外文翻译---从一般角度看经济增值

本科毕业论文（设计）
外文翻译
原文：
Economic Value Added - A General Perspective Performance Measurement
Investors measure overall performance of a firm as a whole to decide whether to invest in the firm or to continue with the firm or to exit from it. In order to achieve goal congruence, managers’ compensation is often linked with the performance of the responsibility centers and also with firm-performance. Therefore selection of the right measure is critical to the success of a firm. To measure performance of a firm we need a simple method for correctly measuring value created/ enhanced by it in a given time frame. All the current metrics trade off between the precision in measuring the value and its cost of measurement. In other words, each method takes into consideration the degree of complexities in quantifying the underlying measure. The more complex is the process, the more is the level of subjectivity and cost in measuring the performance of the firm.
There is a continuous endeavor to develop a single measure that captures the overall performance, yet it is easy to calculate.
Each metric of performance claims its superiority over others. Performance of a firm is usually measured with reference to its past record and the performance of other firms with comparable risk profile. The various performance metrics currently in use are based on the returns on investment generated by the business entity . Therefore to reach a meaningful conclusion, returns generated by the firm in a particular year should be compared with returns generated by assets with similar risk profile (cross sectional analysis)
Similarly return on investment for the current period should be compared with returns generated in past (time series analysis). A firm creates value only if it is able to
generate return higher than its cost of capital. Cost of capital is the weighted average cost of equity and debt (WACC).
The performance of a firm gets reflected on its valuation by the capital market. Market valuation reflects investor’s perception about t he current performance of the firm and also their expectation on its future performance. They build their expectations on the estimated growth of the business in terms of return on capital. This results in an incongruence between current performance and the value of the firm. Even if the current performance is better in relative terms, poor growth prospects adversely affects the value of the firm. Therefore any metric of performance, to be effective, should be able to not only capture the current performance but also should be able to incorporate the direction and magnitude of future growth. Therefore the robustness of a measure is borne out by the degree of correlation the particular metric has with respect to the market valuation.
Perfect correlation is impossible because as shown by empirical research fundamentals of a company cannot fully explain its market capitalization, other factors such as speculative activities, market sentiments and macro-economic factors influence movement in share prices. However the superiority of a performance metric over others lies in providing better information to investors.
Metrics of performance have a very important and critical role not only in evaluating the current performance of a firm but also in achieving high performance and growth in the future. The metrics of performance have a variety of users, which include all the stakeholders whose well being depends on the continued well being of the firm. Principal stakeholders are the equity holders, debt holders, management, and suppliers of material and services, employees and the end-users of the products and services. Value creation and maximization depends on the alignment of the various conflicting interests of these stakeholders towards a common goal. This means maximization of the firm value without jeopardizing the interests of any of the stakeholders. Any metric, which measures the firm value without being biased towards any of the stakeholders or particular class of participants, can be hailed as the true metric of performance. However it is difficult, if not impossible, to develop such
a metric.
Most of the conventional performance measures directly relate to the current net income of a business entity with equity, total assets, net sales or similar surrogates of inputs or outputs. Examples of such measures are return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA) and operating profit margin. Each of these indices measure a different aspect of performance, ROE measures the performance from the perspective of the equity holders,
ROA measures the asset productivity and operating profit margin reflects the margin realized by the firm at the market place. The net income figure in itself is dependent on the operational efficiency, financial leverage and the ability of the entity to formulate right strategy to earn adequate margin in the market place.
It is important to note that none of these measures truly reflect the complete picture by themselves but have to be seen in conjunction with other metrics. These measures are also plagued by the firm level inconsistencies in the accounting figures as well as the inconsistencies in the valuation methods used by accountants in measuring assets, liabilities and income of the firm. Accounting valuation methods are in variance with the methods that are being used to value individual projects and firms. The value of an asset or a firm, which is a collection of assets, is computed by discounting future stream of cash flows. The net present value (NPV) is the surplus that the investment is expected to generate over the cost of capital. Measures of periodical performance of a firm, which is the collection of assets in place, should follow the same underlying principles. Economic value added (EV A)is a measure that captures the valuation principles.
Eva as a performance measure
Proponents of EV A argue that EV A is a superior measure as compared to other performance measures on four counts:
It is nearer to the real cash flows of the business entity;
It is easy to calculate and understand;
It has a higher correlation to the market value of the firm and;
Its application to employee compensation leads to the alignment of managerial
interests with those of the shareholders, thus minimizing the supposedly dysfunctional behavior of the management.
The last two merits can be considered as a reflection of the first two. If EV A truly represents the real cash flows of a business entity and it is easy to calculate and understand, then it automatically follows that it should be closely related to the market valuation and it should minimize the dysfunctional behavior of the management when used as an incentive measure. In other words, close relation to market valuation and convergence of managerial interests with shareholders interests is a vindication of EV A as a superior metric.
EV A as a performance measure looks into the efficacy of EV A both as an absolute measure in comparison with net income, residual income and similar measures as well as a ratio in relation with performance measures like ROE, ROA and Operating Profit Margin, which are commonly used by both managers and equity analysts alike .These measures are normally used internally by the management to evaluate employee performance, incentive calculation and investment decisions and externally by equity analysts to ascertain the performance and growth of the firm. Along with these measures valuation models like NPV, IRR, Payback period and Book rate of return are used both internally and externally by managers for investment decisions. The former measures are backward looking measures which take into account past and current performance and facilitates prediction of future performance, whereas latter measures are more forward looking and discount the expected future cash flow streams associated with a given investment or new investment to ascertain the economic viability of the same.
EV A a superior performance measure?
First let us look into the claim of EV A being superior than the conventional measures such as ROI, ROE and ROA, which are based on the accounting figures. Most of these measures give us the rate of return earned by the firm with respect to capital invested in the firm. The most important limitation of these measures are derived from limitations inherent in the measurement of accounting profit. As per current accounting practices, while historical-cost-based accounting measures are
being used to carry most of the assets in the balance sheet, revenue and expenses (other than depreciation) are recognized in the profit and loss account at their current value. Therefore accounting rate of returns do not reflect the true return from an investment and tend to be biased downwards in the 10 initial years and upwards in the latter years. Similarly as noted by Malkelainen (EsaMalkelainen 1998), distortion occurs basically due to the historical cost and straight line depreciation schedule used by most businesses to value their assets. This leads to a bias in these measures due to the composition of assets of a firm at any given point in time. By composition he refers to the current nature of the assets, more current the assets are, the accounting rate of return is closer to the true rate of return. This distortion will not be significant if there is a continuous stream of investments in assets i.e. the value of the mix of assets is nearer to the current value of the assets. But the probability, that at any point of time, a firm should have such a composition of assets is rare, in most cases either the assets are old or relatively new. This precludes these accounting measures from being used to reach any meaningful conclusion regarding the true performance of the firm.
The other important limitation of accounting measures is that they ignore the cost of equity and only consider the borrowing cost. As a result it ignores the risk inherent in the project and fails to highlight whether the return is commensurate with the risk of the underlying assets. This might result in selecting projects that produce attractive rate of return but destroys firm value because their cost of capital is higher than the benchmark return established by the management. On the other hand accounting measures encourage managers to select projects that will improve the current rate of return and to ignore projects even if their return is higher than their cost of capital. Selection of projects with returns higher than the current rate of return does not automatically increase shareholders’ wealth. Taking up only those projects, which provide returns that are higher than the hurdle rate (cost of capital) results in increasing the wealth of the shareholder. Therefore use of ROE, ROA or similar accounting measures as the benchmark, might result in selection of those projects that though provide rate of return higher than the current rate of return destroys firm-value.
