投资,融资和股利决策在解释公司股权结构中的作用：来自西班牙的经验数据【外文翻译】
股利决策知识点总结
股利决策知识点总结股利是指公司向股东支付的现金或股票形式的收益分配。
股利决策是公司管理层在确定股利政策时所做的决策。
这些决策往往涉及到公司利润使用、现金流量管理、股东回报等方面的考量。
股利决策对公司和股东都有重要的影响，因此了解股利决策的知识点对投资者和公司管理者都非常重要。
本文将对股利决策的相关知识点进行总结，以帮助读者更好地理解和应用股利决策的相关概念。
一、股利决策的意义股利决策涉及到公司分配利润的方式和比例，对公司和股东都有重要的意义。
对于公司来说，股利政策直接关系到公司的现金流量情况、投资项目的融资等方面。
一方面，合理的股利政策可以提高股东的满意度，有利于提高公司的声誉和股价；另一方面，过高的股利政策会对公司的财务状况和未来发展产生负面影响。
因此，公司需要权衡各种因素，确定合适的股利政策。
对于股东来说，股利是投资回报的重要组成部分。
合理的股利政策可以提高股东的满意度，吸引更多的投资者；而过低的股利政策则可能导致投资者的流失。
因此，股东关注公司的股利政策，希望公司能够根据自身的盈利情况和未来发展需求，采取合适的股利政策。
二、股利决策的因素在确定股利政策时，公司需要考虑多种因素，包括但不限于以下几个方面：1. 公司的盈利情况股利政策首先应该考虑到公司的盈利情况。
只有公司能够持续盈利，才能够有能力向股东支付股利。
因此，公司需要根据自身的盈利情况确定合适的股利政策。
2. 公司的现金流量情况除了盈利情况，公司的现金流量也是确定股利政策的重要因素。
即使公司盈利，如果现金流量不足，也会影响公司向股东支付股利。
因此，公司需要综合考虑盈利情况和现金流量情况，确定合适的股利政策。
3. 公司的投资项目公司的投资项目也会影响股利政策的确定。
如果公司有大量的投资项目需要资金支持，可能会限制公司向股东支付股利的能力。
因此，公司需要考虑自身的投资需求和股利政策之间的平衡。
4. 公司的财务状况公司的财务状况也是确定股利政策的重要因素。
股权结构与公司业绩外文翻译(可编辑)
股权结构与公司业绩外文翻译外文翻译Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from IsraelMaterial Source: Journal of Management and Governance Author: Beni Lauterbach and Alexander Vaninsky1.IntroductionFor many years and in many economies, most of the business activity was conducted by proprietorships, partnerships or closed corporations. In these forms of business organization, a small and closely related group of individuals belonging to the same family or cooperating in business for lengthy periods runs the firm and shares its profits.However, over the recent century, a new form of business organization flourished as non-concentrated-ownership corporations emerged. The modern diverse ownership corporation has broken the link between the ownership and active management of the firm. Modern corporations are run by professional managers who typically own only a very small fraction of the shares. In addition, ownership is disperse, that is the corporation is owned by and its profits are distributed among many stockholders.The advantages of the modern corporation are numerous. It relievesfinancing problems, which enables the firm to assume larger-scale operations and utilize economies of scale. It also facilitates complex-operations allowing the most skilled or expert managers to control business even when they the professional mangers do not have enough funds to own the firm. Modern corporations raise money sell common stocks in the capital markets and assign it to the productive activities of professional managers. This is why it is plausible to hypothesize that the modern diverse-ownership corporations perform better than the traditional “closely held” business forms.Moderating factors exist. For example, closely held firms may issue minority shares to raise capital and expand operations. More importantly, modern corporations face a severe new problem called the agency problem: there is a chance that the professional mangers governing the daily operations of the firm would take actions against the best interests of the shareholders. This agency problem stems from the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation, and it troubled many economists before e.g., Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen andMeckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983. The conclusion was that there needs to exist a monitoring system or contract, aligning the manager interests and actions with the wealth and welfare of the owners stockholdersAgency-type problems exist also in closely held firms becausethere are always only a few decision makers. However, given the personal ties between the owners and mangers in these firms, and given the much closer monitoring, agency problems in closely held firms seem in general less severe.The presence of agency problems weakens the central thesis that modern open ownership corporations are more efficient. It is possible that in some business sectors the costs of monitoring and bonding the manager would be excessive. It is also probable that in some cases the advantages of large-scale operations and professional management would be minor and insufficient to outweigh the expected agency costs. Nevertheless, given the historical trend towards diverse ownership corporations, we maintain the hypothesis that diverse-ownership firms perform better than closely held firms. In our view, the trend towards diverse ownership corporations is rational and can be explained by performance gains.2. Ownership Structure and Firm PerformanceOne of the most important trademarks of the modern corporation is the separation of ownership and control. Modern corporations are typically run by professional executives who own only a small fraction of the shares.There is an ongoing debate in the literature on the impact and merit of the separation of ownership and control. Early theorists such as Williamson 1964 propose that non-owner managers prefer their owninterests over that of the shareholders. Consequently, non-owner managed firms become less efficient than owner-managed firms.The more recent literature reexamines this issue and prediction. It points out the existence of mechanisms that moderate the prospects of non-optimal and selfish behavior by the manager. Fama 1980, for example, argues that the availability and competition in the managerial labor markets reduce the prospects that managers would act irresponsibly. In addition, the presence of outside directors on the board constrains management behavior. Others, like Murphy 1985, suggest that executive compensation packages help align management interests with those of the shareholders by generating a link between management pay and firm performanceHence, non-owner manager firms are not less efficient than owner-managed firms. Most interestingly, Demsetz and Lehn 1985 conclude that the structure of ownership varies in ways that are consistent with value imization. That is, diverse ownership and non-owner managed firms emerge when they are more worthwhile.The empirical evidence on the issue is mixed see Short 1994 for a summaryPart of the diverse results can be attributed to the difference across the studies in the criteria for differentiation between owner and non-owner manager controlled firms. These criteria, typically based on percentage ownership by large stockholders, are less innocuous and more problematic than initially believed because, as demonstrated by Morck,Shleifer and Vishny 1988 and McConnell and Servaes 1990, the relation between percentage ownership and firm performance is nonlinear. Further, percent ownership appears insufficient for describing the control structure. Two firms with identical overall percentage ownership by large blockholders are likely to have different control organizations, depending on the identity of the large stockholders.In this study, we utilize the ownership classification scheme proposed by Ang, Hauser and Lauterbach 1997. This scheme distinguishes between non-owner managed firms, firms controlled by concerns, firms controlled by a family, and firms controlled by a group of individuals partners. Obviously, the control structure in each of these firm types is different. Thus, some new perspectives on the relation between ownership structure and firm performance might emerge.3. DataWe employ data from a developing economy, Israel, where many forms of business organization coexist. The sample includes 280 public companies traded on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange TASE during 1994. For each company we collect data on the 1992?1994 net income profits after tax, 1994 total assets, 1994 equity, 1994 top management remuneration, and 1994 ownership structure. All data is extracted from the companies financial reports except for the classification of firms according to their ownership structure, which is based on the publica tions, “Holdings ofInterested Parties” issued by the Israel