(完整版)TED演讲—JosephNye《21世纪权力的变迁》(中英对照)

I'm going to talk to you about power in this 21st century. And basically, what I'd like to tell you is that power is changing, and there are two types of changes I want to discuss. One is power transition, which is change of power amongst states. And they are the simple version of the message, is it's moving from West to East. The other is power diffusion, the way power is moving from all states, West or East, to non-state actors. Those two things are the huge shifts of power in our century. And I want to tell you about them each separately and then how they interact and why, in the end, there may be some good news.
我想讨论的是21世纪的权利。

基本上我想告诉大家的是权利的变化，有两种变化是我想探讨的。

一种是权利的转移，国家和国家之间的权利变化。

这是对权利转移的简单解读，即权利正从西方转移到东方。

另一种是权利的分散，即权利的转移是从西方和东方的各个国家到非国家的范围。

以上两种情况是本世纪权利的重要转移。

我想分别说说这两种情况和它们之间的相互影响以及为什么说最终可能是个好消息。

When we talk about power transition, we often talk about the rise of Asia. It really should be called the recovery, or return, of Asia. If we looked at the world in 1800, you'd find that more than half of the world's people lived in Asia and they made more than half the world's product. Now fast forward to 1900: half the world's people -- more than half -- still live in Asia, but they're making only a fifth of the world's product. What happened? The Industrial Revolution, which meant that all of a sudden, Europe and America became the dominant center of the world. What we're going to see in the 21st century is Asia gradually returning to being more than half of the world's population and more than half of the world's product. That's important, and it's an important shift. But let me tell you a little bit about the other shift that I'm talking about, which is power diffusion.
说到权利的转移，我们经常会提起亚洲的崛起。

确切地说应该称作亚洲的复兴或者亚洲的回归。

回顾19世纪的世界，你会发现世界上一半以上的人口都居住在亚洲而且他们生产的产品占了世界总量的一半以上。

现在我们来看20世纪，世界上一般的人口——超过一半——仍然在亚洲居住，但是他们的生产总值进占全球的五分之一。

这是为什么呢？工业革命，也就是说突然之间，欧洲和美国成为主导世界的中心。

而到了21世纪，我们看到的是亚洲将重新回到占世界一半以上人口和生产总值的位置。

这很重要，而且是一次重大的权利转移。

但是接下来我要和你们探讨一下刚才提到的另外一种转移，那就是权利分散。

To understand power diffusion put this in your mind: computing and communications costs have fallen a thousandfold between 1970 and the beginning of this century. Now that's a big, abstract number, but to make it more real, if the price of an automobile had fallen as rapidly as the price of computing power, you could buy a car today for five dollars. Now when the price of any technology declines that dramatically, the barriers to entry go down; anybody can play in the game. So in 1970, if you wanted to communicate from Oxford to Johannesburg to New Delhi to Brasilia and anywhere simultaneously, you could do it, the technology was there. But to be able to do it, you had to be very rich -- a government, a multinational corporation, maybe the Catholic Church -- but you had to be pretty wealthy. Now, anybody has that capacity, which previously was restricted by price just to a few actors, if they have the price of entry into an internet cafe -- the last time I looked, it was something like a pound an hour -- and if you have Skype, it's free. So capabilities that were once restricted are now available to everyone.
要理解权利分散就要明白一点：计算和交流的成本已经降到原来的千分之几从1970年到本世纪初。

这个数字很大，很抽象，但是具体来说，如果汽车价格的降幅和计算机的降幅一样，那么今天你只花五美元，就可以买辆车。

那么如果所有的技术价格都以这个
幅度下跌，获得这一技术的门槛就会降低；人人都可以享有。

从20世纪70年代开始，如果你想从牛津到约翰内斯堡或到新德里或到巴西利亚或是其他任何地方获得即时通讯，是可行的，因为技术已经发展到了这个阶段。

但是要真正做到这一点，你需要很有钱才行——你要么是政府，要么是跨国公司，也可能是基督教堂不过你得及其有钱才行。

但是几天人人都能享有这些技术，以前人们受到价格的制约只有少数人才能享有，如果人们有足够的钱去网吧——我上次查到的价格大概是每小时一磅左右——但是如果你用Skype，是免费的。

所以曾经被限制的能力现在人人都可以享有。

And what that means is not that the age of the State is over. The State still matters. But the stage is crowded. The State's not alone. There are many, many actors. Some of that's good. Oxfam, a great non-governmental actor. Some of it's bad. Al Qaeda, another non-governmental actor. But think of what it does to how we think in traditional terms and concepts. We think in terms of war and interstate war. And you can think back to 1941, when the government of Japan attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor. It's worth noticing that a non-state actor attacking the United States in 2001 killed more Americans than the government of Japan did in 1941. You might think of that as the privatization of war. So we're seeing a great change in terms of diffusion of power.
这并不意味着国家的时代结束了。

