言语行为理论 中英文
言语行为理论合作原则
言语行为理论合作原则言语行为理论（Speech Act Theory）是由语用学家约翰·奥斯汀（John Austin）和约翰·西尔等人提出的一种理论，主要研究语言的行为功能。
奥斯汀认为，人们在使用语言时不仅仅是在表达事实和意见，还可以通过语言来执行其中一种行为。
他将这种通过语言来实现特定目的的行为称为言语行为。
在言语行为的实施过程中，合作原则（Cooperative Principle）起到了重要的作用。
合作原则是由语用学家保罗·格雷斯（Paul Grice）提出的，他认为人们在交际时遵循一定的合作原则，以达成有效的沟通。
合作原则包括四条准则：信息原则（Quantity），质量原则（Quality），关系原则（Relation）和方式原则（Manner）。
信息原则要求信息丰富，表达者应提供足够的信息，既不过多也不过少。
质量原则要求信息准确，表达者应提供真实、可靠的信息，不提供误导性的信息。
关系原则要求信息相关，表达者应提供与交际背景相关的信息，并避免不相关的信息。
方式原则要求信息清晰，表达者应以明确、简洁的方式表达，避免使用模糊、复杂的语言。
合作原则的遵循有助于有效的交际和沟通。
当交流双方共同遵循合作原则时，信息的传递更加顺畅，理解更加容易。
然而，在实际交际中，人们有时会违反合作原则，故意或无意地提供不准确、不充分、不相关或不清晰的信息，这导致交流的困难和误解的产生。
言语行为理论和合作原则对于语言学习和交际技巧的研究具有重要意义。
通过对言语行为的理解，可以更好地掌握语言的功能和用途，提高自己在交际中的表达能力和沟通效果。
同时，遵循合作原则可以帮助人们在交际中更好地理解对方的意图和信息，增强双方的共识和互动。
总之，言语行为理论和合作原则为我们认识和掌握语言功能提供了重要的理论基础。
通过研究言语行为和合作原则，我们可以更好地理解和运用语言，提高交际能力，加强互动和合作。
言语行为理论(speech acts theory)
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言语行为理论
(1)“ I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth.”
---said by the Queen of England at a ship-launching ceremony(naming a ship).
(2)“ I give and bequeath my
watch to my brother.”
• 言语行为理论是语用学研究中一个十分重要的 理论，它旨在回答语言是怎样用之于“行” ， 而不是用之于“指”这样一个问题，体现了 “言”则“行”这样的语言观。 • 这一理论在20世纪50年代末由哲学家首先提出， 在此后的20、30年间，在语言学界产生了很大 的影响。 • 如今，言语行为理论在语言研究中的地位已经 确立，这一理论已经深入人心，在各种语言科 研中“行为”这一概念常被用作研究的基点。 • 了解这一理论的缘起和它的基本内容对语用研 究具有重要意义。
• 他认为“许多陈叙之言只不过是‘伪陈伪叙’ （pseudo-statement），人们所说的许多话语貌 似陈叙，但它们根本不以坦直地记叙或传递有 关事实的信息为目的，或是仅是部分地以此为 目的。”（1962:1） • 据此，Austin首先区分了两大类话语：言有所 述（constative）和言有所为（performative）。 • 言有所述的话语是可以验证的，即或是真实， 或是谬误；言有所为的话语都是不能验证的， 它们无所谓真实或谬误，因为它们是被用来实 施某一种行为的。
• 说话人在说这些话的时候不是在作陈述 或描述，而是在完成某一动作---如结婚、 命名、遗赠、打赌。当然，Austin所举的 这四个例子都是用于某些习俗化的活动 中的话语，但这种通过说话来做某一件 事的情况并不限于这些习俗化的活动， 如“I promise…”、“I warn…”、“I apologize…”、“I welcome…”等等。 在说这些话时，说话人分别在实施“许 诺”、“警告”、“道歉”、“欢迎” 等动作。
言语行为理论Speech_Acts1
1
Outline
Introduction 奥斯汀的言语行为理论 塞尔对言语行为理论的发展 言语行为理论的归属 对立论的倒塌 间接言语行为理论 言语行为理论的不足与发展
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Introduction
表述句与施为句的划分
Austin的言语行为三分说理论
3
言语行为（speech acts)与指示语、含意、 礼貌等一样，也是语用学的一个重要的研究课 题。
的主要动词，但它们实施行为的功能没有丧失， 这就是内嵌施为句。 a、 意愿动词(如 regret， wish， please等)作 为主句动词，从属分句的施为动词仍具实施行 为的功能。如：
(1) I wish to announce that I promise to be there tomorrow. (2) I regret that I must inform you to leave.
但随问题的深入，Austin发现施为句理论存在一些 不严密的地方。
比如，所谓表述句也可以看做是隐性施为句: The dog is there, 它可以相当于“I tell/warn you that the dog is there”. 这说明在这个表述句中也含有“告诉”或 “警告”的言语行为，于是表述句就形同虚设了。
以（１）为例，假如医生继续说：
（３）Well, for the next few days, you mustn’t smoke at all. Actually, you’d better try to give up smoking. 如果病人根本不重视医生所说的话，从医 院回来之后不但不停止吸烟，而且还在他人面前以不 信任的口吻模仿医生的腔调，重复医生的话例（３）， 那么，尽管模仿出来的话语本身仍有意义，是X1, 但 其作用已经降为X0了。这时该话语也就是失去了医生 的“劝告”的用意了。
宏观语用学-言语行为理论
There isn't enough fresh air in here.
A request of the hearer to open the window. The hearer's opening the window or his refusal to do so.
Illocutionar y act
a. Priest :I now pronounce you husband and wife. b. Referee :You are out!
c. Jury Foreman ：We find the defendant guilty.
In using a declaration ,the speaker changes the word via words.
a. I'm really sorry!
b. Congratulations!
c. Oh,yes,great,mmm,ssahh! In using an expressive,the speaker makes words fit the world(of feeling).
(5)Declaration
A refusal to comply with the requested and issuing a request to her husband to answer the phone instead.
Husband:That's the phone.
Wife:I'm in the bathroom. Husband:Okay.
.
an outing
So it is claimed that all sentences, in addition to whatever they mean,perform specific actions or "do things"through having specific forces. Austin suggests three basic senses in which in saying something one is doing something and three kinds of acts are performed simultaneously.
