会计舞弊财务舞弊外文翻译文献

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财务舞弊的成因及后果

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICSManage.Decis.Econ.18:587–599(1997) The Causes and Consequences of AccountingFraudMason Gerety a,*and Kenneth Lehn ba Department of Finance,Northern Arizona Uni6ersity,Flagstaff,AZ USAb Katz School of Business,Uni6ersity of Pittsburgh,Pittsburgh,PA USAOne of the fundamental purposes of corporate accounting is to facilitate the monitoring ofmanagers.Since managers are instrumental in the production of accounting numbers,andsince it is costly to monitor their behavior in this regard,ﬁrms sometimes report fraudulentaccounting numbers.This paper tests several hypotheses concerning why someﬁrms,and notothers,commit accounting fraud.This is accomplished through examination of a sample of62ﬁrms charged with disclosure violations by the Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC)during the period1981–1987.We also examine whether directors of companies thatcommit accounting fraud are disciplined in the managerial labor market.We adopt the perspective that the decision to commit fraud is governed by the expectedcosts and beneﬁts of this behavior(This approach to the study of fraud has been usedelsewhere,e.g.Darby and Karni(1973)Michael R.Darby and Edi Karni,‘‘Free Competi-tion and the Optimal Amount of Fraud’’,Journal of Law and Economics16(April1973),68–88.For a brief discussion of the economics of fraud,see Edi Karni(1989)‘‘Fraud’’inThe New Palgra7e:Allocation,Information,and Markets,edited by John Earwell,MurrayMilgate,and Peter Newman,New York:W.W.Norton,117–119).Accordingly,a theory ofaccounting fraud requires an understanding of how these costs and beneﬁts vary acrossﬁrms.Those costs and beneﬁts can be varied by external forces,through institutions such as equitymarkets and independent auditors,or internally through the design of monitoring and rewardsystems.We will divide our attention between the external and internal forces that changethe costs and beneﬁts of accounting fraud.©1997John Wiley&Sons,Ltd.INTRODUCTIONDiscussions of the efﬁcient structure of a corpora-tion date at least from Berle and Means(1933). Their focus was the supposed inefﬁciency of the separation of ownership and control.Empirical investigation of the efﬁcient corporate structure has become prominent recently.For example, Demsetz and Lehn(1985)ﬁnd that ownership structure varies based onﬁrm size,proﬁt instabil-ity,regulation,and amenity potential.They pro-pose that external forces are the determinants of corporate structure.In a very real way,corporate ownership structure is a response to market forces.We adopt that perspective here.We con-trol forﬁrm size and industry and test whether anything else matters in the frequency of account-ing fraud.We separate our investigation into ex-ternal(market determined)and internal (endogenous responses to the market)forces that could vary between thoseﬁrms accused of fraud and those not accused.Our results support the concept that market forces shape corporate activi-ties more that internal structures.In a window around the commencement of accounting fraud,weﬁnd evidence that stock performance increases relative to an industry matchﬁrm.Fraud seems to fool the market,at least in the short term.We alsoﬁnd that the announcement of SEC charges of accounting fraud result in statistically signiﬁcant average cu-mulative abnormal returns of−3.05%during a3 day window surrounding these announcements. These results document that SEC charges impose*Correspondence to:Department of Finance,Northern Ari-zona University,Flagstaff,AZ.Tel.:+15205237355. CCC0143–6570/97/070587-13$17.50©1997John Wiley&Sons,Ltd.588M.GERETY AND K.LEHNcosts onﬁrms(or revise investor expectations regarding true asset value).The frequency of‘Big-Eight’versus‘non-Big-Eight’auditors does not differ signiﬁcantly across the two samples,sug-gesting that auditor reputation does not effect the likelihood of committing accounting fraud.We ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant direct relationship exists between R&D expenditures and the frequency of accounting fraud across256industry groups.This result suggests that the more costly it is to value assets,the more likely is accounting fraud.An-other proxy for the ease of valuing assets,intangi-ble assets,is positively,although not signiﬁcantly, related to the frequency of accounting fraud. Weﬁnd that several classic corporate gover-nance variables do not differ signiﬁcantly across the sample of offenders and a sample of control ﬁrms in the same industries.For example,none of the following variables differ signiﬁcantly across the two samples:The mix of outside and inside directors,the presence or absence of audit com-mittees,or the presence or absence of classiﬁed boards.We doﬁnd that while aggregate stock ownership by the board of directors has a weak, and statically insigniﬁcant inﬂuence over the probability of fraud,concentration of ownership in one individual on the board signiﬁcantly re-duces the probability of fraud.The frequency of accounting based executive compensation pack-ages is slightly,but not signiﬁcantly,higher for the sample of offenders than for the control sam-ple.This suggests that the reliance on accounting based managerial compensation incentives does not increase the likelihood of accounting fraud. Some of these results,especially those involving the mix of inside and outside directors,are at odds with other research investigating the role of directors in the incidence of accounting fraud.For example,Beasley(1996)ﬁnds thatﬁrms with a greater proportion of outside directors are less likely to commit accounting fraud.In a multivari-ate logit design,heﬁnds robust results that indi-cate that holding many otherﬁrm characteristics constant,the percentage of outside board mem-bers matters.The multivariate logit design of his work has some advantages over our research de-sign,as he can hold constant other inﬂuences.On the other hand,while Beasley includes in his sampleﬁrms matched by size and industry,he can’t control speciﬁcally for the match.He can only balance his sample with offender and non-of-fenderﬁrms.Our methodology,described later,does not allow for ceterus paribus tests,but does allow for direct matching of the same industry, same size offenders and non-offenders.This dif-ference in test design may account for the differ-ent results.We alsoﬁnd evidence of Fama’s(Fama,1980) managerial labor market at work within the mar-ket for corporate directors.The number of other directorships held by the directors ofﬁrms charged with accounting fraud declines signiﬁ-cantly compared with the corresponding number of directorships for directors of the controlﬁrms. This evidence is consistent with the argument that the managerial labor market penalizes directors who serve on boards ofﬁrms charged with ac-counting fraud.In short,weﬁnd that the decision to commit fraud seems to be governed by the cost of valuing its assets.Corporate governance structures,the reputation of the auditor,and its reliance on accounting-based executive compensation plans do not appear to signiﬁcantly affect the likelihood of accounting fraud,while there appears to be evidence that concentration of stock ownership matters.Consistent with Fama(1980),there ap-pears to be some‘ex post settling up’in the labor market for directors ofﬁrms committing account-ing fraud.We will divide this work into four sections.Theﬁrst describes the sample,a few of the cases of accounting fraud,and outlines the types of fraud committed.The second examines and tests hypotheses regarding the external forces that determine the costs and beneﬁts of account-ing fraud.The third does the same for the internal forces.Finally,we turn our attention to the evi-dence regarding ex-post settling up.EXAMPLES OF ACCOUNTING FRAUDIn some ways,the term accounting fraud is mis-leading.A more generic term,disclosure6iolation, might be more appropriate for our purposes.Our original dataset contained violations that run the gamut from failure toﬁle appropriate and re-quiredﬁnancial statements with the Securities and Exchange Commission to internal fraud that shows lack of proper internal controls to clear and willful misrepresentation of theﬁnancial health of theﬁrm.There are also some notable outliers,including a set of banks that were charged with improper accounting for loan loss©1997John Wiley&Sons,Ltd.Manage.Decis.Econ.18:587–599(1997)589 CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ACCOUNTING FRAUDreserves and one case of a violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.All the results reported in the paper were replicated dropping the banks from the sample,and there were no noticeable changes in the results.Splitting the sample into types of fraud was considered.There are many speciﬁc types of fraud,and splitting to aﬁne level of distinction produces too few observations to make the results meaningful.Grouping to allevi-ate the problem of limited observations becomes ad hoc.We maintained the dataset in its entirety, only eliminatingﬁrms due to lack of data.We now give an overview of some representative,and entertaining,cases from the sample.Many of theﬁrms that started in our sample were dropped because they had failed toﬁle any documents at all with the SEC,and as a result we were unable toﬁnd any relevant information re-garding their corporate structure.Our original sample was quickly whittled to62ﬁrms.There still remained sevenﬁrms charged with a failure to ﬁle some document.Typical in this regard is the SEC v.Permeator Corporation.On March29, 1983the SECﬁled for civil injunctive action against Permeator alleging that they failed toﬁle their198210-K report,andﬁled various other reports late.Otherﬁrms in the sampleﬁled late, or failed toﬁle one or more reports.To be included in the sample they must haveﬁled at least some reports with the SEC at some time.A more common violation was the inﬂation of revenue and/or earnings,or the shifting of rev-enue and/or earnings.Two cases that describe the typical violation are SEC v.McCormick&Com-pany and SEC v.Tandem Computers Incorpo-rated et al.In the case of McCormick&Co.,the ﬁrm and the general manager of a division were accused of inﬂating revenues.This was accom-plished by‘‘(1)the systematic deferral of the recognition of substantial amounts of promo-tional and advertising expense;and(2)the recog-nition of sales revenue in aﬁscal period for goods that were prepared for shipment in that period but not shipped until a later period’’1.The ac-cused general manager was also a member of the Board of Directors.Because the manager had incentive clauses based on bottom line accounting numbers in his contract,he was shifting his bonus forward one period,increasing its present value. The case of Tandem Computers et al.was similar. In this case,the CEO,COO,and controller were also named in the case.Tandem was alleged to be involved in a concerted effort to lie about the ﬁnancial health of theﬁrm.This was allegedly accomplished by shifting sales revenue,recogniz-ing a contingent order as a sale,and recognizing revenue on goods not yet shipped.The allegations of shifting revenue or income,or inﬂating revenue or income,comprise18of ourﬁnal62ﬁrms. Another common allegation involvedﬁrms who made false or misleading statements about the ﬁnancial prospects of theﬁrm.Two classic cases are SEC v.Equity Gold et al.and SEC v.Zoe Products.Equity Gold was aﬁrm that claimed to be in the gold mining business,and also reclaimed old mines.It is alleged that from its inception the ﬁrm and the directors engaged in systematic false statements regarding the amount of gold in re-serves and the amount of drilling done in testing for gold,in an attempt to increase the price of the stock selling on the OTC.At one point they claimed to possess more gold at one mine than had been taken from any gold district up to and including the year1959(i.e.this mine had more gold in it than the entire California district during the California Gold Rush).The statements made by Zoe Products are,in retrospect,just as ludi-crous.Zoe Products was in the business of pro-ducing and marketing natural vitamins,and in an 8-K report they claimed to have found a product that they marketed as‘Sober-Aid’.This product would return an intoxicated person to sobriety.It is easy to dismiss these kinds of cases based on materiality,but in this regard the case of Zoe Products is illuminating.Zoe traded on the OTC, and as of1982(the year of the announcement of Sober-Aid)had the followingﬁnancial informa-tion:book assets of$1387000;long term debt of $26000(much of this was a car loan and some revolving credit card debt used to buy an ofﬁce copier);one employee;6059shareholders,and a maximum market value of$45221498.It would appear that someone believed the claims made by Zoe.The allegation of inadequate internal controls constitutes another type of disclosure violation found in our dataset.The case of Tonka Corpora-tion is one situation where there were not only inadequate internal controls,but perhaps none. Tonka makes toys,and before1981made a proﬁt doing this.Prior to1981,they had no cash man-agement plan to speak of,and their short term cash was held exclusively in certiﬁcates of deposit and commercial paper.They had no short term or©1997John Wiley&Sons,Ltd.Manage.Decis.Econ.18:587–599(1997)590M.GERETY AND K.LEHNlong term investment policy.Indeed,they had no Chief Financial Ofﬁcer.In1981a CFO was hired, in the main to provide a short and long term investment strategy.Unbeknownst to Tonka,the CFO set up a shell company in Iowa and issued 14%preferred stock,which the CFO purchased using Tonka’s money.The CFO and his partner in the Iowaﬁrm then used the cash proceeds to write covered call options.In a matter of2years the CFO had lost over$3000000.The disclosure violation alleged that no one on the Board of Directors of Tonka ever asked for any informa-tion about theﬁrm in Iowa,although they autho-rized all purchases of the preferred stock.There were no internal controls that mitigated this type of fraud.The last obvious grouping ofﬁrms was a set of ﬁve banks that were alleged to have improperly accounted for loan loss reserves.Typical of this type of allegation was the matter of Texas Com-merce Bankshares.The allegation in this case revolved around the lack of an adequate system to identify problem credits.The Commission ar-gued that when the bank grew,it did not add sufﬁcient staff to review the growing portfolio.In an ex-post fashion,the SEC looked at the bank after it got into trouble,and alleged that the bank,if it had examined the portfolio with due diligence,would have written down some of the loans prior to their becoming insolvent.There were many variations on these themes present in the data,and some that were one-of-a-kind accusations.In this vein is the violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by Ashland Oil.We argue that because these violations have many dimensions,ﬁnding a consistent theme in the data will strengthen the work,not detract.We now outline the market forces that inﬂuence the decision to commit accounting fraud.This will be followed by a discussion of the internal corporate structures that either enhance or mitigate the probability of aﬁrm committing accounting fraud.EXTERNAL FORCES THAT EFFECT THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ACCOUNTINGFRAUDOne major external force that drives the choice to commit accounting fraud may be the inherent difﬁculty the market has for valuing some assets.As a general proposition,the prevalence of fraud is expected to be higher in markets where it is costly to verify the quality of the transacted good. In a discussion of fraud in The New Palgrave, Karni2discusses this phenomenon:‘‘Fraud is as prevalent and as persistent as the asymmetrical information necessary to support it.The fraud may occur whenever the cost of veriﬁcation of the producer’s claims to the actual purchase of the good or service is prohibitively high’’.In short, the probability of detecting fraudulent behavior, and hence the expected costs of fraud,varies inversely with the costs of verifying product qual-ity.Following this reasoning the probability of de-tecting accounting fraud is likely to be related inversely to the costs of valuing aﬁrm’s assets. For example,outsiders presumably have more difﬁculty detecting accounting malfeasance in ﬁrms with high research and development(R&D) expenditures or substantial intangible assets than inﬁrms with‘hard’assets that are more easily valued.Since the probability of detection varies directly with the expected cost of committing fraud,accounting fraud should be more likely in ﬁrms with assets that are difﬁcult to value. Another external force to be examined is the effect of conscientious independent auditing.The role of the independent auditor is to provide outside veriﬁcation of the veracity of accounting numbers.Arguably,the major asset of auditors is their reputation for verifying the quality of ac-counting numbers produced by corporate man-agers.Watts and Zimmerman(1986)describe the importance of an auditor’s reputation:Reputation gives auditors incentives to be inde-pendent.It is costly to establish a track record and reputation for discovering and reporting contract breaches,but once established,reputation in-creases the demand for the auditor’s services and fees…If found to have been less independent than expected,the auditor’s reputation is damaged and the present value of the auditor’s services is re-duced.He bears the cost.Thus the auditor’s repu-tation(a valuable asset)serves as a collateral bond for independence.To the extent that the more reputable auditors are more likely to detect accounting fraud,it can be argued thatﬁrms with such auditors are less likely to commit accounting fraud.Assuming that‘Big Eight(now‘Big Six’)’3auditors have the most reputational capital,we examine the prevalence of the use of Big Eight auditors in the sample.©1997John Wiley&Sons,Ltd.Manage.Decis.Econ.18:587–599(1997)591 CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ACCOUNTING FRAUDTable1.Summary Statistics aAccusedﬁrmFirm characteristic p-Value on differenceControlﬁrmTotal assets$3980.28(mil)$2592.12(mil)0.423$22.56(mil)0.874R&D expense$19.42(mil)0.8030.831Big8auditor(proportion)0.6810.1580.5640.121Classiﬁed board(proportion)0.7609.67Number of directors10.050.5760.910%Directors insider0.5660.3950.373%Directors outsiders0.8090.6670.5690.278Audit committee(proportion)0.5790.466Compensation committee(proportion)0.2200.4260.2930.228Nomination committee(proportion)0.0890.121ESOP(proportion)0.5840.4460.310Accounting bonus plan(proportion)0.1310.28917.4614.30Stockholdings,largest board holding0.42027.65Total board holdings24.391.300.722Number of5%stockholdings 1.3853.8853.77Age of directors0.9297.798.690.789Dispersion of age(S.D.)7.028.220.120Tenure on board0.8705.915.07Dispersion of tenure(S.D.)The means here are of allﬁrms for which data was available.Means will differ in matched pairs tests performed later due to the necessity that both the accused and controlﬁrms must have the relevant data available.SAMPLE AND EVIDENCEOurﬁnal sample consists of62ﬁrms charged with ﬁnancial disclosure violations by the Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC)during the ﬁscal years1981–1987.The sample was collected by inspecting the SEC annual reports during this period.Firms were eliminated from the sample either because(a)their returns were not contained on the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP)daily or NASDAQ tapes;or(b)because they are not covered by the Moody’s Industrials, OTC,Public Utility,Bank and Finance,or Trans-portation manuals in theﬁscal year immediately preceding the SEC charges.For each of the62ﬁrms we selected a control ﬁrm that was not charged with accounting fraud by the SEC.The control sample consists of the ﬁrm in the same4-digit Standard Industrial Clas-siﬁcation(SIC)code that was nearest in size,as measured by total book value of assets,to the corresponding offender in theﬁscal year preced-ing the SEC charges.To avoid matchingﬁrms with divergent asset mixes,the ratio of current assets to total assets was compared for each of the pair ofﬁrms.When the ratio of current assets to total assets diverged by an order of magnitude and an alternative match was available,the alter-native was chosen.This only happened twice in the sample.Additional requirements for inclusion in the control sample are that:(a)theﬁrms had not been previously or subsequently charged with accounting violations by the SEC;(b)ﬁnancial data on theﬁrms are contained on the Compustat tape;(c)theﬁrms are listed in the Moody’s manu-als in theﬁscal year preceding the SEC charges; and(d)SEC proxyﬁlings for theﬁrm are avail-able in theﬁscal year preceding the SEC charges.4 Table1provides summary statistics on the accusedﬁrms and their controls.Presented are the mean(or percentage or standard deviation if ap-propriate)of the accused sample,the same rele-vant statistic for the control sample,and the p-value from the test of the hypothesis(non-paired)that the statistics are equal.As can be seen from the univariate statistics presented for the entire sample,the two samples are not signiﬁ-cantly different at a reasonable level of signiﬁ-cance.This lack of signiﬁcant difference will continue in most dimensions when we examine the sample in a series of matched-pair tests. Despite our attempts to match on size,the average difference in the total assets of offenders versus the control sample($1.38million)is statis-tically signiﬁcant from zero(Wilcoxon(paired) t-statistic of2.5)in the year preceding the SEC charges.When ten banks are excluded from the sample,however,this difference($400000)is not©1997John Wiley&Sons,Ltd.Manage.Decis.Econ.18:587–599(1997)592M.GERETY AND K.LEHNstatistically different from zero(Wilcoxon t-statis-tic of1.34).The average difference in the ratio of current to total assets is not statistically different from zero(Wilcoxon t-statistic)for the sample of non-banks.5A fraud is not material if there is no reliance upon the information by an unsophisticated in-vestor.We examine materiality by looking at stock price performance near the beginning of the fraudulent period as well as stock price perfor-mance upon the announcement of the fraud.We ﬁnd that,on average,the cases in the sample were material.To examine materiality,we examined a window surrounding the beginning of theﬁrm’s account-ing fraud.The choice of a date for the commence-ment of fraud was somewhat tenuous,but we chose the release date of theﬁrst10-K or10-Q that the SEC claimed was fraudulent.We found for a sample of23matched pairs ofﬁrms for which data existed,in the150trading days prior to the commencement of fraud the accusedﬁrms performed7.4%worse6than their industry match ﬁrm.In the150trading days following the com-mencement fraud,the offender did as well as the industry match(difference in CAR s−0.004).It seems that the market was fooled by the fraud,at least in the short run.To verify that SEC charges of accounting fraud actually impose costs onﬁrms,we estimated the average effect that the announcements of these charges had on the stock prices ofﬁrms in our sample.Various editions of the Wall Street Jour-nal Index(WSJI)were used to identify theﬁrst public announcement of the SEC charges.If no announcement was contained in the WSJI,the date on which the SEC announced the charges was used.These announcement ranged from ru-mors of SEC charges to deﬁnitive announcements of SEC charges.Conventional event study methodology is used to estimate the stock price effects of these announcements over a three day period:the day before through the day after the announcements.Sufﬁcient stock return data for the event study are available for only37of the62 companies.This sample of37ﬁrms contains18 NYSE and AMEXﬁrms and19NASDAQﬁrms. The average cumulative abnormal return for the37ﬁrms over the3day window surrounding these announcements is−3.05%,which is statisti-cally different from zero(t-statistic=−1.89). The3day CAR’s ranged from−34.39%(Flo-rafax International)to18.7%(Charter Company). The average CAR is less negative for NYSE and AMEXﬁrms(−2.15%,with a t-statistic of −1.79)than forﬁrms that trade on the NASDAQ system(−3.91%,with a t-statistic of−2.02). This difference may result from the fact that compared with NASDAQ companies,the event dates for NYSE and AMEX companies are more likely to be rumors,rather than deﬁnitive SEC charges.Alternatively,this evidence may suggest that charges of accounting misdeeds convey more information about lesser knownﬁrms(i.e.NAS-DAQ)than the do about better knownﬁrms(i.e. NYSE).Next we turn to an examination of the cost of valuing assets.Assuming that the costs of valuing assets varies systematically across industries,we expect the distribution ofﬁrms committing ac-counting fraud to be clustered in industries in which these costs are especially high.To test whether the sample of offenders is distributed randomly across industries,we compare the ac-tual and expected number of offenders in each 3-digit SIC code.We had deﬁnitive3-digit SIC classiﬁcations for55of our original62ﬁrms.The other seven were spread across more than one 3-digit SIC code.The expected number of offend-ers in each industry was computed by multiplying the sample size by the proportion of the full COMPUSTAT sample that fell in the correspond-ing industry.For example,SIC code738,miscel-laneous ofﬁce products,had166ﬁrms in the COMPUSTAT sample,or about1.5%of the to-tal.Toﬁnd the expected number of offenders in this industry,1.5%is multiplied by the total num-ber ofﬁrms in our sample,55,to generate an expected number of0.83.The Chi-square statistic corresponding to the absolute value of the differ-ence between the actual and the expected number of offenders by industry is28717,which reveals rather decisively that the offenders are not dis-tributed randomly across industries.7The difference between the actual and expected number of offenders for the top20and bottom20 SIC codes is listed in Table2.The incidence of offenders(i.e.the difference between the actual and expected number of offenders)is highest among ofﬁce computing and accounting machines (SIC code357),commercial and stock savings banks(SIC code602),drugs(SIC code283), computer programming and data processing ser-vices(SIC code737),and electric lighting and©1997John Wiley&Sons,Ltd.Manage.Decis.Econ.18:587–599(1997)593 CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ACCOUNTING FRAUDTable2.Twenty3-digit SIC Codes with Smallest and Largest Difference between Actual and Expected Number of Fraud Cases3-Digit SIC codes Actual–expected Descriptionnumber of casesPanel A:Industries most underrepresented−2.73578Miscellaneous investing679131−2.26885Crude petroleum and natural gas−1.31257Electronic components367581−1.15667Eating and drinking places−0.92533Telephone communications481308−0.72920Misc plastic products492−0.63868Gas production and distributionGrocery stores−0.59845541Resh,development,testing services−0.58336873−0.56324Trucking421−0.51295Motion picture production781451−0.46769Scheduled air transportationSoap,detergent,toilet preps284−0.43752−0.43752Steel work,roll&ﬁnish mill331344−0.42746Fabricated structural metal−0.41740Apparel,otherﬁnished products230−0.41237Electrical goods-wholesale506Refrig&service ind machines−0.40735358799−0.40735Misc amusement&rec svcs353−0.39226Constr,mining,matl handling eqPanel B:Industries most over-representedSugar&confectionery prods0.844100206Misc food preps0.8491292090.879303Petroleum&pete prod,wholesale5170.889361Paper&paper prod,wholesale5118080.889361Home health care svcsGen bldg contractors-res1520.9245647330.929593Mailing,repo,comml art Svcs2860.934622Industrial org chem0.939651Functions rel to deposit banking6091620.959767Hvy Constr,ex highway0.959767Misc transportation equip3796390.989941Insurance Carriers,nec738 1.165183Misc business servicesSecurity brokers and dealers1.532301621Ins agents,brokers&service1.7535786411.763636Electric lighting,wiring3641.827466Comp programming,data proc737283 1.908704DrugsCommercial banks602 4.8382978.149323Computer&ofﬁce equip357wiring equipment(SIC code364).Industries with the lowest incidence of offenders are miscella-neous investing(SIC code679),crude petroleum and natural gas(SIC code131),electronic compo-nents and accessories(SIC code367),eating and drinking places(SIC code581)and telephone communications(SIC code481).To test whether the distribution of accounting fraud cases across industries varies according to the cost of valuing assets in industries,we regress the difference between the actual and expected number of fraud cases by industry on proxies for the cost of valuing industry assets.One proxy is the ratio of aggregate R&D expenditure in each 3-digit SIC industry to the sum of the aggregate cost of goods sold and general administrative costs in the industry.We expect that as R&D increases relative to other costs,the difﬁculty of monitoring asset values increases.The second proxy is the ratio of aggregate intangible to aggre-gate total assets in each3-digit SIC industry, which also is expected to vary directly with the costs of valuing assets.The regression of the frequency of fraud on the R&D variable yields the most favorable results. The frequency of fraud varies directly,and signiﬁ-©1997John Wiley&Sons,Ltd.Manage.Decis.Econ.18:587–599(1997)。

