美国历年失业率
美国历年失业率unemployment
美国高失业率的原因及对我国的影响
美国高失业率的原因及对我国的影响自去年以来，美国失业率持续上升，失业率从年初的7.6%，上升至10月创纪录的10.2%，至今虽有所回落，但仍在高位持续运行，由于高失业率，导致美国消费信贷持续回落，进而对我国出口贸易产生较大的影响。
一、2023年以来美国的失业、消费信贷情况（一）失业情况。
2023年以来，美国的失业情况持续恶化，失业率从的初的7.6%持续上升，到2023年10月达到10.2%的峰值；进入2022年，失业率虽有所回落，但由于经济不稳定，截至7月末，美国的失业率仍为9.5%，失业率持续在高位徘徊。
与2022年至2023年危机时期大量岗位流失的情况相比，2023年下半年以来，经济快速复苏，但美国并未出现就业岗位大幅新增的复苏现象。
（二）企业需求情况。
全美独立企业联合会最新发布的一份调查结果显示，2022年7月，有91%的美国小企业主报告称其信贷需求已得到满足或不需要借贷，只有4%的企业主称融资是其面临的最主要问题。
8月16日，美联储发布一份信贷状况调查报告，公布有关美国大银行开始放松中小企业和消费者信贷标准，这是自2006年以来，美国银行首次放宽小企业和消费者信贷标准。
由于高失业率的影响，导致美国中小企业产能过剩，银行虽下调了贷款标准，但企业和消费者的贷款需求仍在下降，岗位需求仍在减少。
二、原因分析（一）实际产出与潜在产出的缺口较大，产能利用率较低。
2022年6月，美国工业产能利用率为74.14%，相比2023年6月危机最低水平68.34%有较大幅度提高，但仍显著低于2022年6月前3年平均水平的80.81%，表明当前美国实际产出与潜在产出缺口较大。
据经济合作与发展组织（OECD）估算，美国要在2015年才能达到其潜在产出增长水平，在今后数年内，美国仍将维持较高失业率。
（二）就业制度造成工资刚性，不利于就业形势较快改善。
金融危机爆发以来，美国平均小时工资不但未下降，反而继续维持稳定上升态势，2022年7月末达到22.59美元/小时的历史新高。
美国失业率数据(1930年-2015年2月-月份数据)
3.80 3.70 3.70 3.60 3.80 3.90 3.80 3.80 3.80 3.80 3.90 3.80 3.80 3.80 4.00 3.90 3.80 3.70 3.80 3.70 3.50 3.50 3.70 3.70 3.50 3.40 3.40 3.40 3.40 3.40 3.40 3.40 3.40 3.40 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.70 3.70 3.50 3.50 3.90 4.20 4.40 4.60 4.80 4.90 5.00 5.10 5.40 5.50 5.90 6.10 5.90 5.90 6.00
1966年8月 1966年9月 1966年10月 1966年11月 1966年12月 1967年1月 1967年2月 1967年3月 1967年4月 1967年5月 1967年6月 1967年7月 1967年8月 1967年9月 1967年10月 1967年11月 1967年12月 1968年1月 1968年2月 1968年3月 1968年4月 1968年5月 1968年6月 1968年7月 1968年8月 1968年9月 1968年10月 1968年11月 1968年12月 1969年1月 1969年2月 1969年3月 1969年4月 1969年5月 1969年6月 1969年7月 1969年8月 1969年9月 1969年10月 1969年11月 1969年12月 1970年1月 1970年2月 1970年3月 1970年4月 1970年5月 1970年6月 1970年7月 1970年8月 1970年9月 1970年10月 1970年11月 1970年12月 1971年1月 1971年2月 1971年3月
1961年12月 1962年1月 1962年2月 1962年3月 1962年4月 1962年5月 1962年6月 1962年7月 1962年8月 1962年9月 1962年10月 1962年11月 1962年12月 1963年1月 1963年2月 1963年3月 1963年4月 1963年5月 1963年6月 1963年7月 1963年8月 1963年9月 1963年10月 1963年11月 1963年12月 1964年1月 1964年2月 1964年3月 1964年4月 1964年5月 1964年6月 1964年7月 1964年8月 1964年9月 1964年10月 1964年11月 1964年12月 1965年1月 1965年2月 1965年3月 1965年4月 1965年5月 1965年6月 1965年7月 1965年8月 1965年9月 1965年10月 1965年11月 1965年12月 1966年1月 1966年2月 1966年3月 1966年4月 1966年5月 1966年6月 1966年7月
美国经济现状分析
美国经济现状分析亚特兰大联邦储备银行预计，第二季度美国国内生产总值(GDP)将创纪录地下降35.2%。
简而言之，在美国历史上，没有任何事件比这场由新冠疫情引发的衰退更为迅猛地摧毁了美国经济。
但是，甚至在官方GDP数据尚未出炉之前，经济可能已经迎来拐点。
失业率从2月份3.5%的50年低点飙升至4月份的14.7%，但此后连续两个月下降——6月份的失业率为11.1%。
有经济学家据此认为，从技术角度来看，目前的经济衰退已经结束，美国经济已经进入复苏或增长阶段。
为了让《财富》的广大读者更好地了解美国经济的现状和走向，我们整理了8张图表供您参考，其中涵盖我们在这场危机期间一直在追踪的经济数据：永久性失业人数、酒店和休闲服务业的就业变化、消费支出、首次申请失业救济人数、领取失业救济人数、各州的失业率、种族失业率差距、制造业景气度。
永久性失业人数尽管6月份美国的整体失业率有所下降，但永久性失业人数仍在攀升制图：Lance Lambert 数据来源：美国劳工统计局美国4月份的失业人数超过2,310万，远高于2007-09年“大衰退时期”1,540万的峰值。
但一些人已经重新找到了工作。
4月至6月间，美国失业人数减少了530万，降至1,780万。
然而，美国的“永久性”失业人数从4月份的200万上升到6月份的290万。
这种迹象表明，雇主正在将一些此前“无薪休假”的员工转化为裁员——这可能会阻碍经济复苏。
华盛顿公平增长中心宏观经济政策主管克劳迪娅•萨姆指出，“上个月的永久性失业人数仍在攀升。
很多人说，‘我失业了，工作岗位一去不复返了。
” 她说，这一数字的上升将收窄经济重返正轨的机会窗口。
酒店和休闲服务业的就业变化酒店和休闲服务业在2019年5月至2020年5月的就业人数变化情况制图：Lance Lambert 数据来源：美国劳工统计局新冠疫情甫一爆发，与旅游、餐饮，以及其他跟公共活动相关的企业就遭受重创。
5月份，美国酒店和休闲服务业的工作岗位数量同比下降41%，从2019年5月的1,650万个下降到现在的980万个。
简析美国经济状况及前景预测
简析美国经济状况及前景预测一、2010年来美国的经济状况（一）美国的国内生产总值状况表格今年一季度美国GDP增长同比1.8%，而去年第四季度GDP增速为3.1%，环比下降40%以上，从表格中可看出2010年来美国经济处于增长状态，但是GDP增长率下降。
（2011年一季度，经季节性调整后，按当年价格计算，美国GDP为37516亿美元，同比增长3.9%，环比增长0.9%，折年率增长1.8%）2011年第一季度GDP同比增长3.9%是2010年三季度来连续第三次增长率下降。
（二）美国的失业就业状况截至6月4日一周，美国全国领取失业救济的总人数为367.5万，比前一周修正后的数字减少2.1万。
这次申请失业救济人数下降表明就业市场正在改善，但是速度很慢。
经季节性调整，截至6月11日一周内，美国首次申请失业救济人数比前一周减少1.6万，降至41.4万。
这是首次申请失业救济人数在过去三周来的第二次下降，不过该数字已连续10周处于40万水平上方，不及年初的表现。
（三）美国目前存在通胀压力2010年，美国生产者价格指数(PPI)较上年同比上涨6.9%，其中12月份当月同比上涨6.6%，环比上涨1.0%。
2010年，美国城市居民消费价格指数(CPI)较上年同比上涨1.6%，其中12月份当月同比上涨1.5%，环比上涨0.5%。
分季度来看，一季度同比上涨2.4%，二季度上涨1.7%，三季度上涨1.2%，四季度上涨1.3%。
2011年5月美国生产者物价指数月率增长0.2%，预计增长0.1%。
美国5月消费者物价指数月率上升0.7%，升幅为05年9月来最大，美联储将在本月晚些时候的货币政策会议上继续维持5.25%的利率不变，且仍将视通胀为首要威胁。
（四）美国工业生产情况工业生产是衡量制造业、矿业与公共事业的实质产出重要的经济指标，工作生产指数是反应一个国家经济周期变化的主要标志。
下图是美国从2010年9月到2011年5月的工业生产月率。
美国历年失业率
非农数据日期：2012年5月22日摘要失业率是当今社会最为关注的民生问题，西方各国政府每到选举换届的时候，他们的候选人都会拿出自己关于控制失业的目标。
可见失业率在各国政府心目中的重要性。
失业率的高低可以体现政府的执政能力，可以获得民众的好感，而且失业率还会间接的反映一国经济的好坏，从而影响投资者的投资行为。
所以此次我挑选了失业率为我研究的方向，而众所周知美国是世界第一大经济体，它的经济形势的好坏可以决定着全球经济的发展方向，故我的研究重点就是美国的失业率。
本次的研究成果：第一，通过历史比较分析，了解美国的经济这情况。
第二，通过分析美国的失业，分析美国社会男女的竞争力。
第三，美国的相关失业保障。
关键词：政策效果，失业率，福利，失业原因2012年3月9日，世界各个投资者的目光都投向了美国的劳工统计局即将公布的非农数据。
美国是全球第一大经济体，它的好坏决定了全球经济的走向。
美国在每月的第一个周五晚公布，夏令时是北京时间晚8：30，冬令时是北京时间晚9：30公布非农数据。
非农数据就是指美国的非农业人口的失业率即美国城镇人口的失业率。
2012年3月9号，美国劳工统计局公布了2月份的非农数据报告，为8.3%，相比于一月份没有变化。
这个也说明了美国经济的逐渐回升，这一数据让人们对美国经济重新有了信心。
非农数据主要是由两方面的数据组成。
一，家庭统计数据：家庭统计数据的来源主要是从那些年龄在16周岁以上的农业工人，个体户，不付费的家庭工作者，被雇佣的私人家庭工作者。
二，机构单位统计调查数据：机构单位统计调查数据的来源主要是工厂,办公室和商店,以及联邦、州和地方政府机构。
以这两个数据作为主要数据的原因是：•一，家庭统计数据相对于机构单位统计调查数据有着更大的范围，它包括：个体户，无酬家庭工作人员，农业工人，私人家庭工作这些都是被机构单位统计调查数据排除在外的，另外家庭调查还提供了就业人群的估计。
•二，家庭统计调查包括了农业工人，个体户，不付费的家庭工作者，被雇佣的私人家庭工作者。
浅谈美国非农数据与黄金价格关系
浅谈美国非农数据与黄金价格关系来源：中国黄金资讯网 2011-06-08众所周知，每个月的第一个周五是美国非农数据公布的日子。
该数据通常被誉为外汇市场能够做出反应的所有经济指标中的“皇冠上的宝石”,它是市场最为敏感的月度经济指标，无数次牵动着广大投资者、交易商、政府决策和经济研究机构等的神经。
一般来说，该数据对债券、股票、商品、外汇和黄金都会产生较大影响。
为此，中国黄金资讯网特从以往的历史数据出发，初步探讨该数据与黄金的关系，以给投资者参考。
一、非农数据含义及指标判断非农数据通常指美国非农就业人数，它与失业率一起构成非农就业报告。
通常由美国劳工部在每个月的第一个星期五北京时间晚上20:30（夏令时）或者21:30（冬令时）公布。
