哈佛经理案例全集第章

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哈佛经理常用管理方法上-22页精选文档

哈佛经理常用管理方法上-22页精选文档

哈佛管理技能培训教程:第六单元哈佛经理管理方法与技巧第一章哈佛经理常用管理方法(上)第六单元哈佛经理管理方法与技巧领导艺术的核心在于激励下属主动而积极地工作。

——(美)西蒙部下学习的是上级的行动。

上级对工作全力以赴的实际行动,是对下级最好的教育—(日)土光敏夫哈佛经理在管理中运用的方法和技巧,是一个企业活力与生机所在,也是企业在动态的环境中灵活应变化威胁为机会的能力所在。

企业的明天之树能否常青赋予了哈佛经理努力去寻找和采用最优的管理技巧、决策技巧、组织技巧、激励技巧的责任。

——编者哈佛语录不管在什么情况下,最重要的还是要有倾听部下心声的基本态度。

只要有这种态度,部下也会察觉到,一有机,他们就会向你表示意见的。

松下幸之助上司应该倾听下属想要说的话,并且努力去了解他们对问题的看法。

不了解影响下属行为的亨利·艾伯斯哈佛经理常用管理方法管理科学应用的科学方法,事实上就是应用各种模型来求解。

由于模型和求解方法的性质等□评价模型管理人员区别于自然科学家的是他需要有评价模型。

有用的评价模型必须能反映出管理人员关于“该怎么办”的概念。

这种概念需要管理人员的主观判断。

因此,评价模型只能根据它反映这些主观判断的程度来判定它是对或错。

从这个意义来讲,评价模型也是主观的,但它却并不是任意的。

因为它必须反映管理人员的主观判断。

在单一准则的确定性情况下,选择评价模型是比较容易的。

但在有风险和多准则的情况下,就较为困难。

属于评价模型这一类□预测模型这是用来对环境和系统的性能进行预测的。

预测模型是按照预测各种行动方案的结果这一机理建立的。

它可以有条不紊地把一切可能的设想都罗列出来,作为行动方案;也可以只把管理人员认为好的设想当作行动方案。

无论上述哪种情况,都必须用一定的方法对预测模型所得出的结果进行评价。

属于预测模型的很多。

关于环境的预测方面有:短期预测(一周到一个月)的时间序列法,包括移动平均值法、指数平滑法和拟合平滑法。

第一章哈佛经理的时间管理

第一章哈佛经理的时间管理

哈佛管理技能培训教程:第八单元哈佛经理时间管理第一章哈佛经理的时间管理第八单元哈佛经理时间管理身为总经理切忌为时间所主宰,而应该做一个时间——(日)管理者应更多地注意到:如何去管理他们的时间——一种最有价值的资源。

如果能够最优化地利用和明智地分——(美)卡斯特不需要成本的,那就是时间,但也只有时间这项资源是成本最高的资源。

如何运用每一分钟,抓住一瞬即逝的时机,奥——编者哈佛语录不要说什么“明天再干吧”,今日事今日有效的管理者知道,如果要管理自己的时间,首先应该了解自己的时间实际上耗用彼德·F有一项时间浪费的因素,是管理者自己可以控制并且可以消除的。

这项因素是:管理者自己在浪费别人的时间。

彼德·F哈佛经理的、时间管理概念谈到开发时间,必须知道时间理论。

理论并非是无法证明的,对理论上不能得到佐证的技术,所获得的成果也非常有限。

因此,要了解时间的真面目,除了解析时间真正的内涵以外,还必须对自己如何利用时间即“活用□应用时间的理论根据什么是时间?令人吃惊的是,有许多作者未针对这个问题加以思考,就坦然地述说时间。

这种虽对时间本质模糊不清,却能以树木为例,枝叶生长的根本是根。

不了解时间的本质而探讨时间,就好象无根的枝叶末梢,这种议论容易陷为了有效地说明时间管理术,必须针对“什么是时间”,充分加以讨论,缺乏思想与理论根据的时间术,可说时间的函数性〔f(a,β,……)=K〕例如:表示圆的数学关系式〔f(x,y)=(x-a)2+(y-b)2-r2〕,双曲线〔xy=s〕。

类似此类函数〔y=f(x)〕,x与y之间,有着密不可分的关系存在。

同样地,时间和人、事物的密切关系,表现在时间的存在形式和数学函数中。

例如,活用时间,即为左右生活数学函数的特性,其关系式为曲线(函数必为曲线)。

相对地,依尝试而言,钟表上表示的时间,一般的印象是但是,在活用时间的范围内,绝不可能是单纯的直线关系。

因为,活用时间具有伸缩性、生命性和密度性。

哈佛知名企业管理案例(一)(28个doc)87

哈佛知名企业管理案例(一)(28个doc)87

〖企业用人的黄金法则〗我一直在致力发掘那些能充当最高管理者的人。

他们是一些渴望工作、勤奋向上的人。

这些人总是想干得比别人期望他的更多,也总是帮助他人把各自的工作干好。

——李·艾科卡在下级洋洋自得时,可以多加批评;当他意气消沉时,万勿过于苛刻。

下级有时会对自己的失败心烦意乱,这时如果再去挫伤他的自尊心,那无疑把他改进工作的积极性给打掉了。

——李·艾科卡一、经营有术,濒临倒闭的公司靠他起死回生李·艾科卡,1924年10月出生于美国宾夕法尼亚州艾伦敦,父亲是意大利移民,早年受父亲影响,认为能通过冒险获得成功的道路就是经商。

