企业融资决策中英文对照外文翻译文献
企业资金管理中英文对照外文翻译文献
企业资金管理中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)An Analysis of Working Capital Management Results Across IndustriesAbstractFirms are able to reduce financing costs and/or increase the fund s available for expansion by minimizing the amount of funds tied upin current assets. We provide insights into the performance of surv eyed firms across key components of working capital management by usi ng the CFO magazine’s annual Working CapitalManagement Survey. We discover that significant differences exist b etween industries in working capital measures across time.In addition.w e discover that these measures for working capital change significantl y within industries across time.IntroductionThe importance of efficient working capital management is indisputa ble. Working capital is the difference between resources in cash or readily convertible into cash (Current Assets) and organizational commi tments for which cash will soon be required (Current Liabilities). Th e objective of working capital management is to maintain the optimum balance of each of the working capital components. Business viabilit y relies on the ability to effectively manage receivables. inventory.a nd payables. Firms are able to reduce financing costs and/or increase the funds available for expansion by minimizing the amount of funds tied up in current assets. Much managerial effort is expended in b ringing non-optimal levels of current assets and liabilities back towa rd optimal levels. An optimal level would be one in which a balance is achieved between risk and efficiency.A recent example of business attempting to maximize working capita l management is the recurrent attention being given to the applicatio n of Six Sigma®methodology. Six S igma®methodologies help companies measure and ensure quality in all areas of the enterprise. When used to identify and rectify discrepancies.inefficiencies and erroneous tra nsactions in the financial supply chain. Six Sigma®reduces Days Sale s Outstanding (DSO).accelerates the payment cycle.improves customer sati sfaction and reduces the necessary amount and cost of working capital needs. There appear to be many success stories including Jennifertwon’s(2002) report of a 15percent decrease in days that sales are outstanding.resulting in an increased cash flow of approximately $2 million at Thibodaux Regional Medical Cenrer.Furthermore bad debts declined from 3.4millin to $6000000.However.Waxer’s(2003)study of multiple firms employing Six Sig ma®finds that it is really a “get rich slow”technique with a r ate of return hovering in the 1.2 – 4.5 percent range.Even in a business using Six Sigma®methodology. an “optimal”level of working capital management needs to be identified. Industry factors may impa ct firm credit policy.inventory management.and bill-paying activities. S ome firms may be better suited to minimize receivables and inventory. while others maximize payables. Another aspect of “optimal”is the extent to which poor financial results can be tied to sub-optimal pe rformance.Fortunately.these issues are testable with data published by CFO magazine. which claims to be the source of “tools and informati on for the financial executive.”and are the subject of this resear ch.In addition to providing mean and variance values for the working capital measures and the overall metric.two issues will be addressed in this research. One research question is. “are firms within a p articular industry clustered together at consistent levels of working capital measures?For instance.are firms in one industry able to quickl y transfer sales into cash.while firms from another industry tend to have high sales levels for the particular level of inventory . The other research question is. “does working capital management perform ance for firms within a given industry change from year-to-year?”The following section presents a brief literature review.Next.the r esearch method is described.including some information about the annual Working Capital Management Survey published by CFO magazine. Findings are then presented and conclusions are drawn.Related LiteratureThe importance of working capital management is not new to the f inance literature. Over twenty years ago. Largay and Stickney (1980) reported that the then-recent bankruptcy of W.T. Grant. a nationwide chain of department stores.should have been anticipated because the co rporation had been running a deficit cash flow from operations for e ight of the last ten years of its corporate life.As part of a stud y of the Fortune 500s financial management practices. Gilbert and Rei chert (1995) find that accounts receivable management models are used in 59 percent of these firms to improve working capital projects.wh ile inventory management models were used in 60 percent of the compa nies.More recently. Farragher. Kleiman and Sahu (1999) find that 55 p ercent of firms in the S&P Industrial index complete some form of a cash flow assessment. but did not present insights regarding account s receivable and inventory management. or the variations of any curre nt asset accounts or liability accounts across industries.Thus.mixed ev idence exists concerning the use of working capital management techniq ues.Theoretical determination of optimal trade credit limits are the s ubject of many articles over the years (e.g. Schwartz 1974; Scherr 1 996).with scant attention paid to actual accounts receivable management.Across a limited sample. Weinraub and Visscher (1998) observe a tend ency of firms with low levels of current ratios to also have low l evels of current liabilities. Simultaneously investigating accounts rece ivable and payable issues.Hill. Sartoris.and Ferguson (1984) find diffe rences in the way payment dates are defined. Payees define the date of payment as the date payment is received.while payors view paymen t as the postmark date.Additional WCM insight across firms.industries.a nd time can add to this body of research.Maness and Zietlow (2002. 51. 496) presents two models of value creation that incorporate effective short-term financial management acti vities.However.these models are generic models and do not consider uni que firm or industry influences. Maness and Zietlow discuss industry influences in a short paragraph that includes the observation that. “An industry a company is located in may have more influence on th at company’s fortunes than overall GNP”(2002. 507).In fact. a car eful review of this 627-page textbook finds only sporadic information on actual firm levels of WCM dimensions.virtually nothing on industr y factors except for some boxed items with titles such as. “Should a Retailer Offer an In-House Credit Card”(128) and nothing on WC M stability over time. This research will attempt to fill this void by investigating patterns related to working capital measures within industries and illustrate differences between industries across time.An extensive survey of library and Internet resources provided ver y few recent reports about working capital management. The most relev ant set of articles was Weisel and Bradley’s (2003) article on cash flow management and one of inventory control as a result of effect ive supply chain management by Hadley (2004).Research Method The CFO RankingsThe first annual CFO Working Capital Survey. a joint project with REL Consultancy Group.was published in the June 1997 issue of CFO (Mintz and Lezere 1997). REL is a London. England-based management co nsulting firm specializing in working capital issues for its global l ist of clients. The original survey reports several working capital b enchmarks for public companies using data for 1996. Each company is ranked against its peers and also against the entire field of 1.000 companies. REL continues to update the original information on an a nnual basis.REL uses the “cash flow from operations”value located on firm cash flow statements to estimate cash conversion efficiency (CCE). T his value indicates how well a company transforms revenues into cash flow. A “days of working capital”(DWC) value is based on the d ollar amount in each of the aggregate.equally-weighted receivables.inven tory.and payables accounts. The “days of working capital”(DNC) repr esents the time period between purchase of inventory on acccount fromvendor until the sale to the customer.the collection of the receiva bles. and payment receipt.Thus.it reflects the companys ability to fin ance its core operations with vendor credit. A detailed investigation of WCM is possible because CFO also provides firm and industry val ues for days sales outstanding (A/R).inventory turnover.and days payabl es outstanding (A/P).Research FindingsAverage and Annual Working Capital Management Performance Working capital management component definitions and average values for the entire 1996 –2000 period .Across the nearly 1.000 firms in the survey.cash flow from operations. defined as cash flow from operations divided by sales and referred to as “cash conversion ef ficiency”(CCE).averages 9.0 percent.Incorporating a 95 percent confide nce interval. CCE ranges from 5.6 percent to 12.4 percent. The days working capital (DWC). defined as the sum of receivables and invent ories less payables divided by daily sales.averages 51.8 days and is very similar to the days that sales are outstanding (50.6).because the inventory turnover rate (once every 32.0 days) is similar to the number of days that payables are outstanding (32.4 days).In all ins tances.the standard deviation is relatively small.suggesting that these working capital management variables are consistent across CFO report s.Industry Rankings on Overall Working Capital Management Perfo rmanceCFO magazine provides an overall working capital ranking for firms in its ing the following equation:Industry-based differences in overall working capital management are presented for the twenty-s ix industries that had at least eight companies included in the rank ings each year.In the typical year. CFO magazine ranks 970 companies during this period. Industries are listed in order of the mean ove rall CFO ranking of working capital performance. Since the best avera ge ranking possible for an eight-company industry is 4.5 (this assume s that the eight companies are ranked one through eight for the ent ire survey). it is quite obvious that all firms in the petroleum in dustry must have been receiving very high overall working capital man agement rankings.In fact.the petroleum industry is ranked first in CCE and third in DWC (as illustrated in Table 5 and discussed later i n this paper).Furthermore.the petroleum industry had the lowest standar d deviation of working capital rankings and range of working capital rankings. The only other industry with a mean overall ranking less than 100 was the Electric & Gas Utility industry.which ranked secon d in CCE and fourth in DWC. The two industries with the worst work ing capital rankings were Textiles and Apparel. Textiles rank twenty-s econd in CCE and twenty-sixth in DWC. The apparel industry ranks twenty-third and twenty-fourth in the two working capital measures ConclusionsThe research presented here is based on the annual ratings of wo rking capital management published in CFO magazine. Our findings indic ate a consistency in how industries “stack up”against each other over time with respect to the working capital measures.However.the wor king capital measures themselves are not static (i.e.. averages of wo rking capital measures across all firms change annually); our results indicate significant movements across our entire sample over time. O ur findings are important because they provide insight to working cap ital performance across time. and on working capital management across industries. These changes may be in explained in part by macroecono mic factors Changes in interest rates.rate of innovation.and competitio n are likely to impact working capital management. As interest rates rise.there would be less desire to make payments early.which would stretch accounts payable.accounts receivable.and cash accounts. The ra mifications of this study include the finding of distinct levels of WCM measures for different industries.which tend to be stable over ti me. Many factors help to explain this discovery. The improving econom y during the period of the study may have resulted in improved turn over in some industries.while slowing turnover may have been a signal of troubles ahead. Our results should be interpreted cautiously. Our study takes places over a short time frame during a generally impr oving market. In addition. the survey suffers from survivorship bias –only the top firms within each industry are ranked each year and the composition of those firms within the industry can change annua lly.Further research may take one of two lines.First.there could bea study of whether stock prices respond to CFO magazine’s publication of working capital management rating.Second,there could be a study of which if any of the working capital management components relate to share price performance.Given our results,there studies need to take industry membership into consideration when estimating stock price reaction to working capital management performance.对整个行业中营运资金管理的研究格雷格Filbeck.Schweser学习计划托马斯M克鲁格.威斯康星大学拉克罗斯摘要:企业能够降低融资成本或者尽量减少绑定在流动资产上的成立基金数额来用于扩大现有的资金。
研究中小企业融资要参考的英文文献
研究中小企业融资要参考的英文文献在研究中小企业融资问题时，寻找相关的英文文献是获取国际经验和最佳实践的重要途径。
以下是一些值得参考的英文文献，涵盖了中小企业融资的理论背景、现状分析、政策建议以及案例研究等方面。
“Financing Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: A Global Perspective”, by P.K. Agarwal, A.K. Dixit, and J.C. Garmaise. This book provides an comprehensive overview of the issues and challenges related to financing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) around the world. It presents an analytical framework for understanding the different dimensions of SME financing and outlines best practices and policy recommendations for improving access to finance for these businesses.“The Financing of SMEs: A Review of the Literature and Empirical Evidence”, by R. E. Cull, L. P. Ciccantelli, and J. Valentin. This paper provides a comprehensive literature review on the financing challenges faced by SMEs, exploring the various factors that influence their access to finance,including information asymmetries, lack of collateral, and limited access to formal financial markets. The paper also presents empirical evidence on the impact of different financing strategies on SME performance and outlines policy recommendations for addressing these challenges.“The Role of Microfinance in SME Finance: A Review of the Literature”, by S. Hossain, M.A. Iftekhar, and N. Choudhury. This paper focuses on the role of microfinance in financing SMEs and explores the advantages and disadvantages of microfinance as a financing option for SMEs. It also outlines the potential for microfinance to play a greater role in supporting SME development in emerging markets and provides policy recommendations for achieving this objective.“The Political Economy of SME Finance: Evidence fromCross-Country Data”, by D.J. Mullen and J.R. Roberts. This paper examines the political economy of SME finance, exploring the relationship between government policies, market institutions, and SME financing constraints. Usingcross-country data, the paper finds evidence that government policies can have a significant impact on SME access to finance and that countries with better market institutions are more successful in supporting SME development. The paper provides policy recommendations for improving SME financing in different political and institutional settings.“Financing SMEs in Developing Countries: A Case Study of India”, by S. Bhattacharya, S. Ghosh, and R. Panda. This case study explores the financing challenges faced by SMEs in India and identifies the factors that limit their access to finance, including government policies, market institutions, and cultural traditions. It also presents an in-depth analysis of the various financing options available to SMEs in India, such as informal credit markets, microfinance institutions, and banks, and outlines policy recommendations for enhancing access to finance for these businesses.这些文献提供了对中小企业融资问题的多维度理解，并提供了实用的政策建议和案例研究，有助于更好地解决中小企业的融资需求。
中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献
中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献Title: Financing Channels for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises: A Comparative Analysis of Chinese and English LiteratureIntroduction:Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play a crucial role in driving economic growth, job creation, and innovation. However, they often face challenges in accessing finance due to limited assets, credit history, and information transparency. This article aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of financing channels for SMEs, comparing existing literature in both Chinese and English.1. Overview of SME Financing Channels:1.1 Bank Loans:Traditional bank loans are a common financing option for SMEs. They offer advantages such as long-term repayment periods, lower interest rates, and established banking relationships. However, obtaining bank loans may be challenging for SMEs with insufficient collateral or creditworthiness.1.2 Venture Capital and Private Equity:Venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE) attract external investments in exchange for equity stakes. These financing channels are particularly suitable for high-growth potential SMEs. VC/PE investors often provide not only financial resources but also expertise and networks to support SMEs' growth. However, SMEs may face challenges in meeting the stringent criteria required by VC/PE firms, limiting accessibility.1.3 Angel Investment:Angel investors are wealthy individuals who provide early-stage funding to SMEs. They are often interested in innovative and high-potential ventures. Angel investments can bridge the funding gap during a company's initial stages, but SMEs need to actively seek out and convince potential angel investors to secure funding.1.4 Government Grants and Subsidies:Governments offer grants and subsidies to support SMEs' business development and innovation. These resources play a pivotal role in ensuring SMEs' survival and growth. However, the application process can be cumbersome, and the competition for these funds is usually high.1.5 Crowdfunding:Crowdfunding platforms allow SMEs to raise capital from a large poolof individual investors. This channel provides opportunities for SMEs to showcase their products or services and engage directly with potential customers. However, the success of crowdfunding campaigns depends on effective marketing strategies and compelling narratives.2. Comparative Analysis:2.1 Chinese Literature on SME Financing Channels:In Chinese literature, research on SME financing channels focuses on the unique challenges faced by Chinese SMEs, such as information asymmetry, high collateral requirements, and insufficient financial transparency. Studiesemphasize the importance of government policies, bank loans, and alternative financing channels like venture capital and private equity.2.2 English Literature on SME Financing Channels:English literature encompasses a broader range of financing channels and their implications for SMEs worldwide. It highlights the significance of business angel investment, crowdfunding, trade credit, factoring, and peer-to-peer lending. The literature also emphasizes the role of financial technology (fintech) in expanding SMEs' access to finance.3. Recommendations for SMEs:3.1 Enhancing Financial Literacy:SMEs should invest in improving their financial literacy to understand different financing options and strategies. This knowledge will help them position themselves more effectively when seeking external funding.3.2 Diversifying Funding Sources:To mitigate financing risks, SMEs should explore multiple channels simultaneously. A diversified funding portfolio can help SMEs access different sources of capital while reducing dependence on a single channel.3.3 Building Relationships:Developing relationships with banks, investors, and relevant stakeholders is crucial for SMEs seeking financing. Strong networks and connections can provide valuable support and increase the likelihood of securing funding.Conclusion:Access to appropriate financing channels is crucial for the growth and development of SMEs. This analysis of financing channels for SMEs, comparing Chinese and English literature, highlights the diverse options available. By understanding the strengths and limitations of each channel, SMEs can make informed decisions and adopt strategies that align with their unique business requirements. Governments, financial institutions, and other stakeholders should continue to collaborate in creating an enabling environment that facilitates SMEs' access to finance.。
中小型企业融资决策-外文翻译
中小型企业融资决策-外文翻译外文资料翻译译文中小型企业融资决策融资租赁(金融租赁)也被称为设备租赁(设备租赁),或现代租赁(现代租赁),基本上是全部或大部分的资产所有权转移风险和报酬的租赁。
终极所有权的资产转移,也可能不转移。
它指的具体内容承租人出租人在租赁对象和特定需求的供应商选择、供应商融资购买租赁财产,和使用出租给承租人,承租人对出租人分期支付租金,在租赁期内租赁对象的所有权属于出租人所有,承租人有权使用租赁项目。
任期届满,承租人支付租金在完成融资租赁合同履行义务,租赁对象所有权归属的承租人。
尽管融资租赁交易,租赁公司购买设备的身份,但购买的实质性内容设备供应商的选择等设备的具体要求,由承租人购买合同谈判的条件享受和锻炼,承租人租赁对象本质上是买方。
,是一个融资租赁贷款和贸易和技术更新的扩展新的综合金融行业。
因为它扩展的贷款和组合特征,有一个问题在租赁公司可以回收、处理租赁,所以企业的融资信贷和担保的主要要求,非常适合中小企业融资。
此外,负债融资租赁,不反映在企业的财务报表责任,不影响企业的信用状况。
这种多渠道融资需求的中小企业而言是非常有利的。
