浙江大学2003 第8讲 交易费用与科斯定理
交易费用理论
交易费用理论一、学术论点:罗纳德·科斯指出：市场和企业都是两种不同的组织劳动分工的方式，企业产生的原因是企业组织劳动分工的交易费用低于市场组织劳动分工的费用。
一方面，企业作为一种交易形式，可以把若干个生产要素的所有者和产品的所有者组成一个单位参加市场交易，从而减少了交易者的数目和交易中摩擦，因而降低了交易成本；另一方面，在企业之内，市场交易被取消，伴随着市场交易的复杂结构被企业家所替代，企业家指挥生产，因此，企业替代了市场。
由此可见，无论是企业内部交易，还是市场交易，都存在着不同的交易费用；而企业替代市场，是因为通过企业交易而形成的交易费用比通过市场交易而形成的交易费用低。
二、交易费:是指企业用于寻找交易对象、订立合同、执行交易、洽谈交易、监督交易等方面的费用与支出，主要由搜索成本、谈判成本、签约成本与监督成本构成。
企业运用收购、兼并、重组等资本运营方式，可以将市场内部化，消除由于市场的不确定性所带来的风险，从而降低交易费用。
科斯的这一思想为产权理论奠定了坚实的基础。
三、假设结论交易费用经济学认为：有限理性、机会主义、不确定性、小数目条件使得市场交易费用高昂，为了节省这种交易费用，代替市场的新的交易形式应运而生，这就是企业，而企业的不同组织结构也是为了交易费用节省的必然结果。
基本结论交易费用经济学包含以下几点基本结论：（1）市场和企业虽可相互替代，却是不相同的交易机制。
人类行为和交易费用的理论基础——制度理论因而企业可以取代市场实现交易。
（2）企业取代市场实现交易有可能减少交易的费用。
（3）市场交易费用的存在决定了企业的存在。
（4）企业“内化”市场交易的同时产生额外的管理费用。
当管理费用的增加与市场交易费用节省的数量相当时，企业的边界趋于平衡（不再增长扩大）。
（5）现代交易费用理论认为交易费用的存在及企业节省交易费用的努力是资本主义企业结构演变的唯一动力。
理论区分交易费用理论仔细区分了市场交易和企业内部交易。
科斯与交易费用
公共产品中的产权安排与效率
公共产品的特点：非排他性和非竞争性 科斯对灯塔制度的研究：说明了私人产权
的作用，也说明了私人经营的效率比由 政府一般课税资助的效率高
制度变迁的动力
制度变迁的诱致因素在于主体期望获取最大的潜 在利润，外部利润内在化的过程就是制度变迁 和制度创新的过程。外部利润来源的四个方面： 1·由规模经济带来的利润；2·外部经济内部化 带来的利润；3·克服对风险的厌恶；4·降低交 易费用带来的利
边际（增量）分析 1960年 《社会成本问题》 2·市场交易费用：寻找价格的费用、识别产品部
件的信息费用、考核费用、贡献测度费用
交易费用的定义
• 威廉姆森认为交易费用分为两部分：一是事先 的交易费用，即为签定契约、规定交易双方的 权力、责任等所花费的费用；二是签定契约后 为解决契约本身所存在的问题、从改变条款到 退出契约所花费的费用。交易费用概念还扩展 到包括度量、界定和保证产权（即提供交易条 件）的费用，发现交易对象和交易价格的费用， 监督违约行为并对之制裁的费用，维护交易秩 序的费用等等。
• 科斯所创立的经济学被称为新制度经济学，之 所以被称为“新”是因为相对于以凡勃伦和加 尔布雷斯为代表的制度学派而言，它完全沿用 和承袭了新古典经济学的核心假定、方法和工 具，如理性人假定、稳定偏好和均衡或最大化 分析，在新古典的范式里重新研究和估价资源 配置所依赖的制度条件，将传统理论设定为已 知不变的参数――产权制度、交易费用、经济 组织视为亟待解释的关键性变量。
• 阿罗认为交易费用是经济制度的运行费用，从 而使交易费用概念更具有了一般性。
交易费用理论的发展
科斯定理Coase Theorem
科斯定理（Coase Theorem）目录• 1 什么是科斯定理？• 2 科斯定理的构成• 3 科斯定理的精华• 4 科斯定理的前提条件• 5 科斯定理的不足[1]• 6 科斯定理的实际应用[2]•7 科斯定理的案例分析•8 案例一：科斯定理在水环境保护的应用[3]•9 参考文献什么是科斯定理？科斯定理是由诺贝尔经济学奖得主罗纳德·哈里·科斯(Ronald H. Coase)命名。
他于1937年和1960年分别发表了《厂商的性质》和《社会成本问题》两篇论文，这两篇文章中的论点后来被人们命名为著名的“科斯定理是产权经济学研究的基础，其核心内容是关于交易费用的论断。
科斯定理的基本含义是科斯在1960年《社会成本问题》一文中表达的，而“科斯定理”这个术语是乔治·史提格勒(George Stigler)1966年首次使用的。
科斯定理较为通俗的解释是：“在交易费用为零和对产权充分界定并加以实施的条件下，外部性因素不会引起资源的不当配置。
因为在此场合，当事人（外部性因素的生产者和消费者）将受一种市场里的驱使去就互惠互利的交易进行谈判，也就是说，是外部性因素内部化。
”也有人认为科斯定理是由两个定理组成的。
科斯第一定理即为史提格勒的表述：如果市场交易成本为零，不管权利初始安排如何，市场机制会自动使资源配置达到帕累托最优。
在交易成本大于零的现实世界，科斯第二定理可以表述为：一旦考虑到市场交易的成本，合法权利的初始界定以及经济组织形式的选择将会对资源配置效率产生影响。
科斯定理的构成科斯定理由三组定理构成。
科斯第一定理的内容是：如果交易费用为零，不管产权初始如何安排，当事人之间的谈判都会导致那些财富最大化的安排，即市场机制会自动达到帕雷托最优。
如果科斯第一定理成立，那么它所揭示的经济现象就是：在大千世界中，任何经济活动的效益总是最好的，任何工作的效率都是最高的，任何原始形成的产权制度安排总是最有效的，因为任何交易的费用都是零，人们自然会在内在利益的驱动下，自动实现经济资源的最优配置，因而，产权制度没有必要存在，更谈不上产权制度的优劣。
交易费用理论
• 3、忽视生产费用对企业规模的影响
• 广义的“生产”就是指人们的经济活动，它不仅包括 人们把各种生产要素转化成产品或劳务的过程，也包括交 换、分配和消费(劳动力的生产)。而狭义的“生产”特指 人运用各种资源或生产要素生产产品的技术转化过程，是 人与自然或物的结合和转化关系。科斯等人，是将“交易” 与“生产”并列起来加以分析的，他们所指的“生产”是 狭义的生产，即人与物或生产要素的技术关系。与之相对 的“交易”即是人与人之间的关系。 • 科斯是彻底忽视，威廉姆森认为无足轻重（P180）， 即威廉姆森认为企业的产生主要是因为交易费用的存在。
• （三）交易费用理论的运用
三、交易费用理论的缺陷
（一）“交易费用”范畴与它在理论体系中的 地位不相称
表现在三个方面：1、外延不确定。指在特定产权 制度下完成特定交易的不同的费用项目，如信息费用、 谈判费用、签约费用等难以确定；2、难以计量；3、 产生原因的分析不彻底。 所以作为基本的和核心的理论范畴——“交易费用” 缺乏严格的、标准的外延界定和计量，以及产生原因 都没有彻底阐述，所以其难以承担在新制度经济学理 论体系中的使命。
c、如果交易费用为零，企业则不会出现，这是一个 无法论证而又没有意义的命题。 d、既然企业是取代市场的替代物，那么必然与市场 存在此消彼长的态势，而事实并非如此。 e、市场是先验存在的，与新古典犯同样的错误。
2、将交易费用视为企业规模变动的唯一要素
尽管科斯等的所谓企业规模的扩大，较多制纵 向和横向的扩大，并不是积累式的扩大。（P175） 交易费用应该对市场中的每个企业是一样的， 如果一个企业的交易费用低与另一个企业，那么肯 定是交易费用以外的因素（科技进步、管理改善、 企业资本额等）导致了交易费用的降低，那么科斯 的观点就是错误的。
交易费用理论综述
交易费用理论综述交易费用，是新制度经济学的核心概念，新制度经济学与西方新古典经济学的根本区别就是承认存在有正的交易费用。
自科斯开创性地《企业的性质》一文中首次引入经济学，便受到学术界的广泛关注和发展。
但是争论之声一直都未停息，争论的焦点有二：（1）交易费用的定义问题，（2）交易费用的测量问题。
1.费用的概念1.1交易成本的内涵到目前为止，经济学家从不同角度对交易费用进行了定义。
科斯在《企业的性质》中指出使用价格机制是有代价的。
后来他在《社会成本问题》中详加阐述。
虽然科斯把交易费用引入经济学，但是阿罗首次提出“交易费用”这一名词，并定义为：市场机制运行的费用，把交易费用的定义扩展到所有市场经济组织的范围，并认为由于市场机制的不完全，使交易运作产生了费用。
威廉姆森认为交易成本是经济系统运转所要付出的代价和费用。
诺斯将交易费用定以为包含经济从贸易中获取的政治和经济组织的所有成本；张五常认为交易费用是在“鲁滨逊·克鲁索”经济中不存在的成本，包括了一切不直接发生在物质生产过程中的成本；巴泽尔将交易费用定义为转让、获取和保护产权有关的成本；埃格特森则认为，交易费用是个人交换他们对于经济资产的所有权和确立他们的排他性权利的费用。
1.2交易成本的外延科斯在《企业的性质》中认为交易费用至少包括三部分：（1）发现相对价格的工作；（2）谈判和签约费用；（3）其他方面的不利因素。
威廉姆森在1985年將交易费用区分“事前”交易成本和“事后”交易成本。
“事前”交易费用是指草拟合同、就合同内容进行谈判以及确保合同得以实施所付出的代价。
“事后”交易成本主要指：（1）由于交易行为偏离合作方向而带来的双方不适应成本；（2）讨价还价成本；（3）为解决合同纠纷而建立的治理结构费用；（4）为保证各种承诺得以兑现所支付的那种成本。
2.交易费用的测量对世界各国的学者对交易费用定义，不外乎就是在内涵和外延上的界定；而对交易费用的测量，又不外乎在宏观和微观上的测量。
交易费用和科斯定理
TRANSACTION COSTS AND THE ROBUSTNESS OF THECOASE THEOREM*Luca Anderlini and Leonardo FelliThis paper explores the extent to which ex ante transaction costs may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem.In particular we identify the basic Ôhold-up problem Õthat arises whenever the parties to a Coasian negotiation have to pay ex ante costs for the negotiation to take place.We then show that a ÔCoasian solution Õto this problem is not available:a Coasian solution typically entails a negotiation about the payment of the costs associated with the future negotiation,which in turn is associated with a fresh set of ex ante costs,and hence a new hold-up problem.The Coase theorem (Coase,1960)has had a profound influence on the way economists and legal scholars think about inefficiencies .It guarantees that provided that property rights are allocated,fully informed rational agents involved in an inefficient situation will ensure through negotiation that there are no unexploited gains from trade and hence an efficient outcome obtains.In its strongest formulation,the Coase theorem is interpreted as guaranteeing an efficient outcome regardless of the Ôway in which property rights are assigned Õ(Nicholson,1989,p.725)and whenever the potential mutual gains