他在大学是学工科的,刚进人福特公司时,被分配当一名见习工程师,但他迫切希望搞推销,喜欢和人打交道。

他认为销售商一贯是汽车业的关键、要害部位,是企业的精华。

1953年,艾科卡被提升为费城地区的销售副经理。

这一年他大胆提出了“给56年新车付56美元”的销售计划,即客户购买1956年福特公司的新车,可先付80%的款,然后每月付56美元,3年还清。

这种销售方式几乎人人都能接受,因而地刺激了市场需求。

不到3个月,费城地区销售从全国的末位一跃为首位。

后来,这一计划成为福特公司全国性销售策略的重要组成部分。

作为奖赏,艾科卡被提升为华盛顿地区的销售经理。

1960年,年轻有为的艾科卡担任了福特汽车公司轿车部经理。

接着,他便开始了式样好、性强、价格低的“野马”轿车的生产和销售。

结果这一仗大获全胜。

1970年,艾科卡荣升为福特公司的总裁。

在他就任总裁的八年里,为福特公司净挣了35亿美元的利润,在该公司的历史上留下了最辉煌的业绩。

但成功招致嫉妒。

1978年7月,福特二世解除了艾斯卡总裁职务,同时答应将36万美元的年薪,变成100万美元的退休金,条件是——不要受聘于其他公司。

艾科卡不为100万美元动心,更不愿向命运屈服。

国际造纸公司等多家公司来请他,他都谢绝了;纽约大学商业学院等三四所学校聘请他担任院长,他也谢绝了。

哈佛MBA领导学案例

哈佛MBA领导学案例

CASE 1 CIRCON (A) (Abridged)The night of Friday, August 2, 1996, like most summer nights in Santa Barbara, California, was a beautiful one. Richard Auhll, founder, chairman, and CEO of medial devices maker Circon Corporation, was holding his annual Fiesta party at his house overlooking the Samta Barbara harbor. In attendance, along with approximately 500 other “mostly single”guest, was George Cloutier, a longtime friend and Harvard Business School Class of 1969 section-mate.To an outside observer the party would seem like any other thrown on Fiesta night in Santa Barbara, if perhaps more extravagant and better-attended. Yet a cloud hung over the festivities, unmentioned by Auhll or his guests. The previous day Auhll had received a call from Lon Hirsch, chairman and CEO of U.S Surgical Corporation, informing him that Surgical was launching a hostile takeover bid for Circon. The call had come as a shock to Auhll, particularly since Hirsch owned a vacation home in Aspen a few doors down from Auhll’s, and had been an occasional skiing companion of the Circon leader. “I thought about putting up a sigh at the party, saying “Please don’t ask!” mused Auhll in retrospect, “but I didn’t, and nobody did ask.”Auhll retired early that night, since he had to leave the next morning for Palo Alto to meet with his takeover defense advisors. Cloutier stayed on, hounded by guests who wanted to know whether o buy or sell the Circon stock. As an outsider to the company, Cloutier was perhaps ideally situated to advise his old HBS section-mate on how to respond to the bid. Originally his advice was combative: “I told Richard to forget. We’re not giving up here. We’re staying until the last gun is fired.”Over the following two years, Cloutier would become increasingly enmeshed in the longest-running takeover battle in U.S corporate history. With the benefit of hindsight, one wonders whether he would have given the same advice on that warm night in Santa Barbara, had he known how events would eventually unfold.BACKGROUNDRichard Auhll graduated form the University of Michigan with a bachelor’s degree in aerospace engineering in 1963. He began his professional career as a rocket engineer at United Technology Corporation’s Rocket Division Advanced Decision Group in Sunnyvale, California. Auhll spent five years at United Technology, eventually moving up to program development manager. While working full-time, he also earned a master’s degree in aerospace engineering from Stanford University.After working with his way into management, Auhll became concerned about a possible glass ceiling for engineers. All of his managers had MBAs, and Auhll became convinced that in order to advance to the top management levels, he would need one too. He applied to Stanford and Harvard business schools, and decided to attend Harvard, where he had been award a fellowship. When he arrived at HBS he realized quickly that he was different from most of the other students:I was married at the time and was over at married student housing at Peabody Terrace. I hada child and a wife and I had quite a very good paying job. At that time it was fairly unusual to have an MBA student with five years experience. I was actually one of the older students there and I was interested in pursuing a career very directly. George was single guy, just out of Harvard College. So he was a bon vivant and at the time he was interested in exploring various options in his social life, etc., more important probably than school. Myself, I was at the other end of the spectrum.George Cloutier graduated magna cum laude from Harvard College in 1967 and went straight to HBS. He recalled their HBS experiences:When I was in college, I founded Operation Match, which was the first computer dating company. I was going to go to law school, but I thought, gee, this business thing was fun-you can have a very aggressive, active social life. Richard and I were in the same class and in the same section and actually were friendly. We were among three or four guys who were a bit, as I would like to call it now, a bit eccentric, a bit roguish, who didn’t take the business school quite as seriously as arguably we should have. While I was studious in college and did well academically, the undergraduate experience was more loosely structured than the business school. And since I was fresh out of college, I just kept up my less structured existence.Cloutier became one of only four students in his graduating class who immediately started his own business. Based on Clutier’s HBS thesis, Innovation management provided implementation-based consulting services for small and midsize companies. After six years at Innovation management, Coustier spent the next ten years (1976-1986) as an independent “hired gun”to struggling business. He eventually founded American Management Services (AMS), a management consulting firm in Waltham, Massachusetts.Auhll, meanwhile, was looking for options outside of aerospace, because he saw the window opened by the Apollo project as rapidly closing. He wanted to find a company, preferably on the West Coast, where he could run his own technology enterprise. He interviewed for a position as assistant to the chairman of the board of Applied Magnetics, a high-tech company on the west coast. At the interview Auhll given a tour of Applied Magnetics’ businesses, and took notice of a small eight-person division called Circon.Auhll declined the offer to be a assistant to the chairman, but told the chairman, Harold Frank, that he would be interested in running the small Circon subsidiary. Frank accepted the offer and Auhll joined Applied Magnetics in the fall of 1969. He rapidly changed the product mix from miniature tools for industrial use to high-tech surgical products. He explained:We transformed Circon from having an industrial base, to primarily being a medical company, by taking miniature tools and converting them to surgical instruments. We started making television microscope system for industrial inspection, and we converted that over to television system for surgery. In fact, we were credited with inventing the use of color video systems in surgery at the beginning of 1972. It was written up in the New York Times, the L.A Times, and other papers. From there we took off, though by today’s standards it sound small.In 1976, Auhll took the momentous step of making an offer from Circon. Using $55,000 of his own money, a Small Business Administration guaranteed loan, additional funding from private investors and family member, and leveraged buyout money, he bought Circon from Applied Magnetics for $1.1 million. Circon was chartered as a California corporation in January 1977. Auhll owned 55% of the equity; a private investor named Rudi Schulte owned 15%; Auhll’s former boss at United Technology Corporation owned another 10%; an uncle owned 5%; and miscellaneous small investors owned the remaining 15%.The next years were demanding but heady time for Richard Auhll and Circon. “At the time we had extraordinary margins,” recalled Auhll. “We commanded the major share, almost a monopoly,on this new market of video systems for surgery-all the things that were used in knee surgery and arthroscopy. We were on the ground floor of all that.” Sales grew from $1 million to $9 million from 1977 to 1984. All of this growth wad founded internally, with the exception of a $7 million private placement in 1982 that reduced Auhll’s stake from 55% to approximately 40%. On July 7, 1983, Circon went public, opening at $21 per share and going up to $26.75 on the first day, yield a price/earning ration of 83 to 1. Suddenly, Auhll’s net worth was $50 million, an astronomical sum in the days before the Internet.On the other coast, Cloutier continued to build AMS as its president and CEO. Since graduation Auhll and Cloutier had lost touch, occasionally running into each other “like ships passing in the night” at airports. Cloutier rekindled his friendship with Auhll at their HBS 10-years reunion in June 1979.Cloutier recalled:I remember at the reunion, he was really running around having a good time meeting people. We all had our moments of exuberance, and he had his fairly regularly. In the mid-1980s, he was out here a lot for business, and I used to have him over. I saw how hard he would work. A couple weekends I had him come out to Nantucket where he slept for two days straight because he was so tired. And that’s when we became more friendly. We traveled two or three times to Greece and a couple of times to Venice. We even chartered a yacht for a few of these trips. So we picked up our friendship in the min to late 1980s.In 1986 Auhll made the bet-the company decision to acquire ACMI Corporation, the leading maker of urological endoscopes, which was four times as large as Circon at the time. Auhll lent Circon $2 million of his own money and Circon borrowed another $13 million in order to finance the $28.5 million deal. Auhll then worked harder than he ever had before to re-engineer ACM’s aging product life. After three years of losses, Forbes declared in January 1992 that Auhll’s “shrewd gamble” had “paid off.” In the same year Auh;; was named “Entrepreneur of the year” by the Institute of American Entrepreneur.Despite their growing friendship during this time, Auhll and Cloutier rarely discussed business. In the early 1990s, however, Cloutier got to learn more about Circon when AMS was hired by Circon to create a penetration strategy for Circon’s salesforce.THE INITIAL ATTACKIn April 1995, Auhll made another bold gamble by bidding for Cabot Corporation: “Cabot was kind of a parallel company to Circon, with Circon focused on urology and Cabot focused on gynecology,” said Auhll. “We thought Cabot’s products were a bit obsolete and needed upgrading, and they did not have a clear strategy within their own company. We thought that Cabot fit beautifully within Circon and that the Cirocn/Cabot strategy was very coherent and an outstanding program.” Circon won the bidding contest for Cabot and, though the identity of the other bidders was unknown at the time, Auhll later learned that he had beaten out Leon Hirsch of U.S. Surgical.As with ACMI, Cabot proved to be a net drain on the company at the outset. Exhibit 2 shows that Circon experienced net losses as a result of the Cabot acquisition, and Exhibit 1A shows that Circon’s stock price fell dramatically in t he aftermath of the acquisition, from a hight of $22 to approximately $15 per share. In February 1996, Circon stock plunged further, to $11.25, following a negative earnings announcement for the fourth quarter of 1995 that was largely related to Carbon. Despite this performance, Auhll believed that, with time, he would be able to turn around Cabonin the same way that he had turned around ACMI: “We had done it once, we felt that we could do it again. We had confidence th at we could repeat that performance.”But Auhll would never get that chance. On August 1, 1996, around 6:00 p.m., Auhll took a call from his acquaintance and occasional ski partner Leon Hirsch, chairman and CEO of U.S Surgical. Hirsch had a “terrifying reputation in the business” according to Auhll. “He was the 800-pound gorilla. Well, he was at least a 600-pound gorilla, and Johnson & Johnson was an 800-pound gorilla, and we were a 100-pound gorilla.” Hirsch informed Auhll that U.S Surgical would be annou ncing a tender offer for 100% of Circon’s shares at $18 cash per share, or approximately $230 milloin in total value, the next morning. Hirsch also informed Auhll that Surgical already purchased an 8% stake in Circon through open-market transactions. Auhll owned 11.5% of Circon, and company insiders(employees and directors) held roughly another 13%.“I was rather stunned,” Said Auhll, “I guess it became clear that it was going to be a hostile attempt. He didn’t make any friendly overtures at all.” Though the bid was not announced publicly until after the close of the market, Circon’s share jumped 16% to $12.125 on the Nasdaq that day. At $18, the bid represented almost a 70% premium over the pre-announcement price of Circon. U.S. Surgical’s shared closed a t $34.375, up $0.125 on the New York Stock Exchange.After detailing the terms of the offer, Hirsch asked Auhll what he though about the bid. Auhll deadpanned: “Well, it certainly was not in our strategic plan.” The siege had begun.RAISING THE DRAWBRIDGEThe day after receiving the U.S. Surgical offer, Auhll flew to Polo Alto to meet with Larry Sonsini. Sonsini was law professor at the Boalt Hall School of Law at the University of California (Berkeley). He was a name partner with the large and rapidly growing law firm of Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati. Sonsini and his firm had gained fame and wealth over the previous decade by representing the many venture capital frims and start-up companies founded in Silicon Vally. According to some observers, Sonsini hoped to use his representation of Ciron to help his firm gain prominence advisor.In his meeting with Auhll, Sonsini urged Auhll to bring his board a resolution authorizing a shareholder rights plan, also known as a “poison pill.” The pill would m ake it prohibitively expensive for Surgical to acquire more that a 15% stake in Circon without the approval of Circon’s board. In addition, just two weeks before the bid launched, Circon’s general counsel had fined a shareholder resolution (approved a year earlier) that prohibited shareholder action by written consent and shareholder action through special meeting. Auhll speculated that Surgical’s advisors might have perceived this as a weak link in Circon’s defensive armor:We suspect that when their lawyers checked out the bylaws and things in the Delaware records, they found out that the shareholder resolution had not been filed, and therefore was not in effect. I believe that they thought they could launch a hostile takeover, have a tender offer out for 27 days., and they could get he proxies and hold a shareholders’ meeting and own Circon in 27 days. I am suspecting that this was their strategy.The poison pill did not require a shareholder vote and was therefore adopted in a matter of hours by the Circon board. Filing the amendment to the bylaws was equally quick since the shareholdershad already approved it. In addition to these defenses, Circon ahd