P2P网络借贷国内外理论与实践研究文献综述
第一章 P2P网贷综述
第一章 P2P网贷综述一、 P2P网络借贷的概念1.定义:P2P（peer to peer）是一个互联网学理概念，是peer-to-peer 或person-to-person 的简写，意思是：个人对个人。
表示了互联网的端对端信息交互方式和关系发生特征。
2.特点:在P2P传入中国之后，有了一定的改变。
其特点上也有了中国式的味道。
其一，借贷双方的广泛性。
其二，交易方式的灵活性和高效性。
其三，风险性与收益率双高。
其四，互联网技术的运用。
二、P2P网络借贷的发展历程1、国外发展历程也许，很多人现在都知道P2P就是一种网上借贷的互联网金融模式，但是，对于P2P的发展历史却全无所知。
说起来，P2P网贷的发展其实也挺有意思的故事性的。
P2P小额借贷是一种将非常小额度的资金聚集起来借贷给有资金需求人群的一种商业模型。
它的社会价值主要体现在满足个人资金需求、发展个人信用体系和提高社会闲散资金利用率三个方面，由2006年“诺贝尔和平奖”得主穆罕默德·尤努斯教授首创。
1976年，在一次乡村调查中，穆罕默德·尤努斯教授把27美元借给了42位贫困的村民，以支付他们用以制作竹凳的微薄成本，免受高利贷的盘剥。
由此开启他的小额贷款之路。
1979年，他在国有商业银行体系内部创立了格莱珉分行，开始为贫困的孟加拉妇女提供小额贷款业务。
而P2P网贷模式的雏形，是英国人理查德·杜瓦、詹姆斯·亚历山大、萨拉·马休斯和大卫·尼克尔森4位年轻人共同创造的。
2005年3月，他们创办的全球第一家P2P网贷平台Zopa在伦敦上线运营。
如今Zopa的业务已扩至意大利、美国和日本，平均每天线上的投资额达200多万英镑。
截止2013年年底，Zopa累积成交金额超过4.7亿英镑，而仅仅有45位员工。
Prosper也是在2005年成立的，Lending Club则是成立于2007年。
虽然Zopa、Prosper和Lending Club成立的时间不同，但其创始人却有着相似的创业理念。
我国P2P网络借贷风险管控文献综述
P2P网络借贷风险管控文献综述
摘 要：自2007年我国第一家P2P网络借贷（后文简
）平台“拍拍贷”成立以来，随着互联网技术的
P2P网贷平台得到了迅猛的发展。
P2P网贷
P2P网贷的风险分
P2P网贷风险的主要研究观点及风险管控
P2P网贷发展的方向。
关键词：P2P网络借贷；风险；管控
一、我国P2P网贷发展现状
财政税收与资本市场，2015（2）.
[2] 唐艺军，葛世星.我国P2P网络信贷风险控制实证分
[J].商业研究，2015（10）.
[3] 叶湘榕.P2P借贷的模式风险与监管研究[J].金融监管
2014（3）.
[4] 陈向聪.P2P网络借贷在我国发展面临的法律风险及
[J].海峡法学，2014（4）.
2014）借鉴美国Prosper和
的成功经验，对国内平台提出相关建议：首先
2014）对网贷平台、借款人、贷款人、担保人分
四、我国P2P网贷未来发展方向
借鉴前文的风险分析与管控策略，本文拟提出一些P2P
（作者单位：西安外国语大学）
参考文献：
[1] 卢馨，李慧敏.P2P网络借贷的运行模式与风险管控
（四） 政策法律风险
卢馨、李慧敏（2015）指出由于目前还没有专门约束P2P
2014）认为我国P2P平台的性质（中介服务机
（五）非法集资风险
P2P借贷采用公开方式为进款人提供资金，在我国从一
P2P平
P2P借贷平台除了承担信用中介乃至资金中
陈向聪（2014）认为一些P2P网贷平台的债权合同转让
[5] 贾希凌，马秋萍.P2P网贷平台的主要风险及防范策
[J].上海商学院学报，2014（4）.
p2p网络借贷研究评述
P2P网络借贷研究评述【摘要】本文梳理了P2P网络借贷平台出现至今研究该领域的主要文献，主要从三个方面进行归纳：一是关于P2P网络借贷成功率的研究；二是关于P2P网络借贷中借款利率的研究；三是关于P2P网络借贷其他方面的研究。
本文总结了主要代表性研究的重要观点并进行评述，同时也指出了现有研究的不足之处，并提出了一些进一步研究的建议。
【关键词】P2P网络借贷；借款成功率；借款利率【中图分类号】F830.5【文献标识码】A【文章编号】1004-0994（2016）28-0107-4齐培潇1，2（博士）一、引言随着金融市场的不断完善以及互联网的不断发展和普及，信贷市场中出现了一种新型的借贷模式，即P2P网络借贷模式（Online Peer to Peer Lending）。
在这种模式中，资金提供者与需求者通过P2P网络借贷平台实现了资金的供需匹配。
P2P网络借贷平台属于借贷行为中的中间服务方。
P2P网络借贷出现的背景是正规金融机构一直未能有效解决中小企业融资问题，而以互联网为代表的信息技术的普及，减少了信息不对称和交易成本，并弥补了正规金融机构的不足，借款人可以获得比民间借贷更便利的信用融资渠道，同时付出更低的借款成本（谢平等，2014）。
P2P网络借贷模式不需要金融机构的直接参与，借贷行为的实施与完成主要由出资人和借款人共同决定，借贷平台只是给出资人和借款人提供一个双方交易的中间平台。
借助网络借贷平台，借款人可首先发布借款标，并说明其借款用途或目的，同时提供个人财务状况等信息，如果有出资人对这些借款条件感到满意，并具备相应的资金实力，便可向借款人提供贷款。
对于一个借款标，可以由一个出资人完成投标，也可由两个或两个以上的出资人共同完成投标，直到借款标的金额满额为止。
对借款人而言，P2P网络借贷是不用通过传统金融机构就可能获得贷款的一种新的融资方式，而且可能比通过传统银行来寻求贷款更方便；对出资人而言，P2P 网络借贷可以看作是一种投资行为，其购买的实际上是针对借款人的信用贷款（谢平等，2014）。
P2P网络借贷行业研究必要性和研究方法总结（共5篇）
P2P网络借贷行业研究必要性和研究方法总结（共5篇）第一篇：P2P 网络借贷行业研究必要性和研究方法总结P2P 网络借贷行业研究必要性和研究方法总结P2P网络借贷行业发源于英国，成熟于美国，并于2006年传入我国且逐渐发展繁荣。
继2007年我国第一家P2P借贷公司--拍拍贷成立后，国内P2P借贷公司如雨后春笋般迅猛发展。
P2P网络借贷在我国发展已有8年之余，作为一项新兴事物，它在一步步摸索中逐渐成长。
一路的摸爬滚打中，既赢得了掌声，也受到了无数质疑与抨击。
一方面，P2P网络借贷将互联网金融的普惠性发挥得淋漓尽致，帮助许多中小企业及个人解决了长期制约发展的融资难瓶颈，也给闲散资金拥有者提供了收益较高的投资渠道。
它是如此地受人青睐，以致于无论是平台数量、借贷交易量，还是贷款总额都以迅雷不及掩耳之势发展着。
据零壹研究院监测，P2P网贷平台数量从2013年年底的692家上升到2014年年底的1983家，年度增长率达187%；2014年撮合贷款规模3000亿元左右，年增长率超过172%；贷款余额更是比上年翻了两番。
[1]另一方面，P2P网络借贷在摸索中逐渐偏离了原始轨道，寻了一条能满足现实诉求却充满风险的异化道路，担保、债权回购契合了想要保本获息的中国人投资心理，增加了客户粘性，却将平台置于更大的风险之中，加之行业良莠不齐，它不断被贴上非法吸收公众存款、集资诈骗、庞氏骗局等标签，不断被携款潜逃、跑路等行业乱象置于负面**中，近期爆发的e租宝等大案更是将P2P借贷推向风口浪尖。
P2P网络借贷是这般复杂，以致行业如何定性、如何规制一直成为困扰，它也就在“三无标签”下“野蛮”地生长了近7年。
终于，2015年，监管层开始对它进行整顿和规制，明确了它的信息中介性质，并划归银监会监管，具体由普惠金融部负责。
同年年底，监管细则征求意见稿的出台更是被视为“行业野蛮成长”时代终结的标志，P2P 行业也因此迎来了寒冬期。
然而，与P2P行业一样，法律规制之路也一直处于尝试摸索之中，此次发布的监管细则是否真的适应行业发展现状，是否有利于互联网金融的创新？这些问题都需要去探究。
P2P网络借贷研究综述
P2P网络借贷研究综述作者：殷元星侯海燕来源：《合作经济与科技》2016年第21期[提要] 近年来，融合了互联网信息技术、大数据云计算以及金融功能的互联网金融在国内逐步发展起来，P2P网络借贷在这一背景下诞生并在国内迅速发展呈现出爆发式的增长态势。
本文从借款人、P2P中介平台和出借人等三个层面对国内外P2P网络借贷研究文献进行梳理，在总结现有研究成果基础上，提出未来可能的研究方向。
关键词：互联网金融；金融风险；P2P网络借贷中图分类号：F832.1 文献标识码：AP2P网络借贷伴随着互联网金融的浪潮一路迅猛发展，开启了中国金融信贷和融资的新时代。
但是，近三年来国内P2P网络借贷平台不断出现的庞氏骗局和跑路倒闭事件，将P2P网络借贷推上了风口浪尖。
一、P2P网络借贷国内外研究进展P2P网络借贷在国内外的快速发展和野蛮性扩张引起了学者们的极大关注，从现有文献来看，国内外学者主要从借款人借款成功因素、出借人出借行为和P2P网络借贷平台运营等三个方面展开了相关研究。
（一）借款人借款成功因素研究。
借款人在P2P网络借贷中处于核心地位，借款人源源不断的借款需求是P2P网络借贷生存的根基和持续发展的动力，同时作为资产端的借款人也是网络借贷交易中风险产生的主要来源。
因此，从借款人角度对P2P网络借贷进行研究十分必要。
Rodan等（2004）、Greiner等（2009）和Lin等（2009）从借款人社会资本及借款目的层面进行分析，认为社会资本能够有效提升借款人借款成功率，并且以合并债务为目的借款成功率高于以商业经营为目的借款。
Ravina（2007）、Pope等（2008）、Barasinska（2009）、Puro等（2010）研究了借款人性别、年龄、种族、借款金额等因素对借款成功的影响。
Duarte等（2012）和Ravina（2012）研究了借款人上传至平台的照片对借款的影响，发现长相较好和有魅力的借款人更容易借款成功。
我国网络小贷发展的现状、问题与对策-文献综述
关于我国网络小贷发展的现状、问题与对策的文献综述在信息传输速度高度便捷的当今社会，曾经因为征信难度大，风险高，规模化成本高而在线下的传统信贷领域一直不受重视的小额贷款焕发出了新的生命力。
网络小额贷款，又称P2P网络借贷（peer-to-peer）--互联网点对点金融借贷平台，是一种将小额资金聚集起来借贷给有资金需求人群的一种民间小额借贷模式，其属于互联网金融（ITFIN）产品的一种，也属于民间小额借贷，但同时借助互联网、移动互联网技术的网络信贷平台及相关理财行为、金融服务。
因为规模与量级的扩张，隐藏在其背后的问题也开始为大众所熟知。
近年来，我国网络小贷从无到有，从少到多，发展速度之快令人咋舌，针对这一领域的投资额也一路飙升；带来的问题之多也是令监管机构措手不及以致连发数道“禁令”，因违规息费，暴力催收等引发的负面新闻也不绝于耳。
这些现象也引起了国内外研究者的关注，形成了丰富的研究成果一、国内外网络小贷发展现状2005年3月，英国人Richard·Dova、James·Alexander、Sararh·Mathews和David· Nicholson 4位年轻人创办的全球第一家P2P网贷平台Zopa在伦敦上线运营。
如今Zopa的业务已扩至意大利、美国和日本，平均每天线上的投资额达200多万英镑。
Zopa是“可达成协议的空间（Zone of Possible Agreement）”的缩写[1]。
我国在2007年也诞生了第一家P2P网络借贷--拍拍贷。
随着信息技术的进步，这一种模式，在互联网“东风”下，突飞猛进，截止2018年1月，网络贷款平台累计数量已达6016家。
但与此同时，各网贷平台因出现问题被关停的消息也是不断传出，截止2018年1月，累计问题平台数量就已达4110家之多，问题平台占比68.3%[2]。
而关于网贷平台的暴力催收、资质不合规以及构建消费主义陷阱等问题也在各种媒体上受到广泛关注。
P2P网络借贷国内外理论与实践研究文献综述
这一“新生儿”的成长道路上画上了问号。北美证
数量。Ｄｕａｎ
尽管各国网络借贷有不同的经营模式，但有一 个共同的明显特征：交易是匿名的，因此交易在借贷 双方是信息非对称的，贷款是无抵押的因此必然存 在信用风险（Ｓｔｅｅｌｍａｎｎ，２００６）。 国外网络借贷分三种：一是非营利的Ｋｉｖａ公司 经营；二是以盈利为目的的ＭＹＣ４、ＬｅｎｄｉｎｇＣｌｕｂ、 Ｐｒｏｓｐｅｒ模式；三是单纯提供投资的机会平台，对贷 款成功与违约与否并不负有责任。 王艳、陈小辉、邢增艺（２００９）研究表明国内第一
ａ１．（２００９）认为群体行为在Ｐ２Ｐ网络贷 款中特别显著，原因之一是网络中信息过多，使用者
ｅｔ
ห้องสมุดไป่ตู้
家Ｐ２Ｐ＿拍拍贷提供国内个人对个人小额贷款的
很难理解和使用全部的信息Ｂｒｙｎｊｏｌｆｓｓｏｎ＆Ｓｍｉｍ （２０００）；二是人们更易从网上获得其他人的选择和 建议。Ｄｕａｎ ｅｔ ａ１．（２００９）描述了许多社会和经济的 情形，如群体行为使个人的选择更易受他人决定的 影响，因此导致了许多经济的现象，如：投资者的建
面：
下”与“线上”并行，Ａｇａｒｗａｌ ａｎｄ Ｈａｕｓｗａｌｄ（２００８）认为 小企业因为无法提供公开的高信用等级的原因进入 网络借贷市场。网络借贷领域起源于２００５年英国 的Ｚｏｐａ。目前名气最大的个人借贷网站是２００６年 上线的Ｐｒｏｓｐｅ，运营模式是利用在线拍卖平台对贷 款进行竞价拍卖。 Ｐ２Ｐ贷款在美国和英国成为除了传统储蓄和投 资外的另一种选择（Ｓｌａｖｉｎ ２００７）。Ｐ２Ｐ网络借贷平 台是个人通过第三方平台在收取一定利息的前提下 向其他个人提供小额借贷的金融模式，其客户对象 包括两类：一个是帮助低收人群体生产性活动或小 本经营提供微型信贷，另外一个是针对普通人群的 紧急资金需求。 传统上，供给主体主要是小额信贷机构或民间 融资主体。Ｐｒｏｓｐｅｒ的业务已由美国扩展到意大利 和日本等地。除Ｚｏｐａ和Ｐｒｏｓｐｅｒ之外，国际上比较有 名的个人借贷网站还有非盈利的Ｋｉｖａ，它还设置了 一种“零利率”借款，出借人将钱免息借给发展中国 家的低收入者，帮助他们改善生活。 在英国著名的网络借贷平台有：Ｚｏｐａ，ＲａｔｅＳｅｔ— ｔｅｒ’Ｙｅｓ－Ｓｅｃｕｒｅ．ｃｏｍ，Ｑｕａｒｋｌｅ ａｎｄ Ｆｕｎｄｉｎｇ Ｃｉｒｃｌｅ。在
国内外P2P研究报告
目 录
01. 国内P2P研究 02. 国外P2P研究 03. 国内外P2P平台的比较分析 04. P2P平台对金融业的影响 05. P2P平台的未来展望
国内P2P研究
P2P平台的起源和发展
P2P平台的起源可以追溯到2005年 左右，当时国内开始出现一些基于 互联网的借贷平台。
国际P2P平台的监管政策
英国：实行自律监管，成立了 P2P金融协会，对会员进行自 律监管，同时政府也出台了相 关政策对P2P行业进行规范。
中国：实行备案制，对P2P平 台进行备案管理，要求平台在 地方金融监管局备案并接受监
管。
美国：实行注册制，对P2P平 台进行严格监管，要求平台注 册并接受联邦和州政府的双重 监管。
风险和挑战的比较
国内P2P平台面临的风险和挑 战
国外P2P平台面临的风险和挑 战
国内外P2P平台在风险和挑战 方面的异同点
国内外P2P平台如何应对风险 和挑战
未来发展趋势的比较
国内P2P平台将更加注重合规化发展，加强监管和风险控制。 国外P2P平台将继续探索创新业务模式，拓展国际市场。 国内外P2P平台将更加注重技术升级和数据安全保护。 未来P2P平台将更加注重用户体验和服务质量提升。
欧洲：实行欧盟统一监管，欧 盟出台了相关法规对P2P行业 进行规范，同时各国也根据欧 盟法规制定了相应的监管政策。
国际P2P平台的风险和挑战
监管风险：不同 国家和地区的监 管政策差异大， 需要适应不同监 管环境。
技术风险：平台 技术落后可能导 致信息安全问题， 影响用户体验和 信任度。
信用风险：借款 人违约风险较高 ，可能导致投资 者资金损失。
随着互联网技术的不断发展，P2P 平台逐渐兴起，成为了一种新型的 金融服务模式。
关于P2P网络借贷的文献综述
2017年第11期本文DOI：10.16675/14-1065/f.2017.11.078关于P2P 网络借贷的文献综述□曹静摘要：P2P 网络借贷在我国起步晚，发展时间相对还较短，国内学者从理论上对我国P2P 网络借贷的运营模式、风险、监管等方面进行了研究。
关键词：P2P 网络借贷曰文献综述文章编号：1004-7026（2017）11-0115-01中国图书分类号：F832.4;F49文献标志码：A(西安培华学院陕西西安710125)1关于P2P 网络借贷兴起的理论基础由于P2P 网络借贷在本质上属于民间借贷的领域，所以国内外学者在这方面的研究基本集中在民间金融兴起的原因上。
Ronald I.Mckinnon (1973)在《经济发展中的货币与资本》一书中认为金融体制抑制是发展中国家出现大量民间借贷的根源。
根据Ronald I.Mckinnon 提出的概念，金融抑制是发展中国家政府当局实行的压制金融发展的政策措施，他认为金融抑制政策在发展中国家普遍存在，这些金融抑制政策会对金融体系的效率和金融深化产生阻碍，不益于经济发展。
Anders Isaksson(2002)则指出，民间借贷是对金融抑制和政策歪曲的理性回应。
因为中小企业和个人消费者对非正规金融机构有着十分强烈的需求，然而处于金融抑制体制下的信贷配给和金融机构的制度歧视使得这一部分群体的融资需求得不到满足，由此民间金融应运而生。
林彬乐、林乐芬(2002)在《农村金融体制变迁时期农村金融探析》中从我国经济体制角度出发剖析了我国民间借贷产生的原因。
林毅夫（2005）否定了麦金农提出的发展中国家民间金融产生的根本原因是金融抑制体制，他认为金融体制抑制是造成民间金融普遍存在的一个很重要的的因素，但不是最根本的原因。
高新波、张军田(2006）从制度经济学角度出发,认为民间金融是由于济主体在制度不均衡前提下对所存在的潜在的利润进行追逐导致的结果2关于P2P 网络借贷的运营模式在国内，辛宪（2009）认为，国外的P2P 网络借贷平台主要可以分为三类：以Prosper 为代表的纯中介型平台；以Kiva 为代表的公益性平台；以Zopa 为代表的参与型平台。
关于P2P借贷研究的文献综述
关于P2P借贷研究的文献综述作者：徐硕正来源：《时代金融》2016年第20期【摘要】在中国，仍存有大量难以申请银行贷款的群体，他们最需要资金同时也最难以得到资金，P2P借贷作为具有商业与公益双重适应性的模式已在全球潮起云涌。
本文从定义、溯源、发展与相关研究、分类和存在的法理依据五个方面，“不挥棒子，不看旗子”，尽量客观地对国内外的P2P借贷进行了简要的分析，最后加以简要评述。
【关键词】P2P借贷法理依据文献综述一、引言近年来，互联网金融发展得如火如荼，而且逐渐蔓延出互联网企业集体淘“金”的燎原之势（宋建华，2014）。
互联网企业与银行间的渗透与反击暂且不论，网络融资正逐渐发展其规模，扩张其势力（陈初，2010）。
作为网络融资的重要组成部分之一的“P2P网络借贷”正快速发展，并为传统银行信贷带来了不小的挑战。
英格兰银行执行董事安德鲁·霍尔丹曾预言：“P2P借贷将会取代传统银行。
”然而虽已声名鹊起，却是毁誉参半。
誉者赞其曰“金融创新”、“普惠金融”；毁者斥之“非法集资”、“庞氏骗局”。
二、定义的研究P2P借贷的定义主要可以分为两个部分：基础定义和附加限定。
其中基础定义指的是对其属性和媒介进行规范，而附加限定主要是在基础定义上对借方、贷方与平台提供方的角色、盈利方式等进行进一步的明确。
（一）基础定义P2P的全称是对等网络（Peer to Peer）。
这种起源计算机网络的点对点技术，指一种区别于中央网络系统的，主要依靠用户群（Peers）交换传输信息的信息互联技术。
其中，每个用户具有节点和服务器的双重性质。
节点之间，依靠用户群进行信息交换。
P2P借贷指的是参照这种网络结构建立的资金借贷。
P2P借贷的中文译法为“点对点贷款”（史文才，2013），官方译法是“人人贷”。
现有的文献中，对其定义不尽相同。
林荣琴（2014）认为目前法学界缺少权威的定义。
《中国银监会办公厅关于人人贷有关风险提示的通知》（2011）将P2P信贷服务中介公司界定为收集借款人、出借人信息，评估借款人的抵押物，然后进行配对，收取中介服务费的公司。
关于P2P网络借贷的文献综述
关于P2P网络借贷的文献综述作者：曹静来源：《山西农经》2017年第11期摘要：P2P网络借贷在我国起步晚，发展时间相对还较短，国内学者从理论上对我国P2P 网络借贷的运营模式、风险、监管等方面进行了研究。
关键词：P2P网络借贷；文献综述文章编号：1004-7026（2017）11-0115-01 中国图书分类号：F832.4；F49 文献标志码：A1 关于P2P网络借贷兴起的理论基础由于P2P网络借贷在本质上属于民间借贷的领域，所以国内外学者在这方面的研究基本集中在民间金融兴起的原因上。
Ronald I.Mckinnon （1973）在《经济发展中的货币与资本》一书中认为金融体制抑制是发展中国家出现大量民间借贷的根源。
根据Ronald I.Mckinnon提出的概念，金融抑制是发展中国家政府当局实行的压制金融发展的政策措施，他认为金融抑制政策在发展中国家普遍存在，这些金融抑制政策会对金融体系的效率和金融深化产生阻碍，不益于经济发展。
Anders Isaksson（2002）则指出，民间借贷是对金融抑制和政策歪曲的理性回应。
因为中小企业和个人消费者对非正规金融机构有着十分强烈的需求，然而处于金融抑制体制下的信贷配给和金融机构的制度歧视使得这一部分群体的融资需求得不到满足，由此民间金融应运而生。
林彬乐、林乐芬（2002）在《农村金融体制变迁时期农村金融探析》中从我国经济体制角度出发剖析了我国民间借贷产生的原因。
林毅夫（2005）否定了麦金农提出的发展中国家民间金融产生的根本原因是金融抑制体制，他认为金融体制抑制是造成民间金融普遍存在的一个很重要的的因素，但不是最根本的原因。
高新波、张军田（2006）从制度经济学角度出发，认为民间金融是由于济主体在制度不均衡前提下对所存在的潜在的利润进行追逐导致的结果2 关于P2P网络借贷的运营模式在国内，辛宪（2009）认为，国外的P2P网络借贷平台主要可以分为三类：以Prosper为代表的纯中介型平台；以Kiva为代表的公益性平台；以Zopa为代表的参与型平台。
P2P网络借贷金融文献综述及外文文献资料
本份文档包含：关于该选题的外文文献、文献综述一、外文文献文献信息标题: Emergence of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic Markets: The Case of Online P2P Lending作者: Berger, Sven C; Gleisner, Fabian期刊名称: Business Research；第2卷；第1期；页码：39-65年份: 2015.Emergence of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic Markets: The Case of Online P2PLendingAbstractWe analyze the role of intermediaries in electronic markets using detailed data of more than 14,000 originated loans on an electronic P2P (peer-to-peer) lending platform. In such an electronic credit market, lenders bid to supply a private loan. Screening of potential borrowers and the monitoring of loan repayment can be delegated to designated group leaders. We find that these market participants act as financial intermediaries and significantly improve borrowers' credit conditions by reducing information asymmetries, predominantly for borrowers with less attractive risk characteristics. Our findings may be surprising given the replacement of a bank by an electronic marketplace.Keywords: Asymmetric information, intermediation, social lending, electronic marketsManuscript received July 7, 2008, accepted by Christian Schlag (Finance) March 5, 2009.1 IntroductionThe evolution of information technology in recent years has led to the development of electronic marketplaces where traditional intermediaries may be less important or even redundant for the economic interaction of market participants (Benjamin andWigand 1995, Evans and Wurster 1997, Malone, Yates, and Benjamin 1987). Within the financial services industry, the debate about disintermediation and the future relevance of financial intermediaries (Allen and Santomero 2001, Nellis, McCaffery, and Hutchinson 2000, Schmidt, Hackethal, and Tyrell 1999) is fueled by the increasing role of electronic lending markets (P2P Lending or Social Lending) where an electronic marketplace replaces a bank as the traditional intermediary and enables the brokerage of consumer loans directly between borrowers and lenders (Hulme and Wright 2006, Meyer 2007). A recent study predicts that within the next few years such social banking platforms may have a market share of ten percent of the worldwide market for retail lending and financial planning (Gartner Inc. 2008). For the US, the P2P lending market is estimated to grow to a volume of up to ten billion USD within the next 10 years (Bruene 2007). We examine more than 14,000 credit transactions on the American electronic P2P lending platform , covering all transactions that took place in the market between 2005-11 and 2007-09. Our analysis of the P2P credit market starts with the observation that, despite the direct mediation of loans in the marketplace, new types of intermediaries emerge as market participants provide paid intermediary services. In the paper we then focus on the following questions: (1) From a theoretical point of view, how can these intermediaries create value in the interaction between borrowers and lenders? (2) Should all borrowers make use of an intermediary, and can it make sense to pay for intermediary services? (3) From the borrowers' perspective, what is the economic impact of intermediation in the electronic lending marketplace? Our empirical analysis is confirmatory in nature. It is based on the literature on financial intermediation (e. g., Diamond 1984, Leland and Pyle 1976) from which we derive hypotheses on the role of intermediaries in electronic marketplaces.The electronic lending platform Prosper provides an excellent laboratory for studying intermediaries in electronic marketplaces. Prosper is the largest provider with nearly 90 million USD in loans originated in the examination period from 2005-11 to 2007-09, as market participants were permitted to act as paid intermediaries in this period. As of 2008-09-30, Prosper dominated the US market for P2P lending with atotal of 176 million USD in issued loans, followed by its competitor Lending Club with 19 million USD.1 At that time, the market share of P2P consumer loans represented a fraction of the around 490 billion USD of non-revolving consumer credit outstanding at commercial banks (Federal Reserve 2008). All loans on Prosper have an identical maturity of 36 months. Our data sample includes detailed information on 14,321 financial transactions as well as the market participants that chose to participate in the market and covers transactions with and without the use of an intermediary. This allows us to test for aspects of the financial transaction and individual factors that might influence the usage of intermediary services. In line with traditional intermediation theory, we find that financial intermediaries on electronic P2P lending platforms have significant impact on borrowers' credit conditions, suggesting that intermediation helps to reduce the prevalent information asymmetries. The intermediary primarily contributes by screening potential borrowers. A mandatory screening process by means of the intermediary's commitment to screen every borrower within the group significantly improves borrowers' access to credit. Following diligent screening, the intermediary's recommendation of a borrower signals better information about creditworthiness and thus leads to better credit conditions. Moreover, bidding on the screened borrower's credit listing has an even stronger impact on the resulting interest rate.Our results indicate that borrowers should consider the reputation of an intermediary as it serves as a good proxy for the future diligent assessment of borrowers. Intermediation costs can be compensated by lower interest margins for borrowers. These results are robust to self-selection regarding the choice of an intermediary and characteristics of the financial transaction. All in all, our results suggest that financial intermediaries in electronic credit marketplaces may create substantial value for borrowers. Our findings are consistent with a stream of literature suggesting that electronic markets create business opportunities for new intermediaries (Chircu and Kauffman 2000, Methlie and Pedersen 2002, Bakos 1991, Bakos 1998, Sen and King 2003). Despite the electronic credit marketplace enables the direct mediation of loans, new financial intermediaries emerge between borrowers and lenders. There areseveral reasons why our results are of particular interest also for banks and other financial service providers that face the strategic decision of an active involvement in electronic lending markets. One option could be to participate in these marketplaces and offer financial advisory. Another interesting possibility could be to enter the P2P lending market and to establish a new marketplace to support the existing