文献综述博弈论在供应链管理中的应用

Expected sales response volume:
S (a ,q ) a q 9
2.Assumptions
The manufacturer’s,retailer’s,system’s expected profit functions are as follows:
Note: “cq” should be “q” 10
8
2.Assumptions
m maneu srdf' o am c llta a urrp rgrionfa
rreta sd iloem lrl'a arrp grio nf a
One-period sales response volume function:
S(a,q) a q
~
~
0, ,, 0,E() 0
a —retailer’s local advertising level; q—manufacturer’s national brand name
investment t —fraction of total local advertising
expenditures which manufacturer shares
derivative
of
Fra Baidu bibliotek
r
with
respect
Then we have Eq(5):
12
3.Stackelberg equilibrium
We can observe that:
So the manufacturer can use his co-op advertising policy and his national brand name investment to induce the retailer to increase or decrease local advertising expenditure at a level he expects.
5
1.Introduction
Most studies to date on vertical co-op advertising have focused on a relationship where the manufacturer is a leader and the retailer is a follower.
Keyword: Decision analysis; Game theory; Co-op advertising; Equilibrium; Coordination; Bargaining problems; Utilities.
4
1.Introduction
Vertical co-op advertising is an interactive relationship between a manufacturer and a retailer in which the retailer initiates and implements a local advertising and the manufacturer pays part of the cost.
game:manufacturer is a leader; 2.a noncooperative simultaneous move
game; 3.a cooperative game.
7
2.Assumptions
S—retailer’s sales response volume function of product;
文献综述博弈论在供应链管理中的应用
Huang,Z.M., S.X.Li. 2001. Co-op advertising models in manufacturerretailer supply chains:A game theory approach. European Journal of Operational Research 135,527-544.
13
3.Stackelberg equilibrium
Next the optimal value of q and t are
determined by maximizing the manufacturer’s profit subject to the constraint imposed by Eq(5).Hence,the manufacturer’s problem can be formulated as
The main reason for a manufacturer to use co-op advertising is to strengthen the image of the brand and to motivate immediate sales at retailer level.
This paper is intended to discuss the relationship between co-op advertising and efficiency of manufacturer- retailer transactions.
6
1.Introduction
Three co-op advertising model: 1.a leader-follower noncooperative
3.Stackelberg equilibrium
We model the relationship between the manufacturer and the retailer as a sequential noncooperative game with the manufacturer as the leader and the retailer as the follower.
11
3.Stackelberg equilibrium
We first solve for the reaction function in the
second stage of the game:
r is a concave function of a
Setting
to ato
the first be zero: