股票价格风险中英文对照外文翻译文献

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（财经文章—译中对照—Michael原创）你将在股市的一片大好声中付出高昂代价

（财经文章—译中对照—Michael原创）你将在股市的一片大好声中付出高昂代价YOU PAY A VERY HIGH PRICE IN THE STOCK MARKET FORA CHEERY CONSENSUS你将在股市的一片大好声中付出高昂代价by Warren E. Buffett作者沃伦.巴菲特Forbes, Vol. 124, No. 3, August 6, 1979, 24-26 by permission of the author. 《福布斯》第124卷第3号，1979年8月6日出版，第24-26页。

经作者授权发表Pension fund managers continue to make investment decision with their eyes firmly fixed on therear-view mirror.退休基金经理人仍在如此作着投资的决策，就象眼睛死盯着倒车镜开车一样。

This generals-fighting-the-last-war approach has proven costly in the past and will likely prove equally costly this time around.这种方法好比让将军们去打最后一打仗，过去的事实已经证明这样的代价是沉重的，现在很可能也是如此。

Stocks now sell at levels that should produce long-term returns far superior to bonds.以目前股票的价格水平看，将来产生的长期回报会远大于债券。

Yet pension managers, usually encouraged by corporate sponsors they must necessarily please (“whose bread I eat, his song I sing”), are pouring funds in record proportions into bonds.然而，基金经理们有必要也必须符合机构赞助商的心意（俗话说“拿人钱财、替人消灾”），在赞助商一再怂恿下，基金经理把资金源源不断地投到债券上，从资金比例上看创下了有史以来最高记录。

商业银行风险管理中英文对照外文翻译文献

商业银行风险管理中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)“RISK MANAGEMENT IN COMMERCIAL BANKS”(A CASE STUDY OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR BANKS) - ABSTRACT ONLY1. PREAMBLE:1.1 Risk Management:The future of banking will undoubtedly rest on risk management dynamics. Only those banks that have efficient risk management system will survive in the market in the long run. The effective management of credit risk is a critical component of comprehensive risk management essential for long-term success of a banking institution. Credit risk is the oldest and biggest risk that bank, by virtue of its very nature of business, inherits. This has however, acquired a greater significance in the recent past for various reasons. Foremost among them is the wind of economic liberalization that is blowing across the globe. India is no exception to this swing towards market driven economy. Competition from within and outside the country has intensified. This has resulted in multiplicity of risks both in number and volume resulting in volatile markets. A precursor to successful management of credit risk is a clear understanding about risks involved in lending, quantifications of risks within each item of the portfolio and reaching a conclusion as to the likely composite credit risk profile of a bank.The corner stone of credit risk management is the establishment of a framework that defines corporate priorities, loan approval process, credit risk rating system, risk-adjusted pricing system, loan-review mechanism and comprehensive reporting system.1.2 Significance of the study:The fundamental business of lending has brought trouble to individual banks and entire banking system. It is, therefore, imperative that the banks are adequate systems for credit assessment of individual projects and evaluating risk associated therewith as well as the industry as a whole. Generally, Banks in India evaluate a proposal through the traditional tools of project financing, computing maximum permissible limits, assessing management capabilities and prescribing a ceiling for an industry exposure. As banks move in to a new high powered world of financial operations and trading, with new risks, the need is felt for more sophisticated and versatile instruments for risk assessment, monitoring and controlling risk exposures. It is, therefore, time that banks managements equip themselves fully to grapple with the demands of creating tools and systems capable of assessing, monitoring and controlling risk exposures in a more scientific manner.Credit Risk, that is, default by the borrower to repay lent money, remains the most important risk to manage till date. The predominance of credit risk is even reflected in the composition of economic capital, which banks are required to keep a side for protection against various risks. According to one estimate, Credit Risk takes about 70% and 30%remaining is shared between the other two primary risks, namely Market risk (change in the market price and operational risk i.e., failure of internal controls, etc.). Quality borrowers (Tier-I borrowers) were able to access the capital market directly without going through the debt route. Hence, the credit route is now more open to lesser mortals (Tier-II borrowers).With margin levels going down, banks are unable to absorb the level of loan losses. There has been very little effort to develop a method where risks could be identified and measured. Most of the banks have developed internal rating systems for their borrowers, but there hasbeen very little study to compare such ratings with the final asset classification and also to fine-tune the rating system. Also risks peculiar to each industry are not identified and evaluated openly. Data collection is regular driven. Data on industry-wise, region-wise lending, industry-wise rehabilitated loan, can provide an insight into the future course to be adopted.Better and effective strategic credit risk management process is a better way to Manage portfolio credit risk. The process provides a framework to ensure consistency between strategy and implementation that reduces potential volatility in earnings and maximize shareholders wealth. Beyond and over riding the specifics of risk modeling issues, the challenge is moving towards improved credit risk management lies in addressing banks’readiness and openness to accept change to a more transparent system, to rapidly metamorphosing markets, to more effective and efficient ways of operating and to meet market requirements and increased answerability to stake holders.There is a need for Strategic approach to Credit Risk Management (CRM) in Indian Commercial Banks, particularly in view of;(1) Higher NPAs level in comparison with global benchmark(2) RBI’ s stipulation about dividend distribution by the banks(3) Revised NPAs level and CAR norms(4) New Basel Capital Accord (Basel –II) revolutionAccording to the study conducted by ICRA Limited, the gross NPAs as a proportion of total advances for Indian Banks was 9.40 percent for financial year 2003 and 10.60 percent for financial year 20021. The value of the gross NPAs as ratio for financial year 2003 for the global benchmark banks was as low as 2.26 percent. Net NPAs as a proportion of net advances of Indian banks was 4.33 percent for financial year 2003 and 5.39 percent for financial year 2002. As against this, the value of net NPAs ratio for financial year 2003 for the global benchmark banks was 0.37 percent. Further, it was found that, the total advances of the banking sector to the commercial and agricultural sectors stood at Rs.8,00,000 crore. Of this, Rs.75,000 crore, or 9.40 percent of the total advances is bad and doubtful debt. The size of the NPAs portfolio in the Indian banking industry is close to Rs.1,00,000 crore which is around 6 percent of India’ s GDP2.The RBI has recently announced that the banks should not pay dividends at more than 33.33 percent of their net profit. It has further provided that the banks having NPA levels less than 3 percent and having Capital Adequacy Reserve Ratio (CARR) of more than 11 percent for the last two years will only be eligible to declare dividends without the permission from RBI3. This step is for strengthening the balance sheet of all the banks in the country. The banks should provide sufficient provisions from their profits so as to bring down the net NPAs level to 3 percent of their advances.NPAs are the primary indicators of credit risk. Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) is another measure of credit risk. CAR is supposed to act as a buffer against credit loss, which isset at 9 percent under the RBI stipulation4. With a view to moving towards International best practices and to ensure greater transparency, it has been decided to adopt the ’ 90 days’ ‘ over due’ norm for identification of NPAs from the year ending March 31, 2004.The New Basel Capital Accord is scheduled to be implemented by the end of 2006. All the banking supervisors may have to join the Accord. Even the domestic banks in addition to internationally active banks may have to conform to the Accord principles in the coming decades. The RBI as the regulator of the Indian banking industry has shown keen interest in strengthening the system, and the individual banks have responded in good measure in orienting themselves towards global best practices.1.3 Credit Risk Management(CRM) dynamics:The world over, credit risk has proved to be the most critical of all risks faced by a banking institution. A study of bank failures in New England found that, of the 62 banks in existence before 1984, which failed from 1989 to 1992, in 58 cases it was observed that loans and advances were not being repaid in time 5 . This signifies the role of credit risk management and therefore it forms the basis of present research analysis.Researchers and risk management practitioners have constantly tried to improve on current techniques and in recent years, enormous strides have been made in the art and science of credit risk measurement and management6. Much of the progress in this field has resulted form the limitations of traditional approaches to credit risk management and with the current Bank for International Settlement’ (BIS) regulatory model. Even in banks which regularly fine-tune credit policies and streamline credit processes, it is a real challenge for credit risk managers to correctly identify pockets of risk concentration, quantify extent of risk carried, identify opportunities for diversification and balance the risk-return trade-off in their credit portfolio.The two distinct dimensions of credit risk management can readily be identified as preventive measures and curative measures. Preventive measures include risk assessment, risk measurement and risk pricing, early warning system to pick early signals of future defaults and better credit portfolio diversification. The curative measures, on the other hand, aim at minimizing post-sanction loan losses through such steps as securitization, derivative trading, risk sharing, legal enforcement etc. It is widely believed that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Therefore, the focus of the study is on preventive measures in tune with the norms prescribed by New Basel Capital Accord.The study also intends to throw some light on the two most significant developments impacting the fundamentals of credit risk management practices of banking industry – New Basel Capital Accord and Risk Based Supervision. Apart from highlighting the salient features of credit risk management prescriptions under New Basel Accord, attempts are made to codify the response of Indian banking professionals to various proposals under the accord. Similarly, RBI proposed Risk Based Supervision (RBS) is examined to capture its direction and implementation problems。