Similarly use of these measures result in continuing with activities that destroys firm value until the rate of return falls below the benchmark rate of return.
EV A proponents claim that because of these imperfections, the accounting based measures are not good proxies for value creation. Managerial compensation based on these measures does not encourage value enhancement actions by managers. Value enhancement and earnings are two different things and might be at cross-purposes because short-term performance might be improved at the cost of long term health of the firm. Activities involving enhancement of current earnings may be short term in nature, whereas any value enhancing activities should focus on long term well being of the firm. Avoidance of discretionary costs improves current performance while destroying value of the firm. Managers’ focus on short-term performance will increase as long as their rewards are tied to the current performance over long-term value enhancement (Damodaran 1998, David Young 1999).
The question arises whether EV A is an improvement over conventional measures and serves the purpose of motivating managers to pay attention to shareholders value even if that results in compromising current performance. The answer may be negative because all the above limitations are also associated with EV A. As shown in equation III the calculation of EV A entails the usage of an accounting rate of return, the difference lies only in the fact that the cost of equity is also factored in to arrive at the residual income figure. Though incorporation of the cost of equity capital is the virtue of EV A, because it measures economic surplus, it does not remove the limitations of the accounting profit that forms the basis for computing EV A. Moreover the virtue might not be realized in practice since it is not easy to calculate the cost of equity. Market returns cannot be used as a proxy for cost of equity that supports assets in place because market discounts the expectations. Similarly it is difficult to use CAPM in measuring cost of equity because it is difficult to measure risk-free-rate of return, beta and market premium. Difficulties get compounded in an economic environment like India, where interest rates fluctuate frequently, the capital market is volatile and the regulators are yet to have a complete grip on the capital market to enhance its efficiency. Empirical studies show that the volatility in the Indian capital
markets, like capital markets in other developing economies, is higher than capital markets in developed economies (Tushar Waghmare 2000). Similarly studies show that beta for companies listed in Indian capital markets is not stable (Sanyal, Guha Roy and Sanyal 2000). It is difficult to ascertain the market premium because of the short history of the Indian capital market, which has become active only in the last 12 decade and also because of its high volatility. Therefore even if for the sake of argument it can be said that the potential of EV A as a measure of performance can be realized fully in an advanced economy, the argument that EV A is a better measure is not tenable in the Indian context.
In India EV A is being used with impunity. A case at point is the study published by Economic times (11th December 2000), on corporate performance. While computing EV A it used a flat rate of 13 percent as the cost of capital of all the enterprises included in the study. The study explains that an average 13 percent interest for both the years covered by the study is used as it is almost equal to the prime-lending rate of the commercial bank and financial institution. It is a basic principle of economics that‘higher the risk higher is the expected return’. By estimating WACC at 13% this basic principle is violated. It may be argued that cost of debt should be taken post-tax and therefore effective cost of equity incorporated in the calculation is higher than 13 percent. Even if this argument is accepted the computation cannot be defended because the cost of capital is estimated without using any accepted economic model. Moreover by using a flat rate, variation in risk profiles of firms have been ignored. This shows both the popularity of EV A in India and difficulties in measuring the same. The study has also ignored adjustments in capital and operating income suggested by proponents of EV A.
Source: Asish K. Bhattacharyya , B. V. Phani,2004.“Economic Value Added - A General Perspective”.Indian Institute of Management (IIM), Calcutta and Indian Institute of Techonology Kanpur. Working Paper Series.
译文：
从一般角度看经济增值
业绩评价指标
投资者评价一家公司的整体业绩，来决定是否继续投资这家公司或者是从这家公司中撤出投资。

