博弈论(部分英文版翻译)
博弈论英文课件 (3)
Solving matching pennies
Player 2
Head
Tail
Expected payoffs
Head Player 1
Static (or SimultaneousMove) Games of Complete Information
Matching pennies
Player 2
Head
Tail
Player 1
Head Tail
-1 , 1 1 , -1 1 , -1 -1 , 1
n Head is Player 1’s best response to Player 2’s strategy Tail n Tail is Player 2’s best response to Player 1’s strategy Tail
( 1(H)=0.5, 1(T)=0.5 ) is a Mixed strategy. That is, player 1 plays H and T with probabilities 0.5 and 0.5, respectively.
( 1(H)=0.3, 1(T)=0.7 ) is another Mixed strategy. That is, player 1 plays H and T with probabilities 0.3 and 0.7, respectively.
Ø Player 2’s expected payoff of playing s22:
EU2(s22, (r, 1-r))= r×u2(s11, s22)+(1-r)×u2(s12, s22)
耶鲁大学公开课英文讲义—博弈论第一节
Game Theory: Lecture 1 TranscriptProfessor Ben Polak: So this is Game Theory Economics 159. If you're here for art history, you're either in the wrong room or stay anyway, maybe this is the right room; but this is Game Theory, okay. You should have four handouts; everyone should have four handouts. There is a legal release form--we'll talk about it in a minute--about the videoing. There is a syllabus, which is a preliminary syllabus: it's also online. And there are two games labeled Game 1 and Game 2. Can I get you all to look at Game 1 and start thinking about it. And while you're thinking about it, I am hoping you can multitask a bit. I'll describe a bit about the class and we'll get a bit of admin under our belts. But please try and look at--somebody's not looking at it, because they're using it as a fan here--so look at Game 1 and fill out that form for me, okay?So while you're filling that out, let me tell you a little bit about what we're going to be doing here. So what is Game Theory? Game Theory is a method of studying strategic situations. So what's a strategic situation? Well let's start off with what's not a strategic situation. In your Economics - in your Intro Economics class in 115 or 110, you saw some pretty good examples of situations that were not strategic. You saw firms working in perfect competition. Firms in perfect competition are price takers: they don't particularly have to worry about the actions of their competitors. You also saw firms that were monopolists and monopolists don't have any competitors to worry about, so that's not a particularly strategic situation. They're not price takers but they take the demand curve. Is this looking familiar for some of you who can remember doing 115 last year or maybe two years ago for some of you? Everything in between is strategic. So everything that constitutes imperfect competition is a strategic setting. Think about the motor industry, the motor car industry. Ford has to worry about what GM is doing and what Toyota is doing, and for the moment at least what Chrysler is doing but perhaps not for long. So there's a small number of firms and their actions affect each other.So for a literal definition of what strategic means: it's a setting where the outcomes that affect you depend on actions, not just on your own actions, but on actions of others. All right, that's as much as I'm going to say for preview right now, we're going to come back and see plenty of this over the course of the next semester.So what I want to do is get on to where this applies. It obviously applies in Economics, but it also applies in politics, and in fact, this class will count as a Political Science class if you're a Political Science major. You should go check with the DUS in Political Science. It count - Game Theory is very important in law these days. So for those of you--for the half of you--that aregoing to end up in law school, this is pretty good training. Game Theory is also used in biology and towards the middle of the semester we're actually going to see some examples of Game Theory as applied to evolution. And not surprisingly, Game Theory applies to sport.So let's talk about a bit of admin. How are you doing on filling out those games? Everyone managing to multitask: filling in Game 1? Keep writing. I want to get some admin out of the way and I want to start by getting out of the way what is obviously the elephant in the room. Some of you will have noticed that there's a camera crew here, okay. So as some of you probably know, Yale is undergoing an open education project and they're videoing several classes, and the idea of this, is to make educational materials available beyond the walls of Yale. In fact, on the web, internationally, so people in places, maybe places in the U.S. or places miles away, maybe in Timbuktu or whatever, who find it difficult to get educational materials from the local university or whatever, can watch certain lectures from Yale on the web.Some of you would have been in classes that do that before. What's going to different about this class is that you're going to be participating in it. The way we teach this class is we're going to play games, we're going to have discussions, we're going to talk among the class, and you're going to be learning from each other, and I want you to help people watching at home to be able to learn too. And that means you're going to be on film, at the very least on mike.So how's that going to work? Around the room are three T.A.s holding mikes. Let me show you where they are: one here, one here, and one here. When I ask for classroom discussions, I'm going to have one of the T.A.s go to you with a microphone much like in "Donahue" or something, okay. At certain times, you're going to be seen on film, so the camera is actually going to come around and point in your direction.Now I really want this to happen. I had to argue for this to happen, cause I really feel that this class isn't about me. I'm part of the class obviously, but it's about you teaching each other and participating. But there's a catch, the catch is, that that means you have to sign that legal release form.So you'll see that you have in front of you a legal release form, you have to be able to sign it, and what that says is that we can use you being shown in class. Think of this as a bad hair day release form. All right, you can't sue Yale later if you had a bad hair day. For those of you who are on the run from the FBI, your Visa has run out, or you're sitting next to your ex-girlfriend, now would be a good time to put a paper bag over your head.All right, now just to get you used to the idea, in every class we're going to have I think the same two people, so Jude is the cameraman; why don't you all wave to Jude: this is Jude okay. And Wes is our audio guy: this is Wes. And I will try and remember not to include Jude and Wes in the classroom discussions, but you should be aware that they're there. Now, if this is making you nervous, if it's any consolation, it's making me very nervous. So, all right, we'll try and make this class work as smoothly as we can, allowing for this extra thing. Let me just say, no one's making any money off this--at least I'm hoping these guys are being paid--but me and the T.A.s are not being paid. The aim of this, that I think is a good aim, it's an educational project, and I'm hoping you'll help us with it. The one difference it is going to mean, is that at times I might hold some of the discussions for the class, coming down into this part of the room, here, to make it a little easier for Jude.All right, how are we doing now on filling out those forms? Has everyone filled in their strategy for the first game? Not yet. Okay, let's go on doing a bit more admin. The thing you mostly care about I'm guessing, is the grades. All right, so how is the grade going to work for this class? 30% of the class will be on problem sets, 30% of the grade; 30% on the mid-term, and 40% on the final; so 30/30/40.The mid-term will be held in class on October 17th; that is also in your syllabus. Please don't anybody tell me late - any time after today you didn't know when the mid-term was and therefore it clashes with 17 different things. The mid-term is on October 17th, which is a Wednesday, in class. All right, the problem sets: there will be roughly ten problem sets and I'll talk about them more later on when I hand them out. The first one will go out on Monday but it will be due ten days later. Roughly speaking they'll be every week.The grade distribution: all right, so this is the rough grade distribution. Roughly speaking, a sixth of the class are going to end up with A's, a sixth are going to end up with A-, a sixth are going to end up with B+, a sixth are going to end up with B, a sixth are going to end up with B-, and the remaining sixth, if I added that up right, are going to end up with what I guess we're now calling the presidential grade, is that right?That's not literally true. I'm going to squeeze it a bit, I'm going to curve it a bit, so actually slightly fewer than a sixth will get straight A's, and fewer than a sixth will get C's and below. We'll squeeze the middle to make them be more B's. One thing I can guarantee from past experience in this class, is that the median grade will be a B+. The median will fall somewhere in the B+'s. Just as forewarning for people who have forgotten what a median is,that means half of you--not approximately half, it means exactly half of you--will be getting something like B+ and below and half will get something like B+ and above.Now, how are you doing in filling in the forms? Everyone filled them in yet? Surely must be pretty close to getting everyone filled in. All right, so last things to talk about before I actually collect them in - textbooks. There are textbooks for this class. The main textbook is this one, Dutta'sbook Strategy and Games. If you want a slightly tougher book, more rigorous book, try Joel Watson's book, Strategies. Both of those books are available at the bookstore.But I want to warn everybody ahead of time, I will not be following the textbook. I regard these books as safety nets. If you don't understand something that happened in class, you want to reinforce an idea that came up in class, then you should read the relevant chapters in the book and the syllabus will tell you which chapters to read for each class, or for each week of class, all right. But I will not be following these books religiously at all. In fact, they're just there as back up.In addition, I strongly recommend people read, Thinking Strategically. This is good bedtime reading. Do any of you suffer from insomnia? It's very good bedtime reading if you suffer from insomnia. It's a good book and what's more there's going to be a new edition of this book this year and Norton have allowed us to get advance copies of it. So if you don't buy this book this week, I may be able to make the advance copy of the new edition available for some of you next week. I'm not taking a cut on that either, all right, there's no money changing hands.All right, sections are on the syllabus sign up - sorry on the website, sign up as usual. Put yourself down on the wait list if you don't get into the section you want. You probably will get into the section you want once we're done. All right, now we must be done with the forms. Are we done with the forms? All right, so why don't we send the T.A.s, with or without mikes, up and down the aisles and collect in your Game #1; not Game #2, just Game #1.Just while we're doing that, I think the reputation of this class--I think--if you look at the course evaluations online or whatever, is that this class is reasonably hard but reasonably fun. So I'm hoping that's what the reputation of the class is. If you think this class is going to be easy, I think it isn't actually an easy class. It's actually quite a hard class, but I think I can guarantee it's going to be a fun class. Now one reason it's a fun class, is the nice thing about teaching Game Theory - quieten down folks--one thing about teaching Game Theory is, you get to play games, and that's exactlywhat we've just been doing now. This is our first game and we're going to play games throughout the course, sometimes several times a week, sometimes just once a week.We got all these things in? Everyone handed them in? So I need to get those counted. Has anyone taken the Yale Accounting class? No one wants to - has aspirations to be - one person has. I'll have a T.A. do it, it's all right,we'll have a T.A. do it. So Kaj, can you count those for me? Is that right? Let me read out the game you've just played."Game 1, a simple grade scheme for the class. Read the following carefully. Without showing your neighbor what you are doing, put it in the box below either the letter Alpha or the letter Beta. Think of this as a grade bid. I will randomly pair your form with another form and neither you nor your pair will ever know with whom you were paired. Here's how the grades may be assigned for the class. [Well they won't be, but we can pretend.] If you put Alpha and you're paired with Beta, then you will get an A and your pair a C. If you and your pair both put Alpha, you'll both get B-. If you put Beta and you're paired with Alpha, you'll get a C and your pair an A. If you and your pair both put Beta, then you'll both get B+."So that's the thing you just filled in.Now before we talk about this, let's just collect this information in a more useful way. So I'm going to remove this for now. We'll discuss this in a second, but why don't we actually record what the game is, that we're playing, first. So this is our grade game, and what I'm going to do, since it's kind of hard to absorb all the information just by reading a paragraph of text, I'm going to make a table to record the information. So what I'm going to do is I'm going to put me here, and my pair, the person I'm randomly paired with here, and Alpha and Beta, which are the choices I'm going to make here and on the columns Alpha and Beta, the choices my pair is making.In this table, I'm going to put my grades. So my grade if we both put Alpha is B-, if we both put Beta, was B+. If I put Alpha and she put a Beta, I got an A, and if I put Beta and she put an Alpha, I got a C. Is that correct? That's more or less right? Yeah, okay while we're here, why don't we do the same for my pair? So this is my grades on the left hand table, but now let's look at what my pair will do, what my pair will get.So I should warn the people sitting at the back that my handwriting is pretty bad, that's one reason for moving forward. The other thing I should apologize at this stage of the class is my accent. I will try and improve the handwriting, there's not much I can do about the accent at this stage.So once again if you both put Alpha then my pair gets a B-. If we both put Beta, then we both get