会计造假行为外文翻译文献

会计造假行为外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)一、对会计造假行为主体的界定(一)会计造假的含义财务会计作假可以分成会计信息的急于作假和会计信息的有意不实。

本文主要牵涉会计信息的急于作假，它就是指财务会计活动中当事人．事前经过精心安排，故意以欺诈、舞弊等手段．假造、变造不实会计信息，并使会计信息歪曲充分反映经济活动和财务会计事项．以此达至特定利益的集团或个人的不能抗拒违法犯罪犯罪行为。

(二)会计造假主体的界定财务会计作假主体应当包含炮制假账和有关违法乱纪活动的主谋、共谋和执行者。

按照在作假过程中所充分发挥的促进作用相同，财务会计作假主体包含动议者、决策者、操作者和协同者。

造假的动议者是指为会计造假出谋划策的人。

通常是单位财会部门的负责人．在作假过程中往往饰演替编剧的角色。

造假的决策者是指有权决定会计造假实施的各级领导人。

决策者既可以是领导者个人．也可以是领导层集体，是会计造假的最大受益者。

作假的实施者就是指具有职务便捷、能碰触会计凭证、帐厚、报表等资料，亲自实行和顺利完成财务会计作假的人员。

它不仅包含有关会计人员、办事员人员，而且还包括有关的订货人员、销售人员、看管人员和统计人员。

作假的协同者就是所指从某些方面策应、协调作假的人员。

既包含在作假之初为之提供方便者．例如某些财会人员为作假积极主动出谋划策，提供更多信息及技术方法和手段，与领导共同设计严防检查的对策和措施：也包含在作假事实出现后为其掩盖、布防、通风报信和提供更多伪证等人员。