adopted a staggered board (or classified board), whereby only one-third of the directors stood for re-election at each annual meeting. Gaining control of the board, therefore, would require two proxy contests over two years(to get two-thirds and therefore majority control), rather than just a single contest.Circon also announced an Employee Retention Plan(“silver parachutes”) that would be triggered by a change in control of the company. A Circon spokeswoman said the plan covered approximately 300 employees ( 25% of the total Circon workforce), from sales people to “key professionals.” Circon offic ials declined to elaborate publicly on its retention plan, which had both single trigger and double trigger payouts in place for its top management. A spokesman for Surgical, commenting on the employee-retention plan, said U.S. Surgical was committed to its takeover attempt and accused Circon management of “doing everything it can to entrench itself and preclude shareholders from making their own decision.”All of these defenses were facilitated by Delaware court decisions in case such as Time v. paramount and Moove v. Wallace Computer. These cases held that a board is not required to accept an all cash bid for a company, regardless of support by shareholders in the form of shares tendered, as long as the board determines that its “strategic plan” will deli ver more value to shareholders over the long run. In Time, that Delaware Supreme Court held that “directors are not obligated to abandon a deliberately conceived plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no bais to sustain the corporate strategy. Circon management received the benefit of these rulings because Circon had changed its state of incorporation from California to Delaware when it went public in 1983.SIEGE RESISTANCEWithin days of the bid announcement, Auhll close New York investment bank Bear Steams & Company as Circon’s financial advisor. Brian McCarthy, a managing director with Bear Steams, led the engagement. Auhll described the decision:We interviewed six investment banking firms to represent and guide Circon during the hostile takeover attempt. Of these, two seemed interested onlu in packaging Circon for sale and making a quick commission. Three indicated that Circon had only a 20% chance of remaining independent for even a few months. Two or three firms seemed willing to be aggressive in resisting the attempt by U.S. Surgical.We selected the Bear Steams & Co. team led by Brian McCarthy for two reasons. First, Biran was relatively young and ambitious, and obtaining a high price for Circon and especially a defeat of the hostile takeover attempt would be a major coup for him and would substantially advance his career. Because of the personal stakes involved we believed we would get his full attention and effort. Moreover, he had done a good job for us during the Cabot Medical acquisition. Second, while Bear Steams was a very prominent firm, it was not in the “highest rank” and some success with the Circon defense would likely advance its reputation on Wall Street, so we thought we would obtain solid institutional support. In retrospect I believe our judgment and that we made the best possible choice.On August 13, Bear Streams issued its option to Circon that the $18 per share bid was inadequate. On the basis of this inadequacy option, Circon’s board quickly recommended that Circon shreholders reject the %18 per-share offer. Auhll articulate his reasoning of rejecting the offer:After discussions with my lawyers and bankers, my assessment of our situation was as follows. First, there was a high probability that within three or five months Circon would be acquired by some company. Second, if we could resist and delay U.S. Surgical’s takeover there was strong probability that competitors of either U.S. Surgical or Circon would launch defensive competitive bids for Circon leading to a “bidding war” which might raise our price 50 to 100% over U.S. Surgical’s price. At a minimum, we believed that any effective resistance would cause U.S. Surgical to raise its offer. And third, there was a very high probability that I would no longer be employed by Circon’s new owners.One of the basic questions is: “Is short-term shareholder interest the only consideration?”And is it unethical to do everything other that what the shareholders say in the short team?” I’m not an expert in this area, but my understanding is that short-term shareholder interests are an important factor, but they are not paramount, and they are certainly not the only factors that has to be considered. Delaware has systematically stated in numerous of their case law pronouncements that the judgment of the board of directors is paramount. The speculators and takeover artists and arbitrageurs are not the primary interest; the primary interest, in the state of Delaware, is either the medium-or the long-term shareholder benefit.Circon’s board at this time was composed of four members in addition to Auhll, all of whom wrer friends and business relations of the Circon leader. Though they were all ostensibly outsiders (meaning that they were not Circon employees), all except one had been nominated by Auhll himself. Harold R. Frank was Auhll’s former boss at Applied Magnetics. Paul W. Hartloff, Jr. was a former attorney to Circon, and Rudolf R. Schulte was a local investor and one of Auhll’s major backers in his intial LBO. Exhibit 4 contains a more detailed description of each director’s background and respective stockholders, including information on George Cloustier, Charles Elson, Victor Krulak, and Bruce Thompson who would subsequently join the board.Auhll was instructed by legal counsel not to communicate with Hirsch or other Surgical representative, despite several attempts by Surgical to do so. Instead, Auhll and Hirsch traded bellows in the press. In elaborating on why U.S. Surgical’s offer was inadequate, Auhll was quoted as saying “Execution of our strategic plan will generate superior value.” Hirsch countered with: “Despite Circon’s poor performance, missed forecasts and deteriorating shareholder value before our tender, their directors offer shareholders no alternative and no firm value other than a continuation of a strategic plan that has not produced results.”On August 20, Circon announced that three of its stockholders had filed separate lawsuit against the company, its board, and top executives over their response to Surgical’s takeover offer. The suits sought class-action status and alleged that the board and Auhll in particular had violated duties to shareholders by rejecting the hostile bid. A Circon spokesman said the allegation lacked merit that the company would defend against them.On August 30, Surgical announced that 6.99 million Circon shares had been tendered into its initial tender offer. The tendered shares, when combined with the Circon shares that Surgical already owned, represented 63% of Cirson’s common stock. In view of this initial success, Surgical extended its $18 tender offer for another month, through September 30, 1996. On September 30, Surgical again extended the $18 per-share offer until December 13.The Enemy FaltersWhile shares continued to flow to Surgical, employee moral began to falter almost immediately after the hostile bid was launched, and turnover in the sales force began to increase sharply. Auhll recalled the internal struggle: “We were terrified that we would lose our employees and that would destroy our ability to operate the company. That was a major, major issue, trying to hold our team together. We were worried that we would lose a lot of employees. So I was a major cheerleader out there for the employees, trying to keep morale and keep the esprit de corps p.” Despite best efforts, sales force attrition increased dramatically, which led to missed revenue targets.In view of these operation difficulties, when Surgical’s $18 bid expired on December 16, it announced that it was lowering its tender offer to $17 per share and extending it until February 13, 1997. Auhll was “utterly stunned” by the reduction in offer price:In Novermber, I thought. “My god, Leon is a genius, He’s going to raise the price on December 14, and it’s going to require my lawyer, my management team ,my board, my investment bankers, all working over Chrismas and New Year’s to submit an danswer in 10 working days.” My chief financial officer believes to this day that had Surgical raised its price to $19, the Circon board would have accepted it. Instead, Leon tried to flex his muscles. He not only wanted to acquire Circon, I think he wanted to rub our nose in it and I think he just got very greedy. I expected him to raise the price a dollar or two, at least, and then stress everybody out and we would capitulate. But he lowered the price, which was a total stocker. What that meant was that we didn’t even have to go back to Bear Stearns for an adequacy opinion. We already had one, which was still fresh.Indeed, a day after Surgical’s new offer, Circon announced that its board of directors had recommended that shareholders reject the bid as inadequate. In a Wall Street Journal article Auhll stated that his strategic plan was “on track,” and noted that Circon expected to see savings early in the next year from the closure of a Pennsylvania facility. He also noted to the press that products introduced in the previous few months had been well received. In response, a Surgical spokesman said: “ We are very disappointed that they won’t come to the table to discuss the offer’s benefits and synergies for shareholders.”On June 16, Surgical made a move to increase its position in Circon stock. Surgical announced an amended tender offer to purchase only 973,174 shares at $14.5 per share. This amended offer was for just enough shares to give Surgical 14.9% of Circon’s outstanding shares, an amount just below that which would trigger Circon’s poison pill. Surgical’s initial offer had been for all of Circon’s shares. Under U.S. securities laws, Surgical had to make a new offer to buy a smaller number of shares. In addition, this lower offer was not for control of Circon, but only for a minority position. This lack of a control premium allowed Surgical to succeed in closing the smaller offer ath the much lower price of $14.5 per share. In order to provide adequate disclosure on this smaller offer, Surgical made clear its intention to renew its tender offer, this time at $16.5, for all Circon shares, after the smaller tender offer expired on July 14. As expected, on July 15, Surgical announced that its $14.5 per share amended tender offer had been completed. On August 5, U.S. Surgical renewed its cash tender offer for all outstanding Circon shares at $16.5 per share. At the August 15, 1997 board meeting Brian McCarthy presented a financial analysis which had led Bear Stearns & Co. to renew its written opition that U.S. Surgical tender was “inadequate from financial point of view to the company’s stockhoders.”Without this “inadequacy opition”the hostile takeover defense could not have continued. Some board members were not expecting this renewal.In September 1997, Surgical filed suit against Circon in the Delaware Court of Chancery, seeking an injunction against Circon’s poison pill and employee-retation plan. In the lawsuit, Surgical claimed that Circon’s board adopted the pill for the “improper sole purpose” of allowing Auhll to retain control over the company. The lawsuit also alleged that the employee-retation plan adopted by Circon was a ruse intended to discourage a hostile takeover.A Flanking ManeuverWhile the direct battle for Circon’s share continued, Hirsch announced that Surgical would initiate a proxy battle to oust the one-third of Circon’s directors who would be up for re-election on October 1997. One of the directors who would be standing for election was Auhll himself. Surgical filed proxy materials with the SEC and announced the its intention to elect two directors to the Circon board: stockholder activist Charlie Elson, a Stetson University law professor, and Victor Krulak, a retired U.S. Marine Corp lieutenant general. If elected, the would be the first directors without friendship ties to Auhll. Elson had gained recognition for his writings on corporate governance and his selection by “Chainsaw” Al Dunlap to be a director of Sunbeam Corporation. General Krulak, known to his friends as “Brute,” became famous for serving on the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Vietnam War as head of counterinsurgency operations and training. Elson described his initial involvement:In March 1997, Leon Hirsch called me. So I went to New York and spent a couple of hours to talking to him and the Surgical people about the Circon and the bid. To me , the issue was, can a board turn down an all-cash offer which, at that point, 73% or 74% of its shareholders said that they should go forward with? I was very clear with them, though that I was not representing their interests. I was simple a candidate for the board to represent all the shareholders. I had no obligations to them following the nomination. Once I was elected to the board, I would have no contact or relationship with them.In return for the willingness to stand for the election, Elson and Krulak each received $100,000 in Circon stock from Surgical, as well as “back-up” indemnification in the event that they won board seats but did not receive the same indemnification as the other Circon directors. “We consulted with Counsel and th ey agreed that would not compromise independence,” recalled Elson.In April 1997, Circon announced that Gorge Cloutier had been appointed to fill a “longstanding” vacancy on the Circon board. “George was a friend of mine, and I knew he was a fighter,” rec alled Auhll. “He was an independent person, so I knew he was somebody I could sell to the board and they would be comfortable with him.” Coutier recalled the situation as well:He was looking around for a new director because he had to replace some people on the board. It looked like a couple directors would be leaving and I think he was getting the feeling that they were getting squirrelly on him because the offer had been lowered and he wasn’t meeting his business plan. So he was getting into a place where he needed someone to buck him up, and he probably perceived me as that, and I perceived me as that. I knew that by coming onto the board, I was stepping into automatic lawsuits. Richard had to have someone willing to step in and not care, and that w as me. “Hey Richard, we’ll take these guys abd slap them around and get them straightened out here.” That was my position: we fight until the last minute, last day, last hour, and something will happen. At that point I was probably more aggressive because for me it was riding into and unknown battle. It was just an emotional friendship move—charge into defeat the Hun. Even though we didn’t know then who the Hun was.。