非农业就业人数主要统计从事农业生产以外的职位变化情形。
它能反映出制造行业和服务行业的发展及其增长，数字减少便代表企业减低生产，经济步入萧条。
当社会经济较快时，消费自然随之而增加，消费性以及服务性行业的职位也就增多。
当非农业就业数字大幅增加时，表明了一个健康的经济状况，理论上对汇率应当有利，并可能预示着更高的利率，而潜在的高利率促使外汇市场更多地推动该国货币价值，反之亦然。
因此，该数据是观察社会经济和金融发展程度和状况的一项重要指标。
关于该指标的判断，一般来说如果非农就业据高于预期，将利好美元，美元指数上涨，黄金受压下跌；反之将不利美元，美元指数下跌，提振黄金上行。
而失业率对黄金影响理论上和非农就业数据相反，但实际中以非农就业数据为主。
但以上只是一般的运行原理，市场情况千变万化，有时数据基本符合预期，可能对市场影响有限，有时数据超好或者超坏可能有悖上面的分析思路。
非农就业数据大幅优于预期有时反而让美元的避险需求降低，美元指数下跌；有时非农就业数据意外疲弱可能引发避险情绪和市场忧虑令美元反弹。
所以单纯经济数据还要配合股市、商品和市场反映程度等因素来综合考虑。
二、通过以往数据看非农与金价关系下面我们梳理了2010年非农数据对国际现货黄金的具体影响，仅供投资者参考。
美国的贫富差距及原因(较全)
美国贫富差距的现状及其原因在资本主义的发展进程中，随着资本积累的增长，无产阶级状况趋于恶化，工人阶级同资产阶级之间的贫富差别越来越悬殊，这是马克思早在一百多年前对资本主义积累的一般规律作出的科学分析。
随着垄断资本主义的发展，当今资本主义国家贫富悬殊状况如何，形成目前状况的原因是什么，这是现代资本主义经济研究中的一个重要问题。
第二次世界大战结束以来，随着经济的恢复和生产的发展，西方国家各阶层的收入和财产有了显著增长，生活得到了改善。
从资本主义发展历史的纵向来看，资本主义发展初期那种普遍性的赤贫和营养不良的现象已不复存在。
西方国家的贫困标准也随着生产的发展和消费水平的提高而有所提高。
尽管如此，70年代后半期以来贫富之间的相对差距却迅速扩大，这个严酷的现实必然引起西方国家政府和百姓的关注。
美国是资本主义国家的典型代表。
本文试图对美国在本世纪70年代以来的收入分配状况作一分析。
一、70年代以来美国的贫富状况战后直到60年代，美国各阶层收入差距是趋于缩小的。
按照家庭收入在国民收入中所占的比重，美国全国家庭可分为最低收入家庭、次低收入家庭、中等收入家庭、中上收入家庭和高收入家庭五大类。
从下表可见，在70年代以前，占全国20％的上层家庭的收入占全国总收入的比重趋于下降，由1936年的51.7％降到1965年的41％。
而中层家庭（从次低到中上）的收入占全国总收入的比重缓慢上升，由1936年的44.2％上升到1965年的54％。
最低收入家庭的收入比重略有上升。
但进入70年代以后这种趋势发生了变化，70年代后半期收入差距开始呈现扩大倾向。
对20％收入最高者和20％收入最低者的平均收入进行比较，两者的差距在1974年是7.5倍，1992年扩大到了10.2倍。
1977～1992年间，美国国民收入增长的部分几乎都归入富裕阶层手中。
在这15年间，美国全国60％的人的收入在不同程度上都下降了，只有40％的人的收入有不同程度的增加。
美国失业率数据 月 月份数据
1963年11月
5.70
1963年12月
5.50
1964年1月
5.60
1964年2月
5.40
1964年3月
5.40
1964年4月
5.30
1964年5月
5.10
1964年6月
5.20
1964年7月
4.90
1964年8月
5.00
1964年9月
5.10
1964年10月
5.10
1964年11月
4.80
1964年12月
5.00
1965年1月
4.90
1965年2月
5.10
1965年3月
4.70
1965年4月
4.80
1965年5月
4.60
1965年6月
4.60
1965年7月
4.40
1965年8月
4.40
1965年9月
4.30
1965年10月
4.20
1965年11月
4.10
1965年12月
4.00
1966年1月
4.00
7.70 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.20 7.50 7.40 7.40 7.20 7.50 7.50 7.20 7.40 7.60 7.90 8.30 8.50 8.60 8.90 9.00 9.30 9.40 9.60 9.80 9.80 10.10 10.40 10.80 10.80 10.40 10.40 10.30 10.20 10.10 10.10 9.40 9.50 9.20 8.80 8.50 8.30 8.00 7.80 7.80 7.70 7.40 7.20 7.50 7.50 7.30 7.40 7.20 7.30 7.30 7.20 7.20
【历史】经济危机和第二次世界大战材料 单元测试题(附答案)
（1）据材料一，指出原子弹首次应用于哪场战争？
（2）根据材料二，归纳美国使用原子弹的目的有哪些？
（3）结合所学知识，概括使用原子弹对当时美国产生的影响。
【答案】（1）第二次世界大战。
（2）在苏联参战之前结束太平洋战争、阻止苏联在远东扩张势力。
（3）美国使用原子弹，排斥苏联出兵，加速了日本投降，战后美国独占日本。
（3）因素：①罗斯福的个人魅力、努力和担当；②吸纳和重用人才；③适应时代要求，符合大多数人民利益；④大胆创新。
【解析】
【详解】
（1）依据材料信息“我们唯一要恐惧的事情是恐惧本身。国家要求我们来取行动，而且现在立刻行动起来。我毫不犹豫地担当起领导这支伟大人民队伍的任务，”可知，此内容反映了罗斯福演讲的背景是1929 年爆发的经济危机。
——摘编自H采歇尔《第二次世界大战》（下册）
（1）材料中“红军参战”（苏联参加对日作战）最终是在哪一次会议上确定的？
（2）你同意作者关于日本失败原因的分析吗？结合所学知识简要说明理由。
【答案】（1）雅尔塔会议
（2）不同意。作者仅看到美苏军事因素对打败日本的作用，没有认识到中国坚持十四年抗战（中国战场坚持抗战或世界反法西斯同盟的配合亦可）对打败日本也发挥了重大作用。
【解析】
【详解】
（1）依据材料图表信息“1945的8月6日和9日、美国分别在日本广岛和长崎投下了原子弹‘小男孩’和‘胖子’”可知，此内容反映了原子弹首次应用于第二次世界大战。
（2）依据材料信息“一个重要原因就是要在苏联参战之前结束太平洋战争，或抵消由于苏联参战造成的影响，阻止苏联在远东扩张势力”可知，美国使用原子弹的目的是在苏联参战之前结束太平洋战争、阻止苏联在远东扩张势力。
21世纪初美国经济现状动态分析
21世纪初美国经济现状的动态分析中图分类号:f038 文献标识:a 文章编号:1009-4202(2010)06-172-02摘要本文利用时间序列的建模方法,以2000年—2007年美国失业率为研究对象,构建了arima模型。
经检验该模型能够很好的拟合美国失业率的波动趋势,并在此基础上进行了短期预测。
关键词美国失业率 arima模型美国于19世纪后期崛起,在第一次世界大战后成为世界上最大的债权国。
二战后美国迎来了实力的鼎盛期,无论是在世界生产还是贸易中均居主导地位。
但步入21世纪以来,美国的发展之路并不平坦。
2001年9月11日见证了世贸中心摩天大楼的倒塌,也奏响了美国经济衰退的前曲。
以“911”恐怖事件为界,美国政府的任务发生了变化。
美国开始把更多经费和时间花在保护“自身安全”上。
为此发动的伊拉克战争、阿富汗战争及随后的卡特里娜飓风,无不在不同程度上影响着美国经济。
而2008年的金融危机,是对美国经济自二战以来最严重的冲击。
由于2008年金融危机影响深远,这段时期失业率波动较大,故本文主要以2000年—2007年失业率为分析对象,间接反映了这段时期美国经济的现状。
失业率是指失业人口占劳动人口的比率,旨在衡量闲置中的劳动产能,是反映一个国家或地区失业状况的主要指标。
通过该指标可以判断一定时期内全部劳动人口的就业情况。
一直以来,失业率数字被视为一个反映整体经济状况的指标,而它又是每个月最先发布的经济数据,所以失业率指标被称为所有经济指标的“皇冠上的明珠”,它是市场上最为敏感的月度经济指标。
一般情况下,失业率下降,代表整体经济健康发展,利于货币升值;失业率上升,便代表经济发展放缓衰退,不利于货币升值。
研究失业率的变动情况,对国民经济的健康发展意义重大。
一、数据的收集和预处理本文收集了2000年—2007年共96期美国失业率的月度数据。
数据来源于国家统计局公布的美国失业率月度数据。
本文所用图表均使用sas 9.2完成。
分析经济形势的四大指标
分析经济形势的四大指标王俊宜北京大学经济学院国际贸易系教授好，开始上课。
世界经济形势大家也觉得这两年不太好。
不好在什么地方？不好的程度究竟怎么样？这个我们经济学来说不能凭一种感觉，这个人是这种感觉，那个人是那种感觉，到底谁对、谁错。
形势怎么分析，从经济学来说我们有四个指标来看经济形势。
分析经济形势的四大指标，宏观经济形势，现在全世界没有更好的指标，主要就是这四个指标来看经济形势。
一、经济增长率经济形势好与不好第一个指标就是经济增长率，首先要看经济增长率，去年我们的经济增长率是9.2，这个9.2是怎么来的，根据什么算出来的，全世界都要公布，各个国家都要公布它的经济增长率，在经济学里面两个概念，一个叫做GNP，一个叫叫做GDP。
GNP是国民生产总值，GDP是国内生产总值，这两者的区别在什么地方？GNP没有国家的界限、没有地区的界限，只有是我这个国家的国民在全世界哪个国家，哪个地方投资生产的产值都算我这个国家的国民生产的总值。
GDP呢？没有国民的界限，不管你是哪个国家的人，你到我这个国家投资生产的产值，在我这个国家境内就算我这个国家的GDP。
这里面有一个问题上海大众汽车公司生产的产值德国算什么产值？这两个里面德国算什么产值？GNP，德国到这来投资没有国家的界限，中国算什么产值？算国内生产总值，所以这样一来，这个国家算GNP，那个国家算GDP，全世界的生产总值就重复计算了，所以全世界现在基本上就用GDP，全世界都用GDP，都用国内生产总值，这么算全世界的生产总值是多少，所以都用GDP。
第二点，GDP的组成。
你在统计计算GDP的时候根据什么东西算？西方经济学是四个方面，一个是C，C是消费，第二个是I，I是投资，第三个是G，G是政府的购买，可以说政府的消费，最后一个是NX，N是净，X是export，出口，这是净出口，所以西方经济学算生产总值就是这四个部分加起来算它的生产总值。
我们中国的计算呢？我们中国计算是这么计算的，当我看我们的公报每年的公报就可以看出来，我们计算去年2011年我们的国内生产总值是471564亿，我们计算是三个产业的产值算，第一产业我们中国把什么东西放在第一产业？农林牧渔，而美国还把矿业放在第一产业，我们矿业放在第二产品，我们叫农林牧渔，第一产业去年的产值是47712亿。
失业率在美国和欧洲的对比2000