值得说明的是，在不同的造假案件中．造假主体的人员构成不尽相同．相关人员在造假过程中所承担的职资和所发挥的作用也不一样。

二、做为企业的经营者，对不实会计信息的回潮和传播有著较为繁杂的心态(一)“高指标”诱出假数字前些年在企业和主管部门还没全然挂勾的情况下，一些厂长经理不顾经营业绩的考核压力年年把销售、利润当作最要紧的“任务”揪，推行以“低指标”“乌纱帽”的考核办法，在这种压力下，经营者不粉饰报表、不捏造假数字就伤心考核第一关。

外文翻译--关于打击财务报告舞弊的研究

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译外文题目Fighting Financial Reporting Fraud外文出处Internal Auditor外文作者Green, Scott原文：Fighting Financial Reporting FraudCONGRES PASSED THE U.S. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT of 2002 with the goal of rebuilding investor confidence and protecting capital markets. It recognized that strong internal controls were an important component of confidence building. Section 404 of the act addresses this component by mandating an annual evaluation of internal controls and procedures for financial reporting and requiring management to assess and certify the effectiveness of these controls.In addition Sarbanes-Oxley requires a company's external auditor to complete a separate report that attests to management's assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls and procedures for financial reporting. In short, the external auditor must perform testing to validate management's assessment of the internal control structure.A strong internal audit function can provide both management and the public accountants with comfort that the control structure is being evaluated regularly and that deficiencies are remedied. Documenting and evaluating a company's processes and related control structure are traditional internal audit tasks that protect the enterprise. However, the degree to which internal auditors focus on the accuracy of their organization's financial reporting presentation and disclosure, in addition to operational audits, is a matter of judgment. Critical factors that will determine the scope of internal auditing involvement in the financial reporting process include the strength and experience of the external auditors as well as the extent of their reliance on the internal control function the transparency and culture of the enterprise andaudit priorities based on solid risk analysis.There are three steps every auditor should take-regardless of their level of' involvement-to help protect the organization from fraudulent financial reporting: * Listen to rogues and whistleblowers.* Ask focused questions that may lead to red flags of financial reporting trouble.* Watch for financial oddities by benchmarking performance. Investors depend on interim financial reports and need to believe these reports are fair and accurate. Internal auditing can provide valuable oversight to organizations by helping to ensure that communications arc free from inappropriate financial engineering.THE ART OF LISTENINGOne of the problems with financial reporting scandals is that an unscrupulous chief financial officer (CFO) and members of his or her team are unlikely to announce their intentions. In fact, a common thread running through World Com, Enron, and other high-profile financial sandals is that each company had a strong, respected CFO who kept the number of people involved in the scandal to a minimum, exerted incredible control over the working group and commanded the group's loyalty above all other ethical considerations. These CFOs reportedly rewarded those who supported them and intimidated, excluded, and punished those who did not. No auditor can reasonably expect such II tightly knit group to volunteer that their boss is playing with the numbers. The CFO's sycophants will court his or her approval at the expense of all else even the total destruction of the enterprise.The good news is that, in recent cases, there were outsiders who were willing to step forward. At Enron, for example, Sherron Watkins, a corporate vice president, specifically told both Andersen and senior executives of her concerns regarding the conflict of interest between Enron and the special purpose entities (SPEs) the CFO administered as well as the perception of improper accounting at many of the SPEs he created. She also raised the possibility of the complete financial collapse of the company. Had they listened to Watkins, the fraud might have been identified earlier, thereby limiting the damage to the company and its employees.The lesson for auditors is clear: Listen the rogues who complain. Particu1arly towhere constructive criticism is viewed as an act of disloyalty, those who arc not viewed as a part of the team can be a terrific source information. It is often too easy to dismiss the grumbling of those who arc perceived as outsiders or on the fast track to termination. Internal auditors should resist passive behavior and listen, evaluate, and, if warranted, investigate what they hear.IDENTIFY RED FLAGSAlthough the number of possible disclosure omissions and financial presentation errors are many, internal auditors can look for patterns to help focus their activities to where they will be most effective. Uncovering these red flags may take some digging and may require the auditor to ask tough questions.AGGRESSIVE REVENUE RECOGNITION POLICIESA typical red flag is revenue that is matched to future performance or expense. Qwest Communications has stated that, between 1999 and 200l, it incorrectly accounted for more than $1.1 billion in transactions. Revenues were contingent on the purchase of fiber capacity and future services, but they were improperly booked as earned.Unify Corp, a provider of software products, reportedly went even further when it boosted revenue by loaning money to customers. Those customers then bought Unify's products with no reasonable expectation of ever repaying the loans. A $15 million profit was eventually restated into a 57 million loss.Understanding when revenues are recognized is the first step to comprehending the quality of the revenue stream.Revenues of the highest quality are those that are booked after the customer has received, accepted, and paid for the product or service without any further performance requirement or contingency. To identify aggressive accounting and contingencies, auditors can:* Make a direct inquiry to management ns to the existence of loans to customers or asset- swap agreements.* Conduct a detailed analysis or debt obligations, which may uncover undisclosed contingencies.* Evaluate alternative revenue recognition methodologies available to the company and ask the CFO and external auditors why these were rejected in favor of the current practice. Such inquiry is not a sign of ignorance, but instead demonstrates prudence and due diligence.The revenue policy applied must have a sound business rationale that is easily understood by senior management and directors. If it doesn't, this issue should be raised with the audit committee.EVER-PRESENT NONRECURRING CHARGESCompanies are continually making provisions expenses, even if they are not sure of their exact amount. There has been an epidemic of merger. Product return, lawsuit, obsolete inventory, and bad loan expenses that usually give rise to reserves or nonrecurring charges. The Center for Business Innovation reports that the number of Standard and Poor's 500 (S&P 500) firms declaring special losses grew from 68 in 1982 to Z33 in 2000. 1 n other words, a whopping 47 percent of the S&P 500 had nonrecurring charges in 2000.There arc many legitimate nonrecurring expenses - due to acts of nature, mergers, and asset sales. So how does an auditor identify the misuse of this accounting method to hide underlying weaknesses in operating results? One clue is if a company regularly reverses reserves, such as reorganization expenses, back into operating income. This type of activity creates inflation in reported results. To identify such activity, an auditor should ask probing questions such as:* Why the charge nonrecurring and not a part of normal operating income?* How was the amount of the charge determined and how accurate is it?* What is the likelihood that all or a portion of the charge neither will nor be used?* What will be disclosed about the charge in the financial statements?Confusing or hesitant answers be investigated further. Auditors should have responses documented and on hand future meetings. If nonrecurring for charges are reversed at a later date, auditors should and challenge detailed explanations regarding this treatment.REGULAR CHANGES TO RESERVE, DEPRECIATION, AMORTIZATION,OR COMPREHENSIVE INCOME POLICY Frequent changes in accounting guidance can also mask manipulation of the numbers. It is to be expected that the dollar amount of reserves will change with the business c1imare, bur the method used to calculate reserves should not. If an increase in sales results in an increase in accounts then a corresponding and proportional increase in reserves and bad debt expenses would be expected. I f there does not seem to be a direct correlation; internal auditors should challenge the consistency of the reserve calculation.Likewise, capitalized costs should not increase at a rate greater than revenue over time. There may be a lag in related revenue until after major capitalized projects are completed. Auditors should question capitalization techniques that appear aggressive. Any change in methodology should be just; 6ed by long-term trends, not short-term needs.RELATED·PARTY TRANSACTIONSRelated panics are entities whose management or operating policies can be controlled or influenced by another party. Although related-parry transactions are particularly difficult to identify, there are auditors can regularly several activities undertake to help reveal this red flag. As discussed earlier, ongoing communications with rogues can be effective; however, quarterly procedures should also include activities designed to conflicts, such as:* Maintaining open communications with outside auditors.* Conducting periodic balance-sheet analyses.* Scheduling regular management interviews.At Enron, the external auditors were intimately involved in the creation of SPEs and were aware of the potential conflicts of interest associated with them. SPEs can be effective financing and risk management vehicles if used correctly. A parent company's debt level or other can hinder the capability of risk factors a strong: business segment to obtain favorable interest rates to finance its operations. In such a situation, the parent can create an SPE and transfer the asset to it with the goal of receiving more favorable lending rates. As long as there is another independent third-party investor that has contributed at least 3 percent of the assets, the PE doesnot be consolidated into the parent have to for financial-reporting purposes. Furthermore, if the assets in the SPE are of high quality, banks will perceive the entity as a desirable borrower, resulting in lower lending rates. The SPE will then use this money to pay the parent for the asset received. The bottom line is that the company obtains the money it requires, bur pays less to obtain it than it would without the SPE.Enron ran out of quality assets, so the company transferred inferior assets and pledged Enron stock as a guarantee of payment to the banks. According to the Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. (Powers Report), Enron reported earnings from the third quarter of 2000 through the third quarter of 2001 of almost $1 billion more than should have been reported us a result of this shell game. External auditors routinely request that management attest to and disclose their knowledge of related-party transactions. Simply asking the external auditors about their knowledge of related-party transactions would identified this potential threat to the organization. Such inquiries can be easy for the internal audit department if it maintains it strong relationship with the external auditors. Insightful analyses of balance sheet movements, particularly at year-end when the pressure to report strong results is at its peak, might also identify related-party transactions. The asset movements at Enron were large, and inquiry into their removal from the balance sheet would have uncovered the SPEs and the conflicts of interest with the CFO. Internal auditors need to: ask management directly about any related-party activities and, where appropriate, raise their existence to the audit committee.COMPLEX PRODUCTS Some companies provide complex financial products, such as structured financia1 instruments containing derivatives, or use hedging strategies that few understand. When a star performer produces complex products, few want to challenge this success or reveal that they don't understand how the system works. This is evidenced by the Joe Jett story, the infamous trader who executed seemingly profitable trades that, in reality, had no economic benefit. These trades caused the investment bank Kidder Peabody to port more than S300 million in bogus profits. No one was sure how Jett made his margins, but no one - from supervisors, toauditors, to finance staff wanted to admit their ignorance. Several internal controls should have identified this control break; however, simply requiring that the process be documented in derail may have dissolved the mirage of profitability.An auditor can insist that managers or their employees map out complex strategies. Jett's supervisor would not have able to do this because he did not been know how Jett made money on his trades. Likewise, Jett would not be able to document the process, as the fraud has been discovered.Green, Scott. Fighting Financial Reporting Fraud [J]. Internal Auditor, 2003, 60(6).译文：关于打击财务报告舞弊的研究美国于2002年通过了《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》，旨在重建投资者的信心和保护资本市场的有效运行。