传统性质的租赁和融资租赁的区别就是:传统租赁以承租人租赁使用物件的时间租金、融资成本和融资租赁租金的租户占用时间。
市场经济发展到一定阶段和适应一个强大的融资,在1950年代在美国有一个新的类型的交易,因为它适应了现代经济发展的要求,在60 到70年世界上快速发展,如今已成为一个企业更新设备融资的主要方式之一,被称为“朝阳产业。
“中国在1980年代早期在这个操作模式的介绍了10年的快速发展,与发达国家相比,租赁的优势远未结束,市场潜力是巨大的。
租赁的主要特征租赁的主要特征是:对象的所有权,租赁是出租人为了控制租户租金还款的风险采取的一种形式所有权,在合同结束时最终有可能转移给承租人,租赁租赁人选择购买产品,从租户负责维护出租人只提供金融服务。
租金计算原则是:出租人租赁对象购买价格的基础上,由承租人向出租人资金时间的基础上,根据双方同意租赁利率。
融资过程外文翻译外文文献英文文献融资过程中啄食顺序理论的一个
外文原文Management Research News，Volume 25 Number 12，2002A Rational Justification of the Pecking Order Hypothesis to theChoice of Sources of FinancingBy Vuong Duc Hoang Quan外文翻译原文来自：Management Research News，Volume 25 Number 12，2002：74-90融资过程中啄食顺序理论的一个合理证明Vuong Duc Hoang Quan摘要自从被Stewart Myers (1984)发展以来，啄食顺序理论在近期把研究重心从传统静态权衡理论转移到其他理论的研究的趋势中成为了一道亮点，它试图为公司资本结构的行为寻求一个合理的解释。
这篇文章通过建立啄食顺序理论和与之有明显对立的MM定理1之间的关系，提出了啄食顺序理论的一个合理证明。
为支持我们的解释，在推论过程中，我们采用各种各样现有的理论，包括税盾理论、破产成本理论、代理理论、信号理论和管理风险厌恶理论等，这些证明啄食顺序理论的论据，其内涵也被简要地讨论了。
关键词：公司融资；资本结构；啄食顺序理论介绍企业怎样选择资本结构及其影响因素是公司财务上一个很有争议的根本问题。
传统上，资本结构的形成被认为是有利税率之间静态权衡的结果。
税收优势提倡增加债务，它与破产风险相对，破产风险更偏好于股权融资的使用。
尽管如此，近期的研究已经呈现出了从静态权衡理论为焦点到其他理论的研究的转移，从而试图寻找出一个对资本结构行为更进一步的解释。
Myers (1984)谈到的啄食顺序理论最早是由Donaldson (1961)始创的，是用来描述企业管理者为减轻不对称信息引起的投资不足问题的缺陷而优先采取的融资方式的选择这一融资实际。
因此相对于外源融资，任何类型的企业更倾向于内源融资。
小微企业融资外文文献翻译
小微企业融资外文文献翻译the XXX credit to small and medium enterprises (SMEs)。
However。
micro enterprises (MEs) which are smaller than SMEs。
have been XXX。
using a path XXX finance。
such as family and friends。
due to the lack of access to formal finance。
Path dependence is also evident。
XXX finance.翻译：乌干达的小微企业融资：路径依赖和其他融资决策的决定因素XXX：Winifred XXX-XXX博士摘要：发展中国家的融资文献主要关注正规金融机构向中小型企业（SMEs）提供信贷的角色。
然而，小微企业（MEs）比SMEs更小，却被忽视了。
本文使用路径依赖框架，研究了乌干达小微企业的融资决策，识别了影响它们获得融资的因素。
研究发现，由于缺乏正规融资渠道，小微企业严重依赖非正规融资来源，如家人和朋友。
路径依赖也很明显，过去的融资决策和与非正规融资来源的关系影响了当前的融资决策。
本研究建议政策应着重改善小微企业获得正规融资的渠道，并促进金融素养，减少对非正规融资来源的依赖。
Access to credit is crucial for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and micro enterprises。
as they are considered to be the main drivers of economic growth。
In e countries。
XXX role than SMEs。
XXX-agricultural self-XXX。
XXX due to the way they are XXX。
中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献
中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：The areas of SME financing channels: an overview 1.IntroductionIn all countries, SMEs are an important source of economic growth and create jobs. In addition, these companies through their dynamism and flexibility, the power of innovation and development.The research method is to start from the literature to highlight the importance of the theme of our research. This paper analyzes the data and statistics based on mainly by the World Bank survey, small and medium-sized private enterprises in Romania by some empirical research. According to the method used, and pointed out the importance of financing of SMEs and enhance the public bodies concerned about, especially the measures taken to improve financial development.2.the literature on SMEs financing channelsA popular academic literature on the financing channels of SMEs, has witnessed a lot of research to solve this problem.Countless research studies have indicated that financing channels is a critical obstacle in the growth and development process, especially in small and medium enterprises.Through Baker Dumont reggae - Ke Lute, Ivan, and Marca Smokin Popovich (2004) research, reflecting the fundamental factors of 10 000 enterprises from 80 countries mainly depend on the financing of enterprises. Therefore, the relationship between the study highlights the corporate finance and its characteristics such as age, size and structure of property rights. From this perspective, the authors found that the small size of the young company, and face greater obstacles when they seek financial resources.The iResearch Dick Mei Leke and Salta (2011) analysis of macroeconomic and institutional factors affecting SME financing loans through the statistical data found. In other similar studies, the authors found a positive correlation between the overall economic development (a measure of per capita income) and financial development (measured by private lending ratio of gross domestic product), on the other hand, the level of SME financing is the opposite. In addition, the authors show that the level of financing for SMEs depends on the legal structure and overall business environment.3.in the process of SME financing in the general obstaclesIn general, access to financial products or financial services or financial inclusion assumes that there is no trade barriers to the use of financial products or services, regardless of whether these barriers or non-related pricing (Dumont reggae - Ke Lute, Baker, and Honorine root 2008:2). Therefore, to improve this means of access means increasing the degree of financial products or financial services at a fair price toeveryone.Enterprise does not use financial products or services can be divided into several categories, their identification is necessary, in order to take the necessary measures to improve their financing channels. Therefore, on the one hand, enterprises obtain financing, the financial products and services, but do not use them because they do not have a viable investment projects. On the other hand, it can distinguish between non-voluntary refuse corporate Although these business needs, but not have access to financial services. The status of independent corporate finance or financial services in some companies do not earn enough money or safeguards required by financing institutions and therefore have higher credit risk. At the same time, when some companies in need of funding, financial and banking institutions involved too costly and can not agree to financing. Finally, in the context of the enterprise refused to appear over-priced financial products or services and financial products or services that meet their requirements.Financing channels for enterprise development and the efficient allocation of funds essential. However, compared with large enterprises, SMEs seeking finance is facing many difficulties, because of several reasons, including: the judicial and legislative structure of the instability and imperfect, it does not support the enterprises in need of financing and funding the relationship between; part of the funding and corporate information is incomplete or even lack of information, which hinders the normal and efficient development of relations between enterprises and providers of finance; especially in the young company, the lack of credit history and guarantees the creditors, and sometimes limits the range of financial products that can be used.The number of surveys, especially the World Bank stressed that the financing is one of the biggest obstacle to good development and growth of the SME. For example, the World Bank in the 2006-2009 survey foundthat 31% of the worldwide study of corporate finance is a major obstacle to the current implementation, and even higher proportion of young company in the 40% of cases up to three years of experience (Chavez, kt Boer and Ireland 2010:1). In addition, a series of global surveys, including the information provided by the World Business Environment Survey show that SME financing transaction costs is the main obstacle to enterprise development.4.SME bank financing difficulties and support measuresIn most countries, especially in countries with bank-oriented financial system, the main source of external financing for SMEs by bank loans. Therefore, this type of loan is crucial to the development of SMEs. However, the survey showed, compared to the SMEs and large enterprises are using the new investment in the small extent of bank financing.As we mentioned, the use of financial products is determined by supply and demand. It is therefore important to understand why the SMEs use bank financing to a small extent only. In this regard, some studies (Banerjee and Duflo: 2004) has shown that the main reason for the supply, because every time when SMEs are able to obtain loans, they use it to increase production. This behavior is more proof of financing is an important factor in the development of enterprises. In addition, in the context of the current global financial crisis, the declining availability of bank loans and limited financing opportunities for SMEs. Therefore, it is the main problem facing small and medium enterprises.October 29, 2010, this survey of SMEs in Romania highlights the main problems faced by SMEs and banks. Therefore, 82% of the interviewed entrepreneurs obtain bank financing is very difficult, mainly because of excessive bureaucracy, unreasonable high demand, high interest rates, rigid bank credit indicators, as well as many types of commission and expenses. In addition, more than 61% of SMEentrepreneurs and managers reporting banks lack of transparency (hidden costs, lack of communication channels, etc.), there is no real consultation (using the standard contract, the bank refused to modify or complete the credit contract, etc.) and banks do not legitimate or misuse of the terms of the contract (for example, perform the unauthorized transaction accounts or bank fraud). Understanding this knowledge to take measures to support and promote SME financing.Improve SME financing is still cause for concern, but also national, European and international facing a challenge. For example, in the EU, through the implementation of the new measures established by the Small Business Administration for Europe to improve the financing channels for SMEs, by reducing the return of the structural funds requirements to promote the access of small and medium enterprises, the establishment of the Credit Ombudsman to promote small and medium-sized enterprises and dialogue between the credit institutions, to avoid the double taxation of the tax legislation, which will hinder the international venture capital plays an important role.In particular, empirical research, emphasizing the impact of the degree of financial development of a country is essential that the level of development of the SME financing. Therefore, a series of measures to support SMEs to obtain financing, to ensure the efficient development of the country's financial, which will ensure greater availability of corporate finance. Specifically, the authorities should take measures commonly used to measure the degree of financial development in the seven pillars, namely, the institutional environment, business environment, financial stability, banking and financial services, non-bank financial services, financial markets and access to finance.5 .ConclusionEffective financing for SMEs to create new business is of great significance, and existing growth and development of enterprises, whilepromoting the country's economic and social development. In addition, in the case of the economic crisis, SMEs contribute to restoring the national economy, so it is particularly important to support SME financing. However, most of the survey report stressed, always the financing channels of SMEs is one of the most important factor to affect its operation and development.SMEs trying to get the necessary financial resources to face difficulties related to the entrepreneurs and the economic environment of each country, as well as existing legal and institutional structure. To alleviate these difficulties, the measures taken by public authorities should focus on improving the financial development and to ensure that the corporate finance and economic growth, greater effectiveness.In various countries, including Romania, the decline on the availability of SME financing, or even the lack of statistical data, we believe that policy makers need to focus on and monitor a series of important indicators, depending on the size of the SMEs, experience and industry events share of its loans, which will benefit the public authorities, creditors and investors.原文来自罗马·安吉拉中小企业的融资渠道的领域:概述（奥拉迪亚大学：经济科学，2011年第一卷第一期，431-437）摘要通过中小企业在创造附加值和新的就业岗位中的贡献,使它在国家的经济和社会发展中拥有一个显著的角色。
中小企业融资问题英文参考文献(精选122个最新)
近年来，随着中小企业的飞速发展，中小企业融资问题，已经成为一些中小企业进一步发展所面临的“瓶颈”。
在我国经济体制转型和经济结构调整的特殊历史时期,中小企业融资问题不仅表现得较为突出,也更为复杂。
下面是搜索整理的中小企业融资问题英文参考文献，欢迎借鉴参考。
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Acta Universitatis Danubius: Oeconomica,2016,12(6).[115]Fabio Albuquerque,Joaquín Texeira Quirós,Rosário Justino. Are the cultural accounting values a relevant issue for the SMEs’ financing options?[J]. Contadur ía y Administración,2017,62(1).[116]Cheng Zhang. Small and medium-sized enterprises closed-loop supply chain finance risk based on evolutionary game theory and system dynamics[J]. Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University (Science),2016,21(3).[117]Hezron Mogaka Osano,Hilario Languitone. Factors influencing access to finance by SMEs in Mozambique: case of SMEs in Maputo central business district[J]. Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship,2016,5(1).[118]Mohamed Shaban,Meryem Duygun,John Fry. SME's lending and Islamic finance. Is it a “win–win” situation?[J]. Economic Modelling,2016,55.[119]Pengfei Luo,Huamao Wang,Zhaojun Yang. Investment and financing for SMEs with a partial guarantee and jump risk[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2016,249(3).[120]David F. Moreira. The Microeconomic Impact on Growth of SMEs When the Access to Finance Widens: Evidence from Internet & High-tech Industry[J]. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences,2016,220.[121]Wei NIE,Yueliang SU. Credit Risk Evaluation of SMEs Based on Supply ChainFinancing[J]. Management Science and Engineering,2016,10(2).[122]Alexandra Moritz,Joern H. Block,Andreas Heinz. Financing patterns of European SMEs – an empirical taxonomy[J]. Venture Capital,2016,18(2).以上就是关于中小企业融资问题英文参考文献的分享，希望对你有所帮助。
小微企业融资外文文献翻译
小微企业融资外文文献翻译小微企业融资外文文献翻译(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Micro Enterprise Finance in Uganda: Path Dependence and Other and Determinants of Financing DecisionsDr. Winifred Tarinyeba- KiryabwireAbstractAccess to finance literature in developing countries focuses onaccess to credit constraints of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) micro enterprises because they are considered the drivers of economic growth. However, in low income countries, micro enterprises play a much more significant role than SMEs because of their contribution to non-agricultural self-employment. The predominant use of informal credit rather than formal credit shows that the manner in which micro enterprises are formed and conduct their businesses favors the former over the latter. In addition, other factors such as lengthy credit application procedures, negative perceptions about credit application processes make informal credit more attractive. On the other hand specific factors such as business diversification, the need to acquire business inputs or assets than cannot be obtained using supplier credit are associated with a tendency to use formal credit.IntroductionIt well established that in markets where access to credit is constrained, it is the smaller businesses that have the most difficulty accessing credit. Various policy interventions have been made to improve access to credit including reforming the information and contractual frameworks, macro-economic performance, competitiveness in the financial system, and regulatory frameworks that enablefinancial institutions to develop products for SMEs such as leasing and factoring. Over the past ten years, policy makers in developing and low income countries have focused on microfinance as an intervention to bridge the access to credit gap and improve access to credit for those than cannot obtain credit from mainstream financial institutions such as commercial banks. However, despite, the use of what are often termed as “innovative lending” methods that are designed to ease access to credit, such as use of group lending and other collateral substitutes, micro enterprises continue to rely heavily on informal finance as opposed to formal credit. While other studies have focused broadly on factors that inhibit access to credit, this article seeks to throw some light on specific characteristics of micro enterprises that make them more inclined to use informal credit, as well as specific factors that are more associated with use of formal credit. The former are what I term as path dependence factors.The majority of micro enterprises operate as informally established sole proprietorships. This finding is consistent with the literature on micro enterprises, particularly the fact that they operate in the informal sector. However, nearly all of the enterprises had some form of trading license issued by the local government of the area in whichthey operate. The license identifies the owner of the business and its location, and is renewable every financial year. Most respondents did not understand the concept of business incorporation and thought that having a trading license meant that they were incorporated. Several factors can be attributed to the manner in which micro enterprises are established. First, proprietors generally understand neither the concept of incorporation nor the financial and legal implications of establishing a business as a legal entity separate from its owner. Second, the majority of micro enterprises start as spontaneous business or economic opportunities, rather than as well-thought out business ventures, particularly businesses that operate by the road side, or in other strategic areas, such as telephone booths that operate along busy streets. The owners are primarily concerned with the economic opportunity that the business presents rather than with the formalities of establishing the business. Third, rule of law issues also explain the manner in which businesses generally are established and financed. Although a mechanism exists for incorporating businesses in Uganda, the process and the legal and regulatory burdens, associated with formalizing a business, create costs that, in most cases, far outweigh the benefits or even the economic opportunity created by the business.Commenting on the role of law in determining the efficiency of the economic activities it regulates, Hernando De Soto argues that if laws impede or disrupt economic efficiency, they not only impose unnecessary costs of accessing and remaining in the formal system, but costs of operating informally as well. The former include the time and cost of registering a business, taxes and complying with bureaucratic procedures. On the other hand, the costs of informality include costs of avoiding penalties, evading taxes and labor laws and costs that result from absence of good laws such as not inadequate property rights protection, inability to use the contract system, and inefficiencies associated with extra contractual law.Businesses in Uganda are registered by the Registrar of Companies under the Company’s Act. The office of the Registrar of Companies is located in the capital city of Kampala and this imposes a burden on businesses that operate in other parts of the country that would wish to be registered. However, remoteness of the business registration office was not the primary inhibitor because the tendency not to register was as pronounced in businesses close to the registration office, as it was in those that were remotely placed. In addition, the following fees are required to incorporate a company: a name search andreservation fee of Ugshs. 25,000 ($12.50), stamp duty of 0.5% of the value of the share capital, memorandum and articles of association registration fee of Ugshs. 35,000 ($17.5), and a registration fee ranging from Ugshs. 50,000 to 4,000,000 ($25 to 2000).Legal systems characterized by low regulatory burden, shareholder and creditor rights protection, and efficient bankruptcy processes are associated with incorporated businesses and increased access to finance. On the other hand, inadequate legal protection is associated with limited business incorporation, low joint entrepreneurial activity, and higher financing obstacles. These impediments are what De Soto refers to as the mystery of legal failure. He argues that although nearly every developing and former communist nation has a formal property system, most citizens cannot gain access to it and their only alternative is to retreat with their assets into the extra legal sector where they can live and do business.译文乌干达小微企业融资路径依赖和融资的决定性因素Dr. Winifred Tarinyeba- Kiryabwire摘要通过查阅发展中国家的金融文献，我们往往可以发现由于中小企业是推动发展中国家经济增长的主要动力源，其金融问趣则主要侧重于中小企业的融资受限方面。
【DOC】-民营企业融资问题研究外文文献===
