上市公司治理准则中英文对照
公司章程中英文对照
公司章程中英文对照第一章总则 Chapter 1 General Provisions本公司为有限责任公司。
第三条公司注册地址 Article 3 Registered Address本公司注册地址为[公司注册地址]。
本公司的业务范围包括但不限于：[公司的业务范围描述]。
第三章股东权益与股权转让 Chapter 3 Shareholder's Rights and Transfer of Shares第五条股东权益 Article 5 Shareholder's Rights股东享有按照股权比例分享公司利润的权益，并有权参与公司事务的决策和监督。
第六条股权转让 Article 6 Transfer of Shares在获得其他股东的同意及符合相关法律法规的情况下，股东可以转让其持有的股权。
第四章公司治理 Chapter 4 Corporate Governance公司设立董事会，董事会由几名董事组成，其中包括一名董事长。
第八条董事会职权 Article 8 Powers of the Board of Directors 董事会负责制定公司的战略与发展规划，并对公司的经营管理进行监督和决策。
第九条董事任免 Article 9 Appointment and Removal of Directors董事由股东大会选举产生，任期为五年。
Article 9 Directors are elected by the shareholders' meeting and serve a term of five years.第十条高级管理层 Article 10 Senior Management公司设立总经理，由董事会聘任，并对公司的日常经营管理负责。
第五章财务管理 Chapter 5 Financial Management第十一条财务报告 Article 11 Financial Reports公司应按照相关法律法规的要求，定期编制和公布财务报告。
上市公司治理结构翻译
毕业论文英文资料翻译学院：商学院专业：金融学班级：姓名：学号：指导教师：2012年 6 月Corporate governance and state-owned sharesin China listed companiesQu QiangAbstractDuring the last decade, China public listed companies’ (PLCs) performance is growing weakly and governance practices are seriously defective. Some of the previous studies based on practice of developed economies overlooked the underlying issues, and the empirical researches are mixed. This paper argue that, from the beginning of the reform of restructuring China state-owned enterprises (SOEs) into PLCs, the concern about the potential loss of state assets made the ownership split into three different type of shares, with only a small fraction of A-shares are tradable, and the state keeps on holding the controlling share stakes. This special institutional arrangement rooted deeply in China political system and ideology, as well as in the economic reform strategy, explains large part of the inefficiency of corporate governance of China PLCs.After an unsuccessful policy practice in 2001, in which the government’s objective aiming to finance its huge social security fund gap conflicted with that of market, it should be realized that there are two major unknowns: the time and the pricing mechanism of the state shares to be reduced, which are crucial to the future of China capital market and economic development.Keywords:Corporate governance; State-owned share1. IntroductionSince early 1990s, stock market has been playing a growing important role in reshaping China financial system. It is expected that the market could improve the performance and corporate governance of public listed companies (PLCs). However, the actual performance are growing weakly and governance practices are seriously defective, characterized by insider control and collusion, lack of safeguards for minority shareholders and weak transparency, etc. Most of previous studies based on theories and practice of developed economies attribute these flaws to factors such as culture, uncompetitiveness of markets, poor legal enforcement, inefficient debt and equity market. The empirical researches are mixed. For example,Tian (2001) arguesthat ‘‘ corporate value increase with increased state shareholding when the government is a large shareholder ’’ ; Xu and Wang (1999)suggested that while the state share is negatively related with performance, the large stakeholder of legal persons, or institutional investors, has po sitive effect. The policy of ‘‘speeding fostering institutional investors ’’ by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in this vein in 2002, resulting in massive collision and price manipulation between these investors, has been criticized widely.Without the understanding of the fundamental underlying issue, the share structure, especially the role of state-owned shares playing in corporate governance of China PLCs, it might be impossible to make meaningful results.As the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) reform started in China about two decades before, the government was concerned about the potential loss of state assets if all shares of a restructured SOE were to be freely traded. As a concession, the ownership of each enterprise was split into (1) state share; (2) legal persons shares and (3) common domestic A-shares. After the opening of two stock exchanges in the beginning of 1990s, with only a small fraction of A-shares are tradable, the state keeps on holding the controlling share stakes. This is different from both advanced and other transition economies, explains large part of the inefficiency of corporate governance of China listed companies. This special institutional arrangement rooted deeply in China political system and ideology, as well as in the economic reform strategy.2. Corporate governance and share structure2.1. The role of PLCs in Chinese economyOver the past decade or so, China SOEs underwent significant reforms, about 80% of all small and medium-sized enterprises have been sold to employees and outside investors, more than 1200 large enterprises restructured into PLCs. Meanwhile, stock market had been introduced and growing rapidly, expected to play an important role in reshaping China traditional bank-dominated financial system. By the end of 2002, total market capitalization of PLCs reached 4100 billion RMB, about 40% of China ’s GDP. The output of PLCs amounted about 18% share of China GDP, and distributed in a variety of key industries in the whole economy. The restructuring of SOEs to PLCs has demonstrated as a ‘‘ model’’ for the overall reforming SOEs. However, the performance measured by earnings-related indicators of PLCs have been continuously falling throughout many years. For example, PLCs’ profit per sharedropped from 0.35 RMB in 1993 to 0.20 RMB in 2000, the average annual