外文翻译------人民币升值对股价的影响

中文3300字本科毕业论文外文原文外文题目：The Impact of Renminbi Appreciation on Stock Prices in China出处：Emerging Markets Finance & Trade作者：Chien-Chung Nieh and Hwey-Yun YauABSTRACT: Since removal of the peg in July 2005, China has entered a new era of a managed floating exchange rate system. Although many observers have raised concerns about the impa ct of such a policy change on China’s trade surplus, less attention has been paid to its effects on financial markets. This paper investigates the impact of recent renminbi appreciation on stock prices in China since removal of the peg, using threshold cointegration and momentum threshold error-correction model (M-TECM). The results clearly illustrate that no short-run causal relation exists, and an asymmetric causal relationship running from the renminbi/U.S. dollar exchange rate to Chinese Shanghai A-share stock prices in the long run is based on M-TECM. Policy and the broader implications of the findings are discussed.KEY WORDS: asymmetric causality, exchange rates, momentum threshold error-correction model (M-TECM), stock prices.China’s currency, the r enminbi (RMB), which for the previous decade was tightly pegged at RMB8.28 to the U.S. dollar, was revalued to RMB8.11 per U.S. dollar on July 21,2005. Following removal of the peg, due in part to political pressure from the United States and the United Kingdom, the Chinese authorities also announced that the renminbi would be pegged to a basket of foreign currencies, rather than being strictly tied to the U.S. dollar (USD), and it would be allowed to float within a narrow 0.3 percent daily band against this basket.The revaluation of the RMB/USD exchange rate has marked a new era of a managed floating exchange rate system. The significance of exchange rate system reform is that the shift to a flexible exchange rate regime, especially the adoption of acurrency band that refers to a basket of currencies, provides the monetary authorities with a certain degree of freedom in implementing policies. The new system would most likely act as a crawling peg, rather than being strictly fixed, allowing China greater flexibility either through adjustments in the crawling peg regime that has involved the basket of currencies or through reweighting of the basket. Observers have frequently suggested that the yuan is undervalued, often on the basis of purchasing power parity arguments (Cline 2005; Goldstein 2004; Goldstein and Lardy 2006), contributing to growing large trade surpluses and portfolio capital inflows. As investment (both domestic and foreign) boomed in 2003–4 and inflation accelerated, some argued that rapid RMB appreciation would be helpful in dealing with the increasing pressure of domestic inflation on the economy (Frankel 2007; McKinnon 2006).However, it was also argued that further RMB appreciation might bring a significant decline in China’s exports. Hence, Chinese policymakers have been facing the dilemma of choosing between the two options (i.e., RMB appreciation vs. depreciation). Credible, gradual RMB appreciation is recommended as an alternative strategy (see Kutan and Tsai 2007).Although much attention has been focused on trade flows, Chinese policymakers face a similar dilemma in terms of the impact of expected renminbi appreciation on domestic financial markets, in particular, the stock market. For instance, if the exchange rate appreciates, exporters are likely to lose competitiveness on international markets, causing a drop in profits and hence in stock prices. On the other hand, depreciation of the renminbi is likely to cause importers to lose competitiveness on domestic markets (consumers may not be able to afford ―higher priced‖ imported products), causing a decline in profits and hence in stock prices.Due to the mutual effects of exchange rates on stock prices, the impact of recent changes in the renminbi on domestic stock prices is an important concern in policy circles and among investors. The purpose of this paper is to address these issues and examine whether an asymmetric causal relationship exists between the RMB/USD exchange rate and stock prices since removal of the peg.Literature ReviewThe issue of whether stock prices and exchange rates are related has long been studied. Two major theories, the traditional and portfolio approaches, are applied to test the dynamic relationship between exchange rates and stock prices. The traditional approach argues that a depreciation of domestic currency makes local firms more competitive, which leads to an increase in exports, and consequently raises stock prices. The traditional approach implies that exchange rates lead stock prices. The portfolio approach, on the contrary, argues that an increase in stock prices induces investors to demand more domestic assets and thereby causes appreciation of the domestic currency, which implies that stock prices lead exchange rates. The ―stock-oriented‖ model of e xchange rates by Branson (1983) views the exchange rate as serving to equate supply and demand for assets such as stocks and bonds.Empirical evidence using both approaches has yielded no consensus on the validity of either theory. For example, Mok (1993) found weak bidirectional causality between stock prices and exchange rates, while Bahmani-Oskooee and Sohrabian (1992) and Nieh and Lee (2001) argued for bidirectional causality between stock prices and exchange rates in the short run, but not in the long run. In addition, some studies found a weak or no association between stock prices and exchange rates (e.g., Bartov and Bodnar 1994; Fernandez 2006; Franck and Young 1972).More recently, it has been suggested that some of the mixed results may be driven by extensive use of linear conventional time-series methodologies, which fail to consider information across regions, and thus lead to inefficient estimations and lower testing power. Recent studies therefore allow for a nonlinear causal relationship between the two variables and also use threshold cointegration methods, which further allow for nonlinear adjustment to long-run equilibrium (Balke and Fomby 1997). MethodologyThis paper employs threshold cointegration techniques as elaborated