民营企业融资问题研究外文文献===民营企业融资问题研究外文文献Economic reform and the opening of policies is changing Chinafor the common good. Among those to benefit are transnational corporations who have been making large-scale investments in China. But some of these influential conglomerates and companies are becoming a little uneasy. A recent report warned such foreign business giants were building monopolies here.After a year of investigation, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce's Fair Trade Bureau published a reportentitled "The Competition-restricting Behavior of Multinational Companies in China and Countermeasures." The report gave specifics, such as Microsoft's operating system software and Tetra Pak's packaging materials each holding a 95 per cent share of theChinese market. Eastman Kodak, which formerly held more than 50per cent of China's roll film market, is expected to further consolidate its dominance after taking 20 per cent of its sole major Chinese rival, Lucky Film Corp.According to the report, some transnational companies have been using their dominant roles in technology, brand recognition and capital and management to suppress competitors and maximizeprofits from the Chinese mainland. For example, on the eve of the release of WPS97 - a set of computer programmes developed by a Chinese company - a multinational hurriedly brought forward its version of the same product at much lower prices. To ensure dominance, some multinationals had carried out sweeping mergersand acquisitions to absorb their major competitors. This reportlists a number of industries where free competition may be threatened by multinationals, including software, photosensitive material, mobile phones, cameras, tires and soft packaging.From above mentioned report, we should not jump to such a conclusion that the Chinese anti-monopoly law is only directed against the multinational corporations. But no doubt, this reporthas shown grave concern of Chinese Government over the foreign invested giants in the domestic markets. China's admission to the WTO and the further opening up of Chinese markets to the outside world means more and more transnational corporations will enter the Chinese markets. In addition to the high-level technologies, abundant financial resources, world famous trademarks and strong sales networks, the multinational corporations can also rely on various supports from their parent corporations. In market competition, they can quickly acquire dominant positions, even monopolies.In order to prevent transnational corporations both from monopolizing Chinese markets and from abusing market dominant positions, China urgently needs to adopt an anti-monopoly law. Since the anti-monopoly law targets also the abusing of dominant positions, such a law will serve as an important tool for China to check the influence of the transnational corporations. In my opinion, this report should be regarded as a push for Chineseanti-monopoly legislation.Because of its concern about negative influences of the multinational corporations upon competition, the Chinese Government promulgated "The Provisional Rules on Mergers with and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors" last year.Article 19 stipulates that "if any merger with and acquisitionof a domestic enterprise involves any of the following circumstances," the investors shall submit a report thereon to the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC): (1) the business turnover in the China market of a party to the merger or acquisition in thecurrent year exceeds 1.5 billion yuan (US$181 million); (2) the aggregate number of mergers and acquisitions of domestic enterprises in the relevant industry in China within one year exceeds ten; (3) the share of the Chinese market of a party to the merger or acquisition has reached 20 per cent; or (4) the merger or acquisition will result in the share of the Chinese market of aparty to the merger or acquisition reaching 25 per cent. Even ifno circumstances set out in the previous paragraph exist, MOFCOMor SAIC may still require any foreign investors to submit a report, after any competing domestic enterprise, relevant authority or industrial association so requests, and MOFCOM or SAIC believesthat the merger or acquisition by foreign investors involves an enormous market share, or there exists any other major factors which may substantially influence market competition, the national economy and people's livelihood or the economic security of the state. "A party to the merger or acquisition" referred above shall include any affiliates of the foreign investor.According to Article 20, if any merger with or acquisition of domestic enterprises by a foreign investor involves any of the circumstances set out in Article 19 "hereof, and, according to MOFCOM and SAIC, may result in excessive concentration so as to jeopardize fair competition and harm consumers' interests, MOFCOM and SAIC shall, within 90 days from the date on which all the documents submitted are received, jointly or, upon consultation, solely summon the relevant departments, institutions, enterprises and other interested parties to a hearing, before deciding whether or not to grant the approval in accordance with the law."The implement of Article 20 needs detailed rules, for examplefor interpreting "excessive concentration" or "fair competition'. Due to the lack of such details, the Provisional Rules on Mergers have not been used in concrete cases to date.Obviously, the Provisional Rules on Mergers is aimed to control the market power caused by transnational corporations in Chinese markets. But in my opinion, the Rules, directed against onlyforeign investors, have no vitality, because it could be regarded as a discriminative treatment, and such treatment flies in theface of WTO principles.Also the economic globalization and the wave of transnational movements in terms of capitals and technologies, the nationalities of a lot of corporations seem unclear - sometimes even difficultto be identified.Of course, in view of the stronger financial forces and higher techniques of the transnational corporations compared with the national enterprises, it is necessary for the government tocontrol merger and acquisitions by foreign investors so as to prohibit abusive activities by foreign enterprises with dominant positions in the Chinese markets.For this purpose, the best way is to establish and implement an effective antitrust law in order to provide a free and fair competitive environment to all enterprises, no matter if they are private or public, foreign or domestic.It has been proved that almost any monopoly, either private or administrative, either by domestic enterprises or by multinational corporations, should not be deemed right.I am confident that not only the Chinese people, but also both domestic and foreign-invested businesses, will benefit fromChina's future anti-monopoly legislation.The creation of the anti-monopoly law was put on the legislative agenda at the 10th NPC in its five-year tenure, which ends in March 2008. (The author Wang Xiaoye is a researcher at theInstitute of Legal Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.)。
企业资金管理中英文对照外文翻译文献
企业资金管理中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)An Analysis of Working Capital Management Results Across IndustriesAbstractFirms are able to reduce financing costs and/or increase the fund s available for expansion by minimizing the amount of funds tied upin current assets. We provide insights into the performance of surv eyed firms across key components of working capital management by usi ng the CFO magazine’s annual Working CapitalManagement Survey. We discover that significant differences exist b etween industries in working capital measures across time.In addition.w e discover that these measures for working capital change significantl y within industries across time.IntroductionThe importance of efficient working capital management is indisputa ble. Working capital is the difference between resources in cash or readily convertible into cash (Current Assets) and organizational commi tments for which cash will soon be required (Current Liabilities). Th e objective of working capital management is to maintain the optimum balance of each of the working capital components. Business viabilit y relies on the ability to effectively manage receivables. inventory.a nd payables. Firms are able to reduce financing costs and/or increase the funds available for expansion by minimizing the amount of funds tied up in current assets. Much managerial effort is expended in b ringing non-optimal levels of current assets and liabilities back towa rd optimal levels. An optimal level would be one in which a balance is achieved between risk and efficiency.A recent example of business attempting to maximize working capita l management is the recurrent attention being given to the applicatio n of Six Sigma®methodology. Six S igma®methodologies help companies measure and ensure quality in all areas of the enterprise. When used to identify and rectify discrepancies.inefficiencies and erroneous tra nsactions in the financial supply chain. Six Sigma®reduces Days Sale s Outstanding (DSO).accelerates the payment cycle.improves customer sati sfaction and reduces the necessary amount and cost of working capital needs. There appear to be many success stories including Jennifertwon’s(2002) report of a 15percent decrease in days that sales are outstanding.resulting in an increased cash flow of approximately $2 million at Thibodaux Regional Medical Cenrer.Furthermore bad debts declined from 3.4millin to $6000000.However.Waxer’s(2003)study of multiple firms employing Six Sig ma®finds that it is really a “get rich slow”technique with a r ate of return hovering in the 1.2 – 4.5 percent range.Even in a business using Six Sigma®methodology. an “optimal”level of working capital management needs to be identified. Industry factors may impa ct firm credit policy.inventory management.and bill-paying activities. S ome firms may be better suited to minimize receivables and inventory. while others maximize payables. Another aspect of “optimal”is the extent to which poor financial results can be tied to sub-optimal pe rformance.Fortunately.these issues are testable with data published by CFO magazine. which claims to be the source of “tools and informati on for the financial executive.”and are the subject of this resear ch.In addition to providing mean and variance values for the working capital measures and the overall metric.two issues will be addressed in this research. One research question is. “are firms within a p articular industry clustered together at consistent levels of working capital measures?For instance.are firms in one industry able to quickl y transfer sales into cash.while firms from another industry tend to have high sales levels for the particular level of inventory . The other research question is. “does working capital management perform ance for firms within a given industry change from year-to-year?”The following section presents a brief literature review.Next.the r esearch method is described.including some information about the annual Working Capital Management Survey published by CFO magazine. Findings are then presented and conclusions are drawn.Related LiteratureThe importance of working capital management is not new to the f inance literature. Over twenty years ago. Largay and Stickney (1980) reported that the then-recent bankruptcy of W.T. Grant. a nationwide chain of department stores.should have been anticipated because the co rporation had been running a deficit cash flow from operations for e ight of the last ten years of its corporate life.As part of a stud y of the Fortune 500s financial management practices. Gilbert and Rei chert (1995) find that accounts receivable management models are used in 59 percent of these firms to improve working capital projects.wh ile inventory management models were used in 60 percent of the compa nies.More recently. Farragher. Kleiman and Sahu (1999) find that 55 p ercent of firms in the S&P Industrial index complete some form of a cash flow assessment. but did not present insights regarding account s receivable and inventory management. or the variations of any curre nt asset accounts or liability accounts across industries.Thus.mixed ev idence exists concerning the use of working capital management techniq ues.Theoretical determination of optimal trade credit limits are the s ubject of many articles over the years (e.g. Schwartz 1974; Scherr 1 996).with scant attention paid to actual accounts receivable management.Across a limited sample. Weinraub and Visscher (1998) observe a tend ency of firms with low levels of current ratios to also have low l evels of current liabilities. Simultaneously investigating accounts rece ivable and payable issues.Hill. Sartoris.and Ferguson (1984) find diffe rences in the way payment dates are defined. Payees define the date of payment as the date payment is received.while payors view paymen t as the postmark date.Additional WCM insight across firms.industries.a nd time can add to this body of research.Maness and Zietlow (2002. 51. 496) presents two models of value creation that incorporate effective short-term financial management acti vities.However.these models are generic models and do not consider uni que firm or industry influences. Maness and Zietlow discuss industry influences in a short paragraph that includes the observation that. “An industry a company is located in may have more influence on th at company’s fortunes than overall GNP”(2002. 507).In fact. a car eful review of this 627-page textbook finds only sporadic information on actual firm levels of WCM dimensions.virtually nothing on industr y factors except for some boxed items with titles such as. “Should a Retailer Offer an In-House Credit Card”(128) and nothing on WC M stability over time. This research will attempt to fill this void by investigating patterns related to working capital measures within industries and illustrate differences between industries across time.An extensive survey of library and Internet resources provided ver y few recent reports about working capital management. The most relev ant set of articles was Weisel and Bradley’s (2003) article on cash flow management and one of inventory control as a result of effect ive supply chain management by Hadley (2004).Research Method The CFO RankingsThe first annual CFO Working Capital Survey. a joint project with REL Consultancy Group.was published in the June 1997 issue of CFO (Mintz and Lezere 1997). REL is a London. England-based management co nsulting firm specializing in working capital issues for its global l ist of clients. The original survey reports several working capital b enchmarks for public companies using data for 1996. Each company is ranked against its peers and also against the entire field of 1.000 companies. REL continues to update the original information on an a nnual basis.REL uses the “cash flow from operations”value located on firm cash flow statements to estimate cash conversion efficiency (CCE). T his value indicates how well a company transforms revenues into cash flow. A “days of working capital”(DWC) value is based on the d ollar amount in each of the aggregate.equally-weighted receivables.inven tory.and payables accounts. The “days of working capital”(DNC) repr esents the time period between purchase of inventory on acccount fromvendor until the sale to the customer.the collection of the receiva bles. and payment receipt.Thus.it reflects the companys ability to fin ance its core operations with vendor credit. A detailed investigation of WCM is possible because CFO also provides firm and industry val ues for days sales outstanding (A/R).inventory turnover.and days payabl es outstanding (A/P).Research FindingsAverage and Annual Working Capital Management Performance Working capital management component definitions and average values for the entire 1996 –2000 period .Across the nearly 1.000 firms in the survey.cash flow from operations. defined as cash flow from operations divided by sales and referred to as “cash conversion ef ficiency”(CCE).averages 9.0 percent.Incorporating a 95 percent confide nce interval. CCE ranges from 5.6 percent to 12.4 percent. The days working capital (DWC). defined as the sum of receivables and invent ories less payables divided by daily sales.averages 51.8 days and is very similar to the days that sales are outstanding (50.6).because the inventory turnover rate (once every 32.0 days) is similar to the number of days that payables are outstanding (32.4 days).In all ins tances.the standard deviation is relatively small.suggesting that these working capital management variables are consistent across CFO report s.Industry Rankings on Overall Working Capital Management Perfo rmanceCFO magazine provides an overall working capital ranking for firms in its ing the following equation:Industry-based differences in overall working capital management are presented for the twenty-s ix industries that had at least eight companies included in the rank ings each year.In the typical year. CFO magazine ranks 970 companies during this period. Industries are listed in order of the mean ove rall CFO ranking of working capital performance. Since the best avera ge ranking possible for an eight-company industry is 4.5 (this assume s that the eight companies are ranked one through eight for the ent ire survey). it is quite obvious that all firms in the petroleum in dustry must have been receiving very high overall working capital man agement rankings.In fact.the petroleum industry is ranked first in CCE and third in DWC (as illustrated in Table 5 and discussed later i n this paper).Furthermore.the petroleum industry had the lowest standar d deviation of working capital rankings and range of working capital rankings. The only other industry with a mean overall ranking less than 100 was the Electric & Gas Utility industry.which ranked secon d in CCE and fourth in DWC. The two industries with the worst work ing capital rankings were Textiles and Apparel. Textiles rank twenty-s econd in CCE and twenty-sixth in DWC. The apparel industry ranks twenty-third and twenty-fourth in the two working capital measures ConclusionsThe research presented here is based on the annual ratings of wo rking capital management published in CFO magazine. Our findings indic ate a consistency in how industries “stack up”against each other over time with respect to the working capital measures.However.the wor king capital measures themselves are not static (i.e.. averages of wo rking capital measures across all firms change annually); our results indicate significant movements across our entire sample over time. O ur findings are important because they provide insight to working cap ital performance across time. and on working capital management across industries. These changes may be in explained in part by macroecono mic factors Changes in interest rates.rate of innovation.and competitio n are likely to impact working capital management. As interest rates rise.there would be less desire to make payments early.which would stretch accounts payable.accounts receivable.and cash accounts. The ra mifications of this study include the finding of distinct levels of WCM measures for different industries.which tend to be stable over ti me. Many factors help to explain this discovery. The improving econom y during the period of the study may have resulted in improved turn over in some industries.while slowing turnover may have been a signal of troubles ahead. Our results should be interpreted cautiously. Our study takes places over a short time frame during a generally impr oving market. In addition. the survey suffers from survivorship bias –only the top firms within each industry are ranked each year and the composition of those firms within the industry can change annua lly.Further research may take one of two lines.First.there could bea study of whether stock prices respond to CFO magazine’s publication of working capital management rating.Second,there could be a study of which if any of the working capital management components relate to share price performance.Given our results,there studies need to take industry membership into consideration when estimating stock price reaction to working capital management performance.对整个行业中营运资金管理的研究格雷格Filbeck.Schweser学习计划托马斯M克鲁格.威斯康星大学拉克罗斯摘要:企业能够降低融资成本或者尽量减少绑定在流动资产上的成立基金数额来用于扩大现有的资金。
企业营运资金管理中英文对照外文翻译文献