declining rate is 7.7% ( Table 1).Table 1 Performance of China PLCsYear 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 EPS (RMB) 0.35 0.32 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.18 0.20 0.20 ROE (%) 14.50 13.98 10.80 9.62 9.48 7.36 8.06 7.52 Deficit PLCs (number) 0 2 17 31 41 77 79 97 Deficit PLCs as of total (%) 0 0.68 5.26 5.85 5.50 9.16 8.32 8.7Source:Fundamental Analysis of China Listed Companies, every issues; in the year of 2001 and 2002, the deficit PLCs as of total growth to 13.11 and 13.51, respectively.Why did China PLCs perform so poorly? It is hard to be attributed to macroeconomic factors, since during the same period, the yearly growth rate of China GDP is about 8%, and the other kind of enterprises, such as township and village enterprises and foreign invested enterprises performed quite well.1 Hu et al. (2003) provides another explanation arguing that most of the PLCs are in the so-called declining industries, such as primary and secondary industries, but considering of the current development stage of China, such explanation also not hold. On the other hand, it is impossible to explain why the performance of PLCs is worsening so rapidly and continually, while the general industry composite of PLCs remains stable.It should also be noted that in China, in fact, only a clean and perhaps better performed group of SOEs could be chosen to be listed on the two exchanges. So, the most plausible explanation about the poor performance of China PLCs lies largely in themselves intrinsically, especially in their weak corporate governance, due to their unique share-holding structure.2.2. Share structureTo begin with, let us have a look on the general share structure of China PLCs (Table 2). For a typical listed company in China, there are three major types of shares outstanding: state shares, legal person shares and common A-shares. Each type accounts for about one-third of all shares, entitled to the same cash flow and voting rights, but differentiate in the ways of exchange. Only the common A-shares can be publicly traded, while the legal person and state shares only transferable privately orthrough irregularly scheduled auctions.Table 2 Share structure of China listed companies (1994 –2000) (%)Classes Brief description 1994 1996 1998 2000 State shares Held by the state and its varied ministries, 43.31 35.42 34.25 38.90 bureaus and regional governments, inexchange for the capital contribution madeby the State. Non-tradable; transferable toother institution, under the approvalof CSRCLegal person Owned by domestic institutions, defined 22.44 27.18 28.35 23.82 Shares as non-individual legal entity;Commercial banks excluded by law;non-tradable; transferable to otherinstitutions under theapproval of CSRCTradable Held and trade mostly by domestic 33.02 35.25 34.11 35.72 A-shares individuals and institutions;in IPOs,tradable A-shares should accountfor no less than 25% of total outstanding sharesEmployee Offered to workers and managers of PLC, 0.98 1.20 2.05 0.64 shares usually at a substantial discountShares Including B-shares and H-shares. 12.02 13.33 10.05 7.28 denominated Till 2000, B-shares availableexclusivelyin foreign to foreign investors,separated fromcurrency A-share market;H shares are listed and traded on Hong Kong marketSources: China Securities and Futures Statistics Yearbook, 2001.State shares are held by the central and local governments, which are represented by local financial bureaus, state asset management companies, or investment companies. State shares can also be held by the parent of the listed company, typically an SOE. They are not tradable. Legal person shares are held by domestic institutions such as industrial enter-prises, securities companies, trust and investment companies, foundations and funds, construction and real estate development companies,transportation and power companies, etc. These institutions are further classified according to their ownership structure as SOEs, state-owned non-pro fit organizations, collectively or privately owned enterprises, joint stock companies, etc. Legal person shares are not tradable. Tenev, Zhang, and Breford (2002) , based on a survey of Shanghai Stock Exchange, estimates that in 1999, in more than 95% of the cases, the state is directly or indirectly (through industrial SOEs) in control of listed companies.In a recent research of Liu et al. (2003), in the vein of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999)‘‘ the principle of ultimate ownership,’’ they surveyed 1160 PLCs of China in 2001, the government ultimately controlled 84% of PLCs, in which 8.5% directly, 75.6% indirectly by ‘‘ pyramid shareholding schemes ’’.Compared with most developed countries, the ownership concentration of China ’s PLCs is not so high, while the prominent feature of the ownership structure is that the state can be identified as the ultimate controlling shareholders. Compared with most emerging economies, in terms of types of largest shareholders, China differs from theirs as to the absence of significant ownership by individuals and families, the negligible role of financial institutions and institutional investors, and the state playing an important role. Although many SOEs have been transformed into modern PLCs, yet the ultimate state ownership is still retained, so they also retain the same flaws of old SOEs. These features have a direct bearing on the corporate governance issues that China PLCs are facing.In China, managerial job markets are underdeveloped, especially in the state-dominated PLCs, most board members and managers are still having a corresponding status of civil service, their remuneration promotions