by Enders and Granger (1998) and Enders and Siklos (2001), which extend the residual-based, two-stage estimation method developed by Engle and Granger (1987). The difference between them lies in the formulation of linearity and nonlinearity from their second stage of unit-root tests. The nonlinear model of Enders and Granger (1998) and Enders and Siklos (2001) can be expressed asΔμt=I tρ1μt-1+(1-It)ρ2μt-1+ΣγiΔμt-1+εtEquation (1) is basically a regime-switching model—a threshold autoregressive (TAR) model of the disequilibrium error, where the test for the threshold of the disequilibriumerror is termed a threshold cointegration test. The result of rejection of the null hypothesis of ρ1= ρ2 = 0 implies the existence of a cointegration relationship between the variables.This enables us to proceed with a further test for symmetric adjustment (i.e., H0: ρ1= ρ2), using a standard F-test. When the coefficients of regime adjustment are equal (symmetric adjustment), Equation (1) converges the prevalent augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. Rejecting both the null hypotheses of ρ1 = ρ2 = 0 and ρ1 = ρ2 implies the existence of threshold cointegration with asymmetric adjustment. Instead of estimating Equation (1) with the Heaviside indicator depending on the level of μt–1, the decay could also be allowed depending on the previous period’s change in μt–1. The Heaviside indicator could then be specified as I t= 1 if Dμt–1 ≥ τ and I t= 0 if Dμt–1≤τ. According to Enders and Granger (1998), this model is especially valuable when the adjustment is asymmetric, such that the series exhibits more ―momentum‖ in one direction than the other. This model is then termed a momentum threshold autoregressive (M-TAR) model. The TAR model is used to capture a deep-cycle process if, for example, positive deviations are more prolonged than negative deviations. On the other hand, the M-TAR model allows autoregressive decay to depend on Dμt–1. As such, M-TAR representation may capture sharp movements in a sequence. As there is generally no presumption as whether to use the TAR or M-TAR model, the recommendation is to select the adjustment mechanism by a model selection criterion such as the Akaike information criterion (AIC) or the Schwarz Bayesian criterion (SBC).Granger Causality TestsGiven the threshold cointegration results, we next apply the Granger causality tests using the advanced momentum threshold error-correction model (M-TECM). The M-TECM is expressed asΔY it=α+γ1Z t1+γ2Z t-t+ΣδiΔY1t-i+ΣθiΔY2t-i+νtBased on Equation (2), Granger causality tests are employed to examine whetherall coefficients of D Y1,t–i or D Y2,t–i are jointly statistically different from zero based on a standard F-test or whether the γj coefficients of the error-correction term are significant. Because Granger causality tests are sensitive to the selection of lag length, applying the AIC criterion to determine the appropriate lag lengths, we find empirically that the lag lengths of k1 and k2 equal two (i.e., k1 = k2 = 2). The results clearly illustrate that no short-run causal relationship exists between EX and CHStock (insignificant to reject both H0: δ1=δ2= 0 and H0: θ1=θ2= 0). Besides, there also exists a unidirectional causality running from EX to CHStock in the long run, when the difference in the previous disequilibrium term is above the threshold value of 0.0048. (H0: θ1 = θ2 = γ1 = 0 is rejected at the 10 percent significance level.) On the other hand, the null hypotheses ofδ1=δ2=γ1= 0，δ1=δ2=γ2= 0 and θ1=θ2=γ2= 0cannot be rejected. Furthermore, the significant finding rejecting the null hypothesis of γ1= γ2 in CHStock is consistent with the finding of our previous M-TART estimations and reconfirms the existence of an asymmetric causal relationship between the two variables considered. Nonetheless, the empirical results of conventional ECM estimations show that CHStock and EX are bidirectional causal related in the long run; whereas, there exists a unidirectional causality running from EX to CHStock in the short run.Conclusions and Policy ImplicationsThis paper investigates the causal relationship between the renminbi/U.S. dollar exchange rate and stock prices in China since removal of the peg. Our results can be summarized as follows: first, we find a threshold cointegration link between the exchange rate and Chinese stock prices. This finding implies that it is possible to predict one market from another, which is inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis. Second, there is a discontinuous adjustment to a long-run equilibrium in two separate regimes, indicating an asymmetric causal relationship between the two variables considered. Third, there exists a unidirectional causal relationship running from exchange rates to stock prices in the long run, suggesting that RMB/USD appreciation has a significant impact on stock prices. In particular, the estimated results show that the speed of the adjustment process toward equilibrium is faster in the Shanghai A-share stock market.The results have important implications. First, policymakers need to consider the impact of exchange rate changes on financial markets in designing appropriate policy strategies. Given that the exchange rate is no longer fixed, the authorities consider the impact of exchange rate changes not only on trade flows but also on financial markets.Second, our results have broader theoretical implications. We find no evidence to support the portfolio approach. On the other hand, although the findings show a unidirectional causal relationship running from exchange rates to stock prices in the long run, this does not completely follow using the traditional approach in the literature either. The traditional approach argues that a depreciation of domestic currency makes local firms more competitive, leading to an increase in exports, and consequently raising stock prices. On the contrary, the empirical results shown in this paper reveal that the appreciation of exchange rates leads stock prices because most companies listed on the Chinese A-share stock market are importers rather than exporters.译文：人民币升值对股价的影响摘要：自2005年7月取消了人民币对美元的盯住制度，中国已经进入了一个浮动汇率管理制度的新时代。