中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Effects Of Working Capital Management On Sme ProfitabilityThe corporate finance literature has traditionally focused on the study of long-term financial decisions. Researchers have particularly offered studies analyzing investments, capital structure, dividends or company valuation, among other topics. But the investment that firms make in short-term assets, and the resources used with maturities of under one year, represent the main share of items on a firm’s balance sheet. In fact, in our sample the current assets of small and medium-sized Spanish firms represent 69.48 percent of their assets, and at the same time their current liabilities represent more than 52.82 percent of their liabilities.Working capital management is important because of its effects on the firm’s profitability and risk, and consequently its value (Smith, 1980). On the one hand, maintaining high inventory levels reduces the cost of possible interruptions in the production process, or of loss of business due to the scarcity of products, reducessupply costs, and protects against price fluctuations, among other advantages (Blinder and Manccini, 1991). On the other, granting trade credit favors the firm’s sales in various ways. Trade credit can act as an effective price cut (Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner,1988; Petersen and Rajan, 1997), incentivizes customers to acquire merchandise at times of low demand (Emery, 1987), allows customers to check that the merchandise they receive is as agreed (quantity and quality) and to ensure that the services contracted are carried out (Smith, 1987), and helps firms to strengthen long-term relationships with their customers (Ng, Smith and Smith, 1999). However, firms that invest heavily in inventory and trade credit can suffer reduced profitability. Thus,the greater the investment in current assets, the lower the risk, but also the lower the profitability obtained.On the other hand, trade credit is a spontaneous source of financing that reduces the amount required to finance the sums tied up in the inventory and customer accounts. But we should bear in mind that financing from suppliers can have a very high implicit cost if early payment discounts are available. In fact the opportunity cost may exceed 20 percent, depending on the discount percentage and the discount period granted (Wilner,2000; Ng, Smith and Smith, 1999). In this respect, previous studies have analyzed the high cost of trade credit, and find that firms finance themselves with seller credit when they do not have other more economic sources of financing available (Petersen and Rajan, 1994 and 1997).Decisions about how much to invest in the customer and inventory accounts, and how much credit to accept from suppliers, are reflected in the firm’s cash conve rsion cycle, which represents the average number of days between the date when the firm must start paying its suppliers and the date when it begins to collect payments from its customers. Some previous studies have used this measure to analyze whether shortening the cash conversion cycle has positive or negative effects on the firm’s profitability.Specifically, Shin and Soenen (1998) analyze the relation between the cash conversion cycle and profitability for a sample of firms listed on the US stock exchange during the period 1974-1994. Their results show that reducing the cash conversion cycle to a reasonable extent increases firms’ profitability. More recently,Deloof (2003) analyzes a sample of large Belgian firms during the period 1992-1996. His results confirm that Belgian firms can improve their profitability by reducing the number of days accounts receivable are outstanding and reducing inventories. Moreover, he finds that less profitable firms wait longer to pay their bills.These previous studies have focused their analysis on larger firms. However, the management of current assets and liabilities is particularly important in the case of small and medium-sized companies. Most of these companies’ assets are in the form of current assets. Also, current liabilities are one of their main sources of external finance in view of their difficulties in obtaining funding in the long-term capital markets(Petersen and Rajan, 1997) and the financing constraints that they face (Whited, 1992; Fazzari and Petersen, 1993). In this respect, Elliehausen and Woken (1993), Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Danielson and Scott (2000) show that small and medium-sized US firms use vendor financing when they have run out of debt. Thus, efficient working capital management is particularly important for smaller companies (Peel and Wilson,1996).In this context, the objective of the current work is to provide empirical evidence about the effects of working capital management on profitability for a panel made up of 8,872 SMEs during the period 1996-2002. This work contributes to the literature in two ways. First, no previous such evidence exists for the case of SMEs. We use a sample of Spanish SMEs that operate within the so-called continental model, which is characterized by its less developed capital markets (La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997), and by the fact that most resources are channeled through financial intermediaries (Pampillón, 2000). All this suggests that Spanish SMEs have fewer alternative sources of external finance available, which makes them more dependent on short-term finance in general, and on trade credit in particular. As Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) suggest, firms operating in countries with more developed banking systems grant more trade credit to their customers, and at the same time they receive more finance from their own suppliers. The second contribution is that, unlike the previous studies by Shin and Soenen (1998) and Deloof (2003), in the current work we have conducted tests robust to the possible presence ofendogeneity problems. The aim is to ensure that the relationships found in the analysis carried out are due to the effects of the cash conversion cycle on corporate profitability and not vice versa.Our findings suggest that managers can create value by reducing their firm’s number of days accounts receivable and inventories. Similarly, shortening the cash conversion cycle also improves the firm’s profitability.We obtained the data used in this study from the AMADEUS database. This database was developed by Bureau van Dijk, and contains financial and economic data on European companies.The sample comprises small and medium-sized firms from Spain. The selection of SMEs was carried out according to the requirements established by the European Commission’s recommendation 96/280/CE of 3 April, 1996, on the definition of small and medium-sized firms. Specifically, we selected those firms meeting the following criteria for at least three years: a) have fewer than 250 employees; b) turn over less than €40 million; and c) possess less than €27 million of total assets.In addition to the application of those selection criteria, we applied a series of filters. Thus, we eliminated the observations of firms with anomalies in their accounts, such as negative values in their assets, current assets, fixed assets, liabilities, current liabilities, capital, depreciation, or interest paid. We removed observations of entry items from the balance sheet and profit and loss account exhibiting signs that were contrary to reasonable expectations. Finally, we eliminated 1 percent of the extreme values presented by several variables. As a result of applying these filters, we ended up with a sample of 38,464 observations.In order to introduce the effect of the economic cycle on the levels invested in working capital, we obtained information about the annual GDP growth in Spain from Eurostat.In order to analyze the effects of working capital management on the firm’s profitability, we used the return on assets (ROA) as the dependent variable. We defined this variable as the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to assets.With regards to the independent variables, we measured working capitalmanagement by using the number of days accounts receivable, number of days of inventory and number of days accounts payable. In this respect, number of days accounts receivable (AR) is calculated as 365 ×[accounts receivable/sales]. This variable represents the average number of days that the firm takes to collect payments from its customers. The higher the value, the higher its investment in accounts receivable.We calculated the number of days of inventory (INV) as 365 ×[inventories/purchases]. This variable reflects the average number of days of stock held by the firm. Longer storage times represent a greater investment in inventory for a particular level of operations.The number of days accounts payable (AP) reflects the average time it takes firms to pay their suppliers. We calculated this as 365 × [accounts payable/purchases]. The higher the value, the longer firms take to settle their payment commitments to their suppliers.Considering these three periods jointly, we estimated the cash conversion cycle(CCC). This variable is calculated as the number of days accounts receivable plus thenumber of days of inventory minus the number of days accounts payable. The longerthe cash conversion cycle, the greater the net investment in current assets, and hence the greater the need for financing of current assets.Together with these variables, we introduced as control variables the size of the firm, the growth in its sales, and its leverage. We measured the size (SIZE) as the logarithm of assets, the sales growth (SGROW) as (Sales1 –Sales0)/Sales0, the leverage(DEBT) as the ratio of debt to liabilities. Dellof (2003) in his study of large Belgian firms also considered the ratio of fixed financial assets to total assets as a control variable. For some firms in his study such assets are a significant part of total assets.However our study focuses on SMEs whose fixed financial assets are less important. In fact, companies in our sample invest little in fixed financial assets (a mean of 3.92 percent, but a median of 0.05 percent). Nevertheless, the results remain unaltered whenwe include this variable.Furthermore, and since good economic conditions tend to be reflected in a firm’sprofitability, we controlled for the evolution of the economic cycle using the variable GDPGR, which measures the annual GDP growth.Current assets and liabilities have a series of distinct characteristics according to the sector of activity in which the firm operates. Thus, Table I reports the return on assets and number of days accounts receivable, days of inventory, and days accounts payable by sector of activity. The mining industry and services sector are the two sectors with the highest return on their assets, with a value of 10 percent. Firms that are dedicated to agriculture, trade (wholesale or retail), transport and public services, are some way behind at 7 percent.With regard to the average periods by sector, we find, as we would expect, that the firms dedicated to the retail trade, with an average period of 38 days, take least time to collect payments from their customers. Construction sector firms grant their customers the longest period in which to pay –more than 145 days. Next, we find mining sector firms, with a number of days accounts receivable of 116 days. We also find that inventory is stored longest in agriculture, while stocks are stored least in the transport and public services sector. In relation to the number of days accounts payable, retailers (56 days) followed by wholesalers (77 days) pay their suppliers earliest. Firms are much slower in the construction and mining sectors, taking more than 140 days on average to pay their suppliers. However, as we have mentioned, these firms also grant their own customers the most time to pay them. Considering all the average periods together, we note that the cash conversion cycle is negative in only one sector – that of transport and public services. This is explained by the short storage times habitual in this sector. In this respect, agricultural and manufacturing firms take the longest time to generate cash (95 and 96 days, respectively), and hence need the most resources to finance their operational funding requirements.Table II offers descriptive statistics about the variables used for the sample as a whole. These are generally small firms, with mean assets of more than €6 milli on; their return on assets is around 8 percent; their number of days accounts receivable is around 96 days; and their number of days accounts payable is very similar: around 97 days. Together with this, the sample firms have seen their sales grow by almost 13percent annually on average, and 24.74 percent of their liabilities is taken up by debt. In the period analyzed (1996-2002) the GDP has grown at an average rate of 3.66 percent in Spain.Source: Pedro Juan García-Teruel and Pedro Martínez-Solano ,2006.“Effects of Working Capital Management on SME Profitability” .International Journal of Managerial Finance ,vol. 3, issue 2, April,pages 164-167.译文：营运资金管理对中小企业的盈利能力的影响公司理财著作历来把注意力集中在了长期财务决策研究，研究者详细的提供了投资决策分析、资本结构、股利分配或公司估值等主题的研究，但是企业投资形成的短期资产和以一年内到期方式使用的资源，表现为公司资产负债表的有关下昂目的主要部分。
企业管理企业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献
中英文对照外文翻译(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)Analysis on the Chinese Enterprise Financing Abstract:The main sources of financing for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are equity, trade credit paid on time, long and short term bank credits, delayed payment on trade credit a nd other debt. The marginal costs of each financing instrument are driven by asymmetric informatio n and transactions costs associated with nonpayment. According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms will choose the cheapest source in terms of cost. In the case of the static trade-off theory, firms cho ose finance so that the marginal costs across financing sources are all equal, thus an additional Euro of financing is obtained from all the sources whereas under the Pecking Order Theory the source is determined by how far down the Pecking Order the firm is presently located. In this paper, we argue that both of these theories miss the point that the marginal costs are dependent of the use of the funds, and the asset side of the balance sheet primarily determines the financing source for an additiona l Euro. An empirical analysis on a unique dataset of Portuguese SMEs confirms that the compositio n of the asset side of the balance sheet has an impact of the type of financing used and the Pecking Order Theory and the traditional Static Trade-off theory are rejected.For SME the main sources of financing are equity (internally generated cash), trade credit, ban k credit and other debt. The choice of financing is driven by the costs of the sources which is primar ily determined by costs of solving the asymmetric information problem and the expected costs assoc iated with non-payment of debt. Asymmetric information costs arise from collecting and analysing i nformation to support the decision of extending credit, and the non-payment costs are from collectin g the collateral and selling it to recover the debt. Since SMEs’ management and shareholders are oft en the same person, equity and internally generated funds have no asymmetric information costs and equity is therefore the cheapest source.1 Asset side theory of SME financingIn the previous section we have suggested that SME’s in Portugal are financed using internal g enerated cash, cheap trade credits, long and short-term bank loans and expensive trade credits and o ther loans. In this section the motives behind the different types of financing are discussed.1.1 Cheap Trade creditsThe first external financing source we will discuss is trade-credits. Trade credits are interesting since they represent financial services provided by non-financial firms in competition with financia l intermediaries. The early research within this area focused on the role of trade credits in relation to the credit channel or the so called “Meltzer” effect and in relation to the efficiency of monetary poli cy. The basic idea is that firms with direct access to financial markets, in general large well known firms, issue trade credits to small financially constrained firms . The more recent research breaks the role of trade credits into a strategic motive and financial motive for issuing and using these credits.Strategic motivesThe first theory centers on asymmetric information regarding the firm’s products. Trade credits are offered to the buyers so that the buyer can verify the quantity and quality before submitting pay ments. By offering trade finance the supplier signals to the buyers that they offer products of good q uality. Since small firms, in general, have no reputation then these firms are forced to use trade credi ts to signal the quality of their products. The use of trade credits is therefore driven by asymmetric i nformation of the products and is therefore more likely to be used by small firms, if the buyer has lit tle information about the supplier, or the products are complicated and it is difficult to asses their qu ality.The second strategic motive is pricing. Offering trade finance on favorable terms is the same as a price reduction for the goods. Thus firms can use trade credits to promote sales without officially reducing prices or use them as a tool for price discrimination between different buyers. Trade credit s are most advantageous to risky borrowers since their costs of alternative financing are higher than for borrowers with good credit ratings. Thus trade credits can be used as tool for direct price discrim ination but also as an indirect tool (if all buyers are offered the same terms) in favor of borrowers wi th a low credit standing.Trade credits are also used to develop long term relationships between the supplier and the bu yers. This often manifests itself by the supplier extending the credit period in case the buyer has tem porary financial difficulties. Compared to financial institutions suppliers have better knowledge of t he industry and are therefore better able to judge whether the firm has temporary problems or the problems are of a more permanent nature.The last motive in not strictly a strategic motive but is based on transactions costs. Trade credit s are an efficient way of performing the transactions since it is possible to separate between delivery and payment. In basic terms the truck driver delivering the goods does not have to run around to fin d the person responsible for paying the bills. The buyer also saves transactions costs by reducing the amount of cash required on“hand” .Financing motivesThe basis for this view is that firms compete with financial institutions in offering credit to oth er firms. The traditional view of financial institutions is that they extend credit to firms where asym metric information is a major problem. Financial institutions have advantages in collecting and anal yzing information from, in particular, smaller and medium sized firms that suffer from problems of asymmetric information. The key to this advantage over financial markets lies in the close relations hip between the bank and the firm and in the payment function. The financial institution is able to m onitor the cash inflow and outflows of the firm by monitoring the accounts of the firm.But with trade credits non-financial firms are competing with financial institutions in solving t hese problems and extending credit. How can non-financial institutions compete in this market? Pet ersen and Rajan [1997] briefly discusses several ways that suppliers may have advantages over fina ncial institutions. The supplier has a close working association with the borrower and more frequent ly visits the premises than a financial institution does. The size and timing of the lenders orders with the supplier provides information about the conditions of the borrowers business. Notice that this in formation is available to the supplier before it is available to the financial institution since the financ ial institution has to wait for the cash flow associated with the orders. The use of early payment discounts provides the supplier with an indication of problems with creditworthiness in the firm. Again t he supplier obtains the information before the financial institution does. Thus the supplier may be a ble to obtain information about the creditworthiness faster and cheaper than the financial institution.The supplier may also have advantages in collecting payments. If the supplier has at least a loc al monopoly for the goods then the ability to withhold future deliveries is a powerful incentive for t he firm to pay. This is a particular powerful threat if the borrower only accounts for a small fraction of the suppliers business. In case of defaults the supplier can seize the goods and in general has a be tter use for them than a financial intermediary sizing the same goods. Through its sales network the supplier can sell the reclaimed goods faster and at a higher price than what is available to a financial intermediary. These advantages, of course, depend on the durability of the goods and how much the borrower has transformed them.If asymmetric information is one of the driving forces the explanation of trade credits then fir ms can use the fact that their suppliers have issued them credits in order to obtain additional credit f rom the banks. The banks are aware that the supplier has better information thus the bank can use tr ade credits as signal of the credit worthiness of the firm.That trade credits are in general secured by the goods delivered also puts a limit on the amount of trade credits the firm can obtain, thus the firm cannot use trade credits to finance the entire operat ions of the firm.In summary the prediction is that the level of asymmetric information isrelatively low between the providers of trade credit and the borrowers due to the issuer’s general knowledge of the firm and the industry. In the empirical work below the variables explaining the use of trade credit are credit r isk factors and Cost of Goods Sold. Since these trade credits are secured by the materials delivered to the firm, firms cannot “borrow” for more than the delivery value of the goods and services.1.2 Bank loansBanks have less information than providers of trade credit and the costs of gathering informati on are also higher for banks than for providers of trade credit. Providers of trade credits also have a n advantage over banks in selling the collateral they have themselves delivered, but due to their size and number of transactions banks have an advantage in selling general collateral such as buildings, machinery etc. Banks therefore prefer to issue loans using tangible assets as collateral, also due to a symmetric information, they are less likely to issue loans to more opaque firms such as small and hi gh growth firms. Banks are therefore willing to lend long term provided that tangible assets are avai lable for collateral. In the empirical work below tangible