Securities Authority, “Meitav Stock Guide,” and “Globes Stock Exchange Yearbook”.The initial sample included all firms traded on the TASE about 560 at the time. However, sample size shrunk by half because: 1 according to the Israeli Security Authority the Israeli counterpart of the US SEC only 434 companies provided reliable compensation reports; 2 147 companies have a negative 1992?94 average net income, which makes them unsuitable for the methodology we employ; and 3 for 7 firms we could not determine the ownership structure.The companies in the sample represent a rich variety of ownership structures, as illustrated in Figure 1. Nine percent of the firms do not have any majority owner. Among majority owned firms, individuals family firms or partnerships of individuals own 72% and the rest are controlled by concerns. About half 49% of the individually-controlled firms are dominated by a partnership of individuals and the rest 51% are dominated by families. Professional non-owner CEOs are found in about 15% of the individually controlled firms.4. Methodology: Data Envelopment AnalysisIn this study, we measure relative performance using Data Envelopment Analysis DEA. Data Envelopment Analysis is currently a leading methodology in Operations Research for performance evaluations see Seiford and Thrall, 1990, and previous versions of it have been usedin Finance by Elyasiani andMehdian, 1992, for example.The main advantage of Data Envelopment Analysis is that it is a parameter-free approach. For each analyzed firm, DEA constructs a “twin” comparable virtual firm consisting of a portfolio of other sample firms. Then, the relative performance of the firm can be determined. Other quantitative techniques such as regression analysis are parametric, that is it estimates a “production function” and assesses each firm performance according to its residual relative to the fitted fixed parameters economy-wide production function. We are not claiming that parametric methods are inadequate. Rather, we attempt a different and perhaps more flexible methodology, and compare its results to the standard regression methodology Findings.The equity ratio variable represents expectation that given the firm size, the higher the investments of stockholders equity, the higher their return net income. Finally, the CEO and top management compensation variables are controlling for the managers’ input. One of our central points is that top managers’ actions and skills affect firm output. Hence, higher pay mangers who presumably are also higher-skill are expected to yield superior profits. Rosen 1982 relates executives’ pay and rank in the organization to their skills and abilities, and Murphy 1998 discusses in de tail the structure of executive pay and its relation to firm’s performance.The DEA analysis and the empirical estimation of the relative performance of different organizational forms are repeated in four separate subsets of firms: Investment companies, Industrial companies, Real-estate companies, and Trade and services companies. This sector analysis controls for the special business environment of the firms and facilitates further examination of the net effect of ownership structure on firm performance.5.Empirical Results The main results of the empirical findings reviewed above are that majority Control by a few individuals diminishes firm performance, and that professional non-owner managers promote performance. The conclusions about individual control and professional management are reinforced by two other findings. First, it appears that firms without professional managers and firms controlled by individuals are more likely to exhibit negative net income.Second, Table IV also presents results of regressions of net income, NET INC, on leverage, size, professional manager dummy, and individual control dummy.6. ConclusionsThe empirical analysis of 280 firms in Israel reveals that ownership structure impacts firm performance, where performance is estimated as the actual net income of the firm divided by the optimal net income given the firm’s inputs. We find that:Out of all organizational forms, family owner-managed firms appearleast efficient in generating profits. When all firms are considered, only family firms with owner managers have an average performance score of less than 30%, and when performance is measured relative to the business sector, only family firms with owner-managers have an average score of less than 50%.2Non-owner managed firms perform better than owner-managed firms. These findings suggest that the modern form of business organization, namely the open corporation with disperse ownership and non-owner managers, promotes performance Critical readers may wonder how come “efficient” and “less-efficient” organizational structures coexist. The answer is that we probably do not document a long-term equilibrium situation. The lower-performing family and partnership controlled firms are likely, as time progresses, to transform into public-controlled non-majority owned corporations.A few reservations are in order. First, we do not contend that every company would gain by transforming into a disperse ownership public firm. For example, it is clear that start-up companies are usually better off when they are closely held. Second, there remain questions about the methodology and its application Data Envelopment Analysis is not standard in Finance. Last, we did not show directly that transforming into a disperse ownership public firm improves performances. Future research should further explore any performance gains from the separation ofownership and control.译文股权结构与公司业绩资料来源:管理治理杂志作者:贝尼?劳特巴赫和亚历山大?范尼斯基多年来,在许多经济体中的大多数商业活动是由独资企业、合伙企业或者非公开企业操作管理的。
融资计划和股权结构
融资计划和股权结构在商业世界中，融资计划和股权结构是企业发展的重要基石。
它们不仅关系到企业能否获得足够的资金支持，还影响着企业的治理结构、决策机制以及未来的发展方向。
首先，让我们来谈谈融资计划。
融资计划就像是为企业的成长之旅绘制的一张资金地图。
它明确了企业在不同阶段需要的资金数量、资金用途以及获取资金的方式。
企业在制定融资计划时，需要对自身的发展需求进行深入分析。
比如，新产品的研发、市场拓展、生产设备的购置等都可能需要大量的资金投入。
同时，还要考虑市场环境和行业竞争态势。
如果市场竞争激烈，企业可能需要加快发展步伐，从而需要更多的资金来抢占市场份额。
常见的融资方式包括股权融资和债权融资。
股权融资是指企业通过出售部分股权来换取资金。
这种方式虽然会稀释原有股东的股权，但不需要企业承担固定的还款压力。
新的股东加入还可能带来新的资源和经验。
而债权融资则是企业向债权人借款，如银行贷款、发行债券等。
这种方式需要企业在规定的时间内偿还本金和利息，但不会影响企业的股权结构。
在确定融资规模时，企业不能盲目追求高额资金。
过多的资金可能导致资源浪费和效率低下，而过少的资金则无法满足企业的发展需求。
因此，需要进行精确的计算和合理的规划。
接下来，我们再看看股权结构。
股权结构是指企业中不同股东所持有的股份比例以及相互之间的关系。
一个合理的股权结构对于企业的稳定发展至关重要。
如果股权过于集中，可能会导致决策的独裁和缺乏监督，影响企业的创新和发展。
反之，如果股权过于分散，可能会出现股东之间意见不一致，难以形成有效的决策，甚至可能被外部资本恶意收购。
在设计股权结构时，企业创始人通常会持有较大比例的股权，以保证对企业的控制权。
同时，也会为核心团队成员和战略投资者预留一定的股权份额。
核心团队成员持有股权可以激励他们为企业的发展努力工作，战略投资者则能为企业带来资金、资源和市场渠道等方面的支持。
此外，还要考虑股权的退出机制。
当股东想要退出时，应该有明确的规则和流程，以保证企业的稳定运营和其他股东的利益。
筹资与财务决策在企业管理中的作用
筹资与财务决策在企业管理中的作用每个企业都需要资金来支持日常运营和发展。
为了确保企业能够获得足够的资金，并且能够合理地使用这些资金，筹资与财务决策变得至关重要。
本文将详细介绍筹资与财务决策在企业管理中的作用，并分点列出相关步骤。
一、筹资的作用1. 提供资金来源：筹资是企业获得资金的方式之一。
通过筹资，企业可以获得所需的流动资金和投资资本，以支持企业的日常运营和发展。
2. 分散风险：企业通过筹资可以从多个渠道获得资金，以分散财务风险。
当一个渠道出现问题时，其他渠道的融资仍然可以支持企业的运营。
3. 扩大经营规模：筹资可以帮助企业扩大经营规模，开拓新的市场。
通过融资，企业可以增加生产能力、推出新产品或进入新市场，从而实现收入的增长。
二、筹资的步骤1. 制定筹资计划：企业需要明确筹资的目标和需求，并制定相应的计划。
这包括确定所需资金的金额、筹资方式和期限等。
2. 选择筹资方式：企业可以选择不同的筹资方式来融资，如银行贷款、发行债券、股权融资等。
在选择筹资方式时，企业需要考虑成本、风险和可行性等因素。
3. 寻找合适的融资渠道：企业需要寻找合适的融资渠道来获得资金。
这可以包括与银行和金融机构洽谈贷款、与投资者进行谈判等。
在选择融资渠道时，企业需要考虑可靠性、成本和投资者的要求等因素。
4. 完成融资交易：一旦找到合适的融资渠道，企业需要完成融资交易。
这包括签署合同、准备必要的文件和材料等。
在完成交易之前，企业还需要进行充分的尽职调查，确保合作方的可靠性和合规性。
三、财务决策的作用1. 资本预算决策：企业需要决定如何分配有限的资金以支持不同的项目和投资。
财务决策可以帮助企业评估各种项目的投资回报率、风险和潜在收益，并做出相应的决策。
2. 资本结构决策：财务决策还涉及到企业的资本结构，即债务和股权的比例。
通过分析企业的负债承受能力、股东要求和市场条件等，企业可以确定最优的资本结构，以最大程度地降低资金成本。
3. 分析财务绩效：财务决策需要对企业的财务绩效进行分析和评估。
公司金融学企业融资与投资决策
公司金融学企业融资与投资决策企业的融资与投资决策是公司金融学中的重要内容，它直接影响着企业的经济效益和发展前景。
本文将从企业融资和投资决策两个方面来探讨该主题。
一、企业融资决策企业融资决策是指企业为了满足资金需求而采取的筹资途径和方式的决策。
为了降低融资成本，企业通常会选择多种融资方式，如债务融资和股权融资。
1. 债务融资债务融资是指企业通过借款和发行债券等方式向外部融资。
债务融资具有风险低、稳定性高的特点。
企业在选择债务融资时，应该综合考虑债务规模、债务成本和还款能力等因素。
2. 股权融资股权融资是指企业通过发行股票获取资金。
与债务融资相比，股权融资具有融资规模大、融资成本低的优势。
但同时也要面临股东利益分配等问题。
企业在进行股权融资时，需要注意控制股东权益结构，避免资本过度稀释。