财务风险中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文资料外文翻译财务风险重要性分析译文：摘要：本文探讨了美国大型非金融企业从1964年至2008年股票价格风险的决定小性因素。

我们通过相关结构以及简化模型，研究诸如债务总额，债务期限，现金持有量，及股利政策等公司财务特征，我们发现，股票价格风险主要通过经营和资产特点，如企业年龄，规模，有形资产，经营性现金流及其波动的水平来体现。

与此相反，隐含的财务风险普遍偏低，且比产权比率稳定。

在过去30年，我们对财务风险采取的措施有所减少，反而对股票波动（如独特性风险）采取的措施逐渐增加。

因此，股票价格风险的记载趋势比公司的资产风险趋势更具代表性。

综合二者，结果表明，典型的美国公司谨慎管理的财政政策大大降低了财务风险。

因此，现在看来微不足道的剩余财务风险相对底层的非金融公司为一典型的经济风险。

关键词：资本结构；财务风险；风险管理；企业融资1 绪论2008年的金融危机对金融杠杆的作用产生重大影响。

毫无疑问，向金融机构的巨额举债和内部融资均有风险。

事实上，有证据表明，全球主要银行精心策划的杠杆（如通过抵押贷款和担保债务）和所谓的“影子银行系统”可能是最近的经济和金融混乱的根本原因。

财务杠杆在非金融企业的作用不太明显。

迄今为止，尽管资本市场已困在危机中，美国非金融部门的问题相比金融业的困境来说显得微不足道。

例如，非金融企业破产机遇仅限于自20世纪30年代大萧条以来的最大经济衰退。

事实上，非金融公司申请破产的事件大都发生在美国各行业（如汽车制造业，报纸，房地产）所面临的基本经济压力即金融危机之前。

这令人惊讶的事实引出了一个问题“非金融公司的财务风险是如何重要？”。

这个问题的核心是关于公司的总风险以及公司风险组成部分的各决定因素的不确定性。

最近在资产定价和企业融资再度引发的两个学术研究中分析了股票价格风险利率。

一系列的资产定价文献探讨了关于卡贝尔等的发现。

（2001）在过去的40年，公司特定（特有）的风险有增加的趋势。

股票的估值与股利政策外文文献翻译

股票的估值与股利政策外文文献翻译外文文献翻译原文+译文文献出处：Amidu M. THE STUDY ON V ALUATION OF SHARES AND DIVIDEND POLICY[J]. The journal of risk finance, 2017, 2(2): 136-145.原文THE STUDY ON V ALUATION OF SHARES AND DIVIDENDPOLICYAmidu MAlthough these questions of fact have been the subject of many empirical studies in recent years no consensus has yet been achieved. One reason appears to be the absence in the literature of a complete and reasonably rigorous statement of those parts of the economic theory of valuation bearing directly on the matter of dividend policy. Lacking such a statement, investigators have not yet been able to frame their tests with sufficient precision to distinguish adequately between the various contending hypotheses. Nor have they been able to give a convincing explanation of what their test results do imply about the underlying process of valuation.EFFECT OF DIVIDEND POLICY WITH PERFECT MARKETS, RATIONAL BEHA VIOR, AND PERFECT CERTAINTYThe meaning of the basic assumptions. -Although the terms" perfect markets," "rational behavior," and "perfect certainty" are widely used throughout economic theory, it may be helpful to start by spelling out the precise meaning of these assumptions in the present context.1. In "perfect capital markets," no buyer or seller (or issuer) of securities is large enough for his transactions to have anappreciable impact on the then ruling price. All traders have equal and costless access to information about the ruling price and about all other relevant characteristics of shares (to be detailed specifically later). No brokerage fees, transfer taxes, or other transaction costs are incurred when securities are bought, sold, or issued, and there are no tax differentials either between distributed and undistributed profits or between dividends and capital gains.2."Rational behavior" means that investors always prefer more wealth to less and are indifferent as to whether a given increment to their wealth takes the form of cash payments or an increase in the market value of their holdings of shares.3. "Perfect certainty" implies complete assurance on the part of every investor as to the future investment program and the future profits of every corporation. Because of this assurance, there is, among other things, no need to distinguish between stocks and bonds as sources of fund sat this stage of the analysis. We can, therefore, proceed as if therewere only a single type of financial instrument which, for convenience, we shall refer to as shares of stock.The fundamental principle of valuation.- Under' these assumptions the valuation of all shares would be governed by the following fundamental principle: the price of each share must be such that the rate of return (dividends plus capital gains per dollar invested) on every share will be the same throughout the market over any given interval of time. WHAT DOES THE MARKET "REALLY" CAPITALIZE?In the literature on valuation one can find at least the following four more or less distinct approaches to the valuation of shares: (1) the discounted cash flow approach;(2) the currentearnings plus future investment opportunities approach; (3) the stream of dividends approach; and (4) the stream of earnings approach. To demonstrate that these approaches are, in fact, equivalent it will be helpful to begin by first going back to equation (5) and developing from it a valuation formula to serve as a point of reference and comparisonEARNINGS, DIVIDENDS, AND GROWTH RATESThe convenient case of constant growth rates.-The relation between the stream of earnings of the firm and the stream of dividends and of returns to the stock- holders can be brought out most clearly by specializing(12) to the case in which investment opportunities are such as to generate a constant rate of growth of profits in perpetuity. Admittedly,this case has little empirical significance, but it is convenient for illustrative purposes and has received much attention in the literature.The growth of dividends and the growth of total profits.-Given that total earnings (and the total value of the firm) are growing at the rate kp* what is the rate of growth of dividends per share and of the price per share? Clearly, the answer will vary depending on whether or not the firm is paying out a high percentage of its earnings and thus relying heavily on outside financing. We can show the nature of this dependence explicitly by making use of the fact that whatever the rate of growth of dividends per share the present value of the firm by the dividend approach must be the same as by the earnings approach. The special case of exclusively internal financing.-As noted above the growth rate of dividends per share is not the same as the growth rate of the firm except in the special case in which all financing is internal. This is merely one of a number of peculiarities of thisspecial case on which, unfortunately, many writers have based their entire analysis. The reason for the preoccupation with this special case is far from clear to us. Certainly no one would suggest that it is the only empirically relevant case. Even if the case were in fact the most common, the theorist would still be under an obligation to consider alternative assumptions. We suspect that in the last analysis, the popularity of the internal financing model will be found to reflect little more than its ease of manipulation combined with the failure to push the analysis far enough to disclose how special and how treacherous a case it really is.THE EFFECTS OF DIVIDEND POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTY Uncertainty and the general theory of valuation.-In turning now from the ideal world of certainty to one of uncertainty our first step, alas, must be to jettison the fundamental valuation principle as given, say, in our equation .DIVIDEND POLICY AND MARKET IMPERFECTIONSTo complete the analysis of dividend policy, the logical next step would presumably be to abandon the assumption of perfect capital markets. This is, however, a good deal easier to say than to do principally because there is no unique set of circumstances that constitutes "imperfection. "We can describe not one but a multitude of possible departures from strict perfection, singly and in combinations. Clearly, to attempt to pursue the implications of each of these would only serve to add inordinately to an already overlong discussion. We shall instead, therefore, limit ourselves in this concluding section to a few brief and genera lob serrations about imperfect markets that we hope may prove helpful to those taking up the task of extending the theory of valuation in this direction.It is important to keep in mind that from the standpoint of dividend policy, what counts is not imperfection per se but only imperfection thatmight lead an investor to have a systematic preference as between a dollar of current dividends and a dollar of current capital gains. Whereon such systematic preference is produced, we can subsume the imperfection in the (random) error term always carried along when applying propositions derived from ideal models to real world events.译文股票的估值与股利政策研究Amidu M近年来，虽然有很多关于这些问题的实证探索研究，但是并未研究出有效地结果，专家学者们也未达成一致。

