读《资本成本公司理财和投资理论》
《财务管理学》MM理论专题
中国药科大学国际商学院 常峰
MM理论-3
MM理论的文献的译文来源
弗兰科· 莫迪利亚尼（Modigliani, F.）著.莫迪利 亚尼文萃. 林少宫译.北京：首都经济贸易大学出 版社. 2001年.106-165.
中国药科大学国际商学院 常峰
MM理论-4
“弗兰克· 莫迪利亚尼的研究 的主要方向是家庭储蓄和金 融市场的运行。莫迪利亚尼 教授现在获奖的研究成果涉 及家庭储蓄生命周期假设的 建立与发展和用于企业和资 本成本计价的MM定理的系 统阐述。这两方面紧密相关 的成就都涉及家庭财产的管 理：一方面涉及总价值，另 一方面涉及总价值的构成。”
解读文献一：
资本成本、公司财务与投资理论
Modigliani, F. and Miller, MH. The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment. American Economic Review, 48(3), June 1958, pp2161~2197.
中国药科大学国际商学院 常峰
MM理论-22
1.2 债务筹资及其对证券价格的影响
由（a）推知，除了相差一个数量因子外， 所有债券必有完全相同的售价。 由（b）推知，所有债券的每元价值的报酬 必有同一售价，记这一报酬率为r，并称利息率， 或等价地称为确定性流量的资本化率。
中国药科大学国际商学院 常峰
MM理论-23
中国药科大学国际商学院 常峰
MM理论-27
首先，V2大于V1的情况
考虑某投资者持有s2元价值的公司2股份， 占总股票S2的一个比例 ，在均匀性假设下， 两公司的总报酬X1和X2在任何情况下都是相同， 下面将使用共同的符号X表示。从而，该投资 者初始资产的报酬Y2为： （1.5） Y2 ( X rD2 )
投资的心得和感受(通用10篇)
投资的心得和感受(通用10篇)投资的心得和感受篇1投资学是一门非常有意思有实际应用的学科。
在我们日后的学习生活中经常要用到这门学科的知识。
在未学习投资学这门课之前，我一直以为投资完全靠的是运气，因为你之前并不知道究竟会发生什么，所有的判断和决定都是都是不确定的。
当我学习了这门课之后，我深刻的认识到，投资并非完全靠的是运气，它需要一定的对投资的认识及技术分析。
同时对学习做人做事也获益匪浅。
在这里，我明白了投资并不等于赌博。
它需要很多科学知识，当然其中也有运气的因素，正所谓“谋事在人，成事在天”。
投资学中有很多经典的投资理论与技术分析，例如炒股中的 K 线分析、动态看盘以及技术指标的分析。
通过对这些理论的学习，使我对投资有了初步的认识。
让我明白投资是需要足够的耐心。
在你投资某一项目后，可能现在正在亏损甚至已经亏了很久了，但很有可能在你离开这一项目后，它就开始可以赚钱，这一切都是有可能的。
在我们投资的时候，我们要对此认真分析研究，抓住时机，然后果断的做出决策。
一但认定这次的投资的机会就不要轻易放弃。
投资很重要的一点就是心态的锤炼，心态是决定投资成功的关键，这是需要长期磨练实践的。
想要成为一个成功的投资者确实是一个长期的过程，要经历投资的四个阶段：大亏大赚——大亏小赚——小亏小赚——小亏大赚;要做到这些就必须学会控制亏损，有一套成熟稳定的扣件套路，在很大把握时勇于下手。
投资是一个高水平的斗智斗勇的游戏，其中要掌握的知识复杂繁多。
知识就是力量，这是我们都知道的。
其实知识本身不是力量，知识必须运用，并且在合适的地方合适的时间以合适的方式运用，是人力物力财力有机的结合起来，发挥出各种力量之和和更大的力量。
这种知识与运用知识的能力才是知识的力量。
太多的大学毕业生，甚至是硕士博士生，有很多知识，却一事无成。
原因很简单，只会死知识，不会活运用。
要运用知识，你就要寻找条件创造机会想方设法的争取运用。
正是因为投资的不确定性我们必须为我们的投资做好充足的准备。
学公司理财的感想
学公司理财的感想学公司理财的感想这学期选修了《公司理财》，选择这门课程是因为对公司理财很感兴趣，还有就是它在以后生活中所起到的作用。
现如今，经济在生活中占有越来越重要的位置，使它变得不再是专业人士的专业知识领域，而是许多人都在学习的东西。
很多大学生在毕业后选择自主创业，学习公司理财就尤为必要。
公司理财就是讲公司如何聚财、用财、生财。
公司是一个营利性的经济组织，它必须筹集资金、运用资金，并对营业收入和利润进行分配，这些理财活动对公司至关重要。
公司理财具有三大特点：开放性、动态性、综合性。
1．现代市场经济以金融市场为主导，金融市场作为企业资金融通的场所和联结企业资金供求双方的纽带，对企业财务行为的社会化具有决定性影响。
金融市场体系的开放性决定了企业财务行为的开放性。
公司理财以资金运动为对象，而资金运动是对企业经营过程一般的与本质的抽象，是对企业再生产运行过程的全面再现。
于是，以资金管理为中心的企业理财活动是一个动态管理系统。
围绕资金运动展开。
资金运动作为企业生产经营主要过程和主要方面的综合表现，具有最大的综合性。
掌握了资金运动，犹如牵住了企业生产经营的“牛鼻子”，“牵一发而动全身”。
综合性是理财的重要特征。
公司理财的教学和实践从未像今天这样富有挑战性和令人振奋。
在过去的十年，我们目睹了金融市场的变革和金融工具的创新。
在21世纪的最初几年，我们仍然经常看到金融报刊报道诸如接管，垃圾债券，财务重组，首次公开发行，破产和衍生金融工具等信息。
此外，对“实际期权”）、私募权益资本与风险资本和股利消失等产生新的认识。
全球的金融市场也未曾像今天这样一体化。
公司理财的理论和实践在快速地变化。
“企业管理以财务为中心，财务以资金为中心”，这是现代企业管理制度发展的必然结果。
特别是随着我国现代企业制度的建立，企业的经营更加需要理财活动的有力保障。
公司理财逐渐成为提升企业价值，完善企业财务控制体系的主要活动。
从树立基本的财务观念开始，理财活动涉及企业经营管理的全部过程。
资本成本,公司财务和投资理论【外文翻译】
外文翻译原文The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and Theory of InvestmentMaterial Source: http://ww.jstor.or Author: Franco Modigliani; Merton H. MillerA. Capital Structure and Investment PolicyOn the basis of our propositions with respect to cost of capital and financial structure (and for the moment neglecting tans), we can coercive the following simple rule for optimal investment policy by the firm:Proposition III. If a firm in class is acting in the best interest of the stockholders at the time of the decision, it will exploit an investment opportunity if and only if the rate of return on the investment, say , is as large as or larger than . That is, the cut-off point for investment in the firm will in all cases be and will be completely unaffected by the type of security used to finance the investment. Equivalently, we may say that regardless of the financing used, the marginal cost of capital to a firm is equal to the average cost of capital, which is in turn equal to the capitalization rate for an unlevered stream in the class to which the firm belongs.To establish this result we will consider the three major financing alternatives open to the firm-bonds, retained earnings, and common stock issues-and show that in each case an investment is worth undertaking if, and only if,.Consider first the case of an investment financed by the sale of bonds. We know from Proposition I that the market value of the firm before the investment was undertaken was:(20)And that the value of the common stock was:（21）If now the firm borrows I dollars to finance an investment yielding its market value will become:（22）And the value of its common stock will be:（23）Or using equation 21,（24）HenceTo illustrate, suppose the capitalization rate for uncertain streams in the class is 10 per cent and the rate of interest is 4 per cent. Then if a given company had an expected income of 1,000 and if it were financed entirely by common stock we know from Proposition I that the market value of its stock would be 10,000. Assume now that the managers of the firm discover an investment opportunity which will require an outlay of 100 and which is expected to yield 8 per cent. At first sight this might appear to be a profitable opportunity since the expected return is double the interest cost. If, however, the management borrows the necessary 100 at 4 per cent, the total expected income of the company rises to 1,008 and the market value of the firm to 10,080. But the firm now will have 100 of bonds in its capital structure so that, paradoxically, the market value of the stock must actually be reduced from 10,000 to 9,980 as a consequence of this apparently profitable investment. Or, to put it another way, the gains from being able to tap cheap, borrowed funds are more than offset for the stockholders by the market's discounting of the stock for the added leverage assumed.Consider next the case of retained earnings. Suppose that in the course of its operations the firm acquired I dollars of cash (without impairing the earning power of its assets). If the cash is distributed as a dividend to the stockholders their wealth , after the distribution will be:(25)Where represents the expected return from the assets exclusive of I in question. If however the funds are retained by the company and used to finance newassets whose expected rate of return is , then the stockholders' wealth would become:(26)Clearly as so that an investment financed by retained earnings raises the net worth of the owners if and only if .Consider finally, the case of common-stock financing. Let Po denote the current market price per share of stock and assume, for simplicity, that this price reflects currently expected earnings only, that is, it does not reflect any future increase in earnings as a result of the investment under