二、企业投资决策企业投资决策是指企业对于可行投资项目的选择和评价的决策过程。
投资决策的目标是追求投资回报率最大化，同时要兼顾风险控制。
1. 投资项目评价企业在进行投资决策时，需要对投资项目进行评价。
常用的评价指标包括净现值、内部收益率和投资回收期等。
通过对这些指标的计算和分析，可以判断投资项目的可行性和收益水平。
2. 风险管理企业在进行投资决策时，需要充分考虑风险因素，并采取相应的管理措施。
常用的风险管理工具包括风险分析、风险评估和风险控制等。
通过合理的风险管理，可以减少投资风险，提高投资回报。
三、融资与投资决策的关系融资决策和投资决策是相互关联、相互制约的。
企业在进行融资决策时，需要综合考虑投资项目的需求和风险，以确定融资规模和方式。
而投资决策的实施则需要融资支持，确保项目的顺利进行。
同时，融资决策和投资决策也存在一些矛盾和难题。
例如，企业在进行投资决策时，可能需要面临融资成本高的问题；而在进行融资决策时，又需要考虑投资项目的可行性和回报。
综上所述，企业的融资与投资决策是公司金融学中的重要内容。
通过正确的融资和投资决策，企业可以获得足够的资金支持，实现企业价值最大化。
外文文献
融资理论是企业制定融资政策的理论基础。
自20世纪50年代以来,在解释企业融资决策行为的动机及其所秉承的理论基础时,主要存在着两大理论,一是权衡融资理论;二是优序融资理论。
权衡融资理论认为,企业在构造长期资本来源的组合时,存在着一个最佳的资本结构,企业将按照事先测算的最佳资本结构来选择资金来源及配置各种不同性质的资金。
优序融资理论最早是Modigoliani和Miller(1958)提出的。
理论指出在完善的资本市场中,如果不存在税收、破产成本以及代理成本的影响,那么,企业市场价值将与其资本结构无关。
Myers和Majluf(1984)在《企业知道投资人所不知道信息时的融资和投资决策》一文中,以信息不对称理论为基础,提出企业融资存在一种“啄食顺序原则”。
认为由于所有权和经营权的分离而产生委托代理关系,因为利益不同,内部经营者和股东之间的信息不对称原因,企业的融资顺序上就形成了一个优序策略。
即首先为内部融资,也就是企业的留存收益;其次是长期借款和长期债券;再次是发行优先股融资;最后是发行普通股融资。
此外,1989年Baskin以交易成本、个人所得税和控制权的研究角度对优序融资理论作出了解释,指出由于留存收益提供的内部资金不必承担发行成本,也避免了个人所得税,因此内部资金要优于外部资金。
与权益性资金相比较,负债融资由于具有节税效应,发行成本低,又不会稀释公司的控制权,所以对外融资来说负债融资又优于权益性融资。
Claggett(1991)利用交叉分类法以验证权衡融资理论和优序融资理论在实践中是否存在。
结果发现这两种理论都成立,但优序理论的显著性高于权衡融资理论。
因此,Claggett认为无论是权衡理论还是优序理论都过于简化,实际的操作是介于两者之间,故应称为混合理论。
在国内,也有一些学者在专题研究融资理论及其实践效应。
有的通过实证研究认为我国企业偏好于股权融资,有的认为我国企业融资秩序与优序融资理论的主张正好相反。
企业融资决策中英文对照外文翻译文献
企业融资决策中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)译文：中小型企业融资决策企业的产生、生存及发展均离不开投资与融资活动。
随着我国加入WTO 组织，市场经济体制的逐步完善，金融市场的快速发展，投资与融资效率也越来越成为企业发展的关键。
对于中小型企业而言，应要根据自身发展需求，认真考虑如何选择自己需要和适合自己发展阶段的融资方式以及各种融资方式的利用时机、条件、成本和风险，确定合适的融资规模以及制定最佳融资期限等问题。
要解决这些问题，需要中小型企业制定适当的融资策略，以作出最优化的融资决策。
一、企业融资决策概述(一)企业融资决策概述企业融资决策，是企业根据其价值创造目标需要，利用一定时机与渠道，采取经济有效的融资工具，为公司筹集所需资金的一种市场行为。
它不仅改变了公司的资产负债结构，而且影响了企业内部管理、经营业绩、可持续发展及价值增长。
典型的融资决策包括出售何种债务和股权（融资方式）、如何确定所要出售债务和股权的价值（融资成本）、何时出售些债务和股权（融资时机）等等。
而其中最主要的包括融资规模的决策和融资方式的决策。
融资规模应为企业完成资金使用目的的最低需要量。
而企业的融资方式则多种多样，常见的以下几种：1.财政融资。
财政融资方式从融出的角度来讲，可分为：预算内拨款、财政贷款、通过授权机构的国有资产投资、政策性银行贷款、预算外专项建设基金、财政补贴。
2.银行融资。
从资金融出角度即银行的资金运用来说，主要是各种代款，例如：信用贷款、抵押贷款、担保贷款、贴现贷款、融资租凭、证券投资。
3.商业融资。
其方式也是多种多样，主要包括商品交易过程中各企业间发生的赊购商品、预收货款等形式。
4.政券融资。
该方式主要包括股标融资和债券融资两大类。
(二)融资决策过程企业制定融资决策的过程，也即确定最优资本结构的过程。
具体决策程序是：首先，当一家企业为筹措一笔资金面临几种融资方案时，企业可以分别计算出各个融资方案的加权平均资本成本率，然后选择其中加权平均资本成本率最低的一种。
西方经济中的企业融资与投资决策
西方经济中的企业融资与投资决策近年来，西方经济呈现出快速发展的趋势，企业融资与投资决策成为经济运行的重要组成部分。
本文将从不同的角度探讨西方经济中的企业融资与投资决策，分析其影响因素和优化策略，以期对读者了解西方经济的运行机制起到一定的参考作用。
一、融资决策的影响因素企业融资决策是指企业通过债务或股权等形式筹措资金的决策过程。
在西方经济中，融资决策受到多种因素的影响。
1.1 利率水平利率水平是影响融资决策的核心因素之一。
通常情况下，利率水平越低，企业融资的成本就越低，融资的吸引力就越大。
因此，企业在决定融资方式时需要综合考虑市场利率和自身风险承受能力，选择最适合的融资方案。
1.2 法律和监管环境法律和监管环境对企业融资决策的影响也十分重要。
在西方经济中，有完善的法律体系和监管机制，企业在融资时需要遵守一系列法律法规和准则，如证券法、公司法等。
企业需要在法律框架下进行融资决策，确保其合法性和透明度。
1.3 资本市场状况资本市场状况对企业融资决策有着直接的影响。
如果资本市场景气，投资者信心高涨，企业融资的渠道也就更加畅通。
相反，如果资本市场疲软，投资者谨慎对待，企业融资的难度将会增加。
因此，企业需要时刻关注资本市场的变化，根据实际情况灵活调整融资策略。
二、投资决策的优化策略投资决策是企业为实现预期目标而配置资金和资源的过程。
在西方经济中，投资决策也面临着许多挑战和优化的空间。
2.1 项目评估与风险控制在做出投资决策前，企业需要对各项投资项目进行评估和分析。
通过评估项目的风险性、回报率和可行性等指标，企业可以选择最有利可图的投资项目。
同时，企业还需要加强风险控制，采取有效的措施减少投资风险，确保投资决策的可持续性。
2.2 信息获取与分析在投资决策过程中，信息的获取和分析是非常重要的。
西方企业通常借助专业的机构和媒体获取市场信息、经济数据等，以便做出更准确的投资决策。
同时，企业还需要运用各种分析方法，如SWOT分析、财务分析等，全面评估项目的潜力和风险。
公司股权结构对投融资决策的影响
公司股权结构对投融资决策的影响本文旨在探讨公司股权结构对投融资决策的影响。
股权是指公司所有者对于公司资产和收益享有的权益，股权结构是指公司不同股东之间的所有权比例和关系。
投融资决策是指企业为了获取融资或者通过融资为企业实现战略目标而进行的决策。
在现代市场经济中，股权结构对于企业投融资决策非常重要，本文将从以下几个角度进行分析：一、股权结构对投资方的吸引力在企业进行投资或筹集资金时，股权结构一直是一个关键因素。
企业所有权结构的每个方面都会对投资者的兴趣产生实质性的影响。
如果一个公司拥有分散的股权结构，那么投资者可能会认为公司股价容易受到操纵，而不愿意投资该公司。
反之，如果公司的股权结构相对集中，投资对方将看到公司库存的投资价值，从而更易于寻找融资。
二、股权结构对风险的影响股权结构与企业的风险相关。
如果股权结构分散，股东难以制定共同的目标协议，很难支撑管理决策，造成协调问题，往往反映出低效率和低管理水平企业。
相反，如果公司的股权结构相对集中，单个股东就可以掌握企业的经营和管理权力，从而规避一些潜在风险，更加安全可靠。
三、股权结构对影响公司的信用企业的股权结构对其信用面临影响很大。
如果股权结构不太稳定，很难说其战略决策是否具有可靠性，进而使公司之间信用关系缺乏合作基础。
反之，若公司股东结构相对集中，其股票价格上涨坚定，那么公司的经营风险就会降低，有利于公司的信用得到提升，也更有利于公司的资本市场融资。
四、股权结构对股票交易监管的影响在股权分散的公司中，股东容易利用权益和投票来调控公司的战略目标。
因此，股权结构不稳定的公司可能会受到股票交易监管部门的更严格监管。
而在股权结构相对集中的公司中，股东对企业经营和战略目标的影响力相对较小，因此监管部门可以更为宽松，让企业更具竞争力。
综上所述，公司股权结构对企业的投资决策和融资目标、企业信用和股票交易系统的稳定性具有深刻的影响。
因此，企业应该根据自己的经营战略和发展目标，积极探讨最优股权结构，以便更好地运作企业。
股权结构与企业投资决策的研究分析与实际应用
股权结构与企业投资决策的研究分析与实际应用股权结构和企业投资决策之间的关系是一个重要而复杂的课题。
我们来仔细探讨一下这个主题，看看它如何影响企业的投资方向和最终成效。
首先，股权结构是指公司内部股东之间的权力分配。
这种分配直接影响着公司的决策方式。
比如，某些公司拥有集中的股权结构，少数大股东掌握决策权。
这种情况下，投资决策往往比较迅速，因为决策者不需要花费时间去协调众多股东的意见。
相对而言，分散股权的公司则可能面临更多的协调和谈判，决策效率可能受到影响。
1.1 集中股权的优势在于，能够快速应对市场变化，做出及时的投资决策。
例如，某知名科技公司在面临新兴市场时，依靠少数股东的决策迅速进入，最终获得了丰厚的回报。
股东的统一思想使得公司在面对竞争时更具灵活性。
1.2 然而，集中股权也有其劣势。
由于决策权掌握在少数人手中，可能导致盲目投资。
缺乏多样化的意见，会让公司错失重要的市场信号。
这就需要管理层在决策时，具备更强的前瞻性和判断力。
接下来，我们要看看分散股权的情况。
2.1 在分散股权结构下，虽然决策过程变得复杂，但它可以引入更多的观点和建议。
这有助于做出更全面的投资决策。
例如，一些成功的企业常常会邀请不同领域的专家进行投资评估，以获得更广泛的市场见解。
2.2 但是，决策过程的延迟可能使公司在竞争中落后。
当市场瞬息万变时，慢半拍的决策会带来失去机会的风险。
曾有公司在面对竞争对手快速推出新产品时，因内部意见不合，导致无法及时反应，最终遭受了严重损失。
2.3 此外，分散股权还可能造成股东之间的利益冲突。
有时，大股东的利益和小股东的利益不一致，可能导致公司整体利益受损。
为了避免这种情况，公司需要建立良好的沟通机制，以确保各方意见能够得到充分的讨论和尊重。
那么，股权结构还会对投资决策产生哪些影响呢？3.1 我们可以看到，股权结构不仅影响决策速度，还影响投资策略。
比如，集中股权的企业可能更倾向于冒险投资，以求快速回报，而分散股权的企业则可能更为谨慎，优先考虑风险控制。
股权结构与企业投资决策的分析研究与实际应用
股权结构与企业投资决策的分析研究与实际应用在讨论股权结构与企业投资决策的关系时，我们首先要搞清楚什么是股权结构，以及它为什么会对企业的投资决策产生影响。
简单来说，股权结构就是公司的所有权分布方式，包括股东的数量、股权的比例、不同股东之间的关系等。
而投资决策，顾名思义，就是企业在面对市场机会或挑战时，如何决定资金的投入方向和投入方式。
股权结构与投资决策之间的联系，不仅仅体现在理论上，它在实践中对企业的运作和未来发展起着至关重要的作用。
一、股权结构对投资决策的影响1.1 股东权力的分配企业的股东分布是一个至关重要的因素。
如果某个股东或一小部分股东拥有绝对控股权，那么他们就可以对公司做出很多决策，而这些决策直接影响到公司未来的投资方向。
比如，如果一个大股东非常注重长期利益，他可能更倾向于做出稳健的投资决策，避免冒险。
而如果股东之间的权力分配较为均匀，那么决策过程可能会变得更加复杂和冗长，因为各方意见需要协调一致。
股东权力的集中与分散，直接影响到企业在面对投资选择时的决策效率和决策质量。
1.2 投资决策的方向与风险承担股东结构还决定了公司在投资决策时对风险的承受能力。
如果公司拥有大量的机构投资者，尤其是风险投资基金或私募股权基金等，他们通常更加关注短期回报和高风险高回报的投资项目。
而如果公司股东中以家族企业为主，决策时可能更加谨慎，重视公司的长期稳定发展。
这些不同的股东群体对投资项目的选择标准会有所不同，从而影响公司是否愿意承担高风险的投资。
二、股东背景与企业投资策略2.1 家族企业与投资决策家族企业的股东结构通常较为集中，控制权比较稳定。
这样的股东结构往往有两个特点：一是决策权比较集中，二是股东在制定投资策略时会考虑到家族的利益和长远的传承问题。
因此，家族企业的投资决策往往更加稳健，尤其是在涉及重大资金投入或风险较大的项目时，他们可能会更多地考虑项目的安全性和可持续性。
例如，很多家族企业的投资方式更倾向于保守的资本积累和逐步扩张，而不是迅速进入新兴行业或市场。
【精品文档】61资本结构和公司绩效：来自约旦的证据中英文双语外文文献翻译成品
外文标题：Capital structure and corporate performance: evidence from Jordan 外文作者：Rami Zeitun and Gary Gang Tian文献出处: Australasian Accounting Business & Finance Journal, 2007英文1689单词，8276字符，中文2309汉字。
此文档是外文翻译成品，无需调整复杂的格式哦！下载之后直接可用，方便快捷！价格不贵。
Capital structure and corporate performance: evidence from JordanRami Zeitun and Gary Gang TianThe objective of the current paper is to examine the effect which capital structure has on corporate performance in Jordan. There is a lack of empirical evidence about the effect of capital structure on the performance of firms in both developed and developing countries. Most of the previous evidence on capital structure comes from the determinants of corporate debt ratio. To the best of the auth ors’ knowledge, this research provides the first attempt to investigate the effect of capital structure on corporate performance in Jordan. Our reason for choosing Jordan as a case for this topic is its uniqueness, which we discuss below.First, the Jordanian economy has been subject to a large number of external shocks in the Middle East region during the period of our study. Secondly, the banking system in Jordan also makes this study unique.Thirdly, it is worth noting that both Islamic and non-Islamic banks have a credit policy.The concept of performance is a controversial issue in finance largely due to its multi- dimensional meanings. Research on firm performance emanates from organization theory and strategic management (Murphy et al., 1996). Performance measures are either financial or organisational. Financial performance such as profit maximisation, maximising profit on assets, and maximising shareholders' benefits are at the core of the firm’s effectiveness (Chakravarthy, 1986). Operational performance measures, such as growth in sales and growth in market share.Table 1 reports summary statistics for the variables used in the study.The average return to assets for the sample as a whole is 1.2%, while the average return to equity is about - 14.2%. The two accounting measures of performance