Ôexceed [the]necessary bargaining costs Õ(Nicholson,1989,p.726).1The predictions entailed by the stronger version of the Coase theorem are startling.Whenever property rights are allocated,we should observe only outcomes that are constrained efficient in the sense that all potential gains from trade (net of transaction costs)are exploited.This clearly contradicts even the most casual observation of empirical facts.There are many obvious instances of situations in which Pareto improving negotiation opportunities are available,but are left unexploited by the parties involved.2If we were to believe the predictions of the Ôstrong ÕCoase theorem,all these apparent inefficiencies would not be real inefficiencies at all.They should simply *We are grateful to one of the Editors of this J ournal ,David de Meza,and to two anonymous referees for extremely useful feedback.An early version of this paper was circulated as a working paper entitled ÔCostly Coasian Contracts Õ(Anderlini and Felli,1998).Revisions and further work were com-pleted while Leonardo Felli was visiting the Department of Economics at the University of Pennsylvania and the Department of Economics of the Stern School of Business at NYU.Their generous hospitality is gratefully acknowledged.Both authors thank the ESRC (Grant R000237825)for financial support.We are also grateful to Ian Gale and to seminar participants at the ISER 2000in Siena for stimulating comments.This paper was submitted before Leonardo Felli was invited to become an editor of the Journal and accepted for publication by the previous editorial board.1This stronger version of the Coase theorem does not correspond to what is claimed in Coase (1960),but it is an interpretation of it that is sufficiently common to have found its way into basic micro-economic text-books such as the one quoted above.2Of course,we are not claiming that these observed inefficiencies can necessarily be traced to the sources we identify in our analysis below.In many cases a simple appeal to Ôirrational expectations Õsuffices to explain observed failures to exploit potential gains from trade.See our discussion of some anecdotal evidence that we believe fits our model well in Section 2below.The Economic Journal ,116(January ),223–245.ÓRoyal Economic Society 2006.Published by Blackwell Publishing,9600Garsington Road,Oxford OX42DQ,UK and 350Main Street,Malden,MA 02148,USA.[223]be viewed as the result of transaction costs that are Ôhigh Õrelative to the potential gains from trade.We take the view that this is not a satisfactory explanation of these observed facts.Our aim in this article is to take issue with this strong version of the Coase theorem and show that the impact of transaction costs can extend over and above their size relative to the potential gains from trade.This stems from the strategic role that transaction costs may play in a Coasian negotiation.It turns out that a key factor in determining the strategic role of transaction costs is whether they are payable ex ante or ex post ;after the negotiation concerning the distribution of the unexploited gains from trade takes place.We show that in the presence of ex ante transaction costs a constrained inefficient outcome may obtain.In Anderlini and Felli (2001a )(henceforth AF)we introduce ex ante costs in each round of an alternating offers bargaining model (Rubinstein,1982).In each period,both the proposer and the responder must pay a cost for the negotiation to proceed.If either player declines to pay,the current round of offer and response is cancelled and play moves on to the next round.In that article we show that it is always an equilibrium for both players never to pay the ex ante costs and hence never to agree on a division of the potential surplus,although the sum of the ex ante costs is strictly lower than the surplus itself.Moreover,we show that this is the unique equilibrium outcome in both the fol-lowing cases:(1)If the sum of the ex ante costs is not Ôtoo low Õ(but still less than the availablesurplus)and/or the distribution of these costs across the players is suffi-ciently asymmetric,and(2)If we impose that the equilibrium must be robust to the possibility that theplayers might find a way to renegotiate out of future inefficiencies.3Thus,in AF we show that when the distribution of surplus across contracting parties is endogenous (it is the outcome of the bargaining –if it ever takes place),transaction costs that are payable ex ante can have a devastating effect on efficiency.In this article,we take it as given that if the negotiating stage is reached an agreement will result and,for simplicity,we take as (parametrically)given the parties Õshares of surplus in this agreement.We then introduce transaction costs that are payable ex ante :the negotiation stage is reached only if these costs are paid.We find that for some combinations of bargaining power (determining surplus shares)and ex ante costs adding up to less than the available surplus,no agreement will take place because the costs will not be paid.A natural further question follows at this point.Suppose that we allow the parties to negotiate some compensating transfers before the ex ante costs are payable.In3In AF we actually propose a modification of the extensive form that is meant to capture the requirement of renegotiation-proofness.This is because,there,we