consideration. Then if N is the original number of shares, the price per share is:(27)And the number of new shares, M, needed to finance an investment of I dollars is given by:(28)As a result of the investment the market value of the stock becomes:And the price per share:(29)Since by equation (28), I= M Po, we can add M Po and subtract from the quantity in bracket, obtaining:(30)and only if.Thus an investment financed by common stock is advantageous to the current stockholders if and only if its yield exceeds the capitalization rate .Once again a numerical example may help to illustrate the result and make it clear why the relevant cut-off rate is and not the current yield on common stock,i.e. Suppose that is 10 per cent, r is 4 per cent, that the original expected income of our company is 1,000 and that management has the opportunity of investing 100 having an expected yield of 12 per cent. If the original capital structure is 50 per cent debt and 50 per cent equity, and 1,000 shares of stock are initially outstanding, then, by Proposition I, the market value of the common stock must be 5,000 or 5 per share. Furthermore, since the interest bill is .045,000 =200, the yield on common stock is 800/5,000=16 per cent. It may then appear that financing the additional investment of 100 by issuing 20 shares to outsiders at 5 per share would dilute the equity of the original owners since the 100 promises to yield 12 per cent whereas the common stock is currently yielding 16 per cent. Actually, however, the income of the company would rise to 1,012; the value of the firm to 10,120; and the value of the common stock to 5,120. Since there are now 1,020 shares, each would be worth 5.02 and the wealth of the original stockholders would thus have been increased. What has happened is that the dilution in expected earnings per share (from .80 to .796) has been more than offset, in its effect upon the market price of the shares, by the decrease in leverage.Our conclusion is, once again, at variance with conventional views, so much so as to be easily misinterpreted. Read hastily, Proposition III seems to imply, that the capital structure of a firm is a matter of indifference; and that, consequently, one of the core problems of corporate finance-the problem of the optimal capital structure for a firm-is no problem at all. It may be helpful, therefore, to clear up such possible misunderstandings.B. Proposition III and Financial Planning by FirmsMisinterpretation of the scope of Proposition III can be avoided by remembering that this Proposition tells us only that the type of instrument used to finance an investment is irrelevant to the question of whether or not the investment is worth while. This does not mean that the owners (or the managers) have no grounds whatever for preferring one financing plan to another; or that there are no other policy or technical issues in finance at the level of the firm.That grounds for preferring one type of financial structure to another will still exist within the framework of our model can readily be seen for the case of common-stock financing. In general, except for something like a widely publicized oil-strike, we would expect the market to place very heavy weight on current and recent past earnings in forming expectations as to future returns. Hence, if the owners of a firm discovered a major investment opportunity which they feltwould yield much more than ,they might well prefer not to finance it via common stock at the then ruling price, because this price may fail to capitalize the new venture. A better course would be a pre-emptive issue of stock (and in this connection it should be remembered that stockholders are free to borrow and buy). Another possibility would be to finance the project initially with debt. Once the project had reflected itself in increased actual earnings, the debt could be retired either with a11 equity issue at much better prices or through retained earnings. Still another possibility along the same lines might be to combine the two steps by means of a convertible debenture or preferred stock, perhaps with a progressively declining conversion rate. Even such a double-stage financing plan may possibly be regarded as yielding too large a share to outsiders since the new stockholders are, in effect, being given an crest in any similar opportunities the firm may discover in the future. If there is a reasonable prospect that even larger opportunities may arise in the near future and if there is some danger that borrowing now would preclude more borrowing later, the owners might find their interests best protected by splitting off the current opportunity into a separate subsidiary with independent financing. Clearly the problems involved in making the crucial estimates and in planning the optimal financial strategy are by no means trivial, even though they should have no bearing on the basic decision to invest (as long as ) .Another reason why the alternatives in financial plans may not be matter of indifference arises from the fact that managers are concerned with more than simply furthering the interest of the owners. Such other objectives of the management-which need not be necessarily in conflict with those of the owners-are much more likely to be served by some types of financing arrangements than others. In many forms of borrowing agreements, for example, creditors are able to stipulate terms which the current management may regard as infringing on its prerogatives or restricting its freedom to maneuver. The creditors might even be able to insist on having a direct voice in the formation of policy. To the extent, therefore, that financial policies have these implications for the management of the firm, something like the utility approach described in the introductory section becomes relevant to financial (as opposed to investment) decision-making. It is, however, the utility functions of the managers per se and not of the owners that are now involved.In summary, many of the specific considerations which bulk so large in traditional discussions of corporate finance can readily be superimposed on our simple framework without forcing any drastic (and certainly no systematic)alteration of the conclusion which is our principal concern, namely that for investment decisions, the marginal cost of capital isC. The Effect of the Corporate Income Tax