jensen自由现金流翻译-可编辑
自由现金流量
自由现金流量(FCF)的介绍自由现金流量(Free Cash Flow ；简称 FCF)，由其名称可知...「自由」两字为其精神，也就是可以自由运用的现金流量！或许你会好奇...现金流量就是现金流量，哪里有自由与不自由之分？原因有二，首先，这个钱必须是你自己赚来的，才是属于可以自由运用的，如果是借来的钱或是股东增资的钱，原则上都是专款专用(例如偿还借款改善财务结构、支应特定营运计划...等)，它们都不是高自由度的钱。
其次，这个现金流量必须不能妨碍公司的成长。
因为公司无论是短中长期，都有事先规划好的资本支出计划，例如机器设备的汰旧换新，海外设厂的规划、新产品研发所需的经费...等，就企业而言，成长代表必须购买固定资产(内部成长)或作长期投资(外部成长)，所以自由现金流量必须是营业活动现金流量减去固定资产投资及长期投资的后所剩余的现金流量。
一般对自由现金流量的概念是..... 自由现金流量(FCF)＝营运活动所得的现金流量－(为了维持营运所需的资本支出与税额)由于大部分的投资活动现金流出都是购置固定资产及长期投资的支出，所以我们定义为自由现金流量等于营业活动现金流量减去投资活动现金流出(或加投资活动现金流入)。
可是很多公司会将可以自由动用的钱，短期拿来投资基金或票券，以增加资金运用效率，这部份是以备供出售金融资产的名义，放在投资活动的现金流出项下。
这个部份大多数的公司都可以随时自由运用的，所以自由现金流量再度修正为...营业活动之现金流量减去投资活动之现金净流出(或加投资活动现金净流入)，再加上备供出售金融资产，才是名符其实的自由现金流量。
依照White(2003)对自由现金流量的定义是...『衡量在支付所有必要支出后，可供公司任意使用的现金』自由现金流量(FCF)有很大的用处，尤其是在做公司的评价时，常采用自由现金流量的折现值做为公司评价的基础(请参阅如何评估一文件个股的合理价值 )。
目前自由现金流量(FCF)不属于会计学的科目，因此尚无统一的定义，也无法由公开财务报告直接取得，必须由使用者自行运算！然而什么条件才符合White所谓的必要支出可以扣除呢？是维持现有产能必要的支出吗？还是维持现有市场地位所必要的支出？还是维持目前成长的必要支出？同时成长的方式有内部成长(资本支出)，外部成长(长期投资)，只有自己盖厂房买设备才算(资本支出)，还是包括策略联盟或转投资(长期投资)的也算？White针对上述疑虑，提出了两种自由现金流量的计算公式：自由现金流量＝营业活动之现金流量－净资本支出 ........公式1公式1并未考虑长期投资，如果同时考虑资本支出与长期投资，可用公式2：自由现金流量＝营业活动之现金流量－投资活动之现金流量......公式2在 DRAM厂是不是一个好的投资标的？！与面板股( TFT LCD )是不是一个好的投资标的？！这二篇讨论文章中，我就有将公式2的观念套入，各位可以参考！另外，若将上述备供出售金融资产的项目放入公式后，公式可以修正为....自由现金流量＝营业活动之现金流量－投资活动之现金流量 + 备供出售金融资产……公式3上述三个自由现金流量的公式提供各位参考！想得知各家公司的现金流量表，可以到公开信息观测站查询，进入后选"财务报表"这一区，下方有个现金流量表可供选择，接着输入公司名称或代码，即可找到指定年度(选第四季)年报上的现金流量表，从现金流量表上，就可以找出公式上对应的科目了。
自由现金流量理论综述
自由现金流量理论综述作者：杨倩来源：《企业文化·中旬刊》2014年第04期摘要：自由现金流量理论在资本市场和公司财务理论与实践中有着广泛的应用。
本文首先介绍了自由现金流的涵义，介绍了与自由现金流量相关的理论，探讨了研究自由现金流的理论意义和实践应用。
关键词：自由现金流量；企业价值；绩效评价1.自由现金流量概述1.1自由现金流量的提出及定义自由现金流量是近年来最为流行的公司财务理论的核心概念之一，最早是由美国西北大学拉巴波特、哈佛大学詹森等学者于20世纪80年代提出的。
詹森认为自由现金流量指满足所有具有正的净现值的投资项目所需资金后多余的那部分现金流量。
詹森的定义更多的从经济学的角度来考察现金流量，他关心的是如何支配自由现金流量。
企业的自由现金流量是指扣除税收、必要资本性支出和营运资本增加后能够支付给所有清偿权者的现金流量。
所谓“自由”体现为管理当局可以在不影响企业持续增长的前提下，将这部分现金流量自由地分派给企业所有的索偿权持有人，包括短期、长期债权人以及股权持有人等。
1.2与自由现金流量相关的概念1.2.1现金根据会计准则现金，是指企业库存现金以及可以随时用于支付的存款；现金等价物，是指企业持有的期限短、流动性强、易于转换为已知金额现金、价值变动风险很小的投资。
并指出没有特殊说明，现金一般指现金和现金等价物。
1.2.2现金流量现金流量是指现金及现金等价物的流入量与流出量。
在会计上，按其来源、性质不同分为三类：经营活动产生的现金流量、投资活动产生的现金流量、筹资活动产生的现金流量。
1.2.3现金净流量现金净流量是企业在一定期间的现金净流入量与净流出量的差额。
现金净流量是公司财务资金运转最直接的表现过程，对企业的偿债能力、营运能力和盈利能力有重要的影响。
1.2.4净自由现金流量净自由现金流量等于自由现金流量减去利息、其他融资成本以及税费。
1.2.5自由现金流量假说及其两个推论自由现金流量假说将由现金资源支配权引起的代理问题称作自由现金流量代理问题。
自由现金流
公司估值的DCF方法中，要使用自由现金流(FCF)。
公司的内在价值说到底就是现金的价值。
但是，未来的现金需要折现才能用来计算今天的价值。
而用什么现金呢？什么现金能够从公司拿出来而不影响公司的运营与发展呢？这就是自由现金流:FCF(FreeCash Flow)。
自由现金流的定义：FCF = EBIT x (1-Tax) + Non Cash - Change in WorkingCapital - Capex EBIT:利息及税前盈利Non Cash：非现金，如摊销折旧等。
Change in Working Capital：流动资金变化Capex：资本支出为什么要用自由现金流而不用运营现金流呢？让我们看看这两者的关系。
在中国的会计准则下，运营现金流可以表示为：运营现金流= (EBIT - Interest) x (1-Tax) + Non Cash + Interest - Changein Working Capital 运营现金流= EBIT x (1-Tax) + Non Cash - Change in Working Capital +Interest x Tax 运营现金流= FCF + Interest x Tax + Capex 这里的Interest x Tax实际上就是利息所带来的税款的节省，也称作“TaxShield”税盾。
所以两者的关系可以这样表示：运营现金流= 自由现金流+ 税盾+资本支出或者自由现金流= 运营现金流- 税盾-资本支出为什么要用利息及税前盈利来算自由现金流呢？因为我们要看一个企业的现金。
无论企业的债主还是股东，都有权拿走现金。
但是为了估算一个企业本身的价值，就要看一个企业本身产生现金的能力，所以必须把利息的影响消除。
为什么要加回非现金部分呢？很简单，这些都不是现金。
为什么要减去流动资金的变化呢？因为流动资金的需求增加，也会吞噬现金。
反过来，流动资金需求的减少，反而会增加现金。
企业自由现金流名词解释
企业自由现金流名词解释
企业自由现金流（Free Cash Flow）指企业在特定期间内所能产生的可自由使用的现金流量，即企业可自由支配用于分配股东利益、偿还债务、投资扩张等各项活动的现金净额。
企业自由现金流是企业经营活动所产生的现金流量净额（经营活动现金流入净额减去经营活动现金流出净额）减去资本性支出。
企业自由现金流反映了企业经营状况的有效性和健康度，是评估企业偿债能力、盈利能力以及其价值的重要指标之一。
较高的自由现金流意味着企业盈利能力强、现金流量稳定，有更多的现金可以进行分配、投资或偿债等活动，更利于企业持续发展。
自由现金流
延伸
延伸
与资本性支出相对应的是收益性支出，又叫期间费用。我国《企业会计准则》第二十条规定：“会计核算应 合理划分收益性支出与资本性支出。凡支出的效益与本会计年度相关的，应当作为收益性支出；凡支出的效益与 几个会计年度相关的，应当作为资本性支出”，这类支出应予以资本化，先计入资产类科目，然后，再分期按所 得到的效益，转入适当的费用科目。
FCFE=净收益+折旧与摊销-资本性支出-营运资本追加额-债务本金偿还+新发行债务
（确切的计算公式为：FCFE=OCF-FCInv+Net Borrowing）(net borrowing=debt issued-debt repaid)
净收益+折旧与摊销并不一定是OCF，确切的说应该是净收益+非现金项目。） FCFF是公司支付了所有营运费用、进行了必需的固定资产与营运资产投资后可以向所有投资者分派的税后现 金流量。FCFF是公司所有权利要求者，包括普通股股东、优先股股东和债权人的现金流总和，其计算公式为：
定义
定义
金币自由现金流量，就是企业产生的、在满足了再投资需要之后剩余的现金流量，这部分现金流量是在不影 响公司持续发展的前提下可供分配给企业资本供应者的最大现金额。简单地说，自由现金流量（FCF）是指企业 经营活动产生的现金流量扣除资本性支出（Capital Expenditures，CE）的差额。即：FCF=OCF-CE。自由现金 流是一种财务方法，用来衡量企业实际持有的能够回报股东的现金。指在不危及公司生存与发展的前提下可供分 配给股东（和债权人）的最大现金额。
自由现金流下的过度投资外文翻译
本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文：Over-investment of free cash flowAbstractThis paper examines the extent of firm level over-investment of fre cash flow. Using an accounting-based framework to measure over-investment and free cash flow, I find evidence that, consistent with agencycost explanations, over-investment is concentrated in firms with the highest levels of free cash flow. Further tests examine whether firms’ governance structures are associated with over-investment of free cash flow. The evidence suggests that certain governance structures, such as the presence of activist shareholders, appear to mitigate over-investment.IntroductionThis paper examines firm investing decisions in the presence of free cash flow. In theory, firm level investment should not be related to internally generated cash flows (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). However, prior research has docu-mented a positive relation between investment expenditure and cash flow (e.g., Hubbard, 1998). There are two interpretations for this positive relation. First, the positive relation is a manifestation of an agency problem, where managers in firms with free cash flow engage in wasteful expenditure (e.g., Jensen 1986; Stulz 1990). When managers’objectives differ from those of shareholders, the prese nce of internally generated cash flow in excess of that required to maintain existing assets in place and finance new positive NPV projects