take the view that Ôblack-box Õrene-gotiation is not an appropriate modelling ingredient in a model of the actual negotiation between players.224[J A N U A R Y T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L ÓRoyal Economic Society 2006other words,suppose that we endow the parties with the possibility of undoing the effects of the ex ante transaction costs in a Coasian way ahead of time.Is it then the case that the inefficiencies we found will disappear?The answer we obtain is Ôno Õ,provided that the negotiation of the compensating transfers is itself associated with a fresh set of ex ante transaction costs,regardless of how small these new costs are .Proceeding with a simple stripped-down model of the negotiating phase (in essence a single parameter between 0and 1)has a two-fold advantage.First of all,it safely allows us to abstract from the problem analysed in AF,so that we know that the efficiency failures that we find here come from a different source than the one pinpointed there.Secondly,it allows us to check the robustness of our results to some basic changes in the way ex ante costs are payable,keeping the analysis at a very tractable level.In particular,below we show that our results are Ôpervasive Õin the sense that they survive when it is enough that one party pays,and when the ex ante costs are modelled as Ôstrategic complements Õ.We begin our analysis with a brief review of the related literature (Section 1)and a discussion of the possible interpretations of the ex ante transaction costs (Section2).We then proceed in Section 3to present the simplest possible model of the basic hold-up problem associated with a surplus-enhancing negotiation.This problem is analysed in the case in which the ex ante costs associated with the Coasian negotiation are either complements or substitutes.In Section 4we address the question of whether a Coasian solution to our basic hold-up problem is plausible.We do this by analysing the possibility of a negotiated transfer from one party to the other before the payment of the transaction costs that are at the origin of the hold-up problem.In Section 5we look at how the allocation of property rights may or may not alleviate the inefficiencies stemming from ex ante transaction costs.Section 6offers some concluding remarks.To ease the exposition,we have relegated all proofs to the Appendix.1.Related LiteratureWhat has become known as the Coase theorem (Coase,1960)assumes the absence of transaction costs or other frictions in the bargaining process.Coase (1960)himself does provide an extensive discussion of the role of transaction costs.4Indeed,Coase (1992)describes the result as provocative and intended to show how unrealistic is the world without transaction costs.Here and in AF,we go further by identifying the strategic role played by ex ante transaction costs (as opposed,for instance,to transaction costs that are payable ex post )which may lead to an outcome that is constrained inefficient .The source of inefficiencies in this article is a version of the Ôhold-up problem Õ(Grout,1984;Grossman and Hart,1986;Hart and Moore,1988,among many others).The problem is particularly acute in our setting since it may be impossible for the negotiating parties to find a ÔCoasian solution Õto this hold-up problem.Closely linked to the literature on the hold-up problem is the literature on the4de Meza (1988)provides an extensive survey of the literature on the Coase theorem,including an outline of its history and possible interpretations.2006]225T R A N S A C T I O N C O S T S A N D T H E C O A S E T H E O R E M ÓRoyal Economic Society 2006effects of the allocation of property rights when contracts are incomplete (Grossman and Hart,1986;Hart and Moore,1990;Chiu,1998;de Meza and Lockwood,1998;Rajan and Zingales,1998,among many others).It turns out that the effects of the allocation of property rights on the version of the hold-up problem we analyse here depends on how the parties Õoutside options affect the division of surplus.We devote Section 5below entirely to this point.We are certainly not the first to point out that the Coase theorem no longer holds when there are frictions in the negotiation process.There is a vast literature on bargaining models where the frictions take the form of incomplete and asymmetric information.With incomplete information,efficient agreements often cannot be reached and delays in bargaining may obtain.5By contrast,the reduced form negotiation that we consider in our analysis is one of complete information.The source of inefficiencies in this article can therefore be traced directly to the presence of transaction costs.Dixit and Olson (2000)are concerned with a classical Coasian public good problem in which they explicitly model the agents Õex ante (possibly costly)decisions of whether to participate or not in the bargaining process.In their setting they find both efficient and inefficient equilibria as opposed to the unique constrained inefficient equilibrium we derive in our setting.They also highlight the inefficiency of the symmetric (mixed-strategy)equilibria of their model.2.Ex Ante Transaction CostsWe are concerned with Coasian negotiations in which the parties have to incur some ex ante transaction costs,before they reach the stage in which the actual negotiation occurs.The interpretation of these