retail operations and enable cross-selling. Eventually, lending marketplaces are potential customers for banks' transaction services.Our approach to examining the role of financial intermediaries on electronic lending platforms makes three important contributions to the literature: First, this is one of the first studies analyzing an electronic lending marketplace, and the first study to empirically examine intermediation on an electronic P2P lending platform. We explain how electronic credit markets work, and provide insights into the role of intermediaries in the marketplace. Second, we test theoretical predictions from the literature on financial intermediation with new data. Our sample of more than 14,000 transactions on a P2P lending marketplace includes detailed information on the involved market participants and the loan characteristics. The dataset covers the complete transaction history of the credit marketplace for a time period of almost two years. Third, we quantify the economic impact of intermediation and other transaction characteristics on borrowers' loan spread and show that the usage of financial intermediaries which are neither professional nor institutional but members of the network may significantly improve the terms of trade for the borrowers.The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section gives an overview of electronic P2P lending platforms and explains the functioning of these marketplaces. Section 3 summarizes the relevant previous literature on financial intermediation and derives hypotheses about the role of intermediaries on electronic lending platforms. Section 4 overviews the methodology employed, describes the data, and presents the empirical results of our analyses as well as robustness tests. In section 5 we conclude with a summary and the limitations of our study.2 Intermediaries in electronic credit marketplaces2.1 Electronic marketplaces and disintermediationMarkets are essential for economic activity in mediating the demand for and supply of goods and services. Intermediaries help to facilitate transactions between buyers and sellers by (1) providing transaction processing capabilities, (2) bringing enhanced levels of knowledge and expertise, and (3) adding to the transactability of a given good or service (Chircu and Kauffman 2000).The internet has made e-commerce possible where electronic markets are becoming more important in coordinating supply and demand (Grieger 2003, Segev, Gebauer, and Farber 1999). Electronic markets can facilitate economic activity even under complex and insecure conditions (Cordella 2006), significantly reduce information and transaction costs, and may in this way displace traditional intermediaries (Malone, Yates, and Benjamin 1987). Many authors argue that once electronic markets emerge, traditional intermediaries may be threatened by an electronic brokerage effect also called disintermediation (for a literature overview see Chircu and Kauffman 2000). In sharp contrast to that, the theoretical contributions on electronic markets and disintermediation have not yet been supported by convincing empirical evidence (Chircu and Kauffman 2000, Sen and King 2003). Moreover, the displacement of traditional intermediaries may never occur. Authors like Sarkar, Butler, and Steinfield (1998) or Hagel and Singer (1999) argue that electronic markets may lead to new forms of intermediation.2.2 Electronic lending platformsElectronic lending platforms are electronic markets that mediate between borrowers and lenders of loans.Wefocus here on consumer loans between individual borrowers and lenders and exclude platforms for bonds or syndicated loans (Steelmann 2006). The electronic credit marketplace as a website in the World Wide Web constitutes the general conditions for peer-to-peer lending and provides the administration of current loans. Electronic lending platforms differ in the way loans are originated: Some providers mediate between borrowers and lenders themselves, whereas other providers match borrowers' credit listings and lenders' bids with an auction mechanism (Meyer 2007).The lion share of participants in the marketplace are private individuals, althoughthere are institutional lenders investing in some, too. There are numerous providers that operate nationally due to differing regulatory frameworks. Table 1 provides an overview of the three major Anglo-American and German providers and their business models. A recent development of the business model of P2P lending marketplaces is that lenders may trade loans prior to maturity, increasing the liquidity of P2P loans. As of February 2009, Prosper is still in the process, whereas Lending Club has already successfully registered with the SEC to create a secondary loan market. Despite differing business models, there is one distinctive feature that these marketplaces have in common: Transactions in electronic credit marketplaces occur anonymously between fictitious "screen names". Therefore, information is asymmetrically distributed between borrowers and lenders. Loans are not collateralized and lenders face the inherent risk of default (Steelmann 2006). Despite anonymous interactions, loan listings contain additional information on potential borrowers. Lenders can evaluate individual creditworthiness through quantitative as well as qualitative figures. , America's largest peer-topeer lending marketplace, provides an individual rating and an indicator of indebtedness in cooperation with the credit reporting agency Experian as the two main quantitative figures. The informational value of these figures should be considered high, although the degree to which consumer credit reports are accurate, complete or consistent is in dispute (Avery, Calem, Canner, and Bostic 2003). Most platforms give market participants the opportunity to provide additional personal information about their background, their financial standing and the purpose of the loan. This qualitative, "soft" information is mandatory and its validity is a priori not controlled. Borrowers thereby might have an incentive to overemphasize their "quality" (the present value of the prospective projects, their financial standing or payment behavior) in their personal descriptions (moral hazard).Among the emerging literature on electronic lending marketplaces, a number of working papers examine the role of borrowers' "soft" information that is conveyed in personal pictures and descriptions. A study by Herzenstein, Andrews, Dholakia, and Lyandres (2008) analyzes around 5,000 loan listings on during June 2006and finds that demographic attributes such as race and gender have only a small effect on the likelihood of the auction's funding success when compared to the impact of borrowers' financial strength and effort when listing and publicizing the auction.In contrast to that, Ravina (2008) shows that borrowers' characteristics such as beauty and race significantly affect loan fundability and loan pricing. Incorporating nearly 12,000 loan requests from 2007-03-12 and 2007-04-16 she finds that borrowers perceived as beautiful are more likely to get a loan and pay significantly lower credit spreads. Moreover, Ravina finds that black borrowers pay significantly higher spreads even though they are not more likely to default.A study by Pope and Sydnor (2008) analyzes around 110,000 loan listings on in a one-year period from 2006-06 until 2007-05. There results indicate significant racial disparities on the credit market: Loan listings of black borrowers are less likely to be funded and the spreads paid by blacks are higher than those by comparable whites. In contrast to Ravina (2008), they find that blacks have a higher relative default rate than white borrowers. Of course, it is impossible to evaluate whether P2P lending offers more or less equal access to credit compared to traditional consumer lending: Inherent in an analysis on P2P lending based on transaction data is a potential sample selection bias. Lenders using the online platform might represent those with a high probability of default or lenders whose credit applications have been rejected at traditional banks. For example, Agarwal and Hauswald (2008) find that small business lenders strategically self-select into electronic (transactional) lending with respect to the publicly available information on their creditworthiness. It follows that from observed transactions in a P2P marketplace a comparison to loan availability and loan pricing at traditional banking institutions is not possible.However, none of this is the aim of this paper: We focus on the role of intermediaries that emerge in the interaction between borrowers and lenders in the electronic P2P lending market. Central to our analyses are social networks on the Prosper marketplace called groups.2.3 Groups on In addition to personal profiles, borrowers and lenders can form groups. These smallercommunities within the marketplace review and assess the creditworthiness of individual members. Groups are potentially beneficial for market participants by providing and verifying information or obtaining additional information about borrowers that is not publicly available. Groups lack distinct ownership and governance features as they typically exist in credit cooperatives (Davis 2001, Taylor 1971). There is no ownership of the groups, and there is no collective decision mechanism on accepting group members or granting loans. Furthermore, groups do not exclusively deal with their members. At any time, lenders from outside the group may invest in a group member's loan listing. This implies that there is no rotation of money within the group, and no specific allocation process. There are two papers that specifically examine the role of groups on the P2P lending website : Freedman and Jin (2008) use transaction data from 200601-06 until 2008-07-31 covering around 290,000 loan listings and 25,000 funded loans. They find evidence for the idea that the monitoring within social networks provides a stronger incentive to pay off loans ex-post: Loans with friend endorsements and friend bids have fewer missed payments and yield significantly higher rates of return than other loans. Everett (2008) looks at the influence of group membership on loan default within 13,486 Prosper loans. The dataset covers funded loans from 2006-05-31 until 2007-11-06 and incorporates ex post loan performance information until 2008-05-07. He finds that membership in a group significantly decreases loan default risk if the group enforces real-life personal connections like, e.g., employees of the same company or alumni of a certain university. Both studies presented above look at social networks in the credit market but do not specifically take the group leader into account. It is, however, not the group as an institution per se, but the group leader who decides about membership and plays a substantial role in the lending process.2.4 Group leaders as financial intermediariesIn order to reduce information asymmetries, lenders must screen potential borrowers. Given the large number of available credit listings, it can be costly or impossible to process the information available about potential borrowers. Therefore, intermediaries emerge in the electronic marketplace offering intermediary services in order to assessand limit credit risk. Every participant in the online lending platform can found a group and become a group leader. Group leaders set membership criteria and administer the group. Groups are smaller communities within the marketplace where group members may share a bond based on employment, geography, education, common leisure activities, or other factors. The principle that people from close communities act more responsibly towards each other aims to lower the risk of defaults and therefore enables lending at better rates. Among the most important tasks of the group leader is the screening of borrowers within the group (a voluntary due diligence known as "vetting"). Within groups, it is common that borrowers send personal documents regarding their identity, income, and other pertinent information to the group leader. The group leader may also establish personal contact with the borrowers' employer to verify the personal income in order to recommend a borrower's credit listing.The assignment as a group leader may be timeconsuming, since a detailed "due diligence" of a potential borrower can take several hours. There are many individual motives for forming a group and becoming a group leader. Intrinsic motivation may result from altruism or related social returns from leading a group. As extrinsic motivation and as a more tangible example, the owner of an Apple computer store may run a group on Prosper to promote sales by providing an alternative form of consumer finance. Leading a group can also be even more directly monetarily motivated: Group leaders were permitted to receive remuneration ("fees") for their effort, acting as paid intermediaries. Group leaders collect a fee in the form of additional interest for providing intermediation services until 2007-09-12, when Prosper modified the fee concept (Prosper Marketplace Inc. 2007b). The incentive for borrowers to disclose information to the group leader is to attract more bids on their credit listing for the purpose of better interest rates. Group leaders also supervise the repayment of loans within their group. In the case of default, Prosper informs the group leader who can encourage loan repayment and may arrange limited repayments (called "community payments") on behalf of a member who is not able to do so. Group leaders thus serve as a financial intermediary by acting as middlemen betweenlenders and borrowers. Even though the electronic lending marketplace displaces the traditional depository institution as a financial intermediary (Datta and Chatterjee 2008), group leaders emerge as new intermediaries. The group leader facilitates the movement of capital from surplus units in the marketplace to deficit units by producing information, providing advice, and monitoring loan repayment. Where intermediary services were concerned, borrowers faced the choice between "free" or "paid" intermediaries. It is a priori not clear if intermediation created value for the electronic marketplace and, in particular, for the borrowers.Wefocus here on the value of intermediation for borrowers.3 Development of hypothesesThere is extensive research on financial intermediation. In this section we review the relevant intermediation literature in order to derive hypotheses about the role of intermediaries in electronic credit marketplaces. Traditionally, transaction costs and information problems have provided the foundation for understanding intermediaries (Allen and Santomero 1998, Bhattacharya and Thakor 1993, Dewatripont and Tirole 1994, Santomero 1984). Due to asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders, financial markets can perform poorly or even fail when borrowers know their characteristics (the present value of the prospective projects), but lenders cannot distinguish between them. Market value then reflects average project quality (Akerlof 1970, Leland and Pyle 1976). As a result, "good risks" are driven out of the market and average project quality decreases (adverse selection). This can be the case if borrowers cannot be expected to be entirely straightforward about their characteristics since there may be a substantial reward for exaggerating positive qualities (moral hazard). In his seminal article, Diamond (1984) argues that intermediaries can help to overcome problems of asymmetric information by acting as "delegated monitors". When several lenders in a loan syndicate want to monitor a borrower and monitoring is costly, there will either be inefficiently high monitoring expenditure or a free-riding problem, where no lender has an incentive to monitor. In this case, a financial intermediary as a delegated monitor minimizes the costs of monitoring. In Diamond (1984) the intermediary holds deposits and writes loan contracts to borrowers, whichis not the case with the group leader in the electronic lending platform. Nevertheless, the argumentation is applicable to the