第九届“华政杯”全国法律翻译大赛初赛试题
翻译大赛初赛题
初赛题：A. 汉译英部分：从孔子的“士志于道”，到孟子的“养浩然之气”，再到汉末陈蕃的“澄清天下之志”，宋代范仲淹的“先天下之忧而忧，后天下之乐而乐”，中国历代知识分子都把道义、民生作为自己的双重价值旨归。
思想层面的理性追求与现实层面的民生担当，交织在一起，构成了中国传统士大夫双重的文化人格：一方面追求先进的科学文化思想，崇尚理性，有坚贞气节，凛然傲骨；另一方面又心系民生，渴望建功立业，九死而未悔。
正是这种理性与现实相交织的双重情怀，延续了中国几千年的文明史。
这一传统到了近代五四时期虽有所改变，知识分子对道义的追求演变为对科学、民主的向往，民生的担当转变为救亡、启蒙的责任，但是理性与现实的双重关怀是不变的。
到了当下，现代性的转变，带来了更高层面对科学理性的追寻，现实民生问题凸显为更深层面的人性道德反思。
（343字）B. 英译汉部分：The Chinese did not consciously imitate Indian culture as Rome did, and the introduction of Buddhism into China, extending over many centuries, was a process of almost surreptitious, underground subversion. Not until the eighth century was Buddhism officially recognized and accepted as a state religion, although its promulgation by the Empress Wu Zetian, a woman, forever contaminated its claim to validity in the eyes of subsequent male historians— who were, for the most part, professedly Confucian. Surreptitious or blatant, the importation of foreign linguistic goods into China certainly exceeded the exportation by t he Chinese of its own culture.One wishes there were data available on the import and export in translation toward the end of the Tang Dynasty. Might there have been a reverse thrust from the one we saw in Xuanzang? Instead of absorbing influences from the outside and digesting them, might the latter part of the Tang been more involved in exporting the glories of Du Fu, Li Bai, and Bai Juyi? We know from inferential evidence that the countries that became Korea and Japan were familiar with these poets, but was that a function of Chinese translating the corpus into the native vernaculars, or was it more probably the result of satellite cultures (as they saw themselves) developing scholars familiar with Chinese?Similarly, Elizabethan England, perhaps the most dazzlingly productive period in English literature, was undoubtedly a “borrower” culture, one that relied heavily on what they regarded as superior continental traditions. Difficult as it may be for moderns to recall, the Elizabethans thought the language they inherited was a crude instrument, compared to the more sophisticated continental tongues, particularly French, Spanish, and Italian. “The nation had grown conscious of its cultural inferiority to the Continent,” F. O. Matthiessen writes, “and suddenly burned with the des ire to excel its rivals in letters, as well as in ships and gold.” Translating into one’s native tongue was, Matthiessen insists, “an act of patriotism”.（323 words)。
第八届华政杯全国法律翻译大赛初赛试题
第八届“华政杯”全国法律翻译大赛初赛试题试题1 （519 words）Appreciating the role of property in promoting public welfare necessitates rejecting the Blackstonian conception of property because market failures and the physical characteristics of the resources at stake often require curtailing an owner’s dominion so that ownership can properly serve the public interest. A similar lesson emerges from the robust economic analysis of takings law. This literature indeed shows that compensation is at times required to prevent risk-averse landowners from under-investing in their property and to create a budgetary effect that, assuming public officials are accountable for budget management, forces governments to internalize the costs of their planning decisions. These considerations are particularly pertinent to private homeowners, who are not professional investors and who have purchased a small parcel of land with their life savings, as well as to members of a marginal group with little political clout. But providing private landowners and public officials with proper incentives also implies that, in other cases, full compensation should not be granted. Where a piece of land is owned as part of a diversified investment portfolio, full compensation may lead to inefficient overinvestment, while the possibility of an uncompensated investment is likely to lead to an efficient adjustment of the landowner’s investment decisions commensurate with the risk that the land will be put to public use. Similarly, landowners who are members of powerful and organized groups can use non-legal means to force public officials to weigh their grievances properly. An indiscriminate regime of full compensation may therefore distort the officials’ incentives by s ystematically encouraging them to impose the burden on the non-organized public or on marginal groups, even when the best planning choice would be to place the burden on powerful or organized groups. The absolutist conception of property and the strict proportionality takings regime are also anathema to the most attractive conceptions of membership and citizenship, which insist on integrating social responsibility into our understanding of ownership. The absolutist conception of property expresses and reinf orces an alienated culture, which “underplays the significance of belonging to a community, [and] perceives our membership therein in purely instrumental terms.” In other words, this approach “defines our obligations qua citizens and qua community members as ‘exchanges formonetizable gains,’ . . . [and] thus commodifies both our citizenship and our membership in local communities.” To be sure, the impersonality of market relations is not inherently wrong; quite the contrary, by facilitating dealings “on an explicit, quid pro quo basis,” the market defines an important “sphere of freedom from personal ties and obligations.” A responsible conception of property can and should appreciate these virtues of the market norms. But it should still avoid allowing these norms to override those of the other spheres of society. Property relations participate in the constitution of some of our most cooperative human interactions. Numerous property rules prescribe the rights and obligations of spouses, partners, co-owners, neighbors, and members of local communities. Imposing the competitive norms of the market on these divergent spheres and rejecting the social responsibility of ownership that is part of these ongoing mutual relationships of give and take, would effectively erase these spheres of human interaction.