公司财务风险中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文资料外文翻译外文资料Financial ﬁrm bankruptcy and systemic riskIn Fall 2008 when the Federal Reserve and the Treasury injected $85 billion into the insurance behemoth American International Group (AIG), themoney lent to AIGwent straight to counterparties, and very few funds remained with the insurer. Among the largest recipients was Goldman Sachs, to whomabout $12 billionwas paid to undoAIG’s credit default swaps (CDSs). The bailout plan focused on repaying the debt by slowly selling off AIG’s assets, w ith no intention of maintaining jobs or allowing the CDSmarket to continue to function as before. Thus, the government’s effort to avoid systemic risk with AIG was mainly about ensuring that ﬁrms with which AIG had done business did not fail as a result. T he concerns are obviously greatest vis-a-vis CDSs, ofwhich AIG had over $400 billion contracts outstanding in June 2008.In contrast, the government was much less enthusiastic about aiding General Motors, presumably because they believed its failure would not cause major macroeconomic repercussions by imposing losses on related ﬁrms. This decision is consistent with the view in macroeconomicresearch that financialﬁrmbankruptcies pose a greater amount of systemic risk than nonfinancial firmbankruptcies. For example, Bordo and Haubrich (2009) conclude that “...more severe ﬁnancial events are associated withmore severe recessions...” Likewise, Bernanke (1983) argues the Great Depressionwas so severe because ofweakness in the banking systemthat affected the amount of credit available for investment. Bernanke et al. (1999) hypothesize a financial accelerator mechanism, whereby distress in one sector of the economy leads to more precarious balance sheets and tighter credit conditions. This in turn leads to a drop in investment, which is followed by less lending and a widespread downturn. Were shocks to the economy always to come in the form of distress at nonﬁnancial ﬁrms, these authors argue that the business downturns would not be so severe.We argue instead that the contagious impact of a nonfinancial firm’s bankruptcy is expected to be far larger than that of a financial ﬁrm like AIG, although neither would be catastrophic to the U.S. economy through counterparty risk channels. This is not to say that an episode ofwidespread financial distress among our largest banks would not be followed by an especially severe recession, only that such failures would not cause a recession or affect the depth of a recession. Rather such bankruptcies are symptomatic of common factors in portfolios that lead to wealth losses regardless of whether any firm ﬁles for bankruptcy.Pervasive ﬁnancial fragility may occur because the failure of one ﬁrm leads to the failure of other ﬁrms which cascades through the system (e.g., Davis and Lo, 1999; Jarrow and Yu, 2001). Or systemic risk may wreak havoc when a number of ﬁnancial ﬁrms fail simultaneously, as in the Great Depression when more than 9000 banks failed (Benston, 1986). In the former case, the failure of one ﬁrm, such as AIG, Lehman Brothers or Bear Stearns, could lead to widespread failure through ﬁnancial contracts such as CDSs. In the latter case, the fact that so many ﬁnancial institutions have failed means that both the money supply and the amount of credit in the economy could fall so far as to cause a large drop in economic activity (Friedman and Schwartz, 1971).While a weak ﬁnancial systemcould cause a recession, the recession would not arise because one ﬁrm was allowed to ﬁle bankruptcy. Further, should one or the other ﬁrmgo bankrupt, the nonﬁnancial ﬁrmwould have the greater impact on the economy.Such extreme real effects that appear to be the result of ﬁnancial ﬁrm fragility have led to a large emphasis on the prevention of systemic risk problems by regulators. Foremost amo ng these policies is “too big to fail” (TBTF), the logic of which is that the failure of a large ﬁnancial institution will have ramifications for other ﬁnancial institutions and therefore the risk to the economywould be enormous. TBTF was behind the Fed’s decisions to orchestrate the merger of Bear Stearns and J.P.Morgan Chase in 2008, its leadership in the restructuring of bank loans owed by Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), and its decision to prop up AIG. TBTF may be justiﬁed if the outcome is preven tion of a major downswing in the economy. However, if the systemic risks in these episodes have been exaggerated or the salutary effects of these actions overestimated, then the cost to the efﬁciency of the capital allocation system may far outweigh any po tential beneﬁts from attempting to avoid another Great Depression.No doubt, no regulator wants to take the chance of standing down while watching over another systemic risk crisis, sowe do not have the ability to examine empiricallywhat happens to the economy when regulators back off. There are very fewinstances in themodern history of the U.S.where regulators allowed the bankruptcy of amajor ﬁnancial ﬁrm.Most recently,we can point to the bankruptcy of Lehman,which the Fed pointedly allowed to fail.However,with only one obvious casewhere TBTFwas abandoned, we