on Investment DecisionsIn Section I it was shown that when an disintegrated corporate income tax is introduced, the original version of our Proposition I,Must be rewritten as:(11)Throughout Section I we found it convenient to refer to as the cost of capital. The appropriate measure of the cost of capital relevant to investment decisions, however, is the ratio of the expected return before taxes to the market value, i.e. , . From (11) above we find:（31）Which shows that the cost of capital now depends on the debt ratio, decreasing, as D/V rises, at the constant rate . Thus, with a corporate income tax under which interest is a deductible expense, gains can accrue to stockholders from having debt in the capital structure, even when capital markets are perfect. The gains however are small, as can be seen from (31), and as will be shown more explicitly below.From (31) we can develop the tax-adjusted counterpart of Proposition III by interpreting the term D/V in that equation as the proportion of debt used in any additional financing of V dollars. For example, in the case where the financing is entirely by new common stock, D=0 and the required rate of return S on a venture so financed becomes:（32）For the other extreme of pure debt financing D= V and the required rate of return, D, becomes:(33)For investments financed out of retained earnings, the problem of defining the required rate of return is more difficult since it involves a comparison of the tax consequences to the individual stockholder of receiving a dividend versus having a capital gain. Depending on the time of realization, a capital gain produced by retained earnings may be taxed either at ordinary income tax rates,50 per cent of these rates, 25 per cent, or zero, if held till death. The rate on any dividends received in the event of a distribution will also be a variable depending on the amount of other income received by the stockholder, and with the added complications introduced by the current dividend-credit provisions. If we assume that the managers proceed on the basis of reasonable estimates as to the average values of the relevant tax rates for the owners, then the required return for retained earnings R can be shown to be:（34）Where the assumed rate of personal income tax on dividends and is the assumed rate of tax on capital gains.A numerical illustration may perhaps be helpful in clarifying the relationship between these required rates of return. If we take the following round numbers as representative order-of-magnitude values under present conditions: an after-tax capitalization rate of 10 per cent, a rate of interest on bonds of 4 per cent, a corporate tax rate of 50 per cent, a marginal personal income tax rate on dividends of 40 per cent (corresponding to an income of about $25,000 on a joint return), and a capital gains rate of 20 per cent (one-half the marginal rate on dividends), then the required rates of return would be: (1) 20 per cent for investments financed entirely by issuance of new common shares; (2) 16 per cent for investments financed entirely by new debt; and (3) 15 per cent for investments financed wholly from internal funds.These results would seem to have considerable significance for current discussions of the effect of the corporate income tax on financial policy and on investment. Although we cannot explore the implications of the results in any detail here, we should at least like to call attention to the remarkably small difference between the "cost" of equity funds and debt funds. With the numerical valuesassumed, equity money turned out to be only 25 per cent more expensive than debt money, rather than something on the order of 5 times as expensive as is commonly supposed to be the case. The reason for the wide difference is that the traditional view starts from the position that debt funds are several times cheaper than equity funds even in the absence of taxes, with taxes serving simply to magnify the cost ratio in proportion to the corporate rate. By contrast, in our model in which the repercussions of debt financing on the value of shares are taken into account, the only difference in cost is that due to the tax effect, and its magnitude is simply the tax on the "grossed up" interest payment. Not only is this magnitude likely to be small but our analysis yields the further paradoxical implication that the stockholders' gain from, and hence incentive to use, debt financing is actually smaller the lower the rate of interest. In the extreme case where the firm could borrow for practically nothing, the advantage of debt financing would also be practically nothing.译文资本成本,公司财务和投资理论资料来源: / 作者：莫迪格利尼和米勒A 资本结构和投资政策在我们假设的基础上关于资本成本和财务结构，我们可以得出以下简单的关于企业最优投资政策的规律：命题Ⅲ：如果一个属于k 层级的企业在做决策的时候总是在股票持有者认为的最佳利率的行动，那么他将开发一个投资机会仅且仅当投资的期望回收利率*ρ大于或者等于k ρ时。
公司理财—第五章 资本成本课件
公司理财代码：07524讲师：欣欣老师第三节 边际成本与项目成本03第一节 财务决策法则 01第二节 资本成本计算模型02第五章 资本成本一、资本与资本成本P103（名词）1.资本：资本是指使用期限在一年以上的资金，即列示在资产负债表右方的长期负债和股东权益。
第一节 财务决策法则2.资本成本可以从机会成本、最低收益率、折现率三个角度进行分析。
同一概念应从两个角度理解：（1）筹资者的角度：取得资本所付出的代价（2）投资者的角度：投资者最低要求收益率二、投资决策法则P103（1）两条等价投资决策法则①净现值法则：接受净现值大于零的投资项目。
②收益率法则：接受预期收益率高于资本成本的投资项目。
（2）资本成本等于投资者于同一风险等级的普通股或其他有价证券要求的预期收益率。
（3）改变项目的融资方式并不一定能使一个不利的项目变成一个有利的项目。
第二节 资本成本计算模型筹资费率)(1债券发行额所得税税率)(1债券利息债券资本成本-⨯-⨯=一、债券资本成本（单选、计算）P106•长期债券资本成本主要是指债券利息和筹资费用。
•债券利息计入税前成本费用，可以起到抵税的作用。
分期付息、到期一次还本的资本成本的计算公式为：A公司额发行面值1000元、5年期、票面利率10%的公司债券，该债券每年付息一次，到期还本。
假设债券发行时的市场利率为8%，债券发行费用为发行价格的2%，公司的所得税税率为25%。
（P/A,8%,5）=3.9927 (P/F,8%,5)=0.6806要求：（1）计算该债券的发行价格。
（2）计算该债券的资本成本（列出公式）A公司额发行面值1000元、5年期、票面利率10%的公司债券，该债券每年付息一次，到期还本。
假设债券发行时的市场利率为8%，债券发行费用为发行价格的2%，公司的所得税税率为25%。
（P/A,8%,5）=3.9927 (P/F,8%,5)=0.6806要求：（1）计算该债券的发行价格。
发行价格=100×（P/A,8%,5）+1000×(P/F,8%,5)=1079.87A公司额发行面值1000元、5年期、票面利率10%的公司债券，该债券每年付息一次，到期还本。
资本成本 公司财务和投资理论 pdf
5
Two criteria
The cost of capital!
（1）the maximization of profits
firm !
the net profit!
increase!
physical asset!
worth acquiring!
If expected rate of return or yield >the rate of interest
uncertainty! ! the model of the firm constructed via this certainty or certainty-equivalent For example: Keynesian aggregate investment function Drawbacks: (1) macroeconomic level
Use!
Obtain!
! ! ! The holders' right to a pro-rata share! ! ! ! ! !
Acquire assets! !
Yields are uncertain! !
Pure debt instruments! !
Money-fixed claims! !
Байду номын сангаас
Pure equity issues! !
! ! !
The cost of capital!
2
?
!
to a firm
The cost of capital!