为了能够获得预期的目标，经理人的激励制度总是跟责任中心的业绩相联系，同时也跟公司的业绩相联系。

因此选择正确的业绩评价对于公司的成功也是至至关重要。

评价一家公司的业绩我们需要一种正确的能够测试公司的在一段时间内的价值增加或扩张的简单方法。

所有当前的测量方法在测量价值的精度和它测量成本的协调。

总之，每一种方法都必须考虑到数量化根本措施的复杂程度。

过程越复杂，业绩评价的客观水平和测量成本越高。

发展一种单项的能评价所有业绩的评价措施要有连续不断地努力，但这还是比较容易计算的。

每一种业绩评价的方法都有自己的优势。

一家公司的业绩的评价一般都和它过去的记录和其他具有类似风险的公司的相联系起来。

当前多种的业绩评价指标是基于商业机构的投资项目所取得的回报。

因此为了得到有意义的结论，公司在一系列年度所得到的回报要和具有相同风险的资产所得到的回报相比较（同行业分析比较）。

当前阶段的投资项目的相似的回报必须和以前的回报相比较（时间系列分析）。

只有投资回报高于资本成本是一家公司才会创造价值。

资本成本是由平均的股权成本和债务陈本所衡量（WACC）。

一家公司的业绩获取反映其资本市场的估值。

市场估值反映了该公司的当前性能投资者的认识，也对其未来的业绩的期望。

他们做出的期望是基于业务方面预计的增长资本回报。

这将导致当前的业绩和公司价值的相一致。

即使当前的业绩比相关的项目好，较差的增长前景不利于公司的价值。

因此任何业绩评价的指标，要是需要有效，不但要衡量当前的业绩而且要衡量未来的增长的方向和数量。

因此一项措施的稳健是有特定度量对市场估值的相关度所证明的。

由于是实证的研究，完全的关系是不太可能的，市场资本化和其他的因素比如投机活动，市场变动和宏观经济因素会影响股票价格不太能充分说明公司的基础。

但是对其他业绩度量的优势在于为投资者提供更好的信息。

业绩评价的度量不仅在评价公司当前的业绩还是在未来取得业绩更高更好的增长上都是重要和关键的角色。

业绩评价指标有很多的使用者其中也包括由于公司良好经意而保持良好状态的股东。

主要的股东是指股票持有人、债务持有人、管理和材料及服务、雇员和最终用户的产品和服务的供应商。

价值创造和扩张依赖于全部股东相一致于朝向同一个目标。

这意味着扩大公司价值不能损害任何利益攸关者的利益。

任何的不基于他利益攸关者或任何特定类别的股东的评价公司业绩的方法，能正确评价公司真实的业绩。

但是如果不可能发展这种评价方法，正确评价业绩也是很困难的。

很多简便的业绩评价方法和当前的商业机构利润，全部资本，净资本和类似代理项的收入和支出相关。

比如，股东资产净值的盈利（ROE）,资本收益（ROA），边际收益。

每个这些指标衡量业绩的不同方面，ROE措施从股本持有人的角度性能、ROA测算资产生产率和经营利润，反映了该公司在市场上实现的利润。

净利润由自身的经营效率、财务杠杆和制订适当的策略和在市场中赚取足够的安全度的能力。

还有重要的是需要注意到这些措施都不能真正的反应全部的情况，但是必须和其他的指标相联系起来。

这些措施受到公司会计特征与由会计师测量资产、负债和公司收入中使用的估价方法不一致的影响。

会计估价方法会随着用来计算个别项目和公司的价值所使用的方法而变化。

一项资产或一家公司的资产，是由公司资产扣除未来的现金流计算的。

净现值（NPV）现值是投资的盈余预期将生成的资本成本。

评价一家公司的阶段性的业绩，综合资产的的措施应遵循相同的基本原则。

经济价值增加值（EVA）是获取估价原则的一项措施。

EVA 作为一种业绩评价的方法
EVA 的支持者认为 EVA 是相对于其他的优良措施性能有更优的四项措施：(1）是接近真正的商业实体的现金流量；(2）容易计算和了解；(3)与该公司的市场价值有紧密的联系；(4) 应用于雇员补偿中从而促使管理者和股东的利益相一致，这被称为管理功能调节方法。

后面两个优点可以被视为前两个的体现。

如果 EVA 真正代表真正的商业实体的现金流量，它有很容易计算和了解，自然地，它将与市场估价密切相关，在作为一项激励措施时它就会尽量减少管理的功能失调行为。

换言之，与市场估价密切相关和使管理者利益与股东利益的达
到一致性是EVA优越性的有效体现。

EVA作为一种业绩评价方式，可以从两个方面看EVA的有效性：一方面是与净收入、剩余收入等类似的措施相比，另一方面是与其他业绩评价的措施，ROE, ROA 和经营利润等一些管理人员和股票分析师常用的指标的联系。