have only an inkling of how TBTF policy affects systemic risk. Moreover, at the same time that Lehman failed, the Fed was intervening in the commercial paper market and aiding money marketmutual fundswhile AIGwas downgraded and subsequently bailed out. In addition, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury were scaremongering about the prospects of a second Great Depression to make the passage of TARPmore likely. Thuswewill never knowifthemarket downturn th at followed the Lehman bankruptcy reﬂected fear of contagion from Lehman to the real economy or fear of the depths of existing problems in the real economy that were highlighted so dramatically by regulators.In this paper we analyze the mechanisms by which such risk could cause an economy-wide col-lapse.We focus on two types of contagion that might lead to systemic risk problems: (1) information contagion,where the information that one ﬁnancial ﬁrmis troubled is associatedwith negative shocksat other ﬁnanc ial institutions largely because the ﬁrms share common risk factors; or (2) counterparty contagion,where one important ﬁnancial institution’s collapse leads directly to troubles at other cred-itor ﬁrms whose troubles snowball and drive other ﬁrms into distress. The efﬁcacy of TBTF policies depends crucially on which of these two types of systemic riskmechanisms dominates.Counterparty contagion may warrant intervention in individual bank failureswhile information contagion does not.If regulators do not ste p in to bail out an individual ﬁrm, the alternative is to let it fail. In the case of a bank, the process involves the FDIC as receiver and the insured liabilities of the ﬁrmare very quickly repaid. In contrast, the failure of an investment bank or hedge fund does not involve the FDIC andmay closely resemble a Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 ﬁling of a nonﬁnancial ﬁrm. However, if the nonbank ﬁnancial ﬁrm inquestion has liabilities that are covered by the Securities Industry Protection Corporation (SIPC), the ﬁrmi s required by lawunder the Securities Industry Protection Act (SIPA) to liquidate under Chapter 7 (Don and Wang, 1990). This explains in large partwhy only the holding company of Lehman ﬁled for bankruptcy in 2008 and its broker–dealer subsidiaries were n ot part of the Chapter 11 ﬁling.A major fear of a ﬁnancial ﬁrm liquidation, whether done through the FDIC or as required by SIPA, is that ﬁre sales will depress recoveries for the creditors of the failed ﬁnancial ﬁrm and that these ﬁre saleswill have ramiﬁcations for other ﬁrms in related businesses, even if these businesses do not have direct ties to the failed ﬁrm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). This fear was behind the Fed’s decision to extend liquidity to primary dealers inMarch 2008 – Fed Chairman Bernanke explained in a speech on ﬁnancial system stability that“the risk developed that liquidity pressuresmight force dealers to sell assets into already illiquid markets. Thismight have resulted in...[a] ﬁre sale scenario..., inwhich a cascade of failures andliquidations sharply depresses asset prices, with adverse ﬁnancial and economic implications.”(May 13, 2008 speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta conference at Sea Island, Georgia) The fear of potential ﬁre sales is expressed in further detail in t he same speech as a reason for the merger of Bear Stearns and JP Morgan:“Bear...would be forced to ﬁle for bankruptcy...[which] wouldhave forced Bear’s secured creditors and counterparties to liquidate the underlying collateral and, given the illiquidity of markets, those creditors and counter parties might well have sustained losses. If they responded to losses or the unexpected illiquidity of their holdings by pulling back from providing secured ﬁnancing to other ﬁrms, a much broader liquidity crisis wou ld have ensued.”The idea that creditors of a failed ﬁrm are forced to liquidate assets, and to do so with haste, is counter to the basic tenets of U.S. bankruptcy laws, which are set up to allow creditors the ability to maximize the value of the assets now under their control. If that value is greatest when continuing to operate, the laws allow such a reorganization of the ﬁrm. If the value in liquidation is higher, the laws are in no way prejudiced against selling assets in an orderly procedure. Bankruptcy actually reduces the likelihood of ﬁre sales because assets are not sold quickly once a bankruptcy ﬁling occurs. Cash does not leave the bankrupt firm without the approval of a judge.Without pressure to pay debts, the ﬁrm can remain in bankruptcy for months as it tries to decide on the best course of action. Indeed, a major complaint about the U.S. code is that debtors can easily delay reorganizing and slow down the process.If, however, creditors and management believe that speedy assets sales are in their best interest, then they can press the bankruptcy judge to approve quick action. This occurred in the case of Lehman’s asset sale to Barclays,which involved hiring workers whomight have split up were their divisions not sold quickly.金融公司破产及系统性的风险2008年秋，当美联邦储备委员会和财政部拒绝85亿美金巨资保险投入到美国国际集团时，这边借给美国国际集团的货款就直接落到了竞争对手手里，而投保人只得到极少的一部分资金。