ex ante transaction costs which we favour is that of time spent Ôpreparing Õfor the Coasian negotiation.Typically,a variety of tasks need to be carried out by the parties involved before the actual negotiation begins.In those cases in which the negotiation of an agreement contingent on a state of nature is concerned,both parties need to conceive of,and agree upon,a suitable language to describe the possible realisations of the state of nature precisely.The parties also need to collect and analyse information about the Ôlegal environment Õin which the agreement will be embedded.For instance,in different countries the same agreement will need to be drawn-up differently to make it legally enforce-able.In virtually all settings in which a negotiation is required,the parties need to spend time arranging a way to Ômeet Õand they need to Ôearmark Õsome of their time schedules for the actual meeting.In many cases,before a meaningful negotiation can start,the parties will need to collect and analyse background information that may be relevant to their under-standing of the actual trading opportunities.These activities may range from5See Muthoo (1999)for an up-to-date coverage as well as extensive references on this strand of literature and other issues in bargaining theory.226[J A N U A R Y T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L ÓRoyal Economic Society 2006collecting information about (for instance the creditworthiness of)the other party,to actual Ôthinking Õor Ôcomplexity Õcosts incurred to understand the nego-tiation problem.We view this type of ex ante transaction costs as both relevant and important for the type of effects which we identify in our analysis below.However,it should be emphasised that our model does not directly apply to this type of costs.This is because in our model the size of the gains from trade is fixed and known to the parties.On the other hand,the lack of information and/or understanding of the negotiation setting that we have just described,would clearly make the size of the surplus uncertain for the parties involved.We have not considered the case of uncertain surplus for reasons of space and analytical convenience.However,we conjecture that the general flavour of our results generalises to this case.Where does one look for evidence of transactions that never took place because of ex ante costs?This is obviously no easy endeavour,aside perhaps from small things like not inspecting a used car because the negotiation can only take place after sinking the cost of travelling to where the car is kept.There is a well known colourful story –an anecdotal piece of evidence –that,in our view,fits the bill well enough to be mentioned here.6In 1980,IBM (then the unchallenged dominant player in the computer industry)decided to enter the market for Personal Computers.IBM did not have an operating sys-tem for PCs.To acquire an operating system from an outside source they sent a delegation to visit the offices of Microsoft to negotiate.At the time,however,Microsoft did not own an operating system either,and so they referred the visitors from IBM to a small company –Intergalactic Digital Research –that had a working operating system for PCs.The surprise match between IBM and Digital Research never reached the actual negotiation stage.The founder of Digital Research (Gary Kildall)refused to meet with the IBM delegation be-cause he had Ôother plans Õ.His wife (Dorothy Kildall)met with the represent-atives of IBM but refused their request to sign a non-disclosure agreement.Eventually,the IBM representatives left without any negotiation concerning the actual deal having taken place.The interpretation of events in line with our main point in this paper is clear.If the negotiating stage had been reached,IBM’s bargaining power would have been extreme.As a result Digital Research did not pay the ex ante costs necessary to reach the actual negotiation stage:Gary Kildall decided that his time was better employed elsewhere and Dorothy Kildall was put off by the non-disclosure agreement,a likely signal of the length and complexity of the negotiation to come,as well as a possible direct liability.The inefficiency of the outcome reached is6The story was the subject of a documentary series aired in 1996by PBS television stations in the US.The documentary was entitled Triumph of the Nerds:The Rise of Accidental Empires.The transcripts can be found at /nerds/.The documentary series was in turn based on Cringely (1992).The basic facts summarised here seem to be reasonably uncontroversial.However,it should also be pointed out that the story is so widely known that differing interpretations and versions of some of its details can be found in copious amounts on the World Wide Web.These include disputed accounts of a subsequent meeting between Gary Kildall of Digital Research and IBM.If this meeting did take place,clearly it did not generate an operative deal.Of course,the interpretation of the facts that we give is our own.2006]227T R A N S A C T I O N C O S T S A N D T H E C O A S E T H E O R E M ÓRoyal Economic Society 2006apparent:ownership of the dominant operating system for PCs turned out to be worth tens of billions of dollars in the following two decades alone.7We conclude this Section with an observation.In many cases the parties to a negotiation will have the