraud and errors. Internal accounting controls involve a combination of policies, procedures, and processes designed to mitigate risks and enhance the overall integrity of the accounting system.中文回答：企业内部的会计监督。

企业内部的会计监督是任何组织财务管理体系中一个至关重要的方面。

它们提供了一个框架，用于保护资产、确保财务数据的准确性和可靠性、以及防止欺诈和错误。

内部会计监督涉及一系列政策、程序和流程，这些政策、程序和流程旨在降低风险并提高会计系统的整体完整性。

英文回答：Internal accounting controls can be classified intofive main categories:1. Control environment: This refers to the overall tone at the top of the organization and the way in which the company's management team sets the ethical and professional standards for financial reporting.2. Risk assessment: This involves identifying and assessing the potential risks that could affect the accuracy and reliability of financial reporting.3. Control activities: These are the specific policies and procedures that are put in place to mitigate the identified risks.4. Information and communication: This refers to the processes for capturing, processing, and communicatingfinancial information throughout the organization.5. Monitoring: This involves overseeing the effectiveness of the internal accounting controls and making adjustments as necessary.中文回答：内部会计监督可以分为五大类：1. 控制环境，这指的是组织高层的整体基调，以及公司管理团队设定财务报告道德和职业标准的方式。

会计监督（accountingsupervision）

会计监督（accountingsupervision）在会计工作中，通过记录、计算、分析和检查，对企业、机关、事业单位和其他经济组织等生产经营活动或预算执行情况进行监察和督促的一项管理活动。

会计是情况进行监察和督促的一项管理活动。

会计监督是会计的基本职能之一，同时又是经济监督的重要组成部分。

作用实行会计监督的主要作用有：（1）有利于维护国家财经法规。

财经法规是一切经济单位从事经济活动必须遵循的基本准绳和依据。

会计监督正是依据国家财经法规，对各单位经济活动的真实性、合法性、可行性等进行检查，从而促进各单位严格遵守国家财经法规。

会计工作是财政经济工作的基础，一切财务收支都要通过会计这个“关口”。

因此，有效地发挥会计监督职能，对于防范和制止违犯财经法规的行为，保护国家和集体财产的安全完整具有非常重要的意义。

（2）有利于强化单位内部的经营管理。

会计监督是经济管理的一种手段，其最终目的是促进各单位改善经营管理，提高经济效益。

通过对单位经济活动的真实性、合法性、合理性等方面的监督，保证各单位的经济活动在遵守国家财经法纪的同时，符合本单位的计划、定期、预算和经营管理要求，以便提高经济效益，或避免不必要的经济损失。

主体会计监督的主体是指由谁来实行会计监督。

《中华人民共和国会计法》第十六条规定：“各单位的会计机构、会计人员对本单位实行会计监督。

”这一规定明确了会计人员是会计监督的主体。

在我国，会计人员作为会计监督的认本，有其特殊性。

一方面，会计人员是国家财经法规的维护者；另一方面，会计人员又是本单位的经济管理人员，要维护本单位的经济利益。

会计人员的这种双重身份决定了会计监督的复杂性和艰巨性。

这主要表现在，当国家利益与单位利益不一致时，会计人员坚持原则、维护国家利益，往往会遇到来自各方面的阻力。

这就要求会计人员有很强的政策性和原则性。

种类会计监督可以按不同的标准进行分类。

（1）按监督实行的时间，可以分为事前监督、事中监督和事后监督。

外文翻译新形势下中小企业会计监督存在问题及对策

新形势下中小企业会计监督存在问题及对策中小企业在国民经济中具有举足轻重的地位，它们在培育优秀人才、改革与创新、解决人力出路、活跃市场等方面发挥着极其重要的作用。

自改革开放以来我国的中小企业得到长足的发展，但在全球经济一体化，市场竞争越来越激烈的形势下，中小企业的发展面临着许多困难和问题，在市场竞争中处于劣势。

绝大部分中小企业的管理层知识层次不高，特别对现代企业管理知识比较欠缺，尤其是对财税知识、法规一知半解，在经营管理中，普遍存在重经营轻管理的思想，会计监督意识淡薄，会计行为不规范、会计资料不真实，造成损失和浪费，以致中小企业缺乏核心竞争力，及严重危害了社会经济秩序，又制约中小企业健康快速发展。

究其原因是由于中小企业会计监督存在问题。

因此，加强中小企业的会计监督意义非常重大的。

在新形势下中小企业会计监督的加强，有利于促进其向现代企业制度转变，不断提高经营管理水平，提高企业的社会效益和经济效益，增强核心竞争力，确保中小企业的健康协调发展，为中小企业做大做强奠定坚实的基础。