试题2（509 words）In the common-law tradition, lawyers and jurists consult the reports of judicial decisions to determine applicable rules of law. Common lawyers conduct this evaluative process both as they plan transactions in the shadow of the law and as they frame cases for litigation. With careful attention to particular holdings, and to trends, dominant voices, and cogent rationales, adept practitioners of the common law can say where the law has settled for the moment and how it might evolve in the future. Judges often emerge as actors in the formulation of legal rules, sifting through the available materials to play the cautiously dynamic role that has come to be seen as the hallmark of common-law judging in the Anglo-American tradition. Occasionally, judges issue transformative opinions, ones that allow us to see both the past and the future more clearly and give voice to a bold new conception of the law that will one day be seen as self-evident. Few such opinions have emerged in the course of the war-on-terror litigation. Instead, as dissenting judges have warned, we have witnessed the “silent erosion” of human rights through the accumulation of balancing opinions by the federal courts. True, the Supreme Court has creatively deployed the writ of habeas corpus to ensure a measure of judicial review for enemy combatants detained,indefinitely, at Guantanamo Bay. In Boumediene v. Bush, moreover, the Court narrowly but decisively reaffirmed the role of the federal district courts in the face of legislation that proposed to confine judicial oversight within the narrow appellate-review boundaries set forth in the Detainee Treatment Act. The Constitution was said to guarantee detainees access to the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and Congress was said to have violated that guarantee by restricting review without providing an adequate substitute. The alternative vision, boldly stated in Justice Scalia’s dissent, called for complete judicial deference in the treatment of alien detainees to the war-making power of the president. Although Justice Scalia did not accuse the majority of treason, he did describe the majority opinion as a bait-and-switch that would complicate the task of prosecuting the war and “almost certainly” lead to the death of more Americans. Wholesale judicial deference leaves the law inarticulate, as judges fail to perform the common-law function of passing on the legality of challenged conduct. As we have seen, the federal courts have failed to define what it means to torture a detainee, to opine on the legality of extrajudicial kidnaping (extraordinary rendition), and to specify what sorts of detainee abuse can be permitted before it rises to the level of cruel, inhuman, or degrading conduct. The federal courts have similarly failed to conclude that war-on-terror detainees enjoy the same protections that apply to other prisoners and pretrial detainees under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. As a result of these judicial silences, one can say very little about the concrete legal status of the rendition, detention, and interrogation tactics deployed in the Bush administration’s war on terror, other than that they appear to be lawful more or less by default.试题3（485 words）The notion of restrictive interpretation is often used interchangeably with the principle of in dubio mitius, but the former can also be used to refer to other methods of interpretation, such as the interpretation of exceptions. According to the principle of in dubio mitius, ‘i f the meaning of a term is ambiguous, that meaning is to be preferred which is less onerous to the party assuming an obligation, or which interferes less with the territorial and personal supremacy of a party, orinvolves less general restrictions upon the parties’. Treaty language is not to be interpreted so as to limit state sovereignty or a state’s ‘personal and territorial supremacy’, ‘even though these stipulations do not conflict with such interpretation’. If the language on the existence or scope of an obligation is unclear, the in dubio mitius principle supports the proposition that no or only a minimal obligation should be applied. The application of the principle essentially results in an interpretation in deference to the sovereignty of one specific signatory, the party assuming an obligation (in practice, this is often the respondent state). Such an interpretation is supposed to protect the sovereignty of the parties to a treaty. But most treaty law restricts sovereignty, albeit through the exercise of state sovereignty. The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) initially formulated the in dubio mitius principle as applicable ‘when, in spite of all pertinent considerations, the intention of the Parties still remains doubtful’ and unless i ts application would lead to an interpretation ‘contrary to the plain terms … and would destroy what has been clearly granted’. The principle is not codified in the VCLT (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) and is unlikely to qualify as a general principle of law or part of