This question has vexed at least three classes of economists： （1）the corporation finance specialist （2） the managerial economist （3） the economic theorist! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
读《资本成本、公司理财、投资政策有感》
金融经济学课程论文从假设开始建造的理论花园——读《资本成本、公司理财与投资政策》有感现代企业的经营与金融市场的运行已经紧密地联系在一起，而融资的方式和方法对于企业的经营可以说具有决定性的意义。
所以企业的筹资和资金管理自公司金融诞生以来就一直是人们研究的重点和热点。
我们小组所要宣讲的这篇米勒和莫迪利安尼的《The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment 》（译为《资本成本，公司理财与投资政策》）自1958年在《美国经济评论》上刊登以来，一直被奉为公司金融学的开创性理论，并且论文中总结的MM 定理被不断延伸和发展。
作为经典中的经典，这篇论文在论证内容、理论架构和研究方法上都有着独特之处，值得我们推敲和学习、应用。
无论是资本结构还是公司理财，围绕的中心都是融资。
因为融资是企业发展最初、也是最为关键的一个环节。
企业就是在融资、投资、收益、再融资、投资这样的循环中发展起来的。
论文以融资为主题，通过三个命题，分别阐释了资本结构与企业价值的关系，有负债公司的股票资本成本以及企业投资决策。
这篇论文中并没有使用高深难懂的数学公式，出现的都是简单的计算，却很恰当地说明了问题。
论文的可取之处有很多，先说论文的主题融资。
任何企业的发展都离不开资金的充分支持。
企业融资行为会使企业经营者、股东和债权人之间发生权力、利益、责任的再分配，从而对企业的财务管理产生影响。
①企业融资方式决定了投资者对企业的控制程度和干预方式。
股权投资者一般通过直接参与制定公司的发展战略和重大决策与来参与公司管理，而债权人一般通过主张债务权利对企业实施影响，也就是所说的执行权和代理权。
②融资方式的决策决定企业破产可能性的大小。
股票投资者拥有对企业的剩余收入索取权和企业正常经营的控制权，债权人则拥有固定收入索取权和企业不能偿还债务时的破产权。
通常负债率越高，破产率越大。
公司理财翻译伯克
权益资本成本可以通过CAPM（资本资产定价模型）等模型进行计算，债务资本成本则可以通过利率、债券评级等因素确定。
资本成本的影响因素包括市场环境、公司风险、资金需求等。
在确定最优资本结构时，公司需要综合考虑各种因素，包括财务风险、融资成本、市场环境等，以实现公司价值的最大化。
合理的资本结构和资本成本可以为公司带来更大的竞争优势和市场份额，提高公司的盈利能力。
资本结构和资本成本是相互关联的两个概念，资本结构决策会影响公司的资本成本，而资本成本也会对公司的融资方式和资本结构产生影响。
投资决策
03
确定投资目标
明确公司的投资目标，如提高市场份额、降低成本、增加收益等。
评估投资机会
收集和筛选潜在的投资项目，评估其潜在的收益和风险。
制定投资计划
根据投资目标，制定具体的投资计划，包括投资金额、投资方式、预期回报等。
实施投资计划
按照投资计划进行投资，并跟踪投资的进展和效果。
对投资项目进行财务分析，评估其预期的收益和风险。
财务分析
对投资项目的风险进行评估，确定风险的大小和性质。
风险评估
详细描述
总结词：公司理财的领域包括投资决策、融资决策、营运资金管理和股利分配等，涵盖了公司财务管理的各个方面。
资本结构与资本成本
02
资本结构是指公司通过各种方式筹集资金的比例关系，包括权益资本和债务资本。
常见的资本结构调整方式包括增发股票、发行债券、资产剥离等。
资本结构决策需要考虑公司的财务状况、经营风险、税收政策等因素，以实现公司价值最大化的目标。
公司理财的创新与发展
06
随着科技的发展，公司理财正在向数字化转型，通过大数据、云计算等技术提高财务决策效率和准确性。
《公司理财》第10章-资本结构理论
• 一、无公司所得税时的MM理论
• （一）假设条件
• （1）所有的实物资产归公司所有，即公司拥有资产法人 所有权。这一假设为计算公司价值提供了理论依据。
• （2）资本市场无摩擦。没有公司及个人所得税，证券可 以无成本地、直接地交易或买卖，即没有证券交易印花税、 佣金，没有破产成本。
• （3）公司只能发行两种类型的证券，一种是有风险的股 票，另一种是无风险（信用风险）的债券。
• 分子代表无负债企业的收入在扣除了公司所得税和投资者 的股本所得税后的公司净利。
三、米勒模型
• 米勒模型内容-在考虑公司和个人所得税情况下，有
VL
VU
1
(1
TC )(1 1 TD
VS
)
D
1
(1 TC )(1VS 1 TD
)
D
TC：企业所得税；
二、有公司所得税时的MM定理
• 当公司负债后，由于负债利息是在税前列支，负债使得公 司应税所得额减少，进而缴纳的所得税减少，这一现象称 为“税盾效应”或“节税效应”，节省下来的税收利益增 加了公司的现金流量。
• 由于这部分现金流量是债务资本带来的，用债务资本成本 将其贴现为现值，即是节税价值。假设公司负债是永久性 的，节税价值的计算公式：
TS：加权平均的股利和资本利得税率；
TD:债券收入税；
代表负债的杠杆效应，负债带来的公司价值增加部分
公司理财资本成本
第三节 加权平均资本成本
例3，科思公司计划筹资100万元，所得税为30%。有关 资料如下： (1)向银行借款10万元，借款年利率为7%，手续费为2% (2)发行优先股25万元，预计年股利支付率为12%，筹资 费率为4% (3)发行普通股4万股，每股发行价格10元，筹资费率为 6%。本年度每股股利1.2元，以后每年按8%递增。 (4)其余所需资本通过 留存收益取得。 请计算各资本要素成本和加权平均资本成本？
第三节 加权平均资本成本
加权平均资本成本的影响因素：总体经济条件、公司证券 的流动性、公司内部的经营和融资条件、新项目投资的融 资规模。 加权平均资本成本的基本假设： 1. 基于新项目与公司当前的资产具有相同的经 营风险。 2. 新项目的融资结构与公司当前的资本结构相 同。 3. 公司的现金红利支付率保持不变。
课堂讨论：企业如何估计普通股融资成本？
1999年基于392位美国企业财务总监的问卷调查：
资料来源：Graham and Harvey(2001)，Journal of Financial Economics
课堂讨论：企业如何估计普通股融资成本？
2006年基于167家中国上市公司(A/B/H股)的问卷调查：
ki kd * (1 40%) 11.14% * (1 40%) 6.68%
第三节 加权平均资本成本
(3)留存收益的成本－股利常数增长模型
D1 0.35* (1 7%) Ks g 7% 13.81% P 5.5 0
留存收益的成本－资本资产定价模型
Ks rf ( Rm rf ) 5.5% 1.1* (13.5% 5.5%) 14.3%
第二节 资本要素成本的计算
二、优先股成本
资本成本,公司财务和投资理论【外文翻译】
外文翻译原文The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and Theory of InvestmentMaterial Source: http://ww.jstor.or Author: Franco Modigliani; Merton H. MillerA. Capital Structure and Investment PolicyOn the basis of our propositions with respect to cost of capital and financial structure (and for the moment neglecting tans), we can coercive the following simple rule for optimal investment policy by the firm:Proposition III. If a firm in class is acting in the best interest of the stockholders at the time of the decision, it will exploit an investment opportunity if and only if the rate of return on the investment, say , is as large as or larger than . That is, the cut-off point for investment in the firm will in all cases be and will be completely unaffected by the type of security used to finance the investment. Equivalently, we may say that regardless of the financing used, the marginal cost of capital to a firm is equal to the average cost of capital, which is in turn equal to the capitalization rate for an unlevered stream in the class to which the firm belongs.To establish this result we will consider the three major financing alternatives open to the firm-bonds, retained earnings, and common stock issues-and show that in each case an investment is worth undertaking if, and only if,.Consider first the case of an investment financed by the sale of bonds. We know from Proposition I that the market value of the firm before the investment was undertaken was:(20)And that the value of the common stock was:（21）If now the firm borrows I dollars to finance an investment yielding its market value will become:（22）And the value of its common stock will be:（23）Or using equation 21,（24）HenceTo illustrate, suppose the capitalization rate for uncertain streams in the class is 10 per cent and the rate of interest is 4 per cent. Then if a given company had an expected income of 1,000 and if it were financed entirely by common stock we know from Proposition I that the market value of its stock would be 10,000. Assume now that the managers of the firm discover an investment opportunity which will require an outlay of 100 and which is expected to yield 8 per cent. At first sight this might appear to be a profitable opportunity since the expected return is double the interest cost. If, however, the management borrows the necessary 100 at 4 per cent, the total expected income of the company rises to 1,008 and the market value of the firm to 10,080. But the firm now will have 100 of bonds in its capital structure so that, paradoxically, the market value of the stock must actually be reduced from 10,000 to 9,980 as a consequence of this apparently profitable investment. Or, to put it another way, the gains from being able to tap cheap, borrowed funds are more than offset for the stockholders by the market's discounting of the stock for the added leverage assumed.Consider next the case of retained earnings. Suppose that in the course of its operations the firm acquired I dollars of cash (without impairing the earning power of its assets). If the cash is distributed as a dividend to the stockholders their wealth , after the distribution will be:(25)Where represents the expected return from the assets exclusive of I in question. If however the funds are retained by the company and used to finance newassets whose expected rate of return is , then the stockholders' wealth would become:(26)Clearly as so that an investment financed by retained earnings raises the net worth of the owners if and only if .Consider finally, the case of common-stock financing. Let Po denote the current market price per share of stock and assume, for simplicity, that this price reflects currently expected