are still relying on the assessments of their superiors in the political and administrative hierarchy rather than market performance. Commercial banks and other financial intermediaries are ruled out holding shares of firms, and thus play no role in corporate governance. Because shares that cannot be traded freely account for 65% of the total, stock prices almost have quite weak relation with PLCs performance, and market discipline does not work to improve the corporate governance. When a large portion of a company’s ownership is locked up and illiquid, stock price manipulation (especially coupled with insider information) becomes easy and it gives market participants much incentive to do so. Till recently, those PLCs that performed poorly in previous years, thus their shares having been marked as ST (special treatment) and PT (particular treatment),have relatively high stock price, due to price manipulation.Company managers do not have to worry that poor management may cause their company facing the threat of being taken over. In other words, holders of public shares cannot ‘‘vote with their feet’’ and managers are not concerned about the rights of public shareholders.3. How did the state shares in China PLCs take shape?As already discussed, China PLCs shareholding regime and corporate governance have distorted the effect of market mechanism and caused inefficiency. The present characteristics of ownership and governance have been largely shaped and will continue to be influenced by the overall SEOs reform strategy and the political and ideological debates.3.1. China economic reform strategyFrom the beginning, SOEs restructuring has been widely viewed as the key to the success or failure of reform both in China and other central-planning economies. Two competing approaches have been proposed: the market approach and the ownership approach. The first is based on a belief that if the markets for products and factors are created, and corporate control is established and functions well, efficiency improvements of SOEs can be achieved without dramatic changes in ownership. Proponents of the second approach argues that private ownership is necessary for enterprise ef ficiency. Considering the two alternative views, while in Russia and Eastern Europe, radical ownership reforms were put in place at an early stage of reform, China has adopted a reform strategy that gives priorities to fostering markets and nurturing institutional changes, characterized as the‘‘gradualism’’ strategy controlled by government.Since early 1980s China has been seeking to improve SOEs corporate governance, which was then simply articulated in the term of ‘‘separation of government from management, ’’trying to form a ‘‘modern company system.’’ In the late 1980s, many SOEs were converted into stock companies, and further into PLCs in the beginning of 1990s, when the two national stock exchanges were introduced. In November 1993, the CPC Congress formulated the most important policy regarding SOE reform aiming at the creation of a‘‘modern enterpris e system,’’ with its corporate structure, governance, and management based on the principle of corporatization, and with provisions for full separation of the state ’s exercise of ownership rights from theenterprise ’s exercise of legal person property rights. The Company Law, promulgated at the same time, provided the legal underpinnings for the concept of a modern enterprise system providing rules for the incorporation of all enterprises of different ownership types into limited liability companies and limited liability shareholding companies, and specified governance structures, rules regarding the transfer and sales of shares, and procedures for mergers and bankruptcy.Today’s ownership and governance characteristics of listed companies in China are largely shaped by the past incentives structure of the listing process. At the 1997 CPC 15th Congress, the Central Committee endorsed both the corporatization of large SOEs and the restructuring of small SOEs, and decided to accelerate the speed of reforms. The central component of the reform program was ‘‘grasping the big, and enlivening the small.’’ The notion of grasping the big involves two related sets of reforms. First, the government is creating a number of large enterprise groups with extensive cross-ownership by encouraging mergers in core industries. Second, the government is encouraging those enterprises performing better to be listed on the stock exchange to promote ownership diversification and raise funding for restructuring.The government introduced stock markets partly as a means of financing for the state sector. Though many empirical researches argue that equity financing plays a minor role for firms external fund (Mayer, 1990), and the principal function of capital market is providing price signals through stock trading for resource allocation, in China, it has been widely believed or misunderstood that newly established stock exchanges could play a key role for supporting loss-making SOEs, local governments operating under increasingly hard budget constraints appreciated the feature of limited liability as an opportunity to get off themselves from continuously underwriting SOEs’ liabilities, and under the quota system, local governments were responsible for selecting what companies were to be listed. Local governments tended to give preference to companies that were under their control, urgently needed capital infusion, or socially important. Such criteria would not necessarily result in the selection of the most dynamic, successful, and high-growth companies. They also created a bias against private sector