assets and credit risk variables are expecte d to explain the use of long-term bank loans and the amount of long-term bank loans are limited by the value of tangible assets.The basis for issuing Short Term Bank Loans is the comparative advantages banks have in eval uating and collecting on accounts receivables, i.e. Debtors. It is also possible to use Cash and Cash equivalents as collateral but banks do not have any comparative advantages over other providers of credit in terms of evaluating and collecting these since they consist of cash and marketable securitie s. In terms of inventories, again banks do not have any comparative advantages in evaluating these. Thus, we expect the amounts of debtors to be the key variable in explaining the behaviour of Short Term Bank Loans.1.3 Expensive trade credit and other loansAfter other sources of finance have been exhausted firms can delay payment on their trade cred its. However, this is expensive since it involves giving up the discount and maybe incurs penalty payments. Also the use of this type of credit can have reputational costs and it may be difficult to obtai n trade credit in the future. The nature of the costs, of course, depends on the number of suppliers, if there is only one supplier then these costs can be rather high whereas if the firm can obtain the sam e goods and services from other suppliers then these costs are not particularly high.Other debt is composed of credit card debt, car loans etc. that are dearer than bank loans. Again , the variables determining this type of debt are financial health and performance. Below, however, we do not have any good information regarding these types of loans and what they consists of thus we pay little attention to them in the empirical work.ConclusionsCurrently there exist two theories of capital structure The Pecking Order Theory where firms fi rst exhaust all funding of the cheapest source first, then the second cheapest source and so on. The d ifferences in funding costs are due to adverse selection costs from asymmetric information. The sec ond theory is the Tradeoff .Theory where firms increase the amount of debt as long as the benefits are greater than the costs from doing so. The benefits of debt are tax-shields and “positive agency c osts” and the costs of debt are the expected bankruptcy costs and the “negative agency costs”. In bot h of these theories, the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet is not important and in this paper, that proposition is strongly rejected. So the main conclusion is that the composition of the as set side of the balance sheet influences the composition of the liability side of the balance sheet in te rms of the different types of debt used to finance the firm, or that the use of the funds is important in deciding the type of financing available.We further argue that it is asymmetric information and collateral that determines the relationshi p between the asset side and liability side of the balance sheet. The theory works reasonable well forCheap Trade Credits and Long Term Bank Loans but the tests for Short Term Bank Loans are disap pointing.Source: Jan Bartholdy, Cesario Mateus, “Financing of SMEs”.London businessreview. 2007(9).pp.43-45中国企业融资分析摘要:中小企业融资的主要来源有：股权融资、按时兑现的贸易信贷融资、中长期银行信贷融资、延迟兑现的贸易信贷融资以及其他债务融资，每种融资方式的边际成本取决于与其滞纳金相关的信息不对称成本和交易成本。
上市公司股权融资中英文对照外文翻译文献
上市公司股权融资中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文:Chinese Listed Companies Preference to Equity Fund:Non-Systematic FactorsAbstract ：This article concentrates on the listed companies’ financing activities in China, analyses the reasons that why the listed companies prefer to equity fund from the aspect of non-systematic factors by using western financing theories, such as financing cost, types and qualities of the enterprises’ assets, profitability, industry factors, shareholding structure factors, level of financial management and society culture, and concludes that the preference to equity fund is a reasonable choice to the listed companies according to Chinese financing environment. At last, there are someconcise suggestions be given to rectify the companie s’ preference to equity fund. Keywords: Equity fund, Non-systematic factors, financial cost1. IntroductionThe listed companies in China prefer to equity fund, According to the statistic data showed in <China Securities Journal>, the amount of the listed companies finance in capital market account to 95.87 billions in 1997, among which equity fund take the proportion of 72.5%, and the proportion is 72.6% in 1998 and 72.3% in 1999, on the other hand, the proportion of debt fund to total fund is respective 17.8%, 24.9% and 25.1% in those three years. The proportion of equity fund to total fund is lower in the developed capital market than that in China. Take US for example, when American enterprises need to fund in the capital market, they prefer to debt fund than equity fund. The statistic data shows that, from 1970 to 1985, the American enterprises’ debt fund financed occupied the 91.7% proportion of outside financing, more than equity fund. Yan Dawu etc. found that, approximately 3/4 of the listed companies preferred to equity fund in China. Many researchers agree upon that the listed companies’ outside financing following this order: first one is equity fund, second one is convertible bond, third one is short-term liabilities, last one is long-term liabilities. Many researchers usually analyze our national listed companies’ preference to equity fund with the systematic factors arising in the reform of our national economy. They thought that it just because of those systematic facts that made the listed com panies’ financial activities betray to western classical financing theory. For example, the “picking order” theory claims that when enterprise need fund, they should turn to inside fund (depreciation and retained earnings) first, and then debt fund, and the last choice is equity fund. In this article, the author thinks that it is because of the specific financial environment that activates the enterprises’ such preference, and try to interpret the reasons of that preference to equity fund by combination of non-systematic factors and western financial theories.2. Financings cost of the listed company and preference to equity fund According to western financing the theories, capital cost of equity fund is more than capital cost of debt fund, thus the enterprise should choose debt fund first, then is theturn to equity fund when it fund outside. We should understand that this conception of “capital cost” is taken into account by investors, it is somewhat opportunity cost of the investors, can also be called expected returns. It contains of risk-free rate of returns and risk rate of returns arising from the investors’ risk investment. It is different with financing cost in essence. Financing cost is the cost arising from enterprises’ financing activities and u sing fund, we can call it fund cost. If capital market is efficient, capital cost should equal to fund cost, that is to say, what investors gain in capital market should equal to what fund raisers pay, or the transfer of fund is inevitable. But in an inefficient capital market, the price of stock will be different from its value because of investors’ action of speculation; they only chase capital gain and don’t want to hold the stocks in a long time and receive dividends. Thus the listed companies can gain fund with its fund cost being lower than capital cost.But in our national capital market, capital cost of equity fund is very low; it is because of the following factors: first, the high P/E Ratio (Price Earning Ratio) of new issued shares. According to calculation, average P/E Ratio of Chinese listed companies’ shares is between 30 and 40, it also is maintained at 20 although drops somewhat recently. But the normal P/E Ratio should be under 20 according to experience. We can observe the P/E was only 13.2 from 1874 to 1988 in US, and only 10 in Hong Kong. High P/E Ratio means high share issue price, then the capital cost of equity fund drops even given the same level of dividend. Second, low dividend policy in the listed companies, capital cost of equity fund decided by dividend pay-out ratio and price of per share. In China, many listed companies pay little or even no dividends to their shareholders. According to statistic data, there were 488 listed companies paid no dividend to their shareholders in 1998, 58.44 percents of all listed companies, there were 590, 59.83 percents in 1999, even 2000 in which China Securities Regulatory Commission issue new files to rule dividend policy of companies, there were only 699 companies which pay dividends, 18.47 percents more than that in 1999, but dividend payout ratio deduce 22%. Thus capital cost of equity is very low. Third, there is no rigidity on equity fund, if the listed companies choose equity fund, they can use the fund forever and has no obligation to return this fund. Most of listedcompanies are controlled by Government in China, taking financing risk into account, the major stockholders prefers to equity fund. The management also prefer equity fund because its lower fund cost and needn’t to be paid off, then their position will be more stable than financing in equity fund. We can conclude from the above analysis that cost of equity fund is lower than cost of debt fund in Chinese listed companies and the listed companies prefer to such low-cost fund.3. Types and qualities of assets in listed companies and preference to equity fund Static Trade-off Theory tells us, the value of enterprise with financial leverage is decided by the value of self-owned capital; value arising from tax benefit, cost of financial embarrassment and agency cost. Cost of financial embarrassment and agency cost are negative correlative to the types and qualities of companies’ assets, if the enterprise has more intangible assets, more assets with lower quality, it will has lower liquidity and its assets have lower mortgage value. When this kind of enterprise faces to great financial risk, it will have no way to solve its questions by selling its assets. Furthermore, because care for the ability of turning into cash of the mortgage assets, the creditors will high the level of rate and lay additional items in financial contract to rule the debtor’s action, all of those will enhance the agency cost and deduce the companies’ value. Qualcomm is supplier of wireless data and communication service in America, it is the inventor and user of CDMA and it also occupies the technology of HDR. The market value of its share is 1120 billions dollars at the end of March, 2000, but the quantities of long-term liabilities is zero. Why? Some reasons may be that there are some competitors in the market who own analogous technologies and the management of Qualcomm Company takes conservative attitude in financing activities. But the most important factor may be Qualcomm Company owns a mass of intangible assets which will have lower convertibility and the company’s value will decline when it has no enough money to pay for its debt.Many listed companies in China are transformed from the national enterprises. In the transformation, these listed companies take over the high-quality assets of the national enterprises, but with the development of economy, some projects can not coincidewith the market demand and the values of relative assets decline. On the other hand, there are many intangible assets in new high-tech companies. State-owned companies and high-tech companies are the most parts of the capital market. We can conclude that the qualities of listed companies’ assets are very low. This point is supported by the index of P/B (Price-to-Book value) which is usually thought as one of the most important indexes which can weigh the qualities of the listed companies’ assets. According to statistic data coming from Shenzhen Securities Information Company, by the end of November 14, 2003, there were 412 companies whose P/B is less than 2, take the 30% proportions of total listed companies which issue A-share in China, among them, there were 150 companies whose P/B is less than 1.53, and weighted average P/B of the stock market is 2.42. Lower qualities of assets means more cost may be brought out from debt fund and lower total value of the listed companies. Thus the listed companies prefer to equity fund when need outside financial support in China.4. Profitability and preference to equity fundFinancial Leverage Theory tells us that a small change in company’s profit may make great change in company’s EPS (Earnings per share). Just like leverage, we can get an amplified action by use of it. Debt fund can supply us with this leverage, by use of debt fund, these companies which have high level of profitability will get higher level of EPS because debt fund produces more profit for shareholders than interest shareholder shall pay. On the contrary, these companies which have low level of profitability will get lower level of EPS by use of debt fund because debt fund can not produce enough profit for shareholder to fulfill the demand of paying off the interests. Edison International Company has steady amount of customers and many intangible assets, these supply it with high level of profitability and ability to gain debt fund, its debt account to 67.2% proportions of its total assets in 1999.Listed companies in developed countries or regions always have high level of profitability. Take US for example, there are many listed companies which have excellent performance in American capital market when do business, such as J.P Morgan, its EPS is $11.16 per share in 1999. Besides it, GM, GE, Coca Cola, IBM,Intel, Microsoft, Dell etc. all always are profitable. In Hong Kong, most of those companies whose stock included in Hang Sang Index have the level of EPS more than 1 HKD, many are more than 2 HKD. Such as Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited, its EPS is 7.66 HKD. But listed companies do not have such excellent performance in profitability in China inland. Their profitability is common low. Take the performance of 2000 for example, the weighted average EPS of total listed companies is only 0.20 Yuan per share, and the weighted average P/B is 2.65 Yuan per share, 8.55 percents of these listed companies have negative profit. With low or no profit, the benefit nixes, listed companies’ preference to equity fund is a reasonable phenomenon. Can be gained from debt fund is very little; the listed companies can even suffer from the financial distress caused by debt fund. So with the consideration of shareholders’ interest, the listed companies prefer to equity fund when need outside financial support in China.5. Shareholding structure factors and preference to equity fundListed companies not only face to external financing environmental impacts, but also the structure of the companies shares. Shareholding structure of Chinese listed companies shows characteristics as followed: I. Ownership structure is fairly complex. In addition to the public shares, there are shares held with inland fund and foreign stocks, state-owned shares, legal person shares, and internal employee shares, transferred allotted shares, A shares, B shares, H shares And N shares, and other distinction. From 1995 to 2003, Chinese companies’ outstanding shares of the total equity share almost have no change, even declined slightly. II. There are different prices, dividends, and rights of shares issued by same enterprise. III. The over-concentration of shares. We use the quantity of shares of the three major shareholders who top the list of shareholders of the listed companies to measure the concentration of stock. We study he concentration of stock of these companies which issue new share publicly in the years from 1995 to 2003 and focus on the situation of Chinese listed companies over the same period. The results showed that: from 1995 to 2003, the company-Which once transferred or allotted shares-whose top three shareholders’ shareholding ratio are generally high er than the average level of all thelisted companies, and most of these company's top three shareholders holding 40 percent or higher percent of companies’ shares. In some years, the maximum number even is more than 90 percent, indicating that the company with the implementation of transferred and allotted shares have relatively high concentration rate of shares and major shareholders have absolute control over it. In short, transferring allotting shares and the issuance of additional shares have a certain relevance to the company’s concentration of ownership structure; the company's financing policy is largely controlled by the major shareholders.Chinese listed companies’ special shareholding structure effects its financing action. Because stockholders of the state-owned shares, legal person shares, social and outstanding shares, foreign share have a different objective function, their modes of financing preferences vary, and their preference affect the financing structure of listed companies. Controlling shareholders which hold state-owned shares account for the status of enterprises and carry out financing decisions in accordance with their own objective function. When the objective function conflict with the other shareholders benefit, they often damage the interests of other shareholders by use of the status of controlling. As the first major shareholders of the companies, government has multiple objectives, not always market-oriented, it prefers to use safe fund such as equity fund to maintain the value of state-owned assets, thus resulting in listed company’s preference to equity financing. Debt financing bring business with greater pressure to pay off the par value and interests. Therefore, the state-owned companies are showing a more offensive attitude to debt fund, again because of Chinese state-controlled listed companies have the absolute status in all listed company.From: International Journal of Business and Management; October, 2009.译文：中国上市公司偏好股权融资：非制度性因素摘要：本文把重点集中于中国上市公司的融资活动，运用西方融资理论，从非制度性因素方面，如融资成本、企业资产类型和质量、盈利能力、行业因素、股权结构因素、财务管理水平和社会文化，分析了中国上市公司倾向于股权融资的原因，并得出结论，股权融资偏好是上市公司根据中国融资环境的一种合理的选择。
中小企业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献