言语行为理论和会话含义理论框架下TheGoodEarth及其译文的分析
言语行为理论和会话含义理论框架下The Good Earth及其译文的分析第一部分理论介绍一、言语行为理论1.Austin (1962）指出言语行为理论两大类话语：言有所述(constative)，即表述句。
言有所为 (performative)，即施为句。
2.Searle (1969)指出，要理解话语的间接言语行为，首先要了解其字面意思，然后从字面意义再推断出其间接用意，即句子间接表达的言外之意。
语用翻译模式是一种等效翻译观——翻译中的语用语言等效和社交语用等效。
在Austin基础上发展出来言语行为三分说，即：（言中行为）locutionary act，（言外之意）illocutionary act和（言后效应）perlocutionary act。
其中，locutionary act是以言指事行为，指“说话”这一行为本身；illocutionary act是以言行事行为，指“说话”时实际实施的行为；perlocutionary act是以言成事行为，指“说话” 所产生的后果或取得的效果。
1.间接言语行为言语交际中，出于礼貌考虑间接执行请求、拒绝或抱怨等功能的言语行为就是间接言语行为。
Searle认为间接语言现象实际是通过实施另一种言语行为来间接地实施某一种言语行为。
它可以分为规约化间接言语行为和非规约化间接言语行为。
非规约性间接言语行为，较规约性间接言语行为更为复杂、不稳定。
非规约性间接言语行为需要依靠说话双方共有的背景和语境信息来推断。
因此，非规约性间接言语行为也常称为推理性言语行为。
二、会话含义理论（conversational implicature）Grice提出的合作原则包括以下四个准则：数量准则、质量准则、关系准则和方式准则。
其中数量准则指“所说的话应包含交谈目的所需要的信息，所说的话不应包含超出需要的信息”；质量准则指“不要说自知是虛假的话，不要说缺乏足够证据的话”；关系准则指“说话要有关联，不要答非所问”；方式准则指“避免晦涩、避免歧义，要简练、要有序”。
言语行为理论-speech act theory
外语研究小窝
CONTENTS
Austin简介 文旭简介 最新语用学论文导读
（略）
1、约翰·朗肖·奥斯丁（John Langshaw Austin）
• 约翰·朗肖·奥斯丁（John Langshaw Austin 1911-1960）是牛津学派的重 要代表人物。他于1911年生于英国 的兰开斯特。1924年在施鲁兹伯利 公学攻读希腊、拉丁古典著作，后 入牛津大学贝里奥尔学院学习古典 学、语言学和哲学。1935年起在牛 津大学莫德林学院任教。第二次世 界大战期间，他曾在英国情报部队 服役。战后他重新回到牛津从事教 学活动，奥斯丁于1960年去世，年 仅48岁。
s言ta语te论or断de，sc能rib验e,证an真d w假ereeg：thuAsISveBr.ifiable.•
Perlocutionary act：言语带来的后果，即 听话者的行为
•
“performatives” were sentences that did not state a fact or describe a state, and were not verifiable(to perform an action,
2、Introduction To Its Proposers
• Austin
• John Searle
• 约翰·塞尔是当今世界最著名、最具影响 力的哲学家之一。他于1932年出生在美 国科罗拉多州丹佛市，1949-1952之间就 读于威斯康星大学，1955年获罗兹 （Rhodes）奖学金赴牛津大学学习，并 获哲学博士学位。他曾师从牛津日常语 言学派主要代表、言语行动理论的创建 者奥斯汀（J.L.Austin），深入研究语言分 析哲学。1959年返美，并一直在加州大 学伯克利分校任教，后当选美国人文科 学院院士。
言语行为理论
7.应酬，它是说话者仅对听话者表示礼貌或者善意的象 征性、仪式性的行事行为。例如：“你好！”、“久仰！”
8.感叹，是说话者流露感情的行事行为。比如：“啊， 多美！”
其实，分类远远可以不止这八种，如有下列分类： 命令、请求、询问、感叹、责备、劝说、威胁、 讽刺、抱怨、打赌、证实、允许、安慰、指责、 斥责、奉承、拒绝、承认、建议、批评、鼓励、 表扬、祝愿、感谢、任命、命名、判断、描写、 指认等。所以言语行为到底有多少类是这一理论 的一个薄弱之处，因为这种分类可以无限细化。
出不同程度的承诺，命题内容是说话人即将做出某一行动。 表示这种行为的动词主要有承诺、拒绝、威胁、保证、发 誓等。 4、表达类。这类以言行事行为指说话人在表达话语命题 内容的同时所表达的某种心理状态，实施该行为的前提是 话语命题内容的真实性。表达这种行为的动词主要有道歉、 吹嘘、慰问、感谢、欢迎、祝贺、哀悼等。
第三者喂狗了。
言语行为理论公式： By saying X and doing Y, I did Z. 通过说X和实行Y，我取得了Z。
（1）我明天会来。 （2）医生：你以后不能吸烟了。 （3）大家以后出校门时要带着学生证。 （4）要是再不听话就打屁股。
塞尔（John R．Searl）将言语行为分为以下五种类型： 1、断言类或阐述类。这类以言行事行为表示说话人对某
丈夫：老婆，门铃响了，快去开门。 妻子：我没听见。 （可能1：断定——拒绝。可能2：断定。） 丈夫：真响了。 妻子：没看见我在做面膜吗？ （询问——断定：我没空开门；指令：你去开
门。）
我不是好欺负的。 （断定——承诺：我一定会报复的。） 你真是一个好人。 （断定——感谢：太谢谢你了。） 我再也不要看到你了。（拉开房门）（ 断定——表情，命令：你快走！） 你做了这样的事，我还会容忍你吗？（拉开房门） （询问——表情，命令：你快走！）
第四节言语行为理论
一句话到底是实施了哪种言语行为，要根据具体 的语境。如：
这是世界上最珍贵的宝石啊！ 非本宿舍人员入内一律登记。
母亲：你要是不按时睡觉，还看什么电视连续剧， 我就告诉你爸。生了病还不好好休息。
儿子：行，我向你发誓一定马上就睡。 例中儿子的答话实际上施行了两种行事行为： 1.承诺；2.阻止他母亲继续数落他。
、（思断想 定、或行感动叹说。——了请求以：我要后那个，戒指会。 产生一定影响，及于听众，及于其
但乙的回话在字面意思上看不切题。
他人，及于说话人自己，影响其感情、思想、行 以言行事：通过这句话，怂恿、命令、建议另一人把第三者喂狗。
甲知道准备考试要花去相当多的时间，看电影也要花去相当多的时间。 通过说X和实行Y，我取得了Z。 表达宣告的动词主要有声称、任命、指定、宣布等。
以乙言：指 我事就（喜或欢动以你言现。表在意这这）个：样字子些面。 影响之产生，可能是说话人的心计，意
奥斯汀提出了“行事句”（performatives）的概念，它指那些实施行事行为的句子。
图、目的。” 一句话到底是实施了哪种言语行为，要根据具体的语境。
这类以言行事行为表示说话人对某事做出一定程度的表态，对话语所表达的命题内容做出真假判断。 为了使行事行为的功用分类能够适应分析语言交际话动的需要，应该对塞尔的分类进行适当的补充。 塞尔（John R．Searl）将言语行为分为以下五种类型： 你做了这样的事，我还会容忍你吗？（拉开房门） 塞尔（John R．Searl）将言语行为分为以下五种类型： 其实，分类远远可以不止这八种，如有下列分类：命令、请求、询问、感叹、责备、劝说、威胁、讽刺、抱怨、打赌、证实、允许、 安慰、指责、斥责、奉承、拒绝、承认、建议、批评、鼓励、表扬、祝愿、感谢、任命、命名、判断、描写、指认等。 阻止他母亲继续数落他。 通过说X和实行Y，我取得了Z。 妻子：没看见我在做面膜吗？
言语行为理论
4
• 一位同学对另外一位同学说：“Can I go to
your house tomorrow.” • Your car is looking good • Can I have an interview with your boss? There may be some problem. 听话人想用这种中国人常用的委婉方式表示拒绝， 但是这种言语行为的言后行为却很难实现，原因 在于英语文化中不存在这种用法，对方会认为问 题解决后，就可以进行采访，因此会追问是什么 问题，能否解决。
23
• • • • • • • • • • • • •
消极礼貌策略 Brown和Levinson提出十种消极礼貌策略，包括说话迂回，模 棱两可，尊重对方，避免突出个人，表示悲观，道歉，减小对 对方的强加等。消极礼貌策略以回避为基础。 说话迂回 Can you get me a doctor? 留有余地 Somebody has broken the vase. 减轻说话人的负债感 Let me help you with your suitcase. I’m going up stairs anyway. It wouldn’t be any trouble; I have to go right by there anyway. d. 道歉 I hope it will not take too much of your time. I’m sorry I didn’t come to upset you. But that’s a fact. 非公开地施行面子威胁行为 Brown和Levinson提出了十五种非公开施行面子威胁行为的礼 貌策略：暗示、夸张、暗喻、模糊、反语、低调修辞、修辞反 问、同义反复等。 24
言语行为理论中英文
精品文档言语行为理论目录言语行为理论的提出言语行为理论的发展言语行为理论的评价言语行为理论的不足与问题言语行为理论英文介绍言语行为理论的提出言语行为理论的发展言语行为理论的评价言语行为理论的不足与问题言语行为理论英文介绍展开编辑本段言语行为理论的提出言语行为理论Speech act theory言语行为理论是语言语用研究中的一个重要理论。
它最初是由英国哲学家约翰 . 奥斯汀在 20 世纪 50 年代提出的。
根据言语行为理论，我们说话的同时是在实施某种行为。
根据言语行为理论，说话者说话时可能同时实施三种行为：言内行为，言外行为和言后行为。
言内行为是说出词、短语和分句的行为，它是通过句法、词汇和音位来表达字面意义的行为。
言外行为是表达说话者的意图的行为，它是在说某些话时所实施的行为。
言后行为是通过某些话所实施的行为，或讲某些话所导致的行为，它是话语所产生的后果或所引起的变化，它是通过讲某些话所完成的行为。
编辑本段言语行为理论的发展美国的哲学语言学家约翰 . 舍尔 (Searle) 对言语行为有了深入的探讨，参考实施言外行为的恰当条件（准备条件、诚意条件、命题内容条件、根本条件）对言语行为间接指令进行分类。
对实施间接指令的各种方式即“ 指令” 这一行为所涉及的几个因素出发考虑：说话人（发出指令者）、听话人（指令对象）和说话人想要听话人去做的动作。
例如，在餐桌上请别人递一下盐瓶，可以有以下各种间接的形式。
以说话人为出发点：a) 陈述愿望I would like you to pass me the salt.b) 询问愿望* Would I like you to pass me the salt?听话人为出发点：1a) 陈述能力You can pass me the salt.1b) 询问能力Can you pass me the salt?2a) 陈述意愿You want to pass me the salt.2b) 询问意愿Would you mind passing me the salt?3a) 陈述将来的动作You will pass me the salt.3b) 询问将来的动作Will you pass me the salt?以动作为出发点：a)陈述理由 The soup is not salty enough.b)询问理由 Wouldn't it be a good idea if we add some salt to thesoup?他把言外行为分为五类，每一类行为都有一个共同的、普遍的目的。
言语行为
2.2 施事行为（the illocutionary act）
奥斯汀说：‘’完成一种施事行为就是完成在说某种事情中所存在的 一种行为（an act in saying something) 叫作完成一种叙事行为 “（Austin,1975:99）这类话语都存在一定的语力，如”命令“、”警告 “、”通知“等，其功能是以言行事。
第三 部分
第三部分 塞尔的言语行为理论
塞尔对言语行为的四大分类 言语交际应遵守构成规则 塞尔对施事行为的分类 间接言语行为理论
3.1 塞尔对言语行为的四大分类
约翰·塞尔（J.R.Searle）是当今世界最著名、最具影响力 的哲学家之一。他于1932年出生在美国科罗拉多州丹佛市， 1949-1952之间就读于威斯康星大学，1955年获罗兹 （Rhodes）奖学金赴牛津大学学习，并获哲学博士学位。他 曾师从奥斯汀（J.L.Austin），深入研究语言分析哲学。1959 年返美，并一直在加州大学伯克利分校任教，后当选美国人文 科学院院士。
第一 部分
第一部分 施为句理论
言语行为理论的提出 区分”言有所述“和”言有所为“ 施为句分类
1.1 理论的提出
奥斯汀（1911-1960），英国哲学家、日常语言哲学牛津学派的主要代 表。他一生中没写专著，主要通过在校内外的讲课和讲演发生影响。他的讲 稿和笔记在他死后由其朋友和门生收集整理成《哲学论文集》、《如何以言 行事》与《感觉和可感觉的》等书。
塞尔： A. 发话行为(utterance act)
B. 命题行为( propositional act) C. 施事行为(illocutionary act) D. 成事行为(perlocutionary act)
奥斯汀： A.叙事行为：
言语行为理论
言语行为理论言语行为理论百科名片言语行为理论(Speech act theory)，言语行为理论是语言语用研究中的一个重要理论。
它最初是由英国哲学家约翰.奥斯汀在20世纪50年代提出的。
根据言语行为理论，我们说话的同时是在实施某种行为。
根据言语行为理论，说话者说话时可能同时实施三种行为:言内行为，言外行为和言后行为。
目录言语行为理论的提出言语行为理论的发展言语行为理论的评价言语行为理论的不足与问题言语行为理论英文介绍言语行为理论的提出言语行为理论的发展言语行为理论的评价言语行为理论的不足与问题言语行为理论英文介绍展开言语行为理论的提出言内行为是说出词、短语和分句的行为，它是通过句法、词汇和音位来表达字面意义的行为。
言外行为是表达说话者的意图的行为，它是在说某些话时所实施的行为。
言后行为是通过某些话所实施的行为，或讲某些话所导致的行为，它是话语所产生的后果或所引起的变化，它是通过讲某些话所完成的行为。
言语行为理论的发展美国的哲学语言学家约翰.舍尔(Searle)对言语行为有了深入的探讨，参考实施言外行为的恰当条件(准备条件、诚意条件、命题内容条件、根本条件)对言语行为间接指令进行分类。
对实施间接指令的各种方式即“指令”这一行为所涉及的几个因素出发考虑:说话人(发出指令者)、听话人(指令对象)和说话人想要听话人去做的动作。
例如，在餐桌上请别人递一下盐瓶，可以有以下各种间接的形式。