关于舞弊评价体系的2000年报告【外文翻译】

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译外文出处 A decision aid for assessing the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting 2000[R].New York：AmericanAccounting Association，2000.P1-P4外文作者Bell T.J Carcello原文：A decision aid for assessing the likelihood of fraudulentfinancial reporting 2000SAS No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, provides guidance on the auditor's responsibility to "plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud" (AICPA 1997). Fraud includes both fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets. The focus of this paper is on fraudulent financial reporting. Prior studies have found that failing to detect fraudulent financial reporting can expose the auditor to adverse legal and/or regulatory consequences. For example, Carcello and Palmrose (1994) found a significant positive association between the presence of a financial-reporting irregularity and litigation against the auditor. Also, Feroz et al. (1991) found that an auditor's failure to consider a client's fraud potential was cited in 20 percent of the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases brought against auditors. Given the adverse legal and regulatory consequences to auditors from failing to detect fraudulent financial reporting, research that can help auditors assess fraud risk is of interest to both academics and practitioners.This study has two objectives. First, we provide evidence on the efficacy of a decision aid that could be used to assess the risk of fraudulent financial reporting. The logistic regression model reported in the paper can provide an independent assessmentof the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting that can complement the auditor's unaided risk assessment. Our model embodies a set of fraud-risk factors that demonstrated better classificatory power than a large number of alternative sets evaluated during the study. In using the model, the auditor first assesses whether these "best-model" risk factors are present for the client. The decision aid then weights and combines these individual judgments into an overall assessment of the probability of fraudulent financial reporting. Prior research suggests that properly weighting and combining fraud-risk factors is difficult for auditors (Pincus 1989; Winters and Sullivan 1994). Use of the model might reduce human bias or error associated with the weighting and combining of fraud-risk factors.Another objective of the paper is to provide empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the risk-factor examples presented in SAS No. 53 and elsewhere in the accounting literature, at distinguishing between fraud and nonfraud engagements. This baseline evidence should be useful to researchers who may seek to evaluate the incremental effects of additional risk factors such as the examples presented in paragraph 17 of SAS No. 82. For example, researchers might want to compare the efficacy of a model based entirely on the SAS No. 82 risk factors with the model presented in this paper. Or, a better fraud-risk-assessment model might include some risk factors from the model presented in this paper combined with other factors presented in SAS No. 82.In the next section, we review findings from prior research on the use of fraud-risk factors. In subsequent sections we discuss sample selection issues, present demographic information for our full sample of 382 fraud and nonfraud engagements, discuss the results of univariate and multivariate analyses of the discriminatory power of numerous fraud-risk factors, present our final decision aid, and present an evaluation of the final model's classificatory accuracy. In the final section, we discuss limitations of this research and present a summary and conclusionsPRIOR RESEARCHPrior studies on assessing the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting have focused largely on examining a number of potential fraud-risk factors (i.e., "redflags"). Loebbecke and Willingham (1988) examined numerous SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases to determine the presence of fraud-risk factors. From this work they developed a model (hereafter LTW model) that proposes three conditions under which fraudulent financial reporting might be perpetrated.- According to the L/W model, the auditor should consider the degree to which: (1) conditions (C) of the entity would allow the perpetration of fraud, (2) management is motivated (M) to perpetrate a fraud, and (3) management's ethical values are such that they might knowingly commit a dishonest or criminal act (attitude) (A). The fraud-risk factors identified during examination of tbe Enforcement Releases were mapped into these three components of the LA V framework.Loebbecke et al. (1989) assessed the above model using 77 cases of material financial reporting fraud collected in a survey of U.S. audit partners from a large international audit firm. A majority of the 77 fraud cases were discovered during the mid-to-late 1980s shortly before the survey was administered. However, some cases date as far back as the late 1960s. Loebbecke et al. (1989) reported that at least one risk factor was present in all three LA V model components for a majority (88 percent) of the 77 fraud cases. They were not able to assess the discriminatory power of their model and its individual risk factors because their sample contained only cases where fraud had been discovered. With a fraud-only sample, it is not possible to estimate the rate of false positives resulting from the application of the model to nonfraud engagements.The LA V model was tested by Bell et al. (1991). The full C. M, and A model that contained all 46 risk factors produced a false-positives rate in excess of 25 percent. The best model of the alternatives assessed by Bell et al. (1991) was the model where the three components—C, M, and A—contained only those risk factors from their original mapped sets that were significant stand-alone classifiers of the occurrence of fraud. That model correctly classified 74 percent of the fraud cases, while misclassifying only 11 percent of the nonfraud cases. As discussed in a later section of this paper, using the "high-risk" cutoff of .25, our final model correctly classifies 80 percent of the fraud cases, while misclassifying 11 percent of the nonfraud cases (seeFigure 1 presented later in this paper).In the next section, we discuss the approach used by Bell et al. (1991) to select a sample of nonfraud engagements to supplement the sample of 77 fraud engagements studied by Loebbecke et al. (1989), and we present information about the demographics of the final sample of 382 fraud and nonfraud engagements.SAMPLE SELECTION AND ENGAGEMENT DEMOGRAPHICS The sample of 382 fraud and nonfraud engagements used in the Bell et al. (1991) study was also used in this study. Bell et al. (1991) applied the following approach to select a sample of nonfraud engagements to supplement the sample of 77 fraud engagements studied by Loebbecke et al. (1989). During audit planning in. the summer of 1990,500 audit engagements were sampled randomly from the population of U.S. audit clients for the same international audit firm whose "fraud cases" were sampled by Loebbecke et al. (1989). The sample was stratified so that industries were represented in the same proportions found in the population of the firm's audit engagements. Engagements were randomly drawn from each industry. Four hundred twenty-five surveys were returned and 305 usable responses were available after culling 81 engagements that were not full-scope audits, 32 cases where subjects did not complete the survey instrument because clients had recently changed to other auditors, and seven engagements where fraud had been encountered by the auditor during the recent past. Auditors' judgments about the presence or absence of each of the 46 risk factors contained in the LA V model were collected for these 305 "nonfraud" engagements. Respondents included 233 (76.4 percent) partners, 71 (23.3 percent) managers, and one (0.3 percent) senior auditor. As discussed previously, the majority of the 77 fraud cases used in the Loebbecke et al. (1989) study occurred in the mid-to-late 1980s. However, some of the fraud observations occurred as far back as the late 1960s. Given the infrequency of fraudulent financial reporting, a relatively long time period was required to identify a sample of fraud observations of reasonable size. During the model-estimation phase of the study we tested for possible differences in the propensity for fraud for different time periods. We added a dummy variable indicating those frauds that occurred prior to 1985 and found that it was notsignificant. Several of the risk factors evaluated in the study control for the client's "current" environmental conditions, e.g., "industry is declining with many business failures." Whether the relationship between these environmental risk factors and the occurrence of fraud is stable over time, and whether all significant environmental risk factors have been considered, cannot be determined conclusively from our study.Table 1 presents demographic information for the combined sample of 77 fraud engagements and 305 nonfraud engagements. Panel A presents sample frequencies and related percentages by industry and type of ownership. Most of the industry proportions are comparable for the fraud and nonfraud samples. Exceptions are Banking, High Tech, and Savings & Loans where higher proportions were found in the fraud sample, and Education, Government, and Other Not-for-Profit where a higher proportion was found in the nonfraud sample. We tested several industry-categorical variables during the model-specification stage of the research and found that they did not have significant incremental classificatory power.Panel A of Table 1 presents a comparison of the ownership characteristics (public vs. private) for the fraud and nonfraud samples. Since there is typically more pressure on public companies than private companies to produce earnings, it is not surprising that there is a higher proportion of public companies in the fraud sample (50.6 percent) than in the nonfraud sample (14.4 percent). For the industries Banking, High Tech, and Manufacturing, the fraud sample has a higher proportion of publicly owned companies.Panel B of Table 1 shows the number of years the audit firm had been the auditor for the sampled engagements. First-year audits are more prevalent in the fraud sample (22.1 percent) than in the nonfiraud sample (8.5 percent). Also, there is a higher proportion of frauds in engagements where the audit firm had been the auditor for six to 10 consecutive years. In the model-estimation stage of the study, we tested several categorical variables indicating auditor longevity and found that their incremental effects were not significant.UNIV ARIATE ANALYSES OF FRAUD-RISK FACTORS The fraud-risk factors analyzed in this study are the same 46 factors contained inthe L/W model discussed above. Twenty-one of these risk factors were similar to those presented in SAS No. 53 (presented in Table 2). The remaining 25 risk factors were similar to factors discussed in the extant literature (presented in Table 3).For each of the 46 risk factors, we tested for significant classificatory power using 2x 2 contingency tables and the related Chi-square test of independence. The two variables for each contingency table were "auditor risk-factor judgment" and "occurrence of fraud," and the two levels for each variable were present/absent. Actually, there are three possible outcomes: (1) auditor finds fraud, (2) auditor does not find fraud that is subsequently discovered by others, and (3) auditor does not find fraud and no fraud is later discovered. We coded both outcomes (1) and (2) as fraud because we were most interested in the relationship between the auditors' judgments about the presence of risk factors and the ultimate occurrence of fraud, whether discovered or undiscovered by the auditor.Each fraud-risk factor was presented to auditor-subjects in the form of a question: e.g.. For this engagement, does management place an undue emphasis on meeting earnings projections? The questionnaire provided two responses—Yes and No—and required the subject to choose one response. We used a binary scale rather than a Likert scale with three or more points because we wanted the auditor subjects to form final conclusions about the presence or absence of risk factors even when such judgments were difficult.The results of our univariate analyses are presented in Tables 2 and 3. The 21 factors listed in Table 2 (in abbreviated form) correspond closely to the factors presented in SAS No. 53. Results for the 25 additional factors, which were similar to other factors presented in the fraud literature, are presented in Table 3.Table 2 (SAS No. 53 factors) presents the absolute and relative (percentage) frequencies of "risk-factor-present" responses for the 77 fraud and 305 nonfraud cases. The related Chi square statistics, phi coefficients, and observed significance levels are also presented in the table. The Chi-square statistic is used to test the significance of the relationships between individual risk-factor judgments and occurrence of fraud.Source:A decision aid for assessing the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting 2000[R].New York：American Accounting Association，2000.P1-P4译文：关于舞弊评价体系的2000年报告SAS 发布了关于对财务报表舞弊审计的若干注意事项即第82号条例，此条例为审计人员的职责提供了一个指导方向：审计人员的职责为“做好事先策划并按照策划完成审计，目的为取得财务报表是否有错报、此错报是因为账务错误还是因为舞弊引起的所有材料。

财务报表舞弊上市公司会计舞弊外文文献翻译

财务报表舞弊上市公司会计舞弊外文文献翻译文献出处：Amara I, Amar A B, Jarboui A. Detection of Fraud in Financial Statements: French Companies as a Case Study[J]. International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, 2013, 3(3): 40-51.翻译后中文字数：7240第一部分为译文，第二部分为原文。

默认格式：中文五号宋体，英文五号Times New Roma，行间距1.5倍。

财务报表舞弊的检测：以法国公司为例摘要：本研究的目的是检验“舞弊三角”元素对财务报表舞弊行为的影响。

我们使用2001年至2009年期间的SBF250中的80家法国公司的样本数据，使用逻辑回归方法进行分析。

研究发现，对经理施加绩效考核的压力是导致财务报表舞弊的因素之一。

与财务困难（债务，流动性）和审计事务所规模等因素与舞弊无关。

关键词：舞弊，舞弊三角，压力，机会1.引言如今，全球经济经历了一系列金融危机，导致市场、投资者和舆论对公司账户的不信任。

在这里，只要强调一个事实，即安然公司，一家前美国的能源商品和服务公司，已经为所有社会伙伴造成了70万亿美元的损失。

因此，上述的借口带来了随之而来的经济危机，这种危机已经蔓延到全球所有新兴计划。

例如，广泛宣传的丑闻是Worldcom，Parmalat，Ahold 等的案例（Rezaee，2005年）。

当然，上面列出的财务丑闻不是商界信任危机的唯一原因。

影响经济的真正祸患无疑是“舞弊”。

所有的操作在一定程度上是固有的共同之处：它包括欺骗，违反了对社区造成损害的行为和法规。

正如Rouff（2003）所述，“舞弊是一种故意行为，其作者是一个真正的罪犯”。

会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译

会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译___ confidence and have taken n to address this issue. The n of ns, standards, and guidelines aims to ___ global financial systems.During ___, ___ in more than one country, and most of these ___ the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, reforms were also initiated worldwide. The primary purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) ___; and (2) ___, the public accounting n, and global capital markets.In n, ___ activities, ___ financial fraud are significant and can have long-___, it is essential for companies to ___ fraud, ___.Global Regulatory n for Corporate and Accounting Reforms In response ___, U.S. lawmakers passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This Act aims to protect public interest and restore investor confidence in the capital market. President Bush signed the Act into law on July 30, 2002. The Act ___ It requires executives, boards of directors, and ___, responsibility, ___. The Act, along with subsequent SEC initiatives, ___ since 1933. Other U.S. regulatory bodies, such as NYSE, NASDAQ, and the State Societies of CPAs, have also ___ and their external auditors.Note: ___ if it should be ___.The ___ (IFAC) is a global ___ is to serve the public interest, ___ worldwide, and contribute to the development of strong nal ___ high-___ such as the Global Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the nal n of Securities ns (IOSCO), the World Bank, and the European ___ 2002, the ___ in Financial Reporting to address theglobal ___. The task force's report, titled "Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting: An nal Perspective," ___ issuers. One of the key ___.All public ___ report to the board and address concerns related to financial n, internal controls, or the audit. It is ___ financial reporting, financial controls, the internal audit n, as well as mending, working with, and monitoring the external auditors. The members of ___, and a majority should have ___.8. A principles-based approach ___ credentials, n, ___.Note: ___ (OECD) has been deleted as it is not clear how it relates to the rest of the text.___ (OECD) is a quasi-think tank consisting of 30 member countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom. It also has working nships with over 70 other countries. In 2004, the OECD unveiled the updated n of its "Principles of Corporate Governance," ___ (including the U.S. and UK) in 1999. Although these principles are nonbinding, they serve as a reference for nal n and n, as well as provide guidance for stock exchanges, investors, ns, ___ policymakers, investors, ns, ___ OECD and non-OECD countries.4. Recognizing the ___.6. ___ party ___.In n, member states of the European n have proposed a code of conduct for independent auditors, ___ every five years. Moreover, the nal governments of individual European countries ___. For example, in July 2002, the British ___ to the Company Law. These ___ misleading auditors, redefining the roles of directors, ___.全球企业和会计改革监管行动正在进行中，旨在恢复投资者对财务报告、会计行业和全球金融市场的信心。

