融资过程外文翻译外文文献英文文献融资过程中啄食顺序理论的一个

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资本结构中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照外文翻译(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)The effect of capital structure on profitability : an empirical analysis of listed firms in Ghana IntroductionThe capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on a firm’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. The capital structure of a firm is actually a mix of different securities. In general, a firm can choose among many alternative capital structures. It can issue a large amount of debt or very little debt. It can arrange lease financing, use warrants, issue convertible bonds, sign forward contracts or trade bond swaps. It can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations; however, it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes its overall market value.A number of theories have been advanced in explaining the capital structure of firms. Despite the theoretical appeal of capital structure, researchers in financial management have not found the optimal capital structure. The best that academics and practitioners have been able to achieve are prescriptions that satisfy short-term goals. For example, the lack of a consensus about what would qualify as optimal capital structure has necessitated the need for this research. A better understanding of the issues at hand requires a look at the concept of capital structure and its effect on firm profitability. This paper examines the relationship between capital structure and profitability of companies listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange during the period 1998-2002. The effect of capital structure on the profitability of listed firms in Ghana is a scientific area that has not yet been explored in Ghanaian finance literature.The paper is organized as follows. The following section gives a review of the extant literature on the subject. The next section describes the data and justifies the choice of the variables used in the analysis. The model used in the analysis is then estimated. The subsequent section presents and discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, the last section summarizes the findings of the research and also concludes the discussion.Literature on capital structureThe relationship between capital structure and firm value has been the subject of considerable debate. Throughout the literature, debate has centered on whether there is an optimal capital structure for an individual firm or whether the proportion of debt usage is irrelevant to the individual firm’s value. The capital structure of a firm concerns the mix of debt and equity the firm uses in its operation. Brealey and Myers (2003) contend that the choice of capital structure is fundamentally a marketing problem. They state that the firm can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations, but it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes market value. According to Weston and Brigham (1992), the optimal capital structure is the one that maximizes the market value of the firm’s outstanding shares.Fama and French (1998), analyzing the relationship among taxes, financing decisions, and the firm’s value, concluded that the debt does not concede tax b enefits. Besides, the high leverage degree generates agency problems among shareholders and creditors that predict negative relationships between leverage and profitability. Therefore, negative information relating debt and profitability obscures the tax benefit of the debt. Booth et al. (2001) developed a study attempting to relate the capital structure of several companies in countries with extremely different financial markets. They concluded thatthe variables that affect the choice of the capital structure of the companies are similar, in spite of the great differences presented by the financial markets. Besides, they concluded that profitability has an inverse relationship with debt level and size of the firm. Graham (2000) concluded in his work that big and profitable companies present a low debt rate. Mesquita and Lara (2003) found in their study that the relationship between rates of return and debt indicates a negative relationship for long-term financing. However, they found a positive relationship for short-term financing and equity.Hadlock and James (2002) concluded that companies prefer loan (debt) financing because they anticipate a higher return. Taub (1975) also found significant positive coefficients for four measures of profitability in a regression of these measures against debt ratio. Petersen and Rajan (1994) identified the same association, but for industries. Baker (1973), who worked with a simultaneous equations model, and Nerlove (1968) also found the same type of association for industries. Roden and Lewellen (1995) found a significant positive association between profitability and total debt as a percentage of the total buyout-financing package in their study on leveraged buyouts. Champion (1999) suggested that the use of leverage was one way to improve the performance of an organization.In summary, there is no universal theory of the debt-equity choice. Different views have been put forward regarding the financing choice. The present study investigates the effect of capital structure on profitability of listed firms on the GSE.MethodologyThis study sampled all firms that have been listed on the GSE over a five-year period (1998-2002). Twenty-two firms qualified to be included in the study sample. Variables used for the analysis include profitability and leverage ratios. Profitability is operationalized using a commonly used accounting-based measure: the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to equity. The leverage ratios used include:. short-term debt to the total capital;. long-term debt to total capital;. total debt to total capital.Firm size and sales growth are also included as control variables.The panel character of the data allows for the use of panel data methodology. Panel data involves the pooling of observations on a cross-section of units over several time periods and provides results that are simply not detectable in pure cross-sections or pure time-series studies. A general model for panel data that allows the researcher to estimate panel data with great flexibility and formulate the differences in the behavior of thecross-section elements is adopted. The relationship between debt and profitability is thus estimated in the following regression models:ROE i,t =β0 +β1SDA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (1) ROE i,t=β0 +β1LDA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (2) ROE i,t=β0 +β1DA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (3)where:. ROE i,t is EBIT divided by equity for firm i in time t;. SDA i,t is short-term debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. LDA i,t is long-term debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. DA i,t is total debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. SIZE i,t is the log of sales for firm i in time t;. SG i,t is sales growth for firm i in time t; and. ëi,t is the error term.Empirical resultsTable I provides a summary of the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables for the sample of firms. This shows the average indicators of variables computed from the financial statements. The return rate measured by return on equity (ROE) reveals an average of 36.94 percent with median 28.4 percent. This picture suggests a good performance during the period under study. The ROE measures the contribution of net income per cedi (local currency) invested by the firms’ stockholders; a measure of the efficiency of the owners’ invested capital. The variable SDA measures the ratio of short-term debt to total capital. The average value of this variable is 0.4876 with median 0.4547. The value 0.4547 indicates that approximately 45 percent of total assets are represented by short-term debts, attesting to the fact that Ghanaian firms largely depend on short-term debt for financing their operations due to the difficulty in accessing long-term credit from financial institutions. Another reason is due to the under-developed nature of the Ghanaian long-term debt market. The ratio of total long-term debt to total assets (LDA) also stands on average at 0.0985. Total debt to total capital ratio(DA) presents a mean of 0.5861. This suggests that about 58 percent of total assets are financed by debt capital. The above position reveals that the companies are financially leveraged with a large percentage of total debt being short-term.Table I.Descriptive statisticsMean SD Minimum Median Maximum━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ROE 0.3694 0.5186 -1.0433 0.2836 3.8300SDA 0.4876 0.2296 0.0934 0.4547 1.1018LDA 0.0985 0.1803 0.0000 0.0186 0.7665DA 0.5861 0.2032 0.2054 0.5571 1.1018SIZE 18.2124 1.6495 14.1875 18.2361 22.0995SG 0.3288 0.3457 20.7500 0.2561 1.3597━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Regression analysis is used to investigate the relationship between capital structure and profitability measured by ROE. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results are presented in Table II. The results from the regression models (1), (2), and (3) denote that the independent variables explain the debt ratio determinations of the firms at 68.3, 39.7, and 86.4 percent, respectively. The F-statistics prove the validity of the estimated models. Also, the coefficients are statistically significant in level of confidence of 99 percent.The results in regression (1) reveal a significantly positive relationship between SDA and profitability. This suggests that short-term debt tends to be less expensive, and therefore increasing short-term debt with a relatively low interest rate will lead to an increase in profit levels. The results also show that profitability increases with the control variables (size and sales growth). Regression (2) shows a significantly negative association between LDA and profitability. This implies that an increase in the long-term debt position is associated with a decrease in profitability. This is explained by the fact that long-term debts are relatively more expensive, and therefore employing high proportions of them could lead to low profitability. The results support earlier findings by Miller (1977), Fama and French (1998), Graham (2000) and Booth et al. (2001). Firm size and sales growth are again positively related to profitability.The results from regression (3) indicate a significantly positive association between DA and profitability. The significantly positive regression coefficient for total debt implies that an increase in the debt position is associated with an increase in profitability: thus, the higher the debt, the higher the profitability. Again, this suggests that profitable firms depend more on debt as their main financing option. This supports the findings of Hadlock and James (2002), Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Roden and Lewellen (1995) that profitable firms use more debt. In the Ghanaian case, a high proportion (85 percent)of debt is represented by short-term debt. The results also show positive relationships between the control variables (firm size and sale growth) and profitability.Table II.Regression model results━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Profitability (EBIT/equity)Ordinary least squares━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Variable 1 2 3SIZE 0.0038 (0.0000) 0.0500 (0.0000) 0.0411 (0.0000)SG 0.1314 (0.0000) 0.1316 (0.0000) 0.1413 (0.0000)SDA 0.8025 (0.0000)LDA -0.3722(0.0000)DA -0.7609(0.0000)R²0.6825 0.3968 0.8639SE 0.4365 0.4961 0.4735Prob. (F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ConclusionsThe capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on an organization’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. This present study evaluated the relationship between capital structure and profitability of listed firms on the GSE during a five-year period (1998-2002). The results revealed significantly positive relation between SDA and ROE, suggesting that profitable firms use more short-term debt to finance their operation. Short-term debt is an important component or source of financing for Ghanaian firms, representing 85 percent of total debt financing. However, the results showed a negative relationship between LDA and ROE. With regard to the relationship between total debt and profitability, the regression results showed a significantly positive association between DA and ROE. This suggests that profitable firms depend more on debt as their main financing option. In the Ghanaian case, a high proportion (85 percent) of the debt is represented in short-term debt.译文加纳上市公司资本结构对盈利能力的实证研究论文简介资本结构决策对于任何商业组织都是至关重要的。

融资外文翻译

融资外文翻译————————————————————————————————作者：————————————————————————————————日期：第1页1新兴公司融资威廉·B·加特纳克莱姆森大学斯皮罗创业领导力研究院346 Sirrine厅克莱姆森，SC 29634-1305电话：864.656.0825传真：864.656.7237gartner@凯西J.福雷德克莱姆森大学斯皮罗创业领导力研究院346 Sirrine厅克莱姆森，SC 29634-1305电话：864.650.8800传真：864.656.7237caseyf@约翰·C·亚历山大克莱姆森大学财务部314 Sirrine厅克莱姆森，SC 29634-1323电话：864.656.0547传真：864.656.3748alexanj@本文已提交的版本在巴布森学院的创业研究会议上，教堂山，北卡罗来纳，6月，2008年5日面板上的研究的年度研讨会创业动力，格林维尔，SC，2008年11月。

第2页2新兴公司融资抽象本研究探讨了1214名新生的企业家的融资选择，在教育局常任秘书长II数据集参与的过程中，开始新业务。

资金来源分为两大类：个人和外部。

我们开发了一套假设有关的各种公司和新生的企业家的特点，将有可能影响哪些类别的金融资源的使用，以及所收购的金额。

的大多数新兴企业的融资（所有资金的57％）来自个人捐款它的创始人，谁贡献了每个受访者的中位数为5,500元。

的企业预计将有较高的收入水平，注册成立，并依法登记注册明显更容易获得外部资金。

新生的企业家具有较高的教育和净值水平显着更有可能获得外部资金。

从分析的结果进行介绍和讨论。

我们的研究结果的影响和建议，为今后的研究提供。

关键词：新生的企业家，资本结构，财务，启动，教育局常任秘书长介绍我们企业家参与的过程中，开始探索融资选择新业务。

于创业的过程中，几乎所有的研究获得金融资本都集中在新的公司，而不是新兴的企业（Astebro及哈特，2003年Chaganti等人，1995;区海恩斯，2006年; Verheul Thurik，2001）。

外文文献

融资理论是企业制定融资政策的理论基础。

自20世纪50年代以来,在解释企业融资决策行为的动机及其所秉承的理论基础时,主要存在着两大理论,一是权衡融资理论;二是优序融资理论。

权衡融资理论认为,企业在构造长期资本来源的组合时,存在着一个最佳的资本结构,企业将按照事先测算的最佳资本结构来选择资金来源及配置各种不同性质的资金。

优序融资理论最早是Modigoliani和Miller(1958)提出的。

理论指出在完善的资本市场中,如果不存在税收、破产成本以及代理成本的影响,那么,企业市场价值将与其资本结构无关。

Myers和Majluf(1984)在《企业知道投资人所不知道信息时的融资和投资决策》一文中,以信息不对称理论为基础,提出企业融资存在一种“啄食顺序原则”。

认为由于所有权和经营权的分离而产生委托代理关系,因为利益不同,内部经营者和股东之间的信息不对称原因,企业的融资顺序上就形成了一个优序策略。

即首先为内部融资,也就是企业的留存收益;其次是长期借款和长期债券;再次是发行优先股融资;最后是发行普通股融资。

此外,1989年Baskin以交易成本、个人所得税和控制权的研究角度对优序融资理论作出了解释,指出由于留存收益提供的内部资金不必承担发行成本,也避免了个人所得税,因此内部资金要优于外部资金。