CESifo Working Paper Series UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITEDSTATES AND IN EUROPEA CONTRAST AND THE REASONSRobert M. SolowWorking Paper No. 231January 2000CESifoPoschingerstr. 581679 MunichGermanyPhone: +49 (89) 9224-1410/1425Fax: +49 (89) 9224-1409http://www.CESifo.deCESifo Working Paper No. 231January 2000UNEMPLOYMENT INTHE UNITED STATES AND IN EUROPEA CONTRAST AND THE REASONSThis paper was presented atCESifo Symposium No. 1on the European Unemployment Problem,Munich, 22 June, 1999Robert M. SolowMITDepartment of Economics50 Memorial DriveCambridge, MA 02142USAUnemployment in the United States and in EuropeA Contrast and the ReasonsI hope it will be understood from the beginning that I am not one of those Ameri-cans who think that the Celestial Economist smiles with special favor on the U.S.A., or that American businessmen are more entrepreneurial, American work-ers more ingenious, and American policies more appropriate than their European counterparts. Not at all: I spend most of my time finding fault with American busi-nessmen, workers and economic policies, and with American ideas about those things. Nevertheless, what I plan to say today is implicitly critical of European and German thinking about macroeconomics, and also about the policies that follow from that thinking. I ask you please to keep it in mind that I am really trying to make a few general remarks about macroeconomic principles and macroeconomic poli-cies. I could just as well be talking about two places called Ruritanien and Schlar-affenland, not Germany and the U.S., and maybe I am.The basic facts we have to understand are easy to describe and well known to most of us. In 1970 the unemployment rate in the U.S. was five percent, that in (West) Germany was one percent, and in the rest of the European Union the u n-employment rate stood at three percent. In those days, myself included, used to wonder that the U.S. would have to do in order to reproduce the European experi-ence. In 1997 the unemployment rate was still five percent in the U.S. (4.9 percent to be exact) and in 1998 it was a full half-point lower. Meanwhile the (Unified) Ger-man unemployment rate was at ten percent and the rest of the European Union was between eleven and twelve percent.The contrast is certainly striking. Europe used to have consistently lower unem-ployment than the U.S.; now it has higher. Since 1970, there has been no trend in U.S. unemployment; it is actually a bit lower than it was then. But there have been marked business-cycle fluctuations, with the unemployment rate peaking in 1975, 1982 and 1992, and reaching low points before and after the peaks. Today we have the lowest unemployment rate in 30 years. When you look at the European experience, the clear impression is that there has been a strong upward trend that dominates the business cycle. Unemployment fell cyclically in the late 1980s, but not sharply; it has fallen a bit recently, but even less sharply. There seems to be notendency for the European unemployment rate to go back to the levels that were commonplace thirty years ago.It is very important to realize that this striking contrast can not be explained by a corresponding difference in the size of the working population. It is not the case that unemployment is now low in the U.S. and high in Europe because Americans choose not to join the labor force while Europeans do. It is, in fact, the other way round. In 1997, 73.5 percent of Americans between 15 and 64 years of age were employed, as against 60.4 percent for the European Union and 63.5 percent for Germany. the figures for participation in the labor force are, of course, similar: 77.4 percent of Americans in that age group are counted in the labor force, as against 67.7 percent in the EU and 70.4 percent in Germany. Those observations apply to men and women together, but the figures would be pretty much the same if we considered men and women separately. In fact the contrast is sharpest for women: 67.1 percent of the age group is employed in the U.S., 50.5 percent in the EU, and 54.6 percent in Germany. We shall have to explain the contrast in unemployment by explaining the parallel contrast in employment.I want to make another observation that may be useful later on. It is that unemploy-ment has fallen much further in the U.S. in the past six years than most economists thought it could do without setting off a burst of inflation. I can easily remember when most of my colleagues believed that whenever the unemployment rate fell below six percent - some said 6.5 percent - inflation would get worse. We crossed that line more than four years ago and are now at 4.3 percent unemployment. Dur-ing those years of considerable prosperity and job creation, there has been no tendency for the price level to rise dangerously. Very recently there has been a slow acceleration of wages, not yet translated into prices, though of course there is every reason to watch carefully.Those are the basic facts. I have ignored a few minor details, some of which would sharpen the contrast and some of which would weaken it. Conscience requires me to say that a part of the ability of the recent American economy ot have very low unemployment and very low inflation at the same time is just good luck. This good luck takes several forms, including (a) the spectacular drop in the price of comput-ers, combined with large and growing purchases of computer equipment, (b) a period of slow growth of the health-care costs that are otherwise such