opportunity to delegate to outsiders many of the tasks that we have mentioned as sources of ex ante transaction costs.The most common example of this is the hiring of lawyers.Abstracting from agency problems (be-tween the negotiating party/principal and the lawyer/agent),which are likely to increase the ex ante costs anyway,our analysis applies,unchanged,to the case in which the ex ante transaction costs that we have described are payable to an agent.3.The Basic Hold-up ProblemWe focus on three basic cases in which the presence of ex ante transaction costs generates the hold-up problem we have outlined informally above.The three cases we pursue in detail are chosen with a two-fold objective in mind.First of all they are the simplest models that suffice to put across the main point.Second,the range of cases they cover is meant to convey the fact that the ineffi-ciency we find is Ôpervasive Õin the sense that it obtains in a whole variety of extensive forms.In Anderlini and Felli (2001b )we show that the basic hold-up problem identified here survives when we allow transaction costs to be continuous as opposed to the binary choice considered here.3.1.Perfect ComplementsConsider two agents,called A and B ,who face a ÔCoasian Õopportunity to realise some gains from trade.Without loss of generality we normalise to one the size of the surplus realised if an agreement is reached.We also set the parties Õpayoffs in the case of disagreement to be equal to zero.In the first two cases we look at,once the negotiating phase is reached the division of surplus between the two agents is exogenously given and cannot be changed by the agents.8Let k 2[0,1]be the share of the surplus that accrues to agent A if the parties engage in the negotiation and 1Àk the share of the surplus that accrues to B .For the negotiation to start,each agent has to pay a given ex ante transaction cost .In other words,the agents reach the negotiating phase only if they both pay a7The enormity of the value of the missed transaction raises an obvious question:were Digital Re-search simply Ôdumb Õas some of the characters involved seem to suggest in the transcripts of the documentary cited above?(see footnote 6).Our reply is two-fold.First,the value of the failed trans-action was surely highly uncertain at the time.To measure it with its realised value more than 20years later does not seem correct.Second,the realised value of the failed transaction is measured by the subsequent success of Microsoft.However,while Microsoft did supply IBM with an operating system for PCs soon after the events we have described,they did not sell it,but rather they licensed it to IBM.Microsoft concluded a deal with IBM using a contractual device that,as it turns out,shifted the division of surplus dramatically in its favour.8See our introduction for a discussion of AF where the division of surplus is endogenously deter-mined by the model.228[J A N U A R Y T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L ÓRoyal Economic Society 2006certain amount before the negotiation begins.9These costs should be thought of as representing a combination of the activities necessary for the gains from trade to materialise which we discussed in some detail in Section 2.Let c A >0and c B >0be the two agents Õex ante costs.Clearly,if c A þc B >1then the two agents will never reach the negotiation stage that yields the unit surplus.Clearly,neither would a social planner since the total cost of the negotiation exceeds the surplus which it yields.We are interested in the case in which it would be socially efficient for the two agents to negotiate an agreement.Our first assumption guarantees that this is the case.Assumption 1:The surplus that the negotiation yields exceeds the total ex ante costs that are payable for the negotiation to occur.In other words c A þc B <1.Our two agents play a two-stage game.In period t ¼0they both simultaneously and independently decide whether to pay their ex ante cost.An agreement yielding a surplus of size one at t ¼1is feasible only if both agents pay their ex ante costs at t ¼0.10The game at t ¼1is a simple Ôblack box Õ,yielding payoffs of k to A and 1Àk to B .If one or both agents do not pay their ex ante costs at t ¼0,the game at t ¼1is trivial:the negotiation that yields the unit surplus is not feasible;the agents have no actions to take and they both receive a payoff of zero.Throughout the article,unless otherwise stated,by equilibrium we mean a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game at hand.The normal form that corres-ponds to the two-stage game we have just described is depicted in Figure 1.From this it is immediate to derive our first Proposition,which therefore is stated without proof.Proposition 1:If either c A >k or c B >1Àk the unique equilibrium of the two-stage game represented in Figure 1has neither agent paying the ex ante cost and therefore yields the no-agreement outcome.We view Proposition 1as implying that in the presence of ex ante transaction costs,if the distribution of ex ante costs across the parties is sufficiently Ômis-matched Õwith the distribution of surplus,then the ex ante costs will generate a version of the hold-up problem which will induce the agents not to negotiate an agreement even though it would be socially efficient to do so.9Notice therefore that we are implicitly