earnings only, that is, it does not reflect any future increase in earnings as a result of the investment under consideration. Then if N is the original number of shares, the price per share is:(27)And the number of new shares, M, needed to finance an investment of I dollars is given by:(28)As a result of the investment the market value of the stock becomes:And the price per share:(29)Since by equation (28), I= M Po, we can add M Po and subtract from the quantity in bracket, obtaining:(30)and only if.Thus an investment financed by common stock is advantageous to the current stockholders if and only if its yield exceeds the capitalization rate .Once again a numerical example may help to illustrate the result and make it clear why the relevant cut-off rate is and not the current yield on common stock,i.e. Suppose that is 10 per cent, r is 4 per cent, that the original expected income of our company is 1,000 and that management has the opportunity of investing 100 having an expected yield of 12 per cent. If the original capital structure is 50 per cent debt and 50 per cent equity, and 1,000 shares of stock are initially outstanding, then, by Proposition I, the market value of the common stock must be 5,000 or 5 per share. Furthermore, since the interest bill is .045,000 =200, the yield on common stock is 800/5,000=16 per cent. It may then appear that financing the additional investment of 100 by issuing 20 shares to outsiders at 5 per share would dilute the equity of the original owners since the 100 promises to yield 12 per cent whereas the common stock is currently yielding 16 per cent. Actually, however, the income of the company would rise to 1,012; the value of the firm to 10,120; and the value of the common stock to 5,120. Since there are now 1,020 shares, each would be worth 5.02 and the wealth of the original stockholders would thus have been increased. What has happened is that the dilution in expected earnings per share (from .80 to .796) has been more than offset, in its effect upon the market price of the shares, by the decrease in leverage.Our conclusion is, once again, at variance with conventional views, so much so as to be easily misinterpreted. Read hastily, Proposition III seems to imply, that the capital structure of a firm is a matter of indifference; and that, consequently, one of the core problems of corporate finance-the problem of the optimal capital structure for a firm-is no problem at all. It may be helpful, therefore, to clear up such possible misunderstandings.B. Proposition III and Financial Planning by FirmsMisinterpretation of the scope of Proposition III can be avoided by remembering that this Proposition tells us only that the type of instrument used to finance an investment is irrelevant to the question of whether or not the investment is worth while. This does not mean that the owners (or the managers) have no grounds whatever for preferring one financing plan to another; or that there are no other policy or technical issues in finance at the level of the firm.That grounds for preferring one type of financial structure to another will still exist within the framework of our model can readily be seen for the case of common-stock financing. In general, except for something like a widely publicized oil-strike, we would expect the market to place very heavy weight on current and recent past earnings in forming expectations as to future returns. Hence, if the owners of a firm discovered a major investment opportunity which they feltwould yield much more than ,they might well prefer not to finance it via common stock at the then ruling price, because this price may fail to capitalize the new venture. A better course would be a pre-emptive issue of stock (and in this connection it should be remembered that stockholders are free to borrow and buy). Another possibility would be to finance the project initially with debt. Once the project had reflected itself in increased actual earnings, the debt could be retired either with a11 equity issue at much better prices or through retained earnings. Still another possibility along the same lines might be to combine the two steps by means of a convertible debenture or preferred stock, perhaps with a progressively declining conversion rate. Even such a double-stage financing plan may possibly be regarded as yielding too large a share to outsiders since the new stockholders are, in effect, being given an crest in any similar opportunities the firm may discover in the future. If there is a reasonable prospect that even larger opportunities may arise in the near future and if there is some danger that borrowing now would preclude more borrowing later, the owners might find their interests best protected by splitting off the current opportunity into a separate subsidiary with independent financing. Clearly the problems involved in making the crucial estimates and in planning the optimal financial strategy are by no means trivial, even though they should have no bearing on the basic decision to invest (as long as ) .Another reason why the alternatives in financial plans may not be matter of indifference arises from the fact that managers are concerned with more than simply furthering the interest of the owners. Such other objectives of the management-which need not be necessarily in conflict with those of the owners-are much more likely to be served by some types of financing arrangements than others. In many forms of borrowing agreements, for example, creditors are able to stipulate terms which the current management may regard as infringing on its prerogatives or restricting its freedom to maneuver. The creditors might even be able to insist on having a direct voice in the formation of policy. To the extent, therefore, that financial policies have these implications for the management of the firm, something like the utility approach described in the introductory section becomes relevant to financial (as opposed to investment) decision-making. It is, however, the utility functions of the managers per se and not of the owners that are now involved.In summary, many of the specific considerations which bulk so large in traditional discussions of corporate finance can readily be superimposed on our simple framework without forcing any drastic (and certainly no systematic)alteration of the conclusion which is our principal concern, namely that for investment decisions, the marginal cost of capital isC. The Effect of the Corporate Income Tax on Investment DecisionsIn Section I it was shown that when an disintegrated corporate income tax is introduced, the original version of our Proposition I,Must be rewritten as:(11)Throughout Section I we found it convenient to refer to as the cost of capital. The appropriate measure of the cost of