第一章哈佛经理的产品管理

第一章哈佛经理的产品管理

哈佛管理技能培训教程:第九单元哈佛经理业务管理第一章哈佛经理的产品管理——(美)——(美)所谓效率,说来也非常简单,就是抛弃笨拙的方法,用我们已知的最好方法去工作。

——(美)对业务不精通是一个经理最大的悲哀。

哈佛经理要想成为自己的主人,必须精通——编者生产效率的意义是,使生产的诸要素取得平衡,使最小的努力产生最大的成果。

市场并不是偶然出现的。

它是预料到某种需求的存在从而进行经营活动的结果。

一个企业,如果它的产品和劳务不能销售出去,或不能为人所消费,那么即使它的管理工作是世界上最出色的,也是白费力气。

产品是企业市场营销组合中的一个重要因素。

产品管理直接影响和决定着其他市场营销组因素的管理,对企业市场营销的成败关系重大。

在现代市场经济条件下,每一个企业都应致力于产品质量的提研究产品管理,必须明确产品的概念。

所谓产品,是指能提供给市场,用于满足人们某种欲望和需要的任何事物,包括实物、服务、场所、组织、思想、主意等。

可见,产品概念已经远远超越了传统的有形实物的范围,思想、策划、主意作为产品的重要形式也能卖钱。

正确把握产品的整体概念,对于企业为市场设计、供应适销对路的产品,取得预期收益,至关重要。

因此,必须不断增强对产品整体□产品整体概念现代市场营销理论认为,产品整体概念包含核心产品、有形产品和附加产品三个层次。

核心产品是指消费者购买某种产品时所追求的利益,是顾客真正要买的东西,因而在产品整体概念中也是最基本、最主要的部分。

消费者购买某种产品,并不是为了占有或获得产品本身,而是为了获得有形产品是核心产品借以实现的形式,即向市场提供的实体和服务的形象。

如果有形产品是实体品,则它在市场上通常表现为产品质量水平、外观特色、式样、品牌名称和包装等。

产品的基本效用必须通过某些具体的形式才得以实现。

市场营销者应首先着眼于顾客购买产品时所追求的利益,以求更完附加产品是顾客购买有形产品时所获得的全部附加服务和利益,包括提供信贷、免费送货、质量保证、安装、售后服务等。