证券市场行为金融中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照外文翻译文献中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)外文翻译：Behavioral Finance1. IntroductionBehavioral finance is the paradigm where financial markets are studied using models that are less narrow than those based on Von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility theory and arbitrage assumptions. Specifically, behavioral finance has two building blocks: cognitive psychology and the limits to arbitrage. Cognitive refers to how people think. There is a huge psychology literature documenting that people make systematic errors in the way that they think: They are overconfident, they put too much weight on recent experience, etc. Their preferences may also create distortions. Behavioral finance uses this body of knowledge rather than taking the arrogant approach that it should be ignored. Limits to arbitrage refers to predicting in what circumstances arbitrage forces will be effective, and when they will not be.Behavioral finance uses models in which some agents are not fully rational, either because of preferences or because of mistaken beliefs. An example of an assumption about preferences is that people are loss averse—a $2 gain might make people feel better by as much as a $1 loss makes them feel worse. Mistaken beliefs arise because people are bad Bayesians. Modern finance has as a building block the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH). The EMH argues that competition between investors seeking abnormal profits drives prices to their “correct” value. The EMH does not assume that all investors are rational, but it does assume that markets are rational. The EMH does not assume that markets can foresee the future, but it does assume that markets make unbiased forecasts of the future. In contrast, behavioral finance assumes that, in some circumstances, financial markets are informationally inefficient.Not all misvaluations are caused by psychological biases, however. Some are just due to temporary supply and demand imbalances. For example, the tyranny of indexing can lead to demand shifts that are unrelated to the future cash flows of the firm. When Yahoo was added to the S&P 500 in December 1999, index fund managers had to buy the stock even though it had a limited public float. This extra demand drove up the price by over 50% in a week and over 100% in a month. Eighteen months later, the stock price was down by over 90% from where it was shortly after being added to the S&P.If it is easy to take positions (shorting overvalued stocks or buying undervalued stocks) and these misvaluations are certain to be corrected over a short period, then “arbitrageurs” will take positions and eliminate these mispricings before they become large. However, if it is difficult to take these positions, due to short sales constraints, for instance, or if there is no guarantee that the mispricing will be corrected within a reasonable timeframe, then arbitrage will fail to correct themispricing.1 Indeed, arbitrageurs may even choose to avoid the markets where the mispricing is most severe, because the risks are too great. This is especially true when one is dealing with a large market, such as the Japanese stock market in the late 1980s or the US market for technology stocks in the late 1990s. Arbitrageurs that attempted to short Japanese stocks in mid-1987 and hedge by going long in US stocks were right in the long run, but they lost huge amounts of money in October 1987 when the US market crashed by more than the Japanese market (because of Japanese government intervention). If the arbitrageurs have limited funds, they would be forced to cover their positions just when the relative misvaluations were greatest, resulting in additional buying pressure for Japanese stocks just when they were most overvalued!5. ConclusionsThis brief introduction to behavioral finance has only touched on a few points. More extensive analysis can be found in Barberis and Thaler (2003), Hirshleifer (2001), Shefrin (2000), and Shiller (2000).It is very difficult to find trading strategies that reliably make money. This does not imply that financial markets are informationally efficient, however. Low-frequency misvaluations may be large, without presenting any opportunity to reliably make money. As an example, individuals or institutions who shorted Japanese stocks in 1987–1988 when they were substantially overvalued, or Taiwanese stocks in early 1989 when they were substantially overvalued, or TMT stocks in the US, Europe, and Hong Kong in early 1999 when they were substantially overvalued, all lost enormous amounts of money as these stocks became even more overvalued. Most of these shortsellers, who were right in the long run, were wiped out before the misvaluations started to disappear. Thus, the forces of arbitrage, which work well for high-frequency events, work very poorly for low-frequency eventsBehavioral finance is, relatively speaking, in its infancy. It is not a separate discipline, but instead will increasingly be part of mainstream finance.行为金融1.引言行为金融学就是用来研究金融市场的一种新型的模型。

金融资产证券化中英文对照外文翻译文献

金融资产证券化中英文对照外文翻译文献Financial Asset nAsset-Backed n (ABS) ___ ns。

typically commercial banks。

to remove unmarketable assets。

such as lease assets。

mortgage assets。

or commercial papers。

from their balance sheets in exchange for a long-term loan that can be ___。

the financial assets are transformed into bonds。

known as notes。

and the proceeds from their market issuance e a long-term loan for the asset owner。

also known as the originator。

This article will primarily focus on the n of ABS.ABS nThe ABS ___:1.___ a pool of financial assets that it intends to securitize.2.___ of the assets to a special purpose vehicle (SPV)。

which is created for the sole purpose of holding the assets and issuing the notes.3.The SPV issues the notes。

which are backed by the cash flows generated by the underlying assets.4.The notes are sold to investors in the capital markets。