国家依然很重要。

但是舞台是很拥挤的。

国家不可能单独存在。

还有很多很多的角色。

其中有一些是好的角色。

比如牛津饥荒救济委员会（乐施会）就是一个很重要的非政府角色。

其中也有一些是不好的。

基地组织，是另一个非政府角色。

但是试想这些对我们传统的思维方式和观念有哪些改变。

我们过去考虑的是战争和内战。

大家可以想一想1941年，日本政府日本政府袭击美国珍珠港。

只得注意的是在2001年，一个非政府的角色袭击了美国在这次袭击中丧生的美国人超过了1941年日本政府的行为。

你可能会想战争已经不再是国家行为。

因此我们看到的是权力分散的一个重大变化。

Now the problem is that we're not thinking about it in very innovative ways. So let me step back and ask: what's power? Power is simple the ability to affect others to get the outcomes you want, and you can do it in three ways. You can do it with threats, of coercion -- sticks, you can do it with payments -- carrots, or you can do it by getting others to want what you want. And that ability to get others to want what you want, to get the outcomes you want, without coercion or payment, is what I call soft power. And that soft power has been much neglected and much misunderstood. And yet it's tremendously important. Indeed, if you can learn to use more soft power, you can save a lot on carrots and sticks. Traditionally, the way people thought about power was primarily in terms of military power. For example, the great Oxford historian who taught here at this university, A.J.P. Taylor, defined a great power as a country able to prevail in war. But we need a new narrative if we're to understand power in the 21st century. It's not just prevailing at war, though war still persists. It's not whose army wins; it's also whose story wins. And we have to think much more in terms of narratives and whose narrative is going to be effective.
可问题是我们对此的看法不够新。

所以让我们再退一步重新审视并且想一想：什么是权利？权利其实就是一种能力能够影响他人以达到你的目的，实现权利的方式有三种。

可以威胁他人，通过强迫——棍棒，可以买通他人胡萝卜，或者通过让别人心甘情愿地做你想要达成的结果。

而让别人心甘情愿地做逆向要做的，来达到你的目的，而不是通过强迫或买通，就是我所说的软实力。

而这种软实力很大程度上被人们所忽视所误解了。

然而软实力是极其重要地。

事实上，如果你知道如何运用软实力，你会节省很多地胡萝卜和棍棒。

按照惯例，人们认为权利基本就是军事力量。

例如来自牛津的伟大的历史学家 A.J.P. 泰勒对大国的定义是能够打赢战争的国家。

但是我们需要一个新的阐述来真正懂得21世纪地
权利。

权利不仅仅是赢得战争尽管战争依旧存在。

哪一个国家的军队赢了并不重要；重要的是谁讲的故事能够赢得人心。

而且我们需要进一步考虑这个阐释以及谁的阐释更加有效。

Now let me go back to the question of power transition between states and what's happening there. the narratives that we use now tend to be the rise and fall of the great powers. And the current narrative is all about the rise of China and the decline of the United States. Indeed, with the 2008 financial crisis, many people said this was the beginning of the end of American power. The tectonic【筑造的;构造的】plates of world politics were shifting. And president Medvedev of Russia, for example, pronounced in 2008 this was the beginning of the end of United States power. But in fact, this metaphor【暗喻】of decline is often very misleading. If you look at history, in recent history, you'll see the cycles of belief in American decline come and go every 10 or 15 years or so. In 1958, after the Soviets put up Sputnik【俄人造卫星】, it was "That's the end of America." In 1973, with the oil embargo【禁运】and the closing of the gold window, that was the end of America. In the 1980s, as America went through a transition in the Reagan period, between the rust belt【铁锈地带(指从前工业繁盛今已衰落的发达国家一些地区】economy of the midwest to the Silicon Valley economy of California, that was the end of America. But in fact, what we've seen is none of those were true. Indeed, people were over-enthusiastic in the early 2000s, thinking America could do anything, which led us into some disastrous foreign policy adventures, and now we're back to decline again.
现在我要回到国家之间权利转移的问题讲讲最新的动态。