creates the potential for those funds to be squandered. Second, the positive relation reflects capital market imperfections, where costly externalfinancing creates the potential for internally generated cash flows to expand the feasible investment opportunity set(e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, & Petersen, 1988; Hubbard, 1998).This paper focuses on utilizing accounting information to better measure the constructs of free cash flow and over-investment, thereby allowing a more powerful test of the agency-based explanation for why firm level investment is related to internally generated cash flows. In doing so, this paper is the first to offer large sample evidence of over-investment of free cash flow. Prior research, such as Blanchard, Lopez-di-Silanes, and Vishny (1994), document excessive investment and acquisition activity for eleven firms that experience a large cash windfall due to a legal settlement, Harford (1999) finds using a sample of 487 takeover bids, that cash-rich firms are more likely to make acquisitions that subsequently experience abnormal declines in operating performance, and Bates (2005) finds for a sample of 400 subsidiary sales from 1990 to 1998 that firms who retain cash tend to invest more, relative to industry peers. This paper extends these small sample findings by showing that over-investment of free cash flow is a systematic phenomenon across all types of investment expenditure.The empirical analysis proceeds in two stages. First, the paper uses an accounting-based framework to measure both free cash flow and over-investment. Free cash flow is defined as cash flow beyond what is necessary to maintain assets in place and to finance expected new investments. Over-investment is defined as investment expenditure beyond that required to maintain assets in place and to finance expected new investments in positive NPV projects. To measure over-investment, I decompose total investment expenditure into two components:(i) required investment expenditure to maintain assets in place, and (ii) new investment expenditure. I then decompose new investment expenditure into over-investment in negative NPV pro jects and expected investment expenditure, where the latter varies with the firm’s growth opportunities, financing constraints, industry affiliation and other factors.Under the agency cost explanation, management has the potential to squander free cash flow only when free cash flow is positive. At the other end of the spectrum, firms with negative free cash flow can only squander cash if they are able to raise “cheap” capital. This is less likely to occur because these firms need to be able to raise financing and thereby place themselves under the scrutiny of external markets(DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Stulz, 2004; Jensen, 1986). Consistent with the agency cost explanation, I find a positive association between over-investment and free cash flow for firms with positive free cash flow.For a sample of 58,053 firm-years during the period 1988–2002, I find that for firms with positive free cash flow the average firm over-invests 20% of its free cash flow. Furthermore, I document that the majority of free cash flow is retained in the form of financial assets. The average firm in my sample retains 41% of its free cash flow as either cash or marketable securities.There is little evidence that free cash flow is distributed to external debt holders or shareholders.Finding an association between over-investment and free cash flow is consistent with recent research documenting poor future performance following firm level investment activity. For example, Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) and Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn (2003) show that firms with extensive capital investment activity and growth in net operating assets respectively,experience inferior future stock returns. Furthermore,Dechow, Richardson, and Sloan (2005) find that cash flows retained within the fir m (either capitalized through accruals or “invested” in financial assets) are associated with lower future operating performance and future stock returns. This performance relation is consistent with the over-investment of free cash flows documented in this paper.The second set of empirical analyses examine whether governance structures are effective in mitigating over-investment. Prior research has examined the impact of a variety of governance structures on firm valuation and the quality of managerial decision making (see Brown & Caylor, 2004; Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003; Larcker, Richardson, & Tuna, 2005 for detailed summaries). Collectively, the ability of cross-sectional variation in governance structures to explain firm value and/or firm decision making is relatively weak. Consistent with this, I find evidence that out of a large set of governance measures only a few are related to over-investment. For example, firms with activist shareholders and certain anti-takeover provisions are less likely to over-invest their free cash flow.1. Free cash flow and over-investmentThis section describes in detail the various theories supporting a positive relation between investment expenditure and cash flow and then develops measures of free cash flow and over-investment that can be used to test the agency based explanation.1.1. Explanations for a positive relation between investment expenditure and cash flow .In a world of perfect capital markets there would be no association between firm level investing activities