a problemfor the U.S., and (c) continued improvements in the measurement of the Consumer Price Index itself, most of which eliminate earlier overstatement of inflation. These sources of price stability can not continue forever, so a time may come when the performance of the U.S. economy will no longer seem so wonderful. But I want to emphasize that the minor amendments I mentioned will not change the basic con-trast you have seen. There might be a gentle rise in the U.S. unemployment rate after 1970, instead of fluctuations around a horizontal trend. But the rise would still be small compared with what has happened in France and Germany, and else-where in the European Union.That contrast poses an inevitable question: what explains the difference between the current levels of unemployment in Europe and the U.S.? There is a tendency in matters like this to assume that there must be one single answer to this question, one secret ingredient that explains why the U.S. has kept its unemployment rate moderately low while Europe has seen its rate rise to high levels and get stuck there. That would make for drama; but economic life is not necessarily like a de-tective story, what Americans call a "whodunit". It is more likely that the difference between American and European unemployment arises from the cumulation of several differences in institutions and policies.Furthermore, the talk of "Europe" is not always appropriate. There are big differ-ences within Europe; for instance Austria, Norway and, more recently, the Nether-lands and Denmark have avoided the high unemployment that has continued to characterize France and Germany. In particular, as you know better than I, Ger-many has special problems of its own, associated with reunification and with the international role of the Bundesbank. The most I can hope to do is to pick out a few useful lessons that bear on the main issue.The conventional understanding of this contrast, especially among Europeans, seems to rest entirely on labor-market rigidities. As evidence I can cite the title of a recent and exhaustive article (in English) by my old friend Professor Horst Sie-bert, President of the Kieler Institut für Weltwirtschaft, member of the Sachver-ständigenrat, and certainly one of Europe´s leading economists. The article was called "Labor Market Rigidities: At the Root of Unemployment in Europe".Beyond doubt there are plenty of labor-market rigidities to rest an argument on. The main ones to attract attention seem to have been: (a) the relatively low r e-placement rate embodied in the U.S. unemployment insurance system compared with most European countries, as well as the relatively short duration of benefits allowed in the U.S., the natural consequence being more active search by unem-ployed workers and more willing acceptance of inferior job offers; (b) the broad scope of legal restrictions on discharging workers in Europe which, though per-haps working against unemployment in the short run, has the long-run effect of dis-couraging job creation and strengthening the power of incumbent workers to pro-tect wages at the expense of outsiders seeking employment: (c) the relatively low minimum wage in the U.S., which allows higher employment of low-productivity workers at the expense of greater wage inequality; (d) Siebert points out that the U.S. labor market generally allows greater wage differentiation between classes of workers than in Europe, but I think this may be a more complicated matter than just a difference in labor-market institutions; (e) the greater density and power of trade unions in Europe; (f) the wider wedge of payroll taxes and social charges in Europe that surely pushes some low-wage workers below the margin of employ-ability; even if the long-run incidence of such charges is generally on workers´wages, this tax-shifting may not be possible at or near the minimum wage.That is an impressive array of labor-market rigidities. So perhaps it is understand-able that this is the only explanation of high unemployment that is ever discussed seriously by civil servants and central bankers in much of Europe, especially Ger-many. Consequently the only potential cure for high and persistent unemployment that is ever seriously discussed is labor-market reform and wage moderation, though that process is inevitably slow and sure to be socially divisive.One important respect in which labor-market rigidity clearly plays a major role is in the employment of low-wage workers in an important industry like retailing in the U.S. The relatively low minimum wage has allowed the retail-trade sector to absorb a large number of low-productivity, low-wage workers. And retail formats have evolved correspondingly. In France, for instance, the high minimum wage simply cuts off many workers from the job market. Germany does not have a legal mini-mum wage, but custom and the large tax wedge must have a similar effect. This part of the population is larger in the U.S. than in Europe, probably because of badly-run, ineffective school systems, especially in poor neighborhoods. Of courseI