a B+; in particular, my pair gets a B+. If I put Alpha and my pair puts Beta, then she gets a C. And if I put Beta and she puts Alpha, then she gets an A. So I now have all the information that was on the sheet of paper that you just handed in.Now there's another way of organizing this that's standard in Game Theory, so we may as well get used to it now on the first day. Rather then drawing two different tables like this, what I'm going to do is I'm going to take the second table and super-impose it on top of the first table. Okay, so let me do that and you'll see what I mean. What I'm going to do is draw a larger table, the same basic structure: I'm choosing Alpha and Beta on the rows, my pair is choosing Alpha and Beta on the columns, but now I'm going to put both grades in. So the easy ones are on the diagonal: you both get B- if we both choose Alpha; we both get B+ if we both choose Beta. But if I choose Alpha and my pair chooses Beta, I get an A and she gets a C. And if I choose Beta and she chooses Alpha, then it's me who gets the C and it's her who gets the A.So notice what I did here. The first grade corresponds to the row player, me in this case, and the second grade in each box corresponds to the column player, my pair in this case. So this is a nice succinct way of recording what was in the previous two tables. This is an outcome matrix; this tells us everything that was in the game.Okay, so now seems a good time to start talking about what people did. So let's just have a show of hands. How many of you chose Alpha? Leave your hands up so that Jude can catch that, so people can see at home, okay. All right and how many of you chose Beta? There's far more Alphas - wave your hands the Beta's okay. All right, there's a Beta here, okay. So it looks like a lot of - well we're going to find out, we're going to count--but a lot more Alpha's than Beta's. Let me try and find out some reasons why people chose.So let me have the Alpha's up again. So, the woman who's in red here, can we get a mike to the - yeah, is it okay if we ask you? You're not on the run from the FBI? We can ask you why? Okay, so you chose Alpha right? So why did you choose Alpha?Student: [inaudible] realized that my partner chose Alpha, therefore I chose [inaudible].Professor Ben Polak: All right, so you wrote out these squares, you realized what your partner was going to do, and responded to that. Any otherreasons for choosing Alpha around the room? Can we get the woman here? Try not to be intimidated by these microphones, they're just mikes. It's okay.Student: The reason I chose Alpha, regardless of what my partner chose, I think there would be better outcomes than choosing Beta.Professor Ben Polak: All right, so let me ask your names for a second-so your name was?Student: Courtney.Professor Ben Polak: Courtney and your name was?Student: Clara Elise.Professor Ben Polak: Clara Elise. So slightly different reasons, same choice Alpha. Clara Elise's reason - what did Clara Elise say? She said, no matter what the other person does, she reckons she'd get a better grade if she chose Alpha. So hold that thought a second, we'll come back to - is it Clara Elise, is that right? We'll come back to Clara Elise in a second. Let's talk to the Beta's a second; let me just emphasize at this stage there are no wrong answers. Later on in the class there'll be some questions that have wrong answers. Right now there's no wrong answers. There may be bad reasons but there's no wrong answers. So let's have the Beta's up again. Let's see the Beta's. Oh come on! There was a Beta right here. You were a Beta right? You backed off the Beta, okay. So how can I get a mike into a Beta? Let' s stick in this aisle a bit. Is that a Beta right there? Are you a Beta right there? Can I get the Beta in here? Who was the Beta in here? Can we get the mike in there? Is that possible? In here - you can leave your hand so that - there we go. Just point towards - that's fine, just speak into it, that's fine. Student: So the reason right?Professor Ben Polak: Yeah, go ahead.Student: I personally don't like swings that much and it's the B-/B+ range, so I'd much rather prefer that to a swing from A to C, and that's my reason. Professor Ben Polak: All right, so you're saying it compresses the range.I'm not sure it does compress the range. I mean if you chose Alpha, you're swinging from A to B-; and from Beta, swinging from B+ to C. I mean those are similar kind of ranges but it certainly is a reason. Other reasons for choosing? Yeah, the guy in blue here, yep, good. That's all right. Don't hold the mike; just let it point at you, that's fine.Student: Well I guess I thought we could be more collusive and kind of work together, but I guess not. So I chose Beta.Professor Ben Polak: There's a siren in the background so I missed the answer. Stand up a second, so we can just hear you.Student: Sure.Professor Ben Polak: Sorry, say again.Student: Sure. My name is Travis. I thought we could work together, but I guess not.Professor Ben Polak: All right good. That's a pretty good reason. Student: If you had chosen Beta we would have all gotten B+'s but I guess not.Professor Ben Polak: Good, so Travis is giving us a different reason, right? He's saying that maybe, some of you in the room might actually care about each other's grades, right? I mean you all know each other in class. You all go to the same college. For example, if we played this game up in the business school--are there any MBA students here today? One or two. If we play this game up in the business school, I think it's quite likely we're going to get a lot of Alpha's chosen, right? But if we played this game up in let's say the Divinity School, all right and I'm guessing that Travis' answer is reflecting what you guys are reasoning here. If you played in the Divinity School, you might think that people in the Divinity School might care about other people's grades, right? There might be ethical reasons--perfectly good, sensible, ethical reasons--for choosing Beta in this game. There might be other reasons as well, but that's perhaps the reason to focus on. And perhaps, the lesson I want to draw out of this is that right now this is not a game. Right now we have actions, strategies for people to take, and we know what the outcomes are, but we're missing something that will make this a game. What are we missing here?Student: Objectives.Professor Ben Polak: We're missing objectives. We're missing payoffs. We're missing what people care about, all right. So we can't really start analyzing a game until we know what people care about, and until we know what the payoffs are. Now let's just say something now, which I'll probably forget to say in any other moment of the class, but today it's relevant.Game Theory, me, professors at Yale, cannot tell you what your payoff should be. I can't tell you in a useful way what it is that your goals in life should be or whatever. That's not what Game Theory is about. However, once we know what your payoffs are, once we know what your goals are, perhaps Game Theory can you help you get there.So we've had two different kinds of payoffs mentioned here. We had the kind of payoff where we care about our own grade, and Travis has mentioned the kind of payoff where you might care about other people's grades. And what we're going to do today is analyze this game under both those possible payoffs. To start that off, let's put up some possible payoffs for the game. And I promise we'll come back and look at some other payoffs later. We'll revisit the Divinity School later.All right, so here once again is our same matrix with me and my pair, choosing actions Alpha and Beta, but this time I'm going to put numbers in here. And some of you will perhaps recognize these numbers, but that's not really relevant for now. All right, so what's the idea here? Well the first idea is that these numbers represent utiles or utilities. They represent what these people are trying to maximize, what they're to achieve, their goals.The idea is - just to compare this to the outcome matrix - for the person who's me here, (A,C) yields a payoff of--(A,C) is this box--so (A,C) yields a payoff of three, whereas (B-,B-) yields a payoff of 0, and so on. So what's the interpretation? It's the first interpretation: the natural interpretation that a lot of you jumped to straight away. These are people--people with these payoffs are people--who only care about their own grades. They prefer an A to a B+, they prefer a B+ to a B-, and they prefer a B- to a C. Right, I'm hoping I the grades in order, otherwise it's going to ruin my curve at the end of the year. So these people only care about their own grades. They only care about their own grades.What do we call people who only care about their own grades? What's a good technical term for them? In England, I think we refer to these guys - whether it's technical or not - as "evil gits." These are not perhaps the most moral people in the universe. So now we can ask a different question. Suppose, whether these are actually your payoffs or not, pretend they are for now. Suppose these are all payoffs. Now we can ask, not what did you do, but what should you do? Now we have payoffs that can really switch the question to a normative question: what should you do? Let's come back to - was it Clara Elise--where was Clara Elise before? Let's get the mike on you again. So just explain what you did and why again.Student: Why I chose Alpha?Professor Ben Polak: Yeah, stand up a second, if that's okay.Student: Okay.Professor Ben Polak: You chose Alpha; I'm assuming these were roughly your payoffs, more or less, you were caring about your grades.Student: Yeah, I was thinking -Professor Ben Polak: Why did you choose Alpha?Student: I'm sorry?Professor Ben Polak: Why did you choose Alpha? Just repeat what you said before.Student: Because I thought the payoffs - the two different payoffs that I could have gotten--were highest if I chose Alpha.Professor Ben Polak: Good; so what Clara Elise is saying--it's an important idea--is this (and tell me if I'm paraphrasing you incorrectly but I think this is more or less what you're saying): is no matter what the other person does, no matter what the pair does, she obtains a higher payoff by choosing Alpha. Let's just see that. If the pair chooses Alpha and she chooses Alpha, then she gets 0. If the pair chooses Alpha and she chose Beta, she gets -1. 0 is bigger than -1. If the pair chooses Beta, then if she chooses Alpha she gets 3, Beta she gets 1, and 3 is bigger than 1. So in both cases, no matter what the other person does, she receives a higher payoff from choosing Alpha, so she should choose Alpha. Does everyone follow that line of reasoning? That's a stronger line of reasoning then the reasoning we had earlier. So the woman, I have immediately forgotten the name of, in the red shirt, whose name was -Student: Courtney.Professor Ben Polak: Courtney, so Courtney also gave a reason for choosing Alpha, and it was a perfectly good reason for choosing Alpha, nothing wrong with it, but notice that this reason's a stronger reason. It kind of implies your reason.So let's get some definitions down here. I think I can fit it in here. Let's try and fit it in here.Definition: We say that my strategy Alpha strictly dominates my strategy Beta, if my payoff from Alpha is strictly greater than that from Beta, [and this is the key part of the definition], regardless of what others do.Shall we just read that back? "We say that my strategy Alpha strictly dominates my strategy Beta, if my payoff from Alpha is strictly greater than that from Beta, regardless of what others do." Now it's by no means my main aim in this class to teach you jargon. But a few bits of jargon are going to be helpful in allowing the conversation to move forward and this is certainly one. "Evil gits" is maybe one too, but this is certainly one.Let's draw out some lessons from this. Actually, so you can still read that, let me bring down and clean this board. So the first lesson of the class, and there are going to be lots of lessons, is a lesson that emerges immediately from the definition of a dominated strategy and it's this. So Lesson One of the course is:do not play a strictly dominated strategy. So with apologies to Strunk and White, this is in the passive form, that's dominated, passive voice. Do not play a strictly dominated strategy. Why? Somebody want to tell me why? Do you want to get this guy? Stand up - yeah.Student: Because everyone's going to pick the dominant outcome and then everyone's going to get the worst result - the collectively worst result.Professor Ben Polak: Yeah, that's a possible answer. I'm looking for something more direct here. So we look at the definition of a strictly dominated strategy. I'm saying never play one. What's a possible reason for that? Let's - can we get the woman there?Student: [inaudible]Professor Ben Polak: "You'll always lose." Well, I don't know: it's not about winning and losing. What else could we have? Could we get this guy in the pink down here?Student: Well, the payoffs are lower.Professor Ben Polak: The payoffs are lower, okay. So here's an abbreviated version of that, I mean it's perhaps a little bit longer. The reason I don't want to play a strictly dominated strategy is, if instead, I play the strategy that dominates it, I do better in every case. The reason I never want to play a strictly dominated strategy is, if instead I play the strategy that dominates it, whatever anyone else does I'm doing better than I would have done. Now that's a pretty convincing argument. That sounds like a convincing argument. It sounds like too obvious even to be worth stating in class, so let me now try and shake your faith a little bit in this answer.。
英语第一章阅读 game theory 原文及翻译
The essence of a game is the interdependence of player strategies. There are two distinct types of strategic interdependence: sequential and simultaneous. In the former the players move in sequence, each aware of the others’ previous actions. In the latter the players act at the same time, each ignorant of the others’ actions.
Game theory was pioneered by Princeton mathematician john von Neumann. In the early years the emphasis was on games of pure conflict (zero-sum games). Other games were considered in a cooperative form. That is, the participants were supposed to choose and implement their actions jointly. Recent research has focused on games that are neither zero sum nor purely cooperative. In these games the players choose their actions separately, but their links to others involve elements of both competition and cooperation.