and internally generated cash flows.If a firm needed additional cash to finance an investment activity it would simply raise that cash from external capital markets.If the firm had excess cash beyond that needed to fund available positive NPV projects (including options on future investment) it would distribute free cash flow to external markets. Firms do not, however, operate in such a world.There are a variety of capital market frictions that impede the ability of management to raise cash from external capital markets. In addition,there are significant transaction costs associated with monitoring management to ensure that free cash flow is indeed distributed to external capital markets.In equilibrium,these capital market frictions can serve as a support for a positive association between firm investing activities and internally generated cash flow.The agency cost explanation introduced by Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) suggests that monitoring difficulty creates the potential for management to spend internally generated cash flow on projects that are beneficial from a management perspective but costly from a shareholder perspective(the free cash flow hypothesis).Several papers have investigated the implications of the free cash flow hypothesis on firm investment activity.For example, Lamont (1997) and Berger and Hann (2003) find evidence consistent with cash rich segments cross-subsidizing more poorly performing segments in diversified firms.However, the evidence in these papers could also be consistent with market frictions inhibiting the ability of the firm to raise capital externally and not necessarily an indication of over-investment. Related evidence can also be found in Harford (1999) and Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999, 2001).Harford uses a sample of 487 takeover bids to document that cash rich firms are more likely to make acquisitions and these “cash rich” acquisitions are followed by abnormal declines in operating performance. Opler et al.(1999) find some evidence that companies with excess cash (measured using balance sheet cash information) have higher capital expenditures, and spend more onacquisitions,even when they appear to have poor investment opportunities (as measured by Tobin’s Q). Perhaps the most di rect evidence on the over-investment of free cash flow is the analysis in Blanchard et al. (1994). They find that eleven firms with windfall legal settlements appear to engage in wasteful expenditure.Collectively,prior research is suggestive of an agency-based explanation supporting the positive relation between investment and internally generated cash flow. However, these papers are based on relatively small samples and do not measure over-investment or free cash flow directly.Thus,the findings of earlier work may not be generalizable to larger samples nor is it directly attributable to the agency cost explanation. More generally, a criticism of the literature examining the relation between investment and cash flow is that finding a positive association may merely indicate that cash flows serve as an effective proxy for investment opportunities (e.g., Alti, 2003).My aim is to better measure the constructs of free cash flow and over-investment by incorporating an accounting-based measure of growth opportunities, and test whether the relation is evident in a large sample of firms.Some early work in this area examined the sensitivity of investment to cash flow for high versus low dividend paying firms (Fazzari et al., 1988),comparing differing organizational structures where the ability to raise external financing was easier/harder (Hoshi,Kashyap and Scharfstein,1991,with Japanes keiretsu firms) and debt constraints (Whited, 1992).These papers find evidence of greater sensitivity of investment to cash flow for sets of firms which appeared to be financially constrained (e.g., low dividend paying firms, high debt firms and firms with limited access to banks). However, more recent research casts doubt on the earlier results. Specifically, Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000),find that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow persists even for firms who do not face financing constraints. They construct a measure of ex ante financing constraints for a small sample of firms and find that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow for firms is negatively associated with this measure,thereby casting doubt on the financing constraint hypothesis. Nonetheless the investment expectation model described in Section 1.4 includes a variety of measures designed to capture financing constraints.ConclusionThis paper presents evidence on firm level over-investment of free cash flow. The empirical analysis utilizes an accounting based framework to measure the constructs of free cash flow and over-investment.A comparative advantage of theaccounting researcher is in measuring critical constructs from the financial economics literature.The analysis of over-investment and free cash flow is but one example of how accounting information can be better utilized in academic research. The evidence in this paper suggests that over-investment is a common problem for publicly traded US firms. For non-financial firms during the period 1988–2002, the average firm over-invests 20 percent of its available free cash flow. Furthermore, the majority of free cash flow is retained in the form of financial assets. For each additional dollar of free cash flow the average firm in the sample retains 41 cents as either cash or marketable