would not recommend that the E.U. imitate the U.S. in this respect; but it could learn from American experience and find its own mode of adaptation.I do not think one can deny the significance of labor-market rigidities in Europe, and the likelihood that greater flexibility in the U.S. contributes to its much more favorable performance in terms of employment. But I believe that the almost exclu-sive focus on this aspect of the problem is a major mistake. It hides other, very important, lines of causality, and steers Europe away from possible policy strate-gies that could have substantial results in much less time, and with a fairer distri-bution of the burden.I think this is in part an intellectual failure. Sometimes it is hard to escape the thought that the single-minded focus on the labor market stems from the naive be-lief that unemployment must be a defect in the labor market, as if the hole in a flat tire must always be on the bottom, because that is where the tire is flat. Alterna-tively, or in addition, one detects an equally naive belief that a complicated market economy achieves some sort of favorable, unimprovable, equilibrium very quickly, smoothly and inevitably.There are good empirical reasons for rejecting this convenient belief that the labor market by itself provides an adequate account of the sad story of European u n-employment. At the crudest level, the timing is wrong. One of the two big increases in unemployment took place in the early 1980s, although there was no change in labor-market regulation to account for it.The argument was sometimes made that European wage determination (unlike the U.S.) exhibited "real-wage resistance" or effective indexing of the nominal wage. This stickiness of the real wage could certainly be a source of unemploy-ment in principle and in fact. But real-wage resistance must eventually have worn off. The profit share has risen to very high levels in Europe, meaning that real wages have not kept pace with productivity. But unemployment did not wither away, so this story is inadequate. And the further rise in unemployment after 1990 came during a period when labor markets were being deregulated in the major nations of Europe. (The most recent increase in Germany, in 1996-97, actually happened at a time of wage moderation.) Some other forces must have been at work.The second empirical reason for rejecting an exclusive focus on the labor market is less obvious and more indirect. A useful summary indicator of many kinds of labor-market rigidity is the position of the so-called Beveridge curve, named after Sir William Beveridge´s famous wartime report Full employment in a Free Soci-ety. Beveridge chose to define "full employment" as a situation in which there are as many unfilled jobs as there are unemployed workers. The definition was not generally acceptable, but it suggested studying the relation between the number of unemployed workers and the number of unfilled jobs, both expressed as a fraction of the labor force.In any country at any moment, the Beveridge curve is a downward-sloping relation between the vacancy rate and the unemployment rate. One can usually find such a curve in national time series, if the relevant data exist. It has a negative slope for the common-sense reason that jobs are easier to fill, and the vacancy rate there-fore is lower, the more unemployed workers there are for employers to choose among. A perfectly flexible or efficient labor market would interpose no obstacle to the frictionless matching of an unfilled job and an unemployed worker with the ap-propriate skills. Flexible wages would adjust so that every part of the labor market had, within reason, adequate employment opportunities. In that case, vacant jobs and unemployed workers could not coexist. The Beveridge curve would coincide with the axes of the diagram: there could be vacancies with no unemployment or there could be unemployment with no vacancies. One would expect pressure on wages in either case.Of course no real-world labor market could be perfectly flexible in that sense. La-bor-market rigidities (including skill mismatches as a special form of rigidity) are precisely what allow vacancies and unemployment to coexist, and the more rigidi-ties there are, the more the Beveridge curve diverges from the hypothetical limiting case, the further from the zero-zero point it is located.It is easy to check that each of the specific symptoms of labor-market rigidity that I enumerated earlier has the likely effect of shifting the Beveridge curve outward. Looking at the history of a nation´s vacancy and unemployment rates will tell us something about the extent to which its labor market has become more or less flexible. In the U.S., for instance, there appears to be a well-defined Beveridgecurve for 1958-71 that shifted adversely in the early 1970s and then returned to its initial position in 1987-88, and has stayed there since.It is more interesting and relevant to look at France and Germany, where the story is quite different. I will show you the pictures: it is hard to decide if there was a