capital relevant to investment decisions, however, is the ratio of the expected return before taxes to the market value, i.e. , . From (11) above we find:（31）Which shows that the cost of capital now depends on the debt ratio, decreasing, as D/V rises, at the constant rate . Thus, with a corporate income tax under which interest is a deductible expense, gains can accrue to stockholders from having debt in the capital structure, even when capital markets are perfect. The gains however are small, as can be seen from (31), and as will be shown more explicitly below.From (31) we can develop the tax-adjusted counterpart of Proposition III by interpreting the term D/V in that equation as the proportion of debt used in any additional financing of V dollars. For example, in the case where the financing is entirely by new common stock, D=0 and the required rate of return S on a venture so financed becomes:（32）For the other extreme of pure debt financing D= V and the required rate of return, D, becomes:(33)For investments financed out of retained earnings, the problem of defining the required rate of return is more difficult since it involves a comparison of the tax consequences to the individual stockholder of receiving a dividend versus having a capital gain. Depending on the time of realization, a capital gain produced by retained earnings may be taxed either at ordinary income tax rates,50 per cent of these rates, 25 per cent, or zero, if held till death. The rate on any dividends received in the event of a distribution will also be a variable depending on the amount of other income received by the stockholder, and with the added complications introduced by the current dividend-credit provisions. If we assume that the managers proceed on the basis of reasonable estimates as to the average values of the relevant tax rates for the owners, then the required return for retained earnings R can be shown to be:（34）Where the assumed rate of personal income tax on dividends and is the assumed rate of tax on capital gains.A numerical illustration may perhaps be helpful in clarifying the relationship between these required rates of return. If we take the following round numbers as representative order-of-magnitude values under present conditions: an after-tax capitalization rate of 10 per cent, a rate of interest on bonds of 4 per cent, a corporate tax rate of 50 per cent, a marginal personal income tax rate on dividends of 40 per cent (corresponding to an income of about $25,000 on a joint return), and a capital gains rate of 20 per cent (one-half the marginal rate on dividends), then the required rates of return would be: (1) 20 per cent for investments financed entirely by issuance of new common shares; (2) 16 per cent for investments financed entirely by new debt; and (3) 15 per cent for investments financed wholly from internal funds.These results would seem to have considerable significance for current discussions of the effect of the corporate income tax on financial policy and on investment. Although we cannot explore the implications of the results in any detail here, we should at least like to call attention to the remarkably small difference between the "cost" of equity funds and debt funds. With the numerical valuesassumed, equity money turned out to be only 25 per cent more expensive than debt money, rather than something on the order of 5 times as expensive as is commonly supposed to be the case. The reason for the wide difference is that the traditional view starts from the position that debt funds are several times cheaper than equity funds even in the absence of taxes, with taxes serving simply to magnify the cost ratio in proportion to the corporate rate. By contrast, in our model in which the repercussions of debt financing on the value of shares are taken into account, the only difference in cost is that due to the tax effect, and its magnitude is simply the tax on the "grossed up" interest payment. Not only is this magnitude likely to be small but our analysis yields the further paradoxical implication that the stockholders' gain from, and hence incentive to use, debt financing is actually smaller the lower the rate of interest. In the extreme case where the firm could borrow for practically nothing, the advantage of debt financing would also be practically nothing.译文资本成本,公司财务和投资理论资料来源: / 作者：莫迪格利尼和米勒A 资本结构和投资政策在我们假设的基础上关于资本成本和财务结构，我们可以得出以下简单的关于企业最优投资政策的规律：命题Ⅲ：如果一个属于k 层级的企业在做决策的时候总是在股票持有者认为的最佳利率的行动，那么他将开发一个投资机会仅且仅当投资的期望回收利率*ρ大于或者等于k ρ时。
资本成本,公司财务和投资理论【外文翻译】
外文翻译THE COST OF CAPITAL, CORPORATION FINANCE AND THETHEORY OF INVESTMIENTMaterial Source: American Economics Review,V ol.48,No.3(Jun,1958),261-297 Author:Franco Modigliani and Merton H. MillerWhat is the "cost of capital" to a firm in a world in which funds are used to acquire assets whose yields are uncertain; and in which capital can be obtained by many different media, ranging from pure debt instruments, representing money fixed claims, to pure equity issues, giving holders only the right to a prorata share in the uncertain venture.? This question has vexed at least three classes of economists: (1) the corporation finance specialist concerned with the techniques of financing firms so as to ensure their survival and growth; (2) the managerial economist concerned with capital budgeting; and (3) the economic theorist concerned with explaining investment behavior at both the micro and macro levels.In much of his formal analysis, the economic theorist at least has tended to sidestep the essence of this cost of capital problem by proceeding as though physical assets like bonds could be regarded as yielding known, sure streams. Given this assumption, the theorist has concluded that the cost of capital to the owners of a firm is simply the rate of interest on bonds; and has derived the familiar proposition that the firm, acting rationally, will tend to push investment to the point where the marginal yield on physical assets is equal to the market rate of interest. This proposition can be shown to follow from either of two criteria of rational decision making which are equivalent under certainty, namely (1) the maximization of profits and (2) the maximization of market value.According to the first criterion, a physical asset is worth acquiring if it will increase the net profit of the owners of the firm. But net profit will increase only if the expected rate of return, or yield, of the asset exceeds the rate of interest. According to the second criterion, an asset is worth acquiring if it increases the value of the owners' equity, i.e., if it adds more to the market value of the firm than the costs of acquisition. But what the asset adds is given by capitalizing the stream it generates at the market rate of interest, and this capitalized value