securities. There is little evidence that free cash flow is distributed to external stakeholders, thereby creating the potential for retained free cash flow to be over-invested in the future. Supplemental analysis found only weak evidence that governance structures are effective in mitigating the extent of over-investment.These findings corroborate recent work that has found significant negative future stock returns from capital investment and significant growth in net operating assets (e.g.,Fairfield et al.,2003;Titman et al., 2004).Indeed,Li (2004) finds that future operating performance is lower for firms engaging in investment expenditure and that this negative relation is increasing in contemporaneous free cash flow.A natural explanation for this poor future performance is free cash flow related agency costs.The framework developed in the paper to measure over-investment and free cash flow can easily be extended to consider abnormal investment more generally. Indeed, some recent research has started to use this framework to examine the impact of accounting information systems on investment decisions and the efficient allocation of capital (e.g., Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2005; Goodman, 2005; Wang, 2003).Source: Scott Richardson,2006.“Over-investmen t of free cash flow” .Review of Account Studies,vol.11, june,pp.159-189.译文：自由现金流下的过度投资摘要本文调查了公司水平范围内的自由现金流的过度投资问题。
自由现金流的概念及计算公式解析
自由现金流的概念及计算公式解析在企业价值评估的诸多模型中，一个很常见的模型就是自由现金流折现模型，即DCF模型。
这个模型通过估算企业未来的现金流并将其折算到目前的时间点来判断企业的价值。
这个模型中，自由现金流是一个关键而核心的变量，正确地计算企业未来所产生的自由现金流是一个核心步骤。
而如何认识自由现金流是我们正确计算自由现金流的前提和基础。
本文旨在通过介绍学界对自由现金流的研究帮助投资者正确地认识自由现金流。
并且一般地，自由现金流量较好的公司，一般都是长牛股，是值得投资者关注的，透过自由现金流我们也能进行选股，比如电力行业的长江电力、白酒行业的贵州茅台等等。
一，自由现金流概念的缘起自由现金流最早是由美国学者詹森在1986年提出的。
詹森在其论文《自由现金流量的代理成本、公司财务与收购》中认为“自由现金流是企业在满足了净现值大于零的所有项目所需资金后的那部分现金流量。
这部分资金是在满足了公司再投资需求后的可分配给公司资本供应者的最大现金量。
”公司资本的供应包括债权资本以及股权资本两种，那么詹森计算的自由现金流就是企业自由现金流而不是股东自由现金流。
但是詹森的定义有概念循环的缺点，因为在计算净现值是否大于零的时候，还是要用到自由现金流的折现模型，那么自由现金流就还是一个核心的概念，詹森就陷入了用自由现金流来解释自由现金流的境地。
以后的学者针对这一点对自由现金流的定义进行了完善。
二，国外其他学者对自由现金流定义的研究在詹森之后，卡普兰在1990年对自由现金流做出了详细的阐释。
卡普兰认为“自由现金流等于公司的税后净营业利润加上折旧及摊销等非现金支出，再减去营运资本追加和物业厂房设备及其他资产方面的投资。
它是公司所产生的税后现金流量总额，可以提供给公司资本的所有供应者，包括债权人和股东。
”要指出的是，现在注册会计师考试辅导教材《财务成本管理》中对企业自由现金流量的解释即参照了卡普兰的定义。
美国加利福尼亚大学洛杉矶分校的康纳尔教授在1993年也对自由现金流做出定义，认为投资者手中所掌握的现金流，是公司经营创造出来的现金流入量扣除公司经营支出的现金流（包括工厂、设备等经营过程中的所有投资），所得到的净现金流。
几种自由现金流量的概念及运用比较
几种自由现金流量的概念及运用比较作者：黄禧来源：《中国管理信息化》2015年第08期[摘要]自20世纪80年代提出以来，自由现金流量概念被不断应用到企业价值评估过程中。
本文通过梳理自由现金流的相关概念及特征，分析运用各种自由现金流量法的优点、缺点，相互比较，促进实践过程中对自由现金流量的深入运用。
[关键词]自由现金流；概念；比较doi：10.3969/j.issn.1673-0194.2015.08.129[中图分类号]F275 [文献标识码]A [文章编号]1673-0194（2015）08-0168-01企业经营日常主营业务过程中，必然带来经常性现金收入与支出。
收入与支出相抵后，得到的现金流量，即为经营现金净流量，即：经营现金净流量=息税前利润+固定资产折旧和无形资产摊销-所得税-营运资本净增加。
经营现金净流量反映日常经营活动的情况，是判断企业经营能力、主营业务是否优秀等方面的重要指标。
自由现金流量，就是企业产生的、在满足了再投资需要之后剩余的现金流量，这部分现金流量是在不影响公司持续发展的前提下可供分配给企业资本供应者的最大的现金额。
自由现金流量的概念最早由美国学者迈克·詹森（Michael C. Jensen）于1986年提出，在以安然、世通等为代表的之前财务报告利润指标完美无瑕的所谓绩优公司纷纷破产后，美国证券交易监督委员会要求上市公司年报披露中必须包含自由现金流量这一指标。
1 几种自由现金流量1.1 企业自由现金流量企业内在价值通常由股东股权价值加上债券持有人的债权价值之和体现。
因此，从企业经营的角度分析，有企业自由现金流量的概念，即：企业自由现金流量=息税前利润+固定资产折旧和无形资产摊销-所得税-（营运资本净增加+必要的资本支出）。
1.2 股东自由现金流量企业负债经营，实际是利用杠杠的风险经营。
依据价值投资的理论，企业的资产负债率超过50%时，对企业所有者和债券持有人都是具有风险的。
自由现金流简单举例(渔夫)
自由现金流简单举例（渔夫）下面一段话是摘自百度百科：科普兰教授（1990）更是比较详尽地阐述了自由现金流量的计算方法：“自由现金流量等于企业的税后净营业利润(即将公司不包括利息收支的营业利润扣除实付所得税税金之后的数额）加上折旧及摊销等非现金支出，再减去营运资本的追加和物业厂房设备及其他资产方面的投资。
它是公司所产生的税后现金流量总额，可以提供给公司资本的所有供应者，包括债权人和股东。
”FCF【自由现金流量】= EBIT【息税前利润】×(1 - Tax【税率】) +Depreciation & Amortization【折旧和摊销】-Changes in Working Capital【营运资本变动】- Capital expenditure【资本支出】我相信如果没有怎么学习过财务知识的朋友，马上被这段话跟这个公式弄迷糊掉了，这么复杂怎么运用呢？我也曾经尝试着教一部分对这个公司的认识，然后去查文献，具体应该怎么操作。
其实在实践运用过程中，自由现金流远没有那么复杂，简单地核心的东西知道就可以，自由现金流无法强调可以自由运用的现金流，那么怎么样才算是自由运用呢？就是来源于净的经营活动现金流，然后减去构建固定资产、无形资产等相关支出就可以了，至于其他的内容项，我发现一般情况下不会很大，而且可能会难以计算（管理用报表除外），所以我个人一般在用的时候，或者建议一般分析的人，找到理念的现金流数据，然后我说到的上面两项相减就可以了。
自由现金流检查是投资者必须要经历的一个环节，因为它毕竟代表了赚来可以用的钱。
但是现金流分析也有很大的局限性，比如有很多书告诉你怎么折现，怎么怎么把将来的现金流变成现在的现金流。
我觉得太复杂了，如果未来这么直线得理解，那么要我们这些投资者还干嘛。
所以我倾向于定性判断，就是自由现金流到底是正还是负，正地多不多。
这样的方式去理解。
就足够了。
下面看几个公司的自由现金流公司A 自由现金流查看原图公司B 万福生科自由现金流? 查看原图公司C獐子岛自由现金流查看原图我个人对持续负的自由现金流很恐惧，一般情况下，我会想很多，难道企业模式里，一定要投入这么多的资本性支出，才能维持企业的增长吗？如果真的是这样，万一有一天维持不住了，怎么办？出问题了怎么吗？看看万福生科、獐子岛说可能出问题真会出问题，其实一点也不奇怪，很多东西可以掩饰，但自由现金流相对难掩饰。
自由现金流详解
自由现金流详解作为小韭菜，最喜欢看到企业净利润的增长，但是对于企业的CEO来说，自由现金流才是他们最关心的。
而且利润是基于会计假设得出的，存在很大的会计估计的空间，并不能真实反映企业的盈利健康情况。
从企业投资角度，也更应该采用自由现金流对企业进行盈利估计。
自由现金流的定义如下：自由现金流＝净利润 + 折旧与摊销－资本支出－营运资本追加这是科普兰教授提出的一种计算方法。
从现金流入的角度来说，有两个来源：1、主要来源是企业通过生产经营活动产生的利润（根据收入减去全部费用来计算，再减去税收），这个很好理解。
2、另一个来源是企业的折旧与摊销，折旧指的是企业购买固定资产时，钱已经付出去了，但这个购买成本要分摊到资产的使用周期中，这部分是作为企业的经营费用在利润中扣除的，但并没有实际的支付现金出去，所以在计算现金流时需要加回去。
从现金流出来看，有两个流出点：1、企业要维持正常运营，要保持竞争力，需要更新设备、技术和工艺，这些都需要支出现金，即需要扣除资本支出（包括购置固定资产，无形资产及其他营业性资产的支出）。
这个再次举京东方A 例子，二马经常说的京东方挣的不是钱，而是纸。
京东方为了维持产生经营，确保资金在行业竞争中不掉队。
必须将利润的大部分投入到新的生产线建设中。
股东是分不到钱的。
也就是说他们的利润不是自由现金。
2、营运资本（存货、应收款项的增加而占用的资金等）。
很多企业的利润及资产增加表现出来不是现金增加，而是存货或者应收账款的大幅增加。
这种增加是不健康的。
除非企业能证明存货不会贬值（例如茅台，越存越值钱），应收账款能收回来（不少企业的应收账款成为坏账，需要计提。
甚至大量的应收账款可能导致企业现金流断裂而破产，二马的一个朋友的企业就遇到了这种情况）。
有大量自由现金流的企业是相对安全的企业，通过测算自由现金流选出来的股票是相对安全的。
二马也建议大家投资股票时，更多的关注企业的现金流，而不是利润。
自由现金流介绍
自由现金流也是评估企业成长性和投资价值的重要指标之一。
自由现金流对投资者重要性
自由现金流为投资者提供了关于企业真实盈利能力和财务状况的更全面信 息。
通过分析自由现金流，投资者可以判断企业是否有足够的现金来支持其运 营、扩张和偿还债务。
02
盈利能力的提高有助于企业降低财务风险和融资成本，进而增
加自由现金流。
盈利能力的增强使得企业有更多的资金进行再投资和扩大生产
03Βιβλιοθήκη 规模，进一步增加自由现金流。
提高盈利能力以增加自由现金流策略
优化产品结构和提高产品 质量，以增加销售收入和 毛利率。
提高资产使用效率，加速 资金周转，减少资金占用。
加强成本控制和费用管理， 降低经营成本和期间费用。
案例三
一家上市公司在并购决策中采用了自由现金流折现模型。他们通过对目标公司的自由现金流进行预测和 折现，准确评估了目标公司的价值。最终，这次并购交易为上市公司带来了显著的协同效应和股东价值 提升。
06
自由现金流管理策略及建议
优化运营以提高经营活动产生自由现金流
提高运营效率
通过改进生产流程、降低库存、 减少浪费等方式提高运营效率， 从而增加经营活动产生的自由现 金流。
感谢观看
偿债能力影响自由现金流 的波动