assuming that the agents have some endowments of resources out of which the ex ante costs can be paid.10Notice that we are therefore assuming that the two agents Õex ante costs are perfect complements in the Ôtechnology Õthat determines whether the surplus-generating negotiation is feasible or not.We examine the cases of perfect substitutes,and of strategic complements in Subsections 3.2and 3.3below respectively.2006]229T R A N S A C T I O N C O S T S A N D T H E C O A S E T H E O R E M ÓRoyal Economic Society 2006The intuition behind Proposition 1is simple enough.If negotiating an agree-ment involves some costs that are payable ex ante ,the share of the surplus accruing to each party will not depend,in equilibrium,on whether the ex ante costs are paid.Therefore,the parties will pay the costs only if the distribution of the surplus generated by the negotiation will allow them to recoup the cost ex post .If the distribution of surplus and that of ex ante costs are sufficiently Ômis-matched Õ,then one of the agents will not be able to recoup the ex ante cost.In this case,an agreement will not be reached,even though it would generate a total surplus large enough to cover the ex ante costs of both agents.As a polar benchmark,consider the alternative setup in which both parties can pay the costs c A and c B after the negotiation has occurred and an agreement is reached.In other words the transaction costs can be paid ex post rather than ex ante .11In this case the extensive form of the game is equivalent to a simple negotiation in which the size of the gains from trade is 1Àc A Àc B .The assumption we made on the black-box negotiation implies that in this case the two parties do indeed reach an agreement.Party A receives the share of surplus k (1Àc A Àc B )while party B receives the share (1Àk )(1Àc A Àc B ).In other words when transaction costs can be paid ex post the strong version of the Coase Theorem holds and a constrained efficient outcome is guaranteed.We conclude this subsection with two observations.First of all,the simultaneity in the payment of the ex ante costs is not essential to Proposition 1.The result applies to the case in which the ex ante costs are payable sequentially by the two agents before the actual negotiation begins.Second,while the model has a unique equilibrium for the parameter configu-rations identified in Proposition 1,it has multiple equilibria whenever this pro-position does not apply.It is clear that,whenever both k >c A and (1Àk )>c B ,the model has two equilibria.One in which the ex ante costs are paid and an agreement is reached,and another in which neither agent pays the ex ante costs simply because he expects the other agent not to pay his cost either.The equi-librium in which the agreement is reached strictly Pareto-dominates the no-agreement equilibrium.Clearly,the multiplicity of equilibria disappears if the costs are payable sequentially.The latter observation will become relevant again in Section 4below.3.2.Perfect SubstitutesWe now turn to our second simple model.The next Proposition tells us that when the agents Õex ante costs are perfect substitutes our constrained inefficiency result of Subsection 3.1still holds,although the inefficiency may take a different form.The intuition behind the next results is straightforward.In an environment in which the ex ante costs may be paid by either agent the negotiation leads to a constrained efficient outcome if at least one of the two ex ante costs is smaller than the size of the surplus.It is then easy to envisage a situation in which the share of11These ex post costs could,for example,be associated with registering the agreement with the relevant authorities.230[J A N U A R Y T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L ÓRoyal Economic Society 2006the surplus accruing to each agent is strictly smaller than his ex ante costs although there is enough surplus to cover the smallest of these costs.In this case,in equi-librium,the parties will not reach an agreement although it would be socially efficient to do so.When the ex ante costs are perfect substitutes,a new type of inefficiency can also arise in equilibrium.In particular,it is possible that the agents reach an agree-ment,but the equilibrium involves the highest of the two ex ante costs being paid.Formally,when the ex ante costs are perfect substitutes Assumption 1needs to be modified.Assumption 2below identifies the range of ex ante costs that guarantee that negotiating an agreement is socially efficient in this case.Assumption 2.The surplus that the agreement yields exceeds the minimum ex ante cost payable for the negotiation to become feasible.In other words min f c A ,c B g <1.Without loss of generality (up to a re-labelling of agents )let c A c B .Hence c A <1.Consider now the model with ex ante transaction costs that are perfect substitutes and let Assumption 2above hold.The normal form corresponding to the new two-stage game is depicted in Figure 2.As we mentioned above,the inefficiency generated by the ex ante costs can now take two forms,which our next proposition identifies.As before,it is stated without proof since it is immediate from the payoffs in Figure 2.Proposition 2.If 1>c A >k and c B >1Àk the only equilibrium of the two-stage game represented in Figure 2has neither agent paying the ex ante cost,and therefore