lending platform Prosper for two reasons. Firstly, the capital of several lenders is syndicated into one loan. Secondly, lenders face a large number of potential borrowers in the marketplace. Lenders benefit from additional private information about borrowers in order to better assess credit risk and the appropriate borrowing rate required. Acquiring private information about credit listings implies a time-consuming (repeated) interaction with the borrower which is costly. Therefore, there are group leaders who act as intermediaries in producing additional private information about borrowers within groups. The intermediary realizes significant economies of scale by producing information for the marketplace. Intermediaries can solve another information problem prevalent in electronic marketplaces. Borrowers might not be willing to disclose proprietary information to a large number of lenders in a public financial market. Following Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995), an intermediary acts as the facilitator of knowledge sharing, whereby proprietary information is only disclosed vis-à-vis the intermediary.In the marketplace, participants can voluntarily disclose additional private information regarding their credit listing. Within groups, borrowers may disclose proprietary information regarding their financial standing solely to the group leader. As group members, borrowers can thus avoid disclosing private information to the marketplace. Group leaders assess and recommend a borrower's credit quality based on additional private information, and at the same time preserve the privacy of proprietary information. Groups enable a better assessment of the borrowers' credit quality, resulting in potentially lower rates for borrowers.Finally, group leaders not only screen potential borrowers, but also monitor ongoing loan repayment in place of the potentially large number of lenders. In cases of loan default, Prosper informs the group leader who may encourage loan repayment and even arrange limited repayments by the group. If a borrower's loan is more than one month late, lenders can make what is called a "community payment" on behalf of a borrower who is temporarily not able to do so. These payments can be compared to a mutual insurance mechanism.All in all, the intermediary reduces uncertainty for lenders, which should be reflected in lower required risk premiums. The arguments provided above lead us to the first fundamental hypothesis:Hypothesis H1: Borrowers within groups are able to borrow at lower credit spreads. Next, we formulate three hypotheses that enable us to decompose the role of the group leader in the lending marketplace. With imperfect information about borrowers' credit quality, lenders can use publicly observable signals to assess credit risk (Riley 1975, Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976, Spence 1973). Observable characteristics or actions can serve as signals. On the electronic lending platform Prosper, the recommendation of a credit listing by a group leader is a strong observable signal of credit quality. Borrowers can voluntarily provide additional private information regarding their financial standing to their group leader. Group leaders can then recommend credit listings within their groups. This observable recommendation serves as a signal of good credit quality for the marketplace.This leads to:Hypothesis H2: The recommendation of a credit listing by the group leader leads to lower credit spreads.The reliability of information produced by an intermediary is a prevalent problem in the intermediation literature. Group leaders might recommend credit listings within their group without prior diligent screening. It may be difficult or impossible for potential lenders to distinguish good information from bad. Group leaders can signal credibility of a recommendation by bidding on the recommended credit listing. The potential investment of the group leader is an observable signal for information quality (Leland and Pyle 1976). We derive:Hypothesis H3a: A group leader's bidding serves as a credible signal for the quality of the credit listing and results in lower credit spreads.Hypothesis H3b: A group leader's bidding on a credit listing signals information quality and has a stronger impact on credit spreads than a recommendation by the group leader.We derive two additional hypotheses about the reputation and the size of groups. Past activities within a group, especially regarding the diligent assessment of individualborrowers by the group leader, are only imperfectly observable. In contrast, the reputation of a group in the electronic marketplace is observable from its group rating. The group rating is a measurement of a group's performance in paying back its loans in comparison with expected (historical) default rates. A defaulted loan worsens a group's rating and therefore its reputation. Tirole (1996) shows analytically how a group's good reputation positively influences individual behavior. The group rating reflects a group's ability to assess borrowers' credit quality, and serves as a proxy for the group leader's behavior in the future.In addition to a group leader's general ability, we argue that group reputation serves as an effective mechanism to prevent collusion between the group leader and a borrower within the group. The phenomenon of collusion (see, e.g., Tirole 1991) could be a major concern for participants in the electronic lending marketplace. This would be the case if a potential borrower could "bribe" the group leader in order to receive a recommendation and a bid. With an increasing probability for such collusive behavior, the credibility of the observable actions of the intermediary would be significantly reduced. This would be reflected in a decreasing group rating due to higher than expected defaults within the group. We deduce:Hypothesis H4: A higher group rating leads to lower credit spreads.When deciding to join a group, market participants face the choice of group size. At first sight, a smaller group seems to offer a potentially closeknit community in the marketplace that facilitates the interaction and closer collaboration of group members with the group leader. This is fairly comparable to the stream of literature on relationship lending that emphasizes the exchange and evaluation of "soft information" within small banks (Petersen and Rajan 1994, Elyasiani and Goldberg 2004, Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein 2005). On closer examination, and presumably more important, borrowers and lenders might prefer larger groups because they generate more opportunities for exchange, collectively provide more funds for loans, and, thus, offer easier access to credit. From an investor's perspective, in addition to a larger network, bigger groups are attractive because they may enable effective "peer-monitoring" which lowers credit risk. The concept of peermonitoring,。
P2P网络借贷国内外理论与实践研究文献综述
P2P网络借贷国内外理论与实践研究文献综述一、本文概述随着互联网金融的快速发展，P2P网络借贷作为一种新型的金融模式，在全球范围内引发了广泛的关注和讨论。
本文旨在对P2P网络借贷在国内外的理论与实践进行系统的文献综述，以期对该领域的研究现状和发展趋势进行全面深入的了解。
本文首先将对P2P网络借贷的基本概念进行界定，明确其发展历程和主要特点。
随后，将从国内外两个层面对P2P网络借贷的理论研究进行梳理和评价，包括其理论基础、运营模式、风险控制、监管政策等方面。
在此基础上，本文将重点分析P2P网络借贷在国内外实践中的典型案例，探讨其成功经验与问题挑战。
通过本文的综述，我们希望能够为相关领域的研究者提供有价值的参考信息，为推动P2P网络借贷的健康发展提供理论支持和实践借鉴。
本文也期望能够引起社会各界对P2P网络借贷的关注和思考，共同推动互联网金融行业的健康、稳定和可持续发展。
二、国外P2P网络借贷理论与实践研究自21世纪初，P2P网络借贷作为一种新兴的金融模式，在西方国家迅速崛起并引发了广泛关注。
国外的学者和实践者对该领域进行了深入的研究，为P2P网络借贷的发展提供了坚实的理论基础和实践指导。
国外学者对于P2P网络借贷的理论研究主要集中在信息不对称、风险管理、市场效率等方面。
信息不对称理论认为，P2P平台通过提供透明的信息披露机制，有助于缓解借款人和投资者之间的信息不对称问题。
风险管理方面，学者们研究了如何有效评估借款人的信用风险，并设计相应的风险控制策略。
市场效率理论探讨了P2P网络借贷市场是否能够实现资源的有效配置，以及市场结构和竞争对借贷利率的影响。
在实践方面，国外P2P平台通过不断创新和完善，积累了丰富的运营经验。
这些平台通过精细化的风险管理、技术化的数据分析、智能化的决策支持等手段，提高了借贷交易的效率和安全性。
国外P2P平台还积极探索与金融机构、征信机构等合作，以拓展资金来源、优化资产配置、提升服务质量。
P2P 网络借贷文献综述及外文文献互联网金融
本份文档包含：关于该选题的外文文献、文献综述一、外文文献标题: Emergence of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic Markets: The Case of Online P2P Lending作者: Berger, Sven C; Gleisner, Fabian期刊: Business Research；卷: 2；期: 1；页: 39-65；出版年份: 2009 Emergence of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic Markets: The Case of Online P2PLendingAbstractWe analyze the role of intermediaries in electronic markets using detailed data of more than 14,000 originated loans on an electronic P2P (peer-to-peer) lending platform. In such an electronic credit market, lenders bid to supply a private loan. Screening of potential borrowers and the monitoring of loan repayment can be delegated to designated group leaders. We find that these market participants act as financial intermediaries and significantly improve borrowers' credit conditions by reducing information asymmetries, predominantly for borrowers with less attractive risk characteristics. Our findings may be surprising given the replacement of a bank by an electronic marketplace.Keywords: Asymmetric information, intermediation, social lending, electronic markets1 IntroductionThe evolution of information technology in recent years has led to the development of electronic marketplaces where traditional intermediaries may be less important or even redundant for the economic interaction of market participants (Benjamin and Wigand 1995, Evans and Wurster 1997, Malone, Yates, and Benjamin 1987). Within the financial services industry, the debate about disintermediation and the future relevance of financial intermediaries (Allen and Santomero 2001, Nellis, McCaffery, and Hutchinson 2000, Schmidt, Hackethal, and Tyrell 1999) is fueled by the increasing role of electronic lending markets (P2P Lending or Social Lending) where an electronic marketplace replaces a bank as the traditional intermediary and enables the brokerage of consumer loans directly between borrowers and lenders (Hulme and Wright 2006, Meyer 2007). A recent study predicts that within the next few years such social banking platforms may have a market share of ten percent of the worldwide market for retail lending and financial planning (Gartner Inc. 2008). For the US, the P2P lending market is estimated to grow to a volume of up to ten billion USD within the next 10 years (Bruene 2007). We examine more than 14,000 credit transactions on the American electronic P2P lending platform , covering all transactions that took place in the market between 2005-11 and 2007-09. Our analysis of the P2P credit market starts with the observation that, despite the direct mediation of loans in the marketplace, new types of intermediaries emerge as market participants providepaid intermediary services. In the paper we then focus on the following questions: (1) From a theoretical point of view, how can these intermediaries create value in the interaction between borrowers and lenders? (2) Should all borrowers make use of an intermediary, and can it make sense to pay for intermediary services? (3) From the borrowers' perspective, what is the economic impact of intermediation in the electronic lending marketplace? Our empirical analysis is confirmatory in nature. It is based on the literature on financial intermediation (e. g., Diamond 1984, Leland and Pyle 1976) from which we derive hypotheses on the role of intermediaries in electronic marketplaces.2 Intermediaries in electronic credit marketplaces2.1 Electronic marketplaces and disintermediationMarkets are essential for economic activity in mediating the demand for and supply of goods and services. Intermediaries help to facilitate transactions between buyers and sellers by (1) providing transaction processing capabilities, (2) bringing enhanced levels of knowledge and expertise, and (3) adding to the transactability of a given good or service (Chircu and Kauffman 2000).The internet has made e-commerce possible where electronic markets are becoming more important in coordinating supply and demand (Grieger 2003, Segev, Gebauer, and Farber 1999). Electronic markets can facilitate economic activity even under complex and insecure conditions (Cordella 2006), significantly reduce information and transaction costs, and may in this way displace traditional intermediaries (Malone, Yates, and Benjamin 1987). Many authors argue that once electronic markets emerge, traditional intermediaries may be threatened by an electronic brokerage effect also called disintermediation (for a literature overview see Chircu and Kauffman 2000). In sharp contrast to that, the theoretical contributions on electronic markets and disintermediation have not yet been supported by convincing empirical evidence (Chircu and Kauffman 2000, Sen and King 2003). Moreover, the displacement of traditional intermediaries may never occur. Authors like Sarkar, Butler, and Steinfield (1998) or Hagel and Singer (1999) argue that electronic markets may lead to new forms of intermediation.2.2 Electronic lending platformsElectronic lending platforms are electronic markets that mediate between borrowers and lenders of loans.Wefocus here on consumer loans between individual borrowers and lenders and exclude platforms for bonds or syndicated loans (Steelmann 2006). The electronic credit marketplace as a website in the World Wide Web constitutes the general conditions for peer-to-peer lending and provides the administration of current loans. Electronic lending platforms differ in the way loans are originated: Some providers mediate between borrowers and lenders themselves, whereas other providers match borrowers' credit listings and lenders' bids with an auction mechanism (Meyer 2007).The lion share of participants in the marketplace are private individuals, although there are institutional lenders investing in some, too. There are numerous providers that operate nationally due to differing regulatory frameworks. Table 1 provides an overview of the three major Anglo-American and German providers and theirbusiness models. A recent development of the business model of P2P lending marketplaces is that lenders may trade loans prior to maturity, increasing the liquidity of P2P loans. As of February 2009, Prosper is still in the process, whereas Lending Club has already successfully registered with the SEC to create a secondary loan market. Despite differing business models, there is one distinctive feature that these marketplaces have in common: Transactions in electronic credit marketplaces occur anonymously between fictitious "screen names". Therefore, information is asymmetrically distributed between borrowers and lenders. Loans are not collateralized and lenders face the inherent risk of default (Steelmann 2006). Despite anonymous interactions, loan listings contain additional information on potential borrowers. Lenders can evaluate individual creditworthiness through quantitative as well as qualitative figures. , America's largest peer-topeer lending marketplace, provides an individual rating and an indicator of indebtedness in cooperation with the credit reporting agency Experian as the two main quantitative figures. The informational value of these figures should be considered high, although the degree to which consumer credit reports are accurate, complete or consistent is in dispute (Avery, Calem, Canner, and Bostic 2003). Most platforms give market participants the opportunity to provide additional personal information about their background, their financial standing and the purpose of the loan. This qualitative, "soft" information is mandatory and its validity is a priori not controlled. Borrowers thereby might have an incentive to overemphasize their "quality" (the present value of the prospective projects, their financial standing or payment behavior) in their personal descriptions (moral hazard).2.3 Groups on In addition to personal profiles, borrowers and lenders can form groups. These smaller communities within the marketplace review and assess the creditworthiness of individual members. Groups are potentially beneficial for market participants by providing and verifying information or obtaining additional information about borrowers that is not publicly available. Groups lack distinct ownership and governance features as they typically exist in credit cooperatives (Davis 2001, Taylor 1971). There is no ownership of the groups, and there is no collective decision mechanism on accepting group