偿债能力的变化会导致企业自由现金流的波 动。当企业偿债能力下降时，可能需要通过 出售资产或增加借款来偿还债务，这会使得 自由现金流减少。相反，当企业偿债能力提 高时，可以更好地管理债务和运营资金，从
而增加自由现金流。
保持良好偿债能力以确保稳定自由现金流
01
建立合理的资本结构
自由现金流及价值[外文翻译]
![自由现金流及价值[外文翻译]](https://img.taocdn.com/s3/m/cf0ee675ba0d4a7303763a66.png)
外文翻译Free cash flow and valuationMaterial Source:The Analysis and Use of Financial Statements Author: Gerald I WhiteThe cash flow statement is indented to help predict the firm’s ability to sustain (and increase) cash from current operation. In doing so, the statement provides more objective information about:A firm’s ability to generate cash flows from operatingTrends in cash flow components and consequences of invest and financing decision Management decision regarding such critical areas as financial policy (leverage), dividend policy, and investment for growth Neither the statement of cash flows nor the income statement alone contains sufficient information for decision making. (See Box 2-2 for some empirical evidence in this respect.) In come statement and balance sheet data must be combined with cash flows for insights into the firm’s ability to turn its assets into cash inflows, repay its liabilities, and generate positive return to shareholders. All three financial statements are needed to value the firm appropriately.An important but elusive concept often used in cash flow analysis is free cash flow. It is indented to measure the cash available to the firm for discretionary used after making all required cash outlays. The concept is widely used by analysts and in the fiancéliterature as the basis for many valuation models. The basic elements required it calculate FCF are available from the cash flow statement. In the, however, the definition of FCF varies widely, depending on how one defines and discretionary uses.The basic definition used by many analysts is cash from operations less the amount of capital expenditures required to maintain the firm’s present productive capacity. Discretionary uses include growth-oriented capital expenditures and acquisitions, debt reduction, and payments to stockholders (dividends and stock repurchase).the larger the firm’s FCF, the healthier it is, because it has more cash available for growth, debt payment, and dividends.The argument for t his definition is similar to Hick’s argument regarding the computation of net income, discussed in the previous chapter .if historical costdepreciation provided a good measure of the use of productive capacity; the FCF would equal CFO less depreciation expense .However, historical cost depreciation is arbitrary and measure the cost to replace operating capacity only by coincidence.The obvious alternative to depreciation is the amount of capital expenditures made to maintain current capacity, excluding capital expenditures for growth .In practice however, it is difficult to separate capital expenditures into expansion and replacement components. Lacking better information, all capital expenditures are subtracted from CFO to obtain FCF.Subtracting all capital expenditures from CFO to arrive at FCF brings the definition of FCF closer to the one used in definition of FCF closer to the one used in finance valuation models .In these models, required outflows are defined as well as capital expenditures necessary to finance the firm’s growth opportunities .Growth opportunities are defined as those in which the firm can make “above-normal” returns .It is difficult to determine a priori the amount of capital expenditures required to maintain growth and the discretionary portion of these expenditures; pragmatically, FCF is generally measured as CFO less capital expenditures.Valuation models do, however, differ as to whether FCF is measured as FCF available to the firm <i.e. all provider of capital (debt and equity)> or as FCF available to equity shareholders. In the former case, required payments do not include outlays for interest and debt. In the latter case, they do. Thus, for FCF to the firm, one cannot use reported CFO (less capital expenditures) because CFO includes outlays for interest expense. We return to this issue later in this chapter. In Chapter 19, we elaborate on the differing definitions of FCF and their implications for valuation model.Relationship of income and cash flowsWhen periodic financial statements are prepared, estimates of the revenues earned and expenses incurred during the reporting interval are required. As discussed in the previous chapter, these estimates require management judgment and are subject to modification as more information about the operating cycle become available. Accrual accounting can therefore be affected by management’s choice of accounting policies and estimates. Furthermore, accrual accounting by itself fails to provide adequate information about the liquidity of the firm and long-term solvency. Some of these problems can be alleviated by the use of the cash flow statement in conjunction with the income statement.Cash flow is relatively (but not completely) free of the drawbacks of theaccrual concept. It is less likely to be affected by variations in accounting principles and estimates, making it more useful than reported income in assessing liquidity and solvency.Figure 3-1 compares the level and trend of net income, cash from operation, and two measures of free cash flow for three different companies: Kmart, Westvaco, and Intel. Reported income and CFO were taken directly from the firm’s financial statements.Income, Cash Flow, and the Going-Concern AssumptionAs noted earlier, income statement amounts based on accrual accounting are generally presumed to be good