companies.While the Company Law stipulated various criteria for listing in accordance with the regulations in successful developed markets, these criteria were insufficient toplay a screening role. For example, the law allowed the companies to be listed as divested from SOEs or large and medium SOEs to use pro-forma pro fit records. This provided incentives to establish SOEs for the specific purpose of listing, a trend that came to be known as ‘‘packaging for listing. ’’ The packaged shell companies often did not have a meaningful track record, and their business models were at times ad hoc. Thus, the companies that are listed on China ’s stock exchanges are mostly SOEs. They have strong links with the government, especially local governments, and their boundaries with their parent groups are relatively new and often artificial (Tenev et al., 2002).3.2. Ideological, political constraints of PLCsWhat is distinctive from the experience of China PLCs corporate governance hitherto is that, quite different from other transition economies, political and ideological factors precluded real property right reform in the state sector.The SEOs corporatization reform practices since early 1980s has laid the foundation of the landmark ‘‘ Decision on the Problems of Establishing a Socialist Market Economy,’’adopted by the 14th Congress of Communist Party of China in October 1993, which for the first time stated that the objective of reform was the establi shment of a modern ‘‘ socialist market economy’’ with ‘‘ Chinese characteristics, ’’ i.e. a competitive market system characterized by the predominance of public ownership. Since the government concerned politically and ideologically about the potential loss of state assets if all shares of a restructured SOE were to be freely traded, as a concession, the ownership of each firm is split into (1) state share;(2) legal person shares and (3) common A- and B-shares, with the restriction that no shares would ever be floated. Regardless of share type, the holder of each share is entitled to the same cash flow and voting rights.The government subsequently introduced a series of complementary reforms to build the institutional mechanisms for control consistent with the corporate form. While increasing the autonomy of SOE management, the government was also seeking to strengthen the supervision of state property, but in ways consistent with the new form of enterprise autonomy. In 1994, the government issued supervision regulations that provided the legal basis for the emerging network of state-owned bodies designed to supervise SOE property. The aim, although not yet fully realized, was to move toward an indirect, delegated form of control in line with the tenet ofseparation between ownership and management.So, it is obvious that the policy of restructuring SOEs into PLCs was taken as an alternative to, and as a means of avoiding privatization, failed to address the fundamental property right issue. Moreover, in case that the state is the controlling shareholder, and the state shares are not to be traded, it is possible for the state to control more social assets with relatively less state assets, this allowing the state sector play a leading role in relation to other sectors at the enterprise level in a mixed economy.As the worsening performance of SOEs and state-dominated PLCs were widely known and being criticized, the 15th Congress of CCP in the fall of 1997 announced the policy of ownership diversification of the state sector, and made explicitly clear that ‘‘ shareholding system ’’ was indicated as a means of reforming SOEs. While many researchers hailed it as giving a green light to massive privatization, but it also reiterated that public ownership should continue to remain dominant in China economy.3 Similarly, a decision of the 4th Plenum of the 15th Party Congress (September 1999), and the State Planning and Development Commission’s (SPDC) January 2000 statement elaborating on this decision, reaffirmed that while state ownership would be reduced in a number of sectors, it would remain dominant in industries of strategic importance such as infrastructure, key producer goods, etc. Few specific practical measures for divestiture have in fact been formulated.4. Failed practice of state share reselling in 2001From the above discussion, it is clear that the poor performance of China PLCs is closely related with the state dominated shareholding structure in most of PLCs,because it has distorted a balanced corporate governance structure from inside and destroyed the market discipline from outside. Fortunately, in June 2001 State Council of China started to launch an ambitious reform to resell state shares gradually; but unfortunately, this reform lasted only for 4 months, failed in a dramatic market turbulence.Corporate governance has moved to the center stage of enterprise reform in China in recent years, 4 and the 4th Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s 15th Central Committee held in September 1999 decided to calls for ‘‘ strategic adjustment’’ of the state sector by ‘‘ withdrawing what should be withdrawn. ’’ One of the measures that put out officially for the first time was the permission to resell partof state shares. Though this policy transformation maybe one of the backgrounds of currently hot-debated issue, it should not be regarded as the direct and decisive force of year 2001’s reform, since the ‘‘ decision’’ also made it clear that ‘‘ under the prerequisite of state-controlling, resell part of state-shares to financing SOEs reform and development.’’In fact, the real and direct incentive to resell part of state shares is that the restructuring