small adverse shift in the French and German Beveridge curves around 1975 or if there was none at all. We do not need to know: even if there was an adverse shift, a worsening of overall labor-market rigidity, it was very small compared with the U.S. The main message transmitted by the Beveridge curves for France and Ger-many transcends this minor possibility of alternative interpretations. The message goes squarely against the cliché that high and persistent unemployment is entirely or mainly a matter of worsening function of the labor market. It is precisely in France and Germany that there is no sign of a major unfavorable shift of the Beveridge curve during the period of rising unemployment.To the extent that the location of the Beveridge curve is a reasonable summary of the degree of labor-market rigidity, the large continental economies do not seem to have suffered from noticeable more rigid labor markets during the high-unemployment 1980s than they did in the low-unemployment 1970s. In fact, what stands out from the data for France and Germany is precisely the depressed level of the vacancy variable, i.e., the weakness of the demand for labor. Unfortunately the data sources do not allow the analysis to be extended to the 1990s (especially for Germany after unification), but there is no reason to suppose that the situation has changed. A pure supply-side explanation of the difference between the U.S. and Europe seems to be quite inadequate in view of the facts.I think I detect also in Germany a tendency to identify "supply-side policies" with labor-market deregulation. That does not have to be the case; and I think it very likely that part of the European problem stems from differences centering around product markets. These take the form of excessive product-market regulation, ac-companied by practices that limit the exposure of European firms to competition from best-practice firms, especially from transplants. A closely related deficiency is that European capital markets fail to force corporate governance structures to achieve better performance. I can not take time to provide the evidence for these suspicions now; it is contained in some studies of French and German economicperformance made by the McKinsey Global Institute, in which I have participated along with some other economists.What has this sort of thing got to do with unemployment? Careful studies in the U.S. have demonstrated the importance of analyzing net changes in employment and unemployment as the resultant of gross flows of job creation and job destruc-tion. One notices that, even when total employment and unemployment are hardly changing at all, large numbers of jobs are being created while others are being destroyed. There is always movement in and out of the three basic states: e m-ployed, unemployed, inactive.As I hinted earlier, much of the European failure to reduce unemployment arises from low exit rates from unemployment during limited business-cycle upswings. This in turn suggests that an important part of the problem is an inadequate rate of job creation. Here may be the source of the shocking difference between Europe and the U.S. in the incidence of long-term unemployment. In the U.S. in 1997, 8.7 percent of all the unemployed had been out of work for more than 12 months. The corresponding figure for Germany (1996) was 47.8 percent, for France 41.2 per-cent, for the U.K. 38.6 percent, and for the E.U. as a whole 50.2 percent. Even in recession years the incidence of long-term unemployment is much lower in the U.S. If more jobs were being created in Europe, in a variety of industries in a vari-ety of places, the exit rate from unemployment would be higher. It is even possible that the tolerant character of the European unemployment insurance system is as much a response to as it is a cause of the low exit probability from unemployment.A weakness in job creation could have several sources; one of them might be those legal restrictions on firing workers. But I suggest that product-market d e-regulation (of opening hours, land use, banking practices) and increased competi-tion might help to reduce unemployment by improving employment prospects. This would look fairer and be fairer than a narrow focus on labor-market measures that would just increase working class insecurity. If it should be confirmed that Euro-pean firms are backward about creating jobs, then one can easily think of other ways to improve the situation, like easing the supply of venture capital and finance for small and start-up firms. Exclusive focus on the labor market tends to crowd such possibilities completely off the radar screen.Now I want to speak about the unspeakable: I am almost tempted to suggest that women and young people leave the room. The subject is one that, if it is mentioned at all in polite company, is grouped with witchcraft, drunkenness, and the abuse of children, things that we know are there but that are best denied. It is possible that one source of continued high unemployment in Europe is that the domestic d e-mand for goods and services, and