第一章哈佛经理权力运用上

第一章哈佛经理权力运用上

哈佛管理技能培训教程:第五单元哈佛经理领导权力第一章哈佛经理权力运用(上)第五单元哈佛经理领导权力——(美)富兰克林·D一个管理人员的任务中最困难而最重要的部分也许是管理他自己,使自己成为下级欢迎而且有权期望的那样一种“上司”。

——(美)哈佛经理不仅仅是一个职位,他更是一个王国权力的化身。

一个君主是否成功并不在于他是否已经取得权——编者厂长负责制不等于全厂的事都由我一个人来做,而是要各级人员在分工原则下担起责任来,他们对我负责。

H哈佛经理权力运用一、权力运用原则现代组织理论认为,哈佛经理是权力的拥有者,领导是权力化身。

凡是哈佛经理,不论其职位高低,都有相□领导权力的含义凡是哈佛经理手中都有其职责范围内相应的权力,在运用权力的过程中,有的大显神通,有的政绩平平,有领导权力是领导活动的基础,没有领导权力,哈佛经理就不能对社会组织、被管理者的行为施加影响,进行控制和指挥,领导活动就无法进行。

领导权力的作用,集中地讲就是确保领导者和领导集团的领导活动正常在现实的社会活动中,人们往往把权力和职权混为一谈,其实这是不科学的。

所谓职权是指由哈佛经理的地位所决定的、具有强制性的法定权力。

它有明确的范围,与哈佛经理的个人因素无关,权力因职位不同而变化。

但是权力不仅包括职位权力,还包括非强制权力,即哈佛经理的个人因素所决定而具备的影响力,它的含义大于职权。

在实际生活中,有时存在有职无权和无职有权的现象。

从理论上讲,相应的职位有相应的权力,而现实中,职位不一定意味着有实际的权力,权力不一定意味着职权。

所以,职位同权力之间不能划等号,法定权力不等于实际权力。

要使法定权力成为现实的实际权力,关键在于哈佛经理驾驭和操纵决策系统一定。

真正要实施高效率的领导与指挥,必须形成一定的权威。

如上所述,职权既然不意味着实际的权力,就更不能意味着权威了。

权威从本质上讲,是具有高超驾驭和操纵决策系统,并在决策系统中建立起极高威哈佛经理的权威不同于职权,职权是以法律、奖惩等手段来维护其尊严的,而权威的树立主要是靠哈佛经理的品德和能力等获得哈佛经理的信任来确立和维持的。

名企案例-哈佛知名企业管理案例(一)(28个doc)

名企案例-哈佛知名企业管理案例(一)(28个doc)

〖非常规思维〗3M公司何以超越诺顿公司3M公司创造“一种能絻够激发普通员工建功立业的组织环境”3M公司“生产多少,销售多少”的经营哲学体现了公司管理层的一个坚定信念:市场本身比等级管理者更能鉴别企业发展潜力,而且无论何时,那些具有良好保险单的员工应该不断得到资助和支持,以验证设想的可能性。

在3M公司,其组织结构是按照“成长再分立”的原则自下而上建立的,这种原则鼓励每一事业部资助具有最佳发挥创意的员工,员工成功完成的开发项目可以单独建成分部,然后成长为事业部,这样,新的事业部就可以为自己的新项目融资,启动新一轮“成长再分立”的过程。

追溯3M公司的成长历程,了解其是怎样经过长期努力,将企业员工的能动性融入企业组织的血液中的,将使我们得到一些启发。

3M公司与其在该待业的主要竞争对手――诺顿公司(Norton Company)一开始齐头并进,到如今却形成了鲜明的对比。

战后一段时间,两家公司规模大致相当,但诺顿公司的组织结构更完善一些,3M公司只是个“小弟弟”,尽管它也是一个正在成长的挑战者。

然而到了本世纪50年代中期,3M公司的规模已是诺顿公司的两倍;到60年代中期,已四倍于诺顿公司;到70年代中期,其销售量是诺顿公司的六倍;到80年代中期,其销售量是诺顿公司的八倍;90年代中期,当3M公司成为《幸福》杂志美国最受人尊敬的公司排行榜的常客时,诺顿公司已被法国工业巨头圣·高拜恩(St.Gaobain)公司吞并了。

纵观这两家公司各自的发展历史,它们同为规模庞大、多元化经营的公司,但3M公司和诺顿公司却集中体现了两种完全不同的管理理念。

早在本世纪20年代“专家管理”观念刚刚流行之时,诺顿公司就成了这个正在演变中的管理体制新原理的较早的坚定信奉者。

公司初期采取了时髦的事业部制组织机构,成为财务控制体系的创新者,率先开发了诸如PIMS 回归模式和波士顿咨询集团大力推广的“成长-分享”型矩阵模式等一系列保持领先优势的战略计划体系。

哈佛经理手册

哈佛经理手册

哈佛经理手册第一单元哈佛经理手册我们的大厦宽敞而开放,它向一切人开放,无论他们是持相同意见还是持反对意见。

林顿·B·约翰逊忙碌和紧张,能带来高昂的工作情绪;只有全神贯注时,工作才能产生高效率。

松下幸之助在哈佛经理交流信息.制定战略.下达命令的过程中,会议是一个有效的但不是必需的手段。

一个成功的哈佛经理的每个会议既是最必要的也应是最有效的。

编者哈佛语录在一个管理系统中,效率的降低有时是由于单个领导执行者或团体领导执行者的情绪动摇的结果。

吉诺夫有两种效率:一种只是表面上的效率,而且只是通过纪律约束才在组织中产生的。

它只是另一种真正的效率的模拟。

迪克·卡尔森生产率和创造性一样是取得进步的主要工具。

伊桥俊彦第一章哈佛经理会议通则一.会议准则会议的特征会议是指三个或三个以上的人(其中一个为主持人),为发挥特定功能而进行的一种面对面的多向沟通。

其特定功能,即指下列五项功能中的某一项或某几项:①提供信息;②汇集信息;③解决问题;④宣传政策;⑤培育训练。

会议只是一种管理工具,一般人对它有着热衷与厌恶两种极端的态度!热衷会议的人认为会议不可缺少,他们能够举出许多冠冕堂皇的理由,来维护自己的观点;厌恶会议的人则将会议看作浪费时间与浪费精力的一种活动。

他们也能够举出许多耸人听闻的理由,来支持自己的见解。

在这两类人士之中,厌恶会议者似乎比热衷会议者更多,极具讽刺意味的是:诅咒会议的人往往是些最不懂得开会,甚至是最喜欢滥开会议的人! 客观地说,会议本身并不具备被热衷或被厌恶的理由。