以说话人为出发点:a)陈述愿望 I would like you to pass me the salt.b)询问愿望 * Would I like you to pass me the salt?听话人为出发点:1a)陈述能力 You can pass me the salt.1b)询问能力 Can you pass me the salt?2a)陈述意愿 You want to pass me the salt.2b)询问意愿 Would you mind passing me the salt?3a)陈述将来的动作 You will pass me the salt.3b)询问将来的动作 Will you pass me the salt?以动作为出发点:a)陈述理由 The soup is not salty enough.b)询问理由 Wouldn't it be a good idea if we add some salt to thesoup?他把言外行为分为五类，每一类行为都有一个共同的、普遍的目的。
III.言语行为理论Speech Acts Theory
Pragmatics-Teaching Plan (4)III. Speech Acts Theory3.1 Philosophical Background3.2 Austin‟s Performative-Constative Dichotomy3.2.1 Early Development3.2.2 Felicity Conditions for Performatives and Their Inadequacies3.2.3 Austin‟s Grammatical-Lexical Criteria for Performatives and Their Inadequacies3.2.3.1 Grammatical Criteria for Performatives3.2.3.2 Lexical Criteria for Performatives3.2.3.3 The Inadequacies of the Grammatical-Lexical Criteria3.3 Austin‟s Trichotomy of Speech Acts3.4 Austin‟s Classification of Illocutionary Acts3.5 Searle‟s Interpretation of the Speech Acts3.6 Searle‟s Distinction between Propositional Content and Illocutionary Act3.7 Searle‟s Linguistic Criteria for Speech Ac ts3.8 Searle‟s Felicity Conditions for Performing a Speech Act3.9 Searle‟s Classification of Illocutionary ActsReadings: Levinson, 1983: Chapter 5: Speech ActsVerschueren, 1999: Section 1.1.2何兆熊, 2000: 第四章Austin, J. L. How to Do Things with Words [M]. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962.Searle, J. R. Speech Acts [M]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.Searle, J. R. Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts [M]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.Jiang Wangqi, 2000: Chapter 6.III. Speech Acts Theory3.1 Philosophical BackgroundSpeech act theory is the first major theory in pragmatics, initially proposed in the 1950s and widely discussed in the 1960s and 1970s. There is an enormous literature on it from both the philosophical and linguistic point of view. (Jiang Wangqi, p197)In the early 20th century, philosophers realized that many philosophical problems were in fact problems of language, and could be solved through a proper analysis of language. This approach to philosophy came to be known as analytic philosophy or linguistic philosophy, of which logical positivism(or logical empiricism 逻辑实证哲学) and ordinary language philosophy were two contrastive schools. John Langshaw Austin, the father of the speech act theory, was the representative of the ordinary language philosophers.Logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy disagree in a number of ways:(1) In their attitudes towards ordinary language:Logical positivism: Ordinary language is inadequate and needs to be polished or replaced by an ideal, logical, or artificial language;Ordinary language philosophy: Ordinary language is the best, most needed and desirable one.(2) In their theories of meaning:Logical positivism: Unless a sentence can be verified or tested for its truth or falsity, it is meaningless. And logical positivists have developed a theory of meaning on the basis of truth conditions.Ordinary language philosophy: A distinction should be made between a sentence and the use of the sentence. A sentence in abstract sense cannot be assigned any truth value; only when a sentence is used in actual situations, will it be possible to say whether it is true or not.Speech act theory grows out of Austin‟s struggle against logical positivism. Austin‟s first shot at logical positivism is that there are two types of sentences: performative sentences, which are used to do things, and constative sentences, which are used to describe things.(Jiang Wangqi, p197-198. To be modified with reference to Levinson, p 227)3.2 Austin‟s Performative-Constative Dichotomy3.2.1 Early DevelopmentThis performative-constative distinction was first made by Austin in the late 1930s to interpret the speech act of “promising”. According to Austin, by saying “I promise”, one is not just to say something or make an autobiographical assertion about oneself like “I play cricket”, but to do it, that is, to make a promise. Austin devoted much effort to this study ofthe type of utterances which look autobiographical, as if the speaker were saying of himself that he does something, whereas in fact he is doing it. (Jiang Wangqi, p198-199).In 1952, Austin began to give a series of lectures entitled “Words and Deeds” in Oxford. In 1955, when he went to the United States to deliver William James lectures, he revised the lecture notes and renamed it How to Do Things with Words. The book of the same title was compiled and published by his student J. O. Urmson in 1962. It contains 12 lectures, in the first 7 of which Austin discussed the performative-constative dichotomy. (Jiang Wangqi, p200).Constative utterancesExamples:(1) I pour some liquid into the tube. (said by a chemistry teacher in a demonstration of an experiment, which describes the teacher‟s action at the time of speaking)The utterance of this sentence is not the performance of the action of pouring some liquid. The teacher cannot pour any liquid into a tube by simply uttering these words. He must accompany his words with the actual pouring of some liquid into the tube. Otherwise one can accuse him of making a false statement.(2) We went down to Como. (This sentence can be evaluated along the dimension of truth / falsity, too)Performative utterancesExamples:(1) I do. (as uttered in the wedding ceremony)(2) I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth. (as uttered for a ship-launching ceremony)(3) I give and bequeath my watch to my brother. (as occurring in one‟s will)(4) I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow. (as uttered for betting)(Austin, 1962: 5)(5) I promise to finish it in time. (as in promise-makng)(6) I apologize.(7) I declare the meeting open.(8) I warn you that the bull will charge.The common features of performative utterances are as follows:(A) They do not “describe”or “report”or constate anything at all, are not “true”or “false”;(B)The uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an action, which again would not normally be described as, or as “just”, saying something.