“the game theory＂的汉译法
馆２ ０ ０ ３年 ３月 出版 的《 综 合 英 汉 科技 大词 典 》 中 的 翻译 是 “ （ 数） 对策 （ 博弈 ） 论” ２ ， 张 柏 然 主编 、 商 务
个体间利益与冲突、 竞争与合作等 内容。后来该术 语 从 最初 的数 学用语 转 用于政 治学 、 经 济学 、 社会 学 和国际关系等领域 ， 被我 国译介者套用《 论语》 中的
２ ０ １ ３年 １ ０月
第２ ７卷 第 ５期
新 乡学 院学报（ 社会科学版 ）
Ｊ ｏ ｕ ｎａ ｒ ｌ ｏ ｆ Ｘ ｉ ｎ ｘ ｉ ａ ｎ ｇ Ｕ ｎ ｉ ｖ ｅ ｒ ｓ ｉ ｔ ｙ （ Ｓ ｏ ｃ ｉ ａ ｌ Ｓ ｃ ｉ ｅ ｎ ｃ ｅ Ｅ ｄ ｉ ｔ ｉ ｏ ｎ ）
翻译是 “ 博弈 （ 对策） 论” ＿ １ Ｊ ， 顾 仁敖 主编 、 商务 印 书
１ ９ ４ ４年合 作完成 的著作 Ｔ ｈ ｅ ｏ ｒ ｙ ｏ ｆ Ｇ ａ ｍ ｅ ｓ ａ ｎ ｄ Ｅ ｃ ｏ —
ｎ ｏ ｍｉ ｃ Ｂ ｅ ｈ ａ ｖ ｉ ｏ ｒ 。它归属 于数 学 的 一 个 分 支 学科 ， 其 研究 重点 是不 同个 体 行 为 的 相互 影 响或 作 用 ， 不 同
近 年来 ， “ 博 弈论 ” 这 个 词 汇经 常会 出 现 在一 些 媒体 上 ， 人们 看 到 “ 博弈 ” 二字 ， 总 会 觉 得 这 门学 问 既雅 致 又深 不可 测 ， 致 使许 多读 者 望而 却步 ， 不敢 问 津 。其 实 ， “ 博 弈论” 是英文 “ ｔ ｈ ｅ ｇ ａ ｍｅ ｔ ｈ ｅ ｏ ｒ ｙ ” 的 汉 译 。英 文看上 去 简 单 明 了 的 “ ｔ ｈ ｅ ｇ ａ ｍｅ ｔ ｈ ｅ ｏ ｙ” ｒ 怎 么 会被 译成 了令 人 望而生 畏 的 “ 博 弈论 ” 呢？ 查 阅最近 几 年 出版 发 行 的众 多 科 技 英 汉词 典 ，
博弈论用英文怎么说英语是什么
博弈论用英文怎么说英语是什么博弈论主要研究公式化了的激励结构间的相互作用，是研究具有斗争或竞争性质现象的数学理论和方法。
那么你知道博弈论的英文怎么说吗?下面店铺为大家带来博弈论的英文说法，供大家参考学习。
博弈论的英文说法：game theory英 [ɡeim ˈθiəri]美 [ɡem ˈθiəri]博弈论相关英文表达：博弈论算法 Algorithmic Game Theory合作博弈论 Cooperative Games Theory经济博弈论 Economic Game Theory重复博弈论 repeated game approach博弈论英文说法例句：1. Game theory is a powerful weapon to decision - making of multi - person.博弈论是解决多人竞争决策问题的有利武器.2. Game theory is an equilibrium problem in decision influence.博弈论是在选择中的决策影响和均衡问题.3. Conflict and cooperation are the two fundamental issues in game theory.冲突与合作是博弈论研究的两大基本问题.4. The main research way is the analytical method of Game Theory.研究方法主要是博弈论中的博弈分析方法.5. Game theory; High - tech SMEs; principal - agent; performance management; incentive mechanism.博弈论; 高新技术中小企业; 委托—代理; 绩效管理; 激励机制.6. Textbook farce and textbook game theory – how delightful!经典的闹剧,经典的博弈论——多有趣啊 !7. Contract Theory, Information Economics, Applied Game Theory, Corporate Finance.契约理论, 信息经济学, 应用博弈论, 公司财务,政治经济学.8. This story illustrates an important distinction between ordinary decision theory and theory.这个故事说明了普通决策理论和博弈论之间的一个重要的区别.9. The backward induction is an important reasoning method in game theory.逆向归纳法(倒推法)是博弈论中的一种重要的推理方法.10. What's the definition of the game theory?[灌水]博弈论的定义是什么 ?11. Game theory studies mutual roles among rational agents.博弈论是研究理性的行动者相互作用的理论.12. So the penalty kick, for instance, is like this laboratory mile of game theory.打个比方, 罚点球, 就像博弈论里面的实验室.13. Based on principal - agency, the thesis analyzes budget management system from the angle of game theory.本文以委托代理理论为基础, 从博弈论视角对企业预算管理制度进行了分析.14. Evolutionary game theory provides a uniform frame to study the evolution of cooperation.进化博弈论为理解合作行为的演化提供了一个统一的框架.15. Proving the possibility and inevitability of the tax evasion by the basic theory of GAME.用博弈论的基本理论证明企业偷税的可能性和必然性.。
博弈论英文参考
Journal of Mathematical Psychology 42,215 226(1998)Strategy and Equity:An ERC-Analysis ofthe Gu th van Damme GameGary E.BoltonSmeal College of Business ,Pennsylvania State UniversityandAxel OckenfelsUniversity of MagdeburgGu th and van Damme's three-person bargaining experiment challengesconventional thinking about how self-interest,as well as fairness,influencesbehavior.Among other things,the experiment demonstrates that people careabout receiving their own fair share,but care far less about how the remainderis divided among the other bargainers.The ERC model posits that,along withpecuniary gain,people are motivated by their own relative payoff standing.Beyond this,ERC employs standard game theoretic concepts.We describethe general ERC model,and show that it predicts many of the keyphenomena observed in the experiment. 1998Academic Press1.INTRODUCTION:MOTIVES AND THE GU TH VAN DAMME EXPERIMENT Motives drive decision making.While most economic and business models posit self-interested material gain as the sole driver,this is of course a modeling abstrac-tion.People are motivated by many things.Some the drive to procreate,for example are without a doubt as fundamental as material gain.The question then is whether material gain alone is sufficient to explain the variety of economic activities in which people participate.When confined to casual empiricism,the right answer is hard to judge:People do struggle for profits in highly competitive markets.But they also demand fair treatment in the workplace.People strike mutually beneficial bargains;other times,negotiations collapse in bitter disagree-ment.People ``free ride''on the public domain and contribute substantially to charity.The control afforded by the laboratory permits a precision of analysis rarely open to the casual empiricist.And as illustrated by papers in this issue,the variety of Article No.MP9812112150022-2496Â98 25.00Copyright 1998by Academic PressAll rights of reproduction in any form reserved.Correspondence should be addressed to Gary Bolton,310Beam,Penn State University,University Park,PA 16802,USA;(814)865-0611;fax (814)863-2381;geb3Ä,or Axel Ockenfels,University of Magdeburg,FWW,Postfach 4120,D-39016Magdeburg,Germany;(+391)67-12197;fax (+391)67-12971;axel.ockenfels Äww.uni-magdeburg.de.216BOLTON AND OCKENFELSbehavior suggested by casual empiricism is mirrored in the lab:Experiments featur-ing market institutions often produce the type of competitive behavior we associate with the struggle for material gain(Hoffman,Liebcap,6Shachat,1998). Experiments featuring simple negotiations yield results suggesting a role for fairness (Gu th6van Damme,1998).Some,but not all,subjects in public good games choose to cooperate more than self-interest would dictate(Croson6Marks,1998, and Nagel6Tang,1998).Even when simply given the option of keeping a sum of money or sharing with an anonymous other,many choose to share(Cason6Mui, 1998).While different investigators give these observations different interpretations, we would say the pattern of evidence compels an investigation of whether economic behavior is motivated by more than just material gain.1Gu th and van Damme's bargaining experiment clarifies some central issues although in doing so,it deepens the puzzle.The experiment concerns a three-person bargaining game,in which one bargainer,the proposer X,proposes a division of 120points among the three(10points worth1Dutch guilder,and in some cases worth2).A minimal amount,5points,must be allocated to each player,but otherwise the proposer is free to allocate as he chooses.A second bargainer,the responder Y,either accepts or rejects the proposal.If accepted,the money is distributed accordingly.If rejected,all receive nothing.The third bargainer,the dummy Z,has no say in the negotiation,and no choice but to accept any agreement set by the other two.The game was played in three conditions,each distinguished by the information the responder is given about the proposal.In the xyz-condition,the responder knows the full proposal at the time of accepting or rejecting.In the y-condition,the responder knows only his own allocation.In the z-condition,the responder knows only the dummy's allocation.In some treatments,all games played had the same information condition(the constant mode).In other treatments,games were rotated through all three conditions(the cycle mode).The prediction of subgame perfection,a standard game theoretic solution based on the self-interested material gain assumption,is invariant to both the information condition and treatment mode:Every feasible proposal gives each bargainer a positive amount,so the responder always makes more money accepting than reject-ing.The proposer should therefore ask for the maximum allowable.As an alter-native prediction,the experimenters consider a hypothesis they call``strong intrinsic motivation for fairness.''Again,the predictions are invariant to the information condition and treatment mode:Each bargainer gets a one-third share.Hence the experimenters pit a hypothesis predicated on the material gain motive against one predicated on fairness.In the introduction to their paper,Gu th and van Damme cite five important regularities that emerge from their experiment.We discuss them later in detail;here is a brief summary:First,proposals depend on the information condition,with the responder sometimes getting a large share.Second,the amount the dummy receives1Of course,one of the main advantages of the laboratory is that we can test competing explanations against one another.This has,and continues to be,done.See Roth(1995)for an overview of hypotheses and experiments concerning bargaining games.is in all conditions very small.Third,some proposals are rejected,although a smaller proportion than usually observed in two-person versions of the game,where there is just a proposer and a responder.Fourth,there is a learning trend.And fifth,there are some differences across constant and cycle treatment modes.Most of these observations are inconsistent with one or both hypotheses.We might speculate that the data represent some convex combination of the two.But Gu th and van Damme point out that the way proposers and responders treat the dummy is inconsistent with even a moderated concern for fairness,at least if we understand the concept of fairness to be connected in some way to that of altruism (Section 6):The experimental data clearly refute the idea that proposers are intrinsically motivated by considerations of fairness:they only allocate marginal amounts to the dummy and they give little to the responder in information condition m =z .(Also responders don't show concern for the dummy.)In sum,conventional understandings of self-interest and fairness,whether taken separately or in combination,appear inadequate to explain the data.In this paper,we show that the ERC model predicts four of the five regularities cited by Gu th and van Damme,not only as the general form stated above,but also in detail;for example,the ERC model accurately predicts the direction proposals move across information conditions.Another paper,Bolton 6Ockenfels (1997),demonstrates that the ERC model is consistent with the behavior observed in a wide variety of other laboratory games,including those thought to exhibit behavior reflecting ``equity,''``reciprocity,''and ``competitiveness;''hence the moniker ERC .The ERC model is constructed from standard game theory,save for the motiva-tional premise:ERC players are motivated by both the monetary payoff from the experiment,as well as by their own ``relative payoff,''a measure of how the individual's monetary payoff compares to that of the rest of the group.Put another way,the model asserts that individuals are motivated by the interaction of two things:own absolute (monetary)payoff,and own relative payoff.The distribution of payoffs among other players does not enter in the player's calculation.Hence we see immediately that ERC is consistent with Gu th and van Damme's observation that other players show very little concern for the dummy.2We can say more,and in greater detail.2.THE ERC MODELWe concern ourselves with n-player lab games,n 1,where players are randomly drawn from the population,and anonymously matched.All game payoffs are monetary and non-negative y i ,i =1,2,...,n .ERC posits that each player i217STRATEGY AND EQUITY 2Fehr and Schmidt's (1997)model of ``biased inequality aversion''has some features in common with ERC.One major difference is that the biased inequality model implies that people care about the dif-ference in payoff between self and each of the other individuals.maximizes the expected value of the motivation function,v i(y i,*i).We refer to y i as i's absolute payoff and*i as i's relative payoff,where*i(y i,c,n)={y iÂc1Ân=n c y i,if c>01,if c=0if i's proportion of the social reference share,1Ân;and c= nj=1y j is the size of the pie that is distributed among all players.The``social reference share''is the proportion of the total payoff that i would receive if all players received the same payoff.The motivation function is characterized as follows:A0.v i is continuous and twice differentiable on R+_R+.A1.(a)Narrow self-interest:v i1 0,v i11 0.