投资,融资和股利决策在解释公司股权结构中的作用：来自西班牙的经验数据【外文翻译】

本科毕业论文（设计）

外文翻译

原文：

The Role of Investment, Financing and Dividend Decisions in Explaining Corporate Ownership Structure: Empirical Evidence

from Spain

1、Introduction

There is extensive theoretical and empirical research on how corporate ownership structure influences financing, dividend and investment decisions. However, there is little evidence on the determinants of ownership structure, especially on the effect of these investment, financing and dividend decisions on a firm’s inside and outside shareholdings. The clear reversal of the effect of ownership structure on investment, financing and dividend decisions, and the resulting endogeneity, discourages researchers from addressing such an analysis. We overcome this drawback thanks to the use of the Generalised Method of Moments(GMM). This estimation method controls for the endogeneity problem and, consequently, it allows us to study the role played by investment, financing and dividend decisions in explaining corporate ownership structure in order to provide new evidence on one of the most interesting topics in corporate governance.

Our paper makes a significant contribution to the corporate governance literature in at least three ways. First, we offer new evidence on the determinants of corporate ownership structure, mainly focusing on the effects of investment, financing and dividend decisions on insider stakes and ownership concentration levels. Second, we analyse the interaction between insider ownership and ownership concentration, both of which are considered as agency-cost control mechanisms, by taking into account the convergence of interests and entrenchment effects in the case of ownership

concentration. Third, we contribute new evidence to corporate governance by focusing on the Spanish case. In fact, the Spanish case is interesting in itself because Spain is a civil law country and, according to La Porta et al.(1998), protection of Spanish investors is weaker than that of their UK and US counterparts. As a consequence, there is likely to be opportunistic behavior on the part of entrenched managers and expropriation activities on the part of majority owners, as documented in Miguel et al.(2004).

Consequently, the aim of this paper is to analyse the role played by investment, financing and dividend decisions in explaining corporate ownership structure using Spanish firms. To achieve this aim, we derive two models (insider ownership and ownership concentration models) in accordance with financial theory. Both models are estimated by using panel data methodology in order to eliminate the unobservable heterogeneity. Specifically, we use the GMM to control for the endogeneity problem, the importance of which has been demonstrated by the abovementioned extensive literature on how ownership structure influences investment, financing and dividend decisions.

According to our results, the following conclusions are reached. First, insiders tend to reduce their holdings when debt increases, as a consequence of their risk aversion. Second, the monitoring by large outside owners substitutes for the disciplinary role of debt. Third, higher dividends encourage insiders to increase their stakes in the firm so that they offset their lower potential of shirking by appropriating a larger fraction of the dividends paid. Outside owners are also encouraged to increase their holdings in view of higher dividends, since dividends are tax deductible. Fourth, the levels of insider ownership and ownership concentration are also higher when new investments are undertaken, as a way to control for the greater opportunities for managerial discretion. Finally, managerial holdings depend on the firm’s free cash flow and investment opportunities, whereas outside owners do not seem to have such information when choosing their stakes.

Our study involves two important methodological advances in the corporate governance literature. First, we consider a way of controlling for the endogeneity