这些措施通常用于内部管理评估雇员性能、激励的计算和投资决策和外部股权的分析，以确定公司的业绩和增长。

随着这些措施估价模型，如净现值、内部回报率，回报期和账面回报率同时被内部和外部的经理用来做投资决定。

前者的措施，考虑过去和当前的性能和促进未来的业绩的预测，而后者的措施则更向一给定投资或新的投资和增加或减少预期未来现金流，同时确定的经济可行性。

EVA 是一种更为优越的业绩评价的方法？
首先让我们看EVA优于根据会计计算的传统措施如ROI, ROE 和ROA的原因。

这些措施大多数给我们带来的从公司赚取的回报率与资本投资公司相联系。

这些措施的最重要的限制是用被限制的固有的会计利润来度量。

按现行的会计做法，基于历史成本的会计措施被广泛的运用，在资产负债表、收入和开支（折旧以外的其他资产）被确认在其当前的损益帐中。

因此会计率的返回不反映真正的投资回报，往往在最近几年被低估而在以后的年份被高估。

正如Malkelainen（2008）指出的一样，失真发生在基于历史成本和直线法计算资产的折旧计划的大多数企业。

这将导致这些措施偏差，由于是在给定的时间点内公司的资产组成。

这篇文章指的是当前的资产，越是当前的的资产，计算的是回报率越接近真正汇报率。

如果有多个的资产投资即资产组合的价值是靠近资产的当前值，那么这种不正常的行为将不会产生影响。

但在任何时刻，不论是旧的或较新的资产，一家公司大多数情况下应该都会有一种比较罕见的资产组合。

这不排除这些会计措施用于达成有关于该公司的真正业绩有意义的结论。

其他重要的会计措施缺陷是他们忽略了股权成本，并只考虑借贷成本。

因此，它忽略了项目所固有的风险，而且没有明确揭示回报和基本资产的风险是等同的。

这可能会影响在选择项目时因为项目的资本成本高于管理者既定的标准从而选择了吸引力高但破坏了公司的价值的项目。

另一方面，这些会计措施会促使管理人员选择能改善现时的回报率的项目却忽略那些回报比的资本成本高的项目。

选择回报比现时的回报率高的目项的并不会自增加股东的财富。

只有选择那些回
报率高于成本率的项目才能增加股东的财富。

因此使用ROE, ROA或类似的会计措施，可能会导致经理人选择那些虽然提供的回报率高于当前的回报率却减少了公司价值的项目。

同样使用这些措施将导致继续减少企业价值，直到回报率低于基准回报率。

EVA支持者声称因为这些不完善的地方使基于会计基础业绩评价措施不能成为价值创造的代理。

这些措施不鼓励高管理人员采取的行动增加企业价值。

价值增加和收入是两个不同的概念，可能背道而驰，可能短期的业绩的改善会以公司的长期发展为代价。

活动涉及的当前收入提高可能的情况下，短期内加强活动的任何值应侧重于增加公司长期的利益。

避免酌情成本提高了当前的性能，同时减少了公司的价值。

经理人的管理重点要是在短期业绩增加下，长期业绩也能得到增加。

（Damodaran 1998，David Young 1999）
问题是，EVA是否是传统业绩评价指标的改进，能否达到使管理人重视股东价值即使这会导致影响当前的业绩。

答案可能是负面，因为所有上述的限制亦与EVA 相关联。

方程三所示，EVA 计算需要用到回报率，基于剩余收入EVA区别于会计率只有考虑了资产成本。

成立组合股权资本成本是EVA的一项优势，它用来度量经济盈余但不去掉会计利润的局限性，这是计算EVA的基础框架。

此外，这种优势不可能在实现中常用因为它是一种不容易计算资产的成本的做法。

不能总是将市场回报作为支持资产成本的代理因为市场与期望的总是不同的。

同样很难使用资本资产定价模型中测量的资产的成本，因为它很难衡量风险自由回报率、贝塔系数和市场汇水。

在印度，由于是在利率经常波动的经济环境中：资本市场不稳定和当局管理仍未有完整的方法以提高其效率的资本市场，困难更是增加了更多。

实证研究显示在印度的资本市场波动与在其他发展中国家的经济中的较发达经济体的资本市场相似（Tusha Waghmare 2000)。

同时研究显示在印度资本市场上市公司的贝塔系数是不稳定的（Guha Roy，Sanyal 2000 ）。

由于印度资本市场历史只有短短的一二十年，也由于其高波动故很难确定市场汇水。

因此就站在理论角度可以说EVA具有作为能推进经济增长的业绩评价体系的潜力，在印度可能是不成立的。

在印度，EVA的运用是不受限制的。

这是发表在研究经济时代（2000年12 月）上的研究企业的业绩的一个案例。

它计算EVA时将所有企业的资本成本看为13%。

研究解释说这两年的平均 13%权益涵盖的研究与银行和金融机构的最优惠贷款率几乎相等。

更高的风险带来更高预期的回报是经济学的一个基本原则。

违反了资本成本为13%这一假设，可能是认为采取存入债务成本和因此在计算中成立为股权的组合有效的成本高于13%。

该假设不能证明计算，因为接受该参数的成本资本不可能使用完全被公认的经济模型估计。

此外，为了更公平，公司的风险状况的变化已被忽略。

这篇文章这同时显示了EVA 在印度受欢迎程度和运用的困难。

研究亦忽略在了EVA 的支持者提出的资本和经营收入中的调整。

出处:阿斯伊士K.贝哈塔查雅，B.V.法尼，《从一般角度看经济增值》,印度管理学院和Calcutta Kanpur印度研究所工作论文,2004.。