show that Jordanian companies have a very low accounting performance. The four measures of market performance show a high percentage of performance compared with the accounting measures. For example, the average v alues of Tobin’s Q and MBVR are 170% and 195%, respectively. The high ratios for the market performance measures could be as a result of the increase in firms' share price and equity without any increase in the real activities performance of the firms.The results of the estimation of the panel data models with each of the performance measures and for the full sample of observations for the period 1989-2003 are displayed in Tables 3 to 6. The regression model using price per share to earnings per share (P/E)10 is not significant using any measure of capital structure and, hence, is not reported. The regression model using return on equity (ROE) is excluded from the analysis because the ROE measure does not have any significant variable in the estimation and the R-squared value using this measure in mostcases was less than 0.1%11. The market value of equity to book value of equity (MBVE) is also excluded from the analysis as the R-squared is very small and the result is very similar to Tobin’s Q12. These results make the ROA and Tobin’s Q the most powerful measures of performance in the Jordan case. Therefore, our discussion will concentrate on these two measures of performance beside the MBVR and PROF measures.The significance of the variable TAX suggests that the better performance of Jordanian companies is related to the higher corporate income tax payment, and also to other factors such as the firm’s risk, size, and debt ratio (see Tables 3 to 6). This result indicates that firms with high tax payments have a higher performance rate. The composition of the asset structure (TANGB) has a negative and significant impact on the accounting measure of performance (ROA) and the market measure of performance (MBVR). This result indicates that firms with a high ratio of TANGB have a lower performance ratio.The economic environment and policy and regional risk affect firms’ performance. Hypothesis 7 states that Political Instability around Jordan (regional crises) affects corporate performance. Table 8 presents the results of the estimation including Y ear (time) dummy variables to control for the macroeconomic variables and economic environment and policy impact on firms' performance. The estimated coefficients on time dummies suggest a significant effect of macro economic variables on firms’ performance, implying that major changes to the overall economic environment may significantly affect corporate performance. From 1991 to 1994, time dummies had a positive and significant effect on the firm’s performance measur ed by ROA (using TDTA).This paper examines the impact which capital structure has had on corporate performance in Jordan in which we control the effect of industrial sectors, regional risk, such as the Gulf Crisis 1990-1991 and the outbreak of Intifadah in the West Bank in September 2000. This paper bridges the gap in the relevant literature as state and regional development varies from one country to another and this development could affect the validity of the theories as the environment changes.There is no single study formulated in the Middle East that investigates the impact of capital structure on a firm’s performance. This study tried to fill the gap in this field by investigating the effect of capital structure on corporate performance by taking Jordan as a case study. Furthermore, this paper employed different measures of capital structure such as short- term debt, long-term debt, and total debt to total assets in order to investigate the effect of the debt structure on corporate performance. Investigating the effect of capital structure on corporate performance using market and accounting measures could be valuable as it provides evidence about whether the stock market is efficient or not.An unbalanced panel of 167 companies are studied in this paper, of which 47 firms defaulted due to severe financial distress problems resulting in insolvency. A firm’s capital structure was found to have a significant and negative impact on the firm’s performance measures in both the accounting and market measures. An interesting finding is that the STDTA has a positive and significant effect on the market performance measure (Tobin’s Q), which could to some extent support Myers's (1977) argument that firms with high short-term debt to total assets have a high growth rate and high performance. The results also show that high performance is associated with a high tax rate. This indicates that profitable firms pay a high tax rate. Firm size was found to have a positive impact on a firm’s performance, as large firms h ave low bankruptcy costs. In other words, bankruptcy costs increases as firm size decreases and, hence, bankruptcy costs negatively affects a firm’s performance.REFERENCESAbdel Shahid, S. (2003), “Does Ownership Structure Affect Firm V alue? Evidence from The Egyptian StockMarket”, Working Paper, [online], ().ASE (2002), Amman Stock Exchange, 2002, Fourth Annual Report, (Amman, Jordan).Ang, J. S., R. A. Cole, and Lin, J. W. (2000), “Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”,Journal of Finance 55, 81-106.Barclay, M. J., and Smith, C. W. (1995), “The Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt”, Journal of Finance 50, 609-32. Bradley, M., G. A. Jarrell, and Kim, E. H. (1984), “On the Existence of an Optimal Capital Structure: Theory andEvidence”, Journal of Finance 39, 857-878.Breusch, T., and Pagan, A. (1980), “The Lagrange-Multiplier Test and its Applications to Model Specification inEconometrics”, Review of Economic Studies 47, 239–253.Brick, I. E., and Ravid, S. A. (1985), “On the Relevance of Debt Maturity Structure”,Journal of Finance 40, 1423–37.Chakravarthy, B. S., (1986), “Measuring Strategic Performance”, Strategic Management Journal 7, 437-58.Demsetz, H., and K. Lehn, (1985), “The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequen ces”,Journal ofPolitical Economy 93, 1155-1177.Durand, R., and R. Coeurderoy, (2001), “Age,Order of Entry, Strategic Orientation, and OrganizationalPerformance”, Journal of Business Venturing 16, 471-94.Fisher, F. M., and J. McGowan, (1983), “On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits”,American Economic Review 73, 82-97.Gleason, K. C., L. K Mathur, and I. Mathur, (2000), “The Interrelationship between Culture,Capital Structure, andPerformance: Evidence from European Reta ilers”, Journal of Business Research, 50, 185-191. Gorton, G., and R. Rosen, (1995), “Corporate Control, Portfolio Choice, and the Decline of Banking”,Journal ofFinance 50, 1377-420.Greene, W. H., (2003). Econometrics Analysis (Prentice Hall, New Y ork).Harris, M., A. Raviv, (1991), “The Theory of Capital Structure”, Journal of Finance 46,297–355.Hoffer, C. W., and W. R. Sandberg, (1987), “Improving new venture performance: some guidelines for success”,American Journal of Small Business 12, 11-25.Judge, George, W. E., R. Griffiths, Carter Hill, Helmut Liitkepohl, and Tsoung-Chao Lee, (1985). The Theory andPractice of Econometrics (John Wiley and Sons, New Y ork).Kraus, A., and R. Litzenberger, (1973), “A State-Preference Model of Optimal Financial Le verage”,Journal ofFinance 28, 923-931.Krishnan, V. S., and R. C. Moyer, (1997), “Performance, Capital Structure and Home Country: An Analysis of AsianCorporations”. Global Finance Journal 8, 129-143.Lauterbach, B., and A. V aninsky, (1999), “Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from Israel”,Journal of Management and Governance 3, 189-201.Long, W. F., D. J. Ravenscraft, (1984), “The Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return: Comment”, American EconomicReview 74, 494-500.Mehran, H., (1995), “Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership, and Firm Performance”, Journal of FinancialEconomics 38, 163-184译文：资本结构和公司绩效：来自约旦的证据Rami Zeitun and Gary Gang Tian本文研究的主要目的是考察资本结构对约旦公司绩效的影响。