predictors of future cash flows. That predictive ability is subject to number of implicit assumptions, including the going-concern assumption. For example, the classification of inventories as assets rather than expenses implicitly assumes that they will be cold in the normal course of business. Similarly, the accrual of revenue from credit sales and the valuation of receivables assume that the firm will continue to operate normally; failing firms may find shat customers are unwilling to pay.When the going concern assumption is subject to doubt, revenue recognition and asset valuation can no longer be taken for granted. The value of invention and receivables declined sharply when they must be quickly liquidated. Long-term assets (especially intangibles and other assets with litter or no value in a non-operating framework) also must be reexamined when the going-concern assumption is question. In this respect, the statement of cash flows serves as a check on the assumptions inherent in the income statement.To find out why income can fail as a predictor of cash-generating ability (uncollected receivables or unsold inventories) requires a comparison of amounts recorded as sales and cost of goods sold on the income statement with the patent of cash collections from customers and cash paid for inventories on the cash flow statement. A direct method cash flow statement is helpful in this regard.Income, Cash Flow, and the choice of Accounting PoliciesThe periodic net income differs because accounting methods and assumptions of managers differ, not because their economic activities differ. The cash low statement allows the analyst to distinguish between the actual events. This is not to say that the assumptions made by management are wrong. These assumptions may provide useful information. The user of financial reporting choice.The cash flow statement shows that the cash collected, cash disbursed, and thecash flow from operations is identical because the economic activities of these companies are identical. The differ only with respect income, which is a function of different accounting assumptions and policies.译文自由现金流及价值资料来源: 现金流量表的分析和使用作者：杰拉尔德.I.怀特现金流量表是为了帮助预测企业维持（或增长）目前营运的现金流量。
浅析自由现金流量假说
&" 完善和健全破产制度。破产制度是一种偿债保障机制，
它不仅可以促使企业自动履债，而且在出现偿债危机时能保 护债权人的利益。 现行的破产法主要有两方面的缺陷： 一是浓 重的计划经济色彩， 已很难适应当前的市场经济体制； 二是国 有企业的破产操作完全掌握在政府手中，由于缺乏市场力量 及债权人的监督， 破产往往成为债务人逃脱债务的手段， 根本 达不到保护债权人利益的目标。 因此， 为了加强负债的治理效 应， 新破产法的出台显得尤为现实背景
从 &’ 世纪 $’ 年代到 &’ 世纪 *’ 年代，美国石油行业经历了 从繁荣到衰败的转折， 这是自由现金流量假说最直接的背景。 美国石油行业从 +’ 世纪 $’ 年代末开始出现繁荣景象，利用积 累的大量现金进行了广泛的投资活动，然而由于管理者的自 股 私动机，直接导致了 %"(,-%"*, 年间投资项目的大量失败， 价也持续下跌。詹森认为， 在企业产生大量自由现金流量时， 管理者会更 倾 向 于 浪 费 行 为 和 不 明 智 的 使 用 自 由 现 金 流 量 ， 进而导致投资边际效率降低，因此应该利用负债来降低代理 成本。 此后， 国外很多学者从不同角度对这一理论理行了大量 的实证研究， 其结果也都证明了这一理论。 三、 自由现金流量假说在我国的现实应用 长期以来， 由于资本市场欠发达， 资本金注入不足等体制 性原因和 “拨 改 贷 ” 、 企业之间缺乏平等的竞争环境等政策性 财会月刊 !""#$ %& # ・ ・ "#
#" 完善公司治理结构。融资结构与公司治理存在密切 的
关系，建立健全有效的公司治理结构是充分发挥负债作用的 前提和条件。公司治理结构是指有关企业剩余索取权和剩余 控制权分配的一整套法律、 文化和制度安排。 完善的公司治理 结构能够保证负债的重组功能的实施， 即在企业经营破产时， 不仅剩余索取权由股东向债权人转移，经营管理权也向债权 人转移。这样， 债务融资像股权融资一样， 既包含着企业剩余 索取权的配置， 也包含着剩余控制权的配置。 加强银行对企业的相机控 $" 推 进 国 有 银 行 商 业 化 改 革 ， 制。目前， 由于国有银行对企业或公司债务约束弱化， 进而也 就弱化了债务对经理人员的约束机制。软性约束的债务是可 以不偿还的债务，经理人员不用考虑未来现金流入的一部分 必须用于偿还债务， 也不用考虑过多的债务会导致支付风险， 进而导致公司破产。 因此， 自由现金流量假说中关于债务对经 理人员过度投资进行约束的作用往往无法得到实现。加强银 行对企业的相机控制， 要满足以下条件： ! 银行必须具备监控 动力； 比如信息来源充分、 银行具 " 银行 必 须 具 备 监 控 能 力 ， 通过改革实现资本所 备监控技能； # 国有银行的商业化改革， 有权和法人财产权的分离， 建立相互制约的公司治理结构， 规 范银行经理人员的行为，使商业银行成为真正意义上的现代 金融企业。 无论是国有企业还是 %" 加快发展企业债券融资。在我国， 上市公司，负债都没有起到像发达国家那样所具有的对公司 治理的作用， 企业过度依赖国有银行贷款是其主要原因之一。 要克服这一缺陷， 除了改革国有企业和国有银行， 提高企业的 经营效率、 增强银行的预算约束外， 就是加快发展企业债券融 资。债券融资不仅可以实现融资结构的多元化以降低融资成 本， 而且有利于破产机制及退出机制的建立。目前， 要发展我 国的债券市场， 需要政府减少干预并在政策上给予支持， 完善 债券品种结构及债券市场结构，同时还要加强培育市场中介 机构。
自由现金流及价值[外文翻译]
外文翻译Free cash flow and valuationMaterial Source:The Analysis and Use of Financial Statements Author: Gerald I WhiteThe cash flow statement is indented to help predict the firm’s ability to sustain (and increase) cash from current operation. In doing so, the statement provides more objective information about:A firm’s ability to generate cash flows from operatingTrends in cash flow components and consequences of invest and financing decision Management decision regarding such critical areas as financial policy (leverage), dividend policy, and investment for growth Neither the statement of cash flows nor the income statement alone contains sufficient information for decision making. (See Box 2-2 for some empirical evidence in this respect.) In come statement and balance sheet data must be combined with cash flows for insights into the firm’s ability to turn its assets into cash inflows, repay its liabilities, and generate positive return to shareholders. All three financial statements are needed to value the firm appropriately.An important but elusive concept often used in cash flow analysis is free cash flow. It is indented to measure the cash available to the firm for discretionary used after making all required cash outlays. The concept is widely used by analysts and in the fiancéliterature as the basis for many valuation models. The basic elements required it calculate FCF are available from the cash flow statement. In the, however, the definition of FCF varies widely, depending on how one defines and discretionary uses.The basic definition used by many analysts is cash from operations less the amount of capital expenditures required to maintain the firm’s present productive capacity. Discretionary uses include growth-oriented capital expenditures and acquisitions, debt reduction, and payments to stockholders (dividends and stock