与权益性资金相比较,负债融资由于具有节税效应,发行成本低,又不会稀释公司的控制权,所以对外融资来说负债融资又优于权益性融资。

Claggett(1991)利用交叉分类法以验证权衡融资理论和优序融资理论在实践中是否存在。

结果发现这两种理论都成立,但优序理论的显著性高于权衡融资理论。

因此,Claggett认为无论是权衡理论还是优序理论都过于简化,实际的操作是介于两者之间,故应称为混合理论。

在国内,也有一些学者在专题研究融资理论及其实践效应。

有的通过实证研究认为我国企业偏好于股权融资,有的认为我国企业融资秩序与优序融资理论的主张正好相反。

企业融资决策中英文对照外文翻译文献

企业融资决策中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)译文：中小型企业融资决策企业的产生、生存及发展均离不开投资与融资活动。

随着我国加入WTO 组织，市场经济体制的逐步完善，金融市场的快速发展，投资与融资效率也越来越成为企业发展的关键。

对于中小型企业而言，应要根据自身发展需求，认真考虑如何选择自己需要和适合自己发展阶段的融资方式以及各种融资方式的利用时机、条件、成本和风险，确定合适的融资规模以及制定最佳融资期限等问题。

要解决这些问题，需要中小型企业制定适当的融资策略，以作出最优化的融资决策。

一、企业融资决策概述(一)企业融资决策概述企业融资决策，是企业根据其价值创造目标需要，利用一定时机与渠道，采取经济有效的融资工具，为公司筹集所需资金的一种市场行为。

它不仅改变了公司的资产负债结构，而且影响了企业内部管理、经营业绩、可持续发展及价值增长。

典型的融资决策包括出售何种债务和股权（融资方式）、如何确定所要出售债务和股权的价值（融资成本）、何时出售些债务和股权（融资时机）等等。

而其中最主要的包括融资规模的决策和融资方式的决策。

融资规模应为企业完成资金使用目的的最低需要量。

而企业的融资方式则多种多样，常见的以下几种：1.财政融资。

财政融资方式从融出的角度来讲，可分为：预算内拨款、财政贷款、通过授权机构的国有资产投资、政策性银行贷款、预算外专项建设基金、财政补贴。

2.银行融资。

从资金融出角度即银行的资金运用来说，主要是各种代款，例如：信用贷款、抵押贷款、担保贷款、贴现贷款、融资租凭、证券投资。

3.商业融资。

其方式也是多种多样，主要包括商品交易过程中各企业间发生的赊购商品、预收货款等形式。

4.政券融资。

该方式主要包括股标融资和债券融资两大类。

(二)融资决策过程企业制定融资决策的过程，也即确定最优资本结构的过程。

具体决策程序是：首先，当一家企业为筹措一笔资金面临几种融资方案时，企业可以分别计算出各个融资方案的加权平均资本成本率，然后选择其中加权平均资本成本率最低的一种。

外文翻译---融资过程中啄食顺序理论的一个合理证明

外文原文Management Research News，Volume 25 Number 12，2002A Rational Justification of the Pecking Order Hypothesis to theChoice of Sources of FinancingBy Vuong Duc Hoang Quan外文翻译原文来自：Management Research News，Volume 25 Number 12，2002：74-90融资过程中啄食顺序理论的一个合理证明Vuong Duc Hoang Quan摘要自从被Stewart Myers (1984)发展以来，啄食顺序理论在近期把研究重心从传统静态权衡理论转移到其他理论的研究的趋势中成为了一道亮点，它试图为公司资本结构的行为寻求一个合理的解释。

这篇文章通过建立啄食顺序理论和与之有明显对立的MM定理1之间的关系，提出了啄食顺序理论的一个合理证明。

为支持我们的解释，在推论过程中，我们采用各种各样现有的理论，包括税盾理论、破产成本理论、代理理论、信号理论和管理风险厌恶理论等，这些证明啄食顺序理论的论据，其内涵也被简要地讨论了。

关键词：公司融资；资本结构；啄食顺序理论介绍企业怎样选择资本结构及其影响因素是公司财务上一个很有争议的根本问题。

传统上，资本结构的形成被认为是有利税率之间静态权衡的结果。

税收优势提倡增加债务，它与破产风险相对，破产风险更偏好于股权融资的使用。

尽管如此，近期的研究已经呈现出了从静态权衡理论为焦点到其他理论的研究的转移，从而试图寻找出一个对资本结构行为更进一步的解释。

Myers (1984)谈到的啄食顺序理论最早是由Donaldson (1961)始创的，是用来描述企业管理者为减轻不对称信息引起的投资不足问题的缺陷而优先采取的融资方式的选择这一融资实际。

因此相对于外源融资，任何类型的企业更倾向于内源融资。

中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献

中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：The areas of SME financing channels: an overview 1.IntroductionIn all countries, SMEs are an important source of economic growth and create jobs. In addition, these companies through their dynamism and flexibility, the power of innovation and development.The research method is to start from the literature to highlight the importance of the theme of our research. This paper analyzes the data and statistics based on mainly by the World Bank survey, small and medium-sized private enterprises in Romania by some empirical research. According to the method used, and pointed out the importance of financing of SMEs and enhance the public bodies concerned about, especially the measures taken to improve financial development.2.the literature on SMEs financing channelsA popular academic literature on the financing channels of SMEs, has witnessed a lot of research to solve this problem.Countless research studies have indicated that financing channels is a critical obstacle in the growth and development process, especially in small and medium enterprises.Through Baker Dumont reggae - Ke Lute, Ivan, and Marca Smokin Popovich (2004) research, reflecting the fundamental factors of 10 000 enterprises from 80 countries mainly depend on the financing of enterprises. Therefore, the relationship between the study highlights the corporate finance and its characteristics such as age, size and structure of property rights. From this perspective, the authors found that the small size of the young company, and face greater obstacles when they seek financial resources.The iResearch Dick Mei Leke and Salta (2011) analysis of macroeconomic and institutional factors affecting SME financing loans through the statistical data found. In other similar studies, the authors found a positive correlation between the overall economic development (a measure of per capita income) and financial development (measured by private lending ratio of gross domestic product), on the other hand, the level of SME financing is the opposite. In addition, the authors show that the level of financing for SMEs depends on the legal structure and overall business environment.3.in the process of SME financing in the general obstaclesIn general, access to financial products or financial services or financial inclusion assumes that there is no trade barriers to the use of financial products or services, regardless of whether these barriers or non-related pricing (Dumont reggae - Ke Lute, Baker, and Honorine root 2008:2). Therefore, to improve this means of access means increasing the degree of financial products or financial services at a fair price toeveryone.Enterprise does not use financial products or services can be divided into several categories, their identification is necessary, in order to take the necessary measures to improve their financing channels. Therefore, on the one hand, enterprises obtain financing, the financial products and services, but do not use them because they do not have a viable investment projects. On the other hand, it can distinguish between non-voluntary refuse corporate Although these business needs, but not have access to financial services. The status of independent corporate finance or financial services in some companies do not earn enough money or safeguards required by financing institutions and therefore have higher credit risk. At the same time, when some companies in need of funding, financial and banking institutions involved too costly and can not agree to financing. Finally, in the context of the enterprise refused to appear over-priced financial products or services and financial products or services that meet their requirements.Financing channels for enterprise development and the efficient allocation of funds essential. However, compared with large enterprises, SMEs seeking finance is facing many difficulties, because of several reasons, including: the judicial and legislative structure of the instability and imperfect, it does not support the enterprises in need of financing and funding the relationship between; part of the funding and corporate information is incomplete or even lack of information, which hinders the normal and efficient development of relations between enterprises and providers of finance; especially in the young company, the lack of credit history and guarantees the creditors, and sometimes limits the range of financial products that can be used.The number of surveys, especially the World Bank stressed that the financing is one of the biggest obstacle to good development and growth of the SME. For example, the World Bank in the 2006-2009 survey foundthat 31% of the worldwide study of corporate finance is a major obstacle to the current implementation, and even higher proportion of young company in the 40% of cases up to three years of experience (Chavez, kt Boer and Ireland 2010:1). In addition, a series of global surveys, including the information provided by the World Business Environment Survey show that SME financing transaction costs is the main obstacle to enterprise development.4.SME bank financing difficulties and support measuresIn most countries, especially in countries with bank-oriented financial system, the main source of external financing for SMEs by bank loans. Therefore, this type of loan is crucial to the development of SMEs. However, the survey showed, compared to the SMEs and large enterprises are using the new investment in the small extent of bank financing.As we mentioned, the use of financial products is determined by supply and demand. It is therefore important to understand why the SMEs use bank financing to a small extent only. In this regard, some studies (Banerjee and Duflo: 2004) has shown that the main reason for the supply, because every time when SMEs are able to obtain loans, they use it to increase production. This behavior is more proof of financing is an important factor in the development of enterprises. In addition, in the context of the current global financial crisis, the declining availability of bank loans and limited financing opportunities for SMEs. Therefore, it is the main problem facing small and medium enterprises.October 29, 2010, this survey of SMEs in Romania highlights the main problems faced by SMEs and banks. Therefore, 82% of the interviewed entrepreneurs obtain bank financing is very difficult, mainly because of excessive bureaucracy, unreasonable high demand, high interest rates, rigid bank credit indicators, as well as many types of commission and expenses. In addition, more than 61% of SMEentrepreneurs and managers reporting banks lack of transparency (hidden costs, lack of communication channels, etc.), there is no real consultation (using the standard contract, the bank refused to modify or complete the credit contract, etc.) and banks do not legitimate or misuse of the terms of the contract (for example, perform the unauthorized transaction accounts or bank fraud). Understanding this knowledge to take measures to support and promote SME financing.Improve SME financing is still cause for concern, but also national, European and international facing a challenge. For example, in the EU, through the implementation of the new measures established by the Small Business Administration for Europe to improve the financing channels for SMEs, by reducing the return of the structural funds requirements to promote the access of small and medium enterprises, the establishment of the Credit Ombudsman to promote small and medium-sized enterprises and dialogue between the credit institutions, to avoid the double taxation of the tax legislation, which will hinder the international venture capital plays an important role.In particular, empirical research, emphasizing the impact of the degree of financial development of a country is essential that the level of development of the SME financing. Therefore, a series of measures to support SMEs to obtain financing, to ensure the efficient development of the country's financial, which will ensure greater availability of corporate finance. Specifically, the authorities should take measures commonly used to measure the degree of financial development in the seven pillars, namely, the institutional environment, business environment, financial stability, banking and financial services, non-bank financial services, financial markets and access to finance.5 .ConclusionEffective financing for SMEs to create new business is of great significance, and existing growth and development of enterprises, whilepromoting the country's economic and social development. In addition, in the case of the economic crisis, SMEs contribute to restoring the national economy, so it is particularly important to support SME financing. However, most of the survey report stressed, always the financing channels of SMEs is one of the most important factor to affect its operation and development.SMEs trying to get the necessary financial resources to face difficulties related to the entrepreneurs and the economic environment of each country, as well as existing legal and institutional structure. To alleviate these difficulties, the measures taken by public authorities should focus on improving the financial development and to ensure that the corporate finance and economic growth, greater effectiveness.In various countries, including Romania, the decline on the availability of SME financing, or even the lack of statistical data, we believe that policy makers need to focus on and monitor a series of important indicators, depending on the size of the SMEs, experience and industry events share of its loans, which will benefit the public authorities, creditors and investors.原文来自罗马·安吉拉中小企业的融资渠道的领域:概述（奥拉迪亚大学：经济科学，2011年第一卷第一期，431-437）摘要通过中小企业在创造附加值和新的就业岗位中的贡献,使它在国家的经济和社会发展中拥有一个显著的角色。