(Austin, 1975 [1962]: 5)(C) They cannot be said to be true or false, but can be evaluated along a dimension of “felicity”(恰当性). For example, “I promise to go to Como” is not felicitous unless I intend to go to Como and commit myself to doing so; “I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth”requires my being authorized to perform the naming of this ship.An illustration: Example (2), said by the Queen of England at a ship-launching ceremony, is not a description of what was doing at the time of speaking; to utter this sentence is to perform the very action of naming this ship; one cannot say the Queen made a false statement, even though she did not accompany her words with the action of actually writing Queen Elizabeth on the ship.3.2.2 Felicity Conditions for Performatives and Their InadequaciesAlthough performatives cannot be evaluated as true or false, there are still ways in which they will go wrong, be unhappy / infelicitous. In other words, there are conditions to be met to produce an appropriate performative. The following are the three felicity conditions suggested by Austin (1962: 14-15) and rewritten by Levinson (1983: 229):A.(i) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances.For illustration, in Muslin cultures, a man may achieve a divorce by saying to his wife “I hereby divorce you”three times in succession. The uttering of these words constitutes the performance of divorce. As a British citizen, however, he cannot divorce his wife in this way. There is no such a conventional procedure in British society.A.(ii) The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate, as specified in he procedure.For illustration, according to the Muslin tradition, only the man has the right to divorce his wife in the way mentioned above, and he has to address it to his wife; otherwise, the divorce procedure will still be infelicitous.B. The procedure must be executed by all participants (i) correctly and (ii) completely.For illustration, in the above mentioned divorce ceremony, the Muslin man must use the correct sentence. If he does not, then it will not have the expected effect. And he must say it three times in succession. Once or twice is not enough to bring it off.C.(i)Often the persons must have the requisite thoughts, feelings and intentions, as specified in the procedure.That is to say, the speaker must mean what he says. When promising, for example, he must be prepared to fulfill it.C. (ii) If consequent conduct is specified, then the relevant parties must so do.For example, having promised, the speaker must do so accordingly.Problems in the three felicity conditions:In the discussion of these conditions, however, Austin gradually realized that they are not really useful for distinguishing performatives from constatives.Supporting arguments: It is true that with some performatives, there will be a conventional procedure and the procedure must be executed correctly and completely indeed. So at the wedding ceremony in Britain, when the priest asks the bridegroom,“Wilt thou have this woman to thy wedded wife…and, forsaking all other, keep thee only unto her, so long as ye both shall live?”, the bridegroom could only answer “Yes, I will”. He cannot use other expressions, even if they are synonymous.Counter-arguments:(1) It is also true that with some performatives, there may not be such a strict restriction on wording:(A) At a ship-launching ceremony, the namer may either use name or christen;(B) To make a promise, one either say I promise or I give my word;(2) On the other hand, the so-called constatives may also be infelicitous in above ways:(A) The constative The present king of France is bald is infelicitous in the same ways as the performative I bequeath you my Benz said by someone who does not have a Benz. They both presuppose the existence of something nonexistent.(B) The person who makes a statement must also have the requisite thoughts, feelings and intentions. For illustration, to make a promise one must have the intention to carry it out. Similarly, to state that something is the case, one must also believe it: one cannot say The cat is on the mat, but I don’t believe it.3.2.3 Austin’s Grammatical-Lexical Criteria for Performatives and Their Inadequacies3.2.3.1 Grammatical Criteria for Performatives (Levinson, 1983: 231; Austin, 1962: 61-62)Having failed to separate performatives from constatives by means of felicity conditions, Austin tried to explore whether there are some grammatical criteria for distinguishing them. He noticed that the classic examples of performatives have some common features, namely, they take the first person singular subject I, simple present tense, indicative mood, and active voice, which can be formalized as “I + VP”.Based on this theory, (7)-(10) are not performatives: (Levinson: 232)(7) She names this ship the Queen Elizabeth. (The subject is not the first person)(8) I‟m naming this ship the Queen Elizabeth. (The tense is not the simple present)(9) Name this ship the Queen Elizabeth. (The mood is not indicative, but imperative)(10) This ship is named the Queen Elizabeth. (The voice is passive)However, Austin immediately refuted the theory on the ground that they are neither sufficient nor necessary conditions on a performative.Counter-arguments: (Levinson: 233)1) Constatives may satisfy the above conditions, too, as is demonstrated in Example (1):I pour some liquid into the tube.2) Performatives may take other grammatical forms as well: the subject may be first person plural, second person or third person, and the voice may be passive, as in (11)-(14):(11) We promise to clean the room immediately. (first person plural subject)(12) You are hereby authorized to direct the team. (second person subject; passive voice)(13) Passengers are warned to cross the track by the bridge only. (third person plural subject; passive voice)(14) Notice is hereby given that trespassers will be prosecuted. (third person singular subject; passive voice)3) Other moods than the indicative may be used in informal situations, as in (15):(15) Turn right. (to substitute for I order you to turn right)4) Other tenses may also be used, as in (16):(16) The jury: “You did it.” (to substitute for I find you guilty)3.2.3.2 Lexical Criteria for Performatives (Levinson, p 232)Due to the inadequacies of the grammatical criteria for performatives, Austin suggested inserting hereby(by doing or saying this, 借此) in the sentences that satisfy the above grammatical criteria. The verbs that can be used together with hereby are performative verbs, and the sentences with performative verbs are performative, as is showed in (17a):(17) a. I hereby declare you Mayor of Casterbridge. (So declare is a performative verb)b. * I hereby now beat the eggs till fluffy. (Is beat a performative verb?