repurchase).the larger the firm’s FCF, the healthier it is, because it has more cash available for growth, debt payment, and dividends.The argument for t his definition is similar to Hick’s argument regarding the computation of net income, discussed in the previous chapter .if historical costdepreciation provided a good measure of the use of productive capacity; the FCF would equal CFO less depreciation expense .However, historical cost depreciation is arbitrary and measure the cost to replace operating capacity only by coincidence.The obvious alternative to depreciation is the amount of capital expenditures made to maintain current capacity, excluding capital expenditures for growth .In practice however, it is difficult to separate capital expenditures into expansion and replacement components. Lacking better information, all capital expenditures are subtracted from CFO to obtain FCF.Subtracting all capital expenditures from CFO to arrive at FCF brings the definition of FCF closer to the one used in definition of FCF closer to the one used in finance valuation models .In these models, required outflows are defined as well as capital expenditures necessary to finance the firm’s growth opportunities .Growth opportunities are defined as those in which the firm can make “above-normal” returns .It is difficult to determine a priori the amount of capital expenditures required to maintain growth and the discretionary portion of these expenditures; pragmatically, FCF is generally measured as CFO less capital expenditures.Valuation models do, however, differ as to whether FCF is measured as FCF available to the firm <i.e. all provider of capital (debt and equity)> or as FCF available to equity shareholders. In the former case, required payments do not include outlays for interest and debt. In the latter case, they do. Thus, for FCF to the firm, one cannot use reported CFO (less capital expenditures) because CFO includes outlays for interest expense. We return to this issue later in this chapter. In Chapter 19, we elaborate on the differing definitions of FCF and their implications for valuation model.Relationship of income and cash flowsWhen periodic financial statements are prepared, estimates of the revenues earned and expenses incurred during the reporting interval are required. As discussed in the previous chapter, these estimates require management judgment and are subject to modification as more information about the operating cycle become available. Accrual accounting can therefore be affected by management’s choice of accounting policies and estimates. Furthermore, accrual accounting by itself fails to provide adequate information about the liquidity of the firm and long-term solvency. Some of these problems can be alleviated by the use of the cash flow statement in conjunction with the income statement.Cash flow is relatively (but not completely) free of the drawbacks of theaccrual concept. It is less likely to be affected by variations in accounting principles and estimates, making it more useful than reported income in assessing liquidity and solvency.Figure 3-1 compares the level and trend of net income, cash from operation, and two measures of free cash flow for three different companies: Kmart, Westvaco, and Intel. Reported income and CFO were taken directly from the firm’s financial statements.Income, Cash Flow, and the Going-Concern AssumptionAs noted earlier, income statement amounts based on accrual accounting are generally presumed to be good predictors of future cash flows. That predictive ability is subject to number of implicit assumptions, including the going-concern assumption. For example, the classification of inventories as assets rather than expenses implicitly assumes that they will be cold in the normal course of business. Similarly, the accrual of revenue from credit sales and the valuation of receivables assume that the firm will continue to operate normally; failing firms may find shat customers are unwilling to pay.When the going concern assumption is subject to doubt, revenue recognition and asset valuation can no longer be taken for granted. The value of invention and receivables declined sharply when they must be quickly liquidated. Long-term assets (especially intangibles and other assets with litter or no value in a non-operating framework) also must be reexamined when the going-concern assumption is question. In this respect, the statement of cash flows serves as a check on the assumptions inherent in the income statement.To find out why income can fail as a predictor of cash-generating ability (uncollected receivables or unsold inventories) requires a comparison of amounts recorded as sales and cost of goods sold on the income statement with the patent of cash collections from customers and cash paid for inventories on the cash flow statement. A direct method cash flow statement is helpful in this regard.Income, Cash Flow, and the choice of Accounting PoliciesThe periodic net income differs because accounting methods and assumptions of managers differ, not because their economic activities differ. The cash low statement allows the analyst to distinguish between the actual events. This is not to say that the assumptions made by management are wrong. These assumptions may provide useful information. The user of financial reporting choice.The cash flow statement shows that the cash collected, cash disbursed, and thecash flow from operations is identical because the economic activities of these companies are identical. The differ only with respect income, which is a function of different accounting assumptions and policies.译文自由现金流及价值资料来源: 现金流量表的分析和使用作者：杰拉尔德.I.怀特现金流量表是为了帮助预测企业维持（或增长）目前营运的现金流量。