will exceed its costif and only if the yield of the asset exceeds the rate of interest. Note that, under either formulation, the cost of capital is equal to the rate of interest on bonds, regardless of whether the funds are acquired through debt instruments or through new issues of common stock. Indeed, in a world of sure returns, the distinction between debt and equity funds reduces largely to one of terminology.It must be acknowledged that some attempt is usually made in this type of analysis to allow for the existence of uncertainty. This attempt typically takes the form of superimposing on the results of the certainty analysis the notion of a "risk discount" to be subtracted from the expected yield (or a "risk premium" to be added to the market rate of interest). Investment decisions are then supposed to be based on a comparison of this "risk adjusted" or "certainty equivalent" yield with the market rate of interest. No satisfactory explanation has yet been provided, however, as to what determines the size of the risk discount and how it varies in response to changes in other variables.Considered as a convenient approximation, the model of the firm constructed via this certainty or certainty equivalent approach has admittedly been useful in dealing with some of the grosser aspects of the processes of capital accumulation and economic fluctuations. Such a model underlies, for example, the familiar Keynesian aggregate investment function in which aggregate investment is written as a function of the rate of interest the same riskless rate of interest which appears later in the system in the liquidity preference equation. Yet few would maintain that this approximation is adequate. At the macroeconomic level there are ample grounds for doubting that the rate of interest has as large and as direct an influence on the rate of investment as this analysis would lead us to believe. At the microeconomic level the certainty model has little descriptive value and provides no real guidance to the finance specialist or managerial economist whose main problems cannot be treated in a framework which deals so cavalierly with uncertainty and ignores all forms of financing other than debt issues.Only recently have economists begun to face up seriously to the problem of the cost of capital cum risk. In the process they have found their interests and endeavors merging with those of the finance specialist and the managerial economist who have lived with the problem longer and more intimately. In this joint search to establish the principles which govern rational investment and financial policy in a world of uncertainty two main lines of attack can be discerned. These lines represent, in effect, attempts to extrapolate to the world of uncertainty each of the two criteriaprofitmaximization and market value maximization which were seen to have equivalent implications in the special case of certainty. With the recognition of uncertainty this equivalence vanishes. In fact, the profit maximization criterion is no longer even well defined. Under uncertainty there corresponds to each decision of the firm not a unique profit outcome, but a plurality of mutually exclusive outcomes which can at best be described by a subjective probability distribution. The profit outcome, in short, has become a random variable and as such its maximization no longer has an operational meaning. Nor can this difficulty generally be disposed of by using the mathematical expectation of profits as the variable to be maximized. For decisions which affect the expected value will also tend to affect the dispersion and other characteristics of the distribution of outcomes. In particular, the use of debt rather than equity funds to finance a given venture may well increase the expected return to the owners, but only at the cost of increased dispersion of the outcomes.Under these conditions the profit outcomes of alternative investment and financing decisions can be compared and ranked only in terms of a subjective "utility function" of the owners which weighs the expected yield against other characteristics of the distribution. Accordingly, the extrapolation of the profit maximization criterion of the certainty model has tended to evolve into utility maximization, sometimes explicitly, more frequently in a qualitative and heuristic form.The utility approach undoubtedly represents an advance over the certainty or certainty equivalent approach. It does at least permit us to explore (within limits)some of the implications of different financing arrangements, and it does give some meaning to the "cost" of different types of funds. However, because the cost of capital has become an essentially subjective concept, the utility approach has serious drawbacks for normative as well as analytical purposes. How, for example, is management to ascertain the risk preferences of its stockholders and to compromise among their tastes? And how can the economist build a meaningful investment function in the face of the fact that any given investment opportunity might or might not be worth exploiting depending on precisely who happen to be the owners of the firm at the moment?Fortunately, these questions do not have to be answered; for the alternative approach, based on market value maximization, can provide the basis for an operational definition of the cost of capital and a workable theory of investment. Under this approach any investment project and its concomitant financing plan mustpass only the following test: Will the project, as financed, raise the market value of the firm's shares? If so, it is worth undertaking; if not, its return is less than the marginal cost of capital to the firm. Note that such a test is entirely independent of the tastes of the current owners, since market prices will reflect not only their preferences but those of all potential owners as well. If any current stockholder disagrees with management and the market over the valuation of the project, he is free to sell out and reinvest elsewhere, but will still benefit from the capital appreciation resulting from man agement's decision.The potential advantages of the marketvalue approach have long been appreciated; yet analytical results have been meager. What appears to be keeping this line of development from achieving its promise is largely the lack of an adequate theory of the effect of financial structure on market valuations, and of how these effects can be inferred from objective market data.Our procedure will be to develop in Section I the basic theory itself and to give some brief account of its empirical relevance. In Section II, we show how the theory can be used to answer the cost of capital question and how it permits us to develop a theory of investment of the firm under