中国上市公司股权融资偏好研究

内容摘要优序融资理论（Pecking Order Theory）提出公司在融资时应该首先选择内部融资、然后是债权融资、末尾就要考虑的是股权融资方式了。

但针对中国上市企业融资行为进行分析之后发现中国的上市企业在融资的先后选择与该观点相背离—出现很清晰的偏好股权融资这种方式从而忽视了债权融资方式的现象。

根据这个现象，本文归纳了形成这一融资特征的原因及其影响，并对此融资现象带来的不良影响提出了若干建议。

关键词：上市企业融资偏好证券市场资本构架AbstractOn the basis of Pecking order theory, when corporate financed, they will obey the rule that the first internal financing, then debt financing, finally equity financing.But after analyzing the financing activities of Chinese listed companies, I find the phenomenon that listed companies in China prefer equity financing when they choose the way to finance. But the conclusion isn’t the same as Pecking order theory. Therefore, I summarize the reasons and influence of these financing characteristics in my paper. Finally I put forward some Suggestions how we can reduce the bad influence of the phenomenon.Key words：Listed company Financing preference The securities marketThe capital structure目录一、研究背景及意义 (1)（一）研究背景 (1)（二）研究意义 (1)（三）研究现状 (2)二、文献综述 (2)（一）股权融资偏好原因研究 (3)（二）债务融资偏好原因研究 (4)三、中国上市企业融资偏好特征 (5)四、我国上市企业存在股权融资偏好的原因 (6)（一）“内部人控制”现象 (6)（二）股权融资的低成本 (6)（三）债券市场发展滞后 (6)五、我国上市企业融资偏好的影响分析 (7)（一）导致资金使用效率不高 (7)（二）不利于公司资本结构的优化 (7)（三）加剧公司治理结构的失衡 (8)六、建议 (8)（一）从企业自身出发 (8)（二）从政府角度出发 (9)参考文献 (10)致谢 (11)中国上市企业股权融资偏好研究一、研究背景及现状（一）研究背景自上世纪90年代中国证券交易所成立之后，经过二十多年的迅猛发展产生的进步，中国的证券行业的改变可谓日新月异，上市企业如雨后春笋般出现，证券行业的不断做大。

优序融资理论外文文献翻译

文献信息：文献标题：Financing Preferences of Spanish Firms: Evidence on the Pecking Order Theory（西班牙企业的融资偏好：优序融资理论的实证研究）国外作者：Javier Sánchez-Vidal，Juan Francisco Martín-Ugedo文献出处：《Review of Quantitative Finance & Accounting》, 2005, 25(4):341-355字数统计：英文2111单词，11535字符；中文3840汉字外文文献：Financing Preferences of Spanish Firms: Evidence on thePecking Order TheoryAbstract This paper analyses some of the empirical implications of the pecking order theory in the Spanish market using a panel data analysis of 1,566 firms over 1994–2000. The results show that the pecking order theory holds for most subsamples analyzed, particularly for the small and medium-sized enterprises and for the high-growth and highly leveraged companies. It is also shown that both the more and the less leveraged firms tend to converge towards more balanced capital structures. Finally, we observe that firms finance their funds flow deficits with long term debt.Keywords:capital structure, pecking order theoryIntroductionA prime contribution on information asymmetry in capital structure theory is the Myers and Majluf (1984) model. Myers and Majluf observe that the empirical evidence is not consistent with a financial policy that is determined by a trade-off of the advantages and disadvantages of market imperfections, mainly taxes, costs offinancial distress, and agency costs. Rather, companies’ financial policies seem to be better explained by the behaviour described by Donaldson (1961).He establishes a hierarchy described by company preference for internal funds over external funds; in the case of external funds, a company prefers debt first, then hybrid instruments like convertible bonds, and finally equity issues. This hierarchy, broadly characterized as pecking order theory, indicates that companies do not make financing decisions with the aim of achieving optimal leverage.Although they tend to be taken as the same thing, the pecking order theory and the Myers and Majluf (1984) model are not strictly speaking the same. The pecking order theory i s merely a description of companies’ financing policy, while the Myers and Majluf work represents the first model that attempts to describe this behaviour from a theoretical point of view, based on the presence of information asymmetry. Moreover, the Myers and Majluf (1984)model assumes listed companies and markets where equity is issued through firm commitments, such as the American market, not for markets where the predominant flotation method is rights offerings, such as Spain and most other countries.The aim of this paper is to provide evidence on the pecking order theory in the Spanish market. The analysis takes two directions. First, we examine the evolution of the three largest accounting sources of funding for a company—retained earnings, equity issues and debt—using a model based on Watson and Wilson (2002).Second, we study the role of long-term debt in making up financing deficits, following the flow of funds deficit equation of Shyam-Sunder and Myers(1999).There are several features which distinguish the Spanish financial system from the American one. Probably the main difference affecting the pecking order is the flotation method in equity issues. Equity securities are issued in a wide variety of ways, mainly firm commitments underwritten offers and rights issues. The relative importance of these methods depends on the issuing firm’s country. In the United States rights offerings have declined in frequency, having virtually disappeared by 1980.In Spain, rights prevail. This difference may play an important role in the hierarchy described by the pecking order theory. In addition: (a)debt financing isprimarily raised privately in Spanish firms, thus banks play a very important role; and(b)the Spanish capital market is less developed than the American securities market, having lower capitalization and smaller transaction volumes. Although several papers have already examined the capital structure of Spanish firms, most of them have analyzed the effect of different variables on leverage. However, there is little evidence focusing on pecking order and no study employing the Watson and Wilson (2002) methodology.The results show that small and medium-sized companies behave consistently with predictions of the pecking order theory. When we divide the sample into subsamples on the basis of growth and the level of leverage, we see that high-growth companies base their growth on retained earnings, and firms with very high and very low debt ratios tend to converge towards more moderate debt ratios. Estimation of the flow of funds deficit equation shows that fund deficits are met by the use of long-term debt.The pecking order theory: Theoretical base and empirical evidence The pecking order theory describes a hierarchy in companies’ financial policy as follows: (1)Firms prefer to finance their investments with funds internally generated, namely, retained earnings and depreciation expenses; (2)firms base the dividend payout ratios on the future investment opportunity set and their expected cash flows;(3)payout ratios tend to be sticky in the short term, so in some years internally generated flows will be enough for financing company needs and in some years not;(4)funds obtained in years of financial surpluses, after payment of dividends and financing, are directed to finance short-term financial investments or to reduce debt. When there is a financial deficit, firms will seek external finance: first debt, then hybrid securities like convertible bonds, and finally equity issues.To explain this behaviour Myers and Majluf (1984) construct a model of information asymmetry assuming that firm managers act on behalf of current shareholders. If companies have enough financial slack, they will carry out allinvestments that have a positive net present value. If external funds are needed to finance new investments, the market will interpret equity issues as evidence that company shares are overvalued and thus issue announcement will have a negative impact on the share price.Thus, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that, if the company does not have enough funds to finance new investments, it will issue equity only when there are very profitable investments that can neither be postponed nor financed through debt, or when managers believe that the stock is overvalued enough that shareholders will be disposed to tolerate the market penalty. The information asymmetry may cause current shareholders to renounce positive net present value investment projects in order to avoid a drop in share price due to the issue of equity, thereby creating an underinvestment problem. To avoid these results, it seems reasonable that companies will implement financing policies that allow them the capacity to finance investments and avoid external financing.However, the Myers and Majluf model (1984) has some limitations. The first is that it applies to markets like the American market where shares are offered mainly through firm commitment underwritings and not through rights issues, which is the flotation method that prevails in most other markets. In an underwritten firm commitment, shares are offered simultaneously to the public at large. Thus, if shares are overvalued, there will be a wealth transfer from new to current shareholders. In rights offerings, current shareholders enjoy priority in the purchase of new shares, which minimizes the possibility of wealth transfers. Therefore, the Myers and Majluf (1984) argument that equity issue is the last choice in firms’ financing policies has little currency in markets where rights issues are the prevalent method of equity issue.Another limitation of the Myers and Majluf (1984) model is that it is generally intended to describe listed companies, leaving the rest, mainly the small and medium-sized enterprises(SME),out of the explanation. Because of this, authors since then have tried to explain the pecking order theory using alternative arguments appropriate to non-listed SME companies.A major problem in SME financing, especially in non-Anglo-Saxon countries, islimited access to capital markets (a finance gap) (Holmes and Kent,1991).Financing choices for SME are thus usually reduced to retained earnings and bank loans. This finance gap can be divided into two components: a supply gap, because of limited availability of funds or higher cost, and a knowledge gap, because of limited knowledge about all the possibilities of external finance and a lack of awareness of the advantages and disadvantages of debt. As a consequence of these two components of the finance gap, the main long-term source of finance will be internal financing and, if necessary, bank loans.Another factor that may play a part in the hierarchy of firm choices is the motivation to retain control of the firm (Holmes and Kent, 1991; Hamilton and Fox, 1998).As we have noted, in a firm commitment offering stock is sold at one time to the general public; thus, current shareholders’ relative ownership of firm, as well as their control of the company may be diminished with new share offerings. Such a control problem may arise also in rights issues, but to a lesser extent, because current shareholders may have limited funds to invest in the first place or may want to diversify their investments, so they might not purchase additional shares to maintain their ownership percentage. As a result of all of this, the current shareholders would also be reluctant to issue equity.These factors mentioned above imply a similar hierarchy to the one described by Myers and Majluf (1984); that is, the company would make use of retained earnings in the first place, then debt (bank loans) and, finally, equity issues.Various authors have tried to test the empirical implications of the pecking order theory. Next, we briefly summarize some of them. Watson and Wilson(2002)use a descriptive model in the British market and confirm the pecking order theory, especially for closely-held companies(companies whose ownership is very concentrated and whose manager is usually the main owner).Shyam-Sunder and Myers(1999)and Frank and Goyal(2003)study the way companies finance their flow of funds deficits. The former authors find evidence to support the pecking order theory; the latter find evidence of a target debt ratio. Mato(1990),in the Spanish market, studies financing flow of fund deficits, using anaccounting identity that includes share issues. He finds that companies tend not to use equity issues, but finance their needs primarily with debt. He also observes that debt and internal finance are mutually substitutable.Fama and French(2002)use structural equations that regress leverage and dividend payout as dependent variables on several explanatory variables from the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory. They find no conclusive evidence in support of one specific theory.Lo′pez-Gracia and Aybar-Arias(2000)use Manova analysis to examine the relationship between variables proposed by the pecking order theory and financial constraints in the Spanish market. They find that the significance of internal finance varies according to company size. Saa′-Requejo(1996)uses a nested model with binary variables for Spanish companies to test the choice between internal or external finance and between equity and debt. He finds that companies care about whether the funds are raised publicly or privately and suffer from similar financial constraints, whether they are holding companies or not.Finally, Holmes and Kent(1991)and Ang and Jung(1992)use mail surveys to try to discern typical company financing policies. Both authors find that company managers follow a hierarchy of funding choices similar to the one described by the pecking order theory. Holmes and Kent(1991)find a stricter pecking order in place at SME than at larger companies.In short, many authors have tried to test the pecking order theory, but the evidence is not conclusive.ConclusionsWe have examined several empirical implications of the pecking order theory for a sample of 1,566 Spanish companies partitioned by size, growth, and previous debt level over 1994–2000.The pecking order theory states that firms follow a hierarchy when financing investments. Companies prefer internal funds to external funds; in case of externalfunds firms prefer debt first, with equity issues being their last choice. Given that Myers and Majluf’s (1984) argument is not valid in explaining this h ierarchy in markets like the Spanish where rights issues prevail, a finance gap and the motivation to retain control could help to explain such a hierarchy in these markets.For the whole sample, we find that retained earnings and debt have similar coefficients, higher than the equity issues coefficient, providing evidence of the duality of retained earnings and debt noted by Holmes and Kent(1991).In the case of different subsamples, small and medium-sized firms do seem to follow the pecking order predictions; the retained earnings coefficient exceeds the debt coefficient, which in turn exceeds the equity issues coefficient. Such results could be explained by a finance gap or by the motivation to retain control.Analysis of subsamples based on firms’ growth and previous debt level shows that these factors are very important in determining companies’ financing policies. High-growth companies resort to retained earnings, and then to debt, and finally to equity issues. That is, these firms follow the pecking order theory. Low-growth firms by contrast take a more balanced approach to financing. Analysis of high-leverage and low-leverage firms indicates these companies move towards more moderate debt levels.Finally, estimation of a flow of funds deficit equation reveals that companies tend to fund their financing deficits mainly with long-term debt.中文译文：西班牙企业的融资偏好：优序融资理论的实证研究摘要本文通过使用1994年—2000年西班牙市场的的1566家企业的固定样本数据分析优序融资理论的实证影响。