股权结构与企业投资决策实际应用
股权结构与企业投资决策实际应用在企业的投资决策过程中，股权结构扮演着至关重要的角色。
理解股权结构不仅有助于优化决策，还能帮助企业在激烈的市场竞争中立于不败之地。
今天，我们就来探讨一下股权结构对企业投资决策的影响，并结合一个真实的案例分析，深入理解这一主题。
首先，什么是股权结构？简单来说，就是企业的所有权分配情况。
股东的类型、持股比例以及权利的分配都会直接影响到企业的决策过程。
比如，如果一个企业的股权高度集中，几位大股东就能轻易地影响或控制公司的投资方向；相反，如果股权分散，决策过程可能会更复杂，需要更多的协商和妥协。
1. 股权结构与投资决策的关系1.1 决策的效率在股权结构集中度高的企业中，决策过程通常更为高效。
因为大股东能快速统一意见，减少了因不同股东间利益冲突而导致的时间浪费。
比如，在某些技术密集型行业中，迅速的投资决策往往能够抢占市场先机。
而集中型股东在此过程中能够发挥更大的作用。
1.2 风险承受能力不同的股东在风险承受能力上有着显著的差异。
大股东通常更有能力应对投资失误带来的财务风险，因此在面对高风险投资时，他们可能更有勇气作出决策。
相比之下，小股东可能对风险更加敏感，往往倾向于保守的投资策略。
这种差异会直接影响到企业的投资选择，最终影响公司的长远发展。
2. 股权结构影响下的投资决策模式2.1 控制权与收益权在股权结构中，控制权和收益权的分配关系密切。
控制权集中在少数人手中时，他们可能会选择一些风险较高的项目，因为他们的收益回报也会相应增加。
这样的情况在许多初创企业中尤为常见，创始人通常持有大量股份，因此他们愿意承担更高的风险，以追求更大的市场份额。
2.2 投资项目的选择企业的股权结构还会影响到具体投资项目的选择。
比如，某些股东可能偏好于传统行业的稳健投资，而另一些则可能更愿意尝试新兴行业。
这样的选择不仅反映了股东的个人偏好，也与他们的股权结构紧密相关。
以一家科技公司为例，如果公司的股东大多是技术专家，他们可能更倾向于投资于前沿科技，而非传统制造业。
融资决策对企业的意义和作用
融资决策对企业的意义和作用以融资决策对企业的意义和作用为题，本文将从多个角度探讨融资决策对企业的重要性。
一、资金需求与发展企业在不同的发展阶段都会面临资金需求的问题。
无论是初创企业还是成熟企业，都需要资金来支持业务扩张、技术研发、市场拓展等活动。
而融资决策就是为了解决这些资金需求，确保企业能够顺利发展。
二、推动经济增长融资决策不仅对企业自身发展具有重要意义，也对整个经济增长起到推动作用。
通过融资，企业能够获得更多的资金，进而增加投资，提高产能，创造更多的就业机会，促进经济发展。
三、优化资本结构融资决策可以帮助企业优化资本结构，提高财务稳定性和盈利能力。
通过引入外部资金，企业可以减少负债比例，降低财务风险。
同时，融资还可以提高企业的杠杆效应，增加投资回报率，提高盈利水平。
四、增强竞争力融资决策对企业的意义还在于增强其竞争力。
获得足够的资金后，企业可以加大研发投入，提升产品质量和技术水平，从而在市场竞争中占据优势地位。
此外，融资还可以扩大企业规模，提高市场份额，增强品牌知名度，进一步加强企业的竞争力。
五、拓展国际市场融资决策对企业进军国际市场具有重要作用。
在国际化过程中，企业需要大量的资金来支持海外市场的开拓、新设厂和物流网络的建设等。
通过融资，企业可以获得更多的资金，用于拓展国际市场，实现全球化战略。
六、提升企业声誉融资决策还可以提升企业的声誉和知名度。
当企业成功完成融资，并取得良好的业绩后，将赢得投资者和市场的认可，有助于提升企业的形象和声誉。
这对于吸引更多的投资者、合作伙伴和优秀的员工，进一步推动企业发展具有积极的影响。
七、应对市场风险市场环境的变化可能对企业的经营产生重大影响。
在面临市场风险时，融资决策可以为企业提供更多的资金储备，增加应对风险的能力。
这将有助于企业在不利市场条件下保持稳定运营，减少经营风险。
融资决策对企业的意义和作用不可忽视。
它不仅帮助企业解决资金需求，促进经济增长，还能优化资本结构，增强竞争力，拓展国际市场，提升企业声誉，应对市场风险等。
投资与融资结构在企业经营中的作用
投资与融资结构在企业经营中的作用经营一家企业必须兼顾投资与融资。
投资是指开展新项目、扩大市场、提高产能等方面的资金支出；融资则是为公司筹集资金、提高财务能力的过程。
虽然二者看似毫无关联，但是在企业经营中，投资与融资却是相互依存的，在企业运营中扮演着不可或缺的角色。
本文将探讨投资与融资结构在企业经营中的作用。
一、投资对企业的影响【1.提高企业生产力】企业投资是实现企业发展的重要途径，通过投资扩大生产线、提高生产效率、提升产品质量，第一时间能够带来的就是企业生产力上的提升。
不仅能够提高企业的市场份额，还能够在成本方面具有更强的抗压能力。
【2.开拓新市场】随着市场的不断变化和消费者需求的不断增长，企业需要不断进行投资以开拓新市场。
通过新增产品种类、扩大经营范围、提高营销水平等方式，面对更广泛的消费者群体，从而从根本上增加公司的收入和利润，扩大市场份额。
【3.提升企业形象】企业形象是消费者选择品牌的重要考虑因素之一。
通过投资改善产品质量和服务水平，提高公司的社会责任感，对追求社会公益方面的消费者来说，这些都非常重要，能够带给消费者更好的购物体验和购买信心。
从而促进消费者忠诚度的提高。
二、融资对企业的影响【1.提高企业的资金实力】企业很多时候需要进行融资来满足企业的运营需求，通过发行债券或融资租赁等方式，能够为企业创造更多的的流动资金，提升企业的资金实力，从而扩大企业的规模和发展。
【2.降低企业资金成本】通过融资方式筹集资金，可以降低企业的资金成本，筹集到低成本的资金后，企业可以牢固地占有行业的发展优势，释放出更大的发展潜力和市场竞争力。
【3.增加企业税收优惠】企业进行融资能够在一定程度上给企业带来税收优惠。
在我国财政政策支持下，各地都能够享受一些税收政策优惠，通过融资能够获得较多的利润，同时积极赢得税收优惠，从而为企业健康地发展打下良好的基础。
三、投融资结构带来的变化企业投融资结构指的是企业在运营过程中，资金投入和融资渠道的比重和分布情况。
证券行业工作中的股权投资与公司融资
证券行业工作中的股权投资与公司融资在证券行业中，股权投资与公司融资是两个重要的方面。
股权投资是指投资者通过购买一家公司的股票来获取对该公司所有权的一种投资方式，而公司融资是指公司为了满足其业务发展需要而筹集资金的行为。
本文将探讨证券行业工作中股权投资与公司融资的关系与作用。
一、股权投资股权投资作为一种主要的投资方式，广泛应用于证券行业中。
通过股权投资，投资者可以购买某家公司的股票，并成为该公司的股东。
作为股东，投资者可以享受公司经营所产生的利润，并且拥有对公司重大决策的投票权。
股权投资在证券行业中有着重要的作用。
首先，它为投资者提供了获取投资回报的机会。
通过购买公司股票，投资者可以分享公司未来的成长和盈利。
其次，股权投资可以帮助企业筹集资金。
当公司需要扩大业务、研发新产品或进行并购等需要大量资金的活动时，可以通过发行新股份来吸引投资者，从而实现资金的融资。
二、公司融资公司融资是指公司为了满足业务发展需要而筹集资金的行为。
在证券行业中，公司可以通过发行债券、股票或其他金融工具来进行融资。
通过公司融资，公司可以获取所需的资金，用于扩大业务、投资项目、研发创新等。
公司融资在证券行业中扮演着重要的角色。
首先，它为公司提供了资金支持，帮助公司实现业务发展目标。
无论是扩大规模，增加产能，还是开发新产品，公司都需要充足的资金来支持这些活动。
其次，公司融资可以帮助公司调整资本结构，优化财务状况。
通过发行股票或债券，公司可以增加股东或债权人，分散风险，并降低公司的财务风险。
三、股权投资与公司融资的关系与作用股权投资与公司融资是密切相关的，二者相辅相成，互为因果。
股权投资为公司融资提供了重要的渠道和来源。
通过发行股票或私募股权投资，公司可以吸引投资者购买股票，从而获取资金。
同时，公司融资也为股权投资提供了基础和前提。
只有当公司获得足够的资金支持，其股权投资才有更大的价值和潜力。
股权投资与公司融资的关系还体现在对公司治理和发展的影响上。
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本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文：The Role of Investment, Financing and Dividend Decisions in Explaining Corporate Ownership Structure: Empirical Evidencefrom Spain1、IntroductionThere is extensive theoretical and empirical research on how corporate ownership structure influences financing, dividend and investment decisions. However, there is little evidence on the determinants of ownership structure, especially on the effect of these investment, financing and dividend decisions on a firm’s inside and outside shareholdings. The clear reversal of the effect of ownership structure on investment, financing and dividend decisions, and the resulting endogeneity, discourages researchers from addressing such an analysis. We overcome this drawback thanks to the use of the Generalised Method of Moments(GMM). This estimation method controls for the endogeneity problem and, consequently, it allows us to study the role played by investment, financing and dividend decisions in explaining corporate ownership structure in order to provide new evidence on one of the most interesting topics in corporate governance.Our paper makes a significant contribution to the corporate governance literature in at least three ways. First, we offer new evidence on the determinants of corporate ownership structure, mainly focusing on the effects of investment, financing and dividend decisions on insider stakes and ownership concentration levels. Second, we analyse the interaction between insider ownership and ownership concentration, both of which are considered as agency-cost control mechanisms, by taking into account the convergence of interests and entrenchment effects in the case of ownershipconcentration. Third, we contribute new evidence to corporate governance by focusing on the Spanish case. In fact, the Spanish case is interesting in itself because Spain is a civil law country and, according to La Porta et al.(1998), protection of Spanish investors is weaker than that of their UK and US counterparts. As a consequence, there is likely to be opportunistic behavior on the part of entrenched managers and expropriation activities on the part of majority owners, as documented in Miguel et al.(2004).Consequently, the aim of this paper is to analyse the role played by investment, financing and dividend decisions in explaining corporate ownership structure using Spanish firms. To achieve this aim, we derive two models (insider ownership and ownership concentration models) in accordance with financial theory. Both models are estimated by using panel data methodology in order to eliminate the unobservable heterogeneity. Specifically, we use the GMM to control for the endogeneity problem, the importance of which has been demonstrated by the abovementioned extensive literature on how ownership structure influences investment, financing and dividend decisions.According to our results, the following conclusions are reached. First, insiders tend to reduce their holdings when debt increases, as a consequence of their risk aversion. Second, the monitoring by large outside owners substitutes for the disciplinary role of debt. Third, higher dividends encourage insiders to increase their stakes in the firm so that they offset their lower potential of shirking by appropriating a larger fraction of the dividends paid. Outside owners are also encouraged to increase their holdings in view of higher dividends, since dividends are tax deductible. Fourth, the levels of insider ownership and ownership concentration are also higher when new investments are undertaken, as a way to control for the greater opportunities for managerial discretion. Finally, managerial holdings depend on the firm’s free cash flow and investment opportunities, whereas outside owners do not seem to have such information when choosing their stakes.Our study involves two important methodological advances in the corporate governance literature. First, we consider a way of controlling for the endogeneityproblem by using the GMM. Second, we control for the widely documented non-linearities between ownership structure and performance by using the method proposed by Miguel et al.