(b)Monotonicity:Fixing a*i,given two choices where v i(y1i,*i)=v i(y2i ,*i)and y1i>y2iplayer i chooses(y1i,*i).parative effect:v i2=0for*i=1,and v i22<0.A0is posited for mathematical convenience.A1implies that,fixing the relative payoff,i has preferences over the absolute payoff like those assumed in traditional economics models.A2is the main innovation of the ERC model.It implies that,fix-ing the absolute payoff,v i takes it maximum where i receives the social reference share.Let k=cÂn be the average absolute payoff.Fixing k,i's motivation function can be written as v ki(*i):#v i(k*i,*i).A3insures risk aversion with respect to*i:A3.Risk aversion:v ki"(*i) 0.Define{i(k):=arg max*i v ki(*i)and_i(k):v i(k_i,_i)=v i(0,1).The value{i is the proportion of the social reference share that i would ideally assign to self given the average absolute payoff k.A0 A3insure that{i#[1, )and the value is unique up to i and k>0.By definition,player i is indifferent between a distribution in which i receives the proportion of the social reference share_i and a distribution in which all players receive nothing.With the addition of A4, _i#(0,1]and the value is unique up to i and k>0:A4.Strong equity effect:_i 1.In essence,A4guarantees that i prefers a distribution in which i receives more than the social reference share to a distribution in which all players receive nothing. A5provides an explicit characterization of the heterogeneity that exists among players,stated in terms of{i and_i:A5.Heterogeneity:Let f and g be density functions and k>0.Then f({i|k)>0on[1, )and g(_i|k)>0on(0,1].218BOLTON AND OCKENFELSThe ERC model presented here is basically equivalent to the ERC model proposed in Bolton 6Ockenfels (1997).That paper provides an extensive discussion of the assumptions and their implications.The present model posits three slight modifications that make it easier to apply ERC to the game of Gu th and van Damme (GvD game).First,we define the relative payoff of player i as i 's proportion of the social reference share rather than as i 's proportion of the monetary pie c .These formulations are equivalent when we confine our attention to a fixed number of players n .The present analysis allows us to do comparative statics across games that have differing numbers of players.Second,in A3we assume risk aversion rather than a weaker quasiconcavity assumption.These two modifications are used exclusively to derive proposition ERC7below.Third,we state A4as a basic assumption,rather than a special one necessary for specific propositions.We emphasize that none of these modifications are inconsistent with any of the results in Bolton 6Ockenfels (1997).2.1.Solving the ModelWe solve the model by applying Bayesian perfect equilibrium to the class of motivation functions characterized above.Specifically,we derive predictions under the assumption that players choose the strategy that maximizes the expected value of their motivation function given the information they have about their playing partners'motivation functions.Playing partners in the GvD experiment were anonymous to one another,meaning a player could not know the exact charac-teristics of his partners'motivation functions.We assume that players are sufficiently experienced with one another to know the distribution of motivation functions from which the partners are randomly,and independently selected.In particular,we suppose that proposers know the distribution of _i ,defined above in A5.3.ERC PREDICTIONS AND THE GVD DATAIn this section,we derive a series of seven ERC predictions and compare them to the GvD game data.We organize the analysis (roughly)around the major obser-vations cited by Gu th and van Damme.Following Gu th and van Damme,let x (resp.y ,z )be the points or ``payoffs''received by the proposer X (resp.responder Y ,dummy Z ).3.1.Proposer and Responder Behavior :Fairness and Selfishness in the xyz-and y-conditionsERC asserts that individuals are motivated by their own absolute and their own relative payoff.The distribution of payoffs among other players does not enter the motivation function.The following propositions show that,according to the model,and consistent with the data,neither the proposer X nor the responder Y behave altruistically towards the dummy Z if the information condition is either xyz or y :219STRATEGY AND EQUITY220BOLTON AND OCKENFELSERC1.In information conditions xyz and y,an offer of the social reference share or more to the responder(y 40)is never rejected,regardless of the dummy-payoff z.Proof.Since the pie size is c=120,the social reference share cÂn=120Â3is40. By A1we have that each player i prefers(40,1)to(0,1)so that y=40is never rejected.Moreover,A3and A4imply that y>40(*i>1)is never rejected. Evidence.For information conditions xyz and y(constant and cycle modes combined),Gu th and van Damme(1994)report a total of252offers of y that are greater than or equal to40.None of these offers is rejected.Moreover,when the dummy Z is offered the minimum payoff(5),responders reject in only about70 of the88total cases in conditions xyz and y combined.Gu th and van Damme con-clude from their analysis that,``there is not a single rejection that can be clearly attributed to a low share for the dummy''(Section1).The next three predictions of ERC capture some empirical properties of the proposed distributions(x,y,z)and show that the proposer treats the dummy Z with substantially less regard than the responder Y.All of these results make use of the following lemma:Lemma.The probability that an offer in which y<40is rejected,increases as y decreases.Proof.Follows directly from the heterogeneity assumption,A5.ERC2.In the information conditions xyz and y,the proposer allocates himself at least the social reference share(x 40).Proof.By A1and A2we have that a proposer X always strictly prefers x=y=z=40to any allocation with x<40.The proof of ERC1shows that x=y=z=40carries no risk of rejection.Evidence.True in all but one out of360cases.ERC3.In information conditions xyz and y,the dummy never receives more than the social reference share(z 40).Proof.Suppose that z>40.Then either x<40or y<40.If x<40,then X can improve his situation by redistributing some money from Z to X.This increases the absolute payoff x(and increases the value of the proposer's motivation function) without altering the probability of rejection.If y<40,then X can improve his situation by redistributing money from Z to Y.This decreases the probability of rejection while holding the absolute payoff x constant.Evidence.True in all but two out of360cases.Note that the upper bound for the dummy's payoff,as derived in ERC3,is valid neither empirically nor theoretically for the payoff of the responder Y.The responder's theoretical upper payoff bound is75rather than40,because x may be only40(ERC2)so that y can be as large as75(recall that the minimum value for z is5).In91of the180cases of the information condition xyz(constant and cyclemodes combined),the responder receives a payoff that is greater than the social reference share.The mechanism underlying the asymmetric treatment of the responder Y and the dummy Z becomes even clearer in the next proposition,which states that as long as the probability of rejection is positive,the dummy receives only his minimum payoff.In essence,the responder is served first .However,once the probability of rejection is zero,and X has taken all he wants,any additional amount is,by the theory,allocated indeterminantly:Z might get more than the minimum payoff,or Y might get more than the social reference share,or both might happen.ERC 4.In information conditions xyz and y :If the proposer offers y <40,then z =5,the minimum value allowed .Proof .As long as y <40and z >5,X can redistribute money from Z to Y .This redistribution does not change X 's relative and absolute outcome but increases the probability of acceptance.Evidence .In the constant mode,ERC4is true in all but one out of 75cases with y <40.Evidence in the cycle is less conclusive:In 44out of 108cases with y <40we have z >5.In the constant mode data,the responder Y is clearly served first.While almost none of the dummies receive more than their minimum payoff in the case of y <40,a majority of dummies receive a payoff z >5in the 69cases with y 40.In essence,ERC4says that proposers allocate money to where it has the greatest marginal effect.So a proposer who allocates self x >75,allocates the remainder to the responder Y (except the minimum payoff for the dummy)because giving to the dummy only improves the relative standing,while giving to the responder has an additional positive effect:It reduces the risk of rejection.On the other hand,once the proposer is satiated,and the risk of rejection is zero (y 40),ERC leaves the distribution of the remaining money indeterminant.In fact,there is evidence in the constant mode that proposers do not much care how the money they distribute to the others is allocated:For proposals with y 40,the distribution of the adjusted payoffs y :=y &40and z :=z &5do not differ significantly (Mann Whitney U-test,N =88,two-sided p-value=0.579;the corre-sponding test for the cycle mode yields significance).Gu th and van Damme observe that a strong intrinsic motivation for fairness would imply that each player receives40.But this kind of mitigation of payoffs would imply that dummy Z should receive what is not needed to insure acceptance.The distributions of y and z show that proposers do not have a strong tendency to mitigate payoffs.Rather,proposers in the constant mode appear to give arbitrarily once acceptance is insured.(Bolton et al .,in press,make a similar observation in the context of the dictator game.)3.2.Proposals Are Sensitive to the Information ConditionWe now bring the z-condition into the discussion.Gu th and van Damme emphasize that ``proposers react systematically and strategically to the information that responders receive about the proposal''(Section 1).We might speculate that 221STRATEGY AND EQUITY222BOLTON AND OCKENFELSproposers behave strategically by trying to signal a generous offer y in the z-condi-tion,where the responder Y receives information solely about the offer z.But what kind of offer to z signals that y is large?There are two possible hypotheses.First, one might speculate that a generous offer to Z signals that the proposer X is an altruist,and therefore increases the probability of a generous offer to Y.We will call this the altruism-signaling hypothesis.It implies a negative correlation between z and the probability of rejection.In contrast,the ERC-signaling hypothesis suggests that z is negatively correlated with the responder's expectation of y:Suppose that all proposers want to realize their optimal proportion of the social reference share {X in the z-condition.Then the distribution of{X can be associated with a distribu-tion of total offers y+z.Hence,there is a negative correlation between observed z and expected y.And a proposer who wants to signal that y is large should choose a small z regardless of her{X.As it happens,the constant mode data exhibits no evidence for signaling of any sort.Specifically,there is no correlation between z and y(Spearman rank correla-tion coefficient of0.018,p=0.88).There is,however,a significant correlation between z and y in the cycle mode(correlation coefficient of0.37,p=0.00).Because the correlation is positive,we can rule out ERC-signaling.On the other hand,we expect altruism-signaling to be accompanied by a negative correlation between z and the rejection rate.There is no evidence for this;as Gu th and van Damme put it(Section3)``...responders view high z-values with suspicion,the percentage of rejected proposals does not decrease with z.''In sum,there is no clear evidence for any form of signaling.Therefore,the follow-ing propositions are derived under the assumption that signaling does not take place.That is,we assume that the proposal z does not offer any information that influences the rejection probability.Of course,ERC predicts that very large offers to the dummy,for example z=120,are rejected.However,z