中小企业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Financing of SMEsJan Bartholdy, Cesario MateusOriginally Published in“Financing of SMEs”.London business review.AbstractThe main sources of financing for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are equity, trade credit paid on time, long and short term bank credits, delayed payment on trade credit and other debt. The marginal costs of each financing instrument are driven by asymmetric information and transactions costs associated with nonpayment. According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms will choose the cheapest source in terms of cost. In the case of the static trade-off theory, firms choose finance so that the marginal costs across financing sources are all equal, thus an additional Euro of financing is obtained from all the sources whereas under the Pecking Order Theory the source is determined by how far down the Pecking Order the firm is presently located. In this paper, we argue that both of these theories miss the point that the marginal costs are dependent of the use of the funds, and the asset side of the balance sheet primarily determines the financing source for an additional Euro. An empirical analysis on a unique dataset of Portuguese SME’s confirms that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet has an impact of the type of financing used and the Pecking OrderTheory and the traditional Static Trade-off theory are For SME’s the main sources of financing are equity (internally generated cash), trade credit, bank credit and other debt. The choice of financing is driven by the costs of the sources which is primarily determined by costs of solving the asymmetric information problem and the expected costs associated with non-payment of debt. Asymmetric information costs arise from collecting and analysing information to support the decision of extending credit, and the non-payment costs are from collecting the collateral and selling it to recover the debt. Since SMEs’ management and shareholders are often the same person, equity and internally generated funds have no asymmetric information costs and equity is therefore the cheapest source.2. Asset side theory of SME financingIn the previous section we have suggested that SME’s in Portugal are financed using internal generated cash, cheap trade credits, long and short-term bank loans and expensive trade credits and other loans. In this section the motives behind the different types of financing are discussed.2.1. Cheap Trade creditsThe first external financing source we will discuss is trade-credits. Trade credits are interesting since they represent financial services provided by non-financial firms in competition with financialintermediaries. The early research within this area focused on the role of trade credits in relation to the credit channel or the so called “Meltzer” effect and in relation to the efficiency of monetary policy. The basic idea is that firms with direct access to financial markets, in general large well known firms, issue trade credits to small financially constrained firms . The more recent research breaks the role of trade credits into a strategic motive and financial motive for issuing and using these credits.Strategic motivesThe first theory centers on asymmetric information regarding the firm’s products. Trade credits are offered to the buyers so that the buyer can verify the quantity and quality before submitting payments. By offering trade finance the supplier signals to the buyers that they offer products of good quality. Since small firms, in general, have no reputation then these firms are forced to use trade credits to signal the quality of their products. The use of trade credits is therefore driven by asymmetric information of the products and is therefore more likely to be used by small firms, if the buyer has little information about the supplier, or the products are complicated and it is difficult to asses their quality.The second strategic motive is pricing. Offering trade finance on favorable terms is the same as a price reduction for the goods. Thus firms can use trade credits to promote sales without officially reducing prices or use them as a tool for price discrimination between different buyers.Trade credits are most advantageous to risky borrowers since their costs of alternative financing are higher than for borrowers with good credit ratings. Thus trade credits can be used as tool for direct price discrimination but also as an indirect tool (if all buyers are offered the same terms) in favor of borrowers with a low credit standing.Trade credits are also used to develop long term relationships between the supplier and the buyers. This often manifests itself by the supplier extending the credit period in case the buyer has temporary financial difficulties. Compared to financial institutions suppliers have better knowledge of the industry and are therefore better able to judge whether the firm has temporary problems or the problems are of a more permanent nature.The last motive in not strictly a strategic motive but is based on transactions costs. Trade credits are an efficient way of performing the transactions since it is possible to separate between delivery and payment. In basic terms the truck drive r delivering the goods does not have to run around to find the person responsible for paying the bills. The buyer also saves transactions costs by reducing the amount of cash required on“hand” .Financing motivesThe basis for this view is that firms compete with financial institutions in offering credit to other firms. The traditional view offinancial institutions is that they extend credit to firms where asymmetric information is a major problem. Financial institutions have advantages in collecting and analyzing information from, in particular, smaller and medium sized firms that suffer from problems of asymmetric information. The key to this advantage over financial markets lies in the close relationship between the bank and the firm and in the payment function. The financial institution is able to monitor the cash inflow and outflows of the firm by monitoring the accounts of the firm.But with trade credits non-financial firms are competing with financial institutions in solving these problems and extending credit. How can non-financial institutions compete in this market? Petersen and Rajan [1997] briefly discusses several ways that suppliers may have advantages over financial institutions. The supplier has a close working association with the borrower and more frequently visit s the premises than a financial institution does. The size and timing of the lenders orders with the supplier provides information about the conditions of the borrowers business. Notice that this information is available to the supplier before it is available to the financial institution since the financial institution has to wait for the cash flow associated with the orders. The use of early payment discounts provides the supplier with an indication of problems with creditworthiness in the firm. Again the supplier obtains the information before the financial institution does. Thus the supplier maybe able to obtain information about the creditworthiness faster and cheaper than the financial institution.The supplier may also have advantages in collecting payments. If the supplier has at least a local monopoly for the goods then the ability to withhold future deliveries is a powerful incentive for the firm to pay. This is a particular powerful threat if the borrower only accounts for a small fraction of the suppliers business. In case of defaults the supplier can seize the goods and in general has a better use for them than a financial intermediary sizing the same goods. Through its sales network the supplier can sell the reclaimed goods faster and at a higher price than what is available to a financial intermediary. These advantages, of course, depend on the durability of the goods and how much the borrower has transformed them.If asymmetric information is one of the driving forces the explanation of trade credits then firms can use the fact that their suppliers have issued them credits in order to obtain additional credit from the banks. The banks are aware that the supplier has better information thus the bank can use trade credits as signal of the credit worthiness of the firm.That trade credits are in general secured by the goods delivered also puts a limit on the amount of trade credits the firm can obtain, thus the firm cannot use trade credits to finance the entire operations of the firm.In summary the prediction is that the level of asymmetric information is relatively low between the providers of trade credit and the borrowers due to the issuer’s general knowledge of the firm and the industry. In the empirical work below the variables explaining the use of trade credit are credit risk factors and Cost of Goods Sold. Since these trade credits are secured by the materials delivered to the firm, firms cannot “borrow” for more than the delivery value of the goods and services.2.2 Bank loansBanks have less information than providers of trade credit and the costs of gathering information are also higher for banks than for providers of trade credit. Providers of trade credits also have an advantage over banks in selling the collateral they have themselves delivered, but due to their size and number of transactions banks have an advantage in selling general collateral such as buildings, machinery etc. Banks therefore prefer to issue loans using tangible assets as collateral, also due to asymmetric information, they are less likely to issue loans to more opaque firms such as small and high growth firms. Banks are therefore willing to lend long term provided that tangible assets are available for collateral. In the empirical work below tangible assets and credit risk variables are expected to explain the use of long-term bank loans and the amount of long-term bank loans are limited by the value of tangibleassets.The basis for issuing Short Term Bank Loans is the comparative advantages banks have in evaluating and collecting on accounts receivables, i.e. Debtors. It is also possible to use Cash and Cash equivalents as collateral but banks do not have any comparative advantages over other providers of credit in terms of evaluating and collecting these since they consist of cash and marketable securities. In terms of inventories, again banks do not have any comparative advantages in evaluating these. Thus, we expect the amounts of debtors to be the key variable in explaining the behaviour of Short Term Bank Loans.ConclusionsCurrently there exist two theories of capital structure The Pecking Order Theory where firms first exhaust all funding of the cheapest source first, then the second cheapest source and so on. The differences in funding costs are due to adverse selection costs from asymmetric information. The second theory is the Tradeoff Theory where firms increase the amount of debt as long as the benefits are greater than the costs from doing so. The benefits of debt are tax-shields and “positive agency costs” and the costs of debt are the e xpected bankruptcy costs and the “negative agency costs”. In both of these theories, the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet is not important and in this paper, thatproposition is strongly rejected. So the main conclusion is that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet influences the composition of the liability side of the balance sheet in terms of the different types of debt used to finance the firm, or that the use of the funds is important in deciding the type of financing available.We further argue that it is asymmetric information and collateral that determines the relationship between the asset side and liability side of the balance sheet. The theory works reasonable well for Cheap Trade Credits and Long Term Bank Loans but the tests for Short Term Bank Loans are disappointing.译文：中小企业融资摘要中小企业融资的主要来源有：股权融资、按时兑现的贸易信贷融资、中长期银行信贷融资、延迟兑现的贸易信贷融资以及其他债务融资，每种融资方式的边际成本取决于与其滞纳金相关的信息不对称成本和交易成本。
企业并购中英文对照外文翻译文献
企业并购中英文对照外文翻译文献中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：The choice of payment method in European M & A Global M&A activity has grown dramatically over the last ten years, bringing with it major changes in the organization and control of economic activity around the world. Yet, there is much about the M&A process that we do not fully understand, including the choice of payment method. Given the large size of many M&A transactions, the financing decision can have a significant impact on an acquirer’s ownership structure, financial leverage, and subsequent financing decisions. The financing decision can also have serious corporate control, risk bearing, tax and cash flow implications for the buying and selling firms and shareholders.In making an M&A currency decision, a bidder is faced with a choice between using cash and stock as deal consideration. Given that most bidders have limited cashand liquid assets, cash offers generally require debt financing. As a consequence, a bidder implicitly faces the choice of debt or equity financing, which can involve a tradeoff between corporate control concerns of issuing equity and rising financial distress costs of issuing debt. Thus, a bidder’s M&A currency decision can be strongly influenced by its debt capacity and existing leverage. It can also be strongly influenced by management’s desire to maintain the existing corporate governance structure. In contrast, a seller can be faced with a tradeoff between the tax benefits of stock and the liquidity and risk minimizing benefits of cash consideration. For example, sellers may be willing to acceptstock if they have a low tax basis in the target stock and can defer their tax liabilities by accepting bidder stock as payment. On the other hand, sellers can prefer cash consideration to side step the risk of becoming a minority shareholder in a bidder with concentrated ownership, thereby avoiding the associated moral hazard problems. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, this seller trade off can not be easily measured.Under existing theories of capital structure, debt capacity is a positive function of tangible assets, earnings growth and asset diversification and a negative function of asset volatility. Firms with greater tangible assets can borrow more privately from banks and publicly in the bond market. Since larger firms are generally more diversified, we expect them to have a lower probability of bankruptcy at a given leverage ratio and thus, greater debt capacity. These financing constraint and bankruptcy risk considerations can also reduce a lenders willingness to finance a bidder’s cash bid, especially in relatively large deals.In assessing potential determinants of an M&A payment method, our focus is on a bidder’s M&A financing choices, recognizing that targets can also influence the final terms of an M&A deal. However,if a target’s financing choice is unacceptable to the bidder, then the proposed M&A transaction is likely to be aborted or else the bidder can make a hostile offer on its own terms. For a deal to succeed, the bidder must be satisfied with the financial structure of the deal.Bidder and target considerations:* Corporate ControlBidders controlled by a major shareholder should be reluctant to use stock financing when this causes the controlling shareholder to risk losing control. Assuming control is valuable,the presence of dominant shareholder positions should be associated with more frequent use of cash, especially when the controlling shareholder’s position is threatened. To capture this effect, we use the ultimate vo ting stake held by the largest controlling shareholder.A bidder with diffuse or highly concentrated ownership is less likely to be concerned with corporate control issues. In line with this argument, Martin (1996) documents a significantly negative relationship between the likelihood of stock financing and managerial ownership only over the intermediate ownership range. Therefore, we incorporate the possibility of a non-linear relationship between the method of payment and the voting rights of a bidder’s controlling shareholder by estimating both a linear and cubic specification for the ultimate voting control percentage of the bidder’s largest shareholder. In our robustness analysis, we also estimate a spline function for this variable.Corporate control concerns in M&A activity can manifest themselves in more subtle ways. Concentrated ownership of a target means that a stock financed acquisition can create a large blockholder, threatening the corporate governance of the acquirer. If the seller is closely held or is a corporation disposing of a division, then ownership concentration tends to be very concentrated. This implies that financing the M&A deal with stock can create a new blockholder in the bidder. While the risk of creating a new bidder blockholder with stock financing is higher when a target has a concentrated ownership structure, this is especially ture when relative size of the deal is large. To capture the risk of creating a large blockholder when buying a target with stock financing, we employ CONTROL LOSS, theproduct between the target’s contr ol block and the deal’s ralative size. The relative deal size is computed as the ratio of offer size (excluding assumed liabilities) to the sum of a bidder’s equity pre-offer capitalization plus the offe r size. The target’s controlling blockholder is assumed to have 100 % ownership for unlisted targets and subsidiary targets.* Collateral, Financial Leverage and Debt CapacityWe use the fraction of tangible assets as our primary measure of a bidder’s ability to pay cash, financed from additional borrowing. COLLATERAL is measured by the ratio of property, plant and equipment to book value of total assets. Myers (1977) argues that debtholders in firms with fewer tangible assets and more growth opportunities are subject to greater moral hazard risk, which increases the cost of debt, often making stock more attractive. Hovakimian, Opler and Titman(2001) find that a firm’s percentage of tangible assets has a strong positive influence on its debt level.We also control for a bidder’s financial condition with its leverage ratio, FIN’L LEVERAGE. Since cash is primarily obtained by issuing new debt, highly levered bidders are constrained in their ability to issue debt and as a consequence use stock financing more fr equently. A bidder’s financial leverage is measured by the sum of the bidder’s face value of d ebt prior to the M&A announcement plus the deal value (including assumed liabilities)divided by the sum of the book valve of total assets prior to the announcement plus the deal value (including assumed liabilities). This captures the bidder’s post-deal leverage if the transaction is debt financed. This measure differs from Martin(1996) who uses a pre-deal bidder leverage measure adjusted for industry mean and reports an insignificant effect.Bidder size is likely to influence its financing choices. Larger firms are more diversified and thus, have proportionally lower expected bankruptcy costs. They also have lower flotation costs and are likely to have better access to debt markets, making debt financing more readily available. Thus, cash financing should be more feasible in the case of larger firms. Larger firms are also more apt to choose cash financing in smaller deals due to its ease of use, provided they have sufficient unused debt capacity or liquid assets. Further, the use of cash allows the bidder to avoid the significant costs of obtaining shareholder approval of pre-emptive rights exemptions and authorizations and the higher regulatory costs of stock offers. We measure bidder assets size by the log of pre-merger book value of assets in dollars(total assets). In addition to bidder control and financing considerations, we need to take into account several other bidder characteristics.* Relative Deal Size, Bidder Stock Price Runup and Asymmetric InformationHansen (1987) predicts that bidders have greater incentives to finance with stock when the asymmetric information about target assets is high. This information asymmetry is likely to rise as target assets rise in value relative to those of a bidder. Yet, stock is used in relatively larger deals, it produces more serious dilution of a dominant shareholder’s control position. Finally, as bidder equity capitalization rises, concern about its financing constraint falls, since there is a relatively smaller impact on its overall financial conditon. We proxy for these effects with REL SIZE, which is computed as the ratio of deal offer size (excluding assumed liabilities)divided by the sum of the deal’s offer size plus the bidder’s pre-offer market capitalization at the year-endprior to the bid.Both Myers and Majluf (1984) and Hansen (1987) predict that bidders will prefer to finance with stock when they consider their stock overvalued by the market and prefer to finance with cash when they consider their stock undervalued. As uncertainty about bidder asset value rises, this adverse selection effect is exacerbated. Martin (1996) finds evidence consistent with this adverse selection prediction. For a sample of publicly traded targets, Travlos (1987) finds that stock financed M&A deals exhibit much larger negative announcement effects than cash financed deals. He concludes this is consistent with the empirical validity of an adverse selection effect. We use as a proxy for bidder overvaluation (or undervaluation), calculated from a bidder’s buy and hold cumulative stock return over the year preceding the M&A announcement month.In addition to bidder considerations, we need to take into account typical target considerations. These preferences are related to risk, liquidity, asymmetric information and home bias.T1. Unlisted Targets and Subsidiary T argetsWe use an indicator variable, UNLISTED TARGET, to control for listing status where the variable takes a value of one if the target is a stand-alone company, not listed on any stock exchange and is zero for listed targets and unlisted subsidiaries. When an M&A deal involves an unlisted target, a seller’s consumption/liquidity needs are also likely to be important considerations. These sellers are likely to prefer cashgiven the illiquid and concentrated nature of their portfolio holdings and the often impending retirement of a controlling shareholder-manager. Likewise, corporations selling subsidiaries are often motivated by financial distress concerns or a desire torestructure toward their core competency. In either case, there is a strong preference for cash consideration to realize these financial or asset restructuring goals. A likely consequence is a greater use of cash in such deals, since bidders are frequently motivated to divest subsidiaries to finance new acquisitions or reduce their debt burden. As noted earlier, these two target ownership structures are also likely to elicit bidder corporate control concerns given their concentrated ownership. Thus, bidders are likely to prefer cash financing of such deals, especially as they become relatively large.T2. Cross-Industry Deals and Asymmetric InformationSeller reluctance to accept bidder stock as payment should rise as the asymmetric information problem worsens with greater uncertainty about bidder equity value and future earnings. This problem is also likely to be more serious for conglomerate mergers. In contrast, sellers are more apt to accept a continuing equity position in an intra–industry merger, where they are well acquainted with industry risks and prospects.T3. Cross-Border Deals, Local Exchange Listing and Home BiasIn cross border deals, selling stock to foreign investors can entail several problems. We are concerned with the possibility that investors have a home country bias in their portfolio decisions as documented in Coval and Moskowitz (1999), French and Poterba (1991) and Grinblatt and Keloharju(2001), among others. This can reflect a foreign stock’s g reater trading costs, lower liquidity, exposure to exchange risk and less timely, more limited access to firm information.T4. Bidder Investment OpportunitiesHigh growth bidders can make an attractive equityinvestment for selling shareholders. MKTTO-BOOK, defined as a market value of equity plus book value of debt over the sum of book value of equity plus book value of debt prior to the bid, measures a bidder’s investment in growth opportunities.We expect a higher market tobook ratio to increase a bidde r stock’s attractiveness as M&A consideration. High market to book is also correlated with high levels of tax deductible R&D expenditures, along with low current earnings and cash dividends. These firm attributes lower a bidder’s need for additional debt tax shield, making cash financing less attractive. These attributes are also attractive to high income bracket sellers due to their tax benefits. Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) document a higher incidence of stock financing for higher market to book buyers.译文：并购支付方式在欧洲的选择在过去的十年，全球并购活动已显著增长,同时带来组织的重大改变和在世界各地的经济活动的控制。