—No! )c. * I hereby jog ten miles on Sundays. (Is jog a performative verb? —No!)It is proper for declare to be used together with hereby, so (17a) is performative, whereas beat and jog cannot be used together with hereby, so (17b) and (17c) are not performative.Inadequacies of the lexical criteria: (Levinson: 232-233)1) In fact, performative verbs can be used non-performatively, as in (18):(18) I am betting you five pounds it‟ll rain tomorrow.2) And performative verbs may not be contained in a performative utterance, as in (19):(19) A judge says to a suspect in court: “Guilty!”(= I hereby declare that you are guilty.)3.2.3.3 The Inadequacies of the Grammatical-Lexical Criteria (Levinson, p233)Austin‟s grammatical-lexical criteria for performatives can be summarized as follows: Performative utterances are identifiable because they have the form of first person indicative active sentences in the simple present with one of a delimited set ofperformative verbs as the main verb, which will collocate with the adverb hereby.But even when all these criteria are met, utterances exhibiting all these properties are not necessarily performative, as illustrated by (20):(20) A: How do you get me to throw all these parties?B: I promise to come.Austin gave up his criteria soon and suggested that it is unnecessary for performative utterances to meet either one of the grammatical and lexical criteria. “Shut the door!”, “I order you to shut the door!”, or even “The door!” can perform the same speech act.And the syntactic structure “I + VP” is not often used in actual speech. When we request somebody to do something, we seldom say “I request you…”. More frequently, we use structures which contain no request, such as “I would like you to…”, “I wonder if you…”, “Would you mind…”, etc.So Austin made a distinction between explicit performative and primary performative. Explicit performatives(sentences with performative verbs) are specific ways of being unambiguous in expressing what act you are performing in speaking. (Levinson, p233) Examples of explicit performatives are I promise to go to Como and I baptize this ship the Lago di Como, which contain verbs such as promise and baptize in the first-person sigular present indicative active, describing the kind of act that is being performed.Primary performatives (also called, somewhat misleadingly, “implicit performatives”) are all other forms of utterance which use other less explicit, less specific devices (IFIDs—illocutionary force indicating devices) to perform speech acts such as:(A) Mood (as in Shut the door—imperative, instead of I order you to shut the door);(B) Adverbs (as in I’ll be there without fail, instead of I promise I’ll be there);(C) Particles (as in Therefore, X, instead of I hereby conclude that X);(D) Intonation (you can rely on intonation to distinguish It’s going to rain as a warning,a question, or a protest);(E) Contextual device (for disambiguation)Austin‟s efforts in seeking the linguistic forms for performatives end in failure, but what he did at least gives us such an enlightenment: judgments on language functions cannot be simply based on language forms. Austin raised an important topic for pragmatic studies: the relationship between the forms and the communicative functions of language. Besides, the discussion on performative-constative dichotomy paves the way for a new theory—the theory of illocutionary acts.3.3 Austin‟s Trichotomy of Speech ActsAustin finally abandoned the inadequate performative-constative dichotomy, and believed that all utterances contain both constative and performative elements and they are allsayings and doings at the same time. (Verschueren, 1999: 22) To capture the implications of this intuition, Austin replaced the constative-performative dichotomy by a trichotomy: locutionary act, illocutionary act and perlocutionary act. According to Austin, in uttering a sentence, one is performing three kinds of acts simultaneously (Levinson, p 236):(1) locutionary act: the uttering of a sentence with determinate sense and reference; concretely, it refers to the movement of vocal organs to produce a stretch of meaning sounds—containing a proposition, or the constative aspect of the speech act.This act itself does not constitute verbal communication, but while performing this act, one is often performing an illocutionary act, and sometimes simultaneously performing a perlocutionary act.(2) illocutionary act: It refers to what is done in saying something. In performing a locutionary act (uttering a sentence), one is also performing such acts as : asking or answering a question, giving some information or an assurance or a warning or a threat, announcing a verdict or an intention, making an appointment, an offer, a promise, an appeal or a criticism, making an identification or giving a description, etc. by virtue of the conventional force associated with it (or with its explicit performative paraphrase).(3) perlocutionary act: It refers to what is done by saying something, or the consequential effects of a locutionary act (uttering a sentence) on the audience, such effects being special to the circumstances of utterance. For examples, by telling somebody something, the speaker may change the opinion of the hearer on something, or mislead him, or surprise, or induce / persuade him to / not to do something.To explain the three notions further, Austin (1962: 101-102) used Shoot her as an example:(1) Locutionary act: The uttering of the two words shoot and her in this order and with determinate sense and reference such as Open fire at Miss Smith. It may be described by the hearer as “He said to me …Shoot her‟”.(2) Illocutionary act: The illocutionary act performed in saying Shoot her may be described as “He urged / advised / ordered me to shoot her”, as in different contexts it may have these different illocutionary forces:(a) When you are fighting with a woman, who is going to kill you with the weapon in her hand, then your friend, in saying Shoot her, is offering you a piece of advice;(b) If you are a policeman and the woman is an escaping criminal who is on the verge of success, then this utterance from the mouth of an officer is an order.(3) Perlocutionary act:(A) Somebody‟s saying of Shoot her may lead you to the actual shooting of the woman referred to.(a)This act may be described as “He persuaded me to shoot her”.(b) If, on the other hand, you did not shoot the woman willingly, then you can be said to have been forced to shoot her.