因此,我们有必要恢复会议的真面目。

热衷会议的人总是强调会议的必要性,甚至认为它是不可缺少的。

这未免言重了,因为就算不召开会议,一个机构照样可以存在下去,更何况我们总能找到一些可以取代会议的途径。

让我们探索一下不用开会,却照样可以发挥会议功能提供信息.收集信息.解决问题.宣传政策.培育训练等诸种途径。

1提供信息我们可凭便条.备忘录.甚至正式的书面报告从事信息的交流。

《哈佛商学院MBA案例全书》目录.doc

《哈佛商学院MBA案例全书》目录.doc
案例
[案例一]日本企业独特的成本管理体系
[案例二]日本企业财务管理
[案例三]巴林银行的倒闭
[案例四]5个1分钱与1个5分钱Leabharlann [案例五]金融巨子-贾尼尼
[案例六]麦道克的债务危机
[案例七]佳宝:冒险的代价
[案例八]美国储贷业的灾难
[案例九]世界最大的金融丑闻--住友
[案例十]LTV的融资之道
[案例十一]利利公司转危为安
第一节宏观经济学
一、国民生产和收入
二、大的总计和若干小的总计
三、国民收入的变化:价格水平问题
四、就业
五、货币供给及货币流通速度
六、经济周期:从繁荣到萧条
七、对外贸易
第二节微观经济学
一、需求、需求量和需求曲线
二、供给、供给量和供给曲线
三、生产函数和等产量线
四、总产量、平均产量和边际产量
五、边际生产力递减规律和边际技术替代率递减规律
六、障碍与处理
七、行销出击
第二节营销
一、哈佛营销课
二、营销分析
三、集中性市场营销
四、4P'S:市场营销组合
案例
[案例一]美国福特T型车行销战略
[案例二]无敌哈默就范记
[案例三]杰克敦的厚利多销
[案例四]雪佛莱和奥兹莫比尔的买一送一营销术
[案例五]虎飞自行车公司营销策略的全面规划和重点实施
[案例六]美国米勒啤酒公司营销案
第九章组织管理
第一节组织的重要性
一、少数企业不重视组织管理
二、组织的作用以执行工作计划为使命
第二节组织分类
一、按组织的目标分类
二、按满足心理需求分类
三、按个人与组织的关系分类
第三节组织结构

第一章哈佛经理谈判通则

第一章哈佛经理谈判通则

第一章哈佛经理谈判通则哈佛治理技能培训教程:第十单元哈佛经理谈判能力与技巧第一章哈佛经理谈判通则(下)三、谈判要点□善于假设所谓的假设,确实是“暂定的事实”。

过去发生的、现在存在的,或者以后可能显现的,尽管可不能把握确切的证据,但仍应该把它当作事实,而予以承认。

譬如,当你过马路时,尽管无法了解整条路的路况,而只能依据红绿灯的指示,只要红灯一亮,即可假设正有车子在通过马路。

此一假设,是依照“绿灯行,红灯停”的交通常识而来的。

因此,你的假设也可能错误:假如没有确切的事实做为依照,总是带着些冒险性的。

而关于所假设的事实,我们也无法确认其是否差不多发生,或者以后是否会发生。

正确的假设确实能够使谈判力大幅度地增加。

因此,在谈判进行当中,一旦你发觉自己事前所做的假设无误的话,就该赶忙运用已制订好的策略,展开反击,则其结果自然对你有利。

只是,假如你事先未曾预备好应对的的方法,那么在仓促之间,必定更难以想出什么周全的法子,作为迎战的利器,如此一来,谈判就未必有利于你了。

正确的假设对谈判的关心专门大,然而却没有一种法则,能够作为设定正确假设的依据。

体会也许能够使你更容易正确的假设,但却没有任何谈判专家敢拍着胸脯保证:“我的假设一定准确”。

因此在谈判中,当你一发觉自己做了错误的假设时,就该赶忙悬崖勒马,以免事态更加严峻,而蒙受庞大的缺失。

如何才能提高假设的准确度呢?这儿提供一个方法:把假设的重点放在对方的方法及其可能采取的策略上,而不要老是在与谈判有关的要紧论点以及其它细节中打转。

不管谈判的要紧论点或其它细节,它如何说依旧“人”——你的谈判对手。

因此,对“人”而不对“事”,可说是在做假设时比较合理、也比较安全的一种摸索方式。

1. 假设要依照事实再回过来想想红绿灯的例子。

当信号灯由红转为绿时,则一定有车子通过。

在那个假设中,“绿灯亮了”是唯独已知的事实,因此,只依照此一事实,便假设“有车子通过”,则就未免太草率了。

假如在“绿灯亮了”之外,再加上“听到车子的声音”,那么,“有车子通过”的假设的正确性,就大大的提高了。

哈佛经理弊病诊断案例

哈佛经理弊病诊断案例

第二章哈佛经理弊病诊断一¡经管人员无能症病例¡经营者相当于公司的脑人们的脑由大脑、小脑与脑干所组成,它兼备了司令部和参谋总部的功能,能够对胃、肺、肾、肝等所谓的五脏六腑发号施令。

大脑里的脑干,看起来仿佛双层一般,靠近脑干的皮质,叫做“旧皮质”而外侧的皮质则叫做“新皮质”。

旧皮质主管喜、怒、哀、乐等各种情绪的活动,以及食欲、性欲、从众欲等本能上的活动。

“新皮质”是高等精神活动的大本营,它会靠着学习和经验的累积而生长。

小脑的机能不是考虑事物,而是用来保持躯体的平衡。

例如,当人们走在独木桥上时,它能替人们保持躯体的平衡,并计算每一步的宽度。

此外,人们之因此能用手有规则地敲桌子,也归功于小脑的功能。

依照资料显示,假如小脑的机能失常,就无法以均匀的速度,敲打同一个地点了。

脑干和意志无关,但它具有调整维持生命所必须的反射运动和内脏活动的任务。

当敲桌子不小心碰到滚烫的东西时,会无意识地立即把手缩回来,这确实是脑干的功能之一;另外,当敲桌子运动时,心跳会加快,或瞳孔明暗而扩大、缩小等,这些差不多上因为脑干命令神经发挥功能的缘故。

由此可知,脑的功能可决定人类的一切行为。

假如将脑的任务比喻为企业经营,则相当于能够决定“企业经营”差不多方针,然后依照那个方针掌管行动指令的部门。

依照此意义,企业经营中的“脑”,确实是所谓的经营者;而经营者对经营的方法和对应的手段,确实是“经营方针”吧。

¡无法拟定适当的方针或战略者称为虚拟经营者假如,一个本来没有经营能力的人,不自量力地认为自己具备这种能力而经营企业,会有什么后果呢?假如他走运,企业也许能够经营得专门顺利,但这种侥幸的例子并不多,一般来讲会把公司带上倒闭之路。

再讲,尽管有经营者的秉性,但他的能力不如其他经营者成熟时,后果又是如何呢?这时候他通常会一面尝试、一面修正错误、累积经验,慢慢地成长为一位有能力独当一面的经营者。