中小企业融资外文文献翻译
外文文献：Financing of SMEsAbstractThe main sources of financing for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are equity, trade credit paid on time, long and short term bank credits, delayed payment on trade credit and other debt. The marginal costs of each financing instrument are driven by asymmetric information and transactions costs associated with nonpayment. According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms will choose the cheapest source in terms of cost. In the case of the static trade-off theory, firms choose finance so that the marginal costs across financing sources are all equal, thus an additional Euro of financing is obtained from all the sources whereas under the Pecking Order Theory the source is determined by how far down the Pecking Order the firm is presently located. In this paper, we argue that both of these theories miss the point that the marginal costs are dependent of the use of the funds, and the asset side of the balance sheet primarily determines the financing source for an additional Euro. An empirical analysis on a unique dataset of Portuguese SME’s confirms that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet has an impact of the type of financing used and the Pecking Order Theory and the traditional Static Trade-off theory are rejected.For SME’s the main sources of financing are equity (internally generated cash), trade credit, bank credit and other debt. The choice of financing is driven by the costs of the sources which is primarily determined by costs of solving the asymmetric information problem and the expected costs associated with non-payment of debt. Asymmetric information costs arise from collecting and analysing information to support the decision of extending credit, and the non-payment costs are from collecting the collateral and selling it to recover the debt. Since SMEs’ managementand shareholders are often the same person, equity and internally generated funds have no asymmetric information costs and equity is therefore the cheapest source.2. Asset side theory of SME financingIn the previous section we have suggested that SME’s in Portugal are financed using internal generated cash, cheap trade credits, long and short-term bank loans and expensive trade credits and other loans. In this section the motives behind the different types of financing are discussed.2.1. Cheap Trade creditsThe first external financing source we will discuss is trade-credits. Trade credits are interesting since they represent financial services provided by non-financial firms in competition with financial intermediaries. The early research within this area focused on the role of trade credits in relation to the credit channel or the so called “Meltzer” effect and in relation to the efficiency of monetary policy. The basic idea is that firms with direct access to financial markets, in general large well known firms, issue trade credits to small financially constrained firms . The more recent research breaks the role of trade credits into a strategic motive and financial motive for issuing and using these credits.Strategic motivesThe first theory centers on asymmetric information regarding the firm’s products. Trade credits are offered to the buyers so that the buyer can verify the quantity and quality before submitting payments. By offering trade finance the supplier signals to the buyers that they offer products of good quality. Since small firms, in general, have no reputation then these firms are forced to use trade credits to signal the quality of their products. The use of trade credits is therefore driven by asymmetric information of the products and is therefore more likely to be used by small firms, if the buyer has little information about the supplier, or the products are complicated and it is difficult to asses their quality.The second strategic motive is pricing. Offering trade finance on favorable terms is the same as a price reduction for the goods. Thus firms can use trade credits to promote sales without officially reducing prices or use them as a tool for pricediscrimination between different buyers. Trade credits are most advantageous to risky borrowers since their costs of alternative financing are higher than for borrowers with good credit ratings. Thus trade credits can be used as tool for direct price discrimination but also as an indirect tool (if all buyers are offered the same terms) in favor of borrowers with a low credit standing.Trade credits are also used to develop long term relationships between the supplier and the buyers. This often manifests itself by the supplier extending the credit period in case the buyer has temporary financial difficulties. Compared to financial institutions suppliers have better knowledge of the industry and are therefore better able to judge whether the firm has temporary problems or the problems are of a more permanent nature.The last motive in not strictly a strategic motive but is based on transactions costs. Trade credits are an efficient way of performing the transactions since it is possible to separate between delivery and payment. In basic terms the truck drive r delivering the goods does not have to run around to find the person responsible for paying the bills. The buyer also saves transactions costs by reducing the amount of cash required on“hand” .Financing motivesThe basis for this view is that firms compete with financial institutions in offering credit to other firms. The traditional view of financial institutions is that they extend credit to firms where asymmetric information is a major problem. Financial institutions have advantages in collecting and analyzing information from, in particular, smaller and medium sized firms that suffer from problems of asymmetric information. The key to this advantage over financial markets lies in the close relationship between the bank and the firm and in the payment function. The financial institution is able to monitor the cash inflow and outflows of the firm by monitoring the accounts of the firm.But with trade credits non-financial firms are competing with financial institutions in solving these problems and extending credit. How can non-financial institutions compete in this market? Petersen and Rajan [1997] briefly discussesseveral ways that suppliers may have advantages over financial institutions. The supplier has a close working association with the borrower and more frequently visit s the premises than a financial institution does. The size and timing of the lenders orders with the supplier provides information about the conditions of the borrowers business. Notice that this information is available to the supplier before it is available to the financial institution since the financial institution has to wait for the cash flow associated with the orders. The use of early payment discounts provides the supplier with an indication of problems with creditworthiness in the firm. Again the supplier obtains the information before the financial institution does. Thus the supplier may be able to obtain information about the creditworthiness faster and cheaper than the financial institution.The supplier may also have advantages in collecting payments. If the supplier has at least a local monopoly for the goods then the ability to withhold future deliveries is a powerful incentive for the firm to pay. This is a particular powerful threat if the borrower only accounts for a small fraction of the suppliers business. In case of defaults the supplier can seize the goods and in general has a better use for them than a financial intermediary sizing the same goods. Through its sales network the supplier can sell the reclaimed goods faster and at a higher price than what is available to a financial intermediary. These advantages, of course, depend on the durability of the goods and how much the borrower has transformed them.If asymmetric information is one of the driving forces the explanation of trade credits then firms can use the fact that their suppliers have issued them credits in order to obtain additional credit from the banks. The banks are aware that the supplier has better information thus the bank can use trade credits as signal of the credit worthiness of the firm.That trade credits are in general secured by the goods delivered also puts a limit on the amount of trade credits the firm can obtain, thus the firm cannot use trade credits to finance the entire operations of the firm.In summary the prediction is that the level of asymmetric information is relatively low between the providers of trade credit and the borrowers due to theissuer’s general knowledge of the firm and the ind ustry. In the empirical work below the variables explaining the use of trade credit are credit risk factors and Cost of Goods Sold. Since these trade credits are secured by the materials delivered to the firm, firms cannot “borrow” for more than the delive ry value of the goods and services.2.2 Bank loansBanks have less information than providers of trade credit and the costs of gathering information are also higher for banks than for providers of trade credit. Providers of trade credits also have an advantage over banks in selling the collateral they have themselves delivered, but due to their size and number of transactions banks have an advantage in selling general collateral such as buildings, machinery etc. Banks therefore prefer to issue loans using tangible assets as collateral, also due to asymmetric information, they are less likely to issue loans to more opaque firms such as small and high growth firms. Banks are therefore willing to lend long term provided that tangible assets are available for collateral. In the empirical work below tangible assets and credit risk variables are expected to explain the use of long-term bank loans and the amount of long-term bank loans are limited by the value of tangible assets.The basis for issuing Short Term Bank Loans is the comparative advantages banks have in evaluating and collecting on accounts receivables, i.e. Debtors. It is also possible to use Cash and Cash equivalents as collateral but banks do not have any comparative advantages over other providers of credit in terms of evaluating and collecting these since they consist of cash and marketable securities. In terms of inventories, again banks do not have any comparative advantages in evaluating these. Thus, we expect the amounts of debtors to be the key variable in explaining the behaviour of Short Term Bank Loans.2.3. Expensive trade credit and other loansAfter other sources of finance have been exhausted firms can delay payment on their trade credits. However, this is expensive since it involves giving up the discount and maybe incurs penalty payments. Also the use of this type of credit can havereputational costs and it may be difficult to obtain trade credit in the future. The nature of the costs, of course, depends on the number of suppliers, if there is only one supplier then these costs can be rather high whereas if the firm can obtain the same goods and services from other suppliers then these costs are not particularly high.Other debt is composed of credit card debt, car loans etc. that are dearer than bank loans. Again, the variables determining this type of debt are financial health and performance. Below, however, we do not have any good information regarding these types of loans and what they consists of thus we pay little attention to them in the empirical work.ConclusionsCurrently there exist two theories of capital structure The Pecking Order Theory where firms first exhaust all funding of the cheapest source first, then the second cheapest source and so on. The differences in funding costs are due to adverse selection costs from asymmetric information. The second theory is the Tradeoff Theory where firms increase the amount of debt as long as the benefits are greater than the costs from doing so. The benefits of debt are tax-shields and “positive agency costs” and the costs of debt are the expected bankruptcy costs and the “negative agency costs”. In both of these theories, the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet is not important and in this paper, that proposition is strongly rejected. So the main conclusion is that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet influences the composition of the liability side of the balance sheet in terms of the different types of debt used to finance the firm, or that the use of the funds is important in deciding the type of financing available.We further argue that it is asymmetric information and collateral that determines the relationship between the asset side and liability side of the balance sheet. The theory works reasonable well for Cheap Trade Credits and Long Term Bank Loans but the tests for Short Term Bank Loans are disappointing.中文译文：中小企业融资摘要中小企业融资的主要来源有：股权融资、按时兑现的贸易信贷融资、中长期银行信贷融资、延迟兑现的贸易信贷融资以及其他债务融资，每种融资方式的边际成本取决于与其滞纳金相关的信息不对称成本和交易成本。
融资租赁中英文对照外文翻译文献
中英文对照外文翻译文献中英文资料外文翻译附录1：（原文）The Determinants of the Leasing of Small Companies1, international for small and medium-sized companies were discussedAt the beginning of the 20th century, appear with ford motor as a representative of the mass production methods, people believed in the enterprise of large-scale business is the trend of The Times. But last of the twentieth century ago in economics leading view also think big enterprise is efficient, the scale become the pronoun of efficiency, enterprise's economic development of large-scale become direction. Yet the century in the 1970s, a kind of traditional ideas beganchallenged. In 1973, the British scholar schumacher (E.F.S chumacher) published a small is a good book. Quickly and has caused a great echo. The author thinks that the western countries specialization, large-scale production pattern looks is solved "production problem", but actually is an illusion. This mode of production caused economic inefficiency, environmental pollution, resource exhaustion, and fostered many social problems. Therefore, must choose again a development pattern or way. Schumacher pointed out the development of large-scale and automation error, advocated the development of small and medium-sized intermediate technology. He thinks. To make the society "enduring" development, must go miniaturization, among the development of roads, especially to the development of small and medium-sized enterprises and "intermediate technology". British prime minister Tony Blair also put forward by 2005 to the development of small businesses of British construction become heaven ".2, small and medium-sized enterprises in China's economy contributionSmall and medium-sized enterprises is an important means of technical innovation. Before world war ii, the century with different since the 1960s and 1970s gradually arisen on information technology and biotechnology as the core of the new technology revolution is mainly in small and medium-sized enterprises, and at least in lots of small and medium-sized enterprises tody develops. In the middle of the century ago, rich economies in the proportion ofsmall and medium-sized enterprises has been declining trend; In the middle of the century especially after the 1960s and 1970s, and small and medium-sized enterprises and started mass development (see Storey, D.J., 1994). This suggests that small and medium-sized enterprise is to adapt to this new trend of technological progress. According to statistics, so far, small and medium-sized enterprises in China has more than 800 thousand, accounts for the enterprise 99% of all. In since 1960s of rapid economic growth, industrial output value of new 76% above is created by small and medium-sized enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprise output and realize profits tax have accounted for 60% of the national respectively and 407., in recent years in the total export, small and medium-sized enterprises accounted for about 60 percent. "no doubt, small and medium-sized enterprises has become the new growth point of boosting the national economy, promoting China's economic boom is the main driving force of uplink. About smes in the country's economy, the importance of roughly boils down to:First, provide employment opportunity, absorbing surplus labor force. Compared with large enterprises and small and medium sized enterprises are using more labor-intensive technology, so the development of small and medium-sized enterprises can help alleviate current employment pressure. In fact, although small and medium-sized enterprise role far more than that, but it is small and medium-sized enterprises of this feature, to medium and small-sized enterprisesfor people increasingly attention. Our country the industry and commerce registration of small and medium-sized enterprises, more than 1,500 million, accounts for the total enterprises ninety-nine percent, to be town provides seventy-five percent of the jobs.Second, create the mainstay of GDP. According to the above information: small and medium-sized enterprises in the national industrial output account for about 60, realize profits tax of up to 40%. Table 3-1 for our independent accounting industrial enterprises in 1995-2000 some data, including various types of enterprise of gross industrial output and the proportion of total assets, value added of industry and the proportion of total assets and profit tax amount to total assets ratio (namely fund LiShuiLv). We can find that, regardless of in the output value on the proportions still in proportion of small and medium-sized enterprises are superior to large enterprises. This shows that every unit fund of small and medium-sized enterprises than large enterprise creates more social wealth. But, in addition to 2000, small and medium-sized enterprises outside the capital LiShuiLv below large enterprises. So, in proportion with capital value LiShuiLv appears between some contradictions. Because the latter reflects the former distribution relationship, this is because of hard to get the bank low-interest loans to small and medium-sized enterprises to use capital interest of proportion of those enterprises.Lease financing background is socialized production developed market economydevelopment to a higher level, industrial products, developed countries and its relative surplus of industrial capital seek and develop new market, therefore in the investigation of its function and advantages, cannot be separated from the historical background. Only understand this historical background, can answer financing lease why produced in the 1950s and to worldwide development, rather than creating and developing in other time periods. Financing lease improved social reproduction pace, acceleration of capital goods circulation and consumption, drive investment demand and the fellowship demand expanded. Eventually have a promotion aggregate demand growth, and thus to promote full employment and economic development.3. Move investment demandBritish lease experts, the bott who specially in the world on the lease yearbook of literary theory and the effect. He said: "in fact, some governments are shifting in full-scale lease to stimulate domestic investment. They moved to increase employment desire from an" '. He in investigating the German and British examples. Conclusion: lease industry in ensuring the role of main domestic investment was profound. Governments also encourage leasing company for capital equipment finance to expand exports, in order to improve their producers in the international market competition in position. Lease financing are able to expand domestic demand, increase employment in plays a unique role, reason mainly has two sides, the first, the financing lease of the equipment suppliedwhatever is located where requires some personnel, this undoubtedly will increase employment; Second, governments for lease provides preferential tax reduced leasing companies and enterprise's financing cost, thus make many enterprises want to use lease form to carry on an investment, investment increase is apparent.4 our experienceOur country economy in the 1990s, has maintained a strong growth momentum. During this decade, there are eight years is the Clinton administration office. China's President economic commission chairman is 2001 Nobel Prize winner Joseph. SiDiGeLiCi as he died, but also by the Nobel Prize winner, lemon, the author of the article George gram rove lady janet "Aaron, which are both as a new Keynesian representative figures, they advocate information asymmetry theory that completely on market economic regulation is not solve all problems. As a free economy does not guarantee during the trade information symmetry, causing some areas of adverse selection (vicious circle) and moral hazard (credit crisis), this shows that our country was inclined to conditionally government intervention and control the market. Our country government to use tax and interest rate leverage to regulate the market, with investment policy caused investment direction. These again and lease have internal relations. Our so-called tuyuhun equipment leasing the financing lease of by the financing involving rates, strong city in the policy has led to $rising interest rates to leasebring the opportunity of the development. Our tax on rental industry has certain preferential, while rental industry is more relying on talent advantage and control the ownership of the lease objects legal status, make full use of our country to encourage investment preferential policies, and designed the system "lease", such as: "leveraged lease", "tax leasing", etc in accord with the government encourages investment direction lease modes, enlarged policy efforts, promote the economic development of our country. From our lease data can be found in a decade ago our lease permeability (leasing forehead occupies equipment investment proportion) is 32%, lease the forehead is $120 billion, after 10 years (1999), the leasing of statistical data, the lease 34.4% permeability is the forehead is 2260 billion dollars. Lease lease frontal doubled. Its economic permeability (rental amount of GDP) 30% of the proportion of GDP of China accounts for almost a third. Lease with the China economic double forehead, but no major permeability changes show that lease is not omnipotent, just a economic levers, from our own experience, lease for economic development in the ability to move around." Lease has so magical function, it mainly in the operation of the real rights and use "separation" concept in action, property and rights separation gave lease activities to enlarge government control of the will, become market between government and market between effective macro-control measures. From since 9/11, our country and take several rate cuts and tax adjustment policy, as well as expand access to war, lay particular stresson government input control economy components.Lease financing background is socialized production developed market economy development to a higher level, industrial products, developed countries and its relative surplus of industrial capital seek and develop new market, therefore in the investigation of its function and advantages, cannot be separated from the historical background. Only understand this historical background, can answer financing lease why produced in the 1950s and to worldwide development, rather than creating and developing in other time periods. Financing lease improved social reproduction pace, acceleration of capital goods circulation and consumption, drive investment demand and the fellowship demand expanded. Eventually have a promotion aggregate demand growth, and thus to promote full employment and economic development.附录2：（译文）小型公司融资租赁的决定因素l、国际对中小型公司的探讨20世纪初，出现以福特汽车为代表的大规模生产方式，人们相信企业的大规模经营是大势所趋。