of SOEs and state-dominated PLCs are facing some difficulties in reality: huge deficits and inadequate of social security coverage. According to a recent survey of China central bank (People’s Bank of China), by the end of 2000, 51.2% of the 62,656 enterprises failed to repay their bank debts. The non-performing loan ratios in the state-owned banking system are estimated at between 25 and 30%. While the poor financial performance of a large number of SOEs, including state-controlled listed companies, imposes a severe burden on the banking system, and is also a potential threat to financial stability, unemployment concerns are still making real restriction to further reform on SOEs and PLCs. This underscores the urgent need to establish a modern social security system to provide a social safety net.In March 1998, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security was established aiming at introducing a comprehensive new social security system and the government has adopted a three-pillar approach to pension reform, namely: (a) a mandatory pooled fund to include all SOE employers administered by cities or provinces, (b) mandatory individual accounts managed by cities or provinces and funded by employer and employee contributions, and (c) voluntary supplemental accounts set up by enterprises. In February 2001, the government established the National Social Security Fund and the National Social Security Council to create a supplementary pension system.The implementation of these plans has encountered a number of obstacles, most severe of which is the implied pension deficit has been rising. The existing system has not generated enough reserves nationwide for the transition to a fully funded system, and a comprehensive national system is still not in place because the central government offered cities a choice of different options, and because economic growth rates and labor market conditions vary across regions. Thus, finally, growing enterprise arrears and municipal deficits have been shifted upward to the Ministry of Finance, which had hoped to sidestep this responsibility but was unable to do so. In 1997, MOF transferred money to help cover deficits in five municipalities. By 1999 ittransferred more than 18 billion yuan (US$ 2 billion) to help 21 municipalities make pension payments, and by 2000 this amount had almost doubled to 34 billion yuan (US$ 4 billion) in 25 municipalities, or 17% of total pension spending. These deficits are expected to grow by leaps and bounds over the next few years, as the number of pensioners expands. The MOF had a sense of urgency to find a long-term solution (James, 2002). Since the MOF is the ultimate representative of state assets, it had to sell its state shares to compensate the huge social security fund gap. This policy seemed good to the financial market, but turned out to be unsuccessful.On 12 June 2001, the State Council announced ‘‘ the Te ntative Measure of Reselling State Shares to Finance the Social Security Fund,’’ in which under an initial public offering (IPO) or under a seasoning offering of an existent PLC, the government would resell its shares (up to 10% of the offering), and these proceeds should be channeled to the National Social Security Fund. However, since the MOF decided to resell its non-trade shares, which are generally agreed over-valued, at the market price as that of the tradable common A-shares, the Shanghai Composite Stock Index dropped dramatically by 32%, from 2245 on 12 June 2001 to 1514 on 22 October. Then the China Securities Regulatory Commission had to suspend the reform in a hurry.中国上市公司治理和国有股减持Qu Qiang文摘在过去的十年中，中国上市公司的性能和治理实践的能力越来越弱。
上市公司治理准则(2018修订)AnnouncementNo.29[2018]—
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上市公司治理准则（2018修订）AnnouncementNo.29［2018］—时效性：现行有效发文机关：中国证券监督管理委员会文号：中国证券监督管理委员会公告〔2018〕29号发文日期：2018年09月30日生效日期：2018年09月30日目录第一章总则 3 第二章股东与股东大会 4 第一节股东权利 4 第二节股东大会的规范 4 第三章董事与董事会 5 第一节董事的选任 5 第二节董事的义务 5 第三节董事会的构成和职责 5 第四节董事会议事规则 6 第五节独立董事 6 第六节董事会专门委员会7 第四章监事与监事会7 第五章高级管理人员与公司激励约束机制8 第一节高级管理人员8 第二节绩效与履职评价8 第三节薪酬与激励9 第六章控股股东及其关联方与上市公司9 第一节控股股东及其关联方行为规范9 第二节上市公司的独立性9 第三节关联交易10 第七章机构投资者及其他相关机构10 第八章利益相关者、环境保护与社会责任11 第九章信息披露与透明度11 第十章附则12中国证券监督管理委员会公告（〔2018〕29号）为进一步规范上市公司运作，提升上市公司治理水平，保护投资者合法权益，促进我国资本市场稳定健康发展，我会修订了《上市公司治理准则》，现予公布，自公布之日起施行。
中国证监会2018年9月30日上市公司治理准则第一章总则第一条为规范上市公司运作，提升上市公司治理水平，保护投资者合法权益，促进我国资本市场稳定健康发展，根据《中华人民共和国公司法》(以下简称《公司法》)、《中华人民共和国证券法》及相关法律、行政法规等确定的基本原则，借鉴境内外公司治理实践经验，制定本准则。
第二条本准则适用于依照《公司法》设立且股票在中国境内证券交易所上市交易的股份有限公司。
上市公司应当贯彻本准则所阐述的精神，改善公司治理。
上市公司章程及与治理相关的文件，应当符合本准则的要求。
鼓励上市公司根据自身特点，探索和丰富公司治理实践，提升公司治理水平。
公司治理制度(中英文版)
Edwin 公司治理制度招聘与劳动合同公司招聘员工，遵循公布、公正、择优录用的原那么。
公司通过向社会公布招聘和内部选拔，为公司提供最优秀、最适合的人选。
但相同条件下，公司将优先选拔内部员工。
公司鼓舞员工向公司推荐品学兼优的人材。
一、录用条件一、适用于所有员工的录用条件包括：（1）品格老实员工须老实地将其真实履历、躯体状况、教育状况等信息告知公司，确保其向公司提交的各类证明和材料全面、真实、客观靠得住。
若是员工历史上存在营私舞弊、严峻失职行为，或受到过行政处分、刑事处分、劳动教养，或受到过原单位的处分，或与原公司存在纠纷或经济纠纷，员工须先详细向公司作书面说明。
（2）手续完备员工须依法与原公司办理完解除劳动合同的手续，并向公司出示相关证明。
（3）能力合格员工具有应聘职位所要求的教育背景、工作体会、专业能力和辅助能力（如熟悉利用电脑、外语能力等）及其他特殊要求，并能完成职位描述规定的各项职位职责。
招聘员工时，人力资源部或人事部和需求部门将明确其具体要求。
（4）被录用的员工的名誉和行为不该有不良记录；（5）被录用的员工躯体健康，没有重大疾病、传染病或慢性病或不适应所招聘职位的其他疾病。
二、劳动合同一、公司正式录用员工将与员工依法签定《劳动合同》。
劳动合同须由员工本人签定，他人代签无效。
公司方面由有关负责人签署，并加盖公司公章。
劳动合同签署后，公司持两份合同原件，员工将持一份合同原件。
二、劳动合同的类型分类分为固按期限、无固按期限和以完成必然工作任务为期限的劳动合同。
无固按期限劳动合同的签署，按《劳动合同法》第十四条办理。
三、试用期一、公司依法对新聘员工衽试用期制度。
目的是让公司考察新员工是不是符合录用条件，同时让新员工对公司及所应聘职位的工作进行考察。
员工试用期按《劳动合同法》的规定执行，即劳动合同期限三个月以上不满一年的，试Edwin 用期不得超过一个月；劳动合同期限一年以上不满三年的，试用期不得超过二个月；三年以上固按期限和无固按期限的劳动合同，试用期不得超过六个月。
上市公司治理准则中英文对照
上市公司治理准则中英文对照一、引言上市公司治理准则是一套规范上市公司运作、保护股东权益、提高公司治理水平的重要规则。
在全球化的经济环境下，了解和掌握上市公司治理准则的中英文表述对于企业的国际化发展、投资者的跨境投资以及监管机构的国际交流都具有重要意义。
二、公司治理的基本原则（一）公平对待所有股东Fair treatment of all shareholders上市公司应当平等对待所有股东，不得在股东之间实行不合理的差别待遇，不得有选择性地向部分股东提供信息或给予优惠。