yields the no-agreement outcome.If instead 1>c A >k and c B <1Àk then the only equilibrium of the two-stage game represented in Figure 2has agent A not paying the ex ante cost c A ,and B paying the ex ante cost c B >c A .3.3.Strategic ComplementsOur goal in this subsection is to show that the analogue of Proposition 1holds when the ex ante costs are technologically perfect substitutes but are Ôstrategic complements Õin the game-theoretic sense.12We conjecture that this is true more generally but limit our formal analysis to a simple model closely related to the previous two.12Intuitively,two decision variables are strategic complements if an increase in one induces an increase in the optimal choice (the Ôbest response Õof the opposing player)of the other.See Fudenberg and Tirole (1996,ch.12).2006]231T R A N S A C T I O N C O S T S A N D T H E C O A S E T H E O R E M ÓRoyal Economic Society 2006。
科斯定理中文版
科斯定理中文版全文共四篇示例，供读者参考第一篇示例：科斯定理，又称为交易成本理论，是由诺贝尔经济学奖得主罗纳德·科斯提出的经济理论。
科斯定理的核心思想是，企业内外部组织的选择会受到交易成本的影响。
科斯定理在经济学领域的影响力非常巨大，被认为是塑造了现代产权经济学的基石之一。
科斯定理的提出，源于对企业内外部组织形式的思考。
在传统的经济学理论中，企业内部组织和市场交易是两种不同的经济组织形式。
企业内部组织是由企业拥有者或管理者通过内部协调和管理实现生产活动，而市场交易则是通过市场机制来实现。
在现实世界中，企业内外部组织有时会发生转换，即企业内的某些生产活动可能转移到市场上进行，而企业外的某些生产活动也可能被吸收到企业内部。
科斯定理就是对这种企业内外部组织转换背后的因果关系进行解释的理论。
科斯由于他的研究《The Nature of the Firm》（企业的本质）揭示了企业内外部组织之间的交易成本问题而著名。
科斯认为，企业内外部组织形式的选择取决于两种成本：交易成本和管理成本。
交易成本主要包括信息搜索成本、谈判成本、合同签订成本、监督成本等。
管理成本是企业内部协调和管理生产活动所需的成本。
科斯的核心观点是，企业内外部组织形式的选择取决于这两种成本之间的比较。
当企业内部组织成本低于市场交易成本时，企业就倾向于采用内部组织形式来组织生产活动；反之，当企业内部组织成本高于市场交易成本时，企业就倾向于采用市场交易形式来组织生产活动。
科斯定理正是用这种方式解释企业内外部组织形式的选择逻辑。
科斯定理的一个重要应用领域是产权经济学。
在传统的经济理论中，资源配置问题通常被认为与私有产权密切相关，私有产权可以有效地激励资源的有效配置。
科斯定理指出，私有产权并非是资源配置的唯一途径，企业内外部组织形式的选择同样可以影响资源的配置效率。
科斯定理认为，企业内外部组织形式的选择会受到交易成本的影响，在资源配置的过程中，要综合考虑企业内外部组织形式和产权制度之间的关系。
交易费用——精选推荐
交易费⽤理解交易费⽤⼀、交易费⽤的提出“交易”这⼀概念最早是美国制度经济学家康芒斯提出的，康芒斯不满古典经济学和新古典经济学将经济关系只看成⼈和物的关系。
“他们假定⼀切物品都被⼈占有，认为所有权和被占有的物质东西是相同的，因此就作为理所当然的事情被忽略了，那些理论都是以实际物资为对象⽽构成的，完全不论财产的权利，因为它们是⾃然的。
……如果政治经济学的题材不仅是个⼈和⾃然的势⼒，⽽是⼈类通过财产权的相互转移，彼此赖以维持⽣活，那么我们就必须向法律和伦理中寻找这种⼈类活动的重要转折点。
”康芒斯发现这种“转折点”的根本单位就是“交易”，“交易”被康芒斯视为制度的基本单位，犹如⽣物有机体是由细胞组成⼀样。
康芒斯进⽽把交易分为三个类型：买卖的交易，即平等⼈之间的交换关系；管理的交易，即上下级之间的交换关系；限额的交易，主要指政府对个⼈的关系。
这三种交易类型覆盖了所有⼈与⼈之间的经济活动。
康芒斯就这样把制度与交易关系联系起来。
诺贝尔经济学奖得主科斯在研究企业的性质时，归纳出了“交易费⽤”这个词，科斯写到“利⽤价格机制是有成本的。
通过价格机制组织⽣产的最明显的成本就是所有发现相对价格的⼯作。
……市场上发⽣的每⼀笔交易的谈判签约的费⽤也必须考虑在内。
”科斯在发表的《社会成本问题》⼀⽂中，更明确提出了交易成本的概念。
他对交易费⽤做了进⼀步的界定，即“为了进⾏市场交易，有必要发现谁希望进⾏交易，有必要告诉⼈们交易的愿望和⽅式，以及通过讨价还价的谈判缔结契约，督促契约条款的严格履⾏等等。
这些⼯作常常是成本很⾼的。
”⼆、交易费⽤的含义⾃科斯提出交易费⽤后，众多经济学家都给出了⾃⼰的理解，到⽬前为⽌，还没有⼀个统⼀的定义。
⼤体上科斯认为市场交易费⽤包括发现和通知交易者的费⽤、谈判费⽤、签订合同以及保证合同条款的履⾏⽽进⾏必要的检查费⽤等。
威廉姆森在科斯的基础上进⼀步研究交易的性质，他找出影响交易费⽤的三个交易的性质：资产专⽤性、不确定性、频率。
_交易费用_范畴的提出_发展和运用[1]
![_交易费用_范畴的提出_发展和运用[1]](https://img.taocdn.com/s3/m/040206243169a4517723a369.png)
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特区经济 !"#$%&’ ()*# +$)*),- %))* 年 ’ 月
地了解产成品的性能； ； ! 对要素所有者 的表现的考核存在着困难， 必须采取某些 替代的考核方式， 如按时间来衡量要素所 有者的贡献。 尽管张五常对科斯的某些具 体结论颇有微词， 但他仍遵循了科斯的基 本逻辑：在选择采用何种合约形式时，以 交易费用的多寡为标准。 他还从制度的角度出发， 进一步细化 了交易费用概念。 认为交易费用实际上就 是所谓的 “ 制度成本 ” 。 只要在多于一人的 经济中，就会有制度，只要存在制度或只 要存在社会， 成本就会产生。在这个意义 上， “ 交易费用就可以看作是一系列制度 成本，包括信息成本、监督管理的成本和 制度结构变化的成本”（ 张 五 常 ， &’() 年） 。 诺斯等人则主要进行新经济史方面 的研究，以交易费用为基本分析工具，以 产权制度创新为主线， 通过对西方国家经 济发展的历史考证， 诺斯建构了包括描述 激励系统的产权理论、 界定实施产权的国 家理论和影响人们对制度变化反应的意 识形态理论在内的独特新经济史论框 架。其中制度、 制度结构和制度变迁是新 经济史的主线。诺斯强调， 制度提供人类 相互影响的框架，决定着竞争规则，从而 构成一种社会特别是经济秩序。 制度结构 即制度框架，它在静态上决定了经济实 绩， 而制度变迁则构成长期经济增长的源 泉，经济增长不单是资源静态配置问题， 而更是经济组织的动态演进。 &’0$ 年 1 。 诺斯不仅革新旧的经济史观， 而且通 过新工具和翔实史料的结合， 丰富和深入 了新制度经济学的研究。 他把 “ 科斯定理 ” 概括地更为简洁：当交易费用为正时，制 度是至关重要的。 这句话道出了制度经济 学的基本观念： 制度结构以及制度变迁是 影响经济效率以及经济发展的重要因 素。 杨小凯和黄有光借助消费者—— — 生 产者、 专业化经济和交易费用这 $ 方面因 素， 建立了一个关于企业的一般均衡的契 约模式。该模型的突出之处是， 把企业所 有权的内容结构与定价成本相联系， 同时 * +,-./，
交易费用
2.2
交易费用的性质与测量
2.交易费用可能会影响交易的达成 交易费用的存在是为了促进交易的顺利进行，但是如果交易费用过高，或者不必要的交易 费用太多，就可能对交易产生不利的影响。 案例：《电子商务对企业传统交易费用的影响》
2.2
交易费用的性质与测量
3.交易费用无法消除，但是可以降低
零交易费用只存在“鲁滨逊世界”的孤岛上，但这并不意味着交易费用不能降低。 交易费用的降低主要源自两个方面的因素：制度和技术
2.3
交易费用存在与变化的原因
在认识了交易费用的必然性和重要性之后，交易费用产生和变化的原因就成为新制度经济学 关注的又一个重要问题，威廉姆森认为决定交易费用的因素主要分为三个方面： （1）人的因素 （2）与特定交易有关的因素 （3）交易的市场环境因素
2.3
交易费用存在与变化的原因
2.3.1人的因素 1.有限理性
2.1
什么是交易？什么是交易费用
3.威廉姆森论交易
他提出“当一项物品或者劳务在技术上可分的结合部分发生转移（即从一种技术边界向另一 种技术边界的转移）时由此宣告一个行为阶段结束，另一个行为阶段开始，交易就产生了” 比如，一辆汽车由各种零部件组装而成，这些配件由于技术上的独立性，可能由不同的企业 生产出来，当生产出来的配件产权发生转移，最终用来组装汽车时，交易就产生了。
威廉姆森认为，“有限理性是指，人们的行为是内在理性，但仅是有限的”。这种有限性是由 由个体的神经生理的限制和语言的限制所导致的，即个人的行动会受到知识、远见、技能和时间 的限制。总之，有限理性的存在导致个体不能充分认识周围的事情，不能预知未来可能发生的事 情，对于他们所能预知的未来，他们也不能计划周详并有效的做出恰当的反应。 有限理性只有不确定性或者复杂性条件的情况下才成立。而现实世界就是充满这不确定和复 杂性的，以致个体可能时时处于有限理性的限制。不如合同人在签约时无法保证合同的完全性， 即双方无法对事物的现状和未来有充分的了解，并且细化成一条条合同条款。
交易费用理论课件
〔3〕设定参照系说明交易费用
詹森和麦克林指出：与企业高层管理者拥有全额企 业资本的情况相比较，当企业高层管理者不拥有企 业100%的资本时，他们对待货币性收益和非货币性 收益的态度将有明显的变化，结果产生了代理本钱 张五常认为：在鲁宾逊· 克鲁索经济里，只存在物 质生产过程中的本钱，交易费用是不存在的〔因为 没有交易行为发生〕；在现实世界中，既存在物质 生产过程中的本钱，又存在交易费用；假设以前者 为参照系，在现实世界的总本钱中除去物质生产过 程中的本钱，剩下来的局部都可归入交易费用之列
案例：张震将军的煮鸡蛋理论
张震将军任军委副主席时，要求保证士兵一天吃一个 鸡蛋，并规定必须是煮鸡蛋，炒、蒸、煎均不行。 有认为如此规定过于死板，将军答曰：“一煮鸡蛋 营养价值高；二可防止干部偷工减料，克扣士兵的 鸡蛋。〞
这个故事对我们理解交易费用的概念有何启发？
二、交易费用的外延
交易费用的外延，就是指它到底包括哪些具体 工程。 科斯、威廉姆森和马修斯等都论述过。共同特 点：都从交换过程本身所包含的不同阶段对交 易本钱所包含的工程进行揭示的。
3 . 虽然交易费用无法彻底消除，但却是可以降低的。
三、交易费用的性质
〔1〕交易费用是时机本钱 在科斯指出市场与企业间的相互替代关系后，交易费用 自然地就被赋予了时机本钱的含义，因而才能被纳入新 古典框架，用边际和替代概念加以处理和分析。由于资 源的稀缺性，人们自然要对交易的方式进行选择，交易 费用也因而具有了时机本钱的性质。根据经济理性原那 么，生产者总是按照自己的约束集，选择对他来说交易 费用最小的组织生产的制度结构。
“从最广泛的意义上说，所有不是由市场这只 ‘看不见的手’指导的生产和交换活动，都是有组 织的活动。当把交易本钱定义为鲁宾逊经济中不存 在的所有本钱，把经济组织同样宽泛地定义为任何 要求有‘看不见的手’效劳的安排时，就出现了以 下推论：所有的组织本钱都是交易本钱。〞
科斯弄错了“交易费用”概念