(2004) to categorise the convergence of interests, entrenchment, monitoring and expropriation phenomena, and by entering this information into the model through the use of dummy variables interacted with the explanatory ownership variables. This new approach is applied to explain the diversity of ownership patterns across firms by highlighting the effect of investment, financing and dividend decisions on corporate ownership structure. Specifically, our evidence agrees with the growing interest shown by corporate governance literature in the relationship between ownership structure and both debt and dividends, since these two corporate decisions are shown to be major determinants of a firm’s inside and outside shareholdings.The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our models and discusses the main theoretical arguments supporting the proposed relations. The data set and the methodology used in the estimation of the specified models are described in Section 3. The empirical results are discussed in the following section, and the paper finishes with our main conclusions.2. Theory and Econometric Specification2.1. Basic models of corporate ownership structureSince the main purpose of this paper is to study the role played by investment, financing and dividend decisions in explaining corporate ownership structure, the starting point for our analysis is a basic model accounting for the effect of debt, dividends and investment decisions on a firm’s ownership structure. Financial theory suggests that ownership patterns differ between inside and outside shareholders, and we have thus specified two separate models: one explaining the firm’s insider ownership, the other explaining the level of ownership concentration.Let us now explain how financial theory supports our econometric specification by discussing the expected relationships in both models. Stulz(1988) argues that higher leverage allows managers to control more voting rights for a given stake in the firm, so that increments in the debt-to-capital ratio beyond a certain point leadmanagers to reduce their shareholdings. Moreover, since the firm’s shares become riskier as more debt is issued, managers are likely to own smaller shareholdings when their firm’s debt rises, because of their risk aversion and limited wealth. It is also widely accepted in financial literature that debt constrains managers since they must meet interest payments or face the likelihood of losing their jobs in case of bankruptcy (Jensen, 1986). Debt financing thus limits the private benefits that managers can obtain through the misuse of their dominant position and, consequently, the incentives to entrench through share ownership diminish. These arguments lead us to pose our first hypothesis, according to which:Hypothesis1: Higher debt levels lead to lower levels of insider ownership.The evidence in Denis and Sarin(1999) and Holderness et al.(1999)supports the existence of a negative effect of leverage on the firm’s level of insider ownership.On the other hand, the substitution hypothesis has often been brought into play to justify the negative association between ownership concentration and debt. Thus, if the firm’s debt provides some of the monitoring of managers that otherwise would have come from concentrated ownership, then higher leverage could be associated with lower levels of concentration. According to this substitutability, our second hypothesis states that:Hypothesis 2: Higher debt levels to lower levels of ownership concentration.The results in Grier and Zychowicz(1994) and Demsetz and Villalonga(2001) support the existence of a substitution effect between these two control mechanisms. Jensen(1986) points to dividend payments as an alternative to debt as a way of eliminating a firm’s free cash flow and, consequently, as a potential deterrent to managers’consumption of perquisites. On the basis of the idea that insiders may offset their lower potential of shirking by increasing the amount of dividends they receive through share ownership, our third hypothesis states that:Hypothesis 3: Higher dividends lead to higher insider ownership levels.On the other hand, Shleifer and Vishny(1986) justify the existence of a positive relationship between ownership concentration and dividends based on tax concerns, since large shareholders are usually other companies for which the received dividendsare tax deductible. In this way, dividend payments can be seen as a way of encouraging the possession of higher stakes in the firm, as shown in Allen et al.(2000). The Spanish tax system is similar to that of the USA in that Spanish shareholders that are companies themselves are allowed to deduct a percentage of the dividends received from their income so that they face an effective dividend tax rate much lower than the capital gains tax rate. Taking into account that large Spanish shareholders are usually other companies, we can pursue the above-mentioned US-based tax argument and pose our fourth hypothesis:Hypothesis 4: Higher dividends lead to higher levels of ownership concentration.The effect of investment decisions on corporate ownership structure is not so straightforward. The reverse causality, however, has been widely accepted in financial literature, since investment is one of the major ways through which ownership structure affects a firm’s value. As Jensen and Meckling(1976) assert, managers’natural tendency is to allocate the firm’s resources in their own best interests, which may conflict with value maximisation. Therefore, the higher the insider equity ownership, the more likely it is that the conflicts between managers and shareholders will be resolved, and the more efficient their investment decisions will be. Accordingly, Himmelberg et al.(1999) propose that investment should positively affect insider ownership, since higher investment leads to greater opportunities for managerial discretion, which can be controlled for by means of increases in insider ownership. Consistent with this argument, our fifth hypothesis is as follows: Hypothesis 5: Higher investment leads to higher levels of insider ownershipFollowing this argument, and extending it to the level of ownership concentration by way of the monitoring hypothesis, we pose our sixth hypothesis according to which:Hypothesis 6: Higher investment leads to higher levels of ownership concentration.As suggested by Jensen(1986), the higher the firm’s free cash flow, the greater the managers’incentives to make their firms grow beyond their optimal size. If concentrated ownership solves free cash flow problems, then the desired level ofinsider ownership and ownership concentration in order to avoid overinvestment is expected to increase with the amount of free cash flow. On the basis of Jensen’s(1986) arguments, our seventh hypothesis states that:Hypothesis 7: Higher free cash flow levels lead to higher levels of inside and outside ownership concentration.The available empirical evidence, however, is contradictory. For instance, the results in Bergstrom and Rydqvist(1990) show that there is no significant relationship between equity concentration and free cash flow; whereas Lange and Sharpe(1995) and Himmelberg et al.