conditions of uncertainty. Throughout these sections the approach is essentially a partial equilibrium one focusing on the firm and "industry." Accordingly, the "prices" of certain income streams will be treated as constant and given from outside the model, just as in the standard Marshallian analysis of the firm and industry the prices of all inputs and of all other products are taken as given. We have chosen to focus at this level rather than on the economy as a whole because it is at the level of the firm and the industry that the interests of the various specialists concerned with the cost-of-capital problem come most closely together. Although the emphasis has thus been placed on partial equilibrium analysis, the results obtained also provide the essential building blocks for a general equilibrium model which shows how those prices which are here taken as given, are themselves determined.With the development of Proposition III the main objectives we out- lined in our introductory discussion have been reached. We have in our Propositions I and II at least the foundations of a theory of the valuation of firms and shares in a world of uncertainty. We have shown, moreover, how this theory can lead to an operational definition of the cost of capital and how that concept can be used in turn as a basis for rational investment decision making within the firm. Needless to say, however, much remains to be done before the cost of capital can be put away on the shelfamong the solved problems. Our approach has been that of static, partial equilibrium analysis. It has assumed among other things a state of atomistic competition in the capital markets and an ease of access to those markets which only a relatively small (though important) group of firms even come close to possessing. These and other drastic simplifications have been necessary in order to come to grips with the problem at all. Having served their purpose they can now be relaxed in the direction of greater realism and relevance, a task in which we hope others interested in this area will wish to share.译文资本成本，公司财务和投资理论资料来源:美国经济评论作者：弗兰克·莫迪格利尼和莫顿·米勒对于一个企业来说什么是资本成本？资金用于收购资产的收益是不确定的，资本可以通过许多不同的渠道获取，可以发行债券、要求代表固定资金、发行普通股；只在不确定性风险下给予持有者同比例增长的权利。
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读《资本成本公司理财和投资理论》读《资本成本、公司理财和投资理论》对于现代金融学来说，投资组合理论、MM定理、CAPM和APT是其赖以发展的基石。
我们小组研读的这篇《资本成本、公司理财和投资理论》由莫迪格里尼和米勒于1958年发表于《美国经济评论》，在这篇文章中，作者提出：在一定的条件下，企业无论以负债筹资还是以权益资本筹资都不影响企业的市场总价值。
因为，如果企业偏好债务筹资，债务比例相应上升，企业的风险随之增大，股票价格就会下降。
企业从债务筹资上得到的好处会被股票价格的下跌所抹掉，从而导致企业的总价值（股票加上债务）不变。
企业以不同的方式筹资只是改变了企业的总价值在股权者和债权者之间分割的比例，却不改变企业价值的总额。
这就是被誉为现代金融学benchmark之一的“MM定理”。
一、问题的提出本文开篇，作者就提出了“什么是资本成本”的问题。
从资本成本的角度出发考虑公司理性决策问题。
而这一问题的衡量标准有两个①利润最大化；②公司价值最大化。
作者首先详细分析了传统理论中关于资本成本影响理性公司投资决策的研究中，没有考虑风险因素而带来的种种不足：不考虑风险则两大衡量标准一致，都是在投资收益率高于等于利率时投资，债务融资和股权融资的资本成本都等于债券利率。
作者指出，传统分析方法如采用确定性等价的近似分析法——在期望收益中加上风险折现（或在市场利率的基础上加上风险溢价）——在微观层面上的价值很小。
考虑风险因素时，采用利润最大化标准的思路无法解决很多问题※，因而作者提出应当选用市场价值最大化作为衡量公司投资决策是否理性的标准。
由这个标准出发考虑资本成本，进一步研究公司的资本结构与公司价值之间的关系。
基于市场价值最大化，可以提供一个可以操作的资本成本的定义和可行的投资理论。
在这种方法下，任何投资项目和相关的融资计划仅需要考虑：该融资项目是否能增加公司股票的市场价值。
这种思路完全独立于当前所有者的偏好，很好的解决了利润最大化无法解决的问题。
二、本文的基本思路和前提假设论文的第一部分是基本理论本身（命题1和命题2）和相关经验性的简介。
第二部分在第一部分的基础商讨论有关资本成本的问题和不确定条件下公司投资理论的发展（命题3）。
作者采用局部均衡分析（不考虑税收、利率变化等），视确定收入现金流的价格连续的模型外生的量，在文中提出了三个命题。
其中，最重要的是命题1，命题2、3都是由命题1推导出来的。
MM定理的证明过程使用了套利均衡理论作为其主要的证明方法，最重要的假设前提是完美市场，在这个市场上无交易成本、无税收而且无套利。
这就保证了资本结构不影响公司现金流量，即在满足假定条件时分配给公司债权人和股东的所有未来现金流量之和不受资本结构影响。
MM定理的主要假设如下：1.公司拥有经济中的所有实物资产。
公司可以通过发行普通股和公司债的方式来筹集实物资产投资所需的资金。
先假定公司只能通过发行普通股来筹措资金，第一部分的下半部分再考虑公司发行债券或它们的等价物作为公司资金的来源。
2.假定一段时期后自然相应增加到某一股份的收益流的平均值是有限的、且对于概率分布而言是一个随机变量，取平均值的数学期望值作为这一股份的期望收益。
假设个人投资者关于期望收益的看法是一致的。
3.（战略性地位的假设）公司都可按一定的标准化为“等价收益类”，任一公司发行任何一类的股票的收益都可和其他公司发行的同类股票的收益成比例。
这一假设的重要性在于，可以把公司分成不同的组（类型），每一组里不同公司的股票都是“同类”的，即：彼此是可以替代的。
在任一类中，每一股的价格必须与其期望收益呈比例。
这个比例用连续变量ρk *表示。
4.资本市场为完全竞争市场，套利是自由的，交易成本忽略不计。
5.所有的债券（公司融资债券和个人的负债）均可获得一个稳定而固定的收益率。
公司利用公司融资时的利率与个人用股票担保借入资金时的利率均为一定并且相等。
同时，不考虑利率的期限结构。
6.公司投融资的目的是企业市场价值最大化，与股东利益最大化一致。
7.利率不随着杠杆经营而增长。
本文作者通过分析论证：在完全竞争的市场环境中，企业的价值与企业资本结构无关。
但在考虑公司税赋成本时，由于利息支出为税前列支项目，而股利为税后项目，因而债务融资成本低于股权融资，随着企业资本结构中的负债率的提高，企业价值也得以增加，最理想的企业资本结构是100%债务融资。
三、命题的提出及推导过程命题1：即：任何公司的市场价值独立于资本结构之外，是其期望收益与它的类相关的比率（资本化率）。
将上述恒等式变形为：。
即：任何公司的平均资本成本完全独立于它的资本结构，并等于它所属类的纯股票流的资本化率。
推导：要证明上述命题成立，只需证明如果时，套利将发生恢复这种相等关系。
证明如下：假定属同一类的两家公司1和公司2的预期收益相同，即预期收益；为债券利率，根据假设5有公司债券利率和个人信用借债利率相同。
公司1：完全普通股融资，资本结构为，：公司2：资本结构既含股又含债为，。
情形一：时，可构造如下投资组合：——投资者持有的公司2的股份，即：。
投资收益——投资者持有公司1的股份且，其中为投资者最初持有，部分是投资者个人信用借入；因为，则投资收益套利过程，最终使得；情形二：时，可构造如下投资组合：——投资者持有的公司1的股份，即：投资收益——投资者持有公司2的数量为的股份和数量为的债券，且。
其中，；投资收益套利过程，最终使得。
命题1证毕。
命题2：对于属于k类的任何公司j，其在股票上的期望收益或产出率i可用杠杆的线性函数表示成：。
其中，代表每股期望收益率，代表与融资风险相关的贴水，代表公司的杠杆，代表k类中每股纯股票流的资本化率。
推导：，将代入命题等式中的右边有：右边左边：；显然命题等式中左边=右边，命题2证毕。
仔细观察将其变形可得：这个公式与后来的CAPM定价公式极为相似。
可以看出二者之间关系紧密，且都使用套利均衡理论为主要证明方法。
命题3：公司投资的截止点在任何情况下都是，并且完全不受融资的证券类型的影响。
即不考虑公司所使用的融资方式，一个公司的边际资本成本等同于资本的平均成本，后者接着等于公司所属类的非杠杆经营流的资本化率。
命题3实际上基于前面两个命题成立的情况下（忽略税收不计）给出的投资政策——若k类中的一公司在决策时按照最有利于股东利益的行为进行，当且仅当投资收益率时才会利用投资机会。
推导：考虑三种融资方式——债券、留存收益和发行普通股——每一种情况下，当且仅当投资收益率时才会利用投资机会。
⑴发行债券融资；最有利于股东利益的目标——股票市场价值增加投资前：投资：则：显然，时，，根据目标，则只有时才会利用投资机会。
⑵利用留存收益；最有利于股东利益的目标：股东财富增加A：公司将留存收益（不损害其资产的盈利能力）作为股息分配到股东，分配后股东财富B：公司将留存收益用于筹措期望收益率为的新资产，投资后股东财富显然，时，，根据目标，则只有时才会利用投资机会。
⑶发行普通股融资；最有利于股东利益的目标：股票价格上升代表每股股票的当前市场价值（只反映当前的期望收益）代表原来股票数量代表发行的新股数量，有如下关系：，发行新股后，显然，时，，根据目标，则只有时才会利用投资机会。
命题3证毕。
根据命题3，似乎很容易得出一个结论，就是既然公司投资的标准是，那么不需要考虑选择哪项融资工具（债券、留存收益和发行普通股）。
作者指出，这样的结论是错误的。
虽然，根据命题3融资工具类型与投资无关，但是，所有者或者经理的偏好、选择将导致融资计划的不同。
由于经理的目标不一定等于增加所有者利益，或者经理人的其他目标（这些目标不一定与所有者的目标冲突）使得经理人更可能选择某一而不是其他类型的融资安排。
例如，许多借款协议中，债权人可以规定一些条件，而管理层会认为这些条件冒犯了它的特权或限制了它可操作的自由而不选择借款协议。
在现实中，经理人考虑到普通股可能会导致投资的资本化无效，首先不会选择普通股融资。
比较常见的融资方式选择是①发行优先购股权；②债务融资；③可转换债券或优先股。
而决定经理人的偏好就需要考察经理人的效用函数而不是所有者的效用函数。
对于这个问题，在本文中作者并没有深入讨论。
考虑税收的影响：此前的三大命题分析中并没有考虑税后的影响，作者在文章最后一部分考虑了税收以后的资本成本（股票、债券、留存收益）问题。
为了简化分析，作者使用的是平均税率，用表示公司所得税率。
考虑公司所得税以后，化简后有：，显然，当时，以下降。
作者得出的结论是：对利息作为扣除费用的公司所得税，股东可以从有债务的资本结构中获得累积的利得，这种利得很小。
当D=0，即全部发股融资时，利用股票融资的平均资本成本：；当D=V，即全部发债融资时，利用债券融资的平均资本成本：；当公司全部利用留存收益融资时，令代表股利个人所得税，代表资本利得税；则利用留存收益融资的平均资本成本为：作者最后还举了一个例子，当=10%，=4%，=50%，=40%，==20%。
代入上述公式可得=20%；=16%；=15%。
可以看出三种融资方式的平均资本成本是逐渐下降的，这也暗含了优序融资（peckingorder）的思想。
四、MM定理的实证分析基础命题的一些限制和扩展，现有的方法和结论可以衍生到很多有用的方面，在这里我们仅考虑3点：（1）允许税前的利息扣除（2）承认债券和利率的多样性存在（3）承认现实市场的不完善可能会影响套利行为在这一部份中前两个将要在这一部份给与简要的说明，在第二部分中将对税收问题作进一步的说明。
市场的不完善将要在1部分说明。
现代方法中公司税收的效应。
利息在计算公司利润中的扣除将会阻止套利行为，而套利行为使给定类型的所有企业的价值与其实物资产所产生的预期收益成比例。
相反，每一类型的企业的市场价值与其扣税以后的预期收益（也就是，所支付的利息和预期的股东净收入之和）成比例。
这也就是说我们将用扣税后的总收入来代替原来的，将原命题一盒命题二改写。
虽然改写后命题的形式没有受影响，但有一些解释必须改变。
特别是，税后资本化率不能再解释为资本的平均成本。
和真实的平均成本之间的差别，在我们看来与公司的投资计划有关。
为了描述市场行为，也就是我们所关心的，这种差别是不重要的。
虽然只有在不考虑税收的情况下两者才是严格一致的，但为了表达简单和标准论文中术语的连贯性，我们仍然把视为资本的平均成本。
债券和利率多样性的效果。
在现存的资本市场上，我们发现不是一个而是所有的利率都会根据期限，贷款技术规定，现实目的的相关性，和贷款者融资条件的不同而不同。
经济理论和市场经验都说明随着贷款企业（或个人）债务与股权比率的上升，借款人所要求的收益增加。
如果是这样，我们可以假设存在这样的一个收益曲线，不论其具体的形式是怎么样的，它对所有贷款者都是一样的，然后我们可以将我们的命题扩展成借款供给递增的曲线。