(B) This utterance may also have the effect of frightening the woman concerned.(A)This utterance may also produce in you an irritation towards the speaker.A question for further consideration:―How do we perform locutionay act, illocutionary act and perlocutionary act simultaneously when we say “Morning!”to someone else?(1)Locutionary act:－It refers to act of moving our vocal organs and producing a number of sounds /ˋmɔ:niŋ/, inthis order and with a determinate sense of “Good morning to you!”.－It may be described by the hearer as “He said the word …Morning‟ to me”.(2)Illocutionary act:●The illocutionary act performed in saying “Morning!” may be described as “He offered a greeting” (speaker‟s intention).●The illocutionary force (i.e. speaker‟s meaning/ contextual meaning/ extra meaning 言外之意) conventionally associated with this utterance is a greeting. So the illocutionary force canbe described as “He meant it as a greeting”.(3)Perlocutionary act:―It refers to the effects of the speaker‟s utterance (locutionary act) on the hearer:(A) When the two interlocutors are on normal terms, the effect may be negligible (i.e. slight/ which can be neglected).(B) But if there were any tens ions between them, a simple “Morning!” from one side may bring about great changes in their relationship:(i) The other side may accept his show of friendliness, and be friends with him again. In this case, we can say “He has made peace with the hearer”, in response to the question “What didhe do?”;(ii) On the other hand, the hearer may have some prejudice against the speaker, and take his friendliness as an instance of hypocrisy. As a result, the speaker‟s greeting may lead their relationship from bad to worse.●So the perlocutionary act (i.e. effect) is not necessarily in agreement with the illocutionaryact (i.e. the speaker‟s intention).Interrelation between the three acts:Locutionary act and illocutionary act differ in that the former expresses the literal meaning by means of utterance whereas the latter expresses the speaker‟s intention by meansof the literal meaning. So, the perlocutionary act (the effect of the utterance) may be differentfrom the illocutionary act (speaker‟s intention).The speaker‟s intention, once understood by the hearer, will lead to effect on the hearer—perlocutionary act. However, the speaker‟s intention will not necessarily beunderstood by the hearer, or even though the hearer understands it, that does not mean he will necessarily act accordingly. So the perlocutionary act may not happen, which might lead to the failure of communication.Among the three speech acts, pragmatic researches are most interested in illocutionary act, for it is in accordance with the speaker‟s intention. What can be done with words? How to do these things with words? These are the focuses of pragmatic researches. To the first question, Austin has given a brief, and unsatisfactory answer; the second question was answered mainly by the scholars after Austin.3.4 Austin‟s Classification of Illocutionary Acts(Levinson, p 240; Austin: 151-164)Austin has discriminated among five types of illocutionary acts in the last chapter of How to Do Thing with Words:(1) Verdictives(裁决型): Verdictives are concerned with the delivery of a verdict, a finding, a judgment, or an assessment, upon evidence or reason.Examples: acquit (declare sb. not guilty of a crime), convict (find sb. guilty of a crime), find (as a matter of fact), hold (as a matter of fact), interpret as, take it, understand,read it as, calculate, reckon,estimate, assess, value, characterize, diagnose, analyze, etc. For illustration, when the jury acquit sb. of some crime, they give a verdict, a judgment on the basis of evidence they hear.(2) Exercitives(行使型): Exercitives are concerned with the exercising of powers, rights or influence.Examples: appoint, vote, veto, order, command, warn, advise, dismiss, name, direct, sentence, bequeath, pardon, resign, plead, pray, beg, urge, press, recommend, announce, etc.(3) Commissives (承诺型): “The whole point of a commissive is to commit the speaker to a certain course of action”(Austin, p157) When someone promises, he undertakes the obligation to perform the action promised.Examples: promise, undertake, covenant(written form of promise), contract, bind myself, give my word, am determined to, intend, declare my intention, mean to, plan,propose to, shall, envisage, engage, swear, guarantee, pledge myself, bet, vow, agree, consent, dedicate myself to, side with, oppose, favor, etc.(4) Behabitives (行为型): Behabitives have to do with attitudes and social behaviors,e.g., reaction to other people‟s behavior and fortunes.Examples:(a)For apologies: apologize;(b)For gratitude: thank;(c) For sympathy: sympathize, deplore(be very sorry about), commiserate with(feel sympathy for), compliment, condole, congratulate, felicitate (congratulate);(d) For attitudes: resent, don’t mind, criticize, grumble about, complain of, applaud,overlook, commend(praise),deprecate(express disapproval of; deplore; oppose), and the non-exercitive uses of blame, approve, and favor;(e) For greetings: welcome, bid you farewell;(f) For wishes: bless, curse, toast, drink to, wish (in its strict performative use);(g) For challenges: dare, defy, protest, challenge.(5) Expositives(阐述型): “Expositives are used in acts of exposition involving the expounding of views, the conducting of arguments, and the clarifying of usages and of references.” (Austin, p161)Examples:(a)affirm, deny, state, describe, class, identify;(b)remark, mention;(c)inform, apprise (inform), tell, answer, rejoin (answer), ask;(d)testify, report, swear, conjecture (speculate);(e)accept, concede, withdraw, agree, demur to(object to), adhere to, recognize,repudiate (refuse to accept);(f)correct, revise;(g)postulate (suppose), deduce, argue, neglect;(h)begin by, turn to, conclude by;(i)interpret, distinguish, analyze, define;(j)illustrate, explain, formulate;(k) mean, refer, call, understand, regard asProblems with Austin‟s Classification:Searle (1979: 11-12) has pointed six inadequacies (in ascending order of importance) in Austin‟s classification:(1)There is a persistent confusion between illocutionary (performative) verbs andillocutionary acts;(2)Not all of the verbs listed are illocutionary verbs. e.g. sympathize, regard as, mean to,intend & shall.(3)There is too much overlap from one category to another.