(1999) find that free cash flow positively influences the firm’s ownership concentration and insider ownership, respectively.Insider trading literature supports the idea that insiders trade because they have private information about future prospects of firms, which grants them the opportunity to exploit the potential divergence between inside and market expectations and adjust their holdings to their firms’future performance for personal gain. Accordingly, Tobin’s q should thus be an important determinant of insider ownership, in such a way that managers in firms with better investment opportunities are expected to hold a larger fraction of their firms’ shares in order to take advantage of potential privileged information on the firm’s future performance. And a similar reaction would be expected from outside owners whenever they have access to such information. According to this argument, we pose our eighth hypothesis:Hypothesis 8: Higher Tobin’s q leads to higher levels of inside and outside ownership concentration.Using different proxies for Tobin’s q, the results in Cho(1998) and Denis and Sarin(1999) corroborate the expected positive effect of a firm’s investment opportunities on its managers’ownership, whereas Lange and Sharpe(1995) and Make and Li(2001) find no significant effect on the level of ownership concentration. In contrast, Demsetz and Villalonga(2001) report a negative coefficient for Tobin’s q in both insider ownership and ownership concentration equations, this negative effect being greater on insider ownership than on ownership concentration.Firm size is also controlled for in both models. According to Demsetz andLehn(1985), firm size is negatively related to ownership concentration because the larger the firm, and the larger its capital resources, generally the more difficult it is to own a given fraction of the firm. Based on this idea, our last hypothesis is as follows: Hypothesis 9: Larger firms exhibit lower levels of inside and outside ownership concentration.This negative effect of firm size on inside and outside ownership concentration has been widely supported by previous research.Source: Julio Pindado, Chabela de la Torre. 2006, “The Role of Investment, Financing and Dividend Decisions in Explaining Corporate Ownership Structure: Empirical Evidence from Spain”. European Financial Management, V ol. 12, No. 5,pp.661-687. 原文一：The Role of Investment, Financing and Dividend Decisions in Explaining Corporate Ownership Structure: Empirical Evidencefrom Spain2、IntroductionThere is extensive theoretical and empirical research on how corporate ownership structure influences financing, dividend and investment decisions. However, there is little evidence on the determinants of ownership structure, especially on the effect of these investment, financing and dividend decisions on a firm’s inside and outside shareholdings. The clear reversal of the effect of ownership structure on investment, financing and dividend decisions, and the resulting endogeneity, discourages researchers from addressing such an analysis. We overcome this drawback thanks to the use of the Generalised Method of Moments(GMM). This estimation method controls for the endogeneity problem and, consequently, it allows us to study the role played by investment, financing and dividend decisions inexplaining corporate ownership structure in order to provide new evidence on one of the most interesting topics in corporate governance.Our paper makes a significant contribution to the corporate governance literature in at least three ways. First, we offer new evidence on the determinants of corporate ownership structure, mainly focusing on the effects of investment, financing and dividend decisions on insider stakes and ownership concentration levels. Second, we analyse the interaction between insider ownership and ownership concentration, both of which are considered as agency-cost control mechanisms, by taking into account the convergence of interests and entrenchment effects in the case of ownership concentration. Third, we contribute new evidence to corporate governance by focusing on the Spanish case. In fact, the Spanish case is interesting in itself because Spain is a civil law country and, according to La Porta et al.(1998), protection of Spanish investors is weaker than that of their UK and US counterparts. As a consequence, there is likely to be opportunistic behavior on the part of entrenched managers and expropriation activities on the part of majority owners, as documented in Miguel et al.(2004).Consequently, the aim of this paper is to analyse the role played by investment, financing and dividend decisions in explaining corporate ownership structure using Spanish firms. To achieve this aim, we derive two models (insider ownership and ownership concentration models) in accordance with financial theory. Both models are estimated by using panel data methodology in order to eliminate the unobservable heterogeneity. Specifically, we use the GMM to control for the endogeneity problem, the importance of which has been demonstrated by the abovementioned extensive literature on how ownership structure influences investment, financing and dividend decisions.According to our results, the following conclusions are reached. First, insiders tend to reduce their holdings when debt increases, as a consequence of their risk aversion. Second, the monitoring by large outside owners substitutes for the disciplinary role of debt. Third, higher dividends encourage insiders to increase their stakes in the firm so that they offset their lower potential of shirking by appropriatinga larger fraction of the dividends paid. Outside owners are also encouraged to increase their holdings in view of higher dividends, since dividends are tax deductible. Fourth, the levels of insider ownership and ownership concentration are also higher when new investments are undertaken, as a way to control for the greater opportunities for managerial discretion. Finally, managerial holdings depend on the firm’s free cash flow and investment opportunities, whereas outside owners do not seem to have such information when choosing their stakes.Our study involves two important methodological advances in the corporate governance literature. First, we consider a way of controlling for the endogeneity problem by using the GMM. Second, we control for the widely documented non-linearities between ownership structure and performance by using the method proposed by Miguel et al.(2004) to categorise the convergence of interests, entrenchment, monitoring and expropriation phenomena, and by entering this information into the model through the use of dummy variables interacted with the explanatory ownership variables. This new approach is applied to explain the diversity of ownership patterns across firms by highlighting the effect of investment, financing and dividend decisions on corporate ownership structure. Specifically, our evidence agrees with the growing interest shown by corporate governance literature in the relationship between ownership structure and both debt and dividends, since these two corporate decisions are shown to be major determinants of a fir m’s inside and outside shareholdings.The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our models and discusses the main theoretical arguments supporting the proposed relations. The data set and the methodology used in the estimation of the specified models are described in Section 3. The empirical results are discussed in the following section, and the paper finishes with our main conclusions.2. Theory and Econometric Specification2.1. Basic models of corporate ownership structureSince the main purpose of this paper is to study the role played by investment, financing and dividend decisions in explaining corporate ownership structure, thestarting point for our analysis is a basic model accounting for the effect of debt, dividends and investment decisions on a firm’s ownership structure. Financial theory suggests that ownership patterns differ between inside and outside shareholders, and we have thus specified two separate models: one explaining the firm’s insider ownership, the other explaining the level of ownership concentration.Let us now explain how financial theory supports our econometric specification by discussing the expected relationships in both models. Stulz(1988) argues that higher leverage allows managers to control more voting rights for a given stake in the firm, so that increments in the debt-to-capital ratio beyond a certain point lead managers to reduce their shareholdings. Moreover, since the firm’s shares become riskier as more debt is issued, managers are likely to own smaller shareholdings when their firm’s debt rises, because of their risk aversion and limited wealth. It is also widely accepted in financial literature that debt constrains managers since they must meet interest payments or face the likelihood of losing their jobs in case of bankruptcy (Jensen, 1986). Debt financing thus limits the private benefits that managers can obtain through the misuse of their dominant position and, consequently, the incentives to entrench through share ownership diminish. These arguments lead us to pose our first hypothesis, according to which:Hypothesis1: Higher debt levels lead to lower levels of insider ownership.The evidence in Denis and Sarin(1999) and Holderness et al.