控制规避和搜索瑞典中小企业的外部融资[文献翻译]

外文文献翻译一、外文原文原文：Control Aversion and the Search for External Financing in SwedishSMEsTechnological developmentThe development of technology and the impact of new production methods shape many industries (Murray, 1997). In turbulent environments, business firms need to maintain a readiness to invest in emerging technologies if they are to survive and prosper (see Oakey, 1984). Business firms operating in high-tech environments are perhaps the most obvious examples of firms needing to constantly reinvest in machinery and equipment, as, by definition, they must be on the cutting edge of technology development (Roberts, 1991).The impact of a higher reinvestment rate is not the only reason why these firms need an open attitude towards external financiers. There is also a contributory factor associated with the uncertainty of the capabilities and properties of invested machinery and equipment which plays a role (Lindström and Olofsson, 1998). As the inherent heterogeneity forces firms to refocus and to try out new resource combinations, including new combinations of technology and raw material, it also becomes imperative to acquire adequate financial backing to support investments entailing higher risks.H1: The greater a firm’s need is to invest in new machinery and technology, the more favourable will it perceive the use of external financiers.Financial weaknessSeveral studies (see Reid, 1996; Winborg and Landström, 1997) have shown that most entrepreneurs are not actually interested in obtaining external finance, especially any that would entail any change of ownership. The main reason for this reluctance toallow external financiers access seems to be control aversion (Cressy, 1995). The internally generated funds in effect becomes a spending limit for control averse firms. Simply put, firms will not allow themselves to invest, unless it is absolutely certain that all capital needed can be generated without compromising the existing balance between internally versus externally originated funds.As decisions regarding whether to accept externally generated funds are generally strategic in nature, because it takes time to attract external financiers, the equity to debt ratio is of primary importance in measuring financial distress. The equity to debt ratio is essentially a measure of a firm’s capacity to cope with losses over a long period of time, as it is a measure of the fundamental capital structure in a business firm. In agreement with this, a study by Landström and Winborg (1995) concludes that attitudes toward sexternal financiers are in fact partly dependent on the financial status of the firm. When the firm experiences financial difficulties, the attitude towards external financiers changes and tends to be more positive.H2: The poorer a firm’s fina ncial status, the more favourable will it perceive the use of external financiers.Growth pressureRecent research about small and medium sized firms has to a large extent focused on growth (see Davidsson and Wiklund, 2000; Donckels, 2000). Storey (1997) identifies several factors that explain why some small firms grow, whilst others do not. The analysis shows that younger firms in dynamic sectors tends to grow faster. Hall (1989) has provided evidence that the ambition to grow is correlated to the financial search activity. One group of firms, what Cressy (1995) would call movers, seems to display a strong ambition to grow, which in turn leads to a greater need for capital. These firms are more active in searching for new financiers when the internally generated funds are inadequate (Olofsson, 1994). Fast growing firms therefore tend to display less control aversion. It can be questioned if this attitude is “voluntary” or if the need to grow is connected to the actual survival of the firm.H3: The greater the importance a firm places in the growth in the number of employees, the more favourable will it perceive the use of external financiers.SizeWhen firms grow, they gradually attain a greater ability in resource generation, but they also encounter new difficulties in terms of financial leverage and also in the form of new expectations and requirements (Storey, 1997). As a firm grows, the individual entrepreneur is forced to relinquish control of daily operations into the hands of subordinates (Wiklund, 1998). Increasingly, the entrepreneur also becomes dependent on skills possessed by individuals outside the firm, such as bankers, lawyers and auditors. Regardless of whether control is dispersed within or outside the confines of the firm, the original owner will have to become professional in the handling of financial matters. This usually leads to more elaborate relationships with financial institutions, which in turn leads to an increasing awareness of the possibilities inherent in bank financing. Not surprisingly, earlier research (see Cressy and Olofsson, 1996) has indicated that larger firms have a more favourable perception of external financing.H4: The larger the firm, the more favourable will it perceive the use of external financiers.Control aversion and bank loan applicationsDonaldson’s research from the 1960s indicates that managers do not always prefer the source of finance that has the lowest interest rate (Donaldson, 1961, 1969). Later research (Donaldson, 1984; Myers, 1984) has shown that firms seem to have a stable order of preference for different sources of finance: Internally generated funds are preferred to bank loans, which in turn are preferred to new equity. This stable preference order towards financial sources is referred to as the “p ecking-order” by Myers (1984) Both Donaldson and Myers studied large listed American enterprises, which certainly operate under different circumstances to SMEs. Nevertheless, several studies have shown that the pecking-order framework is a fruitful approach for the study of financial decision-making in small firms (Reid, 1996). The results from (Cressy and Olofsson, 1996) suggests that the SMEs in Sweden have a financial pecking-order: The internally generated funds are most important, followed by bank loans and new equity from external partners. This also leads to the conclusion that ifsmall and medium sized enterprises choose to seek external financing they will try to follow the pecking-order theory.H5: The more favourable a firm perceives external financing to be, the more likely it is that the firm will actually seek financing from a bank.MethodologySample and response rateThe empirical evidence consists of the results of a survey sent to 545 CEOs in Swedish SMEs. In this study we define the term “SME” to include firms with less than 200 employees. This definition is originally derived from the Bolton Report, and this number has come to be accepted in Swedish studies as the norm due to the scarcity of large firms (Bolton, 1971; for Sweden, see Davidsson, 1989). Due to quality problems in the data from Statistics Sweden, it was decided to exclude firms with less than five employees. In addition, firms were excluded if they belonged to groups of companies with more than 200 employees. All firms in this study are incorporated, because of the requirements for the availability of accounts data. All Swedish manufacturing sectors are included in the definition of manufacturing, with the exception of newspapers and publishing houses. Business services sectors include computer consultancy and software and other technical services; consultancy services in the corporate organisation/rationalisation; and corporate security services. There are three different size groups, 5–19 employees, 20–49 employees and 50–199 employees within the two business sectors. The sample extraction was made at Statistics Sweden in late October 1997. The total sample consisted of 600 firms. After exclusion of firms outside the target group, the sample consisted of 545 firms. Of the 545 firms 281 responded, which resulted in a response rate of 51.6 percent. In the different strata the response rates were similar, between 48 and 52%.The table shows that manufacturing firms on average are fifteen years older than business services firms when evaluated at the median. One of the reasons behind this is the fact that younger firms have a higher death ratio than older firms. Another explanation is the lower entry and exit barriers within the business service sector in comparison with the manufacturing sector. From Table I it can also be derived thatthe growth rate among the business service firms are higher than among the manufacturing firms. This is true for both turnover and number of employees. Non-respondentsOne problem with survey studies has to do with non-respondents. If the ratio of non-respondents to respondents is large, there is risk of distortion, which limits the possibility to make generalisa-TABLE IAge, number of employees and turnover by industry sector Industry sectorMean MedianManufacturing Business services Manufacturing Business services Age 33 17 25 10No. of employees1996 48 36 25 201998 51 51 28 33 Turnover, MSEKa1996 68 43 24 201998 80 61 32 30a MSEK = Million Swedish Krona. tions from the study. To reduce the risk of distortion, we have made a simple test to see whether the non-respondents differed from respondents in terms of industry and size, since these variables have been shown to have an impact on financial search behaviour (Cressy and Olofsson, 1996). The analysis indicated that there were no significant differences between respondents and nonrespondents as far as the variables main business, second business, geographical location, number of branches and size were concerned. The p-values varied between 0.29–0.95.According to some researchers, there are similarities between late respondents and non-respondents (Armstrong and Overton, 1977). We divided the sample in two halves, one with early respondents and one with late respondents and tested whether there were any differences between the two groups. Of the more than 100 variables we have collected, we found that five differed significantly between the early and laterespondents. However, we were not able to see any pattern in the differences. LISRELThe data have been analysed using the LISREL method, a modelling method using structural equations. The primary advantage of LISREL lies in the program’s ability to test the significance of indicators and constructs simultaneously across the model. The program provide warnings if there are interrelationships between constructs that have not been suggested in the original model. Therefore, models can be developed through the use of these suggested modifications. Anderson and Gerbing (1988) argue that the model-building task can be seen as a two step approach. The first stage uses factor analysis to provide a confirmatory measurement model that specifies the properties of constructs. In the second stage, the causal relations between constructs are analysed. In the LISREL program, these two separate stages are conducted simultaneously.The principal drawback is the exploratory use of LISREL. The constructs need to be solid theoretically in order for the program to function properly. Bentler and Chou (1987) argue that one of the most important questions in structural modelling is whether the sample comes from a population that is relevant to the theoretical ideas that are being evaluated. In our view, this means that the crucial element in analysing the results of LISREL models is to make absolutely sure that the latent variables, that is, the questions asked (as this article is based on a survey), correspond with the theoretical claims that are made and, subsequently, with the conclusions generated through the use of the model. Thus, if the model provides an acceptable fit within the program and a plausible connection between the questions and the theoretical constructs, then, and only then can it be claimed that progress has been made. The latent variable used must make sense in the given domain (Bentler and Chou, 1987).A common notion is that there is a clear-cut difference between confirmatory and exploratory research. In practice, though, it is hard to assume that a confirmatory analysis needs to provide a perfect fit without resorting to adjustments in the form of respecifications. If this were the case, most models would invariably fail, and the generation of a model providing an acceptable fit would be a statistical rarity if itwere to pass the rigorous testing of the LISREL program (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). Therefore, it is usually necessary to include an element of exploratory analysis, in the form of respecifications, to generate a functioning model.In LISREL models, validity is supposed to be estimated using three different levels of testing: Nomological validity is the validity of the entire model; discriminant validity checks for the independence of constructs from interference from other constructs; and convergent validity concerns the coherence of the latent variables in a given construct. The nomological validity of a LISREL model is assessed by measuring the distance between the data and the model using the degree of freedom and a significance test in the form of a probability estimate (p-value). The discriminant and convergent validity are measured by studying the t-values and R2 values of each relation in the model. The R2 value provides a measurement of the strength of a linear relationship. The t-values provide a test of significance, and the LISREL program suggest a t-value of at least 1.96 (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993).Source:Björn Berggren, Christer Olofsson and Lars Silver, Small Business Economics, 2000, V olume 15, Number 3, Pages 233-242.译文：控制规避和搜索瑞典中小企业的外部融资发展技术科技的发展和新的生产方法的影响形成许多行业（穆雷，1997）。