jensen自由现金流翻译
自由现金流的代理成本，公司财务与收购企业的经理是股东的代理人，一个充满利益冲突的关系。
对代理理论这种冲突的分析，现在是经济学文献中的一个重要组成部分。
支付给股东的现金产生了主要的冲突却很少得到重视。
股东的支付能减少经理控制的资源，从而减少了经理人的权力，并使得当公司需要获得新的资金时更容易受到资本市场的监管，(见M. Rozeff,1982年; F。
H。
Easterbrook,1984年）.内部项目融资避免了这一监管和资金的不可用，或者只有在明确的价格下才可用的可能性。
管理层采用激励机制，以使得其企业以超过最优规模的方式增长。
而这种增长通过增加经理人控制下的资源增加了其权力，它与经理人的报酬增加也有关,因为报酬的变化与销售额的增长正相关(见Kevin Murphy ,1985年）。
公司通过提升职位而不是逐年奖金来奖励中层管理人员的这种趋势,对提供新的职业产生了一种强烈的组织偏见，这种偏见基于提升的奖励制度要求（见乔治贝克尔,1986）。
产品和要素市场的竞争,趋于在交易活动中驱使价格朝最低平均成本方向发展。
因此，管理者必须激励他们的组织，以提高效率和生存的可能性。
然而，产品和生产要素市场规则在新的交易活动和涉及大量经济租金或准租金的交易活动时往往表现较软弱。
在这种情况下，公司的内部控制制度和公司控制权市场监控更为重要。
产生大量经济租金或准租金的交易活动都是能产生大量自由现金流的交易活动。
自由现金流,是指当相关的资本成本贴现时给所有具有正净现值的项目投资时，超过投资所需的现金流.股东和经理之间在支付政策方面的利益冲突，在该组织产生大量自由现金流时表现得尤为严重。
关键是如何激励经理人交出现金，而不是投资低于资本成本的活动或将其浪费在组织的低效率运行上。
这里发展的理论解释了：1)债务在降低自由现金流的代理成本时的好处;2)债务如何代替股息；3)为什么“多元化”计划比同行业收购扩张或基于清算动机的收购更有可能产生亏损；4）为什么广播和烟草行业多种多样的活动中产生收购活动的因素与石油行业相类似;5）为什么投标人与一些目标公司在收购之前表现得异常好。
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jensen自由现金流翻译-可编辑自由现金流的代理成本，公司财务与收购企业的经理是股东的代理人，一个充满利益冲突的关系。
对代理理论这种冲突的分析，现在是经济学文献中的一个重要组成部分。
支付给股东的现金产生了主要的冲突却很少得到重视。
股东的支付能减少经理控制的资源，从而减少了经理人的权力，并使得当公司需要获得新的资金时更容易受到资本市场的监管，(见M. Rozeff，1982年; F.H.Easterbrook，1984年)。
内部项目融资避免了这一监管和资金的不可用，或者只有在明确的价格下才可用的可能性。
管理层采用激励机制，以使得其企业以超过最优规模的方式增长。
而这种增长通过增加经理人控制下的资源增加了其权力，它与经理人的报酬增加也有关，因为报酬的变化与销售额的增长正相关(见Kevin Murphy ，1985年)。
公司通过提升职位而不是逐年奖金来奖励中层管理人员的这种趋势，对提供新的职业产生了一种强烈的组织偏见，这种偏见基于提升的奖励制度要求(见乔治贝克尔，1986)。
产品和要素市场的竞争，趋于在交易活动中驱使价格朝最低平均成本方向发展。
因此，管理者必须激励他们的组织，以提高效率和生存的可能性。
然而，产品和生产要素市场规则在新的交易活动和涉及大量经济租金或准租金的交易活动时往往表现较软弱。
在这种情况下，公司的内部控制制度和公司控制权市场监控更为重要。
产生大量经济租金或准租金的交易活动都是能产生大量自由现金流的交易活动。
自由现金流，是指当相关的资本成本贴现时给所有具有正净现值的项目投资时，超过投资所需的现金流。
股东和经理之间在支付政策方面的利益冲突，在该组织产生大量自由现金流时表现得尤为严重。
关键是如何激励经理人交出现金，而不是投资低于资本成本的活动或将其浪费在组织的低效率运行上。
这里发展的理论解释了:1)债务在降低自由现金流的代理成本时的好处;2)债务如何代替股息;3)为什么“多元化”计划比同行业收购扩张或基于清算动机的收购更有可能产生亏损; 4)为什么广播和烟草行业多种多样的活动中产生收购活动的因素与石油行业相类似; 5)为什么投标人与一些目标公司在收购之前表现得异常好。
1 债务在激励组织有效性中的角色债务的代理成本已得到了广泛的讨论，但债务在激励经理和他们的组织有效性时所带来的好处却被忽略了。
我把债务产生的这些影响叫做“控制假说”。
拥有大量自由现金流的管理者可以增加分红或回购股票，从而支出目前的现金，否则这些现金将被投资在低回报的项目上或被浪费掉。
这使得管理者控制未来现金流的使用，但他们可以通过宣布“永久”增加股息来支付未来现金流的承诺，而这样的承诺往往是不可靠的，因为股息在未来会减少。
事实上，资本市场对削减大型股票价格下降的股息的处罚与自由现金流的代理成本是一致的。
没有留存收益的债务产生使得管理者能够有效的把他们的承诺和支付未来现金流结合起来。
因此，债务可以有效地替代股息，但这些股息一般不被企业融资文献认可。
在股票交易中通过发行债务，经理们能够以某种方式结合他们的承诺和支付未来现金流，这种方式不能通过简单的增加股息来完成的。
如果他们不兑现自己对利息支付和原则性支付的承诺，就给股东债务接受者考虑把公司告上破产法庭的权利。
因此，债务通过减少经理相机处理的开销花费来降低自由现金流的代理成本。
这些债务的控制效应是资本结构的潜在决定因素。
发行大量的债务回购股票也建立了所需的组织激励来激励经理人，并帮助他们克服了正常的组织性裁员抵抗，而这些抵抗是自由现金流支付经常需要的。
作为一个有效的激励因素，未能还本付息造成的威胁使这些组织更有效率。
股票回购债务或现金也有税收优惠。
(利息支付能给公司扣税，等于卖方股票的计税依据，回购部分的收益是不征税的。
)增加杠杆也具有成本。
由于杠杆的增加，一般的债务代理成本上升，包括破产成本。
最优债务权益比率是公司价值最大化的点，在这个点上，债务的边际成本刚好抵消边际效益。
控制假说并不意味着债务问题将始终有积极的控制效果。
举例来说，这些影响对快速增长且有大型和高利润投资项目但没有自由现金流的组织来说则显得不那么重要，因为这些组织将要定期向金融市场获得资金。
在这些时候，市场有机会来评估公司及其管理和拟建项目。
投资银行家和分析师在这种监测中发挥重要的作用，通过价格投资者对金融债权的支付，市场的评估非常明显。
债务的控制功能，在产生大量现金流但具有低增长前景组织中显得更加重要，在必须缩减的组织中也显得更重要。
在这些组织中，管理者将其投资不经济的项目上从而浪费现金流量的压力是最严重的。
2 来自财务重组的证据资本结构的自由现金流理论有助于解释之前令人费解的财务重组效应的结果。
我和Clifford Smith(1985年，表2)及Smith(1986年，表1和3)的论文概述的不仅仅是一系列股票价格在改变资本结构的交易公告方面变动的研究。
大多数增加杠杆的交易，包括股票回购、债务或优先股交换普通股的交易，债券交换优先股的交易，收益债券交换普通股的交易，导致普通股价格显著增加。
两天的收益范围从21.9,(债券交换普通股)到2.2,(债务或收益债券交换优先股)。
大多数降低杠杆的交易，包括出售普通股，普通股交换债券或者优先股的交易，或优先股交换债券，或所谓的可换股债券和可转换优先股迫使转换成普通股票，导致普通股票价格显著下跌。
为期两天的的损失范围从-9.9,(普通股交换债券)-0.4,(可转换优先股强制转换为优先股)。
与此相一致，自由现金流理论预测，除有利可图但没有资金投资项目的公司，价格将会随着股东(或承诺这样做)支出的意外增加而上涨，而价格将会随着付款的减少或新的资金需求而下降(或承诺减少未来支付)。
简单的杠杆变化规律的例外是有针对性的回购和债务以及优先股的出售(各种各样的)。
这些都与不正常的价格下跌(其中有些是微不足道的)有关联。
有针对性的回购价格的下降，似乎是由于收购机率的减少。
债务出售和优先股价格的下降，与自由现金流理论是一致的，因为这些销售在管理人员的控制下带来新的现金流。
此外，价值变动的幅度与未来现金流量支付承诺的结合松紧程度的变化正相关。
例如，债券交换优先股交易的影响要小于债券交换普通股交易的影响。
税务效应可以解释这些结果，但不是所有的都能解释。
例如，优先股交换普通股的交易价格上升就没有税务效应。
3 来自杠杆收购和私有化交易的证据许多私有化交易和杠杆收购(LBO)交易中的利益似乎是由于债务的控制功能。
因为在控制自由现金流的代理成本方面的优势，这些交易产生了一个新的组织形式，这种组织形式可以媲美开放的企业形式。
1984年，私有化交易总额达108亿美元，占所有公共收购的27,(按编号，见W.T.Grimm，1985年，图36和37)。
证据表明平均支付溢价超过了50,。
理想的杠杆收购候选人是经常企业(frequently firm)或有稳定的经营历史和庞大的自由现金流的大规模公司的附属公司(即低增长前景和具有高潜力来产生现金流的公司)。
在这种情况下，自由现金流的代理成本可能会很高。
杠杆收购交易常常以高负债融资，10比1的权益负债比率并不少见。
此外，使用捆绑融资(strip financing)和交易中的股权分配，揭示了激励机制的敏感性、利益冲突和破产成本。
捆绑融资(strip financing)中风险的非股权证券以几乎相等的比例持有，限制了证券持有人之间的利益冲突，也因此限制了破产成本。
一个过于简单化的例子说明了这一点。
考虑两家除融资外其他方面都相同的公司。
A公司是股权完全融资，B公司是高级次级债可转换债券和优先股权的高度杠杆融资。
假设B公司证券只以捆绑的方式出售，也就是说，购买任何证券的X,的买方必须购买所有证券的X,，并且证券“钉”在一起，使他们在以后不能分开出售。
两家公司的证券持有人的现金流分布有相同的杠杆索赔权，但两家公司的组织有很大的不同。
如果B公司经理暂不分红而投资价值减少的项目，或如果他们不称职，捆绑持有人有索赔权来补救A公司的股权持有人没有提供的权力，公司B的证券赋予其持有者在违约事件中支付股息或付息的权利，例如考虑破产公司或成立董事会代表的权利。
当每个股权以上的证券违约时，捆绑持有人在组织中就有新的权利来调解。
因此，在公司B中能更容易和更加快速地替换经理人。
此外，因为每一个在高度杠杆化的B公司的证券持有人在同一债权上有相同的索赔权，违约事件中，高级和初级索赔者在重组索赔上没有冲突，对于捆绑持有者来说，它只是把资金从一个口袋转移到另一个口袋的问题。
因此B公司需要从来不会导致破产，也可以自发迅速地重组，并以比通过破产程序更少的成本和中断来完成。
所有证券按严格比例持有是不可取的，例如，因为国税局限制，在这种情况下，取消了债务利息的扣税和对银行股权持有的限制。
然而，无风险的高级债务不必使用捆绑，而且它具有高层管理人员和风险资本家的优势，这些人员持有较大份额股权并促进交易。
证券普遍受到捆绑的做法通常被称为“夹层”的融资，它包括优于普通股的优先证券，但隶属于高级债务证券。
高层管理人员常常持有15,至20,的股权。
风险资本家和他们所代表的资金保留股权的主要份额。
他们控制董事会董事并且监督经理。
经理和风险资本家对合资成功有浓厚的兴趣，因为他们的权益是从属于其他索赔权。
成功需要(除其他事项外)改变的实施以避免低回报项目的投资产生还本付息的现金并增加股权价值。
不到一小撮的这些企业以破产终结，即便已经通过了私人重组。
这种组织形式的一个全面的测试需要时间和另一次衰退。
4 来自石油行业的证据自从1973年石油行业同时出现自由现金流的大量增加，能源市场发生了彻底的改变，要求行业有重大收缩。
在这种环境下，自由现金流的代理成本巨大，收购市场对现金流的减少起到了关键作用。
从1973年到20世纪70年代末，原油价格增加了十倍。
他们最初预计未来石油价格的上升伴随着行业的扩张，随着石油消费量下降，未来油价上涨的期望也下降了，实际利率与勘探和开发成本也有所增加。
其结果是在20世纪70年代末和80年代初的提炼和分销能力和原油储备的最优水平下降了，使行业产能过剩。
与此同时，利润却很高。
之所以发生这种情况，是因为当边际生产率下降时，行业的资源平均生产率提高了。
因此，与流行的观念相反，行业需要萎缩。
特别是原油储量(行业的主要资产)太高，需要削减勘探和开发(E,D)支出(见我1986的论文)。
在行业内，价格上涨产生大量现金流。
例如，1984年的10个最大的石油公司的现金流量为48.5亿美元，占《邓氏商业月刊》调查中排名前200位公司的总现金流量的28,。
与自由现金流的代理成本相一致，管理层不支付多余的资源给股东。
相反，业内人士继续花费巨资在勘探和开发(E,D)活动，即使平均收益率低于资本成本。