is greater than40in only three cases and is always smaller or equal to55.Therefore,we can safely ignore these sorts of offers.As in Gu th and van Damme,let p(x)(resp.p(y),p(z))be the amount the proposer allocates to player P(P#[X,Y,Z])in the cycle mode and let p(cx)(resp. p(cy),p(cz))be the amount the proposer allocates to player P in the constant mode when the information condition is xyz(resp.y,z).Then,the following propositions state the predicted strategic adjustments of the proposals(x,y,z)to the change in the information conditions.ERC5.The proposer X demands more in the z-condition than in the xyz and y-conditions(x(cx),x(cy)<x(cz)and x(x),x(y)<x(z)).Likewise,the responder Y receives less in the z-condition than in the xyz-and y-condition(y(cx),y(cy)>y(cz) and y(x),y(y)>y(z)).Proof.In the z-condition,the rejection behavior is independent of z(no signal-ing)and therefore independent of the decision of X.Therefore,X should behave as if he or she is in a role of a dictator faced with two recipients.On the other hand, in the xyz-and y-conditions,the proposer is in an ultimatum situation.As shown in Bolton6Ockenfels(1997),the ultimatum situation creates an additionalstrategic incentive to give for all proposers who run the risk of rejection.Hence, ERC predicts lower offers in the z-condition if proposers are sufficiently selfish: {X>2.Proposers with{X 2offer the same total amount in both conditions.Evidence.ERC5is strongly supported by the data(Gu th6van Damme, Sections3and4).ERC6.Offers y and demands x do not differ across the xyz-and y-condition (x(cx)=x(cy)and x(x)=x(y);y(cx)=y(cy)and y(x)=y(y)).Proof.The responder Y is only interested in y and yÂc(ERC1).Since c is common knowledge,the full information condition does not give any additional decision-relevant information to the responder as compared to the y-information condition. Since the rejection behavior is equivalent in both information conditions,the proposer behavior is equivalent as well.Evidence.The data clearly supports ERC with respect to the responder's payoff y(Gu th6van Damme,Sections3and4).Gu th and van Damme find that x(cx)<x(cy)and x(x)<x(y).While these effects are statistically significant,in absolute terms they are``slight''(Gu th6van Damme,1994,Section4).3.3.Rejection RatesThe overall rejection rate for GvD games in information conditions xyz and y is about4percent.This is surprisingly low if one compares it with corresponding rates in the2-person ultimatum game,which typically run in the neighborhood of 15to20percent(see Roth's1995survey).ERC7offers an explanation.We suppose that the average size of the pie is fixed across games.The underlying idea of the proof is that a3-person GvD game creates more room to agree on a distribution of relative payoffs between the proposer and the responder than a2-person game.A proposer with{X 2will propose an offer with a zero probability of rejection in the GvD game,but not generally so in the ultimatum game.Risk aversion(A3)implies that the rest of the proposers,those with{X>2,will choose to use some resources to lower the probability of rejection relative to what it would be in the two-person game.ERC7.Holding the average pie size fixed across games,rejection rates are lower in the3-person GvD game in the information conditions xyz and y than in the2-person ultimatum game.Proof.Given that the average pie size,k,is fixed across games,i's motivation function v ki(*i)can be written as v i(*i)for both n=2and3.Note that if proposerX offers*2Y to the responder Y in the2-person game,then X receives*2X=2&*2Y.If X offers*3Y in the3-person game,he or she receives*3X=3&*3Y.We also knowthat the proposer X always prefers*nX =1to any*nX<1(ERC2).On the otherhand,*nY 1is never rejected(ERC1).Therefore,the optimal offer*nYis smaller orequal to n&1.Likewise,since*nY=0is always rejected(A1and A2),the optimaloffer*nY must be strictly positive.223STRATEGY AND EQUITYFixed average pie across games implies{i(k)#{i#[1, ).Suppose{X=1.Then,X chooses*nX =1independent of n,and by choosing*nY1,proposer X's offer isnever rejected,neither in the2-person game nor in the3-person game.Now sup-pose1<{X 2.Then,in the3-person game,the proposer can realize his or her optimal proportion of the social reference share{X with no risk of rejection by choosing*3Y1.However,on average the proposers with{X<2face a positive probability of rejection in the2-person game.(Here we implicitly assume that the population is not too risk averse in the sense that the probability of a proposer with 1<{X<2who demands more than half of the pie in the2-person game is positive.) Now,it remains to show that for proposers with{X>2,the rejection rate in the 2-person game is no smaller than in the3-person game.First,note that by ERC1 and ERC4the dummy always receives the minimum payoff from proposers with {X>2.Hence,without loss of generality,we can focus our analysis on the choice of the offer to the responder.We can write the problem of proposer X as(normalize v X(0,1)=0):max q(*nY )v X(n&*nY)with respect to*nY#(0,n&1],where q(*)=1& *g(_i|k)d_i is the probability that a randomly chosen responder accepts the offer of*.Suppose*2Y and*3Yare the solutions of the proposer's problem in the2-person and3-person game,respectively.We show that*2Y *3Ywhich implies q(*2Y) q(*3Y).Suppose to the contrary that*2Y >*3Y.Necessarily,in the3-person game,q(*3Y )v X(3&*3Y)>q(*2Y)v X(3&*2Y).(1)Define2q:=q(*3Y )&q(*2Y).By A5and because*2Y>*3Y,2q<0.Define2v:=v X(3&*3Y )&v X(3&*2Y).Then2v>0because*nX=n&*nY<{X and concavity(A3).Then(1)becomes[q(*2Y )+2q][v X(3&*2Y)+2v]>q(*2Y)v X(3&*2Y)or2qv X(3&*2Y )+[g(*2Y)+2q]2v>0.(2)In the2-person game,q(*3Y )v X(2&*3Y)<q(*2Y)v X(2&*2Y).(3)Define2v:=v X(2&*3Y )&v X(2&*2Y).Then2v>0.By the same series of substitutionsthat produce(2)we get2qv X(2&*2Y )+[q(*2Y)+2q]2v<0.(4)224BOLTON AND OCKENFELS。
博弈论 外文翻译2
第一章完全信息静态博弈在这一章中我们讨论像下面的简单形式的博弈：开始的时候由参与者同时选择行动，然后根据所有参与者刚刚选择的行动组合，每个参与者都会得到一个回报。
在此类静态（或各自同时行动）的博弈游戏中，我们仅限于关注完全信息博弈的情况，那就是说每一位参与者的收益函数（根据所有参与者选择行动的不同组合决定某一参与者收益的函数）在所有参与者之间是共同知识。
我们在本书的第二章和第四章讨论动态（或者序列行动）博弈，在本书的第三张和第四章分析不完全信息博弈（博弈中的一些参与者不知道其他参与者的收益函数，如拍卖中得每一个人都不清楚其他人到底原以为拍卖品出多高的价钱）。
在第1.1节首先介绍博弈论入门的两个最基本问题：如何描述一个博弈问题以及如何求得博弈问题的解。
我们扩展了将要用在分析完全信息静态博弈问题中用到的方法，并且这些依据我们将应用在分析后面章节中更丰富的博弈问题。
我们定义博弈的标准式表述和严格劣战略战的概念。
并说明有些博弈问题理性参与者不仅绝不会使用严格劣战略这一原则来解决问题，而且在另外的博弈问题里这种方法预测也是很准确（有时候预测像“想任何结果都有可能发生”之类）。
然后我们进一步引出并定义纳什均衡的概念—这个概念的用途很广泛，对很多种类的博弈都能作出比较严格的预测。
在第1.2节我们运用前面介绍的工具，分析其四个应用模型：(Cournot,1838)的不完全信息博弈竞争模型，（Bertrang,1883）的不完全竞争模型，（Farber，1980）的最后要价仲裁和公共财产问题（（Hume），1739年提出了这种问题，以后又不断被经济学家提出来讨论）。
在每个应用的例子中，我们首先把非标准的问题转化为博弈的标准形式，然后在求出这种博弈的纳什均衡。
（上面每个例子都存在唯一的纳什均衡，但是我们讨论的范围不仅仅是这点）。
在第1.3节回顾理论。
我们首先定义混合战略，它可以理解为一个参与者并不可以确定其他人将会如何行动。
game theory4 博弈论 英文
If q>0: B is better than T If q=0: B is as good as S
{0} B1(q) =
if q > 0
{p: 0≤p≤1} if q = 0 {1} if p < 1/2 {q: 0≤q≤1} if p = 1/2 {0} if p > 1/2 MSNE: {(p,1-p); (0,1)} p≥1/2
• Game • Elimination of strategies that are strictly dominated by mixed strategies
• illustration • example
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MSNE
Elimination By Mixing
Summary
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MSNE
Elimination By Mixing
Summary
B1(q) =
{1} if q < 3/4 {p: 0≤p≤1} if q = 3/4 {0} if q > 3/4
B2(p) =
{0} if p < 1/3 {q: 0≤q≤1} if p = 1/3 {1} if p > 1/3
• P2 must be indifferent between L and R: p*1+(1-p)*2 = p*2+(1-p)*1 => p=1/2
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Elimination By Mixing
Summary
2
1
T (p) B (1-p)
L (q) 0,1 2,2
西方经济学 名词翻译 英中对照 A-Z顺序整理版
2011考研宏微观经济学重要术语英汉对照检索表AAbsolute advantage 绝对优势Absolute income hypothesis of consumption 绝对收入消费理论Accelerator 加速数Accelerator priniciple 加速原理Action lag 政策时滞Active deposit 活期存款Adaptive expectation 适应性预期Adverse selection 逆向选择Aggregate analysis 总量分析Aggregate demand 总需求Aggregate demand(AD) curve 总需求曲线Aggregate supply 总供给Aggregate supply(AS) curve 总供给曲线Allocation of resources 资源配置Antitrust law 反托拉斯法Arc elasticity 弧弹性Asset 资产Asymmetric information信息不对称Auctioneer 拍卖人Austrian school 奥地利学派Automatic stabilizer 自动稳定器Autonomous planned investment 自主投资Average cost 平均成本Average fixed cost 平均不变成本Average product 平均产量Average propensity to consume 平均消费倾向Average propensity to saving 平均储蓄倾向Average revenue 平均收益Average total cost 平均总成本Average variable cost 平均可变成本BBalanced-output 均衡产出Balance of international payment 国际收支平衡Balanced budget 均衡预算Balanced budget multiplier均衡预算乘数Bank reserves 银行准备金Barter 物物交换Base year 基年Black market 黑市Bonds 债券BP curve BP曲线Breakeven point 收支相抵点Budget,balanced 平衡的预算Budget deficit 预算赤字Budget line 预算线Budget surplus 预算盈余Built-in stabilizers 内在稳定器Business fluctuation 经济波动Business cycle 经济周期CCapital 资本Capital deeping 资本深化Capital market 资本市场Capital-output ratio 资本-产出比Capital widening 资本广化Cardinal utility theory 基数效用论Cartel 卡特尔Central bank 中央银行Checking account 支票账户(或活期存款) Classical economics 古典经济学Clearing market 出清市场Coase theorem 科斯定理Cobb-Douglas production function 柯布-道格拉斯生产函数Cobweb model 蛛网模型Collusion 串(共)谋(用于寡头市场分析) Commercial bank 商业银行Common resource 公共资源Common stock 普通股票Comparative cost theory 比较成本说Comparative static analysis 比较静态分析Compensated budget line 补偿预算线Competition 竞争Competitive market 竞争性市场Complement goods 互补品Complete information 完全信息Condition for efficiency in exchange 交换的最优条件Condition for efficiency in production 生产的最优条件Constant cost industry 成本不变行业Constant returns to scale 规模收益(或报酬)不变Consumer 消费者Consumer price index(CPI) 消费者价格指数Consumer sovereignty 消费者统治Consumer surplus 消费者剩余Consumer’s equilibrium 消费者均衡Consumer’s preference 消费者的偏好Consumption 消费Consumption demand 消费需求Consumption function 消费函数Consumption price index 消费物价指数Contract curve 契约曲线Corporate income tax 公司所得税Corporation 公司Cost 成本Cost-benefit analysis 成本-收益分析Cost-push inflation 成本推动型的通货膨胀Cost function 成本函数Cournot model 古诺模型Credit 信贷Cross price elasticity of demand 需求的交叉弹性Crowding out 挤出效应Cyclical unemployment 周期性失业DDecreasing cost industry 成本递减行业Decreasing returns to scale 规模收益(或报酬)递减Deflation 通货收缩Demand 需求Demand-pull inflation 需求拉动的通货膨胀Demand curve 需求曲线Demand for money 货币需求Demand function 需求函数Demand price 需求价格Demand schedule 需求表Depreciation 折旧Depression 萧条Derived demand 引致需求Devaluation 贬值Differentiated oligopoly industry 差别寡头行业Diminishing returns 边际报酬递减Discounting 贴现Discount rate 贴现率Discretionary 相机抉择Discretionary fiscal policy 斟酌使用的财政政策Disequilibrium 非均衡Disinvestment 负投资Disposable personal income(DPI) 可支配收入Dissaving 负储蓄Distribution 分配Distribution theory of marginal productivity 边际生产率分配论Downward-sloping-demand,law of 需求向下倾斜规律Duopoly 双头垄断Durable goods 耐用品Dynamic analysis 动态分析Dynamic models 动态模型EEasy money policy 扩张性货币政策Economies of scale 规模经济Economic development 经济发展Economic efficiency 经济效率Economic growth 经济增长Economic man 经纪人Economic model 经济模型Economic profit 经济利润Economic rent 经济租金Economic stabilization policy 经济稳定政策Economics of information 信息经济学Edgeworth box 埃奇渥斯盒Effects of fiscal policy 财政政策效果Effects of monetary policy 货币财政效果Effective demand 有效需求Efficiency 效率Elastic demand 有弹性的需求Elasticity 弹性Elasticity of demand 需求弹性Endogenous variable 内生变量Endogenous growth 内生增长Engel curve 恩格尔曲线Engel’s law 恩格尔定律Entrepreneur 企业家Entrepreneurship 企业家才能Envelope curve 包络线Equation of cost 成本方程Equation of exchange 交易方程Equilibrium 均衡Equilibrium output 均衡产出Equilibrium growth 均衡增长Equilibrium of capital market 资本市场的均衡Equilibrium price 均衡价格Equilibrium quantity 均衡数量Euler theorem 欧拉定理Excess reserve 超额准备金Excess reserve ratio 超额准备率Exchange 交换Exchange contract curve 交换的契约曲线Exchange rate 汇率Exclusion principle 排他性原则Existence of general equilibrium 一般均衡的存在性Exogenous variable 外生变量Expansion path 扩展线Expectation 预期Expected utility 期望效用Expenditure method 支出法Explicit cost 显性成本Export 出口External diseconomies 外部不经济External economies 外部经济External effects or Externalities 外部影响(外在性)FFactor demand 要素需求Factor demand curve 要素需求曲线Factor demand curve of market 市场对要素的需求曲线Factor demand curve of firm 厂商对要素的需求曲线Factor market 要素市场Factor supply 要素供给Factors of production 生产要素Federal Reserve System 联邦准备制度Final goods 最终产品Financial market 金融市场Financial derivatives 金融衍生品Firm 厂商Fiscal budget 财政预算Fiscal