customary international law. The validity of applying the principle has also been denied where the language in different authentic versions of a treaty conflicts and the conflict cannot be resolved through the general principles of interpretation. The use of the principle appears to have received more support from scholars than from international courts and tribunals. Although the PCIJ cited the notion of restrictive interpretation (meaning, in this context, the principle of in dubio mitius) in several cases, it relied upon it only as a last resort and always emphasized its limits. The starting point of interpretation remains the terms of the treaty, not the interests of those who drafted the treaty in exercise of their sovereignty with the effect of transferring parts of that sovereignty. In the Wimbledon case, the PCIJ found that a restrictive interpretation stops ‘at the point where [it] would be contrary to the plain terms of the article and would destroy what has been clearly gra nted’. In the Nuclear Tests case, the ICJ (International Court of Justice) applied a restrictive interpretation to unilateral statements limiting a state’s freedom of action, followed by an extensive approach to whether a commitment existed.。
第二届“华政杯”全国法律英语翻译大赛初赛试题+答案
第二届“华政杯”全国法律英语翻译大赛初赛试题试题一：（合同法与侵权法）Contracts also generate general duties of care in dealing with the rights, objects of legal protection and legally protected interests of the contractual partners. Such “collateral” obligations do not normally have any relation to the content of the respective “primary” performance obligation and can therefore in principle become significant in every type of contract. The more ambitious a legal system is in the development of such contractual collateral obligations for the protection of interests already existing independent from the direct performance expectations formed by the contract, the more practical weight is given to the respective concurrence of actions rules, which give details of the relationship of contractual liability with parallel tortuous liability. 合同在规定缔约伙伴的权利、法律保护的客体及受法律保护的利益时，也产生一般的注意义务。
法律知识竞赛初赛试题及答案
法律知识竞赛初赛试题及答案一、单选题（每题2分，共20分）1. 根据《中华人民共和国宪法》，以下哪项不是公民的基本权利？A. 言论自由B. 受教育的权利C. 选举权和被选举权D. 拥有私人财产2. 我国刑法规定，以下哪种行为不构成犯罪？A. 故意伤害他人身体B. 盗窃他人财物C. 捡到钱包后归还失主D. 非法侵入他人住宅3. 根据《中华人民共和国民法典》，以下哪种情形属于无效民事行为？A. 基于重大误解的民事行为B. 基于真实意思表示的民事行为C. 双方自愿达成的合同D. 符合法律规定的赠与行为4. 根据《中华人民共和国劳动法》，劳动者在什么情况下可以解除劳动合同？A. 劳动者自愿辞职B. 用人单位不按时支付劳动报酬C. 劳动者违反公司规定D. 用人单位破产5. 以下哪项不是《中华人民共和国婚姻法》规定的婚姻自由原则的内容？A. 男女平等B. 自愿结婚C. 禁止包办、买卖婚姻D. 禁止重婚6. 根据《中华人民共和国合同法》，以下哪种合同是无效的？A. 双方当事人自愿签订的合同B. 以欺诈、胁迫手段订立的合同C. 符合法律规定的买卖合同D. 双方当事人协商一致的合同7. 根据《中华人民共和国刑法》，以下哪种行为构成故意杀人罪？A. 因正当防卫致人死亡B. 因紧急避险致人死亡C. 故意非法剥夺他人生命D. 因意外事故致人死亡8. 根据《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》，以下哪种情况可以提起行政诉讼？A. 行政机关对公民的行政处罚决定B. 行政机关内部的人事调动C. 行政机关对其他机关的行政指导D. 公民之间的民事纠纷9. 根据《中华人民共和国著作权法》，以下哪种行为属于侵犯著作权的行为？A. 合理使用他人作品B. 未经著作权人许可，复制、发行他人作品C. 为个人学习、研究使用他人作品D. 为新闻报道使用他人作品10. 根据《中华人民共和国环境保护法》，以下哪种行为属于环境违法行为？A. 按照规定排放污染物B. 未经批准擅自排放污染物C. 按照规定进行环境影响评价D. 按照规定进行环境监测二、多选题（每题3分，共15分）11. 以下哪些属于《中华人民共和国消费者权益保护法》规定的消费者权利？A. 安全权B. 知情权C. 选择权D. 公平交易权12. 根据《中华人民共和国商标法》，以下哪些行为属于侵犯注册商标专用权的行为？A. 未经商标注册人许可，使用与其注册商标相同的商标B. 销售侵犯注册商标专用权的商品C. 伪造、擅自制造他人注册商标标识D. 为侵犯注册商标专用权的行为提供便利条件13. 以下哪些行为属于《中华人民共和国反不正当竞争法》规定的不正当竞争行为？A. 商业诋毁B. 侵犯商业秘密C. 虚假宣传D. 强制交易14. 根据《中华人民共和国物权法》，以下哪些属于物权的种类？A. 所有权B. 抵押权C. 质权D. 留置权15. 以下哪些行为属于《中华人民共和国专利法》规定的专利侵权行为？A. 未经专利权人许可，实施其专利B. 销售侵犯专利权的产品C. 为侵犯专利权的行为提供条件D. 制造侵犯专利权的产品三、判断题（每题1分，共10分）16. 根据《中华人民共和国宪法》，公民有信仰宗教的自由，也有不信仰宗教的自由。
2022年catti杯全国翻译大赛初赛试题
2022年catti杯全国翻译大赛初赛试题一、单项选择（每题2分，共40分）第1~20题为单项选择题。
请从每题所给的A、B、C、D四个选项中，选出一个正确答案。
1. Which of the following statements about who is responsible for any error that might occur in the process of translation or interpreting is wrong?A. Translators must take all errors seriously no matter whether they occur in the source language or in the target language and correct them promptly.B. Once an interpreter finds that the speaker has made an obvious factual or logical mistake, he/she should correct it in his/her interpretation in a timely manner.C. When someone points out a mistake in the interpretation, the interpreter should immediately admit and correct it.D. If your translation needs to be revised by others, the quality of the translation remains your responsibility, including the errors that have occurred in the revised part.2. Avery had established himself as a/an __________ microbiologist, but had never imagined venturing into the new world of genes and chromosomes.A. efficientB. competentC. patientD. innocent3. It is imperative that the government _______ more investment into the autonomous driving industry.A. attractsB. shall attractC. attractD. attracted4. We have maintained consultation with the ASEAN（东盟）on the formulation of codes of conduct in the South China Sea area.A. 制定中国南海地区行为准则B. 拟定中国南海地区行动准则C. 签订中国南海地区行动准则D. 形成中国南海地区行为准则5. 中国航空航天技术比较先进，是成功把人类送上太空的国家之一。
第九届“华杯赛”团体决赛口试
第九届“华杯赛”团体决赛口试开场共答题题1.大圣赠桃考多少年月宫蟠桃二百年，赠与杯赛表庆贺。
每堆十个少三枚，十二成堆多七个。
华赛选手快作答，大圣赠桃多少个?必答题(2—7题)题2. 在美丽的平面珊瑚礁图案中，三角形都是直角三角形，四边形都是正方形。
如果图9—13中所有的正方形的面积之和是980平方厘米。
问：最大的正方形的边长是多少厘米？题3. 一队少年儿童不超过50人，围成一圈作游戏。
每个儿童的左右相邻都恰是一个男 孩子和一个女孩子。
请你判定，这队少年儿童最多有多少人？为什么？题4 如图9—14所示，直角三角形ABC 由红绿两个直角三角形和一个黄色长方形拼成。
AE=25cm ，BF=20cm 。
问黄色的长方形的面积是多少平方厘米？题5 计算机存储文件A 、文件B 和文件C 的大小之比为2:3:4。
小明用压缩软件将这三个 文件压缩在一起。
压缩后的文件A 、文件B 、和文件C 的大小分别是原大小的25%，10% 和20%。
问：压缩后的三个文件的总大小是原大小的几分之几？25cm 20cm 图9—14 图9—13题6如图9—15所示，大、小两个正方形ABCD与正方形BEFG并排放在一起。
两个正方形面积之差等于37平方厘米。
问：四边形CDGF的面积是多少？图9—15题7在4×4的方格表中填有1~16这16个自然数，将其中任意3个格子中的数同时加1 或减1称为一次操作。
问能否经过有限次这种操作使得16个方格中的数都是零？若能，请举例解释你的操作；若不能，请说明理由。
（群众答题）题8.华杯赛口试，每个代表队要从小学、初一、初二年级各两名选手中派3人。