科斯弄错了“交易费用”概念交易费用是新制度经济学的基本概念，科斯提出这个概念分析制度并比较不同的交易形式或制度安排，这是有新意的。
但笔者认为，科斯虽然提出了交易费用这个概念，但他对交易费用的理解其实是有问题的。
交易费用概念有两种理解，一是认为交易费用是单个个体由于“交易活动”而产生的费用，如签订合约，讨价还价等产生的费用，这种理解是狭隘地理解了“生产”，即人为地把交易和生产分开，其实交易本身也是一种生产活动，都是为了实现某个目标而产生的人的行动。
交易和生产的区分只是经验层面的。
另一种是把交易费用理解为制度（如市场或企业）运行的费用。
下面主要探讨后者。
按照科斯，市场存在交易费用，有交易就有交易费用，交易活动多则交易费用高。
根据这种观点，经济发达国家交易费用很高，而没有什么交易的国家交易费用反而低，如韩国的交易费用反而比朝鲜高，这背离了常识，也使交易费用这个概念就失去意义。
实际上，如此理解的交易费用变成了“产出”概念，即已经不是一个“费用”概念，而是“产出”概念。
我们不能把正常的经济活动都视为交易费用。
交易费用应该理解为交易受到阻碍产生的费用，克服这些阻碍就是降低了交易费用。
如马云的支付宝降低了交易费用。
企业家的行动是降低交易费用的。
下面将强调，交易费用是限制企业家的活动，如干预市场才产生的。
对企业家行动限制得越多，交易费用越高。
当交易因此而减少时，交易费用就增加了。
科斯认为市场本身就存在交易费用，组织替代市场降低了交易费用。
不同的交易形式，如组织或市场有不同的交易费用，根据交易费用的大小，选择不同的交易形式，这个交易费用是局外人（经济学家）可以计算出来的，经济学家根据计算出来的交易成本大小，选择最小的交易形式。
这是新古典经济学的方法（最大化计算），选择不同的交易模式，就是对交易成本高低的计算。
另外，这是给定约束条件下的成本收益分析，也是对孤立的个体而言的最大化分析，而社会是无数个体构成的，分析单个的个体不等于对社会的分析。
交易费用的界定及度量
零。在制度费用为零的社会，交易费用是无限大的。市 场是一种制度，有其自身费用，但在市场制度出现后， 交易也随之发生了。这说明交易费用降低了，至少
是低于当初使得交易无法发生的无限大水平。这便是市 场制度对于交易费用的节约。企业是又一种制度。企业 是对市场的替代，当企业制度对于交易费用的节约
与企业自身费用之比高于市场制度对于交易费用的节约 与市场自身费用之比时，这种替代就会发生。或者，完 成同样的交易（节约相同的交易费用），企业制度
大”，其实是“经济越发达，收入水平越高，制度费用 占GNP的比重也越大”。这些经济学家度量的是制度费用， 不是具有“摩擦力”性质的交易费用。其真
实含义其实是：“经济越发达，收入水平越高，交易费 用占GNP的比重就越小。”当然，制度费用高又不绝对意 味着交易费用就低，并没有简单的对应关系。
必须明确指出度量的是哪个层次制度的，或者哪个具体 制度的费用；必须明确指出度量的是因哪种制度替代另 一种制度而节约的交易费用，只有在此前提下的度
科斯“发现并清楚阐明交易费用和产权对经济制度结构 和经济体系运转的极端重要性”，然而交易费用概念又 是人们意见不一致的关键所在。核心是交易费用的
界定及度量。科斯的交易费用其实是使用市场的费用。 使用市场是有费用的，这个费用被科斯定义为交易费用。 使用企业是有费用的，这个费用当初被科斯定义
为管理费用。正因为科斯的交易费用是这样狭义定义的， 所以才有企业因为交易费用而存在的逻辑结论。科斯的 管理费用后来也被人们定义为交易费用，这是把
量才是有意义的。沃利斯和诺斯、多尔和利昂度量的是 宏观层次的整个市场制度的制度费用；思铎和沃利、巴 得瓦杰和布鲁克度量的是某个金融市场（制度）的
制度费用；威廉姆森所做的是通过考察委托变量来对不 同制度的制度费用给出相对排列；而德· 索托度量的其实 是市场制度替代非市场制度可以节约的交易费用
浙大Summer第8讲科斯定理与合约
2021/7/22
10
合约研究的经济学传统
罗马法的契约原则：契约是由双方意愿一致而产生相 互间法律关系的一种约定。 社会契约理论
洛克的自由契约论
斯密：“诺言与单纯的意图宣告大不相同。 诺言产 生履行的义务，而违反诺言就构成损害的行为”。 埃奇沃斯的契约线：缔约与再缔约 芝大戴维德的口述传统（捆绑问题） 张五常关于分享地租合约的研究（风险、还是费用） 研究合约的策略分歧
2021/7斯定理”这一术语并非我的首创，我也未曾对这一 定理做过精确表述。该定理。。应归功于斯蒂格 勒。。。我最初是在《联邦通讯委员会》一文中提出 了业已被归纳为科斯定理的观点。我说：“一个新发 现的山洞是属于发现山洞的人，还是属于山洞入口处 的土地所有者，还是属于山洞顶上的土地所有者，无 疑取决于财产法。但是，法律只确定谁是必须与之签 约才能获得山洞使用权的人。至于山洞是用于储藏银 行帐册，还是作为天然气储存库，或种植蘑菇，并不 取决于财产法，而取决于银行、天然气公司和蘑菇公 司哪一个能够付出最高费用以获得山洞使用权”。我 当时就指出，这一观点也可使用于发射无线电波（或 排放烟雾）。。。。。
一个值得坚持研究的方向：在交易费用 为零和无穷大之间的人的行为
一般地问：人们究竟怎么对待（交易） 代价？ 稀缺的含义是说人们总要努力节约一切 代价。问题是，限制人们更多节约代价 的条件是什么？
2021/7/22
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为什么“合约”？
转让权——关于资源自用与出让的选择权利 “合约”的要素：
两方或多方实施转让权的权限与能力 双方或多方的合意 各方关于“放弃”的承诺 “邀约（offer)”与“对价（consideration)” 具有法律强制力的协议 履行承诺的保障：第一方、第二方、第三方
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2003/5/11
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科斯定理：背景
从《联邦通信委员会》（1959）到《社会成本 的问题》（1960）
因为集中而顽固的科斯 发表背景 芝大的辩论
问题与传统
互相干扰的无线电频道 传统之见
Pigou教授以福利经济学捍卫普通法：惩罚侵权者 社会成本与私人成本的差异 “公路问题“：奈特挑战Pigou
2003/5/11
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交易费用概念的扩展
Arrow (1960): “ transaction costs are the costs of running the economic system”.
巴泽尔：产权转手引起的成本。
张五常（1987）：交易成本“是一系列制度成 本，其中包括信息成本、谈判成本、起草和实 施合约的成本、界定和实施产权的成本、监督 管理的成本和改变制度安排的成本。简言之， 交易成本包括一切不直接发生在物质生产过程 中的成本”。“把它们称为交易成本会使人产 生误解，因为它们甚至在象共产主义国家那样 禁止市场交易的经济中，也会大得惊人。”
社会成本是不是“问题”，取决于交易费用的 大小和分布。
根据科斯定理，私产经谈判达成自由交易、法 庭裁决和政府直接管制都可能是有效率的。全 部问题的关键，是了解真实的交易费用。
system)
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交易费用的分类（3）
使交易得以发生的费用
产权界定的费用
回想鱼的故事和西部牧场围拦的故事 思考: 界定产权为了交易
改变产权制度的成本
思考“土地承包权”的故事 思考“长途贩运”的故事 思考“周末工程师”的故事 思想、习俗、道德和意识形态
对分类的批评
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交易费用的分类（2）
支持市场交易的费用
市场作为一种组织和制度的自身维持费用 想一想“固定生产成本”的概念，交易活动
中的固定成本是什么？（在机会的“流动成本”？ 注意市场经济的支撑系统（supporting
远离热门争论的科斯
2003/5/11
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科斯定律（不变定律）
只要清楚界定权利，无论这权利谁属， 在交易费用为零的条件下，资源利用的 效率不变
牛 麦
科斯问：牛吃麦的权利谁属？
2003/5/11
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科斯的贡献
产权界定是市场交易的前提——从权利约束的 角度看物品或资产。
有了清楚的权利划分，市场交易导致最高的资 产价值。
成本定义：为获得某种用值所无可避免要支付 的最高代价。 代价——选择放弃的机会
The cost of an event is the highetst-valued opportunity necessarily forsaken “历史成本不是成本”（张五常）
因为已经与现在面临的选择无关 “成本”不“陈” 已经支付的究竟是什么？——是现在放弃的代价 历史成本——成为“以本搏利”之本
2003/5/11
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交易费用的概念
最基本的思想：transactions are costly. 交易
运输与交易 所有权让度 产权的完全让度 产权的部分让度
成本
稀缺、竞争、选择与代价 只有在机会选择的意义才发生“成本”
2003/5/11
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成本（cost)、费用与代价
2003/5/11
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科思的发现
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal with and to what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on. (Coase, 1960) 与1937年论文的主旨一脉相传：“…there is a cost of using the price mechanism…”
2003/5/11
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产权与交易费用
产权的转手（转让权）引发的成本 在稀缺的前提下，如果没有约束，无限大的欲 望把竞争引向人类社会的毁灭。 真实世界充满对竞争的限制 产权与交易费用是两项最基本的约束 分析时的选择：
在产权中处理交易费用（转让权执行的代价） 在交易费用
中心是分析约束下的选择行为。
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交易费用的分类（1）
市场交易成本
发现交易对象和发现价格的成本
为什么“发现”十分昂贵？
交易谈判的成本
为什么讨价还价？ 大商场真的实行“不二价”制度？ 昂贵的合约
执行交易合同的成本
思考：在机会和选择的含义上，直接的 市场交易费用究竟放弃了什么？
2003/5/11
第8讲 交易费用与科斯定理
上讲小结 交易费用的发现 概念 产权与交易费用 科斯定理 交易费用的测度 生产成本、交易费用和经济增长 交易费用对经济分析的意义
2003/5/11
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上讲小结
交易定律：自由交易使双方得益（人总是在得 到比付出更多时才自愿参加交易）。 品质考核的代价：考核过度和考核出错 为节约品质考核代价的种种努力 选择成交方式、定价方式和交易条款的行为 忽略交易中品质考核的代价，许多现象难以解 释——比较关于“市场不完善”的陈词滥调 方法论小结
2003/5/11
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在真实的商业世界里
最低价承诺。许多连锁家电商店宣称，该店出售 的电器是本城最低价。顾客在这些商店里购买 电器之后，只要在本城任何其他商店发现同类 商品标有更低的价格，就可以到作出最低价承 诺的商店得到差价补偿。 解释
？ ？ 价格机制包含对商品的数、量、质的考核，还包括对 交易者品质的考核以及市场监管体系的考核。