(4)There is too much heterogeneity (i.e. there are quite different kinds of verbs) withinthe same categories;(5)Many of the verbs listed in the categories don‟t satisfy the definition given for thecategory;(6)There is no consistent principle of classification.Searle later revised the classification on the basis of three criteria. (See Section 3.9)Comments on Austin‟s contribution to Speech Acts Theory:Austin is the forefather of speech acts theory and he has made an exploration to almost every aspect of this theory. Although some of his views are not adequate and mature, andsome of them were negated by himself after being proposed, his constant pursuits in this field, nevertheless, have established the directions and units of speech acts analyses, and thus laid a good foundation for the researches of later speech acts theorists like Searle.3.5 Searle‟s Interpretation of the Speech ActsAustin died before he had chance to develop his Speech Act Theory. Searle succeeded Austin‟s theory on illocutionary acts, and developed the theory by exploring the necessary and sufficient conditions for performing illocutionry acts. Besides, Searle presented the famous theory of Indirect Speech Acts, that is, through performing one speech act, indirectly performing another speech act.The main difference between Austin and Searle is that, Austin treated Speech Act Theory as the study on the meanings of isolated utterances whereas Searle saw it as one that explains human verbal communication. To Searle, the use of language is a purposeful act constrained by rules, like many other social activities. (Searle, 1969) Whenever we are speaking, we are performing all kinds of speech acts. To Searle, the smallest unit of language communication is speech act, rather than word or sentence, as is usually understood. Hence, language communication process is actually made up of successive speech acts. Every speech act reflects the speaker‟s intention.3.6 Searle‟s Distinction between Propositional Content and Illocutionary ActSearle’s Speech Act Formula: F(p):(Searle, 1979: 1)“F” stands for illocutionary force (言外之力), the action side of every speech act;“p” stands for propositional content, the content side of the speech act, consisting of a reference (所指) and a predication (谓词). (Verschueren: 23)Propositional content:Austin proposed the idea of illocutionary act, but he did not connect it with the propositional content of an utterance, which was later done by Searle. To Searle, the propositional content of an utterance is composed of two parts:(A) Reference (the person or thing referred to): It is usually expressed by a word with an entity in real word such as a proper noun, a nominal phase or a pronoun. Examples are John, daddy, his sister, that cat on the mat, flying planes, etc.(B) Predication (the description of the person or the thing referred to).The relation between the propositional content and illocutionary acts:Searle holds that different utterances, though performing different illocutionary acts, might be common in their propositional content. He illustrates this relation between propositional content and illocutionary acts with following examples (Rosenberg & Travis, 1971: 618):。
(4)言语行为理论
III. The Performative Hypothesis （施为句假设）
Austin showed that most utterances have no truth conditions. They are not statements or questions but actions, a conclusion he reached through an analysis of what he termed „per-formative verbs‟. Compare:
Exmaple
It is hot here! (locution) I want some fresh air. (illocution) Someone might open the window. (perlocution)
PS: “Speech act”, “illocutionary act”, “illocutionary force”, “pragmatic force”, and “force” all mean the same thing.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
first person, declarative, indicative, active, simple present tense
(performative) I promise I‟ll be there. I admit I was foolish. I warn you, this gun is loaded. I apologize. I thank you. I order you to sit down.
(1) 1. 2. 3. 4.
I drive a white car. (Constative) I apologize. (Performative) 包龙星…… (Performative) I bet you ￥100 it will rain. (Performative)
Speech_Act_Theory_言语行为理论
If there is no direct relationship between a sentence type and an illocutionary force. we are faced with an indirect speech act.
Can you pass the salt?
Every act of saying is doing. --Direct speech act --Indirect speech act Will you go or not? / I’m asking you if you will go or not. He’s dishonest. /I’m telling you that he is dishonest.
Direct speech act VS Indirect speech act
If there is a direct match between a sentence type and an illocutionary force, we have a direct speech act.
I promise I will attend your wedding. I order you to listen to the news. I admit I was foolish.
知识回顾 Knowledge Review
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Classifying illocutionary acts
Austin:
Searle:
verdictives 裁决类 exercitives 行使职权类 commisives 承诺类 expositives 阐述类 behavitives 表态行为类
representatives 阐述类 directives 指令类 commisives 承诺类 expressives 表达类 declarations 宣告类
中英文求职信中的言语行为对比分析
中英文求职信中的言语行为对比分析中文求职信与英文求职信中的言语行为对比分析在求职过程中，求职信是至关重要的一环。
它能够展示求职者的个性、能力和职业素养。
在中文和英文求职信中，言语行为存在一些差异。
本文将从以下几个方面对中英文求职信中的言语行为进行对比分析。
在中文求职信中，通常会使用一些礼貌用语，如“尊敬的领导”、“感谢您的”等。
这些用语体现了求职者对用人单位的尊重和感激。
而在英文求职信中，虽然也会使用一些礼貌用语，但相比之下要少一些。
中文求职信中，求职者通常会采用一些含蓄、委婉的表达方式来展示自己的能力和特长。
例如，中文求职信中可能会使用“我相信我能够胜任此岗位”、“我对这个职位充满热情”等语句来表达自己的意愿和能力。
而英文求职信中，求职者则更倾向于使用直接、明了的表达方式。
例如，“I am confident in my ability to perform well in this position” or “I am passionate about this role and its responsibilities”.在中文求职信中，求职者通常会使用一些形容词来描述自己的经历、能力和工作风格。
例如，“我具有优秀的沟通能力”、“我工作勤奋、认真”等。
而在英文求职信中，求职者更注重使用具体的事例和数据来描述自己的能力和经历。
例如，“I have strong communication skills, having led multiple projects with successful outcomes”.在中文求职信中，结尾通常会使用一些客套话来表达对用人单位的感激和希望得到面试的机会。
例如，“再次感谢大家的，期待大家的回复”。
而在英文求职信中，结尾通常会使用一些更加直接的表达方式，例如，“Thank you for your consideration, and I look forward to the opportunity to discuss my qualifications further.”中英文求职信中的言语行为在礼貌用语、表达方式、描述方式和结尾用语等方面存在差异。
6.2.1 Austin's model of speech acts 奥斯汀的言语行为理论
Speech acts theory 言语行为理论 • British philosopher John Austin (1962) • a Philosophical explanation of the nature of lingustic communication • It aims to answer the question “What do we do when using language?”
• Constatives (叙述句) --- statements that either state or describe, and are thus verifiable;(可证 实) • Performatives (施为句) --- sentences that do not state a fact or describe a state, and are not verifiable.（不可证实）
LocutiLeabharlann n:Note: Of the three acts, what speech act theory is most concerned with is the illocutionary act. It attempts to account for the ways by which speakers can mean more than what they say.