规定小学生至少出1人，初二学生至多派一名。
问一个口试队按年级的组成方式有多少种？必答题（9—14题）题9.智能机器猫从平面上的O点出发，按下列规律行走：由O向东走12cm到A1，由A1向北走24cm到A2，由A2向西走36cm到A3，由A3向南走48cm到A4，由A4向东走60cm到A5，······问：智能机器猫到达的A6点与O点的距离是多少厘米？题10.三个连续正整数的乘积恰能被1~100这连续100个自然数之和所整除。
法律竞赛试题及答案
法律竞赛试题及答案一、单项选择题（每题2分，共20分）1. 根据《中华人民共和国宪法》规定，下列哪一项不属于公民的基本权利？A. 言论自由B. 宗教信仰自由C. 选举权和被选举权D. 服兵役的义务答案：D2. 《中华人民共和国民法典》规定，下列哪一项不属于民事权利？A. 财产权B. 人身权C. 知识产权D. 行政权答案：D3. 根据《中华人民共和国刑法》的规定，下列哪一项不属于犯罪的构成要件？A. 犯罪主体B. 犯罪客体C. 犯罪主观方面D. 犯罪客观方面答案：B4. 下列哪一项不是《中华人民共和国合同法》规定的合同无效的情形？A. 合同当事人意思表示不真实B. 合同内容违反法律、行政法规的强制性规定C. 合同当事人之间存在亲属关系D. 合同当事人之间存在欺诈行为答案：C5. 根据《中华人民共和国婚姻法》的规定，下列哪一项不是婚姻无效的情形？A. 重婚B. 有禁止结婚的亲属关系C. 未达到法定婚龄D. 双方自愿离婚答案：D6. 根据《中华人民共和国继承法》的规定，下列哪一项不是法定继承人？A. 配偶B. 子女C. 父母D. 兄弟姐妹答案：D7. 根据《中华人民共和国劳动法》的规定，下列哪一项不是劳动者享有的权利？A. 劳动报酬权B. 休息休假权C. 劳动安全卫生保护权D. 企业经营决策权答案：D8. 根据《中华人民共和国环境保护法》的规定，下列哪一项不属于环境保护的基本原则？A. 预防为主B. 污染者负担C. 环境优先D. 经济优先答案：D9. 根据《中华人民共和国知识产权法》的规定，下列哪一项不属于知识产权的客体？A. 著作权B. 商标权C. 专利权D. 土地使用权答案：D10. 根据《中华人民共和国反垄断法》的规定，下列哪一项不属于垄断行为？A. 经营者达成垄断协议B. 经营者滥用市场支配地位C. 经营者实施不正当竞争D. 经营者集中答案：C二、多项选择题（每题3分，共15分）1. 根据《中华人民共和国宪法》的规定，下列哪些权利属于公民的基本权利？A. 言论自由B. 宗教信仰自由C. 选举权和被选举权D. 服兵役的义务答案：ABC2. 根据《中华人民共和国民法典》的规定，下列哪些权利属于民事权利？A. 财产权B. 人身权C. 知识产权D. 行政权答案：ABC3. 根据《中华人民共和国刑法》的规定，下列哪些要件属于犯罪的构成要件？A. 犯罪主体B. 犯罪客体C. 犯罪主观方面D. 犯罪客观方面答案：ACD4. 根据《中华人民共和国合同法》的规定，下列哪些情形属于合同无效？A. 合同当事人意思表示不真实B. 合同内容违反法律、行政法规的强制性规定C. 合同当事人之间存在亲属关系D. 合同当事人之间存在欺诈行为答案：ABD5. 根据《中华人民共和国婚姻法》的规定，下列哪些情形属于婚姻无效？A. 重婚B. 有禁止结婚的亲属关系C. 未达到法定婚龄D. 双方自愿离婚答案：ABC三、判断题（每题1分，共10分）1. 根据《中华人民共和国宪法》的规定，公民有义务服兵役。
翻译大赛初赛题目及参考译文
翻译大赛初赛试题Love Your Life (热爱你的生活)1.However mean you life is, meet it and live it; do not shun it and call it hard names. It is not so bad as you think. It looks poorest when you are richest. The fault-finder will find faults in paradise. Love you life, poor as it is. You may perhaps have some pleasant, thrilling, glorious hours, even in a poor-house. The setting sun is reflected from the windows of a shabby house as brightly as from a rich man’s mansion; the snow melts before its door as early in the spring. I do not see but a quiet mind may live as contentedly there, and have as cheering thoughts as in palace. The town’s poor seems to me often to live the most independent lives of any. Maybe they are simply great enough to receive without misgiving. Most think that they are above being supported by the town; but it often happens that they are not above supporting themselves by dishonest means, which should be more disreputable. Cultivate poverty like a garden herb, like sage. Do not trouble yourself much to get new things, whether clothes or friends. Turn the old, return to them. Things do not change; we change. Sell your clothes and keep your thoughts.I think you will be distressed to know that my wife and I have been not a little disturbed by your IV set which is kept on to a very late hour each evening. If it is possible for it to be toned sown a little, especially after ten o’clock at night, you would be showing us a great kindness.In view of the fact that I have to leave the house before seven o’clock in the morning, we are obliged to retire early to bed.I am sorry to raise the matter and I trust you will not consider me fussy or unneighborly in making the request.2. October 1. In the morning I saw, to my great surprise, the ship had floated with high tide and was driven on shore again much nearer the island, which, as it was some comfort on one hand (for seeing her sit upright and not broken to pieces, I hoped, if the wind abated, I might get on board, and get some food and necessaries out of her for my relief), so on the other hand, it renewed my grief at the loss of my comrades, who, I imagined, if we had all stayed on board, might have saved the ship, or at least that they would not have been all drowned as they were; and that had the men saved, we might perhaps have built us a boat out of the ruins of the ship, to have carried us to some other part of the world.3. There is no denying the mightiness of the sea. I love her not only because she has the beautiful hues and many intriguing objects hidden deep underneath her, but alsobecause she is broad and liberal enough to turn the foul into the pure. The numerous small rivers that she accommodates may be of a black or yellow color, but once they flow into her bosom, they instantly take on the green color signifying peace and tranquility. A person with a terrifying hot temper will become, I believe, as meek as a lamb after a long stay by the seashore. Likewise, I believe a narrow-minded person will become tolerant and open-hearted if he often keeps company with the sea.1.无论科学发展得多快，海洋的形成仍是一个有待科学家解决的迷。
首届“华政杯”全国法律英语翻译大赛初赛原文
请将以下四篇翻译成中文第一篇：STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR DIRECTORS(a) Each member of the board of directors, when discharging the duties of a director, shall act: (1) in good faith, and (2) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.(b) The members of the board of directors or a committee of the board, when becoming informed in connection with their decision-making function or devoting attention to their oversight function, shall discharge their duties with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances.(c) In discharging board or committee duties a director, who does not have knowledge that makes reliance unwarranted, is entitled to rely on the performance by any of the persons specified in subsection (e)(1) or subsection (e)(3) to whom the board may have delegated, formally or informally by course of conduct, the authority or duty to perform one or more of the board’s functions that are delegable under applicable law.