创业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献
创业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Entrepreneurial FinancingThe financing of startups entails potentially extreme adverse selection costs given the absent track record of the firms seeking capital, and given the risky nature of the industries in which many of them operate. Exacerbating the problem, this scenario often involves an innovator who has extensive technical knowledge but has neither the accumulated reputation nor the bondable wealth necessary to convey this information credibly.Barry characterizes venture capital as having evolved precisely to fill this startup financing niche:At the level of small, risky ventures, access to capital markets is restricted. Not all entrepreneurs can self-finance their projects, and not all can find bankers or angels who will carry the shortfall. Venture capitalists offer them a source of funds that is specifically designed for use in risky settings. The venture capitalists themselves perform due diligence prior to investing, and information gleaned in that process can greatly reduce the adverse selection problem..This outlook raises several questions. Why is it assumed that banks cannot (or choose not to) perform the same level of due diligence as venture capitalists (VCs)? In what sense is venture capital “designed” for risky settings? The puzzle deepens when one notes that straight debt is typically advocated as a solution to the adverse selection problem whereas in practice VCs often hold convertible preferred equity. Indeed, a defining characteristic of the venture capital market is that contracts are fairly high-powered in the sense that expected payoffs come disproportionately from the equity component or “upside”.These questions can be addressed by reflecting upon the costly due diligence to w hich Barry refers. By directly revealing the project’s quality, due diligence reduces information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and the VC. By contrast, if quality were signaled—the traditional solution to the adverse selection problem—costly due diligence would be unnecessary since there would be no more information to convey.In otherwise, either signaling or costly due diligence can solve the adverse selection problem. The two mechanisms are substitutes; the question then becomes which is more cost-effective.The first contribution of the paper is to show that signaling can be prohibitively expensive in entrepreneurial financing markets, and so costly due diligence dominates. The “cost” of signaling is driven by the incentives of bad firms to pool. Yet,for startups, if funding is not obtained then the firm may have almost no value. With such low reservation values, bad entrepreneurs attempt to pool at nearly any cost. As the analysis shows, securities is unattractive enough to drive out bad entrepreneurs—and thus to serve as a credible signal—tend to be unattractive to good entrepreneurs as well. Costly due diligence emerges as the preferred solution.As testament to the empirical importance of due diligence costs in venture capital markets, Fried and Hans characterize the VC funding process as composed of six distinct, progressively rigorous stages of screening. This due diligence takes an average of 97 days to complete even before the first round of funding is initiated. The majority of funding proposals do not successfully pass through the first screen, let alone subsequent screens, and the full process is described as “much more involved in bank loan reviews.The second contribution of the paper is to illustrate a link between costly due diligence and high-powered (or equity-like) financial contracts. The intuition behind this link is simple. By definition, low-powered contracts are safe; i.e., expected payoffs vary little across firms. High-powered contracts magnify the differential in payoff between funding good and bad projects, and hence magnify the incentives to screen out bad projects. In effect, high-powered contracts make the VC bear the cost of choosing entrepreneurs unwisely. Therefore high-powered contracts encourage due diligence.To summarize, this model is designed to make three simple points: (1) upside sharing is to be expected given costly evaluation, (2) such costly evaluations serve as a substitute traditional solutions to the adverse selection problem, and (3) traditional solutions are dominated for parameterizations of the model that correspond to venturecapital markets.Following the path-breaking empirical work of Saar, a theoretical literature on VC contract design emerged. One common feature of these papers is that they rationalize the optimality of convertible securities. A second common feature of these models is the admission of agency costs. For example, VCs and entrepreneurs may have different preferences regarding project risk or exit strategy.In part, the literature’s relia nce on agency costs owes to a widespread belief in their empirical relevance. It is also presumably related to the aforementioned consensus: since debt is considered the optimal response to adverse selection, non-debt securities must imply the presence of another market friction. On the other hand, it is clear how agency costs could lead to equity-like securities. Conflicts-of-interest over future actions are mitigated by granting both parties roughly symmetrical payoffs, which leads to upside-sharing. Of course, the omission of agency problems from the current model is not intended to suggest that they are unimportant empirically. Rather, the lesson is that agency costs are not a necessary condition for equity-like securities.Perhaps surprisingly, the theoretical results most closely related to this paper are contained in analyses of publicly traded securities. Assuming liquidity is exogenous and that prices are set by competitive market makers, Boot and Thakor show that splitting securities into an information-sensitive piece and a safer piece may either increase or decrease traders’ incentives to produce information. Fulghieri and Lukin study a similar environment but split the firm’s claims into a piece sold to outside investors and another piece that is retained, again analyzing the interaction between security design and information acquisition.Two important distinctions set my results apart from these models of public trading. First, their models exogenously rule out signaling, so it not possible to examine whether traditional solutions to adverse selection are dominated and, if so, under what conditions. Second, it is not clear how the results of these public trading models might be extended to entrepreneurial finance markets since the assumption that drives their results—losses by liquidity traders with perfectly inelasticdemand—has no obvious counterpart in an entrepreneurial finance setting.The economy consists of entrepreneurs with projects requiring capital investment K. The value of funded projects is 1 with probability πτ, where τ∈{G, B} is an indicator of project quality, and λ< 1 otherwise.Funded projects have expected value Vi = πτ 1 + (1 − πτ)λ. It is assumed thatλ< K. Otherwise the model would admit riskless debt, which would eliminate the adverse selection problem.Entrepreneurs have reservation value V; that is, contracts are acceptable only if the residual claim has expected value V or higher. In a model of mature firm financing, V is most clearly interpreted as the value of assets-in-place, because this is the continuation value of the firm in the absence of new investment. Such an interpretation is valid in entrepreneurial settings as well because without attracting financing the entrepreneur owns the existing assets outright. The key difference is one of magnitude. Compared to models of mature firms, in entrepreneurial settings the value of assets-in-place is small relative to other parameters.The net present value of projects, Vτ−V − K, is assumed to satisfyEVG − V − K ≥0 ≥EV B − V − K. (1) Equation (1) justifies the nomenclature “good” and “bad.” The net present value of a project is positive if and only if the project is good. Finally, it is assumed that net present values satisfyθ(EG − V − K) + (1 −θ)(EB − V − K) ≥0, (2) where θis the proportion of good projects in the economy. Because net present values are positive (on average), the model admits pooling equilibrium.One source of capital is an uninformed investor who conducts a mechanical credit evaluation based on observable characteristics. This investor may be thought of as a proxy for the competitive commercial banking market. Consistent with this interpretation, it will be shown that this investor takes debt in equilibrium. Briefly, the intuition is that when one is uninformed, one solves the adverse selection problem in the traditional way. As mentioned in the introduction, this solution is debt.An alternative source of capital is an investor endowed with technology that canevaluate project quality. This investor is referred to as a VC. Consistent with this identification, it will be shown that the VC takes high-powered contracts in equilibrium. Likewise, it needs to be shown that the VC actually employs the screening technology. A priori, this usage is not obvious. In particular, if the financial contract is very generous (if it leaves the VC with a large stake), then it may be profitable to forego the costly evaluation in favor of funding all projects. Such an outcome would benefit bad entrepreneurs, because they too would like to attract funding provided they can pool with good firms and thereby obtain mispriced financing. By limiting this pooling, costly due diligence effects a transfer from bad entrepreneurs to good entrepreneurs, and in the process, directs real investment toward better projects.Entrepreneurs seeking venture capital finance form a (randomly ordered) queue, and the VC sequentially evaluates them. For each entrepreneur, upon paying a cost C the VC receives a signal s ∈{G, B} withPr{s = G | entrepreneur is bad} = Pr{s = B | entrepreneur is good} =ε(3) The unconditional probability of a good signal is θ(1 − ε) + (1 − θ)ε, so VCs expect to evaluate 1/(θ(1 − ε) + (1 − θ)ε) entrepreneurs before a goo d one is found. The financial contract must be sufficiently generous (ex ante) as to compensate the VC for both capital contribution K and expected evaluation costs C= C/(θ(1 − ε) + (1 − θ)ε) incurred in the process of obtaining each good signal.This game admits three types of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In separating equilibrium, good entrepreneurs offer a security which bad entrepreneurs find too unpleasant to mimic (choosing instead to receive reservation utility V). Adverse selection in the queue becomes degenerate since only good firms are active. VC equilibrium serve as a second solution. In this scenario, the entrepreneurs’ contracts induce the investor to evaluate all firms in the queue. Finally, pooling can be thought of as the case in which good entrepreneurs find both of the aforementioned solutions to adverse selection too expensive.In this paper, I limit attention to debt and equity. Earlier drafts consideredarbitrary securities, with similar resulting intuition: high-powered securities promote due diligence, whereas low-powered securities are more effective signaling devices. The restriction to standard securities simplifies the presentation, retains the crucial intuition, and facilitates comparison of my results with those of the existing literature.This paper argues that in entrepreneurial finance markets, direct revelation of project quality (via the due diligence of VCs) is more cost-effective than signaling quality. This theme ties into an empirical literature showing that the due diligence process in those markets is quite extensive. Indeed, due diligence is a defining feature of the VC market.Several features of the model are quite strong and give the appearance that the mechanisms considered for resolving adverse selection are perfect substitutes. In a richer model, the two mechanisms could work as partial complements as well. Generally, a role exists for both entrepreneurial signaling and VC due diligence. Earlier drafts of the paper show complement may be motivated in multiple ways. For example, suppose entrepreneurs have noisy private information. Then the optimal security may involve signaling, thus eliminating entrepreneurs with bad information. But to the extent that the pool has residual uncertainty even after this self-selection, costly due diligence may still add value.Information acquisition occurs outside venture capital markets, of course. This model may shed light on the usage of unit IPOs, which are bundles of stocks and warrants often used for particularly small, risky offerings. The inclusion of warrants is puzzling from an adverse selection perspective, since the existing literature argues that securities should emphasize payoffs in bad states. The logic of this paper suggests that these securities, which emphasize good states to an extreme, motivate investors to evaluate projects and might be used when other mechanisms of dealing with adverse selection are too expensive.Finally, the model’s conclusions are not tied to the assumption that good entrepreneurs choose the contract. A connection between information acquisition incentives and the shape of the security exists independently of the contract’s origins. One could equivalently model a general partner in a venture capital fund raisingmoney from limited partners, announcing what securities the fund intends to hold. The more equity-like the securities are, the stronger the general partner’s information acquisition incentives.Source: Chris Yung. Entrepreneurial Financing And Costly Due Diligence. The Financial Review, 2009(44),pp137-149.译文：创业融资由于缺乏融资的信用记录以及所经营公司存在的风险性，初创企业的融资通常情况下都需要很高的逆向选择成本。
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企业融资决策中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)译文：中小型企业融资决策企业的产生、生存及发展均离不开投资与融资活动。
随着我国加入WTO 组织，市场经济体制的逐步完善，金融市场的快速发展，投资与融资效率也越来越成为企业发展的关键。
对于中小型企业而言，应要根据自身发展需求，认真考虑如何选择自己需要和适合自己发展阶段的融资方式以及各种融资方式的利用时机、条件、成本和风险，确定合适的融资规模以及制定最佳融资期限等问题。
要解决这些问题，需要中小型企业制定适当的融资策略，以作出最优化的融资决策。
一、企业融资决策概述(一)企业融资决策概述企业融资决策，是企业根据其价值创造目标需要，利用一定时机与渠道，采取经济有效的融资工具，为公司筹集所需资金的一种市场行为。
它不仅改变了公司的资产负债结构，而且影响了企业内部管理、经营业绩、可持续发展及价值增长。
典型的融资决策包括出售何种债务和股权（融资方式）、如何确定所要出售债务和股权的价值（融资成本）、何时出售些债务和股权（融资时机）等等。
而其中最主要的包括融资规模的决策和融资方式的决策。
融资规模应为企业完成资金使用目的的最低需要量。
而企业的融资方式则多种多样，常见的以下几种：1.财政融资。
财政融资方式从融出的角度来讲，可分为：预算内拨款、财政贷款、通过授权机构的国有资产投资、政策性银行贷款、预算外专项建设基金、财政补贴。
2.银行融资。
从资金融出角度即银行的资金运用来说，主要是各种代款，例如：信用贷款、抵押贷款、担保贷款、贴现贷款、融资租凭、证券投资。
3.商业融资。
其方式也是多种多样，主要包括商品交易过程中各企业间发生的赊购商品、预收货款等形式。
4.政券融资。
该方式主要包括股标融资和债券融资两大类。
(二)融资决策过程企业制定融资决策的过程，也即确定最优资本结构的过程。
具体决策程序是：首先，当一家企业为筹措一笔资金面临几种融资方案时，企业可以分别计算出各个融资方案的加权平均资本成本率，然后选择其中加权平均资本成本率最低的一种。
其次，被选中的加权平均资本成本率最低的那种融资方案只是诸种方案中最佳的，并不意味着它已经形成了最佳资本结构，这时，企业要观察投资者对贷出款项的要求、股票市场的价格波动等情况，根据财务判断分析资本结构的合理性，同时企业财务人员可利用一些财务分析方法对资本结构通行更详尽的分析。
最后，根据分析结果，在企业进一步的融资决策中改进其资本结构。
(三)中小企业融资的总思路中小企业融资的总体思路应是：投资与融资相结合，以投资带动融资。
融资决策在中小企业财务决策中并不具备像大企业（尤其是股份公司）那样的独立性，它应该是企业投资决策的一部分，融资必须直接为投资服务。
这也就是说，中小企业的融资决策必须通过投资决策这一环节才能通向财务管理目标，而不是像股份公司那样，融资决策与财务目标之间可以建立直接的函数关系。
这是因为：1.中小企业财务目标是利润最大化，只有投资活动才能为企业带来利润，即最优的投资决策就是最优的筹资决策。
2. 中小企业的资金供需矛盾突出，企业融资的渠道、数量、时间都受到各种客观条件的限制。
要像大企业那样灵活地运用多种手段来自由调整资本结构，对中小企业来说是不现实的。
因此，对于有数十年经营历史，由职业经理层管理的中小型企业而言，融资计划是为投资服务的，必须与投资需求相匹配，包括融资金额和融资时间上的匹配。
更重要的，投资项目必须是经过多方面因素考虑的，不是盲目圈钱的幌子，否则容易出现投融资决策失效，导致投资失败、损害企业权益的问题。
在监督职能缺乏的中小型企业中，进行程序化的项目可行性论证是必要的，但只是决策的一个部分，提供财务上的参考，不能对整个计划是否可行提供意见，更不能作为项目可行的决定性依据。
战略和内部需要等各种因素综合考虑是很重要的。
二、我国中小型企业融资环境分析企业是在一定环境下的各种经济资源的有机集合体。
企业运营只有适应和了解环境变化的要求，才能立于不败之地。
企业面临的环境是指存在于企业周围，影响企业生存和发展的各种客观因素和力量的总称，它是企业选择筹资方式的基础。
就现阶段而言，我国中小企业的融资环境现状主要有以下几个方面：(一)从中小企业自身的状况来看我国中小企业的经营管理水平和技术水平往往比较低，企业内部缺乏有效的监督制约机制，这样造成的一个结果就是资金使用效率不高，风险比较大。
因此，银行等金融机构对中小企业经营和发展的信任度很低，所以也不会轻易地将资金借贷给中小企业。
(二)从银行等金融机构的经营原则来考虑银行等金融机构的经营讲究资金的“效益性、安全性、流动性”，在实践中银行等金融机构给予客户贷款的一个前提条件就是要求客户能够提供有效的担保，中小企业自身则因资力有限而无法提供有效的担保，同时因为中小企业经营的风险性，第三人在一般情况下也不会为中小企业的债务提供担保。
既然不能提供足额有效的担保，银行等金融机构就不会给中小企业发放贷款。
(三)从国家的产业政策和经济政策来看政府对中小企业的扶持不足也是造成中小企业融资难的一个重要原因。
我国对中小企业虽然也有一些扶持政策，比如《中华人民共和国乡镇企业法》当中也规定，“国家运用信贷手段，鼓励和扶持乡镇企业的发展”：“县级以上人民政府依照国家有关规定，可以设立乡镇企业发展基金”，“乡镇企业发展基金专门用于扶持乡镇企业发展”等，但是因为缺乏有效的制度保障，这些规定很难落到实处。
(四)从我国的金融管制来看企业之间不能相互借贷也在一定程度上增加了中小企业融资的难度。
依据我国现行法律，公民之间、企业与公民之间、企业或公民与金融机构之间可以发生合法的借贷关系，然而企业与企业之间的借贷却被视为非法借贷关系而为法律所不允许。
这样，对于中小企业来说，等于少了一条融资的途径，无形之中也增加了中小企业的融资难度。
三、中小型企业应制定合理融资的具体策略因此，对于在现阶段我国的中小企业融资环境对中小企业融资不利的情况下而言，中小企业在制定具体的融资策略时，应注意以下几个方面：(一)资金数量上追求合理性对以股份公司为代表的大企业来讲，融资的目的在于实现最佳资本结构，即追求资金成本最低和企业价值最大；而对中小企业来讲，融资的目的是直接确保生产经营所需的资金。
资金不足会影响生产发展，而资金过剩也会导致资金使用效果降低，形成浪费。
由于中小企业融资不易，所以经营者在遇到比较宽松的筹资环境时，往往容易犯“韩信点兵，多多益善”的错误。
但如果筹来的资金用得不合理或者并非真正需要，那么好事就变成了坏事，企业反倒可能背负沉重的债务负担，进一步影响融资能力和获利能力。
因此，企业界在进行融资决策之初，要根据企业对资金的需要、企业自身的实际条件以及融资决策的难易程度和成本情况下，量力而行，确定企业合理的融资规模。
(二)资金使用上追求效益性中小企业在融资渠道和方式上不像大企业那样存在较大的选择余地，但这并不是说中小企业只能“饥不择食”，相反，由于中小企业的抗风险能力弱以及筹资困难，更应该对每笔资金善加权衡，综合考虑经营需要与资金成本、融资风险及投资收益等诸多方面的因素，必须把资金的来源和投向结合起来，分析资金成本率与投资收益串的关系，避免决策失误。
(三)资金结构上追求配比性中小企业的资金运用决定资金筹集的类型和数量。
我们知道，企业总资产由流动资产和非流动资产两部分构成。
流动资产又分为两种不同性态：一是其数量随生产经营的变动而波动的流动资产，即所谓的暂时性流动资产；二是类似于固定资产那样长期保持稳定水平的流动资产，即所谓的永久性流动资产。
按结构上的配比原则，中小企业用于固定资产和永久性流动资产上的资金，以中长期融资方式筹措为宜；由于季节性、周期性和随机因素造成企业经营活动变化所需的资金，则主要以短期融资方式筹措为宜。
强调融资和投资在资金结构上的配比关系对中小企业尤为重要。
(四)资金运作上，在追求增量筹资的同时更加注重存量筹资增量筹资指从数量上增加资金总占用量，以满足生产经营需要；存量筹资是指在不增加资金总占用量的前提下，通过调整资金占用结构、加速资金周转，尽量避免不合理的资金使用，提高单位资金的使用效果，以满足企业不断扩大的生产经营需要。
增量筹资与存量筹资的紧密结合，也反映出中小企业的筹资活动与投资活动的内在必然联系，因为存量筹资实际上就是一种资金运用，它属于投资活动的范畴。
比如，企业若能将闲置设备适时采用出租、出售转让等形式进行“存量筹资”，则不但可以避免损失和资金的积压，而且有助于提高长期资金的流动性，减轻过于沉重的融资压力。
(五)筹资渠道上，追求以信誉取胜主动与金融机构保持良好关系，使之了解企业，看到企业远大的前景，愿意支持企业的发展，这对每一个成功的中小企业经营者来说都是必修的一课。
具体包括两个方面：一方面是对金融机构的选择，应选择对中小企业立业与成长前途感兴趣并愿意对其投资的金融机构；能给予企业经营指导的金融机构；分支机构多、交易方便的金融机构；资金充足，而且资金费用低的金融机构；员工素质好、职业道德良好的金融机构等。
另一方面是中小企业要主动向合作的金融机构沟通企业的经营方针、发展计划、财务状况，说明遇到的困难，以实绩和信誉赢得金融机构的信任和支持，而不应以各种违法或不正当的手段套取资金。
(六)筹资方式上，选择适合企业本身规模、实力与所处阶段在对融资收益与成本进行比较之后，认为确有必要融资时，就需要考虑选择什么样的融资方式。
在选择融资方式时，通常要考虑企业自身规模的大小、实力强弱以及企业所处的发展阶段，同时结合不同融资方式的特点，选择适合本企业发展的融资方式，例如，在中小企业创业初期，其融资方式可以上选择股权融资，因为创业初期，风险很大，很少有金融机构等债权人来为你融资。
而在股权融资中，企业主与其朋友和家庭成员的资金占了绝大多数。
这部分融资是属于“内部人融资”或“内部融资”，也叫企业“自己投资”。
到中小企业发展到一定时期和规模以后，就可以选择债权融资。
债权融资主要来自金融机构，包括商业银行和财务公司等。
属于高科技行业的中小企业，可以考虑到创业板市场发行股票融资；不符合上市条件的中小企业，则可以考虑银行贷款融资等。
(七)融资方式上，选择最有利于提高企业竞争力的融资方式中小企业融资通常会给企业带来以下直接影响：首先，通过融资，可以壮大中小企业资本实力，增强中小企业的支付能力和发展后劲；其次，通过融资，可以提高中小企业的信誉，扩大企业产品的市场份额；再次，通过融资，可以扩大中小企业规模，增强企业获利能力，从而充分利用规模经济优势提高企业在市场上的竞争力，加快企业的发展。
但是企业竞争力的提高程度因企业融资方式、融资收益的不同而存在很大差异。
比如，股票融资、尤其是初次发行普通股并上市流通，不仅会给企业带来巨大的资金融通，还会大大提高企业的知名度和商誉，使企业的竞争力获得提高。