（二）保护股东权利Protecting shareholders' rightsShareholders should have the right to participate in and vote on major corporate decisions, and have access to accurate and timely information股东应享有参与和表决公司重大决策的权利，并能够获取准确、及时的信息。
（三）强化信息披露Enhanced information disclosureThe company shall disclose relevant information truthfully, accurately, completely and timely to ensure that shareholders have sufficient understanding of the company's operations and financial situation公司应当真实、准确、完整、及时地披露相关信息，确保股东对公司的运营和财务状况有充分的了解。
三、股东与股东大会（一）股东的权利和义务Rights and obligations of shareholdersShareholders have the right to receive dividends, vote on company matters, and inspect the company's financial and accounting reports At the same time, they should fulfill their obligations such as paying subscribed capital in full and in a timely manner股东有权获得股息、对公司事务进行表决以及查阅公司的财务和会计报告。
上市公司治理准则中英文对照
精心整理上市公司治理准则中英文对照中文：导言为推动上市公司建立和完善现代企业制度，规范上市公司运作，促进准则。
的行为准则和职业道德等内容。
第一章第一节股东权利第一条股东作为公司的所有者，享有法律、行政法规和公司章程规定的合法权利。
上市公司应建立能够确保股东充分行使权利的公司治理结构。
第二条上市公司的治理结构应确保所有股东，特别是中小股东享有平等地位。
股东按其持有的股份享有平等的权利，并承担相应的义务。
第三条股东对法律、行政法规和公司章程规定的公司重大事项，享有知情权和参与权。
上市公司应建立和股东沟通的有效渠道。
第四条股东有权按照法律、行政法规的规定，通过民事诉讼或其他法律手段保护其合法权利。
股东大会、董事会的决议违反法律、行政法规的规定，侵犯股东合法权益，股东有权依法提起要求停止上述违法行为或司依法提起要求赔偿的诉讼。
第二节股东大会的规范第五条第八条上市公司应在保证股东大会合法、有效的前提下，通过各种方式和途径，包括充分运用现代信息技术手段，扩大股东参与股东大会的比例。
股东大会时间、地点的选择应有利于让尽可能多的股东参加会议。
第九条股东既可以亲自到股东大会现场投票，也可以委托代理人代为投票，两者具有同样的法律效力。
第十条上市公司董事会、独立董事和符合有关条件的股东可向上市公司股东征集其在股东大会上的投票权。
投票权征集应采取无偿的方式进行，并应向被征集人充分披露信息。
第十一条机构投资者应在公司董事选任、经营者激励与监督、重大事项决策等方面发挥作用。
第三节关联交易第十二条上市公司与关联人之间的关联交易应签订书面协议。
协议的签订应当遵循平等、自愿、等价、具体。
披露。
第十三条业原则,第二章第一节控股股东行为的规范第十五条控股股东对拟上市公司改制重组时应遵循先改制、后上市的原则，并注重建立合理制衡的股权结构。
第十六条控股股东对拟上市公司改制重组时应分离其社会职能，剥离非经营性资产，非经营性机构、福利性机构及其设施不得进入上市公司。
商务翻译(汉译英)Unit 8 上市公司治理准则
重心的转移（二）
时态、语气的体现 英语中的时态比较丰富，包括现在、过去、将来、进行、完成 等时态，动词的词形变化比较多。而汉语的时态表达比较简单， 有时借助于词汇来表达。如表示过去的常用“着” “了” “过” “已” 等，表示将来的有“会” “就”“将” “要” “马上” “以后”等等，含有这些词汇的句子一般都可以译成英语中对应 的时态。在汉语中有时可以用词汇手段来表示虚拟语气，如“本 应该”“若非”“要是”“假如”等。但在有些情况下，汉语句 子中并没有使用这些词汇，也表示一定的虚拟语气，在这种情况 下，就要求译者对原文的分析要深入、要透彻。如：
1.不是他没有讲清楚，就是我没听明白。 2.Either he did not speak distinctly or I did not hear well. 3.树林能为野生动物提供栖息之所，野生动物也能使树木茂 盛起来。 4.Not only can a forest provide a home for wildlife, but also wildlife can in turn make the trees and plants flourish. 5.外商投资企业经企业申请，税务部门批准，可减免或免征 工商统一税。 6.A foreign investment enterprise may apply to tax authorities and may enjoy, if the application is approved, reduction or exemption of the consolidation industrial and commercial tax.
她曾经下决心好好学数学，可还是一再失败。 她越失败就越失望。虽然她知道这门功课有用，但 不明白为何每个高中生都要学数学。她常说假如高 中不开数学课，那学生可就快乐多了。
上市公司治理准则中英文对照
上市公司治理准则中英文对照一、引言上市公司治理准则是规范上市公司运作、保障投资者权益、促进资本市场健康发展的重要文件。
随着全球经济一体化的加速，越来越多的中国上市公司走向国际市场，同时也有众多国际投资者参与中国资本市场。
因此，提供上市公司治理准则的中英文对照版本具有重要的现实意义。
二、上市公司治理准则的主要内容（一）股东与股东大会Shareholders and Shareholders' General Meeting股东享有平等的权利，能够按照其所持有的股份行使表决权。
Shareholders enjoy equal rights and can exercise their voting rights in accordance with the shares they hold股东大会是公司的最高权力机构，应当依法行使职权。
The shareholders' general meeting is the highest authority of the company and shall exercise its functions and powers in accordance with the law（二）董事与董事会Directors and the Board of Directors董事应当具备履行职责所必需的知识、技能和经验。
Directors should possess the necessary knowledge, skills and experience to perform their duties董事会应当对公司的战略规划、重大决策等进行审议和决策。
The board of directors should review and make decisions on the company's strategic planning and major decisions（三）监事与监事会Supervisors and the Board of Supervisors监事应当认真履行监督职责，维护公司及股东的合法权益。
上市公司治理准则-中英文对照
上市公司治理准则中英文对照Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China导言为推动上市公司建立和完善现代企业制度,规范上市公司运作，促进我国证券市场健康发展，根据《公司法》、《证券法》及其它相关法律、法规确定的基本原则，并参照国外公司治理实践中普遍认同的标准，制订本准则。
本准则阐明了我国上市公司治理的基本原则、投资者权利保护的实现方式，以及上市公司董事、监事、经理等高级管理人员所应当遵循的基本的行为准则和职业道德等内容。
本准则适用于中国境内的上市公司。
上市公司改善公司治理，应当贯彻本准则所阐述的精神。
上市公司制定或者修改公司章程及治理细则，应当体现本准则所列明的内容。
本准则是评判上市公司是否具有良好的公司治理结构的主要衡量标准，对公司治理存在重大问题的上市公司,证券监管机构将责令其按照本准则的要求进行整改。
第一章股东与股东大会第一节股东权利第一条股东作为公司的所有者，享有法律、行政法规和公司章程规定的合法权利。
上市公司应建立能够确保股东充分行使权利的公司治理结构。
第二条上市公司的治理结构应确保所有股东,特别是中小股东享有平等地位。
股东按其持有的股份享有平等的权利，并承担相应的义务.第三条股东对法律、行政法规和公司章程规定的公司重大事项，享有知情权和参与权。
上市公司应建立和股东沟通的有效渠道.第四条股东有权按照法律、行政法规的规定，通过民事诉讼或其他法律手段保护其合法权利。
股东大会、董事会的决议违反法律、行政法规的规定，侵犯股东合法权益,股东有权依法提起要求停止上述违法行为或侵害行为的诉讼。
董事、监事、经理执行职务时违反法律、行政法规或者公司章程的规定，给公司造成损害的，应承担赔偿责任。
股东有权要求公司依法提起要求赔偿的诉讼.第二节股东大会的规范第五条上市公司应在公司章程中规定股东大会的召开和表决程序，包括通知、登记、提案的审议、投票、计票、表决结果的宣布、会议决议的形成、会议记录及其签署、公告等.第六条董事会应认真审议并安排股东大会审议事项。
上市公司治理准则中英文对照
上市公司治理准则中英文对照I. 前言上市公司治理准则的制定和实施对于维护市场秩序、保护投资者合法权益，推动上市公司健康发展具有重要意义。
本文将对上市公司治理准则进行中英文对照，以便更好的理解和应用。
II. 公司治理原则1. 透明度公司应确保信息的透明度和真实性，及时披露财务状况、业务运营情况、关联交易等信息，以便让投资者了解公司的真实情况。
TransparencyCompanies should ensure the transparency and authenticity of information, and disclose financial status, business operations, related transactions, etc. in a timely manner, in order to let investors understand the true situation of the company.2. 公平公正公司应遵守公平公正的原则，建立和完善公司治理结构，保护股东权益，维护股东平等待遇。
Equity and FairnessCompanies should abide by the principles of equity and fairness, establish and improve corporate governance structure, protect shareholder rights, and maintain equal treatment of shareholders.3. 监管合规公司应遵守相关法律法规、规章制度和上市规则，加强内部控制，推动公司从内部出发建立监管合规的机制。
Regulatory ComplianceCompanies should comply with relevant laws, regulations, rules and listing rules, strengthen internal controls, and promote the establishment of regulatory compliance mechanisms from within the company.4. 责任和效率公司董事、高级管理人员应履行其职责，有效管理公司，提高公司运营效率，为股东创造长期价值。
上市公司治理准则中英文对照共16页文档
上市公司治理准则中英文对照Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China导言为推动上市公司建立和完善现代企业制度，规范上市公司运作，促进我国证券市场健康发展，根据《公司法》、《证券法》及其它相关法律、法规确定的基本原则，并参照国外公司治理实践中普遍认同的标准，制订本准则。
本准则阐明了我国上市公司治理的基本原则、投资者权利保护的实现方式，以及上市公司董事、监事、经理等高级管理人员所应当遵循的基本的行为准则和职业道德等内容。