members or granting loans. Furthermore, groups do not exclusively deal with their members. At any time, lenders from outside the group may invest in a group member's loan listing. This implies that there is no rotation of money within the group, and no specific allocation process. There are two papers that specifically examine the role of groups on the P2P lending website : Freedman and Jin (2008) use transaction data from 200601-06 until 2008-07-31 covering around 290,000 loan listings and 25,000 funded loans. They find evidence for the idea that the monitoring within social networks provides a stronger incentive to pay off loans ex-post: Loans with friend endorsements and friend bids have fewer missed payments and yield significantly higher rates of return than other loans. Everett (2008) looks at the influence of group membership on loan default within 13,486 Prosper loans. The dataset covers funded loans from 2006-05-31 until 2007-11-06 and incorporates ex post loan performance information until 2008-05-07.He finds that membership in a group significantly decreases loan default risk if the group enforces real-life personal connections like, e.g., employees of the same company or alumni of a certain university. Both studies presented above look at social networks in the credit market but do not specifically take the group leader into account. It is, however, not the group as an institution per se, but the group leader who decides about membership and plays a substantial role in the lending process.2.4 Group leaders as financial intermediariesIn order to reduce information asymmetries, lenders must screen potential borrowers. Given the large number of available credit listings, it can be costly or impossible to process the information available about potential borrowers. Therefore, intermediaries emerge in the electronic marketplace offering intermediary services in order to assess and limit credit risk. Every participant in the online lending platform can found a group and become a group leader. Group leaders set membership criteria and administer the group. Groups are smaller communities within the marketplace where group members may share a bond based on employment, geography, education, common leisure activities, or other factors. The principle that people from close communities act more responsibly towards each other aims to lower the risk of defaults and therefore enables lending at better rates. Among the most important tasks of the group leader is the screening of borrowers within the group (a voluntary due diligence known as "vetting"). Within groups, it is common that borrowers send personal documents regarding their identity, income, and other pertinent information to the group leader. The group leader may also establish personal contact with the borrowers' employer to verify the personal income in order to recommend a borrower's credit listing.All in all, the intermediary reduces uncertainty for lenders, which should be reflected in lower required risk premiums. The arguments provided above lead us to the first fundamental hypothesis:Hypothesis H1: Borrowers within groups are able to borrow at lower credit spreads. Next, we formulate three hypotheses that enable us to decompose the role of the group leader in the lending marketplace. With imperfect information about borrowers' credit quality, lenders can use publicly observable signals to assess credit risk (Riley 1975, Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976, Spence 1973). Observable characteristics or actions can serve as signals. On the electronic lending platform Prosper, the recommendation of a credit listing by a group leader is a strong observable signal of credit quality. Borrowers can voluntarily provide additional private information regarding their financial standing to their group leader. Group leaders can then recommend credit listings within their groups. This observable recommendation serves as a signal of good credit quality for the marketplace.This leads to:Hypothesis H2: The recommendation of a credit listing by the group leader leads to lower credit spreads.The reliability of information produced by an intermediary is a prevalent problem in the intermediation literature. Group leaders might recommend credit listings within their group without prior diligent screening. It may be difficult or impossible for potential lenders to distinguish good information from bad. Group leaders can signalcredibility of a recommendation by bidding on the recommended credit listing. The potential investment of the group leader is an observable signal for information quality (Leland and Pyle 1976). We derive:Hypothesis H3a: A group leader's bidding serves as a credible signal for the quality of the credit listing and results in lower credit spreads.Hypothesis H3b: A group leader's bidding on a credit listing signals information quality and has a stronger impact on credit spreads than a recommendation by the group leader.We derive two additional hypotheses about the reputation and the size of groups. Past activities within a group, especially regarding the diligent assessment of individual borrowers by the group leader, are only imperfectly observable. In contrast, the reputation of a group in the electronic marketplace is observable from its group rating. The group rating is a measurement of a group's performance in paying back its loans in comparison with expected (historical) default rates. A defaulted loan worsens a group's rating and therefore its reputation. Tirole (1996) shows analytically how a group's good reputation positively influences individual behavior. The group rating reflects a group's ability to assess borrowers' credit quality, and serves as a proxy for the group leader's behavior in the future.In addition to a group leader's general ability, we argue that group reputation serves as an effective mechanism to prevent collusion between the group leader and a borrower within the group. The phenomenon of collusion (see, e.g., Tirole 1991) could be a major concern for participants in the electronic lending marketplace. This would be the case if a potential borrower could "bribe" the group leader in order to receive a recommendation and a bid. With an increasing probability for such collusive behavior, the credibility of the observable actions of the intermediary would be significantly reduced. This would be reflected in a decreasing group rating due to higher than expected defaults within the group. We deduce:Hypothesis H4: A higher group rating leads to lower credit spreads.When deciding to join a group, market participants face the choice of group size. At first sight, a smaller group seems to offer a potentially closeknit community in the marketplace that facilitates the interaction and closer collaboration of group members with the group leader. This is fairly comparable to the stream of literature on relationship lending that emphasizes the exchange and evaluation of "soft information" within small banks (Petersen and Rajan 1994, Elyasiani and Goldberg 2004, Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein 2005). On closer examination, and presumably more important, borrowers and lenders might prefer larger groups because they generate more opportunities for exchange, collectively provide more funds for loans, and, thus, offer easier access to credit. From an investor's perspective, in addition to a larger network, bigger groups are attractive because they may enable effective "peer-monitoring" which lowers credit risk. The concept of peermonitoring, where group members have better information and intra-group monitoring leads to greater rates of repayment, is formalized in a large body of academic literature dealing with the optimal design of group lending agreements in the context of developing economies (Stiglitz 1990, Varian 1990, Chowdhury 2005, Besley and Coate 1995).Armendariz de Aghion (1999) provides tentative arguments in favor of a positive correlation between group size and the peer-monitoring effort. Within groups in the electronic lending marketplace, even though there is no joint liability as it typically exists in group lending (see, e.g., Prescott 1997), there are several incentive mechanisms in place to create peer pressure and induce peer-monitoring. First of all, groups comprise of individuals that share a common background or interest, based on, e.g., employment, geography, education, or leisure activities. The group can be viewed as a community where anonymity is reduced and relationships are established. In those relationships lies the potential for social sanctions (see Besley and Coate 1995 for a succinct introduction), resulting in peer pressure. Moreover, in cases of loan default, limited repayments ("community payments") may be arranged. This is, to a certain extent, comparable to a joint liability. Hence, we argue that, beyond the group leader's functions, there are peer-monitoring effects increasing with group size. These effects are perceived and valued by lenders, resulting in a lower demanded risk premium.This leads to:Hypothesis H5: Increasing group size leads to lower credit spreads.4 Empirical Study4.1 MethodologyWe apply OLS regression analysis in order to determine the factors that impact the credit spreads as the outcome of the credit transactions in the marketplace and test the hypotheses H1 through H5. As a robustness test to control for a potential estimation bias due to self-selection in the choice of an intermediary, we further apply the matching method explained in section 4.5. Econometric matching techniques were developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and extended by Heckman and Robb Jr (1985). The methods take into account the fact that the characteristics of group members may differ significantly from those of non-group members and ensure that such observed characteristics are not biasing the regression estimations.4.2 Dependent and Independent VariablesIn our empirical analysis of intermediaries on an electronic P2P lending platform, the interest rates measure how successfully borrowers can access capital. Lower interest rates indicate better access to capital. The interest rates on Prosper should generally be interpreted with respect to market interest rates (de Bondt 2005). As the dependent variable we therefore analyze the spread over three-year interest rate swaps (on the use of swap rates as a proxy for the risk-free rate see Zhu 2006), measured in basis points (i.e. one hundredth of one percent) in order to control for differing market interest rates in our data. This ensures matching maturities since all loans on Prosper have a maturity of 36 months. We employ Borrower Rate, representing borrowers' total loan cost, and Borrower Rate Net which excludes a potential group fee in order to evaluate the net effect of intermediation. Daily time series of these swap rates were obtained from the website of the Federal Reserve. To facilitate the testing of our hypotheses from Chapter 3, we employ listingand group-specific variables. We present an overview of our variables in Table 2.In order to test hypotheses H1, H2, H3a and H3b we rely on the group-relatedvariables Group Affiliation, Certification, Group Leader Bid, and Mandatory Review. They measure the effect of group membership, a group leader's screening of potential borrowers, and the group leader's bid for a recommended loan listing. To be able to assess the usage of a paid intermediary, we look at Paid Group as well as Group Fee. In order to evaluate the effect of a group's reputation in hypothesis H4, we use the independent variable Group Rating. Group Size measures the potential effect hypothesized in hypothesis H5.We incorporate a number of borrower and transaction characteristics into our analyses. First we look at four criteria based on individuals' credit reports commonly used by by traditional lending institutions (Avery, Bostic, Calem, and Canner 1996). As a proxy for probability of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD), we use Credit Grade and Debt-toIncome (DTI) Grade. Both variables are provided by Prosper in cooperation with the credit reporting agency Experian. Credit grades are derived from the individual credit score, where 40 points on the credit grade scale represent one rating notch. Therefore, Credit Grade can be included as a metric variable in our regression models. Amount and Homeownership serve as additional risk characteristics.We include two important transaction characteristics related to internet-based e-commerce: As self-disclosure may reduce uncertainty in electronic marketplaces (Tidwell and Walther 2002), we control for Visual Self-Disclosure in borrowers' loan listings with the provision of personal photographs. We include Auction as a control variable reflecting use of the auction mechanism on Prosper as this may significantly influence price determination (Klemperer 2004). Borrowers can choose the auction mechanism if they want to give lenders the chance to bid down the interest rate. Not using the auction mechanism will close a loan listing as soon as the requested loan amount is met by bidders. We include quarter dummies into each regression model to control for the eve of the sub-prime crisis in 2007. Moreover, this allows to control for the fact that consumers tend to adopt innovations in a process over a certain time (Olshavsky 1980) which could cause a distortions in the database by consumers' hesitant use of intermediaries in the marketplace.Table 3 presents Pearson's correlations of our independent variables. We further display Cramér's V coefficient (Cramér 1991), as it "is probably the best-known measure of association for contingency tables" (Kline 2004, p. 151). In the case of two dichotome variables, Cramér's V simplifies to the Phi coefficient [straight phi]. We see that a group's mandatory review process correlates positively with the recommendation by the group leader (Certification) and the group leader's bid. There is also a significant and positive correlation between certification and Group Leader Bid. Interestingly, we find that Group Size correlates negatively with Certification, Group Leader's Bid, and a mandatory review process. As expected, Credit Grade is negatively correlated with Amount and Homeownership. Between the variables that are used within the same regression models there is no significant correlation above 0.5 which is a first indicator that there is not any multicollinearity issue with the data. In line with our expectations, we document a significant and high correlation of 0.75 between Paid Group and Group Fee. This is not an issue since these two variables will not be included simultaneously into our multivariate analyses.4.3 Description of data setOur empirical analysis of financial intermediaries in the electronic P2P lending platform Prosper is based on 14,321 credit transactions between 200511 and 2007-09, covering all transactions that took place in the market in this time period. As of 2007-09-12, the marketplace consisted of a total of 385,161 registered users.Our data set includes detailed information about these credit transactions, and there is also comprehensive information about the course of the loan-originating auction, including individual bidding and its impact on interest rates. At this point in time the data set is still heavily right censored with respect to subsequent information on ex-postrealized loan defaults. For this reason we adopt the borrowers' perspective and focus our analyses on the credit spreads realized. We begin with a closer look at the borrowers and the lenders in the marketplace. Borrowers (lenders) are defined quite literally as market participants that were involved in transactions solely as borrowers (lenders).As we can see from Table 4, the sample of 14,321 credit transactions involved almost twice as many lenders as borrowers (32,996 vs. 16,778). This reflects the fact that on Prosper, several lenders collectively syndicate a loan in order to diversify their investments among many borrowers.We see that nearly 90 percent of lenders in the marketplace held a stake in at least two loans, with an average bid size of 96.22 USD (whereas most of the bids amount to the minimum, resulting in a median of 50 USD). Every second lender was invested in more than 10 loans, and the average lender held 32.7 loan shares. We rarely observe repeated borrowing in the marketplace. Only 4.6 percent of borrowers have a second, and 0.2 percent of borrowers have a third loan.Borrowers and lenders can form groups or become group members. We argue in section 2 that group leaders serve as financial intermediaries in the marketplace. Figure 4.3 presents the composition of groups by group size.We find that, in terms of member share, groups are dominated by lenders. The share of lenders within groups ranges from 45 to 68 percent and tends to increase with group size. We calculate the share of internal financing for each group as the percentage of the last 12 months' loan amount that is provided by members of the same group. Even with an increasing group size and an increasing absolute number of lenders within a group, only a fraction of loans are syndicated within groups. With the exception of very small groups, the share of internal financing is between 0.8 and 2.2 percent. We can subsume that groups are dominated by lenders and that borrowers' loans are funded primarily by lenders outside of their group. This supports our interpretation of group leaders as financial intermediaries that produce and signal information about potential borrowers for lenders outside the group.Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for loan amount and borrower rate by borrowers' credit grade as well as borrowers' group affiliation. Several interesting patterns emerge from this table.Out of a total sample of 14,321 loans, 9,187 transactions were carried out by group members and 5,134 transactions without group affiliation. 58 percent of total group-affiliated borrowers were members of paid groups. We find borrowers of allcredit grades in paid and unpaid groups as well as without group affiliation. Borrowers with the best credit grades AA, A and B were in relative terms more frequent in the sub-sample of borrowers without group affiliation (40 percent vs. 25 of all group-affiliated borrowers).The average loan amount over the total sample was 6,102 USD. Borrowers with a better credit grade borrowed higher loan amounts. We see a mean loan amount in the total sample for borrowers with the best credit grade AA of 8,264 USD whereas for "high risk" borrowers (credit grade HR) the amount was only about one third of that. The average loan amount was higher for borrowers without group affiliation. However, when comparing by credit grades, we find higher average loan amounts for group members than for borrowers without group association. When comparing unpaid and paid groups, we find that borrowers with better credit grades borrowed significantly higher amounts in groups with a paid group leader than in unpaid groups. Table 5 also lists the average borrower rate by credit grade as the spread over three-year interest rate swaps. We see that the average spread was 1,011 basis points (= 10.11 percent). Comparing borrowers with and without group affiliation, we find that average spreads by credit grade were lower for borrowers with group affiliation. Table 5 documents significant differences in average spreads between paid and unpaid groups. Borrowers in unpaid groups on average borrowed at lower spreads than borrowers in paid groups or borrowers without group affiliation. When comparing paid groups to borrowers without group affiliation, we find that borrowers with credit grades of AA, A, B and C (credit grades of D, E, and HR) borrowed at higher (lower) spreads in paid groups.Table 6 provides sample statistics on the temporal distribution of the loan origination and the originated volume. We observe 22 transactions in the fourth quarter of 2005, and document an increase in transactions to more than 3,000 loans in the first and second quarter of 2007. We also see an increase in mean loan volume from between 4,500 and 5,000 USD in 2006 to between 6,500 and 7,500 USD in the first and second quarter of 2007. To gain a better understanding of the patterns documented in Table 5 and 6, we offer some further insights into the role of groups in the electronic lending platform in Table 7.The first three rows in Table 7 represent the distribution of variables based on individuals' credit reports by group membership. As already presented in the last rows of Table 5, the median credit grade of borrowers without group affiliation tends to be better. Group-affiliated borrowers are on average more indebted which is reflected in the Debt-to-Income (DTI) Grade. We find an average DTI Grade of 40 percent within groups compared to 32 percent with transactions outside groups. Within the sample, 41 percent of borrowers owned a house, and homeownership was more frequent in transactions outside groups (45 percent). Average Credit Grade and DTI Grade, as well as the distribution of Homeownership seem to confirm the finding that borrowers with better risk characteristics are more frequent in the sub-sample of borrowers without group affiliation.Regarding the characteristics of the transaction, we find that two out of three bidders within the sample reveal personal photographs (Visual SelfDisclosure). This is far。
P2P网贷平台研究综述
[1]Freedman S，Jin G Z. Do social networks solve information problems for peer-to -peer lending？evidence from prosper. com[R]. NET Institute Working Paper，2008.
业界关于p2p网贷平台的起源有两种说法一种说法认为是受了孟加拉国尤努斯教授在1983年创办的孟加拉乡村银行模式的发展而来另一种说法认为是在北美华人民间标会合会的个人互助借贷模式发展中逐渐发展而来
P2P网贷平台研究综述
作者：周传瑞
来源：《中国集体经济》2018年第14期
摘要：目前我国P2P行业蓬勃发展。文章基于对国内外的研究发展情况进行分析和梳理，从借贷双方行为、运营模式、法律监管监管、网贷中社会资本四个方面加以归纳总结。文章对P2P平台相关方向深入研究有积极有效的作用。
从上述文献来看，国内外学者对P2P网贷的研究主要集中在五个方面上。在投融资双方行为研究上，对投资人的研究主要是在投资人的羊群行为上，剖析了投资人羊群行为的表现和羊群行为背后的原因，对融资人行为的研究相对投资人来说较少；在软信息的研究上比例是最大的，国内外学者实证表明软信息对借款人的借贷成功率的积极作用，软信息越多的借款人成功率也越高；在P2P网贷平台运营模式上，国内学者的研究主要是通过与国外P2P平台运营模式特征上做比较分析，目前我国与国外P2P运营模式上的区别主要原因是我国社会信用体系的不完善所采取的一系列为借款人增信的行为；P2P网贷目前尚处于有效监管之外，学者都对政府介入行业监管持支持的态度，并根据中国国情提出相应的监管框架。
[2]Lee E，Lee B. Herding behavior in online P2P lending：An empirical investigation[J]. Electronic Commerce Research & Applications，2011（05）.
P2P网络借贷国际发展与中国实践
3、建立完善的征信体系
政府应加快建立完善的征信体系，将个人信用信息纳入其中。这将有助于减少 借款人的违约风险，降低投资者的风险损失。同时，也能够提高平台的运营效 率和服务质量。
4、提高平台服务质量
P2P网络借贷平台应不断提高自身的服务质量，为投资者提供更加安全、便捷、 高效的金融服务。这包括加强风险管理、提高信息披露透明度、优化用户体验 等措施。同时，平台应遵守法律法规和行业规范，树立良好的行业形象。
一、P2P网络借贷国际发展现状
P2P网络借贷起源于英国，随后在美国、德国、法国等国家得到快速发展。国 际上的P2P网络借贷平台通常以互联网技术为依托，具有高效、便捷、低成本 等特点，为广大借款人和出借人提供了新的融资和投资渠道。
然而，P2P网络借贷在国际发展过程中也暴露出一些问题，如监管缺失、风险 控制不足、运营不善等。例如，美国最大的P2P平台“营利性”的运营方宜人 贷，因涉嫌非法吸收公众存款和集资诈骗被警方调查。这一事件引起了国际社 会对P2P网络借贷行业监管的重视。
二、中国P2P网络借贷实践探究
1、政策法规：中国政府对P2P网络借贷行业实行“鼓励创新、防范风险”的政 策。2016年8月，中国银监会发布了《网络借贷信息中介机构业务活动管理暂 行办法》，以规范P2P网络借贷行业发展，保护投资者利益。
2、市场环境：中国作为全球最大的P2P市场，拥有数千家P2P平台。其中，大 型平台如陆金所、拍拍贷、人人贷等已成为行业领军企业。这些平台在运营中 不断优化风险控制手段，提高服务质量和效率，为借款人和出借人提供了良好 的交易环境。
P2P网络借贷国际发展与中国 实践
目录
01 一、P2P网络借贷国 际发展现状
03 三、总结与展望
02
我国P2P网络借贷行业发展现状研究
我国P2P网络借贷行业发展现状研究一、概述随着互联网技术的飞速发展和金融创新的不断深入，P2P （PeertoPeer）网络借贷作为一种新兴的金融模式在我国迅速崛起。
P2P网络借贷，即点对点借贷，是指通过互联网平台，将资金需求方与资金供给方直接对接，实现资金的融通。
这种模式打破了传统金融机构在借贷过程中的垄断地位，为小微企业和个人提供了更加便捷、高效的融资渠道，同时也为投资者提供了新的投资选择。
我国P2P网络借贷行业自2007年起步，经历了探索期、高速发展期和规范调整期三个阶段。
在探索期，行业主要以借鉴国外模式为主，发展较为缓慢。
进入高速发展期，随着国家对于互联网金融的鼓励政策出台，P2P平台如雨后春笋般涌现，行业规模迅速扩大。
伴随着行业的快速发展，也出现了诸如平台跑路、非法集资等问题。
规范调整期成为了行业发展的必然选择。
当前，我国P2P网络借贷行业正处于一个关键的转折点。
政府监管部门出台了一系列政策，旨在规范行业发展，防范金融风险。
这些政策包括但不限于加强平台监管、限制资金池操作、明确信息披露要求等。
这些举措对于提升行业整体的健康度、保护投资者权益具有重要意义。
本研究旨在深入分析我国P2P网络借贷行业的现状，包括行业规模、市场结构、运营模式、风险管理以及监管政策等方面，探讨行业面临的挑战和机遇，为行业的可持续发展提供参考和建议。
通过对行业的全面剖析，本研究将有助于理解我国P2P网络借贷行业的真实面貌，为相关政策制定者和从业者提供决策依据。
1. P2P网络借贷的背景与定义P2P网络借贷，即PeertoPeer lending，起源于21世纪初的英国，随着互联网技术的飞速发展和金融创新的不断推进，逐渐在全球范围内得到了广泛的关注和应用。
P2P网络借贷的核心理念是通过互联网平台实现个体与个体之间的直接借贷，它打破了传统金融中介的限制，使借款人和投资者能够更方便、快捷地进行资金融通。
在我国，P2P网络借贷行业的发展历程充满了曲折与变革。
国内外P2P融资模式的发展比较研究兼论对中国的启示
内容摘要
政府部门应加强对平台的运营监管，防止出现非法集资、资金池等问题五是 提高投资者的风险意识六是推动行业自律和规范化发展。平台和行业协会应加强 自律和规范化发展倡导行业七是培养优秀的人才队伍八是加强国际合作与交流。 学习借鉴国际先进经验和技术手段九是建立完善的退出机制十是建立健全的法律 制度和社会信用体系等。
国内外P2P融资模式的发展比较 研究兼论对中国的启示
01 引言
目录
02
一、国内P2P融资模 式的发展
03
二、国外P2P融资模 式的发展
04 三、对中国的启示
05 结论
06 参考内容
引言
引言
近年来，P2P融资模式在全球范围内异军突起，以其独特的优势在各行各业得 到了广泛的应用。这种模式以其高性价比、隐私保护、负载均衡等特性，实现了 资源的高效利用，大大降低了成本，同时为社会的发展带来了巨大的潜力。本次 演示将从国内外两个方面对P2P融资模式的发展进行比较研究，探讨其对我国在 创新融资方面的启示。
文献综述
在平台模式方面，P2P网络借贷平台通常分为纯平台模式和债权转让模式。纯 平台模式是指平台只提供信息匹配、借贷流程等基础服务，不参与借贷交易。债 权转让模式是指平台先以自有资金出借给借款人，然后将债权转让给出借人，实 现债权流动。中国大部分P2P网络借贷平台采用债权转让模式。
文献综述
在业务特点方面，P2P网络借贷主要服务于传统金融机构无法覆盖的借款人群 体，尤其是小微企业和个人。由于借款人信用状况较差，因此借款利率较高，而 出借人则追求较高的收益。此外，P2P网络借贷的另一个特点是非抵押、非担保， 主要依赖借款人的信用和还款能力。
参考内容
引言
引言
P2P网络借贷，即peer-to-peer lending，是一种基于互联网平台的金融服 务模式，它将借款人和出借人通过互联网平台连接起来，使双方能够直接进行借 贷交易。这种模式的出现，不仅拓宽了借款人和出借人的融资渠道，也降低了融 资成本，提高了资金使用效率。然而，随着P2P网络借贷的快速发展，风险和问 题也随之显现。因此，本次演示旨在探讨国内外P2P网络借贷的发展状况，分析 其业务特点、风险管控和监管等方面的差异和面临的挑战。
互联网金融发展文献综述及外文文献资料P2P金融
本份文档包含：关于该选题的外文文献、文献综述一、外文文献标题: Online brokers lead the way for French internet finance作者: Caffard, Christophe期刊名称: International Financial Law Review卷: 20；期: 3；页: 20-24Online brokers lead the way for French internet finance1 Regulated brokersRegulated brokers are legal entities which have an investment services licence and are subject to the prudential regulations of the Comite de Reglementation Bancaire et Financiere (CRBF) and the Conseil des Marches Financiers (CMF).* Choice of legal form: regulated brokers are not required to be incorporated in a specific legal form; however, under article 13 of the MAF Law, the CECEI checks whether the legal form of the brokerage company is appropriate for providing investment services. In practice, any type of commercial company is admitted: societes de capitaux (limited companies) or societes de personnes (partnerships). The formalities of share transfer, tax and the scope of liability of a company's management will be relevant factors to the choice of legal form.* Application for an investment services licence from the CECEI: the most important part of the application is the description of the investment services, and a business plan including prospective financial statements for the following three years. The CMF will check whether the business plan is consistent with the investment services licence requested by the broker. The CECEI will ensure that the applicant's own initial funds are consistent with the business plan.The scope of the investment services licence is variable and covers one or more ofthe following investment services:Reception and transmission of orders to another investment services provider on behalf of investors, for execution. This is the core investment service provided by thebrokerage companies and, as such, a licence to provide this service is the minimum required for a brokerage company. Brokerage companies may request an investment services licence limited to the reception and transmission of orders. In this case, there will need to be a tripartite agreement between the investor, the broker and an investment services provider authorized to execute the orders of the investor. These single-- licensed brokerage companies are mere intermediaries remunerated by a commission paid by the investors. They are not entitled to benefit from the European passport under the ISD.Execution of such order other than for own account. This is defined as the execution of orders on behalf of a customer under the provision of an agency or a brokerage agreement. The brokerage company authorized to execute orders received from the investors offers a larger range of services with more potential. The broker with an investment services licence covering the execution of orders will be in charge of executing the final orders on the regulated markets, provided it is has been authorized as a market member. Unauthorized brokerage companies transmit the orders they have received to authorized market members. Authorized brokerage companies may offer investors a quasi-immediate execution of orders on the markets.Placing. This is the search for subscribers or purchasers on behalf of the issuer or seller of financial instruments. According to the CMF, in the case of a public offer of listed financial instruments placed by a market firm (for example on the Paris Stock Exchange or Nouveau March&), an online broker, which sells financial instruments online, is deemed to be providing his client with a reception-transmission of orders service and not a placing service. A placing service requires the broker to comply with capital adequacy ratios whenever it is associated with an underwriting commitment.Account-keeping, custody and clearing. These are not considered to be investment services, but assimilated services restricted to credit institutions or investment firms, and are subject to the CMF's General Regulations.CRBF regulators. CBF regulations subject brokerage companies to the following requirements: the minimum issued and paid-up share capital depends on the nature and number of investment services carried out; brokerage companies who offeraccount-keeping, custody and reception, transmission and execution of orders must have a minimum paid-up share capital of Ffrl million (about $160,000). This is reduced to Ffr350,000 when the brokerage company is not involved in account-keeping or custody services;* the minimum shareholder funds must be equal to the higher of- 25% of the overheads of the previous year, or overheads forecast in the business plan; and- the aggregate client positions divided by 150;* internal compliance procedures must be established; and* the brokerage company must comply with certain ratios relating to solvency and large exposure.Regulated brokers are also subject to the CMF's rules on the appointment of a compliance officer, information and advice for clients, mandatory clauses to be inserted in clients' agreements, professional cards required from certain employees and reporting requirements to the CMF.2 Non-regulated brokersNon-regulated brokers are sole agents appointed by an investment firm authorized by the CECEI, or an appropriate authority of an EU member state. Sole agents are nonregulated entities and are neither subject to the minimum capital and shareholder funds requirements nor to the CMF/CRBF regulations.Sole agents enter into investment services agreements with clients on behalf and in the name of their principal, who must be a regulated investment services provider. These agreements are binding on who is, as a general rule, solely liable visa-vis clients and the supervisory authorities (the CMF and/or the Bank of France). In this respect, the incorporation and activities of a sole agent brokerage is simpler, safer and cheaper than for regulated brokers. However, sole agents are fully dependent on the principal since they are not authorized to be appointed by more than one investment firm and if, for any reason, the mandate is cancelled or terminated, sole agents must stop any brokerage activity, unless they get a new mandate or are granted an investment service licence by the CECEI. Sole agents do not benefit from theEuropean passport under the ISD, as they are not considered to be investment firms. It is important to note that the sole agent does not own the brokerage business, since clients simply have a contractual relationship. This is why sole agent status is generally more suitable when the principal and agent are companies within the same group or with long-term common interests.French branches of EU investment service providersThe licence for an EU investment service provider allows it to set up branches in France, subject to authorization from the authorities of its home state.This procedure is much simpler and quicker than an application for an investment services licence with the CECEI. The other advantages of operating in France in this way are that a branch is not required to show an endowment capital in France, and that prudential ratios of the home state apply to the French branch.As a general rule under the ISD, the home state authorities retain jurisdiction over the branch in the home state, with the exception of the public policy rules, which will apply to the branches. In France, the regulation referred to below is considered to be a public policy rule with which French branches operating online brokerage services in France must comply.Regulations applicable to brokerage servicesThe offer of brokerage services and the provision of brokerage services are regulated by reference to the nature of the financial instruments offered online.The offer of brokerage servicesAdvertising / marketingThe advertising of financial instruments is heavily regulated when advertisements are included in a public offering process. In this case the advertisement is in the form of a prospectus, which must comply with COB regulations, which provide detailed requirements regarding the form and content of the prospectus. As a general rule, any other form of advertising in a public offering process must refer to the prospectus approved by the COB.