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言语行为理论目录言语行为理论的提出言语行为理论的发展言语行为理论的评价言语行为理论的不足与问题言语行为理论英文介绍言语行为理论的提出言语行为理论的发展言语行为理论的评价言语行为理论的不足与问题言语行为理论英文介绍展开编辑本段言语行为理论的提出言语行为理论Speech act theory言语行为理论是语言语用研究中的一个重要理论。
它最初是由英国哲学家约翰.奥斯汀在20世纪50年代提出的。
根据言语行为理论，我们说话的同时是在实施某种行为。
根据言语行为理论，说话者说话时可能同时实施三种行为：言内行为，言外行为和言后行为。
言内行为是说出词、短语和分句的行为，它是通过句法、词汇和音位来表达字面意义的行为。
言外行为是表达说话者的意图的行为，它是在说某些话时所实施的行为。
言后行为是通过某些话所实施的行为，或讲某些话所导致的行为，它是话语所产生的后果或所引起的变化，它是通过讲某些话所完成的行为。
编辑本段言语行为理论的发展美国的哲学语言学家约翰.舍尔(Searle)对言语行为有了深入的探讨，参考实施言外行为的恰当条件（准备条件、诚意条件、命题内容条件、根本条件）对言语行为间接指令进行分类。
对实施间接指令的各种方式即“指令”这一行为所涉及的几个因素出发考虑：说话人（发出指令者）、听话人（指令对象）和说话人想要听话人去做的动作。
例如，在餐桌上请别人递一下盐瓶，可以有以下各种间接的形式。
以说话人为出发点：a)陈述愿望 I would like you to pass me the salt.b)询问愿望 * Would I like you to pass me the salt?听话人为出发点：1a)陈述能力 You can pass me the salt.1b)询问能力 Can you pass me the salt?2a)陈述意愿 You want to pass me the salt.2b)询问意愿 Would you mind passing me the salt?3a)陈述将来的动作 You will pass me the salt.3b)询问将来的动作 Will you pass me the salt?以动作为出发点：a)陈述理由 The soup is not salty enough.b)询问理由 Wouldn't it be a good idea if we add some salt to the soup?他把言外行为分为五类，每一类行为都有一个共同的、普遍的目的。
这五大类是：阐述类：陈述或描述说话者认为是真实的情况；指令类：试图使听话者做某些事情；承诺类：说话者自己承诺未来要有一些行为。
表达类：表达对某一现状的感情和态度。
宣告类：通过说话引起骤变。
每一类中的行为都有同样的目的，但具有同样目的的言外行为可能具有不同程度的言外之力。
编辑本段言语行为理论的评价有部分学者，如斯珀伯和威尔逊（Sperber & Wilson,1986a) ，对言语行为理论提出了不同看法。
他们认为，言语行为理论根本没有存在的必要性，因而对列文森（Levinson,1983:226)的观点，既“言语行为与前提、含意一样，是任何普通语用学理论必须解释的主要现象”，提出了质疑并指出“言语行为理论家们关注的大量现象对语用学来说没有特殊兴趣”（Sperber & Wilson,1986a:243)。
20世纪90年代初期，托马斯（Thomas,1995)详细地分析了奥斯汀的言语行为理论以后指出，该理论之所以对语言学界产生巨大的影响，主要有以下四个方面的原因：A.在真值条件语义学受到挫折时推出《如何以言行事》一书显得很及时；B.他的观点清楚易懂；C.虽然他对自己的观点前后作过改变，但他的作品始终保持一条连贯的思想主线；D.他提出的很多问题至今仍是语用学研究的重要课题。
编辑本段言语行为理论的不足与问题施为假设问题言语行为不仅可以叙事、指事，还可以行事，传递语用用意或施为用意。
不管话语中的施为用意是显性的或隐形的，凡是认为施为用意总可以通过施为句表现的观点，就是施为假设（Sadock,1988)。
可见，持这一假设的学者认为，施为句包含或者隐含施为动词、主语为第一人称单数。
然而，只有施为动词假设存在以下三方面的不足：A.存在可以将施为动词与其它动词区分开来的形式或语法手段；B.施为动词的出现不一定能保证某一行为的实施，如仪式性施为句和协作性施为句，就受必要的合适条件的限制，否则便不能以言行事，元语言施为句也会产生类似问题;C.没有施为动词同样可以以言行事。
这一假设受到了间接言语行为的直接挑战。
这为后来塞尔提出间接言语行为理论奠定了基础。
社会文化特征问题言语行为理论可以解释句法学、真实条件语义学等无能为力的很多语言现象。
可见，言语行为理论的贡献是不可否认的，但任何理论又都存在不完备性。
在一定程度上，奥斯汀与塞尔都坚持言语行为的规约性或惯用性，但塞尔同时强调了意向性（intentionality)。
他认为，礼貌是使用间接言语行为（比如“请求”）最重要的动因，不过他忽略了影响言语行为礼貌程度的社会文化特征。
Koyama（ 1997)对此提出了批评意见，并认为言语行为的基础“说话人”和“听话人”这样的概念也具有文化特色，以致在人类交往和语言使用中不同文化背景的说话人和听话人会表现不同的特征。
罗萨多（Rosaldo,1982)认为，言语行为理论忽略了重要的情景和文化因素对语言使用的制约作用。
知道怎样说话就等于如何以言行事，以及何时以言行事。
以此为据，他反对塞尔将言语行为划分为：断言类、指令类、承诺类、表达类、宣告类等），因为这样的分类不是语言使用中跨文化分类（cross-cultural typology)的基础。
同时，在分析了除英语以外的其他语料以后，威尔日比卡（Wierzbicka,1985a)指出，许诺、命令、警告等言语行为在英语里是通过常规方式实施的，而在有的语言中则具有文化依附性，因而应该强调言语行为的文化特殊性。
制约条件问题在对言语行为进行评论时，梅伊（Mey,1993)也认为，应该将言语行为与人们所处的社会语境（societal contexts)结合起来。
进而，他提出从社会和语言两个角度考察的“语用行为”（pragmatic act)这一概念。
从社会的角度看，言语行为应该涉及一定的社会制约条件，比如说话人接受的特殊教育、年龄、性别、职业等，这些制约因素就构成了交际中人们背景信息的一部分。
从语言学角度而言，梅伊关注的是可以用来实施某一语用行为的语言形式，也既使用什么样的语言以及语言形式去设施语用行为。
在维索尔伦（Verschuern,1999)看来，这就是语言顺应性（adaptability)问题。
言语行为是语用行为的一部分，其理解需要依靠语境条件和交际目的。
因而，语用行为是受语境条件制约的、是顺应性行为。
语境包含了社会习俗、文化、社会结构，或者合适条件。
在这一观点支持下，梅伊认为以前的言语行为理论就不能对言语行为的社会基础进行解释。
编辑本段言语行为理论英文介绍Speech act theory is an important theory in the pragmatic study of language. It was originated with the British philosopher John Austin in the late 50’s of the 20th century.According to speech act theory, we are performing actions when we are speaking.According to speech act theory, a speaker might be performing three acts simultaneously when speaking: locutionary act, illocutionary act, and perlocutionary act.。
a) A locutionary act is the act of uttering words, phrases, clauses. It is the act of conveying literal meaning by means of syntax lexicon and phonology.b) An illocutionary act is the act of expressing the speaker’s intention; it is the act performed in saying something.c) A perlocutionary act is the act performed by or resulting from saying something; it is the consequence of, or the change brought about the utterance; it is the act performed by saying something.American philosopher-linguist John Searle classified illocutionary acts into five general types. Each type has a common, general purpose.a) representatives: stating or describing, saying what the speaker believes to be trueeg: I have never seen the man before. / the earth is globe.b) directives: trying to get the hearer to do somethingeg: Open the window! / Would you like to go to the picnic with us?c) commissives: committing the speaker himself to some future course of actioneg: I promise to come. / I will bring you the book tomorrow without fail.d) expressives: expressing feelings or attitude towards an existing stateeg: I’m sorry for the mess I have made. / It’s really kind of you to have thought of me.e) declarations: bringing about immediate changes by saying somethingeg: I now declare the meeting open. / I fire you.Important remark:All the acts that belong to the same category share the same purpose or the same illocutionary point, but they differ in their strength or forth.。