外文翻译---上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策

Reasons and countermeasures of listed companies ' financial fraudPick to: financial fraud accompanied by China's reform and opening process and continuous development, bring social harm is more and more apparent, whether to financial fraud effective management by the people's widespread concern. On the listed company's financial fraud concepts and methods were summarized, from the interest drive, corporate governance, accounting personnel occupation moral standards, accounting and auditing system, in-depth analysis of the causes of financial fraud, and in view of the above reasons put forward the corresponding control measuresKey words: financial fraud; reasons; control countermeasures; listed companyIntroductionSince the beginning of Enron in late 2001, cases of financial fraud in listed companies at home and abroad frequently burst out. In early 2006, the Shanghai national accounting Institute Research Center for financial fraud (snaiFFRC) disclosed to "kelong" headed by the "2005 top ten most fraudulent financial companies of the listed companies" means is more amazing the financial fraud of "smart". Self, circulating trading, trading of yin and Yang, the packing channels, always accounting errors, large bath, mergers and acquisitions, restructuring, concealed stocks, the report cash traps, this is a top ten listing companies financial fraud trick.One, the concept of financial fraud and wayFinancial fraud is the subject of false financial information processing in accounting and reporting process, to obtain undue economic interests, used deceptive means to intentionally lied about the importance and financial facts of violations of laws and substantive violations. Financial fraud has four characteristics: unlawful, intentional sexuality, danger, and concealment. Specific means of financial fraud can be said to be endless, but the core is intact. Income fraud including fictitious earnings and revenue across periods; cost of fraud including cross-phase meter cost less and adjustment costs as well as costs of capital; corrupt cash fraud, should be the project assets, such as fraud, less provision for impairment; liabilities are generally less-total liabilities of fraud.Financial fraud means basically has the following several aspects:1.the use of improper accounting policies and accounting fraud. Management typically useintertemporal amortization class accounts for many share, share more, less or less cost to adjust profit. (1) the selection of inappropriate borrowing costs accounting method. In practice, many listed company through misuse of borrowing costs accounting, in build a project completed and not the final. (2) improper selection of equity investment accounting methods. Principles of enterprise accounting regulations: investment enterprises of joint control or significant influence, should adopt equity method; instead, it uses the cost method.But many companies use, when the investee company profit, should not use the equity method investment using the equity method of accounting; when the investee company loss, the equity method to the cost method .(3) improper selection of merging policy. (4) the improper selection of depreciation method.Extended depreciation, by accelerating method is changed into the straight line method, inpractice it is often seen. (5) the improper selection of income, cost confirmation method.Advance or delay the confirmation of income or expense is also listed companies generally adopt cheating. (6) the improper selection of the impairment provision method.2. use of enterprise internal control system defects and the weak link of fraud. As the cashier personnel use enterprise blank check, financial dedicated seal, legal person seal does not separate keeping malpractice, privately issued checks, misappropriation of public funds. Cozy with his duties incompatible staff collude with a fraud.3.related party transaction fraud. The related party transaction fraud, refers to the management using the related party transaction to hide losses, fictitious profits, and not in the statements and notes in accordance with the provisions as appropriate, full disclosure, the resulting information will have on the users of financial statements misleading a fraud method. Typically, Chinese listed companies using the purchase and sale of related fraud, fraud, entrusted with the operation of funds embezzlement, fraud and other four kinds of cost sharing related transactions by way of fictitious profit.4. the assets of fraud. Asset restructuring, mergers and acquisitions, debt restructuring, asset replacement form, occurring between the related parties. Assets reorganization of corrupt corrupt corrupt major mergers and acquisitions and debt restructuring in two ways.5. cover up fraud transaction or fact. Hide transaction or fact of fraud is through the use of accounting statements to hide transactions of listed companies or the truth, or has not been fully disclosed in the notes to the report deals truth an fraud methods.Second, the causes of listed companies ' financial malpracticeListed companies ' financial malpractice caused several of the following reasons:1. financial return far greater than the cost of fraud. To meet listing standards at some companies desperate to find ways to make financial fraud, and fraud, to meet the policy requirements. In addition, because the share price is times the income and earnings per share, and high stock market price/earnings ratio of deformity in China, so the main purpose of listed company's financial fraud is false profits. False profits of $ 1, the circulation market value of listed companies will increase 10 times times times. Relative to the fraud fraud income, cost is too low, from a certain extent, it is too low a fraud cost contributed some fraud.2. corporate governance structure is not perfect. Corporate governance structure is in fact about between owners, the Board of Directors and senior executive officers rights assigned and the arrangement of a system of checks and balances, the reality in China, led directly to the equity structure of listed companies malformations include the general meeting of shareholders, Board of Directors, Board of supervisors, which distort the relationship between corporate governance structure of checks and balances, which has provided an opportunity for financial fraud in listed companies. This is mainly manifested in the following aspects: (1) the ownership structure is not reasonable. As of the second half of 2006, the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market, shares of over50 listed companies only 185, largest shareholder holding ratio of no more than 25 and only 219, 60~70 listed companies have invaded and occupied by large shareholders of listed company's funds. In the case of high concentration of ownership, possibilities of treatment failure of listed companies increased, listed companies, the greater possibility of financial fraud. (2) the independence of the Board is not strong, internal control is a serious problem. China listed company Director served as Senior Manager of the phenomenon is more prevalent, Director serves as the Senior Manager (internal control) more than 50 per cent of the sample company 32, more than 30 per cent of a sample of 65 companies. In this case, the operation of the Board is usually "Insider" or shareholder control, rather than based on the collective interest. This has led to the phenomenon of frequent corporate financial fraud. (3) the Supervisory Board weakening the oversight function, financial report difficulty in discharging its oversight functions. Based on analysis of listed company financial reporting fraud, Board of supervisors system in suppression of financial fraud in China did not play a role of Directors and managers of monitoring. Listed companies are required by law to set up a supervisory board, Board of supervisors actually are in a very awkward position, lower right or upper right of vulnerable rights of supervision or stronger right.3. accounting staff lack of professional ethics. Finance and accounting personnel who are directly involved in financial fraud, from the macro perspective, is mainly long term and not enough on accounting ethics education, lack of accounting professional standards; micro-perspective, strong sense of company accountants law, in order to meet company leaders of unhealthy psychological, thus violating the ethics of being practical and realistic, objective and fair. In addition, individuals driven by economic interests, has also led to some accountants deliberately forged, altered, hiding and destroyed the accounting information, taking advantage of his position of financial fraud.4. accounting and audit system is not sound. In recent years, although China is making a lot of accounting and auditing legislation, but from the practical point of view are not perfect and sound. Poor operability of some provisions, resulting in accounting fraud an opportunity. New accounting law "legal responsibility" chapter referred to "serious", "criminal", "significant losses" are not quantified, has no specific explanation. 2006 implementation of new accounting standards, provided more accounting options for management, which provides management with more profit opportunities. In addition, lack of punishment measures, social supervision is not strong, quality performance evaluation of accounting does not work, no ability to detect fraud, also can lead to occurrence of listed companies ' financial malpractice.Third, the governance of listed companies’financial fraud countermeasures1. coordinating the relationship between benefits and costs of financial fraud. We should increase the penalties for financial fraud, financial fraud costs more than it gains, so you can basically stop financial fraud. At the same time, in charge of financial malpractice should bear unlimited joint and several financial responsibility, which can to a large extent, inhibit their impulses of illegal counterfeiting. For those who dare to report the accounting officer shall provide ample rewards, so that its behavior is greater than the loss of income to report financial fraud. In this way, financial malpractice liability and they will take the initiative to give up the idea of financial fraud.2. perfect the corporate governance structure. Improve the internal governance structure of thecompany, is to prevent financial fraud, improve the quality of accounting information. (1) to improve the company's ownership structure, can solve the status of minority shareholders and the controlling shareholder is not symmetric. (2) the perfection of listed company's Board. In the establishment of external independent directors on the Board of the company, and provides that a certain proportion of the external independent directors, and established a number of specialized committees, raise the level of professionalization of the Board, to play the role of the Board. (3) improvement Board of supervisors of listed companies. As the Board of supervisors a mere formality, only to stand in the governance structure of the company, to further improve the system of Board of supervisors.3. raising the level of professional ethics of accountants. State management and accounting departments, should continuously strengthen the ideological education of accountants and accounting staff levels continue to improve, making it able to consciously resist financial malpractice, gradually establishing accounting integrity and fair image.4. accounting and auditing systems. Accounting standards and the flexibility of the system is the important basis for financial fraud to achieve. First of all, according to China's actual conditions, principles of system of accounting standards and make appropriate adjustments, in general lack of ethical culture in China now, improving the reliability of the accounting report is the key. Second, correctly handle the relationship between consistency and flexibility, reducing the options available to the company within the scope of accounting system as much as possible, especially when it comes to income and expenses recognized measuring principle, the depreciation of fixed assets, eight-asset impairment provision ratio and maximum detailed provisions should be made. Introduce specific implementation details will be quantitative and specific legal responsibility to explain, this has the advantage of parties a clear financial consequences of fraud, also in favour of the relevant departments to determine the financial fraud and punishable by appropriate penalties. Finally, give full play to the role of public opinion and the media. As the perfection of the securities market, market supervision is not limited to certified public accountants and the Government, the general public and the media has also been involved in the regulatory process.The endAt present, China is in an early stage of market economy, all kinds of deceptive behaviors emerge, accounting activity as a measure of economic activity, inevitably financial fraud. Financial fraud is not only an economic phenomenon, is also a visualization of the deep moral conviction. So, on the governance of financial fraud is a systems engineering, business, community and government supervision of Trinity system is required in all departments and make concerted efforts, coordinate with each other. Only an integrated approach to governance, to create good information environment for China's economic development.Reference.[1] Hou Yanlei, Zhai Yingmin. The financial fraud of listed companies analysis [J]. Economy and management,2006, (7):71-73.[2] Huang Xinjian . Chinese listed company's financial fraud and the Countermeasures Research [J]. Economic survey,2006, (4):77-79.[3] Wang Jianxin. The financial fraud of listed companies : motives and management [J ]. Market modernization,2008, (2):346-347.[4] Yang Yunshu . The financial fraud of listed companies analysis [J ]. Accounting research,2006,(5):62-63.[5]You Xiaofeng. Chinese Research on financial governance of Listed Companies [ M]. Beijing: Economic Science Press,2005: 144-145.[6] Zhang Aimin. The combination of internal and external, prevention of financial fraud of Listed Companies [ J]. Contemporary economy,2006, (2):18-19.[7]Hong Ge. Fraud in financial reports of listed companies governance approach [J]. Economic review,2005, (9):117-137.[8]Wang Haixia. Internal governance structure in listed companies and the prevention of financial fraud [J]. Auditing & Finance,2005, (7):23-24.上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策摘要：财务舞弊行为伴随着中国改革开放的进程而不断演进发展，带给社会的危害也愈来愈明显，能否对财务舞弊行为进行切实有效地治理受到人们的普遍关注。

虚假财务报告的后果中英文对照外文翻译文献

虚假财务报告的后果中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)虚假财务报告的后果1.欺诈和欺诈性财务报告从广义上讲，欺诈可能被定义为故意以不正当行为或非法手段获得的增益以及优势。

这可能包括：（鲁宾G . A .，2007）财务报告舞弊；挪用资产（在内部或外部的系统中做出，如：贪污，工资欺诈和盗窃等行为）；获得非法资产或进行不道德的活动（如：利用过度的客户结算或欺诈性的销售行为）；用于非法目的的费用（商业和公共贿赂以及其他不正当支付系统）；欺瞒获得的收入或有意回避成本（在系统实体中对员工或第三方欺诈，或当一个实体通过一定手段故意避免成本，如收入税和销售税）；对公司的欺诈行为（例如假冒生产者故意侵犯知识产权）。

可以通过对该部门机构的制度的完整性的认识来调查它的欺诈行为。

它在调查了世界银行集团和银行的融资项目后，指控了他们的欺诈和腐败行为，认定了哪些行为可以被认为行为是在银行系统中的欺诈或腐败行为：（Banca银行,蒙迪艾尔.2009）拍卖欺诈，在拍卖中理解所有的参与者，在合同执行中的欺诈，避免对合同执行的审计，做出不适当的价格和伙伴关系，让审计人员误判合同中的成本和工作，并对审计人员进行贿赂，错误地使用世界银行的资金或自己的立场，这就是在运动，偷窃和欺骗的情况下的欺诈。

虽然所有类别的欺诈都可以说是主要的和值得辩论，但是只有财务报告舞弊才是影响最大的和最值得研究的。

（鲁宾G . A .，2007）在财务报告中欺诈行为的基础是肇事者（董事，审计人员，员工等）错误地提出了现实的自觉意图。

但错误地提出现实的自觉意图的原因可能是欺诈财务报告中任何一项不当资产的回收。

因此，“欺诈性报告仅指故意歪曲，包括遗漏大量财务信息旨在误导财务报表的使用者”也可译为（波帕一人，铝。

罗斯·，2009）：操纵，伪造，伪造或更改文件或证明文件，错误或遗漏的事件、交易或信息，故意滥用会计原则与价值、分类、方式介绍或信息传递，虚拟条目记录（年底）操纵结果或达到其他目标，调整不正确的假设和判断来估计帐户余额，遗漏、发展或拖延承认事件或交易发生在报告所述期间，隐瞒或保密的事实可能影响的数量记录在财务报表，在改变记录或条件的重大交易中；进行复杂的交易旨在歪曲实体的财务状况或性能。

会计舞弊三角理论与舞弊钻石理论外文文献翻译

文献出处：Mansor N. Fraud Triangle Theory and Fraud Diamond Theory. Understanding the Convergent and Divergent For Future Research[J]. International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, 2015, 1(5): 38-45.翻译后中文字数：6404第一部分为译文，第二部分为原文。

默认格式：中文五号宋体，英文五号Times New Roma，行间距1.5倍。

舞弊三角理论与舞弊钻石理论：理解二者的异同点摘要：世界上很多知名企业都经历了大规模的舞弊行为，这些行为导致中低阶层痛苦不堪并且失业率上升，对我们的世界经济都产生了不利的影响。

为了进一步了解舞弊的根本动机，本文深入研究了两种经典舞弊理论的相同点和不同点：（i）舞弊三角理论;和（ii）舞弊钻石理论。

本文研究对组织制定防范和调查组织舞弊的实际战略有重要帮助。

本文首先考察了舞弊的概念，然后讨论了两种古典理论的趋同性和不同点。

该研究使用的文献包括期刊文章，教科书和互联网获得的二次信息来源等。

这两个理论的讨论有助于理解舞弊行为，特别是对法务会计师，审计师，舞弊审查员和其他反舞弊机构来说比较重要。

该研究还作为进一步舞弊相关研究的指导。

关键词：舞弊，舞弊钻石理论，舞弊三角理论，法务会计1.引言近年来，公司财务会计丑闻不断出现，如Enron，WorldCom，Global Crossing和Tyco 等舞弊案件连续发生。

这些丑闻增加了全球对舞弊的担忧，数十亿美元的股东价值流失，并导致投资者和公众对金融市场的信心受到侵蚀（参见Peterson和Buckhoff，2004;Rezaee，Crumbley和Elmore，2004年Bierstaker，Brody和Pacini2006）。