(d) In discharging board or committee duties a director, who does not have knowledge that makes reliance unwarranted, is entitled to rely on information, opinions, reports or statements, including financial statements and other financial data, prepared or presented by any of the persons specified in subsection (e).第二篇：Implied terms about title(1) In a contract of sale, other than one to which subsection (3) below applies, there is an implied term on the part of the seller that in the case of a sale he has a right to sell the goods, and in the case of an agreement to sell he will have such a right at the time when the property is to pass.(2) In a contract of sale, other than one to which subsection (3) below applies, there is also an implied term that—(a) the goods are free, and will remain free until the time when the property is to pass, from any charge or encumbrance not disclosed or known to the buyer before the contract is made, and(b) the buyer will enjoy quiet possession of the goods except so far as it may be disturbed by the owner or other person entitled to the benefit of any charge or encumbrance so disclosed or known.(3) This subsection applies to a contract of sale in the case of which there appears from the contract or is to be inferred from its circumstances an intention that the seller should transfer only such title as he or a third person may have.(4) In a contract to which subsection (3) above applies there is an implied term that all charges or encumbrances known to the seller and not known to the buyer have been disclosed to the buyer before the contract is made.(5) In a contract to which subsection (3) above applies there is also an implied term that none of the following will disturb the buyer’s q uiet possession of the goods, namely—(a) the seller;(b) in a case where the parties to the contract intend that the seller should transfer only such title as a third person may have, that person;(c) anyone claiming through or under the seller or that third person otherwise than under a charge or encumbrance disclosed or known to the buyer before the contract is made.第三篇：The United States, after threatening unilateral action under the much criticized Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, brought the matter to the WTO. The facts presented by the United States Trade Representative were sharply contested. But even if these facts had been conceded, the United States would have faced a serious problem: neither trade law nor antitrust law provided a forum or context for examination of the whole problem. The alleged private restraints were subject to the jurisdiction of the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), but the JFTC, not unpredictably, found no antitrust violation. Japan's trade-restraining statutes, alone, were the basis for the US case at the WTO, but they were only a piece of the picture.A dispute resolution panel concluded that Japan's laws did not run afoul of the GATT rules. Whether the laws seriously harmed trade and competition was not relevant. The GATT's prohibitions against trade-restraining laws are narrow. They do not prohibit measures simply because they unreasonably restrain trade. The US challenge failed because (i) the trade-restraining laws of the Japanese government were not new restraints of which the United States had no notice at the time Japan agreed to reduce its trade protection (i.e. the existence and enforcement of the laws did not defeat United States' reasonable expectations) and (ii) the measures did not discriminate against foreigners; they were neutral on their face.第四篇：In order to conceptualize this world, I introduce literature on legal pluralism, and I suggest that, following its insights, we need to realize that normative conflict among multiple, overlapping legal systems is unavoidable and might even sometimes be desirable, both as a source of alternative ideas and as a site for discourse among multiple community affiliations. Thus, instead of trying to stifle conflict either through an imposition of sovereigntist, territorially-based prerogative or through universalist harmonization schemes, communities might sometimes seek (and increasingly are creating) a wide variety of procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices for managing, without eliminating, hybridity. Such mechanisms, institutions, and practices can help mediate conflicts by recognizing that multiple communities may legitimately wish to assert their norms over a given act or actor, by seeking ways of reconciling competing norms, and by deferring to other approaches if possible. Moreover, when deference is impossible (because some instances of legal pluralism are repressive, violent, and/or profoundly illiberal), procedures for managing hybridity can at least require an explanation of why a decision maker cannot defer. In sum, pluralism offers not only a more comprehensive descriptive account of the world we live in, but also suggests a potentially useful alternative approach to the design of procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices.。
全国翻译员技能大赛模拟试题及答案
全国翻译员技能大赛模拟试题及答案试题一：英译汉原文：The weather today is cloudy with occasional showers and a high of 20 degrees Celsius.参赛者答案：今天的天气多云，偶有阵雨，最高气温为摄氏20度。
答案解析：参赛者正确翻译了原文的意思，并使用了恰当的词汇和语法。
试题二：汉译英原文：翻译是一门艺术和技巧相结合的工作。
答案解析：参赛者准确地翻译了原文，使用了合适的词汇和语法。
试题三：中译法原文：中国传统文化有着悠久的历史和博大精深的内涵。
参赛者答案：La culture traditionnelle chinoise a une histoire longue et une connotation riche et profonde.答案解析：参赛者将原文翻译成法语，表达了准确的意思，且语法正确。
试题四：法译中参赛者答案：法国的法律制度包括两种主要类型的法律：民法和刑法。
答案解析：参赛者正确翻译了原文，使用了适当的词汇和语法。
试题五：语言分析德语中，名词的性别有男性、女性和中性三种。