therefore for labor, has been forced to unnec-essarily and unhealthily low levels?To be more blunt, I mean to suggest that American fiscal and monetary policy has been more successful than Europe has been in supporting aggregate demand, and above all more aggressive in taking advantage of opportunities to expand whenever inflationary pressure has been weak, whatever the cause of that weak-ness. This could be important for two reasons. The first reason is quite direct: the direct effect of excessively tight fiscal and monetary policy on an economy with limited wage and price flexibility, that is, on any economy we know. It is not a new thought that the imposition of the Maastricht criteria and the rush to satisfy them have forced European economies into fiscal consolidation and high real interest rates. The only dream-like aspect of this is the belief sometimes expressed and tacitly accepted that this can have nothing to do with high unemployment.The second reason why demand-side policy could be very important has to do with its interaction with the supply side. Any gain in labor-market flexibility or in product-market deregulation will be both more effective and more easily accepted if it oc-curs at a time when aggregate demand is strong and market prospects are favor-able. There is likely to be considerable payoff to coordination of supply-side and demand-side policies within the large European countries and among members of the European Union.In even more unfashionable words, I think that some part of European and German unemployment is "Keynesian" in character and would respond to expansionary demand-side policy at a time when there is little inflationary pressure. I do not want to guess how much unemployment, in Germany for instance, is accounted for in this way. I have seen one estimate that it could be between 1.5 and 2.5 percentage points. Other nations of the European Union could of course differ, in either direc-tion. This is just the sort of question that economic research could illuminate; the puzzle is that more is not being done.Bad policy sometimes comes from bad ideas (although it may occasionally hap-pen that bad ideas are fabricated to justify bad policies). I have just suggested that a key question for Germany (and France and much of Europe) today is this: how much scope is there for deliberate expansion of demand? To put it more explicitly: by how much could the level of production and income rise without pressing on productive capacity and stimulating inflation? For economists this very same question appears in a slightly different form: what is the gap between the current level of aggregate output and potential output, the level of GDP that would employ capital and labor fully, without stretching or overheating?It seems to me that, in Germany, both the Bundesbank and the Sachverständigen-rat answer that question in a doctrinaire way. They simply assume that the gap is almost never more than trivial. In other words, they take it for granted that, in the absence of inflation, the economy is always producing just about the right amount, employing just about the right number of people, utilizing its capital at just about the right intensity, given the rules governing the labor market. In that view it is essen-tially never correct to use fiscal and monetary policy to create additional demand for goods and services in order to induce higher production. At least it is never correct now, whenever now is.There is a very strange asymmetry at work here, however. I suspect we could all easily imagine circumstances in which the Bundesbank would think it appropriate, even necessary, to use monetary policy to eliminate excess demand, i.e., to cause the economy to contract. It is therefore possible for demand to exceed supply in the aggregate. But somehow it never happens that demand falls short of supply persistently enough to call for offsetting policy. I think there is no good theoretical argument to support this view. It is at best an article of faith. Where I come from, many economists think that the gap between actual and potential output is a quan-tity that may be positive or negative, depending on circumstances. In any case it is a quantity to be imperfectly estimated, not something known by divine intuition.Some European central banks, including the Bundesbank, go through the motions of estimating the gap by a more or less elaborate statistical procedure. I can not go into the technical details here, but these procedures are essentially a dogmatic exercise. They are guaranteed either to smooth away any persistent differencebetween actual and potential output, or else to tell you that if output is below poten-tial this year it must have been above potential last year or the year before. I can be more explicit: if I understand the Bundesbank´s method adequately, it is re-quired always to make the average level of potential output during each four or five year period equal the average level of output actually observed during that same period. This means that the calculation can never conclude that there has been