本准则适用于中国境内的上市公司。
上市公司改善公司治理，应当贯彻本准则所阐述的精神。
上市公司制定或者修改公司章程及治理细则，应当体现本准则所列明的内容。
本准则是评判上市公司是否具有良好的公司治理结构的主要衡量标准，对公司治理存在重大问题的上市公司，证券监管机构将责令其按照本准则的要求进行整改。
第一章股东与股东大会第一节股东权利第一条股东作为公司的所有者，享有法律、行政法规和公司章程规定的合法权利。
上市公司应建立能够确保股东充分行使权利的公司治理结构。
第二条上市公司的治理结构应确保所有股东，特别是中小股东享有平等地位。
股东按其持有的股份享有平等的权利，并承担相应的义务。
第三条股东对法律、行政法规和公司章程规定的公司重大事项，享有知情权和参与权。
上市公司应建立和股东沟通的有效渠道。
第四条股东有权按照法律、行政法规的规定，通过民事诉讼或其他法律手段保护其合法权利。
股东大会、董事会的决议违反法律、行政法规的规定，侵犯股东合法权益，股东有权依法提起要求停止上述违法行为或侵害行为的诉讼。
董事、监事、经理执行职务时违反法律、行政法规或者公司章程的规定，给公司造成损害的，应承担赔偿责任。
股东有权要求公司依法提起要求赔偿的诉讼。
第二节股东大会的规范第五条上市公司应在公司章程中规定股东大会的召开和表决程序，包括通知、登记、提案的审议、投票、计票、表决结果的宣布、会议决议的形成、会议记录及其签署、公告等。
公司治理原则 2015 英文
公司治理原则 2015 英文ENGLISH ANSWER:Corporate Governance Principles 2015。
Key Principles.Board Leadership: The board of directors is ultimately responsible for the governance of the company. The board should be composed of independent directors who arequalified and experienced. The board should also be diverse and inclusive, reflecting the company's stakeholders.Board Oversight: The board of directors is responsible for overseeing the management of the company. This includes setting the company's strategy, approving major transactions, and monitoring the company's performance.Risk Management: The board of directors is responsible for managing the company's risks. This includes identifying,assessing, and mitigating risks that could harm the company.Internal Control: The company should have a system of internal controls to ensure that the company's assets are protected and that the company's financial information is accurate.Disclosure and Transparency: The company shoulddisclose all material information to its shareholders and other stakeholders. This includes information about the company's financial performance, its risks, and its governance practices.Stakeholder Engagement: The company should engage with its stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, and the community. This engagement should be open, transparent, and constructive.Benefits of Good Corporate Governance.Good corporate governance can provide a number of benefits to a company, including:Improved financial performance: Companies with good corporate governance tend to have better financial performance than companies with poor corporate governance.Reduced risk: Companies with good corporate governance are less likely to experience financial distress or other types of risk.Increased shareholder value: Companies with good corporate governance tend to have higher shareholder value than companies with poor corporate governance.Improved reputation: Companies with good corporate governance have a better reputation than companies with poor corporate governance.Greater trust: Companies with good corporate governance are more likely to be trusted by their stakeholders.Conclusion.Corporate governance is essential for the success of any company. Good corporate governance can provide a number of benefits, including improved financial performance, reduced risk, increased shareholder value, and improved reputation.CHINESE ANSWER:公司治理原则 2015。
上市公司治理准则中英文对照
上市公司治理准则中英文对照一、公司治理框架1.公司治理结构应包括董事会、监事会和高级管理层，确保公司的决策制定、执行和监督机制的有效运作。
2.公司治理结构应根据法律、法规和公司要求的独立性、公正性、透明度原则进行设计。
二、董事会1.董事会应由执行董事和非执行董事组成，确保董事会的多元化和独立性。
The board of directors shall consist of executive directors and non-executive directors, to ensure the diversity and independence of the board of directors.2.董事会应按照公司治理规定，定期召开会议，制定重大决策，并监督公司的运营情况。
三、监事会1.监事会应由独立监事和股东监事组成，监督公司的经营和财务状况，并行使法律规定的监督职责。
2.监事会应定期召开会议，审查公司的财务报告和内部控制制度，并发表意见和建议。
四、高级管理层1.高级管理层应遵守公司的治理规范，负责公司的日常经营管理和组织，向董事会和监事会报告工作。
2.高级管理层应具备良好的职业道德和管理能力，确保公司的长期发展和利益最大化。
五、信息披露1.公司应及时、准确、全面地披露与公司治理相关的信息，确保投资者对公司的了解和监督。
2.公司应建立健全信息披露制度，并公布信息披露政策，明确披露的内容和时间要求。
六、股东权益保护1.公司应保护股东的权益，尊重股东的知情权、参与权和监督权。
2.公司应公平对待股东，确保所有股东的利益得到平等对待。
七、合规与风险管理1.公司应建立健全的合规与风险管理制度，确保公司的合规运作和风险控制。
2.公司应对重大风险进行评估和控制，并定期披露风险相关信息。
总结：上市公司治理准则中英文对照的内容涵盖了公司治理结构、董事会、监事会、高级管理层、信息披露、股东权益保护以及合规与风险管理等方面，旨在规范上市公司的运作，保护投资者的权益，并提高公司的透明度和长期发展能力。
股份有限公司管理规范条例中英文对照
股份有限公司治理条例REGULATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT OFA COMPANY LIMITED BY SHARES股份有限公司治理条例Interpretation释义1．In these Regulations一、在本章程中“Act”means the Companies Act；“法规”（Act）指《公司法》；“seal”means the common seal of the company；“印鉴”指公司的通常印鉴；“secretary”means any person appointed to perform the duties of a secretary of the company；“书记员”（secretary）指任何被指派履行公司书记员职务的人；expressions referring to writing shall，unless the contrary intention appears，be construed as including references to printing，lithography，photography and other modes of representing or reproducing words in a visible form；如无相反旨意，书面表达形式应解释为包括铅印、版印、影印及其他以可见形式呈现或复制文字的模式；words or expressions contained in these Regulations shall be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of the Interpretation Act，and of the Act as in force at the date at which these Regulations become binding on the company．本章程所含的单词和词组应按《法律解释法》以及本章程对公司产生约束力之日有效的《公司法》的规定予以解释。
OECD公司治理准则partII(中英文对照)
OECD公司治理准则I.确保有效的公司治理框架基础Ensure the basis for Effective Corporate Governance公司治理框架应当提升透明、有效的市场，遵循法治原则，明确规定不同的监管、管理及执行权力之间的责任划分。
The corporate governance framework should promote transparent and efficient markets,be consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate the division of responsibilitiesamong different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authoritiesA、公司治理结构的发展应当着眼于其对经济的全面发展、市场的统一、为市场参与者所创造的动力和推动透明有效的市场的影响上。
The corporate governance framework should be developed with a view to its impact onoverall economic performance, market integrity and the incentives it creates for marketparticipants and the promotion of transparent and efficient markets.B、在一法域内，影响公司治理实践的法律和规章要求应当符合法治原则，且是透明的、可执行的。