参赛者答案：在德语中，名词的性别分为男性、女性和中性三种。
答案解析：参赛者准确地分析了德语中名词性别的分类。
试题六：术语翻译原文：Intellectual property rights参赛者答案：知识产权答案解析：参赛者正确翻译了原文，使用了常见的术语翻译。
以上为本次全国翻译员技能大赛模拟试题及答案。
解析试题一和四为中英互译题，参赛者需要准确翻译原文，使用恰当的词汇和语法。
试题二和三为英汉和汉法互译题，参赛者需要理解原文的意思，并能准确翻译成目标语言，语法正确。
试题五为语言分析题，参赛者需要分析德语中名词性别的分类。
试题六为术语翻译题，参赛者需要准确翻译给定的术语。
参赛者在答题过程中需要注意词汇选择、语法准确以及文化背景的考察。
2024年第九届“学宪法、讲宪法”竞赛题库试卷试题及答案.docx
2024年第九届“学宪法、讲宪法”活动竞赛题一、单项题(共150题)1、我国现行宪法是中华人民共和国成立以来的第四部宪法，由第五届全国人民代表大会第五次会议于(D)年通过的。
A、1954B、1975C、1978 D, 19822、我国现行宪法除序言外，有一百四十三条，其五个修正案共有⑻条。
As 三十一B、三十二C、五HD、五十二3、根据我国宪法规定，国家保护和改善生活环境和(D),防治污染和其他公害。
A、生态平衡B、生存环境C、自然环境D、生态环境4、我国宪法规定，(C)是我国的根本制度。
A、人民民主专政B、生产资料公有制C、社会主义制度D、人民代表大会制度5,我国宪法规定，国家推行计划生育，使人口的增长同经济和(D)相适应。
A、社会发展B、社会资源的增长C、生态环境D、社会发展计划6、社会主义初级阶段，国家坚持(D)的分配制度。
A、按劳分配B、按劳分配与按需分配相结合C、按需分配D、按劳分配为主体，多种分配方式并存7、(B)年通过的宪法修正案增加了中国共产党领导的多党合作和政治协商制度将长期存在和发展的规定。
A、1999B、1993C、1988 I)、19828、中国坚持独立自主的对外政策，坚持互相尊重(D)、互不侵犯、互不干涉内政、平等互利、和平共处五项原则。
A、主权B、领土C、主权和领空D,主权和领土完整9、一切国家机关和武装力量、各政党和各社会团体、各企业事业组织，都必须以(A)为根本的活动准则。
A、宪法和法律B、党章C、章程D、法规10、中华人民共和国的一切权力属于(B)。
A、公民B、人民C、人民代表大会D工农联盟11、在法律规定范围内的个体经济、私营经济等非公有制经济，是社会主义市场经济的(A)。
As重要组成部分B、必要补充C、重要基础D、最具活力、最有前途的部分12、在我国，国民经济中的主导力量是(A)。
会或者(C)以上的全国人民代表大会代表提议，并由全国人民代表大会以全体代表的(C)以上多数通过。
2024年第九届“学宪法、讲宪法”竞赛测试题库及答案
2024年第九届“学宪法、讲宪法”竞赛测试题库及答案一、选择题1. 以下哪项是我国宪法规定的国家性质？A. 社会主义国家B. 共产主义国家C. 民主主义国家D. 共和制国家答案：A2. 宪法是国家的根本法，具有最高的法律地位、法律权威和法律效力。
以下哪项是宪法的核心价值？A. 维护国家统一B. 保障公民权利C. 维护社会稳定D. 促进经济发展答案：B3. 我国宪法规定，中华人民共和国的一切权力属于谁？A. 人民B. 国务院总理C. 人民代表大会D. 政府部门答案：A4. 宪法规定，我国实行哪种制度？A. 议会制B. 总统制C. 议员制D. 人民代表大会制答案：D5. 以下哪项是我国宪法规定的基本经济制度？A. 社会主义市场经济B. 计划经济C. 混合经济D. 私有制经济答案：A二、判断题1. 宪法规定，国家尊重和保障人权。
（对/错）答案：对2. 宪法规定，中华人民共和国公民有宗教信仰自由。
（对/错）答案：对3. 宪法规定，国家保障妇女享有与男子平等的权利。
（对/错）答案：对4. 宪法规定，国家在必要时得设立特别行政区。
（对/错）答案：对5. 宪法规定，中华人民共和国公民有受教育的权利和义务。
（对/错）答案：对三、填空题1. 宪法规定，中华人民共和国是______的社会主义国家。
答案：工人阶级领导的、以工农联盟为基础的2. 宪法规定，中华人民共和国的一切权力属于______。
答案：人民3. 宪法规定，中华人民共和国公民在法律面前一律______。
答案：平等4. 宪法规定，国家尊重和保障______。
答案：人权5. 宪法规定，中华人民共和国公民有______的权利和义务。
答案：受教育的四、简答题1. 简述我国宪法的基本原则。
答案：我国宪法的基本原则有：人民主权原则、尊重和保障人权原则、法治原则、民族平等原则、民主集中制原则等。
2. 简述我国宪法规定的公民基本权利。
答案：我国宪法规定的公民基本权利有：平等权、政治权利、宗教信仰自由、人身自由、人格尊严、住宅权、财产权、受教育权、劳动权、休息权、获得物质帮助权等。
第九届华政杯全国法律翻译大赛初赛试题
第九届“华政杯”全国法律翻译大赛初赛试题试题一：（598 words）Commerce’s primary argument is that the plain statutory language mandating that a countervailing duty “shall be imposed” requires it to impose countervailing duties when it is able to identify a subsidy, even in an NME country. See Commerce Br. 19-23; Commerce Reply Br. 2. We disagree. The text of the relevant statute states that if “the administering authority determines that the government of a country . . . is providing, directly or indirectly, a countervailable su bsidy,” and if the domestic injury requirement is met, “then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise a countervailing duty, in addition to any other duty imposed, equal to the amount of the net countervailable subsidy.” 19 U.S.C. § 1671. Contrary to C ommerce’s argument we do not find the statute to be clear on its face. The statute does not explicitly require the imposition of countervailing duties on goods from NME countries. The question is whether government payments in an NME economy constitute “co untervailable subsidies” within the meaning of the statute. We have indeed previously held that the statute does not compel the imposition of countervailing duties to goods from NME countries because the government payments with respect to such goods are n ot “bounties or grants,” or “countervailable subsidies” in the current terminology.Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1314.Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the predecessor to the current countervailing duty law, stated that “whenever any country . . . shall pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant,” then “there shall be levied . . . in addition to any duties otherwise imposed, a duty equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant.” 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1988) (repealed 1994). In Georgetown Steel we found that the “economic incentives and benefits” provided by governments in NME countries “do not constitute bounties or grants under section 303,” 801 F.2d at 1314, that is, “countervailable subsidies” in the language of the current statute. Georgetown Steel found “no indication . . . that Congress intended” this law to apply to NME exports, noting that the purpose of countervailing duty law is “to offset the unfair competitive advantage that foreign producers would otherwise enjoy from export subsidies,” and that “[i]n exports from a nonmarket economy . . . this kind of ‘unfair’ competition cannot exist.” 801 F.2d at 1315-16 (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 456 (1978)). We stated that “[e]ven if one were to label the incentives [provided by NMEs to exporting entities] as a ‘subsidy,’ . . . the governments of those nonmarket economies would in effect be subsidizing themselves.” Id. at 1316. We thus upheld Commerce’s decision not to impose countervailing duties on goods from NME countries.The “bounty or grant” language of Section 303 involved in Georgetown Steel was replaced by the current “countervailable subsidy” language in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (“URAA”), but Co ngress made clear that this change was not intended to substantively affect the countervailing duty law. The URAA Statement of Administrative Action (“SAA”), which “shall be regarded as an authoritative expression by the United States concerning the interp retation and application of the [URAA],” 19 U.S.C. §3512(d), stated that “the definition of ‘subsidy’ will have the same meaning that administrative practice and courts have ascribed to the term ‘bounty or grant’ and ‘subsidy’ under prior versions of the statute” and that “practices countervailable under the current law will be countervailable under the revised statute,” H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 925 (1994). Thus, Georgetown Steel is equally applicable to the revised statute.