企业营运资金管理中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Effects Of Working Capital Management On Sme ProfitabilityThe corporate finance literature has traditionally focused on the study of long-term financial decisions. Researchers have particularly offered studies analyzing investments, capital structure, dividends or company valuation, among other topics. But the investment that firms make in short-term assets, and the resources used with maturities of under one year, represent the main share of items on a firm’s balance sheet. In fact, in our sample the current assets of small and medium-sized Spanish firms represent 69.48 percent of their assets, and at the same time their current liabilities represent more than 52.82 percent of their liabilities.Working capital management is important because of its effects on the firm’s profitability and risk, and consequently its value (Smith, 1980). On the one hand, maintaining high inventory levels reduces the cost of possible interruptions in the production process, or of loss of business due to the scarcity of products, reducessupply costs, and protects against price fluctuations, among other advantages (Blinder and Manccini, 1991). On the other, granting trade credit favors the firm’s sales in various ways. Trade credit can act as an effective price cut (Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner,1988; Petersen and Rajan, 1997), incentivizes customers to acquire merchandise at times of low demand (Emery, 1987), allows customers to check that the merchandise they receive is as agreed (quantity and quality) and to ensure that the services contracted are carried out (Smith, 1987), and helps firms to strengthen long-term relationships with their customers (Ng, Smith and Smith, 1999). However, firms that invest heavily in inventory and trade credit can suffer reduced profitability. Thus,the greater the investment in current assets, the lower the risk, but also the lower the profitability obtained.On the other hand, trade credit is a spontaneous source of financing that reduces the amount required to finance the sums tied up in the inventory and customer accounts. But we should bear in mind that financing from suppliers can have a very high implicit cost if early payment discounts are available. In fact the opportunity cost may exceed 20 percent, depending on the discount percentage and the discount period granted (Wilner,2000; Ng, Smith and Smith, 1999). In this respect, previous studies have analyzed the high cost of trade credit, and find that firms finance themselves with seller credit when they do not have other more economic sources of financing available (Petersen and Rajan, 1994 and 1997).Decisions about how much to invest in the customer and inventory accounts, and how much credit to accept from suppliers, are reflected in the firm’s cash conve rsion cycle, which represents the average number of days between the date when the firm must start paying its suppliers and the date when it begins to collect payments from its customers. Some previous studies have used this measure to analyze whether shortening the cash conversion cycle has positive or negative effects on the firm’s profitability.Specifically, Shin and Soenen (1998) analyze the relation between the cash conversion cycle and profitability for a sample of firms listed on the US stock exchange during the period 1974-1994. Their results show that reducing the cash conversion cycle to a reasonable extent increases firms’ profitability. More recently,Deloof (2003) analyzes a sample of large Belgian firms during the period 1992-1996. His results confirm that Belgian firms can improve their profitability by reducing the number of days accounts receivable are outstanding and reducing inventories. Moreover, he finds that less profitable firms wait longer to pay their bills.These previous studies have focused their analysis on larger firms. However, the management of current assets and liabilities is particularly important in the case of small and medium-sized companies. Most of these companies’ assets are in the form of current assets. Also, current liabilities are one of their main sources of external finance in view of their difficulties in obtaining funding in the long-term capital markets(Petersen and Rajan, 1997) and the financing constraints that they face (Whited, 1992; Fazzari and Petersen, 1993). In this respect, Elliehausen and Woken (1993), Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Danielson and Scott (2000) show that small and medium-sized US firms use vendor financing when they have run out of debt. Thus, efficient working capital management is particularly important for smaller companies (Peel and Wilson,1996).In this context, the objective of the current work is to provide empirical evidence about the effects of working capital management on profitability for a panel made up of 8,872 SMEs during the period 1996-2002. This work contributes to the literature in two ways. First, no previous such evidence exists for the case of SMEs. We use a sample of Spanish SMEs that operate within the so-called continental model, which is characterized by its less developed capital markets (La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997), and by the fact that most resources are channeled through financial intermediaries (Pampillón, 2000). All this suggests that Spanish SMEs have fewer alternative sources of external finance available, which makes them more dependent on short-term finance in general, and on trade credit in particular. As Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) suggest, firms operating in countries with more developed banking systems grant more trade credit to their customers, and at the same time they receive more finance from their own suppliers. The second contribution is that, unlike the previous studies by Shin and Soenen (1998) and Deloof (2003), in the current work we have conducted tests robust to the possible presence ofendogeneity problems. The aim is to ensure that the relationships found in the analysis carried out are due to the effects of the cash conversion cycle on corporate profitability and not vice versa.Our findings suggest that managers can create value by reducing their firm’s number of days accounts receivable and inventories. Similarly, shortening the cash conversion cycle also improves the firm’s profitability.We obtained the data used in this study from the AMADEUS database. This database was developed by Bureau van Dijk, and contains financial and economic data on European companies.The sample comprises small and medium-sized firms from Spain. The selection of SMEs was carried out according to the requirements established by the European Commission’s recommendation 96/280/CE of 3 April, 1996, on the definition of small and medium-sized firms. Specifically, we selected those firms meeting the following criteria for at least three years: a) have fewer than 250 employees; b) turn over less than €40 million; and c) possess less than €27 million of total assets.In addition to the application of those selection criteria, we applied a series of filters. Thus, we eliminated the observations of firms with anomalies in their accounts, such as negative values in their assets, current assets, fixed assets, liabilities, current liabilities, capital, depreciation, or interest paid. We removed observations of entry items from the balance sheet and profit and loss account exhibiting signs that were contrary to reasonable expectations. Finally, we eliminated 1 percent of the extreme values presented by several variables. As a result of applying these filters, we ended up with a sample of 38,464 observations.In order to introduce the effect of the economic cycle on the levels invested in working capital, we obtained information about the annual GDP growth in Spain from Eurostat.In order to analyze the effects of working capital management on the firm’s profitability, we used the return on assets (ROA) as the dependent variable. We defined this variable as the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to assets.With regards to the independent variables, we measured working capitalmanagement by using the number of days accounts receivable, number of days of inventory and number of days accounts payable. In this respect, number of days accounts receivable (AR) is calculated as 365 ×[accounts receivable/sales]. This variable represents the average number of days that the firm takes to collect payments from its customers. The higher the value, the higher its investment in accounts receivable.We calculated the number of days of inventory (INV) as 365 ×[inventories/purchases]. This variable reflects the average number of days of stock held by the firm. Longer storage times represent a greater investment in inventory for a particular level of operations.The number of days accounts payable (AP) reflects the average time it takes firms to pay their suppliers. We calculated this as 365 × [accounts payable/purchases]. The higher the value, the longer firms take to settle their payment commitments to their suppliers.Considering these three periods jointly, we estimated the cash conversion cycle(CCC). This variable is calculated as the number of days accounts receivable plus thenumber of days of inventory minus the number of days accounts payable. The longerthe cash conversion cycle, the greater the net investment in current assets, and hence the greater the need for financing of current assets.Together with these variables, we introduced as control variables the size of the firm, the growth in its sales, and its leverage. We measured the size (SIZE) as the logarithm of assets, the sales growth (SGROW) as (Sales1 –Sales0)/Sales0, the leverage(DEBT) as the ratio of debt to liabilities. Dellof (2003) in his study of large Belgian firms also considered the ratio of fixed financial assets to total assets as a control variable. For some firms in his study such assets are a significant part of total assets.However our study focuses on SMEs whose fixed financial assets are less important. In fact, companies in our sample invest little in fixed financial assets (a mean of 3.92 percent, but a median of 0.05 percent). Nevertheless, the results remain unaltered whenwe include this variable.Furthermore, and since good economic conditions tend to be reflected in a firm’sprofitability, we controlled for the evolution of the economic cycle using the variable GDPGR, which measures the annual GDP growth.Current assets and liabilities have a series of distinct characteristics according to the sector of activity in which the firm operates. Thus, Table I reports the return on assets and number of days accounts receivable, days of inventory, and days accounts payable by sector of activity. The mining industry and services sector are the two sectors with the highest return on their assets, with a value of 10 percent. Firms that are dedicated to agriculture, trade (wholesale or retail), transport and public services, are some way behind at 7 percent.With regard to the average periods by sector, we find, as we would expect, that the firms dedicated to the retail trade, with an average period of 38 days, take least time to collect payments from their customers. Construction sector firms grant their customers the longest period in which to pay –more than 145 days. Next, we find mining sector firms, with a number of days accounts receivable of 116 days. We also find that inventory is stored longest in agriculture, while stocks are stored least in the transport and public services sector. In relation to the number of days accounts payable, retailers (56 days) followed by wholesalers (77 days) pay their suppliers earliest. Firms are much slower in the construction and mining sectors, taking more than 140 days on average to pay their suppliers. However, as we have mentioned, these firms also grant their own customers the most time to pay them. Considering all the average periods together, we note that the cash conversion cycle is negative in only one sector – that of transport and public services. This is explained by the short storage times habitual in this sector. In this respect, agricultural and manufacturing firms take the longest time to generate cash (95 and 96 days, respectively), and hence need the most resources to finance their operational funding requirements.Table II offers descriptive statistics about the variables used for the sample as a whole. These are generally small firms, with mean assets of more than €6 milli on; their return on assets is around 8 percent; their number of days accounts receivable is around 96 days; and their number of days accounts payable is very similar: around 97 days. Together with this, the sample firms have seen their sales grow by almost 13percent annually on average, and 24.74 percent of their liabilities is taken up by debt. In the period analyzed (1996-2002) the GDP has grown at an average rate of 3.66 percent in Spain.Source: Pedro Juan García-Teruel and Pedro Martínez-Solano ,2006.“Effects of Working Capital Management on SME Profitability” .International Journal of Managerial Finance ,vol. 3, issue 2, April,pages 164-167.译文：营运资金管理对中小企业的盈利能力的影响公司理财著作历来把注意力集中在了长期财务决策研究，研究者详细的提供了投资决策分析、资本结构、股利分配或公司估值等主题的研究，但是企业投资形成的短期资产和以一年内到期方式使用的资源，表现为公司资产负债表的有关下昂目的主要部分。

啄食顺序理论论文

中级财务管理专题报告啄食顺序理论班级：学号：姓名：日期：目录标题 (3)摘要 (3)关键字 (3)正文一、啄食顺序理论(一)啄食顺序理论 (3)(二) 与M-M理论的关系 (3)(三) 啄食理论的假设前提 (3)（1）资本结构的信息不对称分析 (4)（2）资本结构的代理成本分析 (4)(四) 啄食理论的基本点 (4)(五) 啄食理论的目标 (4)(六)啄食理论的核心观点 (4)(七)啄食理论的理论评价 (5)二、理论应用（一）美国企业融资顺序 (5)（二）中国企业融资顺序 (7)（三）我国企业现状决定的中美融资差异 (8)（四）鉴于上诉原因，我的个人看法 (9)三、对于“啄食顺序理论”我的理解“啄食顺序理论”专题研究【摘要】啄食顺序（Pecking order）在生物学上，指群居动物通过争斗获取优先权和较高地位等级的自然现象。

而在财务管理中，对于融资，同样也有规律可循，不同的融资渠道，在不同的经济背景下、不同的资本结构也存在一定的优先权。

下面我们将从不同的角度来研究与分析著名的“啄食顺序理论”。

关键字：啄食理论资本结构融资一、啄食顺序理论（一）啄食顺序理论：啄食顺序理论，也称为“优序融资理论”，最早，由美国经济学家，梅耶（Mayer）提出，啄食顺序原则：①内源融资；②外源融资；③间接融资；④直接融资；⑤债券融资；⑥股票融资。

这个顺序即是在内源融资和外源融资中首选内源融资；在外源融资中的直接融资和间接融资中首选间接融资；在直接融资中的债券融资和股票融资中首选债券融资。

其中内部融资主要是指公司的自有资金和在生产经营过程中的资金积累部分；外部融资又可分为通过银行筹资的间接融资和通过资本市场筹资的直接融资（直接融资包括债券融资和股权融资）。