policy 财政政策Fiscal restrain 财政紧缩Fixed cost 不变成本Fixed exchange rates 固定汇率Fixed input 不变投入Flexible exchange rates 浮动汇率Flow 流量Foreign exchange 外汇Foreign trade 对外贸易Foreign trade multiplier 对外贸易乘数Free rider 免费乘车者Free trade 自由贸易Frictional unemployment 摩擦性失业Full employment 充分就业Full-employment budget surplus 充分就业预算盈余Functional finance 功能财政Future 期货GGalloping inflation 奔腾式通货膨胀Game theory 博弈论GDP deflator 国内生产总值平减指数General equilibrium 一般均衡General equilibrium position 一般均衡状态Giffen goods 吉芬物品Gini coefficient 基尼系数Golden rules of economic growth 经济增长的黄金律Government expenditure multiplier 政府支出乘数Government purchase 政府购买Government regulation 政府管制Gross domestic product(GDP) 国内生产总值Gross national product(GNP) 国民生产总值Gross investment 总投资HHigh-powered money 高能货币Human capital 人力资本Hyperinflation 超级通货膨胀H-O model H-O模型IIS curve IS曲线IS-LM analysis IS-LM分析IS-LM-BP Model IS-LM-BP模型Ideal output 理想的产量Identity between saving and investment 储蓄-投资衡等式Imperfect competition 不完全竞争Implicit cost 隐含成本Imports 进口Impossibility theorem 不可能定理Income 收入Income elasticity of demand 需求的收入弹性Income effect 收入效应Income method 收入法Income theory 收入理论Income velocity of money 货币的收入流通速度Increasing cost industry 成本递增行业Increasing returns to scale 规模收益(或报酬)递增Index number 指数Indifference curve 无差异曲线Indirect taxes 间接税Individual analysis 个量分析Induced investment 引致投资Industry 行业Inefficiency of monopoly 垄断的低效率Inelasticity 缺乏弹性Inferior good 抵档物品Inferior goods 劣等品Inflation 通货膨胀Innovation 创新Input 投入Input-output 投入-产出Input-output analysis 投入-产出分析Instrument of fiscal control 财政政策工具Instrument of monetary control or Monetary policy tool货币政策工具Insurance 保险Interest 利息Interest rate 利率Interest rate elasticity 利率弹性Intermediate cycle 中周期Intermediate goods 中间产品International division of labour 国际分工Inventory investment 存货投资Investment 投资Investment demand 投资需求Investment function 投资函数Investment multiplier 投资乘数Investment tax credit 投资税抵免Invisible hand theorem 看不见的手定理Involuntary unemployment 非自愿失业Isocline 等斜线Isocost line 等成本线Isoquant curve 等产量曲线JJuglar cycle 朱拉格周期KKeynes’s law 凯恩斯定律Keynesian economics 凯恩斯主义经济学Keynesian revolution 凯恩斯革命Keynesianism 凯恩斯主义Keynesian trop 凯恩斯陷阱Kinked demand curve 弯折的需求曲线Kitchin cycle 基尼系数Kondretieff cycle 康德拉耶夫周期LLM curve LM曲线Labor 劳动Labor theory of value 劳动价值论Laissez faire 自由放任Land 土地Land price 土地价格Lausanne school 洛桑学派Law of diminishing marginal utility 边际效用递减规律Least-cost production 最低成本生产Liabilities 负债Life cycle hypothesis 生命周期假说Life-cycle hypothesis of consumption消费的生命周期理论Liquidity preference 流动性偏好Liquidity trap 流动性陷阱Long cycle 长周期Long run 长期Long run consumption decision 长期消费决策Lorenz curve 洛伦兹曲线Lottery ticket 彩票Low inflation 温和的通货膨胀Luxury 奢侈品MMacroeconomics 宏观经济学Marginal cost 边际成本Marginal cost of factor 边际要素成本Marginal efficiency of capital(MEC) 资本边际效率Marginal efficiency of investment 投资边际效率Marginal product 边际产量Marginal productivity 边际生产率Marginal propensity to consume 边际消费倾向Marginal propensity to save 边际储蓄倾向Marginal rate of substitution of commodities边际商品替代率Marginal rate of technical substitution边际技术替代率Marginal rate of transformation 边际转换率Marginal revenue 边际收益Marginal revenue product 边际收益产品Marginal utility 边际效用Market 市场Market failures 市场失灵Market structure 市场结构Menu cost 菜单成本Merchantilism 重商主义Microeconomics 微观经济学Misery index 痛苦指数Model 模型Monetarism 货币主义Monetary base 基础货币Monetary-fiscal policy mix 政策的混合使用Monetary illusion 货币幻觉Monetary policy 货币政策Money 货币Money markets 货币市场Money multiplier 货币乘数Money supply 货币供给Monopolistic competition 垄断竞争Monopoly 垄断/卖方垄断Monopsony 买方垄断Moral hazard 道德风险Moral suasion 道义上的劝告Mortgage credit 抵押贷款Multiplier 乘数Multiplier effect 乘数效应Multiplier-accelerator interaction 乘数-加速数相互作用Multiplier theory 乘数理论NNash equilibrium 纳什均衡National income(NI) 国民收入Natural monopoly 自然垄断Natural rate of unemployment 自然失业率Natural supply 自然供给Necessity 必需品Net domestic products，NDP 国内生产净值Net exports 净出口Net investment 净投资New-Austrian school 新奥地利学派New-Cambridge school 新剑桥学派New-Classic school 新古典学派New- Classical synthesis 新古典综合派New- Classical growth model 新古典增长模型New- Keynesian school 新凯恩斯学派New institution school 新制度学派Nominal GDP 名义GDPNormal goods 正常物品Normal profits 正常利润Normative economics 规范经济学OOkun’s law 奥肯定律Oligopoly 寡头垄断Oligopoly market 寡头市场Open market operation 公开市场操作Opportunity cost 机会成本Optimality of general equilibrium 一般均衡最优性Optimum plant size 最优生产规模Option 期权Ordinal utility theory 序数效用论PParameter 参数Pareto criterion 帕累托标准Pareto efficiency 帕累托效率Pareto improvement 帕累托改进Pareto optimality 帕累托最优Partial equilibrium 局部均衡Payment or Expenditure 支出Perfect competition market 完全竞争市场Perfect elasticity 完全弹性Perfect inelasticity 完全无弹性Permanent income hypothesis 永久收入假说Permanent income hypothesis of Consumption永久收入消费理论Personal income(PI) 个人收入Personal income tax 个人所得税Personal disposable income 个人可支配收入Philips curve 菲利普斯曲线Point elasticity 点弹性Positive economics 实证经济学Potential GDP 潜在的GDP Preference 偏好Present value 现值Price-consumption curve 价格-消费曲线Price discrimination 价格歧视Price elasticity of demand 需求的价格弹性Price elasticity of supply 供给的价格弹性Price expansion path 价格扩展线Price index 价格指数Price rigidity 价格刚性Price stabilization 价格稳定Price theory 价格理论Principal-agent 委托-代理Prisoner’s dilemma 囚徒困境Private cost 私人成本Private goods 私人物品Producer 生产者Producer surplus 生产者剩余Product function 生产函数Product differentiation 产品差别Product markets 产品市场Production contract curve 生产的契约曲线Production group 生产集团Production possibility curve 生产可能性曲线Productivity 生产率(力)Profit 利润Progressive tax 累进税Proportional tax 比例税Prosperity 繁荣Public choice 公共选择Public debt 公债Public goods 公共物品Purchasing power parity 购买力平价Pure oligopoly industry 纯粹寡头行业QQuantity equation of exchange 货币数量交易方程Quantity theory of money 货币数量论Quasi-rent 准租金Quotas 配额RRate of rediscount policy 再贴现率政策Rational expectations 理性预期Rational man 理性人Real GDP 实际GDP(实际国内生产总值) Real interest rate 实际利率Real wages 实际工资Real business cycle 实际经济周期Recession 衰退Regressive tax 累退税Relative income hypothesis 相对收入假说Relative income hypothesis of consumption相对收入消费理论Rent 地租/租金Rent-seeking 寻租Replacement investment 重置投资Reputation 信誉Required reserves orLegal reserve 法定准备金Reserve 准备金Reserve rate 准备率Revenue 收益Rigid price 刚性价格Risk 风险Risk averter 风险回避着Risk lover 风险爱好者Risk neutral 风险中立者SSaving 储蓄Say’s law 萨伊定律Scarcity 稀缺Second best 次优Security market 证券市场Service 劳务Short cycles 短周期Short run 短期Single rule 单一规则Social cost 社会成本Social walfare function 社会福利函数Speculative demand 投机需求Stability of general equilibrium 一般均衡的稳定性Stagflation 滞胀Staggered contracts 交错合同Static analysis 静态分析Static model 静态模型Sticky wages 粘性工资Sticky price 粘性价格Stock 存量/股票Structural unemployment 结构性失业Structural inflation 结构性通货膨胀Subsidy 津贴Substitutes 替代品Substitution effect 替代效应Supply 供给Supply curve 供给曲线Supply curve of factor 要素供给曲线Supply curve of labor 劳动供给曲线Supply curve of land 土地供给曲线Supply curve of capital 资本供给曲线Supply economics 供给经济学Supply function 供给函数Supply-side School 供给学派Supply schedule 供给表System of material product balances 物质产品平衡体系System of national accounts 国民经济核算体系TTariff 关税Tatonnement process “试探”过程Tax multiplier 税收乘数Technological advance 技术进步Tight-money policy 紧缩性货币政策Time deposit 定期存款Time inconsistency 时间不一致性The precautionary motive 谨慎动机(或预防动机)The rate of unemployment 失业率The speculative motive 投机动机The transactional motive 交易动机Theory of economics of scale 规模经济理论Tobin’s theory 拖宾的”q”说Total cost 总成本Total fixed cost 总不变成本Total product 总产量Total revenue 总收益Total utility 总效用Total variable cost 总可变成本Transactions costs 交易成本Transactions demand 交易需求Treasury bills 国库券UUncertainty 不确定性Undistributed profit 未分配利润Unemployment 失业Unintended investment 非意愿的投资Uniqueness of general equilibrium 一般均衡的唯一性Unitary elasticity 单一弹性Utility 效用Utility function 效用函数Utility possibility curve 效用可能性曲线VValue of marginal product 边际产品价值Velocity of money 货币流通速度Variable cost 可变成本Variable input 可变投入Voluntary unemployment 自愿失业Vulgar economics 庸俗经济学WWage 工资Walras general equilibrium 瓦尔拉斯一般均衡Wealth 财富Welfare 福利Welfare economics 福利经济学Wholesale price index 批发物价指数XYZ。
社会学名词中英对译
社会学名词（中英对译）中文名词英文翻译实证主义positivism /positivist动力学the dyanamics静力学the statics分工the work-division神学the theology形而上学the metaphysics进化论the evolution-theory唯名论the nominalism唯实论the realism官僚制度bureaucratic system结构主义the structuralism唯物主义the materialism辩证法Dialectic唯心主义the idealism生产关系productionrelations剩余价值Increase-value剩余劳动Overtime失调因素maladjustive factors社区community社会福利the socially-welfare社会化the socialization社会控制the social-control社会参与thesocially-participation社会工作the social work残疾人handicapped社会救助the socially-welfare问卷thequestionnaire独生子女the singles-children现代化modernization/aggiornamento基本方针the baselines行为准则Behavioral-omens矛盾contravention时代背景the time-background工业化industrialization民主化democratization文明化civilize同质性Homogeneity协调过程the coordination-process血缘的related by blood整合的integrated异质性Heterogenitaet社会阶级social layer class自然科学natural/physical science抽象科学abstract science社会秩序social order社会有机论socialorganism-theory资本主义capitalism使收入极大化make the incomemore profitable社会冲突理论social conflicttheory操作化operationalize实证分析empiricalanalysis有限理性boundedrationality经济人的利己主义倾向self-interest orientation ofeconomic actors 交互分类cross-classify维度dimension内部劳动力市场internal labor market隐性契约implicit contracts社会网络social network家族企业household enterprise固定成本fixed cost合资企业joint-stock company中产阶级bourgeois组织文化organizationalculture一般规律 a rule of thumb社会研究social research符号互动论symbolic interactionism同化assimilation行动理论Action theory表意性活动Activity expressive工具性活动Activity instrumental工作调适Adjustment work疏离Alienation同化Assimilation权威Authority科层权威Authority bureaucratic感召权威Authority charismatic双重权威Authority dual患病行为Behavior illness角色行为Behavior role偏见Bias资产阶级Bourgeoisie科层制度Bureaucracy资本家Capitalist变迁推动者/变媒Change agent传意途径Channel communication感召力Charisma文化间距Cultural lag文化震惊Cultural shock 文化Culture文化模式Culture patterns 文化特质Culture traits 主流文化Culture mainstream 达尔文Darwin非个人化Depersonalization 偏差Deviance初级偏差Deviance primary 次级偏差Deviance secondary 偏差者Deviant偏差行为Deviant behavior偏差社会地位Deviant social status 选择医生行为Doctor - shopping behaviour 涂尔干Durkheim 家庭Family平等（平权）家庭Family equalitarian 扩展式家庭Family extended 寄养家庭Family foster 母权家庭Family matriarchal 核心家庭Family nuclear 父权家庭Family patriarchal 单亲家庭Family single-parent 传统式家庭Family traditional 民间医药Folk medicine 社会动力Force social 初级收获Gain primary 次级收获Gain secondary 帮派Gang 性相Gender 代沟Generation gap 群体Group 内群体Group in 外群体Group out 朋辈群体Group peer初级（直接）群体Group primary 种族与民族群体Group race and ethnic 参照群体Group reference 次级（间接）群体Group secondary 他群体Group they- 我群体Group we- 意识型态Ideology工业化Industrialization规范（制度）化Institutionalization内化Internalization少年罪行Juvenile delinquency标签理论Labelling theory认可权力Legitimate power宏观社会学Macro-sociology马克斯Marx医疗社会学Medical sociology微观社会学Micro-sociology现代化Modernization一夫一妻制Monogamy民德Mores协商秩序Negotiated order非工作取向Non-task oriented规范Norms强制性组织Organization coercive正式组织Organization formal志愿性组织Organization voluntary典范/范例Paradigm父（男）权社会Patriarchal society柏拉图Plato现实冲击Reality shock再社会化Resocialization角色Role角色冲突Role conflict角色集合Role set倚赖性的病人角色Role dependant - patient 自我实现预言Self - fulfilling prophecy 病者角色Sick role社会变迁Social change社会阶层（级）Social classes社会管制Social control会制度Social institutions社会互动Social interaction社会流动Social mobility社会规范Social norm社会秩序Social order社会组织Social organization社会污名（烙印）Social stigma社会阶层Social stratum社会结构Social structure社会支援网络Social support network社会（教）化Socialization社会（教）化过程Socialization process 社会化的机构（媒介）Socialization agents of 初级社会化Socialization primary 次级社会化Socialization secondary地位Status自致（成就）地位Status achieved先赋地位Status ascribed定型效应Stereotyping effect污名/烙印Stigma污名化/烙印化Stigmatization次文化Subculture演译系统System of interpretation禁忌Taboo价值体系Value system西化Westernization第一部分Part OneI-欧洲古典社会学家Auguste Comte奥古斯特•孔德Karl Marx 卡尔•马克思Herbert Spencer 赫伯特•斯宾塞Vilfredo Pareto 维尔弗雷多•帕累托Ferdinand Toennies费迪南德•滕尼斯Emile Durkheim 埃米尔•涂尔干Georg Simmel 格奥尔格•齐美尔Gaetano Mosca 加耶塔诺•莫斯卡Max Weber 马克斯•韦伯Leonard T. Hobhouse 莱奥纳多。
Chap.5 Extensive Form of Games 博弈论英文版教学课件
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5.2 The Strategies of Extensive-Form Games
Definition 5.3 A strategy for a player is a complete plan of action—it specifies a feasible action for the player in very contingency in which the player might be called on to act.