试题二：（499 words）When a statute’s constitutionality is in doubt, we have an obligation to interpret the law, if possible, to avoid the constitutional problem. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988). As one treatise puts it, “[a] statute should be interpreted in a way that avoids placing its constitutionality in doubt.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts §38, p. 247 (2012). This canon applies fully when considering vagueness challenges. In cases like this one, “our task is not to destroy the Act if we can, but to construe it, if consistent with the will of Congress, so as to comport with constitutional limitations.” Civil Service Comm’n v. Lett er Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 571 (1973); see also Skilling v. United States, 561 U. S. 358, 403 (2010). Indeed, “‘[t]he elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from uncon stitutionality.’” Id., a t 406 (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 657 (1895); emphasis deleted); see also Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (No. 11,558) (CC Va. 1833) (Marshall, C. J.).The Court all but concedes that the residual clause would be constitutional if it applied to “real-world con duct.” Whether that is the best interpretation of the re sidual clause is beside the point. What matters is whether it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute. And it surely is that.First, this interpretation heeds the pointed distinction that the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA) draws between the “element[s]” of an offense and “conduct.” Under §924(e)(2)(B)(i), a crime qualifies as a “violent felony” if one of its “element[s]” involves “the use, attempted use,or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” But the residual clause, which appears in the very next subsection, §924(e)(2)(B)(ii), focuses on “conduct”—specifically, “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injur y to another.” The use of these two different terms in §924(e) indicates that “conduct” refers to things done during the commission of an offense that are not part of the elements needed for conviction. Because those extra actions vary from case to case, it is natural to interpret “conduct” to mean real-world conduct, not the conduct involved in some Platonic ideal of the offense.Second, as the Court points out, standards like the one in the residual clause almost always appear in laws that call for application by a trier of fact. This strongly suggests that theresidual clause calls for the same sort of application.Third, if the Court is correct that the residual clause is nearly incomprehensible when interpreted as applying to an “idealized ordinary case of the crime,” then that is telling evidence that this is not what Congress intended. When another interpretation is ready at hand, why should we assume that Congress gave the clause a meaning that is impossible—or even, exceedingly difficult—to apply?各参赛选手任选一题作答，且只能提交一道试题的译文。
“法律杯”知识竞赛初赛题库
题库1.故意犯罪的行为人对自己的行为发生危害社会的结果所持的心理态度是？明知自己的行为会发生危害社会的结果，但是却希望或者放任这种结果发生，因而构成犯罪的，是故意犯罪。
2．我国刑事法律的生效时间是？刑法的生效时间，一般有两种规定方式:一是从公布之日起生效;二是公布之后经过一段时间再施行。
我国新刑法于1997年3月14日通过，生效日期规定在刑法第452条，即1997年10月1日起施行。
3.猎人不小心误将树林中的人当作野兽而开枪击毙，猎人的行为如何认定？（C）Ａ．是意外事件Ｂ．是过于自信的过失杀人罪Ｃ．是疏忽大意的过失杀人罪Ｄ．不构成犯罪4.单位犯罪的，如何处罚？对单位判处罚金，并对直接责任人员判处刑罚。
5.一般预防的对象主要是？有可能实施犯罪行为的人。
6.正当防卫的时间条件是？不法侵害正在进行。
7. 我国刑法规定，又聋又哑的人或者盲人犯罪(D)。
A. 可以从轻处罚B. 可以从轻或者减轻处罚C. 应当减轻或者免除处罚D. 可以从轻、减轻或者免除处罚8.我国刑法中的资格刑是（D）。
A.管制B.拘役C.死刑D.剥夺政治权利9.死刑缓期执行减为有期徒刑的刑期，从（C）之日起计算。
A.判决确定B.判决执行C.死刑缓期执行期满D.判决公布10.某饭店楼上所挂的广告招牌，一天被风吹倒压伤一行人。
依据法律的规定，应赔偿该行人的损失的是：（A ）A.饭店B.饭店大楼的承建人C.该饭店所在城市的城建局D.该行人自己负责11.《婚姻法》规定，夫妻双方都有各用自己姓名的权利，体现了（D）原则。
A.保护妇女B.姓名自由C.人生自由D.男女平等12.我国的《中华人民共和国民法通则》颁布于何时（C）？A.19861001B.19860920C. 19860412D.1987010113.耕地的承包期为（B ）年。
A．20 B.30 C.40 D.5014. 下列情形不属于无效婚姻的有：（ D）A. 甲男和乙女未到法定婚龄而结婚的B. 甲男婚前患有医学上认为不应当结婚的疾病，婚后未治愈C. 甲男乙女是表兄妹而结婚D. 乙女因受家庭强迫与甲男结婚15.我国现已颁布民法典。
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第九届“华政杯”全国法律翻译大赛初赛试题试题一：（598 words）Commerce’s primary argument is that the plain statutory language mandating that a countervailing duty “shall be imposed” requires it to impose countervailing duties when it is able to identify a subsidy, even in an NME country. See Commerce Br. 19-23; Commerce Reply Br. 2. We disagree. The text of the relevant statute states that if “the administering authority determines that the government of a country . . . is providing, directly or indirectly, a countervailable su bsidy,” and if the domestic injury requirement is met, “then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise a countervailing duty, in addition to any other duty imposed, equal to the amount of the net countervailable subsidy.” 19 U.S.C. § 1671. Contrary to C ommerce’s argument we do not find the statute to be clear on its face. The statute does not explicitly require the imposition of countervailing duties on goods from NME countries. The question is whether government payments in an NME economy constitute “co untervailable subsidies” within the meaning of the statute. We have indeed previously held that the statute does not compel the imposition of countervailing duties to goods from NME countries because the government payments with respect to such goods are n ot “bounties or grants,” or “countervailable subsidies” in the current terminology.Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1314.Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the predecessor to the current countervailing duty law, stated that “whenever any country . . . shall pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant,” then “there shall be levied . . . in addition to any duties otherwise imposed, a duty equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant.” 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1988) (repealed 1994). In Georgetown Steel we found that the “economic incentives and benefits” provided by governments in NME countries “do not constitute bounties or grants under section 303,” 801 F.2d at 1314, that is, “countervailable subsidies” in the language of the current statute. Georgetown Steel found “no indication . . . that Congress intended” this law to apply to NME exports, noting that the purpose of countervailing duty law is “to offset the unfair competitive advantage that foreign producers would otherwise enjoy from export subsidies,” and that “[i]n exports from a nonmarket economy . . . this kind of ‘unfair’ competition cannot exist.” 801 F.2d at 1315-16 (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 456 (1978)). We stated that “[e]ven if one were to label the incentives [provided by NMEs to exporting entities] as a ‘subsidy,’ . . . the governments of those nonmarket economies would in effect be subsidizing themselves.” Id. at 1316. We thus upheld Commerce’s decision not to impose countervailing duties on goods from NME countries.The “bounty or grant” language of Section 303 involved in Georgetown Steel was replaced by the current “countervailable subsidy” language in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (“URAA”), but Co ngress made clear that this change was not intended to substantively affect the countervailing duty law. The URAA Statement of Administrative Action (“SAA”), which “shall be regarded as an authoritative expression by the United States concerning the interp retation and application of the [URAA],” 19 U.S.C. §3512(d), stated that “the definition of ‘subsidy’ will have the same meaning that administrative practice and courts have ascribed to the term ‘bounty or grant’ and ‘subsidy’ under prior versions of the statute” and that “practices countervailable under the current law will be countervailable under the revised statute,” H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 925 (1994). Thus, Georgetown Steel is equally applicable to the revised statute.试题二：（499 words）When a statu te’s constitutionality is in doubt, we have an obligation to interpret the law, if possible, to avoid the constitutional problem. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988). As one treatise puts it, “[a] statute should be interpreted in a way that avoids placing its constitutionality in doubt.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts §38, p. 247 (2012). This canon applies fully when considering vagueness challenges. In cases like this one, “our task is not to destroy the Act if we can, but to construe it, if consistent with the will of Congress, so as to comport with constitutional limitations.” Civil Service Comm’n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 571 (1973); see also Skilling v. United States, 561 U. S. 358, 403 (2010). Indeed, “‘[t]he elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from uncon stitutionality.’” Id., at 406 (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 657 (1895); emphasis deleted); see also Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (No. 11,558) (CC Va. 1833) (Marshall, C. J.).The Court all but concedes that the residual clause would be constitutional if it applied to “real-world con duct.” Whether that is the best interpretation of the re sidual clause is beside the point. What matters is whether it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute. And it surely is that.First, this interpretation heeds the pointed distinction that the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA) draws between the “element[s]” of an offense and “conduct.” Under §924(e)(2)(B)(i), a crime qualifies as a “violent felony” if one of its “element[s]” involves “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” But the residual clause, which appears in the very next subsection, §924(e)(2)(B)(ii), focuses on “conduct”—specifically, “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” The use of these two different terms in §924(e) indicates that “conduct” refers to things done during the commission of an offense that are not part of the elements needed for conviction. Because those extra actions vary from case to case, it is natural to interpret “conduct” to mean real-world conduct, not the conduct involved in some Platonic ideal of the offense.Second, as the Court points out, standards like the one in the residual clause almost always appear in laws that call for application by a trier of fact. This strongly suggests that theresidual clause calls for the same sort of application.Third, if the Court is correct that the residual clause is nearly incomprehensible when interpreted as applying to an “idealized ordinary case of the crime,” then that is telling evidence that this is not what Congress intended. When another interpretation is ready at hand, why should we assume that Congress gave the clause a meaning that is impossible—or even, exceedingly difficult—to apply?各参赛选手任选一题作答，且只能提交一道试题的译文。