当公司要为自己的新项目进行融资时，将优先考虑使用内部的盈余，其次是采用债券融资，最后才考虑股权融资。

也就是说，内部融资优于外部债权融资，外部债权融资优于外部股权融资。

金融体系中英文对照外文翻译文献

金融体系中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)Comparative Financial Systems1 What is a Financial System?The purpose of a ﬁnancial system is to channel funds from agents with surpluses to agents with deﬁcits. In the traditional literature there have be en two approaches to analyzing this process. The ﬁrst is to consider how agents interact through ﬁnancial markets. The second looks at the operation ofﬁnancial intermediaries such as banks and insurance companies. Fifty years ago, the ﬁnancial system co uld be neatly bifurcated in this way. Rich house-holds and large ﬁrms used the equity and bond markets,while less wealthy house-holds and medium and small ﬁrms used banks, insurance companies and other ﬁnancial institutions. Table 1, for example, shows the ownership of corporate equities in 1950. Households owned over 90 percent. By 2000 it can be seen that the situation had changed dramatically.By then households held less than 40 percent, nonbank intermediaries, primarily pension funds and mutual funds, held over 40 percent. This change illustrates why it is no longer possible to consider the role of ﬁnancial markets and ﬁnancial institutions separately. Rather than intermediating directly between households and ﬁrms, ﬁnancial institutions have increasingly come to intermediate between households and markets, on the one hand, and between ﬁrms and markets,on the other. This makes it necessary to consider the ﬁnancial system as anirreducible whole.The notion that a ﬁnancial system transfers resources between households and ﬁrms is, of course, a simpliﬁcation. Governments usually play a significant role in the ﬁnancial system. They are major borrowers, particularlyduring times of war, recession, or when large infrastructure projects are being undertaken. They sometimes also save signiﬁcant amounts of funds. For example, when countries such as Norway and many Middle Eastern States have access to large amounts of natural resources (oil), the government may acquire large trust funds on behalf of the population.In addition to their roles as borrowers or savers, governments usually playa number of other important roles. Central banks typically issue ﬁat money and are extensively involved in the payments system. Financial systems with unregulated markets and intermediaries, such as the US in the late nineteenth century, often experience ﬁnancial crises.The desire to eliminate these crises led many governments to intervene in a signiﬁcant way in the ﬁnancial system. Central banks or some other regulatory authority are charged with regulating the banking system and other intermediaries, such as insurance companies. So in most countries governments play an important role in the operation of ﬁnancialsystems. This intervention means that the political system, which determines the government and its policies, is also relevant for the ﬁnancial system.There are some historical instances where ﬁnancial markets and institutions have operated in the absence of a well-deﬁned legal system, relyinginstead on reputation and other im plicit mechanisms. However, in most ﬁnancial systems the law plays an important role. It determines what kinds ofcontracts are feasible, what kinds of governance mechanisms can be used for corporations, the restrictions that can be placed on securities and so forth. Hence, the legal system is an important component of a ﬁnancial system.A ﬁnancial system is much more than all of this, however. An important pre-requisite of the ability to write contracts and enforce rights of various kinds is a system of accounting. In addition to allowing contracts to be written, an accounting system allows investors to value a company more easily and to assess how much it would be prudent to lend to it. Accounting information is only one type of information (albeit the most important) required by ﬁnancial systems. The incentives to generate and disseminate information are crucial features of a ﬁnancial system.Without signiﬁcant amounts of human capital it will not be possible for any of these components of a ﬁnancial system to operate eﬀectively. Well-trained lawyers, accountants and ﬁnancial professionals such as bankers are crucial for an eﬀective ﬁnancial system, as the experience of Eastern Europe demonstrates.The literature on comparative ﬁnancial systems is at an early stage. Our survey builds on previous overviews by Allen (1993), Allen and Gale (1995) and Thakor (1996). These overviews have focused on two sets of issues.(1)Normative: How eﬀective are diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial system atvarious functions?(2) Positive: What drives the evolution of the ﬁnancial system?The ﬁrst set of issues is considered in Sections 2-6, which focus on issues of investment and saving, growth, risk sharing, information provision and corporate governance, respectively. Section 7 consider s the inﬂuence of law and politics on the ﬁnancial system while Section 8 looks at the role ﬁnancial crises have had in shaping the ﬁnancial system. Section 9 contains concludingremarks.2 Investment and SavingOne of the primary purposes of the ﬁnancial system is to allow savings to be invested in ﬁrms. In a series of important papers, Mayer (1988, 1990) documents how ﬁrms obtained funds and ﬁnanced investment in a number of diﬀerent countries. Table 2 shows the results from the most recent set of studies, based on data from 1970-1989, using Mayer’s methodology. The ﬁgures use data obtained from sources-and-uses-of-funds statements. For France, the data are from Bertero (1994), while for the US, UK, Japan and Germany they are from Corbett and Jenkinson (1996). It can be seen that internal ﬁnance is by far the most important source of funds in all countries.Bank ﬁnance is moderately important in most countries and particularly important in Japan and France. Bond ﬁnance is only important in the US and equity ﬁnance is either unimportant or negative (i.e., shares are being repurchased in aggregate) in all countries. Mayer’s studies and those using his methodology have had an important impact because they have raised the question of how important ﬁnancial marke ts are in terms of providing funds for investment. It seems that, at least in the aggregate, equity markets are unimportant while bond markets are important only in the US. These ﬁndings contrast strongly with theemphasis on equity and bond markets in the traditional ﬁnance literature. Bank ﬁnance is important in all countries,but not as important as internal ﬁnance.Another perspective on how the ﬁnancial system operates is obtained by looking at savings and the holding of ﬁnancial assets. Table 3 shows t he relative importance of banks and markets in the US, UK, Japan, France and Germany. It can be seen that the US is at one extreme and Germany at the other. In the US, banks are relatively unimportant: the ratio of assets to GDP is only 53%, about a third the German ratio of 152%. On the other hand, the US ratio of equity market capitalization to GDP is 82%, three times the German ratio of 24%. Japan and the UK are interesting intermediate cases where banks and markets are both important. In France, banks are important and markets less so. The US and UK are often referred to as market-based systems while Germany, Japan and France are often referred to as bank-based systems. Table 4 shows the total portfolio allocation of assets ultimately owned by the household sector. In the US and UK, equity is a much more important component of household assets than in Japan,Germany and France. For cash and cash equivalents (which includes bank accounts), the reverse is true. Tables 3 and 4 provide an interesting contrast to Table 2. One would expect that, in the long run, household portfolios would reﬂect the ﬁnancing patterns of ﬁrms. Since internal ﬁnance accrues to equity holders, one might expect that equity would be much more important in Japan, France and Germany. There are, of course, diﬀerences in the data sets underlying the diﬀerent tables. For example, household portfolios consist of ﬁnancial assets and exclude privately held ﬁrms, whereas the sources-and-uses-of-funds data include all ﬁrms. Nevertheless, it seem s unlikely that these diﬀerences could cause such huge discrepancies. It is puzzling that these diﬀerent ways of viewing the ﬁnancial system produce such radically diﬀerent results.Another puzzle concerning internal versus external ﬁnance is the diﬀerence between the developed world and emerging countries. Although it is true for the US, UK, Japan, France, Germany and for most other developed countries that internal ﬁnance dominates external ﬁnance, this is not the case for emerging countries. Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) show that, for a range of emerging economies, external ﬁnance is more important than internal ﬁnance. Moreover, equity is the most important ﬁnancing instrument and dominates debt. This diﬀerence between the industrialized nations and the emerging countries has so far received little attention. There is a large theoretical literature on the operation of and rationale for internal capital markets. Internal capital markets diﬀer from external capital markets because of asymmetric information, investment incentives, asset speciﬁcity, control rights, transaction costs or incomplete markets There has also been considerable debate on the relationship between liquidity and investment (see, for example, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen(1988), Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991))that the lender will not carry out the threat in practice, the incentive eﬀect disappears. Although the lender’s behavior is now ex post optimal, both parties may be worse oﬀ ex ante.The time inconsistency of commitments that are optimal ex ante and suboptimal ex post is typical in contracting problems. The contract commits one to certain courses of action in order to inﬂuence the behavior of the other party. Then once that party’s behavior has been determined, the beneﬁt of the commitment disappears and there is now an incentive to depart from it.Whatever agreements have been entered into are subject to revision because both parties can typically be made better oﬀby “renegotiating” the original agreement. The possibility of renegotiation puts additional restrictions on the kind of contract or agreement that is feasible (we are referring here to the contract or agreement as executed, ratherthan the contract as originally written or conceived) and, to that extent, tends to reduce the welfare of both parties ex ante. Anything that gives the parties a greater power to commit themselves to the terms of the contract will, conversely, be welfare-enhancing.Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) (included as a chapter in this section) have suggested that ﬁnancial markets have an advantage over ﬁnancial intermediaries in maintaining commitments to refuse further funding. If the ﬁrm obtains its funding from the bond market, th en, in the event that it needs additional investment, it will have to go back to the bond market. Because the bonds are widely held, however, the ﬁrm will ﬁnd it diﬃcult to renegotiate with the bond holders. Apart from the transaction costs involved in negotiating with a large number of bond holders, there is a free-rider problem. Each bond holder would like to maintain his original claim over the returns to the project, while allowing the others to renegotiate their claims in order to ﬁnance the additional investment. The free-rider problem, which is often thought of as the curse of cooperative enterprises, turns out to be a virtue in disguise when it comes to maintaining commitments.From a theoretical point of view, there are many ways of maintaining a commitment. Financial institutions may develop a valuable reputation for maintaining commitments. In any one case, it is worth incurring the small cost of a sub-optimal action in order to maintain the value of the reputation. Incomplete information about the borrower’s type may lead to a similar outcome. If default causes the institution to change its beliefs about the defaulter’s type, then it may be optimal to refuse to deal with a ﬁrm after it has defaulted. Institutional strategies such as delegating decisions to agents who are given no discretion to renegotiate may also be an eﬀective commitment device.Several authors have argued that, under certain circumstances, renegotiation is welfare-improving. In that case, the Dewatripont-Maskin argument is turned on its head. Intermediaries that establish long-term relationships with clients may have an advantage over ﬁnancial markets precisely because it is easier for them to renegotiate contracts.The crucial assumption is that contracts are incomplete. Because of the high transaction costs of writing complete contracts, some potentially Pareto-improving contingencies are left out of contracts and securities. This incompleteness of contracts may make renegotiation desirable. The missing contingencies can be replaced by contract adjustments that are negotiated by the parties ex post, after they observe the realization of variables on which the contingencies would have been based. The incomplete contract determines the status quo for the ex post bargaining game (i.e., renegotiation)that determines the ﬁnal outcome.An import ant question in this whole area is “How important are these relationships empirically?” Here there does not seem to be a lot of evidence.As far as the importance of renegotiation in the sense of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), the work of Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) suggests that little renegotiation occurs in the case of ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms.Conventional wisdom holds that banks are so well secured that they can and do “pull the plug” as soon as a borrower becomes distressed, leaving theunsecured creditors and other claimants holding the bag.Petersen and Rajan (1994) suggest that ﬁrms that have a longer relationship with a bank do have greater access to credit, controlling for a number of features of the borrowers’ history. It is not clea r from their work exactly what lies behind the value of the relationship. For example, the increased access to credit could be an incentive device or it could be the result ofgreater information or the relationship itself could make the borrower more credit worthy. Berger and Udell (1992) ﬁnd that banks smooth loan rates in response to interest rate shocks. Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Berlin and Mester (1997) ﬁnd that smoothing occurs as a ﬁrm’s credit risk changes.Berlin and Mester (1998) ﬁnd that loan rate smoothing is associated with lower bank proﬁts. They argue that this suggests the smoothing does not arise as part of an optimal relationship.This section has pointed to a number of issues for future research.• What is the relationship between th e sources of funds for investment,as revealed by Mayer (1988, 1990), and the portfolio choices of investorsand institutions? The answer to this question may shed some light onthe relative importance of external and internal finance.• Why are financing patterns so different in developing and developedeconomies?• What is the empirical importance of long-term relationships? Is renegotiationimportant is it a good thing or a bad thing?• Do long-term relationships constitute an important advantage of bankbasedsystems over market-based systems?金融体系的比较1、什么是金融体系？一个金融系统的目的（作用）是将资金从盈余者（机构）向短缺者（机构）转移（输送）。