The legal and regulatory requirements that affect corporate governance practices in ajurisdiction should be consistent with the rule of law, transparent and enforceableC、在一法域内，不同权力之间的职责划分应当予以明确规定，且应确保服务于公共利益。
OECD公司治理准则partII中英文对照
OECD公司治理准则partII(中英文对照)OECD公司治理准则I.确保有效的公司治理框架基础Ensure the basis for Effective Corporate Governance公司治理框架应当提升透明、有效的市场，遵循法治原则，明确规定不同的监管、管理及执行权力之间的责任划分。
The corporate governance framework should promote transparentand efficient markets, be consistent with the rule of law and clearlyarticulate the division of responsibilities among different supervisory,regulatory and enforcement authoritiesA、公司治理结构的发展应当着眼于其对经济的全面发展、市场的统一、为市场参与者所创造的动力和推动透明有效的市场的影响上。
The corporate governance framework should be developed with aview to its impact on overall economic performance, market integrityand the incentives it creates for market participants and thepromotion of transparent and efficient markets.B、在一法域内，影响公司治理实践的法律和规章要求应当符合法治原则，且是透明的、可执行的。
The legal and regulatory requirements that affect corporategovernance practices in a jurisdiction should be consistent with therule of law, transparent and enforceableC、在一法域内，不同权力之间的职责划分应当予以明确规定，且应确保服务于公共利益。
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上市公司治理准则中英文对照中文:导言为推动上市公司建立和完善现代企业制度,规范上市公司运作,促进我国证券市场健康发展,根据《公司法》、《证券法》及其它相关法律、法规确定的基本原则,并参照国外公司治理实践中普遍认同的标准,制订本准则。
本准则阐明了我国上市公司治理的基本原则、投资者权利保护的实现方式,以及上市公司董事、监事、经理等高级管理人员所应当遵循的基本的行为准则和职业道德等内容。
本准则适用于中国境内的上市公司。
上市公司改善公司治理,应当贯彻本准则所阐述的精神。
上市公司制定或者修改公司章程及治理细则,应当体现本准则所列明的内容。
本准则是评判上市公司是否具有良好的公司治理结构的主要衡量标准,对公司治理存在重大问题的上市公司,证券监管机构将责令其按照本准则的要求进行整改。
第一章股东与股东大会第一节股东权利第一条股东作为公司的所有者,享有法律、行政法规和公司章程规定的合法权利。
上市公司应建立能够确保股东充分行使权利的公司治理结构。
第二条上市公司的治理结构应确保所有股东,特别是中小股东享有平等地位。
股东按其持有的股份享有平等的权利，并承担相应的义务。
第三条股东对法律、行政法规和公司章程规定的公司重大事项,享有知情权和参与权。
上市公司应建立和股东沟通的有效渠道。
第四条股东有权按照法律、行政法规的规定，通过民事诉讼或其他法律手段保护其合法权利。
股东大会、董事会的决议违反法律、行政法规的规定,侵犯股东合法权益，股东有权依法提起要求停止上述违法行为或侵害行为的诉讼。
董事、监事、经理执行职务时违反法律、行政法规或者公司章程的规定，给公司造成损害的，应承担赔偿责任。
股东有权要求公司依法提起要求赔偿的诉讼。
第二节股东大会的规范第五条上市公司应在公司章程中规定股东大会的召开和表决程序,包括通知、登记、提案的审议、投票、计票、表决结果的宣布、会议决议的形成、会议记录及其签署、公告等。
第六条董事会应认真审议并安排股东大会审议事项。
股东大会应给予每个提案合理的讨论时间。
第七条上市公司应在公司章程中规定股东大会对董事会的授权原则，授权内容应明确具体。
第八条上市公司应在保证股东大会合法、有效的前提下，通过各种方式和途径，包括充分运用现代信息技术手段,扩大股东参与股东大会的比例。
股东大会时间、地点的选择应有利于让尽可能多的股东参加会议。
第九条股东既可以亲自到股东大会现场投票,也可以委托代理人代为投票，两者具有同样的法律效力。
第十条上市公司董事会、独立董事和符合有关条件的股东可向上市公司股东征集其在股东大会上的投票权。
投票权征集应采取无偿的方式进行,并应向被征集人充分披露信息。
第十一条机构投资者应在公司董事选任、经营者激励与监督、重大事项决策等方面发挥作用。
第三节关联交易第十二条上市公司与关联人之间的关联交易应签订书面协议。
协议的签订应当遵循平等、自愿、等价、有偿的原则，协议内容应明确、具体。
公司应将该协议的订立、变更、终止及履行情况等事项按照有关规定予以披露。
第十三条上市公司应采取有效措施防止关联人以垄断采购和销售业务渠道等方式干预公司的经营，损害公司利益。
关联交易活动应遵循商业原则, 关联交易的价格原则上应不偏离市场独立第三方的价格或收费的标准。
公司应对关联交易的定价依据予以充分披露。
第十四条上市公司的资产属于公司所有。
上市公司应采取有效措施防止股东及其关联方以各种形式占用或转移公司的资金、资产及其他资源。
上市公司不得为股东及其关联方提供担保。
第二章控股股东与上市公司第一节控股股东行为的规范第十五条控股股东对拟上市公司改制重组时应遵循先改制、后上市的原则，并注重建立合理制衡的股权结构。
第十六条控股股东对拟上市公司改制重组时应分离其社会职能，剥离非经营性资产,非经营性机构、福利性机构及其设施不得进入上市公司。
第十七条控股股东为上市公司主业服务的存续企业或机构可以按照专业化、市场化的原则改组为专业化公司,并根据商业原则与上市公司签订有关协议。
从事其他业务的存续企业应增强其独立发展的能力。
无继续经营能力的存续企业，应按有关法律、法规的规定，通过实施破产等途径退出市场。
企业重组时具备一定条件的，可以一次性分离其社会职能及分流富余人员，不保留存续企业。
第十八条控股股东应支持上市公司深化劳动、人事、分配制度改革，转换经营管理机制,建立管理人员竞聘上岗、能上能下,职工择优录用、能进能出,收入分配能增能减、有效激励的各项制度。
第十九条控股股东对上市公司及其他股东负有诚信义务。
控股股东对其所控股的上市公司应严格依法行使出资人的权利，控股股东不得利用资产重组等方式损害上市公司和其他股东的合法权益，不得利用其特殊地位谋取额外的利益。
第二十条控股股东对上市公司董事、监事候选人的提名，应严格遵循法律、法规和公司章程规定的条件和程序。
控股股东提名的董事、监事候选人应当具备相关专业知识和决策、监督能力。
控股股东不得对股东大会人事选举决议和董事会人事聘任决议履行任何批准手续;不得越过股东大会、董事会任免上市公司的高级管理人员。
第二十一条上市公司的重大决策应由股东大会和董事会依法作出。
控股股东不得直接或间接干预公司的决策及依法开展的生产经营活动，损害公司及其他股东的权益。
第二节上市公司的独立性第二十二条控股股东与上市公司应实行人员、资产、财务分开,机构、业务独立，各自独立核算、独立承担责任和风险。
第二十三条上市公司人员应独立于控股股东。
上市公司的经理人员、财务负责人、营销负责人和董事会秘书在控股股东单位不得担任除董事以外的其他职务。
控股股东高级管理人员兼任上市公司董事的,应保证有足够的时间和精力承担上市公司的工作。
第二十四条控股股东投入上市公司的资产应独立完整、权属清晰。
控股股东以非货币性资产出资的,应办理产权变更手续，明确界定该资产的范围。
上市公司应当对该资产独立登记、建帐、核算、管理。
控股股东不得占用、支配该资产或干预上市公司对该资产的经营管理。
第二十五条上市公司应按照有关法律、法规的要求建立健全的财务、会计管理制度，独立核算。
控股股东应尊重公司财务的独立性,不得干预公司的财务、会计活动。
第二十六条上市公司的董事会、监事会及其他内部机构应独立运作。
控股股东及其职能部门与上市公司及其职能部门之间没有上下级关系。
控股股东及其下属机构不得向上市公司及其下属机构下达任何有关上市公司经营的计划和指令，也不得以其他任何形式影响其经营管理的独立性。
第二十七条上市公司业务应完全独立于控股股东。
控股股东及其下属的其他单位不应从事与上市公司相同或相近的业务。
控股股东应采取有效措施避免同业竞争。
第三章董事与董事会第一节董事的选聘程序第二十八条上市公司应在公司章程中规定规范、透明的董事选聘程序,保证董事选聘公开、公平、公正、独立。
第二十九条上市公司应在股东大会召开前披露董事候选人的详细资料,保证股东在投票时对候选人有足够的了解。
第三十条董事候选人应在股东大会召开之前作出书面承诺,同意接受提名,承诺公开披露的董事候选人的资料真实、完整并保证当选后切实履行董事职责。
第三十一条在董事的选举过程中，应充分反映中小股东的意见。
股东大会在董事选举中应积极推行累积投票制度。
控股股东控股比例在30%以上的上市公司，应当采用累积投票制。
采用累积投票制度的上市公司应在公司章程里规定该制度的实施细则。
第三十二条上市公司应和董事签订聘任合同,明确公司和董事之间的权利义务、董事的任期、董事违反法律法规和公司章程的责任以及公司因故提前解除合同的补偿等内容。
第二节董事的义务第三十三条董事应根据公司和全体股东的最大利益，忠实、诚信、勤勉地履行职责。
第三十四条董事应保证有足够的时间和精力履行其应尽的职责。
第三十五条董事应以认真负责的态度出席董事会，对所议事项表达明确的意见。
董事确实无法亲自出席董事会的,可以书面形式委托其他董事按委托人的意愿代为投票,委托人应独立承担法律责任。
第三十六条董事应遵守有关法律、法规及公司章程的规定,严格遵守其公开作出的承诺。
第三十七条董事应积极参加有关培训,以了解作为董事的权利、义务和责任,熟悉有关法律法规, 掌握作为董事应具备的相关知识。
第三十八条董事会决议违反法律、法规和公司章程的规定,致使公司遭受损失的,参与决议的董事对公司承担赔偿责任。
但经证明在表决时曾表明异议并记载于会议记录的董事除外。
第三十九条经股东大会批准，上市公司可以为董事购买责任保险。
但董事因违反法律法规和公司章程规定而导致的责任除外。
第三节董事会的构成和职责第四十条董事会的人数及人员构成应符合有关法律、法规的要求，确保董事会能够进行富有成效的讨论,作出科学、迅速和谨慎的决策。
第四十一条董事会应具备合理的专业结构，其成员应具备履行职务所必需的的知识、技能和素质。
第四十二条董事会向股东大会负责。
上市公司治理结构应确保董事会能够按照法律、法规和公司章程的规定行使职权。
第四十三条董事会应认真履行有关法律、法规和公司章程规定的职责，确保公司遵守法律、法规和公司章程的规定,公平对待所有股东，并关注其他利益相关者的利益。
第四节董事会议事规则第四十四条上市公司应在公司章程中规定规范的董事会议事规则，确保董事会高效运作和科学决策。
第四十五条董事会应定期召开会议,并根据需要及时召开临时会议。
董事会会议应有事先拟定的议题。
第四十六条上市公司董事会会议应严格按照规定的程序进行。
董事会应按规定的时间事先通知所有董事，并提供足够的资料,包括会议议题的相关背景材料和有助于董事理解公司业务进展的信息和数据。
当2名或2名以上独立董事认为资料不充分或论证不明确时,可联名以书面形式向董事会提出延期召开董事会会议或延期审议该事项，董事会应予以采纳。
第四十七条董事会会议记录应完整、真实。
董事会秘书对会议所议事项要认真组织记录和整理。
出席会议的董事、董事会秘书和记录人应在会议记录上签名。
董事会会议记录应作为公司重要档案妥善保存，以作为日后明确董事责任的重要依据。
第四十八条董事会授权董事长在董事会闭会期间行使董事会部分职权的，上市公司应在公司章程中明确规定授权原则和授权内容，授权内容应当明确、具体。
凡涉及公司重大利益的事项应由董事会集体决策。
第五节独立董事制度第四十九条上市公司应按照有关规定建立独立董事制度。
独立董事应独立于所受聘的公司及其主要股东。
独立董事不得在上市公司担任除独立董事外的其他任何职务。
第五十条独立董事对公司及全体股东负有诚信与勤勉义务。
独立董事应按照相关法律、法规、公司章程的要求，认真履行职责，维护公司整体利益，尤其要关注中小股东的合法权益不受损害。
独立董事应独立履行职责,不受公司主要股东、实际控制人、以及其他与上市公司存在利害关系的单位或个人的影响。
第五十一条独立董事的任职条件、选举更换程序、职责等，应符合有关规定。