我们现在用的阐释大多是大国的崛起和没落。

而近来这种阐述全都是中国的崛起和美国的没落。

确实，2008年发生的经济危机会让很多人说这是美国领导力终结的开始。

全球政治格局的板块正在发生转变。

例如俄罗斯的总统梅德韦杰夫，在2008年曾说过经济危机是美国领导力结束的开端。

然而事实上，这种衰落的比喻非常误导人。

如果回顾历史，近代历史你会发现这种认为美国衰落的说法每隔10年到20年左右就会出现。

1958年，苏联发射人造卫星以后人们就说“美国要衰落了。

” 1973年的石油禁运和黄金窗口的关闭，又有人说美国要衰落了。

20世纪80年代，在里根就职期间，美国经历了一次从美国中西部老工业基地到加州的硅谷经济的转变，又有人在说美国要衰落了。

但事实上，我们发现所有这些谣言都不是真的。

事实上，正是人们在21世纪初过分乐观，认为美国无所不能，导致了我们作出了一些灾难性的外交政策，现在又出现了美国衰落的声音。

The moral of this story is all these narratives about rise and fall and decline tell us a lot more about psychology than they do about reality. If we try to focus on the reality, then what we need to focus on is what's really happening in terms of China and the United States. Goldman Sachs has projected that China, the Chinese economy, will surpass that of the U.S. by 2027. So we've got, what, 17 more years to go or so before China's bigger. Now someday, with a billion point three people getting richer, they are going to be bigger than the United States. But be very careful of these projections such as the Goldman Sachs projection as though that gives you an accurate picture of power transition in this century. Let me mention three reasons why it's too simple. First of all, it's a linear projection. You know, everything says, here's the growth rate of China, here's the growth rate of the U.S., here it goes -- straight line. History is not linear. There are often bumps along the road, accidents along the way. The second thing is that the Chinese economy passes the U.S. economy in, let's say, 2030, which it may it【就算事实真的如此】, that will be a measure of
total economic size, but not of per capita income -- won't tell you about the composition of the economy. China still has large areas of underdevelopment. And per capita income is a better measure of the sophistication of the economy. And that the Chinese won't catch up or pass the Americans until somewhere in the latter part, after 2050, of this century.
总之所有这些关于崛起，倒退和衰落的阐述讲的更多的是一种心理而不是事实。

现在让我们只关注事实，那么我们就需要关注当下在中国和美国正在发生的事情。

高盛预言中国，中国经济将会在2027年超过美国。

所以我们只剩下在中国超过美国之前我们只剩下17年左右。

也许未来等到这1.3亿人口富起来的时候，他们将超过美国。

但是不要轻易接受高盛这些公司做出的预测。

尽管这些预测能给你本世纪潜力转移的精确画面。

让我来给出为什么这些预测过于简单的原因。

第一，它是线性的预测。

种种迹象这是中国的增长率，这是美国的增长率，请看——直线然而历史不是一条直线。

历史进程经常出现曲折和突发事件。

第二中国经济如果说在2030年超过了美国经济，就算事实真的如此，也是按经济总量来衡量的，并非人均收入——并不能说明经济的组成。

中国的广大地区还很落后。

人均收入能够更好的衡量经济的复杂性。

在这之后，中国才有可能在人均收入超过美国，那会是在本世纪，2050年以后。

The other point that's worth noticing is how one-dimensional this projection is. You know, it looks at economic power measured by GDP. Doesn't tell you much about military power, doesn't tell you very much about soft power. It's all one-dimensional. And also, when we think about the rise of Asia, or return of Asia, as I called it a little bit earlier, it's worth remembering Asia's not one thing. If you're sitting in Japan, or in New Delhi, or in Hanoi, your view of the rise of China is a little different than if you're sitting in Beijing. Indeed, one of the advantages that the Americans will have in terms of power in Asia is all those countries want an American insurance policy against the rise of China. It's as though Mexico and Canada were hostile neighbors to the United States, which they're not. So these simple projections of the Goldman Sachs type are not telling us what we need to know about power transition.
另外值得一提的是这个预测的衡量标准是多么的单一。

它看到是通过GDP，衡量的经济实力。

并不说明军事实力，也不能说明软实力。

它的衡量标准是单一的。

而且说到亚洲的崛起，或者是亚洲的回归，就像我之前提到的，需要注意的是亚洲不是一个整体。

对于日本，新德里，或者河内来说，对与中国的崛起和中国自己的看法是不同的。

事实上，关于亚洲的势力美国拥有的一个优势就是所有这些国家都希望得到美国政策的保护来制衡中国。

就像墨西哥和加拿大历史上是美国不很友好的邻邦，现在也是这样的。

所以高盛作出的这些简单的预测并不能说明我们应该知道的全力转移。

But you might ask, well so what, in any case? Why does it matter? Who cares? Is this just a game that diplomats and academics play? The answer is it matters quite a lot. Because, if you believe in decline and you get the answers wrong on this, the facts, not the myths, you may have policies which are very dangerous. Let me give you an example from history. The Peloponnesian War【伯罗奔尼萨战争】was the great conflict in which the Greek city state system tore itself apart two and a half millennia ago. What caused it? Thucydides【修西得底斯】, the great historian of the the Peloponnesian War, said it was the rise in the power of Athens and the fear it created in Sparta. Notice both halves【对半分】of that explanation.
然而，你可能会说，无论如何，那又怎么样呢？为什么这一点很重要？谁会在乎？这只是一场外交家们和学术界的一场游戏吗？答案是这一点很重要。

因为，如果相信衰落关于这个问题得到的答案是错误的，事实上，不是谣传，这样错误的答案是很危险的。

以下是历史上的例子。

伯罗奔尼萨战争是希腊城邦体制的很大的冲突导致了两千伍佰年前希腊的分崩离析。

根源是什么？修西得底斯，伯罗奔尼萨战争时期的伟大历史学家，说是因为希腊人的崛起和斯巴达克人对希腊人崛起的恐惧。

注意这前后这两部分的原因。

Many people argue that the 21st century is going to repeat the 20th century, in which World War One, the great conflagration【大火】in which the European state system tore itself apart and destroyed its centrality in the world, that that was caused by the rise in the power of Germany and the fear that it created in Britain. So there are people who are telling us this is going to be reproduced today, that what we're going to see is the same thing now in this century. No. I think that's wrong. It's bad history. For one thing, Germany had surpassed Britain in Industrial strength by 1900. And as I said earlier, China has not passed the United States. But also, if you have this belief and it creates a sense of fear, it leads to overreaction. And the greatest danger we have of managing this power transition of the shift toward the East is fear. To paraphrase【释义，解释】Franklin Roosevelt from a different context, the greatest thing we have to fear is fear itself. We don't have to fear the rise of China or the return of Asia. And if we have policies in which we take it in that larger historical perspective, we're going to be able to manage this process.
很多人认为 21世纪将会重蹈20世纪的覆辙，第一次世界大战的战火使得整个欧洲的体制分崩离析破坏了它在世界的中心地位，原因就是德国的崛起和英国的恐慌。

所以今天有些人告诉我们今天这样得历史将会重演，为我们将会看到的是本世纪历史得重演。

不，我认为这不会发生。

那段历史不会重蹈。

一方面，在1900年德国得工业实力已经超过了英国。

就像我之前说过的，中国还没有超过美国。

但同时如果相信衰落就会产生恐惧，导致过度反映。

我们在处理权利向东方转移时面临的最大的危险就是恐惧。

用罗斯福的话来说就是我们最需要害怕的是害怕本身。

我们不需要害怕中国的崛起或者亚洲的回归。

如果我们采取的政策能够从历史的大局出发，我们就可以处理好这个过程。

Let me say a word now about the distribution of power and how it relates to power diffusion and then pull these two types together. If you ask how is power distributed in the world today, it's distributed much like a three-dimensional chess game. Top board: military power among states. The United States is the only superpower, and it's likely to remain that way for two or three decades. China's not going to replace the U.S. on this military board. Middle board of this three-dimensional chess game: economic power among states. Power is multi-polar. There are balancers. The U.S., Europe, China, Japan can balance each other. The bottom board of this three-dimensional, the board of transnational relations, things that cross borders outside the control of governments, things like climate change, drug trade, financial flows, pandemics,【传染病】all these things that cross borders outside the control of governments, there nobody's in charge. It makes no sense to call this unipolar or multi-polar. Power is chaotically distributed. And the only way you can solve these problems -- and this is where many greatest challenges are coming in this century -- is through cooperation, through working together, which means that soft power becomes more important, that ability to organize networks to deal with these kinds of problems and to be able to get cooperation.
现在我想说的一个词就是权利的分配以及它是如何和权利的分散相联系的然后我会把二者撮合到一起。

如果你们想知道今天世界的是如何分配的，权利的分配很像是三维的象棋。

最高层：各国的军事力量。

美国是唯一的超级大国，而且未来20到30年依然如此。

中国在军事这盘棋还不能取代美国。

这盘三维象棋的中间是：各国经济实力的较量。

经济实力是多极的。

各级之间相互平衡。

美国，欧洲，中国，日本能够相互制衡。

三维象棋的最下层，是各国之间的关系，是各国政府所不能够控制的因素，例如气候变暖，毒品走私，货币流入和流出，传染病，所有这些跨国因素都不是政府所能掌控的，而且也没有人负责。