企业融资外文文献

Bank Involvement with SMEs: BeyondRelationship LendingAugusto de la Torre，María Soledad Martínez Pería，Sergio L. SchmuklerPolicy Research Working Paper 4649，2010AbstractThe “conventional wisdom”in academic and policy circles argues that, while large and foreign banks are generally not interested in serving SMEs, small and niche banks have an advantage in doing so because they can overcome SME opaqueness through relationship lending. This paper shows that there is a gap between this view and what banks actually do. Banks perceive SMEs as a core and strategic business and seem well positioned to expand their links with SMEs. The recent intensification of bank involvement with SMEs in various emerging markets documented in this paper is neither led by small or niche banks nor highly dependent on relationship lending. Rather, all types of banks are catering to SMEs and larger, multiple-service banks have in fact a comparative advantage in offering a wide range of products and services on a large scale, through the use of new technologies, business models, and risk management systems.Keywords: small and medium enterprises, bank finance, financial constraints, banking market structure1. IntroductionThe financing of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) has attracted much attention in recent years and has become an important topic for economists and policymakers working on financial and economic development. This interest is driven in part by the fact that SMEs account for the majority of firms in an economy and a significant share of employment (Hallberg 2001). Furthermore, most large companies usually start as small enterprises, so the ability of SMEs to develop and invest becomes crucial to any economy wishing to prosper.The recent attention on SME financing also comes from the perception among academics and policymakers that SMEs lack appropriate financing and need to receive special assistance, such as government programs that increase lending. Various studies support this perception. A number of papers find that SMEs are more financially constrained than large firms. For example, using data from 10,000 firms in 80 countries,Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Maksimovic (2006) show that the probability that a firm rates financing as a major obstacle is 39% for small firms, 38% for medium-size firms, and 29% for large firms. Furthermore, small firms finance, on average, 13 percentage points less of their investments with external finance when compared to large firms.4 Importantly, lack of access to external finance is a key obstacle to firm growth, especially for SMEs (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic 2005). On the policy side, there are a large number of initiatives across countries to foster SME financing including government subsidized lines of credit and public guarantee funds. One example that has been deemed as relatively successful is Chile’s Fondo de Garantía para Pequeños Empresarios (FOGAPE), a fund created toencourage bank lending to SMEs through partial credit guarantees. This fund has many features that make it attractive, including some incentives to reduce moral hazard, promote competition among banks, and encourage self sustainability.银行参与中小型企业融资：超越关系型借贷【作者】奥古斯托·德拉托雷，玛丽亚·索莱达·马丁内斯·帕利亚，塞尔吉奥L·施穆克勒【资料来源】《政策研究工作文件》4649号，2010年摘要：学术界和政策界的“传统智慧”认为虽然大型银行和外资银行对一般中小型企业的服务并不感兴趣，但是小型的针对特定产品或服务用户群的银行却在这方面能获得益处，因为他们可以通过关系型借贷来克服中小企业的不透明性。

外文文献及翻译瑞查德森-自由现金流与过度投资

This paper examines firm investing decisions in the presence of free cash flow. In theory, firm level investment should not be related to internally generated cash flows (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). However, prior research has documented a positive relation between investment expenditure and cash flow(e.g., Hubbard, 1998). There are two interpretations for this positive relation. First, the positive relation is a manifestation of an agency problem, where managers in firms with free cash flow engage in wasteful expenditure (e.g.,Jensen 1986; Stulz 1990). When managers‟ objectives differ from those of shareholders, the presence of internally generated cash flow in excess of that required to maintain existing assets in place and finance new positive NPV projects creates the potential for those funds to be squandered. Second, the positive relation reflects capital market imperfections, where costly external financing creates the potential for internally generated cash flows to expand the feasible investment opportunity set (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, & Petersen,1988; Hubbard, 1998).This paper focuses on utilizing accounting information to better measure the constructs of free cash flow and over-investment, thereby allowing a more powerful test of the agency-based explanation for why firm level investment is related to internally generated cash flows. In doing so, this paper is the first to offer large sample evidence of over-investment of free cash flow. Prior research, such as Blanchard, Lopez-di-Silanes, and Vishny (1994), document excessive investment and acquisition activity for eleven firms that experience a large cash windfall due to a legal settlement, Harford (1999) finds using a sample of 487 takeover bids, that cash-rich firms are more likely to make acquisitions that subsequently experience abnormal declines in operating performance, and Bates (2005) finds for a sample of 400 subsidiary sales from1990 to 1998 that firms who retain cash tend to invest more, relative to industry peers. This paper extends these small sample findings by showing thatover-investment of free cash flow is a systematic phenomenon across all types of investment expenditure.The empirical analysis proceeds in two stages. First, the paper uses an accounting-based framework to measure both free cash flow and over-investment. Free cash flow is defined as cash flow beyond what is necessary to maintain assets in place and to finance expected new investments.Over-investment is defined as investment expenditure beyond that required to maintain assets in place and to finance expected new investments in positive NPV projects. To measure over-investment, I decompose total investment expenditure into two components: (i) required investment expenditure to maintain assets in place, and (ii) new investment expenditure. I then decompose new investment expenditure into over-investment in negative NPV projects and expected investment expenditure, where the latter varies with the firm‟s growth opportunities, financing constraints, industry affiliation and other factors.Under the agency cost explanation, management has the potential to squander free cash flow only when free cash flow is positive. At the other end of the spectrum, firms with negative free cash flow can only squander cash if they are able to raise ……cheap‟‟ capital. This is less likely to occur because these firms need to be able to raise financing and thereby place themselves under the scrutiny of external markets (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Stulz, 2004; Jensen, 1986). Consistent with the agency cost explanation, I find a positive association between over-investment and free cash flow for firms with positive free cash flow.1For a sample of 58,053 firm-years during the period 1988–2002, I find that for firms with positive free cash flow the average firm over-invests 20% of its free cash flow. Furthermore, I document that the majority of free cash flow is retained in the form of financial assets. The average firm in my sample retains 41% of its free cash flow as either cash or marketable securities. There is little evidence that free cash flow is distributed to external debt holders or shareholders.Finding an association between over-investment and free cash flow is consistent with recent research documenting poor future performance following firm level investment activity. For example, Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) and Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn (2003) show that firms with extensive capital investment activity and growth in net operating assets respectively, experience inferior future stock returns. Furthermore, Dechow, Richardson, and Sloan(2005) find that cash flows retained within the firm (either capitalized through accruals or ……invested‟‟ in financial assets) a re associated with lower future operating performance and future stock returns. This performance relation is consistent with the over-investment of free cash flows documented in this paper.The second set of empirical analyses examine whether governance structures are effective in mitigating over-investment. Prior research has examined the impact of a variety of governance structures on firm valuation and the quality of managerial decision making (see Brown & Caylor, 2004; Gompers,Ishii, & Metrick, 2003; Larcker, Richardson, & Tuna, 2005 for detailed summaries).Collectively, the ability of cross-sectional variation in governance structures to explain firm valueand/or firm decision making is relatively weak. Consistent with this, I find evidence that out of a large set of governance measures only a few are related to over-investment. For example, firms with activist shareholders and certain anti-takeover provisions are less likely to over-invest their free cash flow. The next section develops testable hypotheses concerning the relation between free cash flow and over-investment. Section 2 describes the sample selection and variable measurement. Section 3 discusses empirical results for the over-investment of free cash flow. Section 4 contains empirical analysis examining the link between corporate governance and the over-investment of free cash flow, while section 5 concludes.1.Free cash flow and over-investmentThis section describes in detail the various theories supporting a positive relation between investment expenditure and cash flow and then develops measures of free cash flow and over-investment that can be used to test the agency based explanation.1.1.Explanations for a positive relation between investment expenditure and cash flowIn a world of perfect capital markets there would be no association between firm level investing activities and internally generated cash flows. If a firm needed additional cash to finance an investment activity it would simply raise that cash from external capital markets. If the firm had excess cash beyond that needed to fund available positive NPV projects (including options on future investment) it would distribute free cash flow to external markets. Firms do not, however, operate in such a world. There are a variety of capital market frictions that impede the ability of management to raise cash from external capital markets. In addition, there are significant transaction costs associated with monitoring management to ensure that free cash flow is indeed distributed to external capital markets. In equilibrium, these capital market frictions can serve as a support for a positive association between firm investing activities and internally generated cash flow.The agency cost explanation introduced by Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990)suggests that monitoring difficulty creates the potential for management to spend internally generated cash flow on projects that are beneficial from a management perspective but costly from a shareholder perspective (the free cash flow hypothesis). Several papers have investigated the implications of the free cash flow hypothesis on firm investment activity. For example, Lamont(1997) and Berger and Hann (2003) find evidence consistent with cash rich segments cross-subsidizing more poorly performing segments in diversified firms. However, the evidence in these papers could also be consistent with market frictions inhibiting the ability of the firm to raise capital externally and not necessarily an indication of over-investment.Related evidence can also be found in Harford (1999) and Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999,2001). Harford uses a sample of 487 takeover bids to document that cash rich firms are more likely to make acquisitions and these ……cash rich‟‟ acquisitions are followed by abnormal declines in operating performance. Opler et al.(1999) find some evidence that companies with excess cash (measured using balance sheet cash information) have higher capital expenditures, and spend more on acquisitions, even when they appear to have poor investment opportunities (as measured by Tobin‟s Q). Perhaps the most direct evidence on the over-investment of free cash flow is the analysis in Blanchard et al.(1994). They find that eleven firms with windfall legal settlements appear toengage in wasteful expenditure.Collectively, prior research is suggestive of an agency-based explanation supporting the positive relation between investment and internally generated cash flow. However, these papers are based on relatively small samples and do not measure over-investment or free cash flow directly. Thus, the findings of earlier work may not be generalizable to larger samples nor is it directly attributable to the agency cost explanation. More generally, a criticism of the literature examining the relation between investment and cash flow is that finding a positive association may merely indicate that cash flows serve as an effective proxy for investment opportunities (e.g., Alti, 2003). My aim is to better measure the constructs of free cash flow and over-investment by incorporating an accounting-based measure of growth opportunities, and test whether the relation is evident in a large sample of firms.In addition to prior empirical work on agency based explanations for the link between firm level investment and internally generated free cash flow, there exists a stream of research dedicated to examining the role of financing constraints (e.g., Fazzari et al. (1988), Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991),Fazzari and Petersen (1993), Whited (1992) and Hubbard (1998)). Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that information asymmetries increase the cost of capital for firms forced to raise external finance, thereby reducing the feasible investment. Thus, in the presence of internally generated cash flow, such firms will invest more in response to the lower cost of capital.Some early work in this area examined the sensitivity of investment to cash flow for high versus low dividend paying firms (Fazzari et al., 1988), comparing differing organizational structures where the ability to raise external financing was easier/harder (Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, 1991, with Japanese keiretsu firms) and debt constraints (Whited, 1992). These papers find evidence of greater sensitivity of investment to cash flow for sets of firms which appeared to be financially constrained (e.g., low dividend paying firms, high debt firms and firms with limited access to banks). However, more recent research casts doubt on the earlier results. Specifically, Kaplan and Zingales(1997, 2000), find that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow persists even for firms who do not face financing constraints. They construct a measure of ex ante financing constraints for a small sample of firms and find that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow for firms is negatively associated with this measure, thereby casting doubt on the financing constraint hypothesis. Nonetheless the investment expectation model described in Section 1.4includes a variety of measures designed to capture financing constraints.5. ConclusionThis paper presents evidence on firm level over-investment of free cash flow. The empirical analysis utilizes an accounting based framework to measure the constructs of free cash flow andover-investment. A comparative advantage of the accounting researcher is in measuring critical constructs from the financial economics literature. The analysis of over-investment and free cash flow is but one example of how accounting information can be better utilized in academic research. Theevidence in this paper suggests that over-investment is a common problem for publicly traded US firms. For non-financial firms during the period 1988–2002, the average firm over-invests 20 percent of its available free cash flow. Furthermore, the majority of free cash flow is retained in the form of financial assets. For each additional dollar of free cash flow the average firm in the sample retains 41 cents as either cash or marketable securities. There is little evidence that free cash flow is distributed to external stakeholders, thereby creating the potential for retained free cash flow to be over-invested in the future. Supplemental analysis found only weak evidence that governance structures are effective in mitigating the extent of over-investment.These findings corroborate recent work that has found significant negative future stock returns from capital investment and significant growth in net operating assets (e.g., Fairfield et al., 2003; Titman et al., 2004). Indeed, Li(2004) finds that future operating performance is lower for firms engaging in investment expenditure and that this negative relation is increasing in contemporaneous free cash flow.A natural explanation for this poor future performance is free cash flow related agency costs.The framework developed in the paper to measure over-investment and free cash flow can easily be extended to consider abnormal investment more generally. Indeed, some recent research has started to use this framework to examine the impact of accounting information systems on investment decisions and the efficient allocation of capital (e.g., Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith,2005; Goodman, 2005; Wang, 2003).翻译版本一：本文实证检验了在自由现金流量下企业的投资决策。