我国政府高度重视中小企业的发展，想法设法为中小企业提高整体素质和市场竞争力创造条件。

因此必须从强化内部监督和外部监督着手，加强会计监督，规范中小企业的会计行为。

一、我国中小企业内部会计监督现状及存在问题我国从改革开放到现在，经济发展基本与国际接轨，会计监督体系逐步建立和完善，取得了很大的发展，但是现阶段也存在者不足，特别是加入WTO后，面对大量的外国企业加入中国市场，中小企业内部会计监督存在的弊端逐步暴露出来。

财政、审计、统计、经信、工商、税务、海关、银行等部门缺乏联动机制，有些企业受局部利益的驱动，根据不同的对象和目的报送不同的会计报告，会计工作违规违纪，弄虚作假的现象时有发生，造成会计工作秩序混乱，会计信息失真，严重影响了投资者和债权人以及社会公众的利益，同时也阻碍了国家宏观调控和管理的正常进行。

造成上述问题的原因是会计监督不到位。

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Evolution and Thinking of the Accounting Supervision Mode ofChina’s State-owned EnterprisesGuo YaxiongSchool of Accountancy, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, P.R.C, 330013 4. COUNTERMEASURES4.1. IMPLEMENT MODE COMBINATION MANAGEMENTAccounting supervision modes of state-owned enterprises are various. Full implementation of these modes would be a waste of resources, increase the difficulty of accounting management. It’s necessary to targeted select two or more accounting supervision modes to implement accounting supervision according to operation characteristics of the supervised state-owned enterprises. The author believes that, generally, the internal audit system is a conventional system. If you want to select systems among the assigned accountant system, assignment board of supervisors system and outside director system, the number of systems chosen is better no more than two. At the same time, it’s no need to implement assigning accountants system and dispatching board of supervisors system in the same enterprise, and it’s inappropriate to promote outside director system in a large scale.4.2. Improve the efficiency of accounting supervision.Asymmetric information theory suggests that private information possessed by agents is unobservable, hidden action is unverifiable, thus the biggest problem brought is the opportunistic behavior. Therefore, it’s not necessary to emphasize the diversified forms of accounting supervision of state-owned enterprises, but necessary to emphasize the actual results, the efficiency of the accounting supervision, and limit opportunistic behavior of agents. Firstly, the appointment and assignment personnel should quickly master financial information of the enterprise such as financial results, operating results and cash flow, and be familiar with production and business activities of the enterprise. Secondly, the responsibilities must be assigned to individuals, safeguard mechanisms for implementation should be established, and someone should be assigned to track, supervise, inspect and evaluate the implementation of the system .Thirdly, establish a national accounting supervision expert’s database of state-owned enterprises, strengthen job training, and build a professional team of high-level and rich experience in business management. Finally, the information acquired in implementation of a variety of accounting supervision modes should be shared. State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission should organize a variety of communication meetings, on-site meetings and seminars which can attract a lot of appointment and assignment personnel to participate in, to consult problems appearing in accounting supervision and communicate measures against the problems.4.3. Make clear the limits of accounting supervisionIn the case of separation of ownership and management, insider control theory tells usthat directors of enterprise in fact or in law control the enterprise, and make use of available information and the facility of management to gain more interests in enterprise management and decision-making. Accounting supervision is to maintain the economic order and prevent insider control to ensure normal economic activity of state-owned enterprises. State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission, the personnel appointed and assigned should clearly understand the nature and limits of accounting supervision. Accounting supervision should be based on the economic development and economic efficiency of enterprises, and focus on long-term interests of enterprises. Regulation not only should be in place, but also moderate, and should not directly interfere or participate in the daily management activities. The personnel can act as "judge," but should not act as "athletes", neither act as a combination of both.4.4. Develop incentive and restraint systemAccording to principal-agent theory, as the principal need the help and cooperation of agents to accomplish the intended goal, the client will use a series of incentives to motivate agents to work hard to maximize the value of the overall agent, so as to achieve a balanced relationship between principal and agent. Under the circumstance of market economy, incentive and restraint mechanisms of accounting supervision are particularly important and directly related to the efficiency of the accounting supervision. The subjects of accounting supervision are human beings, so they also need to be stimulated and restrained in accounting supervision activities. Incentive mechanism promotes accounting supervisory staff to continually identify problems, and actively fight against accounting fraud. Restraint mechanism makes the actions of accounting supervisory personnel do not exceed the scope of laws and regulations. To do a good job of accounting supervision, first, a law of encouraging and supporting appointed personnel to perform their duties should be coordinated. Various forms of incentive mechanisms, such as the priority in employment, option incentives and difference between the rewards, should be developed. Second, the sense of responsibility should be strengthened, restraint mechanisms such as occupational ban, administrative penalties, and legal liability accountability should be established, and accountability should be intensified.中国国有企业会计监督模式的进化和思考4 应对措施4.1 实施模式组合管理国有企业的会计监管模式是多方面的。

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财务会计中英文.

会计 外文翻译 外文文献 英文文献 新会计准则

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