In extensive-form games, a contingency in which the player should act is just a information set. So a strategy of extensive-form games specifies a feasible action for the player in very information set.
Consider the dynamic Investment in New Product game of complete information, in which firm 1 chooses first and firm 2 chooses after he/she observes the firm’s choice.
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经济学常用英文名词翻译修正无误版
经济学常用英文名词翻译修正无误版经济学常用英文名词翻译Equilibrium，competitive 竞争均衡见竟争均衡（competitive equilibrium）。
Equilibrium，general 一般均衡见一般均衡分析（general－equilibrium analysis）Equilibrium，macroeconomic 宏观经济均衡意愿总需求等于意愿总供给的GDP水平。
在均衡时，意愿的消费（C），政府支出（G），投资（I）和净出口（X）的总量正好等于在当前价格水平下企业所愿意出售的总量。
Equimarginal principle 等边际法则决定收入在不同消费品之间分配的法则。
消费者可按此法则选择消费组合，使花费在所有商品和服务上的每一美元的边际效用都相等，就能保证消费者所获得的效用最大化。
Exchange rate 汇率见外汇汇率（foreign exchange rate）Exchange－rate system 汇率制度国家之间进行支付时所依据的一组规则、安排和制度。
历史上最重要的汇率制度是金本位制、布雷顿森林体系和现在的浮动汇率制。
Excise tax vs． sales tax 消费税和销售税消费税是对某种或某组商品，如酒和烟草的购买所课征的税。
销售税是对除少数特定商品（如食品）以外的所有商品所课征的税。
Exclusion principle 排他原则私人品区别于公共品的一种性质。
当生产者将一种商品卖给A后，若能很容易地将B、C、D等人排除在该商品益处享用过程之外，则排他原则就在发生作用，该商品也因此是一项私人品。
若不能轻易地把其他人排除在分享过程之外，如公共卫生或国防，则我们称该商品具有公共品的特征。
Exogenous vs． induced variables 外生变量和引致变量外生变量是那些由经济体系以外的因素来决定的变量。
与外生变量相对应的是引致变量，后者是由经济体系的内在运行所决定的。
game-theory1--博弈论-英文
• models are NOT designed to tell us what people will do, they are not designed to be descriptive
Introduction to Game Theory
Lecture 1
Disclaimer: this presentation is only a supporting material and is not sufficient to master the topics covered during the lecture. Study of relevant books is strongly recommended.
6
Introduction Economic Models Game Theory Models Games Summary
Economic Models - Problem
• based on Homo Rationalis
• acts purposefully and logically • has well-defined goals • has motivation and ability to approach them • does not exist!
• Osborne, M. J. – An Introduction to Game Theory Gibbons, R. – A Primer in Game Theory Suggested articles
• Important information on webpage
• Grading: Midterm 30%, Final 60%, Homework 10%, Experiments up to 5%
社会学名词（中英对译）
社会学名词（中英对译）社会学名词（中英对译）中⽂名词英⽂翻译实证主义positivism /positivist动⼒学 the dyanamics静⼒学 the statics分⼯ the work-division神学 the theology形⽽上学 the metaphysics进化论the evolution-theory唯名论 the nominalism唯实论 the realism官僚制度bureaucratic system结构主义 the structuralism唯物主义the materialism辩证法Dialectic唯⼼主义 the idealism⽣产关系 productionrelations剩余价值 Increase-value剩余劳动Overtime失调因素maladjustive factors社区 community社会福利the socially-welfare社会化 the socialization社会控制the social-control社会参与 thesocially-participation社会⼯作 the social work残疾⼈handicapped社会救助the socially-welfare问卷 thequestionnaire独⽣⼦⼥the singles-children现代化modernization/aggiornamento基本⽅针the baselines⾏为准则Behavioral-omens⽭盾contravention时代背景the time-background⼯业化 industrialization民主化 democratization⽂明化civilize同质性Homogeneity协调过程 the coordination-process⾎缘的related by blood整合的 integrated异质性Heterogenitaet社会阶级 social layer class⾃然科学 natural/physical science抽象科学 abstract science社会秩序 social order社会有机论 socialorganism-theory资本主义 capitalism使收⼊极⼤化 make the incomemore profitable社会冲突理论 social conflicttheory操作化 operationalize实证分析 empiricalanalysis有限理性 boundedrationality经济⼈的利⼰主义倾向 self-interest orientation ofeconomic actors 交互分类 cross-classify 维度dimension内部劳动⼒市场internal labor market隐性契约 implicit contracts社会⽹络 social network家族企业 household enterprise固定成本 fixed cost合资企业 joint-stock company中产阶级 bourgeois组织⽂化 organizationalculture⼀般规律 a rule of thumb社会研究social research符号互动论symbolic interactionism同化assimilation⾏动理论Action theory表意性活动Activity expressive⼯具性活动Activity instrumental⼯作调适Adjustment work疏离Alienation同化Assimilation权威Authority科层权威Authority bureaucratic感召权威Authority charismatic双重权威Authority dual患病⾏为Behavior illness⾓⾊⾏为Behavior role偏见Bias资产阶级Bourgeoisie科层制度Bureaucracy资本家Capitalist变迁推动者/ 变媒Change agent传意途径Channel communication感召⼒Charisma⽂化间距Cultural lag⽂化震惊Cultural shock⽂化Culture⽂化模式Culture patterns⽂化特质Culture traits主流⽂化Culture mainstream达尔⽂Darwin⾮个⼈化Depersonalization偏差Deviance初级偏差Deviance primary次级偏差Deviance secondary偏差者Deviant偏差⾏为Deviant behavior偏差社会地位Deviant social status选择医⽣⾏为Doctor - shopping behaviour 涂尔⼲Durkheim 家庭Family平等（平权）家庭Family equalitarian扩展式家庭Family extended寄养家庭Family foster母权家庭Family matriarchal核⼼家庭Family nuclear⽗权家庭Family patriarchal单亲家庭Family single-parent传统式家庭Family traditional民间医药Folk medicine社会动⼒Force social初级收获Gain primary次级收获Gain secondary帮派Gang性相Gender代沟Generation gap群体Group内群体Group in外群体Group out朋辈群体Group peer初级（直接）群体Group primary种族与民族群体Group race and ethnic 参照群体Group reference次级（间接）群体Group secondary他群体Group they-我群体Group we-意识型态Ideology⼯业化Industrialization规范（制度）化Institutionalization内化Internalization少年罪⾏Juvenile delinquency标签理论Labelling theory认可权⼒Legitimate power宏观社会学Macro-sociology马克斯Marx医疗社会学Medical sociology微观社会学Micro-sociology现代化Modernization⼀夫⼀妻制Monogamy民德Mores协商秩序Negotiated order⾮⼯作取向Non-task oriented规范Norms强制性组织Organization coercive正式组织Organization formal志愿性组织Organization voluntary典范/ 范例Paradigm⽗（男）权社会Patriarchal society柏拉图Plato现实冲击Reality shock再社会化Resocialization⾓⾊Role⾓⾊冲突Role conflict⾓⾊集合Role set倚赖性的病⼈⾓⾊Role dependant - patient ⾃我实现预⾔Self - fulfilling prophecy 病者⾓⾊Sick role社会变迁Social change社会阶层（级）Social classes社会管制Social control会制度Social institutions社会互动Social interaction社会流动Social mobility社会规范Social norm社会秩序Social order社会组织Social organization社会污名（烙印）Social stigma社会阶层Social stratum社会结构Social structure社会⽀援⽹络Social support network社会（教）化Socialization社会（教）化过程Socialization process社会化的机构（媒介）Socialization agents of 初级社会化Socialization primary次级社会化Socialization secondary地位Status⾃致（成就）地位Status achieved先赋地位Status ascribed定型效应Stereotyping effect污名/ 烙印Stigma污名化/ 烙印化Stigmatization次⽂化Subculture演译系统System of interpretation禁忌Taboo价值体系Value system西化Westernization第⼀部分Part OneI-欧洲古典社会学家Auguste Comte 奥古斯特?孔德Karl Marx 卡尔?马克思Herbert Spencer 赫伯特?斯宾塞Vilfredo Pareto 维尔弗雷多?帕累托Ferdinand Toennies 费迪南德?滕尼斯Emile Durkheim 埃⽶尔?涂尔⼲Georg Simmel 格奥尔格?齐美尔Gaetano Mosca 加耶塔诺?莫斯卡Max Weber 马克斯?韦伯Leonard T. Hobhouse 莱奥纳多。
博弈论(部分英文版翻译)