对财务报表舞弊的思考【外文翻译】

外文文献翻译原文：Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit Description and Characteristics of FraudFraud is a broad legal concept and auditors do not make legal determinations of whether fraud has occurred. Rather, the auditor's interest specifically relates to acts that result in a material misstatement of the financial statements. The primary factor that distinguishes fraud from error is whether the underlying action that results in the misstatement of the financial statements is intentional or unintentional. For purposes of the Statement, fraud is an intentional act that results in a material misstatement in financial statements that are the subject of an audit.Intent is often difficult to determine, particularly in matters involving accounting estimates and the application of accounting principles. For example, unreasonable accounting estimates may be unintentional or may be the result of an intentional attempt to misstate the financial statements. Although an audit is not designed to determine intent, the auditor has a responsibility to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement, whether the misstatement is intentional or not.Two types of misstatements are relevant to the auditor's consideration of fraud —misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting and misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets.1、Misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting are intentional misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclosures in financial statements designed to deceive financial statement users where the effect causes the financial statements not to be presented, in all material respects, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Fraudulent financial reporting may be accomplished by the following:（1）Manipulation, falsification, or alteration of accounting records or supportingdocuments from which financial statements are prepared（2）Misrepresentation in or intentional omission from the financial statements of events, transactions, or other significant information（3）Intentional misapplication of accounting principles relating to amounts, classification, manner of presentation, or disclosureFraudulent financial reporting need not be the result of a grand plan or conspiracy. It may be that management representatives rationalize the appropriateness of a material misstatement, for example, as an aggressive rather than indefensible interpretation of complex accounting rules, or as a temporary misstatement of financial statements, including interim statements, expected to be corrected later when operational results improve.2、Misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets (sometimes referred to as theft or defalcation) involve the theft of an entity's assets where the effect of the theft causes the financial statements not to be presented, in all material respects, in conformity with GAAP. Misappropriation of assets can be accomplished in various ways, including embezzling receipts, stealing assets, or causing an entity to pay for goods or services that have not been received. Misappropriation of assets may be accompanied by false or misleading records or documents, possibly created by circumventing controls. The scope of this Statement includes only those misappropriations of assets for which the effect of the misappropriation causes the financial statements not to be fairly presented, in all material respects, in conformity with GAAP.Three conditions generally are present when fraud occurs. First, management or other employees have an incentive or are under pressure, which provides a reason to commit fraud. Second, circumstances exist — for example, the absence of controls, ineffective controls, or the ability of management to override controls — that provide an opportunity for a fraud to be perpetrated. Third, those involved are able to rationalize committing a fraudulent act. Some individuals possess an attitude, character, or set of ethical values that allow them to knowingly and intentionally commit a dishonest act. However, even otherwise honest individuals can commitfraud in an environment that imposes sufficient pressure on them. The greater the incentive or pressure, the more likely an individual will be able to rationalize the acceptability of committing fraud.Management has a unique ability to perpetrate fraud because it frequently is in a position to directly or indirectly manipulate accounting records and present fraudulent financial information. Fraudulent financial reporting often involves management override of controls that otherwise may appear to be operating effectively.6 Management can either direct employees to perpetrate fraud or solicit their help in carrying it out. In addition, management personnel at a component of the entity may be in a position to manipulate the accounting records of the component in a manner that causes a material misstatement in the consolidated financial statements of the entity. Management override of controls can occur in unpredictable ways.Frauds have been committed by management override of existing controls using such techniques as (a) recording fictitious journal entries, particularly those recorded close to the end of an accounting period to manipulate operating results, (b) intentionally biasing assumptions and judgments used to estimate account balances, and (c) altering records and terms related to significant and unusual transactions.Typically, management and employees engaged in fraud will take steps to conceal the fraud from the auditors and others within and outside the organization. Fraud may be concealed by withholding evidence or misrepresenting information in response to inquiries or by falsifying documentation. For example, management that engages in fraudulent financial reporting might alter shipping documents. Employees or members of management who misappropriate cash might try to conceal their thefts by forging signatures or falsifying electronic approvals on disbursement authorizations. An audit conducted in accordance with GAAS rarely involves the authentication of such documentation, nor are auditors trained as or expected to be experts in such authentication. In addition, an auditor may not discover the existence of a modification of documentation through a side agreement that management or a third party has not disclosed.Fraud also may be concealed through collusion among management, employees,or third parties. Collusion may cause the auditor who has properly performed the audit to conclude that evidence provided is persuasive when it is, in fact, false. For example, through collusion, false evidence that controls have been operating effectively may be presented to the auditor, or consistent misleading explanations may be given to the auditor by more than one individual within the entity to explain an unexpected result of an analytical procedure. As another example, the auditor may receive a false confirmation from a third party that is in collusion with management.Although fraud usually is concea led and management’s intent is difficult to determine, the presence of certain conditions may suggest to the auditor the possibility that fraud may exist. For example, an important contract may be missing, a subsidiary ledger may not be satisfactorily reconciled to its control account, or the results of an analytical procedure performed during the audit may not be consistent with expectations. However, these conditions may be the result of circumstances other than fraud. Documents may legitimately have been lost or misfiled；the subsidiary ledger may be out of balance with its control account because of an unintentional accounting error；and unexpected analytical relationships may be the result of unanticipated changes in underlying economic factors. Even reports of alleged fraud may not always be reliable because an employee or outsider may be mistaken or may be motivated for unknown reasons to make a false allegation.As indicated in paragraph 1, the auditor has a responsibility to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement, whether caused by fraud or error. However, absolute assurance is not attainable and thus even a properly planned and performed audit may not detect a material misstatement resulting from fraud. A material misstatement may not be detected because of the nature of audit evidence or because the characteristics of fraud as discussed above may cause the auditor to rely unknowingly on audit evidence that appears to be valid, but is, in fact, false and fraudulent. Furthermore, audit procedures that are effective for detecting an error may be ineffective for detecting fraud.The Importance of Exercising Professional SkepticismDue professional care requires the auditor to exercise professional skepticism. See SAS No. 1, Codification of Auditing Standards and Procedures (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 230.07–.09, “Due Professional Care in the Performance of Work”). Because of the characteristics of fraud, the auditor’s exercise of professional skepticism is important when considering the risk of material misstatement due to fraud. Professional skepticism is an attitude that includes a questioning mind and a critical assessment of audit evidence. The auditor should conduct the engagement with a mindset that recognizes the possibility that a material misstatement due to fraud could be present, regardless of any past experience with the entity and regardless of the auditor’s belief about management’s h onesty and integrity. Furthermore, professional skepticism requires an ongoing questioning of whether the information and evidence obtained suggests that a material misstatement due to fraud has occurred. In exercising professional skepticism in gathering and evaluating evidence, the auditor should not be satisfied with less-than-persuasive evidence because of a belief that management is honest.Considering Fraud Risk FactorsBecause fraud is usually concealed, material misstatements due to fraud are difficult to detect. Nevertheless, the auditor may identify events or conditions that indicate incentives/pressures to perpetrate fraud, opportunities to carry out the fraud, or attitudes/rationalizations to justify a fraudulent action. Such events or conditions are referred to as “fraud risk factors.” Fraud risk factors do not necessarily indicate the existence of fraud；however, they often are present in circumstances where fraud exists.When obtaining information about the entity and its environment, the auditor should consider whether the information indicates that one or more fraud risk factors are present. The auditor should use professional judgment in determining whether a risk factor is present and should be considered in identifying and assessing the risks of material misstatement due to fraud.Examples of fraud risk factors related to fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets are presented in the Appendix . These illustrative risk factors are classified based on the three conditions generally present when fraud exists: incentive/pressure to perpetrate fraud, an opportunity to carry out the fraud, and attitude/rationalization to justify the fraudulent action. Although the risk factors cover a broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to consider additional or different risk factors. Not all of these examples are relevant in all circumstances, and some may be of greater or lesser significance in entities of different size or with different ownership characteristics or circumstances. Also, the order of the examples of risk factors provided is not intended to reflect their relative importance or frequency of occurrence.Overall Responses to the Risk of Material MisstatementJudgments about the risk of material misstatement due to fraud have an overall effect on how the audit is conducted in the following ways:Assignment of personnel and supervision. The knowledge, skill, and ability of personnel assigned significant engagement responsibilities should be commensurate with the auditor's assessment of the risks of material misstatement due to fraud for the engagement. For example, the auditor may respond to an identified risk of material misstatement due to fraud by assigning additional persons with specialized skill and knowledge, such as forensic and information technology (IT) specialists, or by assigning more experienced personnel to the engagement. In addition, the extent of supervision should reflect the risks of material misstatement due to fraud (see SAS No. 22, AU sec. 311.11).Accounting principles. The auditor should consider management’s selection and application of significant accounting principles, particularly those related to subjective measurements and complex transactions. In this respect, the auditor may have a greater concern about whether the accounting principles selected and policies adopted are being applied in an inappropriate manner to create a material misstatement of the financial statements. In developing judgments about the quality of such principles (seeSAS No. 61, Communication With Audit Committees [AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 380.11]), the auditor should consider whether their collective application indicates a bias that may create such a material misstatement of thefinancial statements.source：American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.Consideration Of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit[J]. Accounting Research Manager, 2002,5:24—30.译文：对财务报表舞弊的思考（一）舞弊的特征舞弊是一个广泛的法律概念，审计师无法准确判断是否发生了舞弊行为。

会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译

会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译Corporate accounting fraud has been on the rise in recent times。

leading to a global call for XXX。

accounting and auditing standard-setting bodies。

and other ns such as the European n。

the XXX Accountants。

and the n for Economic XXX.BackgroundThe corporate accounting scandals of the early 2000s。

such as Enron and WorldCom。

brought to light the XXX scandals had far-reaching consequences。

including the loss of jobs。

ns。

and investments。

and a XXX。

leading to the XXX.Current XXXXXX fraud。

it still XXX。

Some of the common methods used by XXX fraud。

overstating assets。

understating liabilities。

and XXX。

including legal n。

fines。

XXX.XXXXXX fraud。

us XXX increased transparency and disclosure requirements。

stricter ns。

and the XXX.nCorporate accounting fraud remains a significant issue。

but the global call for XXX。

XXX.During XXX United States。

世通会计舞弊英文版(The WorldCom Fraud)

– Ultimately, stock was delisted by Nasdaq
10.
11.
12.
July 21, 2002 - WorldCom filed for bankruptcy
© 2003, 2005 by the AICPA

17,000 jobs cut to save $1 billion. WorldCom may write off $50.6 billion in intangible assets. Added additional board members to serve on a special investigative panel to review accounting practices:

Netted $140 million from stock sales
Facing dismissal, he resigned from WorldCom on April 30, 2002
Bernie Ebbers classic resignation statement: "I am confident that WorldCom will continue to lead the industry, setting the standards others will follow.”

Operating Expenses to Assets
-CFO’s directions affected the balance sheet: Assets: Computer assets Leasing assets
xxx (Huge Increase) xxx (Huge Increase)

关于会计的英文文献原文(带中文翻译)