把这些叫做单极或者多极是没有任何意义的。

权利的分配是很混乱的。

而且唯一能解决这些跨国问题的——这也正是本世纪出现的很多大的挑战的唯一出路——那就是合作，通过互相合作，也就是说软实力越来越重要了，协调各国的关系来解决这些问题并达成一致日益重要。

Another way of putting it is that as we think of power in the 21st century, we want to get away from the idea that power's always zero sum -- my gain is your loss and vice versa. Power can also be positive sum, where your gain can be my gain. If China develops greater energy security and greater capacity to deal with its problems of carbon emissions, that's good for us as well as good for China as well as good for everybody else. So empowering China to deal with its own problems of carbon is good for everybody, and it's not a zero sum, I win, you lose. It's one in which we can all gain. So as we think about power in this century, we want to get away from this view that it's all I win, you lose. Now I don't mean to be Pollyannaish【盲目乐观】about this. Wars persist. Power persists. Military power is important. Keeping balances is important. All this is still persists. Hard power is there, and it will remain. But unless you learn how to mix hard power with soft power into strategies that I call smart power, you're not going to deal with the new kinds of problems that we're facing.
另外一种阐释就是说到21世纪的权利，我们想要摆脱权利总是走向零和——不是你死就是我活权利也可以是正和，你获得的同时我也可以获得。

如果中国能的能源安全发展的更好，处理碳排放的能力越强对我们来说有好处，同时对中国有好处而且对每个国家都有好处。

因此赋予中国应对温室效应的能力对谁都有好处，而且这不是一个零和游戏，我赢你就输了。

这是一场双赢的游戏。

所以想到本世纪的权利，我们要摆脱这种你死我活的观念。

我并不是过分乐观。

战争已就存在，权利依旧存在。

军事力量依旧很重要。

保持平衡很重要。

所有这些仍然继续。

硬实力很重要，而且依然很重要。

但是除非学会如何将硬实力和软实力相结合到我所说的巧实力的战略中，就不用再处理我们所面对的类似的新问题了。

So the key question that we need to think about as we look at this is how do we work together to produce global public goods, things from which all of us can benefit? How do we define our national interests so that it's not just zero sum, but positive sum. In that sense, if we define our interests, for example, for the United States the way Britain defined its interests in the 19th century, keeping an open trading system, keeping a monetary stability, keeping freedom of the seas -- those were good for Britain, they were good for others as well. And in the 21st century, you have to do an analog to that. How do we produce global public goods, which are good for us, but good for everyone at the same time? And that's going to be the good news dimension of what we need to think about as we think of power in the 21st century.
因此关键问题是关于这个问题时我们需要思考如何合作来创造有益于全世界有益于每个国家的东西。

思考如何定义国家利益这样它就不再是零和，而是正和。

那样的话，如果我们能够定义我们的利益，例如，在19世纪英国认为美国可以使其保持开放的贸易体系，稳定的货币，和海上自由——这些对英国都是有利的，对其他国家也是有利的。

在21世界，我们应该以史为鉴，如何创造有利于全世界，有利于我们自己，但同时又有利于每个人的事情，这就是我们在思考 21世纪的权利时想到的一些好的结果。

There are ways to define our interests in which, while protecting ourselves with hard power, we can organize with others in networks to produce, not only public goods, but ways that will enhance our soft power. So if one looks at the statements that have been made about this, I am impressed that when Hillary Clinton described the foreign policy of the Obama administration, she said that the foreign policy of the Obama administration was going to be smart power, as she put it, "using all the tools in our foreign policy tool box." And if we're going to deal with these two great power shifts that I've described, the power shift represented by transition among states, the power shift represented by diffusion of power away from all states, we're going to have to develop a new narrative of power in which we combine hard and soft power into strategies of smart power. And that's the good news I have. We can do that.
对于国家利益的理解，在用硬实力保护自我的同时我们还可以协调和其他国家的关系来创造不仅是有利于全世界同时也有利于增强我们的软实力的理解。

因此得到这一结论的说法，希拉里克林顿关于奥巴马政府外交政策的阐述让我印象颇深，她说奥巴马政府的外交政策应该立足于巧实力，就向她说得那样“利用外交政策的各种策略。

“要处理好我提到的这两种全力转移，一种是国家之间权利的转移，一种是从国家分散出来的权利，我们就需要形成关于权利的新的阐释将软硬实力结合到巧实力中。

这就是我说的好消息。

我们能够做到。

Thank you very much.。