* The marketing in France of financial instruments listed on a foreign market must comply with COB regulation no. 99-04. This provides that, before anytransaction, the broker must send his clients an information memorandum presenting the foreign market and the financial instruments dealt on that market. This may be sent to clients via the internet.Any advertising of operations on the foreign market must include certain mandatory information, including the identification of the legal entity which is soliciting French clients.As a general rule, the advertising of collective investment schemes is subject to regulation by the COB, which ensures that any advertisement is consistent with the notice d'information and with regulations applicable to collective investment schemes generally. SICA Vs and FCPs subject to COB regulation no. 89-02 may not be marketed until the management company has been notified of the COB's approval.However, any direct or indirect solicitation to invest in collective investment schemes subject to the simplified COB approval procedure (less formal because the scheme only targets professional investors), must contain a disclaimer informing investors that any subscription or transfer of shares or units, is restricted to qualified investors or investors whose initial investment is at least euro500,000 ($457,000) or (depending on the scheme) euro,30,000. The disclaimer must also mention that these collective investment schemes are not approved by the COB and adhere to specific investment rules.* The COB has issued guidelines no. 99-02 relating to the marketing and sale via the internet of i) collective investment scheme units or shares; and ii) discretionary mandates. These guidelines are not binding. Its purpose is to clarify certain aspects of the COB regulations which apply to collective investment schemes (management company and depositary) and to any information on financial instruments disclosed during a public offering. The COB is preparing new guidelines relating to financial advice and information disseminated via the internet.* COB regulations and recommendations are applicable to online brokers whenever financial instruments (listed or otherwise) are offered to the public.* Under the CMF's regulations, regulated brokers are bound to inform and advise their clients after having assessed their financial knowledge.* In any event, there is a prohibition on advertising units of investment funds which invest in futures markets (Article 23 of the law of 23/12/1988), or to market non-OECD financial instruments in France without the prior consent of the French Ministry of Economy.3 Canvassing lawUnder the law of 1972 relating to financial canvassing, canvassing consists of contacting potential clients by way of visits, letters, circulars and telephone calls to: i) induce them to subscribe, purchase, exchange or sell securities or participate in such operations; and ii) offer services and advice on a regular basis.The law of 1972 is not adapted to the internet and legislative reform in this field is awaited. The CMF, the COB and the CECEI consider that offers to provide e-banking and e-brokerage services would be treated in the same manner as offers of services or advice by way of letters, circulars or telephone calls.It is difficult to determine which information systems or practices will qualify as financial canvassing (and therefore regulated) or merely as financial advertising (and therefore permitted); the CECEI and the COB have not yet given any clear guidance on this question.According to a discussion and research paper on internet risk released by the Commission Bancaire (the supervisory arm of the Bank of France) in July 2000, advertising messages, including a link to the seller's site (in the case of banks) displayed on general purpose websites, or posting information, advice or offers on sites or news groups in the client's country, would be viewed as financial advertising and would not constitute financial canvassing.The Bank of France takes the view that in these examples there is no active solicitation of clients since they access the financial advertisements deliberately and of their own accord, as if visiting the premises of a bank.In contrast with these passive marketing techniques, sending messages to email addresses would be equated with sending letters and as such would qualify as canvassing, according to the Bank of France.In any case, before soliciting French customers, the brokerage company mustnotify the Bank of France (CECEI) of its intention to solicit such customers; and employees of the brokerage company must be granted a specific solicitation card by the French authorities. Any breach of this rule would constitute a criminal offence.4 Public offering regulationsPublic offering regulations are applicable whenever financial instruments are issued or transferred to the public in France, using advertising, canvassing, credit institutions or investment service providers. Public offerings are heavily regulated and are subject to a number of requirements, including prior approval by COB of a prospectus, filing with the Commercial Registry of the French translation of the issuer's constitutional documents, publication of a legal notice in the BALO and continuing information obligations.The public offering regulations apply to offers of both listed and unlisted financial instruments. In this respect, online brokers offering listed shares to the public are subject to public offering regulations and in particular COB Regulation no. 99-08, under which the online broker must comply with the following disclosure and advertising rules:* the preparation of a simplified prospectus which must be approved by the COB and made freely available to the public; and * any advertisement must refer to the simplified prospectus and specify how to obtain a copy.A private placement (as opposed to a public offering) is defined as the issue or transfer of financial instruments to qualified investors or to a restricted circle of investors.In order to ensure a private placement via the internet, it is necessary to restrict electronic access to the broker's website by passwords granted solely to qualified investors. It is also mandatory under COB Regulation No. 99-09 that a private placement disclaimer be displayed on the webpages of the broker's website. The disclaimer must mention that:* offering materials (advertisements, information memoranda, etc) have not been submitted to the COB for its approval;* qualified investors must participate in the private placement for their ownaccount;* any offer to the public of the financial instruments subscribed or purchased by the qualified investors in the private placement would be subject to public offering regulations; and* if the investors are members of a restricted circle of more than 100, they must certify that they are associated with the management of the issuer on a professional or a personal basis. The provision of online brokerage servicesRules of conduct applicable to online brokers Regulated brokers and principals of non-regulated brokers are investment service providers and are subject to the rules of conduct set out in its General Regulation. The CMF has issued General Decision no. 99-07 providing regulations and guidelines. It implements the CMF rules of conduct.As a general rule, the message must clearly identify the issuer of a message offering the service of reception or transmission of orders. In particular, the website must display the legal status of the broker and the investment service it is authorized to provide. Regulated brokers and non-regulated brokers must be clearly distinguished, and the latter must disclose the identity of their investment service provider whom they are asking as agent.If the online broker is not in charge of account-keeping and custody services, whoever is must be clearly identified. Before entering into a contract with any new client, theonline broker must verify the client's identity and domicile by requesting the following documents:a photocopy of a valid official identity document (passport, identity card, driving licence);* bank details; and* written evidence of address.The broker must send confirmation that he has received these documents and, in doing so, check the client's address. These formalities and verifications may not be carried out via the internet.Once the identity and domicile ofthe new client have been checked, the onlinebroker can provide investment services to his client where:* the client has signed an agreement relating to the evidential rules and procedures applicable to the reception of orders via the internet;* the funds or financial instruments have been credited to the client's account. This does not apply to the broker if it is not the account keeper or the custodian;* the broker has checked that its client may receive the information on the relevant financial instruments and risks via the internet; and* the broker must ensure that the client receives in advance more detailed information regarding operations involving financial instruments which do not correspond to the client's regular dealings.In cases where the broker is responsible for account-- keeping, it should operate an automated system monitoring the accounts of the client and freezing any order in the event of insufficient provision or margin cover.The CMF also recommends that this automated system should freeze any order sent by the client which does not comply with market regulations.Compliance with these rules of conduct raises problems when the broker's website is outsourced to a third party, which happens frequently. The authorities are concerned that brokers may lose control over the operation of their websites and would be unable to take any operational responsibility, while remaining liable. This is why the Commission Bancaire is considering imposing an obligation on investment firms and credit institutions providing online financial services, to monitor their outside internet service providers and/or software companies.5 Regulation of contracts entered Into by online brokersContracts with clients These are subject to the CMF regulations, and in particular to CMF General Decision no. 98-28 relating to the mandatory clauses which must be included in agreements entered into with clients. It came into force in June 2000 and any existing contract is required to be duly amended.The agreements must contain a clause setting out the identity of the client and its legal capacity. In particular, qualified investors must be identified among other legal entities as well as the investment services provided. The categories of financialinstruments and financial services must also be stated in the agreement. This is important since it is taken into account when determining whether the broker has properly assessed the skills of his client. In this respect, it is recommended that high-risk speculative and/or complex operations, such as operations on futures markets, be restricted to informed clients or to qualified investors.In practice, the online broker asks new clients to answer a questionnaire which acts as proof that the broker has fulfilled its obligations to assess the skills ofits client.The agreement must contain a confidentiality clause which is binding. In this respect, it is useful for the online broker to provide exceptions to this obligation so that information on clients can be centralized within a member ofthe same group of companies, or accessed by an outside software company.Contracts with other investment services providersThe number of contracts entered into by brokers with other investment service providers depends on the scope of its licence. Non-regulated brokers must enter into an exclusive mandate with a licensed investment service provider.Regulated brokers which are not market members or not licensed for the execution of orders must conclude a transmission of orders agreement with market members or other investment service providers.These contracts are not subject to the CMF General Decision no. 98-28 or to other specific regulations, with the exception of.* clearing agreements;* when a client gives a broker with whom he has an account an order for transmission to another non-resident institution with comparable status, the broker is forbidden from being remunerated in the form of hard commission (a commission rebate) by the institution to which the order has been transmitted; and* a non account-keeping broker receiving orders from a client for transmission to another institution may be remunerated in the form of a hard commission, provided that the broker informs the client when entering into contractual relations (and thereafter annually) of the terms and conditions and amount of the hard commission.Contracts entered into with software companiesThese contracts might at first appear to have regulatory implications. However, recent financial regulations applicable to e-- brokerage now have a direct bearing on implications for IT agreements.In practice, brokers must ensure that the operation of the website and the reception and transmission of software orders complies with the CMF General Decision and any other applicable regulations applicable. The upgrade clause of the IT agreement entered into with the software company should address the question of the software being upgraded in the event of changes to applicable regulations.It is also recommended that any outsourcing agreement contains a clause which sets out how the online broker monitors the operation of the outsourced website.二、文献综述互联网金融发展文献综述摘要互联网金融的快速发展成为近年来中国经济金融领域备受瞩目的重要现象，国内学术界讨论互联网金融的文献数量也急速膨胀，但目前尚缺少对与互联网金融相关的各类文献进行全面梳理的综述类论文。
P2P 网络借贷文献综述及外文文献互联网金融