创业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献

创业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Entrepreneurial FinancingThe financing of startups entails potentially extreme adverse selection costs given the absent track record of the firms seeking capital, and given the risky nature of the industries in which many of them operate. Exacerbating the problem, this scenario often involves an innovator who has extensive technical knowledge but has neither the accumulated reputation nor the bondable wealth necessary to convey this information credibly.Barry characterizes venture capital as having evolved precisely to fill this startup financing niche:At the level of small, risky ventures, access to capital markets is restricted. Not all entrepreneurs can self-finance their projects, and not all can find bankers or angels who will carry the shortfall. Venture capitalists offer them a source of funds that is specifically designed for use in risky settings. The venture capitalists themselves perform due diligence prior to investing, and information gleaned in that process can greatly reduce the adverse selection problem..This outlook raises several questions. Why is it assumed that banks cannot (or choose not to) perform the same level of due diligence as venture capitalists (VCs)? In what sense is venture capital “designed” for risky settings? The puzzle deepens when one notes that straight debt is typically advocated as a solution to the adverse selection problem whereas in practice VCs often hold convertible preferred equity. Indeed, a defining characteristic of the venture capital market is that contracts are fairly high-powered in the sense that expected payoffs come disproportionately from the equity component or “upside”.These questions can be addressed by reflecting upon the costly due diligence to w hich Barry refers. By directly revealing the project’s quality, due diligence reduces information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and the VC. By contrast, if quality were signaled—the traditional solution to the adverse selection problem—costly due diligence would be unnecessary since there would be no more information to convey.In otherwise, either signaling or costly due diligence can solve the adverse selection problem. The two mechanisms are substitutes; the question then becomes which is more cost-effective.The first contribution of the paper is to show that signaling can be prohibitively expensive in entrepreneurial financing markets, and so costly due diligence dominates. The “cost” of signaling is driven by the incentives of bad firms to pool. Yet,for startups, if funding is not obtained then the firm may have almost no value. With such low reservation values, bad entrepreneurs attempt to pool at nearly any cost. As the analysis shows, securities is unattractive enough to drive out bad entrepreneurs—and thus to serve as a credible signal—tend to be unattractive to good entrepreneurs as well. Costly due diligence emerges as the preferred solution.As testament to the empirical importance of due diligence costs in venture capital markets, Fried and Hans characterize the VC funding process as composed of six distinct, progressively rigorous stages of screening. This due diligence takes an average of 97 days to complete even before the first round of funding is initiated. The majority of funding proposals do not successfully pass through the first screen, let alone subsequent screens, and the full process is described as “much more involved in bank loan reviews.The second contribution of the paper is to illustrate a link between costly due diligence and high-powered (or equity-like) financial contracts. The intuition behind this link is simple. By definition, low-powered contracts are safe; i.e., expected payoffs vary little across firms. High-powered contracts magnify the differential in payoff between funding good and bad projects, and hence magnify the incentives to screen out bad projects. In effect, high-powered contracts make the VC bear the cost of choosing entrepreneurs unwisely. Therefore high-powered contracts encourage due diligence.To summarize, this model is designed to make three simple points: (1) upside sharing is to be expected given costly evaluation, (2) such costly evaluations serve as a substitute traditional solutions to the adverse selection problem, and (3) traditional solutions are dominated for parameterizations of the model that correspond to venturecapital markets.Following the path-breaking empirical work of Saar, a theoretical literature on VC contract design emerged. One common feature of these papers is that they rationalize the optimality of convertible securities. A second common feature of these models is the admission of agency costs. For example, VCs and entrepreneurs may have different preferences regarding project risk or exit strategy.In part, the literature’s relia nce on agency costs owes to a widespread belief in their empirical relevance. It is also presumably related to the aforementioned consensus: since debt is considered the optimal response to adverse selection, non-debt securities must imply the presence of another market friction. On the other hand, it is clear how agency costs could lead to equity-like securities. Conflicts-of-interest over future actions are mitigated by granting both parties roughly symmetrical payoffs, which leads to upside-sharing. Of course, the omission of agency problems from the current model is not intended to suggest that they are unimportant empirically. Rather, the lesson is that agency costs are not a necessary condition for equity-like securities.Perhaps surprisingly, the theoretical results most closely related to this paper are contained in analyses of publicly traded securities. Assuming liquidity is exogenous and that prices are set by competitive market makers, Boot and Thakor show that splitting securities into an information-sensitive piece and a safer piece may either increase or decrease traders’ incentives to produce information. Fulghieri and Lukin study a similar environment but split the firm’s claims into a piece sold to outside investors and another piece that is retained, again analyzing the interaction between security design and information acquisition.Two important distinctions set my results apart from these models of public trading. First, their models exogenously rule out signaling, so it not possible to examine whether traditional solutions to adverse selection are dominated and, if so, under what conditions. Second, it is not clear how the results of these public trading models might be extended to entrepreneurial finance markets since the assumption that drives their results—losses by liquidity traders with perfectly inelasticdemand—has no obvious counterpart in an entrepreneurial finance setting.The economy consists of entrepreneurs with projects requiring capital investment K. The value of funded projects is 1 with probability πτ, where τ∈{G, B} is an indicator of project quality, and λ< 1 otherwise.Funded projects have expected value Vi = πτ 1 + (1 − πτ)λ. It is assumed thatλ< K. Otherwise the model would admit riskless debt, which would eliminate the adverse selection problem.Entrepreneurs have reservation value V; that is, contracts are acceptable only if the residual claim has expected value V or higher. In a model of mature firm financing, V is most clearly interpreted as the value of assets-in-place, because this is the continuation value of the firm in the absence of new investment. Such an interpretation is valid in entrepreneurial settings as well because without attracting financing the entrepreneur owns the existing assets outright. The key difference is one of magnitude. Compared to models of mature firms, in entrepreneurial settings the value of assets-in-place is small relative to other parameters.The net present value of projects, Vτ−V − K, is assumed to satisfyEVG − V − K ≥0 ≥EV B − V − K. (1) Equation (1) justifies the nomenclature “good” and “bad.” The net present value of a project is positive if and only if the project is good. Finally, it is assumed that net present values satisfyθ(EG − V − K) + (1 −θ)(EB − V − K) ≥0, (2) where θis the proportion of good projects in the economy. Because net present values are positive (on average), the model admits pooling equilibrium.One source of capital is an uninformed investor who conducts a mechanical credit evaluation based on observable characteristics. This investor may be thought of as a proxy for the competitive commercial banking market. Consistent with this interpretation, it will be shown that this investor takes debt in equilibrium. Briefly, the intuition is that when one is uninformed, one solves the adverse selection problem in the traditional way. As mentioned in the introduction, this solution is debt.An alternative source of capital is an investor endowed with technology that canevaluate project quality. This investor is referred to as a VC. Consistent with this identification, it will be shown that the VC takes high-powered contracts in equilibrium. Likewise, it needs to be shown that the VC actually employs the screening technology. A priori, this usage is not obvious. In particular, if the financial contract is very generous (if it leaves the VC with a large stake), then it may be profitable to forego the costly evaluation in favor of funding all projects. Such an outcome would benefit bad entrepreneurs, because they too would like to attract funding provided they can pool with good firms and thereby obtain mispriced financing. By limiting this pooling, costly due diligence effects a transfer from bad entrepreneurs to good entrepreneurs, and in the process, directs real investment toward better projects.Entrepreneurs seeking venture capital finance form a (randomly ordered) queue, and the VC sequentially evaluates them. For each entrepreneur, upon paying a cost C the VC receives a signal s ∈{G, B} withPr{s = G | entrepreneur is bad} = Pr{s = B | entrepreneur is good} =ε(3) The unconditional probability of a good signal is θ(1 − ε) + (1 − θ)ε, so VCs expect to evaluate 1/(θ(1 − ε) + (1 − θ)ε) entrepreneurs before a goo d one is found. The financial contract must be sufficiently generous (ex ante) as to compensate the VC for both capital contribution K and expected evaluation costs C= C/(θ(1 − ε) + (1 − θ)ε) incurred in the process of obtaining each good signal.This game admits three types of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In separating equilibrium, good entrepreneurs offer a security which bad entrepreneurs find too unpleasant to mimic (choosing instead to receive reservation utility V). Adverse selection in the queue becomes degenerate since only good firms are active. VC equilibrium serve as a second solution. In this scenario, the entrepreneurs’ contracts induce the investor to evaluate all firms in the queue. Finally, pooling can be thought of as the case in which good entrepreneurs find both of the aforementioned solutions to adverse selection too expensive.In this paper, I limit attention to debt and equity. Earlier drafts consideredarbitrary securities, with similar resulting intuition: high-powered securities promote due diligence, whereas low-powered securities are more effective signaling devices. The restriction to standard securities simplifies the presentation, retains the crucial intuition, and facilitates comparison of my results with those of the existing literature.This paper argues that in entrepreneurial finance markets, direct revelation of project quality (via the due diligence of VCs) is more cost-effective than signaling quality. This theme ties into an empirical literature showing that the due diligence process in those markets is quite extensive. Indeed, due diligence is a defining feature of the VC market.Several features of the model are quite strong and give the appearance that the mechanisms considered for resolving adverse selection are perfect substitutes. In a richer model, the two mechanisms could work as partial complements as well. Generally, a role exists for both entrepreneurial signaling and VC due diligence. Earlier drafts of the paper show complement may be motivated in multiple ways. For example, suppose entrepreneurs have noisy private information. Then the optimal security may involve signaling, thus eliminating entrepreneurs with bad information. But to the extent that the pool has residual uncertainty even after this self-selection, costly due diligence may still add value.Information acquisition occurs outside venture capital markets, of course. This model may shed light on the usage of unit IPOs, which are bundles of stocks and warrants often used for particularly small, risky offerings. The inclusion of warrants is puzzling from an adverse selection perspective, since the existing literature argues that securities should emphasize payoffs in bad states. The logic of this paper suggests that these securities, which emphasize good states to an extreme, motivate investors to evaluate projects and might be used when other mechanisms of dealing with adverse selection are too expensive.Finally, the model’s conclusions are not tied to the assumption that good entrepreneurs choose the contract. A connection between information acquisition incentives and the shape of the security exists independently of the contract’s origins. One could equivalently model a general partner in a venture capital fund raisingmoney from limited partners, announcing what securities the fund intends to hold. The more equity-like the securities are, the stronger the general partner’s information acquisition incentives.Source: Chris Yung. Entrepreneurial Financing And Costly Due Diligence. The Financial Review, 2009(44),pp137-149.译文：创业融资由于缺乏融资的信用记录以及所经营公司存在的风险性，初创企业的融资通常情况下都需要很高的逆向选择成本。