a persistent gap in either direction. This method is not confirming the dogma; it is part of the dogma.If this method had been applied in the 1930s, it would have reported a much smaller Depression than we believed then and believe now to have occurred; it would have claimed that the Depression was only about half as bad as it appeared to be. In addition, it would have come to the truly remarkable conclusion that some of those long depression years - which certainly contributed to the rise of Hitler -were actually years of excess demand and overemployment. The Bundesbank, if it had existed then, would have felt impelled to contract the already desperate econ-omy; and the Sachverständigenrat would have agreed.Of course that foolishness would never have occurred. Their own intelligence and common sense would have told the Bundesbank and Sachverständigenrat what was happening, and they would have reacted constructively. Yes, of course they would, but we are then entitled to ask the question: why should it take a catastro-phe like the Great Depression to interpose a little common sense into macroeco-nomic thinking?In the U.S., economists have developed simple methods to estimate the gap be-tween potential and actual output that do not prejudge the answer. I do not think that we are foolishly optimistic about the accuracy of these estimates; we know that they rest on observed economic regularities that may change unpredictably; so the estimates are only rough approximations, and may be systematically wrong for a while before the errors are noticed and corrected. But at least they are a way to appeal to observation instead of doctrinaire belief. I am going to see what such methods might say about Germany today. Please do not take what I say literally. The exercise should be carried out by German research workers who are more familiar with the data than I am. I wonder why they are not already doing so.。
新冠肺炎疫情对中美调查失业率的影响
新冠肺炎疫情对中美调查失业率的影响一、概述新冠肺炎疫情自2019年末暴发以来，迅速席卷全球，对各国经济和社会造成了前所未有的冲击。
中美两国作为世界最大的经济体之一，其失业率受到了疫情的直接且深远的影响。
本文旨在探讨新冠疫情对中美调查失业率的具体影响，分析疫情背景下失业率的变动趋势及其背后的原因，为进一步理解疫情对经济社会的综合影响提供参考。
1. 简述新冠疫情的全球影响。
新冠疫情自2019年末爆发以来，迅速席卷全球，对世界各国造成了前所未有的冲击。
疫情不仅导致了大量的人员感染和死亡，还严重扰乱了各国的经济、社会和政治秩序。
全球经济活动受到严重限制，许多行业和企业遭受重创，失业率飙升。
国际旅行和贸易也受到严重影响，导致全球供应链中断，进一步加剧了经济困境。
在疫情的影响下，各国政府不得不采取一系列措施来应对危机，包括财政刺激计划、货币政策调整以及公共卫生防控等。
这些措施的实施和执行也面临着诸多挑战和困难。
新冠疫情给全球带来了深刻而持久的影响，需要各国共同努力来应对和解决。
2. 介绍失业率的定义及其在经济发展中的重要性。
失业率，作为一个衡量一个国家或地区劳动力市场状况的关键指标，通常指的是在一定时期内，未就业劳动力人口与总劳动力人口的比例。
在统计失业人口时，通常会排除那些正在寻找工作但暂时未能找到的人，以及因各种原因暂时退出劳动力市场的个体。
失业率不仅反映了劳动力的供求关系，也揭示了经济活动的活跃程度和社会的整体经济状况。
在经济发展中，失业率的重要性不言而喻。
它是评估宏观经济政策效果的重要依据。
政府通过调控财政政策、货币政策等手段来影响经济增长和就业，而失业率的变化则直接反映了这些政策的效果。
失业率的高低直接关系到社会的稳定和民生的改善。
高失业率意味着大量劳动力未能充分发挥其生产潜力，这不仅会浪费社会资源，还可能引发一系列社会问题，如贫富差距扩大、社会治安恶化等。
降低失业率、提高就业水平是各国政府追求的重要目标。
全球各国统计年鉴指标数据：5-6_失业率(2000-2017)
15.3
7.0
8.2
2.9
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.9
4.1
6.6
7.2
11.2
1.9
2.6
7.6
2.7
3.1
2.4
6.1
8.0
5.6
11.7
12.1
13.5
4.3
4.3
14.5
0.6
1.4
11.1
11.3
8.5
10.8
7.7
8.4
15.5
11.3
12.4
4.7
4.4
5.1
3.0
13.7
14.8
12.5
7.8
4.0
5.1
9.6
13.0
12.0
7.2
14.0
10.7
8.5
2.3
2.2
1.1
11.4
11.8
12.9
12.9
15.9
13.2
5.7
4.3
5.1
17.9
15.3
13.5
3.8
4.1
3.9
11.5
9.7
8.1
9.0
8.0
6.6
25.2
26.6
27.3
22.1
19.6
17.2
4.7
4.4
4.2
2.4
2.0
9.7
4.8
4.6
5.7
4.9
3.5
3.8
3.8
3.6
16.3
17.8
9.6
3.8
7.6
10.8
10.1
(全国版)2020中考历史复习世界现代史课时训练(24)经济大危机和第二次世界大战试题
课时训练(二十四) 经济大危机和第二次世界大战一、选择题1.[2019·临沂]在下图所反映的美国“失业率”变化曲线中,失业率增加幅度最大的年份区间是 ( )A.1926年-1927年B.1929年-1933年C.1937年-1938年D.1944年-1945年2.[2019·潍坊]1929年-1933年,在资本主义经济危机期间,各国争相提高关税,世界贸易锐减2/3。
这说明经济危机( )A.推动了区域经济发展B.提高了国家竞争力C.加速了资本主义灭亡D.阻碍了经济全球化3.[2019·连云港]“各工业企业制定本行业的公平经营规章,确定各企业的生产规模、价格水平、市场分配、工资标准和工作日时数。
”这一规定属于罗斯福新政的( )A.整顿金融B.恢复工业C.调整农业D.以工代赈4.[2019·宿迁]1933年,临危受命的罗斯福就任美国总统后,迅速推行“新政”。
其主要特点是( )A.防止盲目的生产过剩B.加强对工业的控制和调节C.增强联邦政府的权力D.加强对经济的调节和干预5.下面是1929年—1939年美国失业人数、国民生产总值变化表。
导致1933年—1939年数据变化的主要原因是( )A.第一次科技革命推动B.国家大规模干预经济C.全球性经济危机爆发D.美国实行新经济政策6.[2019·雅安]美国在《农业调整法》(1933年5月通过)生效的第一年,屠宰了二千三百万头牛、六百四十万头猪,减少了三百万公顷小麦和四百万公顷棉花播种面积。
美国实施此政策主要目的是( )A.建立社会保障制度B.维护工人的合法权益C.稳定农产品的价格D.增加失业者就业机会7.[2019·柳州]下图反映了1929年-1937年美国失业人数变化情况,促使B点到C点变化的直接有效措施是( )A.推行“以工代赈”B.创立养老金制度C.颁布《紧急银行法令》D.颁布《农业调整法》8.[2019·辽阳]20世纪30年代,制造“国会纵火案”、打击共产党、屠杀犹太人的法西斯国家是( )A.意大利B.日本C.德国D.西班牙9.20世纪30-40年代,威胁世界和平与安全的主要因素是( )A.法西斯势力的侵略B.美苏争霸C.西方大国推行绥靖政策D.宗教纷争10.[2019·南充]揭开了世界反法西斯战争序幕的历史事件是( )A.九一八事变B.意大利吞并埃塞俄比亚C.七七事变D.德国突袭波兰11.[2019·成都]史料的类型多种多样,价值各有不同。
经济学失业
经济学原理
4
劳动力数据
与失业者相对应，那些有工作的人就称为就业者。
就业者和失业者之和称为劳动力。
劳动力=就业者+失业者
与劳动力相对应的是非劳动力，即成年人中既不是就业
者也不是失业者的人，比如全日制的学生、军人、退休
人员、家务劳动者、监狱服刑人员、被医院收留的人员
如精神病患等等。
非劳动力和劳动力加在一起就是一个国家的成年总人
算失业的。
二是有工作的意愿，有些有工作能力的人不愿意工作，
这些人也不能算作失业的。
三是正在找工作，比如在有关部门进行失业登记，如果
有人长期失业，一直找不到工作，已经失去信心，不再
继续找工作了，这样的人是不算做失业的。
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经济学原理
3
失业的概念
失业者还包括这样一些特殊情况：被暂时解雇，等待重
第三，有些报告自己是非劳动者的人可能是愿意工作
的。这些人可能已经努力地寻找工作了，但是在求职失
败后放弃了努力，这些人被称为丧失信心的工人，尽管
他们没有工作，但没有被统计在失业人员中。 6/11/2021
经济学原理
12
思考1：计算劳动力数据
用以下数据计算劳动力，失业率， 成年人口和劳
动力参工率 ：
某国成年人口的分类
比例。
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经济学原理
6
失业的统计
美国是由劳工统计局对失业问题进行统计，定期公布失
业率、劳动参与率等指标。
我国长期以来并没有进行失业问题的统计，我国公布的
是一个具有中国特色的相近的指标：城镇登记失业率，
即具有当地城镇户口的劳动者中没有工作并且在当地就