但是,问题在因此否有足够让他尝试、改错的机会。

《哈佛管理全集》目录

《哈佛管理全集》目录

《哈佛管理全集》目录MBA教育与哈佛商学院 3第一章MBA教育的历史及现状第二章美国的MBA教育第三章哈佛商学院第一单元经营战略与方针 5第一章经营战略与方针——竞争中的制胜法宝第二章经营战略基础(一)分析决策过程第三章经营战略基础(二)行业结构分析第四章通用的竞争战略第五章居于行业不同发展阶段的战略选择第六章居于行业不同竞争阶段的战略选择第七章战略管理第八章经营方针管理第九章著名企业经营战略方案案例精选第二单元组织行为学12第一章组织行为学第二章管理中的个体分析第三章群体动态与决策第四章组织管理论与结构第五章个人、群体和组织第六章领导理论:激情与艺术第七章著名企业组织管理案例精选第三单元人力资源管理17第一章人力资源管理——一个转变中的领域第二章公司职员的挑选和培训第三章考评系统(一)工作绩效评价方法第四章考评系统(二)人员考评制度第五章能力开发系统第六章工作报偿(一)工资与福利第七章工作报偿(二)改善绩效的激励第八章著名企业人力资源管理案例精选第四单元财务管理23第一章财务管理——理财的经济分析方法第二章企业筹资(一)一般理论与短期筹资决策第三章企业筹资(二)中长期筹资决策第四章资本结构优化第五章企业投资(一)长期投资评估第六章企业投资(二)短期投资管理第七章股息决策和债息决策上卷/ 下卷第五单元市场营销管理27第一章市场营销战略与战术第二章市场运销管理过程第三章目标市场营销第四章产品决策第五章产品定价决策第六章渠道决策第七章物流决策第八章广告决策第九章促销沟通与销售促进决策第六单元生产与作业管理36第一章企业生产与业务管理系统第二章设施选址第三章物质系统的布置第四章产品设计与工艺过程的选择第五章生产计划系统的设计第六章作业计划系统的设计第七章库存管理第八章工作研究与人—机工程第九章JIT(准时生产)——改变世界的生产方式第七单元管理沟通41第一章管理沟通基础(一)沟通形态与网络第二章管理沟通基础(二)沟通过程分析第三章企业外部沟通(一)公共关系策略第四章企业外部沟通(二)CI策略第五章企业内部沟通:倾听与对话第六章会议管理技巧第七章商务谈判技巧第八单元管理控制45第一章控制工作概述第二章控制工作的原理和要求第三章控制工作的类型第四章预算控制第五章非预算控制第六章实施控制的心理学第七章管理过程中的控制策略第九单元管理经济学49第一章管理经济学:企业管理与市场机制的经济分析第二章需求分析与估计第三章生产决策分析(一)投入要素的最优组合第四章生产决策分析(二)产品的最优组合第五章风险决策分析第六章成本利润分析第七章市场结构与企业行为第八章总案例:韦斯特福尔公司的管理决策附录中国的MBA教育MBA教育与哈佛商学院27人的一生只做一个企业经理、银行家、企业家,挣许多钱是不够的。

哈佛经理弊病诊断案例

哈佛经理弊病诊断案例

第二章哈佛经理弊病诊断一¡经管人员无能症病例¡经营者相当于公司的脑人们的脑由大脑、小脑与脑干所组成,它兼备了司令部和参谋总部的功能,能够对胃、肺、肾、肝等所谓的五脏六腑发号施令。

大脑里的脑干,瞧起来仿佛双层一般,靠近脑干的皮质,喊做“旧皮质〞而外侧的皮质那么喊做“新皮质〞。

旧皮质主管喜、怒、哀、乐等各种情绪的活动,以及食欲、性欲、从众欲等本能上的活动。

“新皮质〞是高等精神活动的大本营,它会靠着学习和经验的累积而生长。

小脑的机能不是考虑事物,而是用来维持躯体的平衡。

例如,当人们走在独木桥上时,它能替人们维持躯体的平衡,并计算每一步的宽度。

此外,人们之因此能用手有规那么地敲桌子,也回功于小脑的功能。

依据资料显示,要是小脑的机能失常,就无法以均匀的速度,敲打同一个地点了。

脑干和意志无关,但它具有调整维持生命所必须的反射运动和内脏活动的任务。

当敲桌子不小心碰到滚烫的东西时,会无意识地马上把手缩回来,这确实是根基脑干的功能之一;另外,当敲桌子运动时,心跳会加快,或瞳孔明暗而扩大、缩小等,这些根基上因为脑干命令神经发扬功能的缘故。

由此可知,脑的功能可决定人类的一切行为。

要是将脑的任务比喻为企业经营,那么相当于能够决定“企业经营〞全然方针,然后依据那个方针掌管行动指令的部门。

依据此意义,企业经营中的“脑〞,确实是根基所谓的经营者;而经营者对经营的方式和对应的手段,确实是根基“经营方针〞吧。

¡无法拟定适当的方针或战略者称为虚拟经营者要是,一个本来没有经营能力的人,不自量力地认为自己具备这种能力而经营企业,会有什么后果呢?要是他走运,企业也许能够经营得特别顺利,但这种侥幸的例子并不多,一般来讲会把公司带上倒闭之路。

再讲,尽管有经营者的秉性,但他的能力不如其他经营者成熟时,后果又是如何呢?这时候他通常会一面尝试、一面修正错误、累积经验,慢慢地成长为一位有能力独当一面的经营者。

然而,咨询题在因此否有足够让他尝试、改错的时机。

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第八章战略性决策第一节传统的决策程序传统的决策程序可分为五个主要阶段:1.认识阶段,发现问题或危机的存在。

2.辨认阶段,决策者自各项预兆中,判定问题或危机的原因,据以建立问题或危机模式。

3.解决阶段,拟订各项决策方案,并就影响决策方案的各因素如目标、决策环境、同阶层管理人员的价值观念等设立评断标准,然后将各方案与标准比较而选定最佳方案。

4.实施阶段。

5.绩效控制阶段。

第二节组织决策组织决策可分经济人决策模式与行政人员决策模式两种,现分述如下:一、经济人决策模式经济人决策模式的程序基于下列假设:组织目标已知且意见一致;决策人员已知晓问题或危机的存在;在解决问题或争取有利时机之际,决策人员了解所有可能方案,同时以恰当的评断标准判定各方案的结果;决策人员已辨明目标或危机的实质;恰当的评断标准是指能产生最佳答案的标准,也即当其用来评估各方案时,足以令厂商选定的最佳方案;决策人员对所有状况因素完全了解;决策人员以合理的科学的方法,评估各决策方案。

当然,决策必然受到诸如决策者人格问题、决策环境等的限制。

二、行政人员决策模式行政人员决策模式包括一系列假设及作业方法:目标常模糊不清,具有冲突性而且不一致;忽略问题或危机的存在;由于疏于辨认,当观察目标或审度时机时,常误解问题或贻误时机;决策以模式为基础,故如果专注重大事项,则对主要的资料、变数与因果关系,必定鲜少遗漏;在“解决阶段”由于问题或危机已成为模式,收集的资料仅是提纲挈领,注重少数变动较大的因素,故决策者对状况的了解因而被限制;很少有决策者采用最佳诊断标准,大多数是采用满足评断标准,故决策方案仅能满足少数目标;决策者习惯以经验法则作为决策方案,甚至根本不用“满足评断标准”评断决策方案。

第三节更精确的组织决策模式Paul 曾提出六种主要的组织决策模式。

假定这些模式的惟一可能最合于组织阶层、组织单位的依存方式、主要任务的特征及工作人员与组织环境之间的绩效评估等各种不同状况的最佳模式。

一、官僚模式官僚模式是基于古典管理学家的“均势”理论,其假定决策人员必须具备“权”与“能”。

二、规范式决策理论规范式决策理论运用贝氏定理、拉普拉斯定理与极小极大原理等作业研究技术解决问题。

三、行为决策理论行为决策理论以自我满足的决策为其特征,反对采用最佳决策。

四、集体决策集体决策决策过程包含群体动力,已有许多人从事此种决策形态的研究,仅适用于高阶层管理层次以下的小集团。

五、折中模式折中模式的主要特征在于综合决策过程中决策者的意见。

六、开放系统模式开放系统模式的特征是把细分战略性决策作为一序列的步骤,即通称为“逐步渐进决策”。

若因依赖性的存在而需相互协议,则运用第五种模式较为合适。

M intzberg等人的决策程序正与上述相符,并组合了一个繁而不紊的战略性决策程序,与“传统决策程序”的基本决策程序并无差别,并增添若干决策程序。

同时又指出决策人员如无权批准某一特别的战略性决策,还缺少权限。

显然这是逐步决策程序的证明。

最后提出,决策程序中断有三处主要方式:内部中断,当急需战略性决策时,由于认识不清与意见不一致,而造成中断,叫做内部中断;新选择中断,在最终评估与选择时,另有新方案被认为可行时,则产生中断,叫做新选择中断;外部中断,选定决策方案不即付诸实施,仍继续做评估及挑选,因此而造成决策中断,称为外部中断。