The Optimization Method of Financial Statements Based on Accounting Management TheoryABSTRACTThis paper develops an approach to enhance the reliability and usefulness of financial statements. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) was fundamentally flawed by fair value accounting and asset-impairment accounting. According to legal theory and accounting theory, accounting data must have legal evidence as its source document. The conventional “mixed attribute” accounting system should be re placed by a “segregated” system with historical cost and fair value being kept strictly apart in financial statements. The proposed optimizing method will significantly enhance the reliability and usefulness of financial statements.I.. INTRODUCTIONBased on international-accounting-convergence approach, the Ministry of Finance issued the Enterprise Accounting Standards in 2006 taking the International Financial Reporting Standards (hereinafter referred to as “the International Standards”) for reference. The Enterprise Accounting Standards carries out fair value accounting successfully, and spreads the sense that accounting should reflect market value objectively. The objective of accounting reformation following-up is to establish the accounting theory and methodology which not only use international advanced theory for reference, but also accord with the needs of China's socialist market economy construction. On the basis of a thorough evaluation of the achievements and limitations of International Standards, this paper puts forward a stand that to deepen accounting reformation and enhance the stability of accounting regulations.II. OPTIMIZA TION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS SYSTEM: PARALLELING LISTING OF LEGAL FACTS AND FINANCIAL EXPECTA TIONAs an important management activity, accounting should make use of information systems based on classified statistics, and serve for both micro-economic management and macro-economic regulation at the same time. Optimization of financial statements system should try to take all aspects of the demands of the financial statements in both macro and micro level into account.Why do companies need to prepare financial statements? Whose demands should be considered while preparing financial statements? Those questions are basic issues we should consider on the optimization of financial statements. From the perspective of "public interests", reliability and legal evidence are required as qualitative characters, which is the origin of the traditional "historical cost accounting". From the perspective of "private interest", security investors and financial regulatory authoritieshope that financial statements reflect changes of market prices timely recording "objective" market conditions. This is the origin of "fair value accounting". Whether one set of financial statements can be compatible with these two different views and balance the public interest and private interest? To solve this problem, we design a new balance sheet and an income statement.From 1992 to 2006, a lot of new ideas and new perspectives are introduced into China's accounting practices from international accounting standards in a gradual manner during the accounting reform in China. These ideas and perspectives enriched the understanding of the financial statements in China. These achievements deserve our full assessment and should be fully affirmed. However, academia and standard-setters are also aware that International Standards are still in the process of developing .The purpose of proposing new formats of financial statements in this paper is to push forward the accounting reform into a deeper level on the basis of international convergence.III. THE PRACTICABILITY OF IMPROVING THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS SYSTEMWhether the financial statements are able to maintain their stability? It is necessary to mobilize the initiatives of both supply-side and demand-side at the same time. We should consider whether financial statements could meet the demands of the macro-economic regulation and business administration, and whether they are popular with millions of accountants.Accountants are responsible for preparing financial statements and auditors are responsible for auditing. They will benefit from the implementation of the new financial statements.Firstly, for the accountants, under the isolated design of historical cost accounting and fair value accounting, their daily accounting practice is greatly simplified. Accounting process will not need assets impairment and fair value any longer. Accounting books will not record impairment and appreciation of assets any longer, for the historical cost accounting is comprehensively implemented. Fair value information will be recorded in accordance with assessment only at the balance sheet date and only in the annual financial statements. Historical cost accounting is more likely to be recognized by the tax authorities, which saves heavy workload of the tax adjustment. Accountants will not need to calculate the deferred income tax expense any longer, and the profit-after-tax in the solid line table is acknowledged by the Company Law, which solves the problem of determining the profit available for distribution.Accountants do not need to record the fair value information needed by security investors in the accounting books; instead, they only need to list the fair value information at the balance sheet date. In addition, because the data in the solid line table has legal credibility, so the legal risks of accountants can be well controlled. Secondly, the arbitrariness of the accounting process will be reduced, and the auditors’ review process will be greatly simplified. The independent auditors will not have to bear the considerable legal risk for the dotted-line table they audit, because the risk of fair value information has been prompted as "not supported by legalevidences". Accountants and auditors can quickly adapt to this financial statements system, without the need of training. In this way, they can save a lot of time to help companies to improve management efficiency. Surveys show that the above design of financial statements is popular with accountants and auditors. Since the workloads of accounting and auditing have been substantially reduced, therefore, the total expenses for auditing and evaluation will not exceed current level as well.In short, from the perspectives of both supply-side and demand-side, the improved financial statements are expected to enhance the usefulness of financial statements, without increase the burden of the supply-side.IV. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONSThe current rule of mixed presentation of fair value data and historical cost data could be improved. The core concept of fair value is to make financial statements reflect the fair value of assets and liabilities, so that we can subtract the fair value of liabilities from assets to obtain the net fair value.However, the current International Standards do not implement this concept, but try to partly transform the historical cost accounting, which leads to mixed using of impairment accounting and fair value accounting. China's accounting academic research has followed up step by step since 1980s, and now has already introduced a mixed-attributes model into corporate financial statements.By distinguishing legal facts from financial expectations, we can balance public interests and private interests and can redesign the financial statements system with enhancing management efficiency and implementing higher-level laws as main objective. By presenting fair value and historical cost in one set of financial statements at the same time, the statements will not only meet the needs of keeping books according to domestic laws, but also meet the demand from financial regulatory authorities and security investorsWe hope that practitioners and theorists offer advices and suggestions on the problem of improving the financial statements to build a financial statements system which not only meets the domestic needs, but also converges with the International Standards.基于会计管理理论的财务报表的优化方法摘要本文提供了一个方法，以提高财务报表的可靠性和实用性。

会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译

会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译(含：英文原文及中文译文)文献出处：Badawi I M.Global corporate accounting frauds and action for reforms[J].Review of Business,2005,:26(:2).英文原文Global Corporate Accounting Frauds and Action for ReformsIbrahim BadawiSt.John’s UniversityAbstractThe recent wave of corporate fraudulent financial reporting has prompted global actions for reforms in corporate governance and financial reporting,by governments and accounting and auditing standard-setting bodies in the U.S.and internationally,including the European Commission;the International Federation of Accountants;the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development;and others,in order to restore investor confidence in financial reporting,the accounting profession and global financial markets.IntroductionDuring the recent series of corporate fraudulent financial reporting incidents in the U.S.,similar corporate scandals were disclosed in several other countries.Almost all cases of foreign corporate accounting frauds were committed by entities that conduct their businesses in more than onecountry,and most of these entities are also listed on U.S.stock exchanges. Following the legislative and regulatory reforms of corporate America, resulting from the SarbanesOxley Act of2002,reforms were also initiated worldwide.The primary purpose of this paper is twofold:(1)to identify the prominent American and foreign companies involved in fraudulent financial reporting and the nature of accounting irregularities they committed;and(2)to highlight the global reaction for corporate reforms which are aimed at restoring investor confidence in financial reporting,the public accounting profession and global capital markets.Cases of Global Corporate Accounting FraudsThe list of corporate financial accounting scandals in the U.S.is extensive,and each one was the result of one or more creative accounting irregularities.Exhibit1identifies a sample of panies that committed such fraud and the nature of their fraudulent financial reporting activities.Who Commits Financial Fraud and HowThere are three groups of business people who commit financial statement frauds.They range from senior management(CEO and CFO); mid-and lower-level management;and organizational criminals[6,16]. CEOs and CFOs commit accounting frauds to conceal true business performance,to preserve personal status and control and to maintain personal income and wealth.Mid-and lower-level employees falsifyfinancial statements related to their area of responsibility(subsidiary, division or other unit)to conceal poor performance and/or to earn performance-based anizational criminals falsify financial statements to obtain loans or to inflate a stock they plan to sell in a “pump-and-dump”scheme.Methods of financial statement schemes range from fictitious or fabricated revenues;altering the times at which revenues are recognized;improper asset valuations and reporting; concealing liabilities and expenses;and improper financial statement disclosures.Global Regulatory Action for Corporate and Accounting ReformsIn response to corporate and accounting scandals,the effects of which are still being felt throughout the U.S.economy,and in order to protect public interest and to restore investor confidence in the capital market,wmakers,in a compromise by the House and Senate, passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002.President Bush signed this Act into law(Public Law107-204)on July30,2002.The Act resulted in major changes to compliance practices of large U.S.and non-U.S. companies whose securities are listed or traded on U.S.stock exchanges, requiring executives,boards of directors and external auditors to undertake measures to implement greater accountability,responsibility and transparency of financial reporting.The statutes of the Act,and the new SEC initiatives that followed[1,4,8,12,15],are considered the mostsignificant legislation and regulations affecting the corporate community and the accounting profession since1933.Other U.S.regulatory bodies such as NYSE,NASDAQ and the State Societies of CPAs have also passed new regulations which place additional burdens on publicly traded companies and their external auditors.The Sarbanes-Oxley Act(SOA)is expressly applicable to any pany registered on U.S.exchanges under either the Securities Act of1933or the Security Exchange Act of1934,regardless of country of incorporation or corporate domicile.Furthermore,external auditors of such registrants,regardless of their nationality or place of business,are subject to the oversight of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board(PCAOB)and to the statutory requirements of the SOA.The United States’SOA has reverberated around the globe through the corporate and accounting reforms addressed by the International Federation of Accountants(IFAC);the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD);the European Commission(UC); and authoritative bodies within individual European countries.International Federation of Accountants(IFAC)The IFAC is a private governance organization whose members are the national professional associations of accountants.It formally describes itself as the global representative of the accounting profession, with the objective of serving the public interest,strengthening theworldwide accountancy profession and contributing to the development of strong international economies by establishing and promoting adherence to high quality standards[9].The Federation represents accountancy groups worldwide and has served as a reminder that restoring public confidence in financial reporting and the accounting profession should be considered a global mission.It is also considered a key player in the global auditing arena which,among other things, constructs international standards on auditing and has laid down an international ethical code for professional accountants[14].The IFAC has recently secured a degree of support for its endeavors from some of the world’s most influential international organizations in economic and financial spheres,including global Financial Stability Forum(FSF),the International Organization of Securities Commissions(IOSCO),the World Bank and,most significantly,the EC.In October2002,IFAC commissioned a Task Force on Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting to use a global perspective to consider how to restore the credibility of financial reporting and corporate disclosure.Its report,“Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting:An International Perspective,”includes recommendations for strengthening corporate governance,and raising the regulating standards of issuers.Among its conclusions and recommendations related to audit committees are:1.All public interest entities should have an independent auditcommittee or similar body.2.The audit committee should regularly report to the board and should address concerns about financial information,internal controls or the audit.3.The audit committee must meet regularly and have sufficient time to perform its role effectively.4.Audit committees should have core responsibilities,including monitoring and reviewing the integrity of financial reporting,financial controls,the internal audit function,as well as for recommending, working with and monitoring the external auditors.5.Audit committee members should be financially literate and a majority should have“substantial financial experience.”They should receive further training as necessary on their responsibilities and on the company.6.Audit committees should have regular private“executive sessions”with the outside auditors and the head of the internal audit department.These executive sessions should not include members of management.There should be similar meetings with the chief financial officer and other key financial executives,but without other members of management.7.Audit committee members should be independent of management.8.There should be a principles-based approach to definingindependence on an international panies should disclose committee members’credentials,remuneration and shareholdings.9.Reinforcing the role of the audit committee should improve the relationship between the auditor and the company.The audit committee should recommend the hiring and firing of auditors and approve their fees, as well as review the audit plan.10.The IFAC Code of Ethics should be the foundation for individual national independence rules.It should be relied on in making decisions on whether auditors should provide non-audit services.Non-audit services performed by the auditor should be approved by the audit committee.11.All fees,for audit and non-audit services,should be disclosed to shareholders.12.Key audit team members,including the engagement and independent review partners,should serve no longer than seven years on the audit.13.Two years should pass before a key audit team member can takea position at the company as a director or any other important management positionOrganization for Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD) The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)is a quasi-think tank made up of30member countries,includingthe United States and United Kingdom,and it has working relationships with more than70other countries.In2004,the OECD unveiled the updated revision of its“Principles of Corporate Governance”that had originally been adopted by its member governments(including the U.S. and UK)in1999.Although they are nonbinding,the principles provide a reference for national legislation and regulation,as well as guidance for stock exchanges,investors,corporations and other parties[11,13].The principles have long become an international benchmark for policy makers,investors,corporations and other stakeholders worldwide.They have advanced the corporate governance agenda and provided specific guidance for legislative and regulatory initiatives in both the OECD and non-OECD countries.The2004updated version of“Principles of Corporate Governance”includes recommendations on accounting and auditing standards,the independence of board members and the need for boards to act in the interest of the company and the shareholders.The updated version also sets more demanding standards in a number of areas that impact corporate executive compensation and finance,such as:1.Granting investors the right to nominate company directors,as well as a more forceful role in electing them.2.Providing shareholders with a voice in the compensation policy for board members and executives,and giving these stockholders theability to submit questions to auditors.3.Mandating that institutional investors disclose their overall voting policies and how they manage material conflicts of interest that may affect the way the investors exercise key ownership functions,such as voting4.Identifying the need for effective protection of creditor rights and an efficient system for dealing with corporate insolvency.5.Directing rating agencies,brokers and other providers of information that could influence investor decisions to disclose conflicts of interest,and how those conflicts are being managed.6.Mandating board members to be more rigorous in disclosing related party transactions,and protecting socalled“whistle blowers”by providing the employees with confidential access to a board-level contact.U.S.-EU Cooperation for Corporate Reforms Initially,the European Union resented applicability of U.S.Sarbanes-Oxley Act reforms to European companies and accounting firms operating in the U.S.However, after a series of negotiations,the U.S.and EU authorities have agreed to cooperate and decided to develop a compatible set of regulations.The regulatory bodies on both continents have undertaken a two-way cooperative approach based on effective equivalence of regulation and oversight authorities.Furthermore,member states of the European Union have proposed a code of conduct on the independent auditors whichincludes a five-year auditor rotation requirement.Furthermore,the national governments of the individual European countries have proposed reforms of their corporate laws.For example,in July2002,the British government released a white paper proposing changes to the Company Law,which included harsher penalties for misleading auditors;redefining the roles of the directors;and creating standards for boards in accounting supervision and other disclosure issues.The British government is also reviewing the roles of non-executive directors and is considering the regulation of audit committees.中文译文全球企业会计欺诈与改革行动易卜拉欣·巴达维圣约翰大学摘要最近一波企业欺诈性财务报告激发了全球公司治理和财务报告改革，政府和会计和审计机构在美国和国际上的标准制定机构，包括欧盟委员会，国际会计师联合会;经济合作与发展组织;以恢复投资者对财务报告，会计行业和全球金融市场的信心。