(1999)supports the existence of a negative effect of leverage on the firm’s level of insider ownership.On the other hand, the substitution hypothesis has often been brought into play to justify the negative association between ownership concentration and debt. Thus, if the firm’s debt provides some of the monitoring of managers that otherwise would have come from concentrated ownership, then higher leverage could be associated with lower levels of concentration. According to this substitutability, our second hypothesis states that:Hypothesis 2: Higher debt levels to lower levels of ownership concentration.The results in Grier and Zychowicz(1994) and Demsetz and Villalonga(2001) support the existence of a substitution effect between these two control mechanisms.Jensen(1986) points to dividend payments as an alternative to debt as a way of eliminating a firm’s free cash flow and, consequently, as a potential deterrent to managers’consumption of perquisites. On the basis of the idea that insiders may offset their lower potential of shirking by increasing the amount of dividends they receive through share ownership, our third hypothesis states that:Hypothesis 3: Higher dividends lead to higher insider ownership levels.On the other hand, Shleifer and Vishny(1986) justify the existence of a positive relationship between ownership concentration and dividends based on tax concerns, since large shareholders are usually other companies for which the received dividends are tax deductible. In this way, dividend payments can be seen as a way of encouraging the possession of higher stakes in the firm, as shown in Allen et al.(2000). The Spanish tax system is similar to that of the USA in that Spanish shareholders that are companies themselves are allowed to deduct a percentage of the dividends received from their income so that they face an effective dividend tax rate much lower than the capital gains tax rate. Taking into account that large Spanish shareholders are usually other companies, we can pursue the above-mentioned US-based tax argument and pose our fourth hypothesis:Hypothesis 4: Higher dividends lead to higher levels of ownership concentration.The effect of investment decisions on corporate ownership structure is not so straightforward. The reverse causality, however, has been widely accepted in financial literature, since investment is one of the major ways through which ownership structure affects a firm’s value. As Jensen and Meckling(1976) assert, managers’natural tendency is to allocate the firm’s resources in their own best interests, which may conflict with value maximisation. Therefore, the higher the insider equity ownership, the more likely it is that the conflicts between managers and shareholders will be resolved, and the more efficient their investment decisions will be. Accordingly, Himmelberg et al.(1999) propose that investment should positively affect insider ownership, since higher investment leads to greater opportunities for managerial discretion, which can be controlled for by means of increases in insider ownership. Consistent with this argument, our fifth hypothesis is as follows:Hypothesis 5: Higher investment leads to higher levels of insider ownershipFollowing this argument, and extending it to the level of ownership concentration by way of the monitoring hypothesis, we pose our sixth hypothesis according to which:Hypothesis 6: Higher investment leads to higher levels of ownership concentration.As suggested by Jensen(1986), the higher the firm’s free cash flow, the greater the managers’incentives to make their firms grow beyond their optimal size. If concentrated ownership solves free cash flow problems, then the desired level of insider ownership and ownership concentration in order to avoid overinvestment is expected to increase with the amount of free cash flow. On the basis of Jensen’s(1986) arguments, our seventh hypothesis states that:Hypothesis 7: Higher free cash flow levels lead to higher levels of inside and outside ownership concentration.The available empirical evidence, however, is contradictory. For instance, the results in Bergstrom and Rydqvist(1990) show that there is no significant relationship between equity concentration and free cash flow; whereas Lange and Sharpe(1995) and Himmelberg et al.(1999) find that free cash flow positively influences the firm’s ownership concentration and insider ownership, respectively.Insider trading literature supports the idea that insiders trade because they have private information about future prospects of firms, which grants them the opportunity to exploit the potential divergence between inside and market expectations and adjust their holdings to their firms’future performance for personal gain. Accordingly, Tobin’s q should thus be an important determinant of insider ownership, in such a way that managers in firms with better investment opportunities are expected to hold a larger fraction of their firms’ shares in order to take advantage of potential privileged information on the firm’s future performance. And a similar reaction would be expected from outside owners whenever they have access to such information. According to this argument, we pose our eighth hypothesis:Hypothesis 8: Higher Tobin’s q leads to higher levels of inside and outsideownership concentration.Using different proxies for Tobin’s q, the results in Cho(1998) and Denis and Sarin(1999) corroborate the expected positive effect of a firm’s investment opportunities on its managers’ownership, whereas Lange and Sharpe(1995) and Make and Li(2001) find no significant effect on the level of ownership concentration. In contrast, Demsetz and Villalonga(2001) report a negative coefficient for Tobin’s q in both insider ownership and ownership concentration equations, this negative effect being greater on insider ownership than on ownership concentration.Firm size is also controlled for in both models. According to Demsetz and Lehn(1985), firm size is negatively related to ownership concentration because the larger the firm, and the larger its capital resources, generally the more difficult it is to own a given fraction of the firm. Based on this idea, our last hypothesis is as follows: Hypothesis 9: Larger firms exhibit lower levels of inside and outside ownership concentration.This negative effect of firm size on inside and outside ownership concentration has been widely supported by previous research.Source: Julio Pindado, Chabela de la Torre. 2006, “The Role of Investment, Financing and Dividend Decisions in Explaining Corporate Ownership Structure: Empirical Evidence from Spain”. European Financial Management, V ol. 12, No. 5,pp.661-687.译文：投资，融资和股利决策在解释公司股权结构中的作用：来自西班牙的经验数据1、简介有广泛的理论和经验如何影响企业的所有制结构融资，分红和投资决策的研究。