第四节战略决策模式一、认识阶段问题或危机的发生,启发了战略性决策程序的进行。

将参涉目标、过去绩效及其他认知评断标准与问题相互印证,即为认识阶段。

二、辨认阶段辨认阶段与认识阶段大体相同。

是因为决策者当时仅研究而并不拟订具体决策方案。

不过在辨认阶段,决策者必须就问题或危机设定模式。

三、解决阶段在解决阶段,主要工作为寻找现成的方案及针对情况设计较明确的新方案。

方案提出后则需加以评估选择,这种工作常由最高管理者或企划部担任,他们可就情况决定采用或不用情报资料从事理性的选择。

四、实施阶段至于实施阶段,决策者如果没有批准权力,则必需通过组织层次,争取决策方案的批准。

总之,战略性决策虽极其复杂,但是遵循一种明确的典范从事决策的方法,这一程序可能与传统的观念不合,同时又牵涉更多的心理与社会变数关系。

改进方法主要在于明确地界定目标,以消除“综合”所引起的各项问题。

实用案例1ENI:实施国际经营方略意大利国家能源控股公司(ENI)控制着400余家分公司,拥有十多万名员工,年销售额高达数百亿英磅,它积极从事七个领域的业务:碳氢类和其他燃料的勘探、开采和输送;石油化工;机械制造;冶金;金融;工程建筑;其他业务如旅游、印刷、软件开发以及工业转轨(指将现有某厂转产或是采用不同工艺生产同一产品)等等。

它的巨大成功得益于决策者天才的经营头脑与国家的有力支持。

20世纪30年代经济危机发生后,意大利成立了至今仍是该国石油集团中的龙头企业的国家石油总公司(AGIP)。

与它同时产生的还有从事炼油的ANIC;与盎格鲁—伊朗石油公司合建的IROM;与新泽西标准石油公司合建的STANIC;二战后政府还创建了经营甲烷输送管道的SNAM公司和SAIP钻探集团。

上述各公司在二战后全国工业重建过程中一股脑儿组合到一起,成为ENI国家能源控股公司。

ENI的创建的所有意大利碳氢能源领域企业的大联合,很大程度上是其首任总裁恩里科·马推的杰作。

此人是个精明强干的企业经理,具有国家主义、集体主义、平等主义等价值观念。

他着力创建了ENI,为其初步发展确立了方向与任务。

由于他为增强意大利在能源上的自力更生能力作出了巨大的贡献,他在国内声望极高,也使ENI与外国和私人的大石油公司结下了不共戴天之仇。

马推原先是党派领袖,有经营私人工业企业的资历,战后初期被上议院任命为AGIP公司的总经理。

当时战争无情地将AGIP的炼油厂和输油管线摧残得千疮百孔,其油轮队伍几乎全军覆没。

意大利政府不得不将AGIP即将破产的勘探与开采子公司全部清盘。

当时马推对外国公司大举收购AGIP廉价出让的勘探企业感到惊奇,敏锐地感到里面大有文章,又听说战时在波尔山谷发现了储量丰富的甲烷气,所以他托故推延了清盘和拍卖,背着上司继续在波尔山谷寻觅宝藏。

后来勘探队在卡维尔加发现了重要的天然气田。

AGIP总算躲过了被零趸批卖的惨剧。

不久AGIP控制了国有输油管线公司,开始建造向各企业和北方工业基地输送甲烷的管线网络。

由于国家没有关于勘探权与开采权挂钩办法的法规,众所瞩目的波尔山谷甲烷田与一些大油田的开采权在国会引起了一场长达三年之久的大辩论,AGIP自然无法游离于辩论之外。

国会后来通过的方案是设立国家碳氢资源总公司ENI,它通过直接的收购或是借助政府投资的方式接管原先国家控制的所有碳氢能源公司。

这个实体还垄断波尔山谷的勘探开采权,而私人公司可在意大利境内其他地方竞争。

在马推的推动下,政府后来同意将ENI的独家勘探权扩大到全国范围。

新公司资金总额达150亿英镑,其分公司还拥有名义上的150亿英镑财产。

它可进行股票贸易,可通过相关公司开展业务,可投资其他公司或合资办企业。

马推升任ENI总裁,波尔德里尼成为他的副手。

ENI创建之初,意大利领土上惟一可获得的较大能源资源是天然气,所以ENI注重天然气的生产和输送,AGIP和一家甲烷公司合并后负责这方面的业务。

ENI重建了SNAM管线公司,让它管理波尔山谷的天然气网络,并适时地扩展为省级、省与省之间的巨大管线系统,后来又增添了国际炼油厂、输送管线、化工厂的建造业务。

在石油加工、石油化工方面,ANIC是领头企业,买入佛罗伦萨的皮格诺恩工业设备公司后,ENI进入机械制造业,生产抽油泵、发动机压缩器、阀门和其他炼油厂设备,后来也建造海上钻井平台。

至此,庞大的ENI石油帝国在亚平宁半岛上崛起了。

ENI迅速扩张的天然气开采与传输业务产生了效益,它的国际化进程有了资金保障。

与原油出产国谈判时,马推引进了一种新的投资合作办法:不仅付给产油国一定标准的油田使用费及承担后续开采工程的所有费用,还将向产油国提供共同开发该国天然资源的机会。

原先ENI像其他外国石油公司一样,在勘探开采活动中独自承担巨大的风险。

而现在,如果勘探中确实找到了可产生经济效益的资源时,东道国挣得所有利润的50%;若愿意,东道国还可与ENI一起进行进一步的开发,等于从ENI所得的50%的利润中再取得将近一半的利益。

这样一来,东道国所得与ENI公司所得之比是75%∶25%。

因而马推提出的合作方案被称为“75∶25计划”。

东道国必将从此计划中获得更多的实惠,而ENI则建立与东道国亲密的合作关系,大大降低了经济风险。

ENI与埃及首次进行此类合作成功后,又与伊朗、摩洛哥、利比亚、苏丹、突尼斯、尼日利亚等国合作开发资源。

马推通过这些活动有效地在国外确立了意大利国家石油企业的地位,突破了国际石油工业的固定格局。

马推还将“75∶25计划”从勘探领域推广到AGIP在发展中国家建炼油厂和输送制成品的实践中。

ENI在摩洛哥、加纳和突尼斯建立了合资的炼油厂,还在刚果、南亚、拉丁美洲承包炼油厂建造工程,均取得了经济、政治上的巨大成功。

ENI对意大利迅速从战争创伤中复苏贡献很大,它是SISI工业财团的一个重要成员。

此财团其他成员有菲亚特汽车公司、皮苯利橡胶产品集团、意大利混凝土道路建筑集团。

这个财团事实上在逐渐都市化的意大利创造了汽车文明。

价钱合理的汽车、新的高速公路网络、AGIP的汽油合在一起促成了意大利经济“奇迹”的出现。

AGIP在非洲大部分地区、希腊、澳大利亚、瑞士、联邦德国和阿根廷建立了汽油、润滑油配送的分公司。

通过一系列合并、改组,新的SAIPEM 工业集团使ENI的天然气、石油运输能力呈加速度增长,SAIPEM还是欧洲海上钻探的先锋。

马推还通过建造欧洲中央管线工程,从热那亚北上至巴维亚,输油管一直延伸到瑞士和联邦德国ENI斯图加特炼油厂。

这使得马推与ESSO、海湾公司等主要对手在进行输油站竞争时有了王牌。

在拉弗那发现大量天然气后,ENI在石化领域有了重大进展,建了三个大型石化厂,生产合成橡胶、肥料、醋酸并与美国菲利浦碳黑厂合作生产碳黑。

1956年,意大利国会设立国有工业管理部,它要求所有国有公司的新的投资项目的40%必须是在南方落后地区。

ENI着手在西西里海岸建设大型炼油厂和油轮码头。

ANIC戈拉公司这座地区性石化分厂,也在此时应运而生。

马推还促使ENI建造了AGIP核能工厂,开始生产大型核子加速器的元器件。

但是马推创造一家完整的(包括发电和碳氢燃料生产)能源集团的宏愿落空了。

政府决定组建单独行动的ENEL核能开发公司,将ENI的核项目全部拉过去,包括铀矿勘探和核燃料生产。

为了保证大项目的资金,ENI创建了SOFID金融公司,处理集团全部的财政和投资。

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