博弈论By Thomas S.Ferguson /译者：xly 第一部分：公平的组合游戏1.Take-Away游戏1.1 一个简单的Take-Away游戏1.2 什么叫做组合游戏？1.3 P态与N态1.4 差集游戏1.5 相关练习2.Nim游戏初步分析Nim-sum多堆的Nim游戏Bounton理论的证明Misere版本的Nim游戏相关练习3.图表游戏有向图游戏SG函数相关例题一般图的SG函数4.组合游戏的和n个图表游戏的和SG定理有关应用Take-and-Break游戏相关练习5.Coin Turning游戏例子二维空间的Coin Turning游戏Nim复杂情况方格游戏练习6.Green Hackenbush竹竿Green Hackenbush on tressGreen hackenbush on general Rooted Graphs 练习参考资料第一部分：公平的组合游戏1.take-away游戏组合游戏是一种两人游戏，给定足够的条件时，当一方无法继续操作时，游戏的胜负就出来了。
这种游戏的胜负取决于一系列的状态，包括初始状态和正准备操作的玩家。
游戏双方轮流操作，直到达到最终状态。
最终状态的意思是，该状态已经不能被操作。
这时，胜负已分。
这里介绍两本关于组合游戏的主要资料。
一本是J.H.Conway写的On Numbers and Games，学术出版社1976年出版。
这本书介绍了很多关于这方面的基本思想，加快了今天这块领域的发展。
更适合这堂课的另一本参考书，Berlekamp，Conway和Guy写的winning ways for your mathematical plays，学术出版社1982年出版，是一套两册的平装本。
这本书介绍了很多有趣的游戏，学数学的本科生可以理解它。
这些理论可以分为两类，Impartial games是指任意给定一个状态，对游戏双方而言将要采取的操作是一样的；而partizan games是说，给定一个状态，游戏双方要采取的操作会有不同。
经济学常用英文名词翻译修正无误版
经济学常用英文名词翻译Equilibrium，competitive 竞争均衡见竟争均衡（competitive equilibrium）。
Equilibrium，general 一般均衡见一般均衡分析（general－equilibrium analysis）Equilibrium，macroeconomic 宏观经济均衡意愿总需求等于意愿总供给的GDP 水平。
在均衡时，意愿的消费（C），政府支出（G），投资（I）和净出口（X）的总量正好等于在当前价格水平下企业所愿意出售的总量。
Equimarginal principle 等边际法则决定收入在不同消费品之间分配的法则。
消费者可按此法则选择消费组合，使花费在所有商品和服务上的每一美元的边际效用都相等，就能保证消费者所获得的效用最大化。
Exchange rate 汇率见外汇汇率（foreign exchange rate）Exchange－rate system 汇率制度国家之间进行支付时所依据的一组规则、安排和制度。
历史上最重要的汇率制度是金本位制、布雷顿森林体系和现在的浮动汇率制。
Excise tax vs． sales tax 消费税和销售税消费税是对某种或某组商品，如酒和烟草的购买所课征的税。
销售税是对除少数特定商品（如食品）以外的所有商品所课征的税。
Exclusion principle 排他原则私人品区别于公共品的一种性质。
当生产者将一种商品卖给A后，若能很容易地将B、C、D等人排除在该商品益处享用过程之外，则排他原则就在发生作用，该商品也因此是一项私人品。
若不能轻易地把其他人排除在分享过程之外，如公共卫生或国防，则我们称该商品具有公共品的特征。
Exogenous vs． induced variables 外生变量和引致变量外生变量是那些由经济体系以外的因素来决定的变量。
与外生变量相对应的是引致变量，后者是由经济体系的内在运行所决定的。
信息科技英语综合教程刘爱军(完整版)
信息科技英语综合教程刘爱军(完整版)科技英语综合教程(词语翻译见后面)第一单元第二单元第三单元第四单元第五单元第一单元1.互赢博弈和互败博弈2.连续策略博弈3.联立策略博弈4.直线推理5.循环推理6.纳什均衡7.支配性策略8.最优化结果9.合作破裂 10.边缘化策略1. pure conflict2. competition and cooperation3. strategic interdependence4. prisoners’dilemma5. long-run loss6. tit-for-tat strategy7. mixing one’s moves8. hit a passing shot cross-court or down the line9. monopoly market 10. equilibrium shares 第二单元1.博弈论，对策论2.密码学；密码系统3.公钥4.密钥5.数字签名6.即时成像7.电子货币8.源代码9.宝丽来公司 10. 柯达11.哈西值 12.ＭＤＳ算法 13. SHA-1算法 14. MIME标准 15. Linux系统 16. ActiveX控件 17. Java语言 18.投资回报率 19.ＩＰ协议 20.波长 21.纳米材料 22.纳米系统 23.纳米技术 24.盘尼西林（音译）；青霉素 25.荷尔蒙（音译）；激素 26.晚期癌症 28.宿主 30.镭射（音译）；激光（音译）1.磁共振成像 3.磁性 5.造影剂，对比剂 7.硒化镉 9.上皮细胞 1. death rate/ mortality 3. membrane 5. side effect 7. radiation therapy 9. advanced tumor 第三单元1. 脊髓损伤 3.自然愈合 5.供养/ 滋养细胞27.靶向细胞 29.微机械学 2.氢质子 4.纳米晶体 6.量子点 8.纳米碳管 10.近红外线激光 2. iron oxide 4. mechanical effect 6. antibody 8. cell line 10. biological agent 2.专用许可证 4.中枢神经系统 6.异质的7.(人工)培养的细胞 8.裸鼠 9.刺激感1. embryonic stem cells2. cell therapy3. cell population4. clinicaltrial 5. differentiation 6. a benign tumor 7. sugar molecule 8. immune system 9. mutation 第四单元1.分组电缆多媒体 3.电缆调制解调器系统 4.原始设备制造商5.网状无线网络6.基于互联网协议的语音传输7.托管语音ＩＰ 9.无源光网 1. VoD (video on demand) 3. seamless mobility 5. dual-band, dual-mode 7. daisy chain routing 8. TDM (time division multiplex)9. FTTH (fiber to the house) 第五单元1.现有的技术 3.蜂窝网络 4.附加存储卡用槽2.服务质量 8.虚拟专用网 10.光线路终端 2. bandwidth-on-demand 4. real-time videoconference 6. dedicated path 10. FTTP (fiber to the premise) 2.语音命令5.具有电脑功能6.内置式数码相机7.建立临时办公室 8.文字处理能力9.标准键盘 10.定位服务1. flashy memory2. mobile-phone watchers3. projection keyboard 5. speech-recognition system 6. “dual hinge” design7. the touch-tone pad 9. the luxuriously large screen 10. smart-phones4. defenders of the PC 8. a phone guy。
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博弈论(部分英文版翻译)
博弈论
托马斯·S.Ferguson/translator:·xly
第一部分:公平组合游戏
1.外卖游戏
1.1简单的外卖游戏1.2什么是组合游戏？1.3 P状态和N状态1.4游戏1.5相关练习
2.尼姆游戏初步分析尼姆和多堆尼姆游戏布顿理论证明守财奴版尼姆游戏相关练习
3.图形游戏有向图形游戏SG函数
相关例子的一般图的SG函数
4.组合游戏和N图游戏及SG定理的相关应用
与休息游戏相关的练习
5.硬币游戏的例子
二维空间中的硬币旋转游戏尼姆复杂的网格游戏练习
6.绿色哈肯布什竹竿
树木上的绿色哈肯布什
普通根图练习的绿色引导
参考材料
第一部分:公平组合游戏1。
外卖游戏
组合游戏是两人游戏。
如果有足够的条件，当一方不能继续经营时，游戏的结果就会出来。
这个游戏的结果取决于一系列的状态，包括初
始状态和准备操作的玩家。
游戏双方轮流操作，直到达到最终状态。
最终状态意味着该状态不能再运行。
此时，结果已经出现分歧。
这里有两个关于组合游戏的主要材料。
一部是康威的《论数字与游戏》，学术出版社1976年出版。
这本书介绍了这一领域的许多基本思想，加速了这一领域今天的发展。
另一本更适合这门课的参考书是学术出版社于1982年出版的两卷本平装本，书名是《柏林坎普、康威和盖伊的数学游戏制胜之道》。
这本书介绍了许多有趣的游戏，学习数学的本科生可以理解。
这些理论可以分为两类。
公平游戏指的是任何给定的状态，游戏双方要采取的行动是相同的。
另一方面，游击队游戏意味着给定一个状态，游戏双方将采取不同的行动。
例如，国际象棋是一种游击队游戏。
在第一部分，我们只研究“公平竞争”。
公平组合游戏的介绍可以在理查德·盖伊写的公平游戏中找到(发表在1989年的COMAP数学探索系列中)。
让我们从一个简单的例子开始。
1.1一个简单的外卖游戏。
这是这个公平组合游戏的一些规则(从一堆筹码中取一些):
(1)有两个玩家，我们分别将他们标记为1号和2号；(2)桌上有一堆筹码，总共21个筹码；
(3)一次操作可以取1、2、3个筹码，至少要取一个筹码，最多要取3个筹码。
(4)轮流进行，从玩家1开始；
(5)拿最后一个筹码的玩家赢(不能继续的玩家输)。
我们如何分析这个游戏？玩家有获胜的策略吗？你喜欢成为第一名还是第二名？这是个好决定吗？
我们将从最终状态到初始状态对游戏进行分析。
这种方法有时被称为逆向归纳法。
如果只剩下1、2或3个筹码，那么下一个玩家可以一次全部拿走并获胜。
假设还剩4份薯条。
那么下一个玩家肯定会留下1、2或3个筹码，然后他的对手会赢。
因此，四个筹码的状态对于下一个玩家是失败的，而对于前一个玩家是赢的。
如果还剩5、6或7个筹码，那么下一个玩家可以拿4个筹码赢。
如果还有8个筹码，下一个玩家肯定会留下5、6或7个筹码，这样前一个玩家就可以赢了。
这样，我们希望能够将状态改为0、4、8、12、16并获胜。
现在让我们来分析一下以下21份薯条的状况。
因为21不能除以4，所以我们先赢了。
唯一最好的办法就是先吃一份炸薯条，这样XXXX竞赛就成了一个正方形的棋盘。
表单，初始化为空。
玩家可以选择一个空方块，并在上面写下S或O。
谁先写连续的SOS，谁就赢了。
如果没人能写出来，那么这场比赛就是平局。
(a)假设n=4，首先在第一个正方形上写s。
证明最后一手会赢。
证明当n=7时，第一个玩家获胜。
证明n=XXXX提出了一个广义的尼姆对策和精致定理，称为
尼姆(k).尼姆(K)游戏基本上与尼姆游戏相同，只是必须在一次操作中从K堆筹码中取出筹码(给定K，并且必须从一堆筹码中取出至少一个筹码)。
当K=1时，这是尼姆游戏。
摩尔定理指出(x1，x2？当且仅当x1到xn是按位(二进制)时，xn)是p 状态
模(k+1)运算的结果是0。
(a)考虑练习3的灵活游戏，但稍有变化，即玩家每次操作时可以移动1。
或者左边两个硬币。
请注意，这实际上是尼姆(k)游戏，其中k=2。
用摩尔定理证明练习3的状态是n状态，并找到一种方法把它变成p状态。
证明摩尔定理。
考虑一下米莎游戏的最佳解决方案。
(我已经在这个问题上给出了证明，你可以问你需要什么。
)
3.图表游戏
我们现在将给出有向图游戏中组合游戏的等价描述。
这包括第1章和第2章中描述的游戏。
这可以通过用有向图的节点表示状态，用有向图的边表示操作来实现。
接下来，我们将定义一个名为SG(Sprague-Grundy)的函数，它包含比P和N状态更多的信息。
3.1有向图游戏。
让我们首先给出有向图的数学定义。
定义.有向图G可以表示为(x，f)，x是一组非空节点(即状态)；F是x(x∈X)的函数，X是X的子集。
对于给定的X，F(x)表示从状态X 开始可以到达的状态(称为X的追随者)。
如果F(x)为空，则x为最终状态。
两人游戏可以在地图上进行，从x0(初始状态)开始，并遵循以下规
则:(1)玩家1从x0开始；(2)双方轮流操作；
(3)当处于x状态时，执行操作的玩家将其改变为状态y∈f(x)；(4)如果在玩家操作之前游戏已经达到其最终状态，则判定玩家已经失败。
根据定义，图形游戏不能在无限制操作期间停止。
为了避免这种情况和其他问题，我们现在考虑这样一个图:无论从哪个x0状态，都有一个与x0相关的整数n，因此从x0开始的每条路的长度小于或等于n。
这样一个图被称为[渐进有界]。
如果x是一个有限集合，这意味着在这个图中没有环(环就是这样一条路径，x0，x1？在xm中，x0=xm，m>3)。
例如，我们在1.1节中分析的差集博弈，S={1，2，3}是一个图形博弈的代表。
让X={0，1，？，n}是状态集。
空堆是最终状态，所以F(0)是空集。
类似地，F(1)={0}，F(2)={0，1 }；2x}时。
事实上，这是一个非常愚蠢的游戏。
第一只手可以在第一次手术中拿走所有的薯条！计算SG函数有什么用？
这个问题将在下一章回答。
如果游戏考虑的是n堆而不是1堆的情况，那么游戏就不那么简单了。
下一章将要讨论的定理将告诉我们如何将nim-加法与SG函数相结合来解决多桩问题。
3.4更一般的SG功能。
让我们暂时看一下当图不再渐进有界或包含环时的问题。
首先，让我们假设渐进有界条件放宽到渐进有限(每条路都是有限长度)。
这个条件相当于我们所说的组合游戏的条件(6)(第1.2节)。
图中仍不允许出现环。
让我们举一个例子，它是进步的，而不是进步的。
这是一个渐进的有限图表，因为游戏将在有限的操作次数后结束。
然而，它不是一个渐进有界图，因为不是每条路的长度一开始就能知道它的上限。