本份文档包含：关于该选题的外文文献、文献综述一、外文文献标题: Emergence of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic Markets: The Case of Online P2P Lending作者: Berger, Sven C; Gleisner, Fabian期刊: Business Research；卷: 2；期: 1；页: 39-65；出版年份: 2009 Emergence of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic Markets: The Case of Online P2PLendingAbstractWe analyze the role of intermediaries in electronic markets using detailed data of more than 14,000 originated loans on an electronic P2P (peer-to-peer) lending platform. In such an electronic credit market, lenders bid to supply a private loan. Screening of potential borrowers and the monitoring of loan repayment can be delegated to designated group leaders. We find that these market participants act as financial intermediaries and significantly improve borrowers' credit conditions by reducing information asymmetries, predominantly for borrowers with less attractive risk characteristics. Our findings may be surprising given the replacement of a bank by an electronic marketplace.Keywords: Asymmetric information, intermediation, social lending, electronic markets1 IntroductionThe evolution of information technology in recent years has led to the development of electronic marketplaces where traditional intermediaries may be less important or even redundant for the economic interaction of market participants (Benjamin and Wigand 1995, Evans and Wurster 1997, Malone, Yates, and Benjamin 1987). Within the financial services industry, the debate about disintermediation and the future relevance of financial intermediaries (Allen and Santomero 2001, Nellis, McCaffery, and Hutchinson 2000, Schmidt, Hackethal, and Tyrell 1999) is fueled by the increasing role of electronic lending markets (P2P Lending or Social Lending) where an electronic marketplace replaces a bank as the traditional intermediary and enables the brokerage of consumer loans directly between borrowers and lenders (Hulme and Wright 2006, Meyer 2007). A recent study predicts that within the next few years such social banking platforms may have a market share of ten percent of the worldwide market for retail lending and financial planning (Gartner Inc. 2008). For the US, the P2P lending market is estimated to grow to a volume of up to ten billion USD within the next 10 years (Bruene 2007). We examine more than 14,000 credit transactions on the American electronic P2P lending platform , covering all transactions that took place in the market between 2005-11 and 2007-09. Our analysis of the P2P credit market starts with the observation that, despite the direct mediation of loans in the marketplace, new types of intermediaries emerge as market participants providepaid intermediary services. In the paper we then focus on the following questions: (1) From a theoretical point of view, how can these intermediaries create value in the interaction between borrowers and lenders? (2) Should all borrowers make use of an intermediary, and can it make sense to pay for intermediary services? (3) From the borrowers' perspective, what is the economic impact of intermediation in the electronic lending marketplace? Our empirical analysis is confirmatory in nature. It is based on the literature on financial intermediation (e. g., Diamond 1984, Leland and Pyle 1976) from which we derive hypotheses on the role of intermediaries in electronic marketplaces.2 Intermediaries in electronic credit marketplaces2.1 Electronic marketplaces and disintermediationMarkets are essential for economic activity in mediating the demand for and supply of goods and services. Intermediaries help to facilitate transactions between buyers and sellers by (1) providing transaction processing capabilities, (2) bringing enhanced levels of knowledge and expertise, and (3) adding to the transactability of a given good or service (Chircu and Kauffman 2000).The internet has made e-commerce possible where electronic markets are becoming more important in coordinating supply and demand (Grieger 2003, Segev, Gebauer, and Farber 1999). Electronic markets can facilitate economic activity even under complex and insecure conditions (Cordella 2006), significantly reduce information and transaction costs, and may in this way displace traditional intermediaries (Malone, Yates, and Benjamin 1987). Many authors argue that once electronic markets emerge, traditional intermediaries may be threatened by an electronic brokerage effect also called disintermediation (for a literature overview see Chircu and Kauffman 2000). In sharp contrast to that, the theoretical contributions on electronic markets and disintermediation have not yet been supported by convincing empirical evidence (Chircu and Kauffman 2000, Sen and King 2003). Moreover, the displacement of traditional intermediaries may never occur. Authors like Sarkar, Butler, and Steinfield (1998) or Hagel and Singer (1999) argue that electronic markets may lead to new forms of intermediation.2.2 Electronic lending platformsElectronic lending platforms are electronic markets that mediate between borrowers and lenders of loans.Wefocus here on consumer loans between individual borrowers and lenders and exclude platforms for bonds or syndicated loans (Steelmann 2006). The electronic credit marketplace as a website in the World Wide Web constitutes the general conditions for peer-to-peer lending and provides the administration of current loans. Electronic lending platforms differ in the way loans are originated: Some providers mediate between borrowers and lenders themselves, whereas other providers match borrowers' credit listings and lenders' bids with an auction mechanism (Meyer 2007).The lion share of participants in the marketplace are private individuals, although there are institutional lenders investing in some, too. There are numerous providers that operate nationally due to differing regulatory frameworks. Table 1 provides an overview of the three major Anglo-American and German providers and theirbusiness models. A recent development of the business model of P2P lending marketplaces is that lenders may trade loans prior to maturity, increasing the liquidity of P2P loans. As of February 2009, Prosper is still in the process, whereas Lending Club has already successfully registered with the SEC to create a secondary loan market. Despite differing business models, there is one distinctive feature that these marketplaces have in common: Transactions in electronic credit marketplaces occur anonymously between fictitious "screen names". Therefore, information is asymmetrically distributed between borrowers and lenders. Loans are not collateralized and lenders face the inherent risk of default (Steelmann 2006). Despite anonymous interactions, loan listings contain additional information on potential borrowers. Lenders can evaluate individual creditworthiness through quantitative as well as qualitative figures. , America's largest peer-topeer lending marketplace, provides an individual rating and an indicator of indebtedness in cooperation with the credit reporting agency Experian as the two main quantitative figures. The informational value of these figures should be considered high, although the degree to which consumer credit reports are accurate, complete or consistent is in dispute (Avery, Calem, Canner, and Bostic 2003). Most platforms give market participants the opportunity to provide additional personal information about their background, their financial standing and the purpose of the loan. This qualitative, "soft" information is mandatory and its validity is a priori not controlled. Borrowers thereby might have an incentive to overemphasize their "quality" (the present value of the prospective projects, their financial standing or payment behavior) in their personal descriptions (moral hazard).2.3 Groups on In addition to personal profiles, borrowers and lenders can form groups. These smaller communities within the marketplace review and assess the creditworthiness of individual members. Groups are potentially beneficial for market participants by providing and verifying information or obtaining additional information about borrowers that is not publicly available. Groups lack distinct ownership and governance features as they typically exist in credit cooperatives (Davis 2001, Taylor 1971). There is no ownership of the groups, and there is no collective decision mechanism on accepting group members or granting loans. Furthermore, groups do not exclusively deal with their members. At any time, lenders from outside the group may invest in a group member's loan listing. This implies that there is no rotation of money within the group, and no specific allocation process. There are two papers that specifically examine the role of groups on the P2P lending website : Freedman and Jin (2008) use transaction data from 200601-06 until 2008-07-31 covering around 290,000 loan listings and 25,000 funded loans. They find evidence for the idea that the monitoring within social networks provides a stronger incentive to pay off loans ex-post: Loans with friend endorsements and friend bids have fewer missed payments and yield significantly higher rates of return than other loans. Everett (2008) looks at the influence of group membership on loan default within 13,486 Prosper loans. The dataset covers funded loans from 2006-05-31 until 2007-11-06 and incorporates ex post loan performance information until 2008-05-07.He finds that membership in a group significantly decreases loan default risk if the group enforces real-life personal connections like, e.g., employees of the same company or alumni of a certain university. Both studies presented above look at social networks in the credit market but do not specifically take the group leader into account. It is, however, not the group as an institution per se, but the group leader who decides about membership and plays a substantial role in the lending process.2.4 Group leaders as financial intermediariesIn order to reduce information asymmetries, lenders must screen potential borrowers. Given the large number of available credit listings, it can be costly or impossible to process the information available about potential borrowers. Therefore, intermediaries emerge in the electronic marketplace offering intermediary services in order to assess and limit credit risk. Every participant in the online lending platform can found a group and become a group leader. Group leaders set membership criteria and administer the group. Groups are smaller communities within the marketplace where group members may share a bond based on employment, geography, education, common leisure activities, or other factors. The principle that people from close communities act more responsibly towards each other aims to lower the risk of defaults and therefore enables lending at better rates. Among the most important tasks of the group leader is the screening of borrowers within the group (a voluntary due diligence known as "vetting"). Within groups, it is common that borrowers send personal documents regarding their identity, income, and other pertinent information to the group leader. The group leader may also establish personal contact with the borrowers' employer to verify the personal income in order to recommend a borrower's credit listing.All in all, the intermediary reduces uncertainty for lenders, which should be reflected in lower required risk premiums. The arguments provided above lead us to the first fundamental hypothesis:Hypothesis H1: Borrowers within groups are able to borrow at lower credit spreads. Next, we formulate three hypotheses that enable us to decompose the role of the group leader in the lending marketplace. With imperfect information about borrowers' credit quality, lenders can use publicly observable signals to assess credit risk (Riley 1975, Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976, Spence 1973). Observable characteristics or actions can serve as signals. On the electronic lending platform Prosper, the recommendation of a credit listing by a group leader is a strong observable signal of credit quality. Borrowers can voluntarily provide additional private information regarding their financial standing to their group leader. Group leaders can then recommend credit listings within their groups. This observable recommendation serves as a signal of good credit quality for the marketplace.This leads to:Hypothesis H2: The recommendation of a credit listing by the group leader leads to lower credit spreads.The reliability of information produced by an intermediary is a prevalent problem in the intermediation literature. Group leaders might recommend credit listings within their group without prior diligent screening. It may be difficult or impossible for potential lenders to distinguish good information from bad. Group leaders can signalcredibility of a recommendation by bidding on the recommended credit listing. The potential investment of the group leader is an observable signal for information quality (Leland and Pyle 1976). We derive:Hypothesis H3a: A group leader's bidding serves as a credible signal for the quality of the credit listing and results in lower credit spreads.Hypothesis H3b: A group leader's bidding on a credit listing signals information quality and has a stronger impact on credit spreads than a recommendation by the group leader.We derive two additional hypotheses about the reputation and the size of groups. Past activities within a group, especially regarding the diligent assessment of individual borrowers by the group leader, are only imperfectly observable. In contrast, the reputation of a group in the electronic marketplace is observable from its group rating. The group rating is a measurement of a group's performance in paying back its loans in comparison with expected (historical) default rates. A defaulted loan worsens a group's rating and therefore its reputation. Tirole (1996) shows analytically how a group's good reputation positively influences individual behavior. The group rating reflects a group's ability to assess borrowers' credit quality, and serves as a proxy for the group leader's behavior in the future.In addition to a group leader's general ability, we argue that group reputation serves as an effective mechanism to prevent collusion between the group leader and a borrower within the group. The phenomenon of collusion (see, e.g., Tirole 1991) could be a major concern for participants in the electronic lending marketplace. This would be the case if a potential borrower could "bribe" the group leader in order to receive a recommendation and a bid. With an increasing probability for such collusive behavior, the credibility of the observable actions of the intermediary would be significantly reduced. This would be reflected in a decreasing group rating due to higher than expected defaults within the group. We deduce:Hypothesis H4: A higher group rating leads to lower credit spreads.When deciding to join a group, market participants face the choice of group size. At first sight, a smaller group seems to offer a potentially closeknit community in the marketplace that facilitates the interaction and closer collaboration of group members with the group leader. This is fairly comparable to the stream of literature on relationship lending that emphasizes the exchange and evaluation of "soft information" within small banks (Petersen and Rajan 1994, Elyasiani and Goldberg 2004, Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein 2005). On closer examination, and presumably more important, borrowers and lenders might prefer larger groups because they generate more opportunities for exchange, collectively provide more funds for loans, and, thus, offer easier access to credit. From an investor's perspective, in addition to a larger network, bigger groups are attractive because they may enable effective "peer-monitoring" which lowers credit risk. The concept of peermonitoring, where group members have better information and intra-group monitoring leads to greater rates of repayment, is formalized in a large body of academic literature dealing with the optimal design of group lending agreements in the context of developing economies (Stiglitz 1990, Varian 1990, Chowdhury 2005, Besley and Coate 1995).Armendariz de Aghion (1999) provides tentative arguments in favor of a positive correlation between group size and the peer-monitoring effort. Within groups in the electronic lending marketplace, even though there is no joint liability as it typically exists in group lending (see, e.g., Prescott 1997), there are several incentive mechanisms in place to create peer pressure and induce peer-monitoring. First of all, groups comprise of individuals that share a common background or interest, based on, e.g., employment, geography, education, or leisure activities. The group can be viewed as a community where anonymity is reduced and relationships are established. In those relationships lies the potential for social sanctions (see Besley and Coate 1995 for a succinct introduction), resulting in peer pressure. Moreover, in cases of loan default, limited repayments ("community payments") may be arranged. This is, to a certain extent, comparable to a joint liability. Hence, we argue that, beyond the group leader's functions, there are peer-monitoring effects increasing with group size. These effects are perceived and valued by lenders, resulting in a lower demanded risk premium.This leads to:Hypothesis H5: Increasing group size leads to lower credit spreads.4 Empirical Study4.1 MethodologyWe apply OLS regression analysis in order to determine the factors that impact the credit spreads as the outcome of the credit transactions in the marketplace and test the hypotheses H1 through H5. As a robustness test to control for a potential estimation bias due to self-selection in the choice of an intermediary, we further apply the matching method explained in section 4.5. Econometric matching techniques were developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and extended by Heckman and Robb Jr (1985). The methods take into account the fact that the characteristics of group members may differ significantly from those of non-group members and ensure that such observed characteristics are not biasing the regression estimations.4.2 Dependent and Independent VariablesIn our empirical analysis of intermediaries on an electronic P2P lending platform, the interest rates measure how successfully borrowers can access capital. Lower interest rates indicate better access to capital. The interest rates on Prosper should generally be interpreted with respect to market interest rates (de Bondt 2005). As the dependent variable we therefore analyze the spread over three-year interest rate swaps (on the use of swap rates as a proxy for the risk-free rate see Zhu 2006), measured in basis points (i.e. one hundredth of one percent) in order to control for differing market interest rates in our data. This ensures matching maturities since all loans on Prosper have a maturity of 36 months. We employ Borrower Rate, representing borrowers' total loan cost, and Borrower Rate Net which excludes a potential group fee in order to evaluate the net effect of intermediation. Daily time series of these swap rates were obtained from the website of the Federal Reserve. To facilitate the testing of our hypotheses from Chapter 3, we employ listingand group-specific variables. We present an overview of our variables in Table 2.In order to test hypotheses H1, H2, H3a and H3b we rely on the group-relatedvariables Group Affiliation, Certification, Group Leader Bid, and Mandatory Review. They measure the effect of group membership, a group leader's screening of potential borrowers, and the group leader's bid for a recommended loan listing. To be able to assess the usage of a paid intermediary, we look at Paid Group as well as Group Fee. In order to evaluate the effect of a group's reputation in hypothesis H4, we use the independent variable Group Rating. Group Size measures the potential effect hypothesized in hypothesis H5.We incorporate a number of borrower and transaction characteristics into our analyses. First we look at four criteria based on individuals' credit reports commonly used by by traditional lending institutions (Avery, Bostic, Calem, and Canner 1996). As a proxy for probability of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD), we use Credit Grade and Debt-toIncome (DTI) Grade. Both variables are provided by Prosper in cooperation with the credit reporting agency Experian. Credit grades are derived from the individual credit score, where 40 points on the credit grade scale represent one rating notch. Therefore, Credit Grade can be included as a metric variable in our regression models. Amount and Homeownership serve as additional risk characteristics.We include two important transaction characteristics related to internet-based e-commerce: As self-disclosure may reduce uncertainty in electronic marketplaces (Tidwell and Walther 2002), we control for Visual Self-Disclosure in borrowers' loan listings with the provision of personal photographs. We include Auction as a control variable reflecting use of the auction mechanism on Prosper as this may significantly influence price determination (Klemperer 2004). Borrowers can choose the auction mechanism if they want to give lenders the chance to bid down the interest rate. Not using the auction mechanism will close a loan listing as soon as the requested loan amount is met by bidders. We include quarter dummies into each regression model to control for the eve of the sub-prime crisis in 2007. Moreover, this allows to control for the fact that consumers tend to adopt innovations in a process over a certain time (Olshavsky 1980) which could cause a distortions in the database by consumers' hesitant use of intermediaries in the marketplace.Table 3 presents Pearson's correlations of our independent variables. We further display Cramér's V coefficient (Cramér 1991), as it "is probably the best-known measure of association for contingency tables" (Kline 2004, p. 151). In the case of two dichotome variables, Cramér's V simplifies to the Phi coefficient [straight phi]. We see that a group's mandatory review process correlates positively with the recommendation by the group leader (Certification) and the group leader's bid. There is also a significant and positive correlation between certification and Group Leader Bid. Interestingly, we find that Group Size correlates negatively with Certification, Group Leader's Bid, and a mandatory review process. As expected, Credit Grade is negatively correlated with Amount and Homeownership. Between the variables that are used within the same regression models there is no significant correlation above 0.5 which is a first indicator that there is not any multicollinearity issue with the data. In line with our expectations, we document a significant and high correlation of 0.75 between Paid Group and Group Fee. This is not an issue since these two variables will not be included simultaneously into our multivariate analyses.4.3 Description of data setOur empirical analysis of financial intermediaries in the electronic P2P lending platform Prosper is based on 14,321 credit transactions between 200511 and 2007-09, covering all transactions that took place in the market in this time period. As of 2007-09-12, the marketplace consisted of a total of 385,161 registered users.Our data set includes detailed information about these credit transactions, and there is also comprehensive information about the course of the loan-originating auction, including individual bidding and its impact on interest rates. At this point in time the data set is still heavily right censored with respect to subsequent information on ex-postrealized loan defaults. For this reason we adopt the borrowers' perspective and focus our analyses on the credit spreads realized. We begin with a closer look at the borrowers and the lenders in the marketplace. Borrowers (lenders) are defined quite literally as market participants that were involved in transactions solely as borrowers (lenders).As we can see from Table 4, the sample of 14,321 credit transactions involved almost twice as many lenders as borrowers (32,996 vs. 16,778). This reflects the fact that on Prosper, several lenders collectively syndicate a loan in order to diversify their investments among many borrowers.We see that nearly 90 percent of lenders in the marketplace held a stake in at least two loans, with an average bid size of 96.22 USD (whereas most of the bids amount to the minimum, resulting in a median of 50 USD). Every second lender was invested in more than 10 loans, and the average lender held 32.7 loan shares. We rarely observe repeated borrowing in the marketplace. Only 4.6 percent of borrowers have a second, and 0.2 percent of borrowers have a third loan.Borrowers and lenders can form groups or become group members. We argue in section 2 that group leaders serve as financial intermediaries in the marketplace. Figure 4.3 presents the composition of groups by group size.We find that, in terms of member share, groups are dominated by lenders. The share of lenders within groups ranges from 45 to 68 percent and tends to increase with group size. We calculate the share of internal financing for each group as the percentage of the last 12 months' loan amount that is provided by members of the same group. Even with an increasing group size and an increasing absolute number of lenders within a group, only a fraction of loans are syndicated within groups. With the exception of very small groups, the share of internal financing is between 0.8 and 2.2 percent. We can subsume that groups are dominated by lenders and that borrowers' loans are funded primarily by lenders outside of their group. This supports our interpretation of group leaders as financial intermediaries that produce and signal information about potential borrowers for lenders outside the group.Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for loan amount and borrower rate by borrowers' credit grade as well as borrowers' group affiliation. Several interesting patterns emerge from this table.Out of a total sample of 14,321 loans, 9,187 transactions were carried out by group members and 5,134 transactions without group affiliation. 58 percent of total group-affiliated borrowers were members of paid groups. We find borrowers of allcredit grades in paid and unpaid groups as well as without group affiliation. Borrowers with the best credit grades AA, A and B were in relative terms more frequent in the sub-sample of borrowers without group affiliation (40 percent vs. 25 of all group-affiliated borrowers).The average loan amount over the total sample was 6,102 USD. Borrowers with a better credit grade borrowed higher loan amounts. We see a mean loan amount in the total sample for borrowers with the best credit grade AA of 8,264 USD whereas for "high risk" borrowers (credit grade HR) the amount was only about one third of that. The average loan amount was higher for borrowers without group affiliation. However, when comparing by credit grades, we find higher average loan amounts for group members than for borrowers without group association. When comparing unpaid and paid groups, we find that borrowers with better credit grades borrowed significantly higher amounts in groups with a paid group leader than in unpaid groups. Table 5 also lists the average borrower rate by credit grade as the spread over three-year interest rate swaps. We see that the average spread was 1,011 basis points (= 10.11 percent). Comparing borrowers with and without group affiliation, we find that average spreads by credit grade were lower for borrowers with group affiliation. Table 5 documents significant differences in average spreads between paid and unpaid groups. Borrowers in unpaid groups on average borrowed at lower spreads than borrowers in paid groups or borrowers without group affiliation. When comparing paid groups to borrowers without group affiliation, we find that borrowers with credit grades of AA, A, B and C (credit grades of D, E, and HR) borrowed at higher (lower) spreads in paid groups.Table 6 provides sample statistics on the temporal distribution of the loan origination and the originated volume. We observe 22 transactions in the fourth quarter of 2005, and document an increase in transactions to more than 3,000 loans in the first and second quarter of 2007. We also see an increase in mean loan volume from between 4,500 and 5,000 USD in 2006 to between 6,500 and 7,500 USD in the first and second quarter of 2007. To gain a better understanding of the patterns documented in Table 5 and 6, we offer some further insights into the role of groups in the electronic lending platform in Table 7.The first three rows in Table 7 represent the distribution of variables based on individuals' credit reports by group membership. As already presented in the last rows of Table 5, the median credit grade of borrowers without group affiliation tends to be better. Group-affiliated borrowers are on average more indebted which is reflected in the Debt-to-Income (DTI) Grade. We find an average DTI Grade of 40 percent within groups compared to 32 percent with transactions outside groups. Within the sample, 41 percent of borrowers owned a house, and homeownership was more frequent in transactions outside groups (45 percent). Average Credit Grade and DTI Grade, as well as the distribution of Homeownership seem to confirm the finding that borrowers with better risk characteristics are more frequent in the sub-sample of borrowers without group affiliation.Regarding the characteristics of the transaction, we find that two out of three bidders within the sample reveal personal photographs (Visual SelfDisclosure). This is far。
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Ｐ２Ｐ网络借贷国内外理论 与实践研究文献综述
莫易娴 （华南农业大学经济管理学院，广东广州５１０６４２）
摘要：２００５年起源于英国的Ｐ２Ｐ网络借贷，业务迅速扩展到美国、意大利、日本和中国等地。本 文分析Ｐ２Ｐ网络借贷的现实背景，从文献梳理视角，大量参考国内外Ｐ２Ｐ网络借贷理论机理及实 践现状。从网络借贷的起源、现状、分类、积极作用和消极作用、风险及对策几方面总结国内外 研究现状，并指出网络借贷的未来发展趋势。 关键词：Ｐ２Ｐ；网络借贷；互联网技术；金融冲突
文章编号：１００３—４６２５（２０１１）１２—０１０１—０４ 中图分类号：Ｆ８３２．４ 文献标识码：Ａ
面对信息不对称下的道德风险和逆向选择等金 融冲突，基于一次性博弈和匿名交易等假设，正规金 融机构按新古典市场的基本原则要求农户、中小企 业提供抵押品或担保。那些拥有“软信息”且缺乏抵 押品的农户特别是贫困农户和中小企业便遭遇到金 融排斥（世界银行，１９８９）。 网络的普及和业务使用率的不断上升，网络借 贷作为一种新生事物也开始悄然出现，网络借贷具 备简洁、方便等特点，有利于解决部分人资金“短缺 之渴”，使网络借贷这一民间草根金融被越来越多人 看好。特别在美国２００８年金融危机后几年内，传统 金融机构融资低迷的同时却是网络借贷非常迅速的 发展高潮。截至２０１１年２月，全球最大的网络借贷 平台Ｐｒｏｓｐｅｒ有１亿会员，提供２１．９亿美元的个人借 贷。 关于网络借贷的研究国内外主要有以下几方
ａ１．（２００９）认为群体行为在Ｐ２Ｐ网络贷 款中特别显著，原因之一是网络中信息过多，使用者
ｅｔ
家Ｐ２Ｐ＿拍拍贷提供国内个人对个人小额贷款的
很难理解和使用全部的信息Ｂｒｙｎｊｏｌｆｓｓｏｎ＆Ｓｍｉｍ （２０００）；二是人们更易从网上获得其他人的选择和 建议。Ｄｕａｎ ｅｔ ａ１．（２００９）描述了许多社会和经济的 情形，如群体行为使个人的选择更易受他人决定的 影响，因此导致了许多经济的现象，如：投资者的建
营的量有多大，有多少违约概率及数量多少、给逾期
面对获得贷款影响较小，但是Ｒａｖｉｎａ（２００７）和Ｐｏｐｅ ａｎｄ Ｓｙｎｄｏｒ（２００８）发现影响贷款成功决定的因素是 借款人的特征：种族、年龄、性别、体重，外貌美丽和 种族明显地对借款成功及借款利率有影响，而且黑 人借款成本很高。Ｒａｖｉｎａ（２００８）发现黑人违约概率
议（Ｓｃｈａｒｆｓｔｅｉｎ＆Ｓｔｅｉｎ １９９０），首次公开发行定价行为
（ＩＰＯｓ）（Ｗｅｌｃｈ １９９２），时尚和习俗（Ｂｉｋｈｃｈａｎｄａｎｉ
ｅｔ
网络借贷平台还有Ｆａｃｅｂｏｏｋ
ａｌ
ｌｉｎｋｓ，ｅＢａｙａｕｃｔｉｏｎｓ，ｅＰ—
ａ１．
ｃｈａｔｓ等。
我国的Ｐ２Ｐ网络借贷网站，其模板来自欧美国 家。２００７年８月，中国第一个Ｐ２Ｐ借贷网站拍拍贷 成立。经过几年的尝试和发展，经营的模式也在摸 索中逐渐成熟。国内另一较有影响力的借贷平台是 齐放网，它是第一个通过网络借贷专为学生提供贷 款的社区。国内还有其他的网络借贷平台，如面向 农户和学生小额信贷的５１９ｉｖｅ网站和针对农户小 额信贷的Ｗｏｋａｉ网站，这两个网站都是由外国人创 办，采取与当地小额信贷机构进行合作的形式，对借 款人资信进行审查。目前国内Ｐ２Ｐ借贷网站有较大 影响力的如红岭创投、易贷３６５、齐放网、宜信、人人 贷、哈哈贷、Ｅ速贷等。
金融理论与实践
借贷平台，还有为学生提供贷款的齐放网，面向农户 和学生小额信贷的５１９ｉｖｅ网站和针对农户小额信 贷的Ｗｏｋａｉ网站。 此外，一些地方性的网络借贷供求平台也在为 当地的借贷者和贷款者提供中介服务。不过，这些
１０２
２０１１年第１２期（总第３８９期）
万方数据
【金融讲坛】
程度高；由于针对的是中低收入以及创业人群，其 有相当大的公益性质，具有较大的社会效益，解决了 很多做小额贷款尝试的机构组织普遍存在的成本 高、不易追踪等问题，是现有银行体系必要和有效的 补充。国内此方面的研究有：徐志远和吴卫东 （２００８）、吴晓光（２０ｌ １）从信息中介、网络诚信度、长 尾效应三方面论述网络给中小企业融资开创新局 面。王磊磊（２０１０）认为网络借贷不仅突破了地域的 局限性，而且在灵活性和指向性上更具优势。陈静 俊（２０１１）认为提供便利、高效的借款途径并且盘活
数量。Ｄｕａｎ
尽管各国网络借贷有不同的经营模式，但有一 个共同的明显特征：交易是匿名的，因此交易在借贷 双方是信息非对称的，贷款是无抵押的因此必然存 在信用风险（Ｓｔｅｅｌｍａｎｎ，２００６）。 国外网络借贷分三种：一是非营利的Ｋｉｖａ公司 经营；二是以盈利为目的的ＭＹＣ４、ＬｅｎｄｉｎｇＣｌｕｂ、 Ｐｒｏｓｐｅｒ模式；三是单纯提供投资的机会平台，对贷 款成功与违约与否并不负有责任。 王艳、陈小辉、邢增艺（２００９）研究表明国内第一
利率（Ｓｃｈｅｎｏｎｅ，２００４）。
它的补偿成本及更低的管理成本。
现代经济理论认为信息决定了借贷市场的成败 （Ｓｔｉｇｌｉｔｚ，１９８１），而且有用的信息是包含大量借款人 的信息，但是因为隐私的原因，使得使用这些信息的 部门仅限于可信度高的部门如银行和信用管理机构 （Ｊｅｎｔｚｓｃｈ，２００７），问题是使个人隐私曝露在每一个 可能的贷款人甚至是整个网络的使用者下，这会对 保护借款人隐私是不利的。
一、网络借贷的起源及现状介绍 国外由２００６年“诺贝尔和平奖”得主尤努斯教 授（孟加拉国）首创，随着互联网技术的快速发展和 普及，小额借贷逐渐由单一的“线下”模式转变为“线
收稿日期：２０１１－１０
基金项目：感谢国家社科基金（０９ＢＪＹｌ００）；国家社科基金（１１ＢＪＬ０１２）：机构贷款投向农村地区的市场化模式：垂直联结的理论
Ｓｕｎｄａｙ
过去Ｚｅｌｄｅｓ（１９８９）发现穷人借款需求没有得到 满足，Ｅｖａｎｓ ａｎｄ Ｊｏｖａｎｏｖｉｃ（１９８９）缺乏资金影响穷人 脱贫。Ｂｏｎｄ ａｎｄ Ｔｏｗｎｓｅｎｄ（１９９６）经调查发现在芝加 哥银行贷款不是低收入企业主启动资金的重要来 源。Ｊａｍｅｓ和Ｈａｄｌｏｃｋ（２００２）、Ｍｉｈｏｖ和Ｄｅｎｉｓ（２００３）认 为公司在向银行贷款前通常会衡量贷款的成本，如 信息的垄断、交易成本、合同成本等。有关公司信息 不透明在成长期间特别明显，这点使得这些潜在的 借款人被迫接受更高的银行贷款利率，特别是只与 一家银行打交道的时候更突出。 Ｊａｍｅｓ和Ｈｏｕｓｔｏｎ（２００６）认为网络借贷给这类公 司提供了一个机会，它们通过ＳＥＣ机构的分析报道 增加了透明度，使得更多的借款人获得更低的借款
范式及其实践；２０１０年教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目（规划基金项目）（１０ＹＪＡ７９０１３６）的支持。 作者简介：莫易娴（１９７３一），女，广西柳州人，经济学博士，金融系讲师，目前研究方向：网络金融、银行经营管理。
２０１１年第１２期（总第３８９期）
１０１
金融理论与实践
万方数据
【金融讲坛】
美国，还有为大学生提供融资的ＧｒｅｅｎＮｏｔｅ，著名的
居民闲散资金。 五、网络借贷发展中出现的消极作用
网站只是作为一种联系渠道或是宣传手段，而非纯 粹意义的网上借贷。 陈初（２０１０）认为网络借贷经营模式主要分成四 类。 一是以企业网上行为参数为基础综合授信。银 行先对贷款企业进行综合授信，然后由贷款企业客 户进行无抵押、无担保的贷款，信贷风险由银行和贷 款企业共同承担。 二是做银行金融业务前端流程的外包服务商。 网络信贷企业与国内银行共同拓展合作，主打贷款 超市概念。
面：
下”与“线上”并行，Ａｇａｒｗａｌ ａｎｄ Ｈａｕｓｗａｌｄ（２００８）认为 小企业因为无法提供公开的高信用等级的原因进入 网络借贷市场。网络借贷领域起源于２００５年英国 的Ｚｏｐａ。目前名气最大的个人借贷网站是２００６年 上线的Ｐｒｏｓｐｅ，运营模式是利用在线拍卖平台对贷 款进行竞价拍卖。 Ｐ２Ｐ贷款在美国和英国成为除了传统储蓄和投 资外的另一种选择（Ｓｌａｖｉｎ ２００７）。Ｐ２Ｐ网络借贷平 台是个人通过第三方平台在收取一定利息的前提下 向其他个人提供小额借贷的金融模式，其客户对象 包括两类：一个是帮助低收人群体生产性活动或小 本经营提供微型信贷，另外一个是针对普通人群的 紧急资金需求。 传统上，供给主体主要是小额信贷机构或民间 融资主体。Ｐｒｏｓｐｅｒ的业务已由美国扩展到意大利 和日本等地。除Ｚｏｐａ和Ｐｒｏｓｐｅｒ之外，国际上比较有 名的个人借贷网站还有非盈利的Ｋｉｖａ，它还设置了 一种“零利率”借款，出借人将钱免息借给发展中国 家的低收入者，帮助他们改善生活。 在英国著名的网络借贷平台有：Ｚｏｐａ，ＲａｔｅＳｅｔ— ｔｅｒ’Ｙｅｓ－Ｓｅｃｕｒｅ．ｃｏｍ，Ｑｕａｒｋｌｅ ａｎｄ Ｆｕｎｄｉｎｇ Ｃｉｒｃｌｅ。在
比白种人高。
Байду номын сангаас
贷款的借款人施加压力的步骤及方法。
三、网络借贷经营模式的分类
国外网络借贷成立贷款小组负责人，负责人是 负责联系贷款人和借款人的中介，可以减少贷款违 约的概率。另外，借款人通过网络联保的贷款，有助 于减少贷款违约概率。系列的研究焦点在社会网络 理论和Ｒｙａｎ，Ｒｅｕｋ，＆Ｗａｎｇ（２００７）认为通过贷款小 组的组织者可以提高借款的成功率和拍卖成功的总
ｅｔ
这一新生事物的出现吸引众多研究者的关注， ａ１．２００９；Ｈｅｒｒｅｒｏ—Ｌｏｐｅｚ ２００９；Ｋｌａｆｆｔ（２００８）认为 由于贷款人缺乏匿名网络环境下贷款的经验，使贷
ｅｔ
款风险更高。（Ｒｉｌｅｙ １９７５，Ｒｏｔｈｓｃｈｉｌｄ ａｎｄ Ｓｔｉｇｌｉｔｚ １９７６，Ｓｐｅｎｃｅ １９７３）认为在一个不完美市场里，我们 通过观察借款人的特征及行为来观察网络借贷。但 是有关借款人的特征与借款成功的关系研究结论方 面有时却是矛盾的，如当借款人带有照片时，Ｈｅ卜 Ｌｙａｎｄｒｅｓ（２００８）认为 种族、性别与借款人的金融实力及对借款的努力方
三是“Ｐ２Ｐ”网络融资模式。 四是建立为学生提供贷款的社区。 四、网络借贷积极作用
Ａｋｅｒｌｏｆ（１９７０）、Ｓｔｉｇｌｉｔｚ和Ｗｅｉｓｓ（１９８１）认为会导 致逆向选择和道德风险的问题，由于信息的不对称 性导致借贷市场的危机，如近期的美国金融危机。 Ｔｅｌｅｇｒａｐｈ（２００６）认为最大的问题是：不能有 足够的资金去满足众多借款人与贷款人的要求及管 理层的指责，有些网络借贷实行“零利率”，如何实现