会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译备课讲稿

会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译(含：英文原文及中文译文)文献出处：Badawi I M. Global corporate accounting frauds and action for reforms[J]. Review of Business, 2005, :26(:2).英文原文Global Corporate Accounting Frauds and Action for ReformsIbrahim BadawiSt. John’s UniversityAbstractThe recent wave of corporate fraudulent financial reporting has prompted global actions for reforms in corporate governance and financial reporting, by governments and accounting and auditing standard-setting bodies in the U.S. and internationally, including the European Commission; the International Federation of Accountants; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; and others, in order to restore investor confidence in financial reporting, the accounting profession and global financial markets.IntroductionDuring the recent series of corporate fraudulent financial reporting incidents in the U.S., similar corporate scandals were disclosed in several other countries. Almost all cases of foreign corporate accounting frauds were committed by entities that conduct their businesses in more than onecountry, and most of these entities are also listed on U.S. stock exchanges. Following the legislative and regulatory reforms of corporate America, resulting from the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, reforms were also initiated worldwide. The primary purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to identify the prominent American and foreign companies involved in fraudulent financial reporting and the nature of accounting irregularities they committed; and (2) to highlight the global reaction for corporate reforms which are aimed at restoring investor confidence in financial reporting, the public accounting profession and global capital markets.Cases of Global Corporate Accounting FraudsThe list of corporate financial accounting scandals in the U.S. is extensive, and each one was the result of one or more creative accounting irregularities. Exhibit 1 identifies a sample of U.S. companies that committed such fraud and the nature of their fraudulent financial reporting activities.Who Commits Financial Fraud and HowThere are three groups of business people who commit financial statement frauds. They range from senior management (CEO and CFO); mid- and lower-level management; and organizational criminals [6,16]. CEOs and CFOs commit accounting frauds to conceal true business performance, to preserve personal status and control and to maintain personal income and wealth. Mid- and lower-level employees falsifyfinancial statements related to their area of responsibility (subsidiary, division or other unit) to conceal poor performance and/or to earn performance-based bonuses. Organizational criminals falsify financial statements to obtain loans or to inflate a stock they plan to sell in a “pump-and-dump” scheme. Methods o f financial statement schemes range from fictitious or fabricated revenues; altering the times at which revenues are recognized; improper asset valuations and reporting; concealing liabilities and expenses; and improper financial statement disclosures.Global Regulatory Action for Corporate and Accounting ReformsIn response to corporate and accounting scandals, the effects of which are still being felt throughout the U.S. economy, and in order to protect public interest and to restore investor confidence in the capital market, U.S. lawmakers, in a compromise by the House and Senate, passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. President Bush signed this Act into law (Public Law 107-204) on July 30, 2002. The Act resulted in major changes to compliance practices of large U.S. and non-U.S. companies whose securities are listed or traded on U.S. stock exchanges, requiring executives, boards of directors and external auditors to undertake measures to implement greater accountability, responsibility and transparency of financial reporting. The statutes of the Act, and the new SEC initiatives that followed [1,4,8,12,15], are considered the mostsignificant legislation and regulations affecting the corporate community and the accounting profession since 1933. Other U.S. regulatory bodies such as NYSE, NASDAQ and the State Societies of CPAs have also passed new regulations which place additional burdens on publicly traded companies and their external auditors.The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) is expressly applicable to any non-U.S. company registered on U.S. exchanges under either the Securities Act of 1933 or the Security Exchange Act of 1934, regardless of country of incorporation or corporate domicile. Furthermore, external auditors of such registrants, regardless of their nationality or place of business, are subject to the oversight of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and to the statutory requirements of the SOA.The United States’ SOA has reverberated around the globe through the corporate and accounting reforms addressed by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC); the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the European Commission (UC); and authoritative bodies within individual European countries.International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)The IFAC is a private governance organization whose members are the national professional associations of accountants. It formally describes itself as the global representative of the accounting profession, with the objective of serving the public interest, strengthening theworldwide accountancy profession and contributing to the development of strong international economies by establishing and promoting adherence to high quality standards [9]. The Federation represents accountancy groups worldwide and has served as a reminder that restoring public confidence in financial reporting and the accounting profession should be considered a global mission. It is also considered a key player in the global auditing arena which, among other things, constructs international standards on auditing and has laid down an international ethical code for professional accountants [14]. The IFAC has recently secured a degree of support for its endeavors from some of the world’s most influential interna tional organizations in economic and financial spheres, including global Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the World Bank and, most significantly, the EC. In October 2002, IFAC commissioned a Task Force on Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting to use a global perspective to consider how to restore the credibility of financial reporting and corporate disclosure. Its report, “Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting: An International Perspective,” includes recommendations for strengthening corporate governance, and raising the regulating standards of issuers. Among its conclusions and recommendations related to audit committees are:1. All public interest entities should have an independent auditcommittee or similar body.2. The audit committee should regularly report to the board and should address concerns about financial information, internal controls or the audit.3. The audit committee must meet regularly and have sufficient time to perform its role effectively.4. Audit committees should have core responsibilities, including monitoring and reviewing the integrity of financial reporting, financial controls, the internal audit function, as well as for recommending, working with and monitoring the external auditors.5. Audit committee members should be financially literate and a majority should have “substantial financial experience.” They should receive further training as necessary on their responsibilities and on the company.6. Audit committees should have regular private “executive sessions” with the outside auditors and the head of the internal audit department. These executive sessions should not include members of management. There should be similar meetings with the chief financial officer and other key financial executives, but without other members of management.7. Audit committee members should be independent of management.8. There should be a principles-based approach to definingindependence on an international level. Companies should disclose committee members’ credentials, remuneration and shareholdings.9. Reinforcing the role of the audit committee should improve the relationship between the auditor and the company. The audit committee should recommend the hiring and firing of auditors and approve their fees, as well as review the audit plan. 10. The IFAC Code of Ethics should be the foundation for individual national independence rules. It should be relied on in making decisions on whether auditors should provide non-audit services. Non-audit services performed by the auditor should be approved by the audit committee.11. All fees, for audit and non-audit services, should be disclosed to shareholders.12. Key audit team members, including the engagement and independent review partners, should serve no longer than seven years on the audit.13. Two years should pass before a key audit team member can takea position at the company as a director or any other important management positionOrganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is a quasi-think tank made up of 30 member countries, includingthe United States and United Kingdom, and it has working relationships with more than 70 other countries. In 2004, the OECD unveiled the updated revision of its “Principles of Corporate Governance” that had originally been adopted by its member governments (including the U.S. and UK) in 1999. Although they are nonbinding, the principles provide a reference for national legislation and regulation, as well as guidance for stock exchanges, investors, corporations and other parties [11,13]. The principles have long become an international benchmark for policy makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders worldwide. They have advanced the corporate governance agenda and provided specific guidance for legislative and regulatory initiatives in both the OECD and non-OECD countries.The 2004 updated version of “Principles of Corporate Governance” includes recommendations on accounting and auditing standards, the independence of board members and the need for boards to act in the interest of the company and the shareholders. The updated version also sets more demanding standards in a number of areas that impact corporate executive compensation and finance, such as:1. Granting investors the right to nominate company directors, as well as a more forceful role in electing them.2. Providing shareholders with a voice in the compensation policy for board members and executives, and giving these stockholders theability to submit questions to auditors.3. Mandating that institutional investors disclose their overall voting policies and how they manage material conflicts of interest that may affect the way the investors exercise key ownership functions, such as voting4. Identifying the need for effective protection of creditor rights and an efficient system for dealing with corporate insolvency.5. Directing rating agencies, brokers and other providers of information that could influence investor decisions to disclose conflicts of interest, and how those conflicts are being managed.6. Mandating board members to be more rigorous in disclosing related party transactions, and protecting soca lled “whistle blowers” by providing the employees with confidential access to a board-level contact.U.S.-EU Cooperation for Corporate Reforms Initially, the European Union resented applicability of U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act reforms to European companies and accounting firms operating in the U.S. However, after a series of negotiations, the U.S. and EU authorities have agreed to cooperate and decided to develop a compatible set of regulations. The regulatory bodies on both continents have undertaken a two-way cooperative approach based on effective equivalence of regulation and oversight authorities. Furthermore, member states of the European Union have proposed a code of conduct on the independent auditors whichincludes a five-year auditor rotation requirement. Furthermore, the national governments of the individual European countries have proposed reforms of their corporate laws. For example, in July 2002, the British government released a white paper proposing changes to the Company Law, which included harsher penalties for misleading auditors; redefining the roles of the directors; and creating standards for boards in accounting supervision and other disclosure issues. The British government is also reviewing the roles of non-executive directors and is considering the regulation of audit committees.中文译文全球企业会计欺诈与改革行动易卜拉欣·巴达维圣约翰大学摘要最近一波企业欺诈性财务报告激发了全球公司治理和财务报告改革，政府和会计和审计机构在美国和国际上的标准制定机构，包括欧盟委员会，国际会计师联合会;经济合作与发展组织;以恢复投资者对财务报告，会计行业和全球金融市场的信心。

会计内部控制中英文对照外文翻译文献

会计内部控制中英文对照外文翻译文献n:Internal control is an accounting re or control system ___ policies。

protecting assets。

and preventing fraud and errors。

It is an important component of nal management that includes planning。

methods。

and res used to meet tasks。

goals。

and objectives。

and in doing so。

supports performance-based management。

Internal control is equal to management control and can help managers achieve the expected effective management of resources。

However。

designing and establishing effective internal control is not a simple task and cannot be achieved through quick fixes。

This article discusses the different aspects of the concept of internal control and management.Keywords: internal control。

management control。

control environment。

control activities。

n2.Internal Control Perspective: ___The environment requires new business control variables that are not responsive to any potential ___ control。

关于会计的英文文献原文（带中文翻译）

The Optimization Method of Financial Statements Based on Accounting Management TheoryABSTRACTThis paper develops an approach to enhance the reliability and usefulness of financial statements. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) was fundamentally flawed by fair value accounting and asset-impairment accounting. According to legal theory and accounting theory, accounting data must have legal evidence as its source document. The conventional “mixed attribute” accounting system should be replaced by a “segregated” system with historical cost and fair value being kept strictly apart in financial statements. The proposed optimizing method will significantly enhance the reliability and usefulness of financial statements.I.. INTRODUCTIONBased on international-accounting-convergence approach, the Ministry of Finance issued the Enterprise Accounting Standards in 2006 taking the International Financial Reporting Standards (hereinafter referred to as “the International Standards”) for reference. The Enterprise Accounting Standards carries out fair value accounting successfully, and spreads the sense that accounting should reflect market value objectively. The objective of accounting reformation following-up is to establish the accounting theory and methodology which not only use international advanced theory for reference, but also accord with the needs of China's socialist market economy construction. On the basis of a thorough evaluation of the achievements and limitations of International Standards, this paper puts forward a stand that to deepen accounting reformation and enhance the stability of accounting regulations.II. OPTIMIZATION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS SYSTEM: PARALLELING LISTING OF LEGAL FACTS AND FINANCIAL EXPECTATIONAs an important management activity, accounting should make use of information systems based on classified statistics, and serve for both micro-economic management and macro-economic regulation at the same time. Optimization of financial statements system should try to take all aspects of the demands of the financial statements in both macro and micro level into account.Why do companies need to prepare financial statements? Whose demands should be considered while preparing financial statements? Those questions are basic issues we should consider on the optimization of financial statements. From the perspective of "public interests", reliability and legal evidence are required as qualitative characters, which is the origin of the traditional "historical cost accounting". From the perspective of "private interest", security investors and financial regulatory authoritieshope that financial statements reflect changes of market prices timely recording "objective" market conditions. This is the origin of "fair value accounting". Whether one set of financial statements can be compatible with these two different views and balance the public interest and private interest? To solve this problem, we design a new balance sheet and an income statement.From 1992 to 2006, a lot of new ideas and new perspectives are introduced into China's accounting practices from international accounting standards in a gradual manner during the accounting reform in China. These ideas and perspectives enriched the understanding of the financial statements in China. These achievements deserve our full assessment and should be fully affirmed. However, academia and standard-setters are also aware that International Standards are still in the process of developing .The purpose of proposing new formats of financial statements in this paper is to push forward the accounting reform into a deeper level on the basis of international convergence.III. THE PRACTICABILITY OF IMPROVING THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS SYSTEMWhether the financial statements are able to maintain their stability? It is necessary to mobilize the initiatives of both supply-side and demand-side at the same time. We should consider whether financial statements could meet the demands of the macro-economic regulation and business administration, and whether they are popular with millions of accountants.Accountants are responsible for preparing financial statements and auditors are responsible for auditing. They will benefit from the implementation of the new financial statements.Firstly, for the accountants, under the isolated design of historical cost accounting and fair value accounting, their daily accounting practice is greatly simplified. Accounting process will not need assets impairment and fair value any longer. Accounting books will not record impairment and appreciation of assets any longer, for the historical cost accounting is comprehensively implemented. Fair value information will be recorded in accordance with assessment only at the balance sheet date and only in the annual financial statements. Historical cost accounting is more likely to be recognized by the tax authorities, which saves heavy workload of the tax adjustment. Accountants will not need to calculate the deferred income tax expense any longer, and the profit-after-tax in the solid line table is acknowledged by the Company Law, which solves the problem of determining the profit available for distribution.Accountants do not need to record the fair value information needed by security investors in the accounting books; instead, they only need to list the fair value information at the balance sheet date. In addition, because the data in the solid line table has legal credibility, so the legal risks of accountants can be well controlled. Secondly, the arbitrariness of the accounting process will be reduced, and the auditors’ review process will be greatly simplified. The independent auditors will not have to bear the considerable legal risk for the dotted-line table they audit, because the risk of fair value information has been prompted as "not supported by legalevidences". Accountants and auditors can quickly adapt to this financial statements system, without the need of training. In this way, they can save a lot of time to help companies to improve management efficiency. Surveys show that the above design of financial statements is popular with accountants and auditors. Since the workloads of accounting and auditing have been substantially reduced, therefore, the total expenses for auditing and evaluation will not exceed current level as well.In short, from the perspectives of both supply-side and demand-side, the improved financial statements are expected to enhance the usefulness of financial statements, without increase the burden of the supply-side.IV. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONSThe current rule of mixed presentation of fair value data and historical cost data could be improved. The core concept of fair value is to make financial statements reflect the fair value of assets and liabilities, so that we can subtract the fair value of liabilities from assets to obtain the net fair value.However, the current International Standards do not implement this concept, but try to partly transform the historical cost accounting, which leads to mixed using of impairment accounting and fair value accounting. China's accounting academic research has followed up step by step since 1980s, and now has already introduced a mixed-attributes model into corporate financial statements.By distinguishing legal facts from financial expectations, we can balance public interests and private interests and can redesign the financial statements system with enhancing management efficiency and implementing higher-level laws as main objective. By presenting fair value and historical cost in one set of financial statements at the same time, the statements will not only meet the needs of keeping books according to domestic laws, but also meet the demand from financial regulatory authorities and security investorsWe hope that practitioners and theorists offer advices and suggestions on the problem of improving the financial statements to build a financial statements system which not only meets the domestic needs, but also converges with the International Standards.基于会计管理理论的财务报表的优化方法摘要本文提供了一个方法，以提高财务报表的可靠性和实用性。

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