货币政策的影响股票价格外文翻译

原文The Impact of Monetary Policy on Stock PricesMaterial Source:chool of Management, University of Bath, Bath, UK；Department of Economics,University of Glasgow,Glasgow,UKAutor:Christos Ioannidis and Alexandros Kontonikas b* Previous empirical evidence broadly supports the notion that restrictive . monetary policy decreases (increases) contemporaneous stock returns, as well as expected stock returns. These studies typically relate stock returns to measures of monetary policy stringency in the context of single equation specifications and/or multivariate Vector Autoregressions.In this paper we take a closer look at the impact of monetary policy on stock returns by utilising thirty years of data across thirteen OECD countries. Given the considerable debate on the relative merits of money aggregates during the late 1970s and early 1980s, we adopt the nowadays standard approach of measuring monetary policy using interest rate variables. We expand previous work by examining the sensitivity of our findings to the inclusion of dividend payments in the stock returns calculation, while considering both nominal and real returns. Our results indicate that for the majority of the countries under investigation the monetary environment is an important determinant of investors’required returns. We also examine the contemporaneous effect of monetary policy on stock returns taking into account the non-normality typically inherent in such data as well as the significant co-movement of international stock markets. The main result, that expansionary monetary policy boosts the stock market, remains largely robust in most sample countries.The implications of such findings for monetary policy making and investor portfolio formation are highly important.Central bankers and stock market participants should be aware of the relationship between monetary policy and stock market performance in order to better understand the effects of policy shifts. Monetary authorities in particular face the dilemma of whether to react to stock price movements, above and beyond the standard response to inflation and output developments. There is an ongoing debate in the monetary policy rules literature between the proactive and reactive approach. On the one hand, the proactive view advocates that monetary policymakers should alter interest rates in response todeveloping stock price bubbles in order to reduce overall macroeconomic volatility . On the other hand, according to the reactive approach, monetary authorities should wait and see whether the stock price reversal occurs, and if it does, to react accordingly to the extent that there are implications for inflation and output stability. Hence, the reactive approach is consistent with an accommodative expost response to stock price changes . Despite the difference in the timing of the reaction, both approaches effectively assume that the monetary authorities can affect stock market value. It is apparent then, that the empirical verification of this assumption is important for monetary policy formulation. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the theoretical framework underlying the relationship between monetary policy and the stock market.The present value or discounted cash flow model offers useful insights on the stock market effects of monetary policy changes. According to this widely used model the stock price is the present value of expected future dividends .Thorbecke (1997) employs a number of alternative methodologies to examine the relationship between monetary policy and stock prices in the United States. Using a V AR system that includes monthly equity returns, output growth, inflation, and the federal funds rate, he finds that monetary policy shocks, measured by orthogonalized innovations in the federal funds rate, have a greater impact on smaller capitalisation stocks, this is in line with the hypothesis that monetary policy affects firms access to credit (see Gertler and Gilchrist,1993). In the same paper, Thorbecke (1997) adopts the Boschen and Mills (1995) index as an alternative measure of monetary policy conditions. In line with his V AR estimates, he finds that expansionary monetary policy exerts a large and statistically significant positive effect on monthly stock returns. In a recent study, Cassola and Morana (2004) also employ the V AR methodology. In particular, they use a cointegrated V AR system including real GDP, inflation, real M3 balances, short term interest rate, bond yield, and real stock prices in order to examine the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the Euro area. Their results from impulse response analysis indicate that a permanent positive monetary shock has a temporary positive effect on real stock prices. Patelis (1997) examines whether some portion of the observed predictability in excess US stock returns can be attributed to shifts in the monetary policy stance. Following Fama and French8 (1989), he employs the long-horizon regression methodology, using two sets of explanatory variables: monetary policy variables and financial variables. He finds that monetary policy variables are significant predictorsof future returns, although they cannot account fully for the observed stock return predictability. Patelis’explanation for the finding that monetary policy indicators are significant predictors of excess stock returns relates to the financial propagation mechanism (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989) and to the credit channel of monetary policy transmission (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995)Jensen and Johnson (1995) also find that monetary policy developments are associated with patterns in stock returns. They show that long-term stock returns following discount rate decreases are higher and less volatile than returns following rate increases. Their motivation for the employment of the discount rate as a proxy for the stance of monetary policy follows from the view that the discount rate is typically regarded as a signal of monetary and possibly economic developments. This argument is based on Waud’s (1970) suggestion that discount rate changes affect market participants’expectations about monetary policy. Since rate changes are made only at substantial intervals, they represent a somewhat discontinuous instrument of monetary policy, and they are established by a public body perceived as being competent in judging the economy’s cash and credit needs. Financial economists discuss various reasons why changes in the discount rate may affect stock returns. For example, discrete policy rate changes influence forecasts of market determined interest rates and the equity cost of capital. Also, changes in the discount rate possibly affect expectations of corporate profitability (Waud, 1970). In a subsequent study, Jensen, Mercer and Johnson (1996) extend the Fama and French (1989) analysis by suggesting that the monetary environment affects investors’required returns. Monetary policy stance is proxied by a binary dummy variable indicating discount rate changes Jensen et al. (1996) find that predictable variation in stock returns depends on monetary as well as business conditions, with expected stock returns being higher in tight money periods than in easy money periods. The results also indicate an asymmetry in the relation between business conditions and stock returns: business conditions could predict future stock returns only in periods of expansive monetary policy. Conover, Jensen and Johnson (1999) argue that not only US stock returns, but also returns on foreign markets are related with US monetary environments . They find that stock returns in twelve OECD countries over the period 1956-1995 are generally higher in expansive US and local monetary environments than they are in restrictive environments.译文货币政策的影响股票价格资料来源: School of Management, University of Bath, Bath, UK；Department of Economics, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK作者：Christos Ioannidis and Alexandros Kontonikas b*以前的经验证据广泛支持观念货币政策的限制能同时降低股票的回报率,以及预期的股票收益。

股市金融全球化中英文对照外文翻译文献

股市金融全球化中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)外文:Taking Stock Seriously: Equity-Market Performance,Government Policy, and Financial GlobalizationMosley, Layna Singer, David AndrewAre equity markets just another facet of global finance, or are they unique in their responses to—and influences on—government policies and institutions? Recent work has explored the impact of political factors on bond market behavior and foreign direct investment, but little attention has been paid to stock markets. On the basis of the particular concerns of equity investors, we hypothesize a positive association between stock-market valuations and levels of democracy, shareholder rights, legal traditions, and capital-account liberalization, a negative association with real interest rates, and no association with fiscal deficits or surpluses. We assess our expectations by analyzing the political and institutional determinants of aggregate price-to-earnings ratios for a sample of up to 37 countries from 1985 to 2004, using both cross-sectional and time-series cross-sectional analyses. We find support for most, but not all, of our hypotheses. Our findings suggest that we must disaggregate the effects of different asset markets to understand the impact of economicglobalization on government policies.How do government policies and institutions affect equity-market performance a cross countries? As stock markets grow broader and deeper in both the developed and developing worlds, this question becomes more critical. In 2004, global stock-market capitalization stood at $37.2 trillion, compared to global GDP of $41.3 trillion. While this figure was slightly less than global commercial bank assets, it markedly exceeded the total size of outstanding public debt securities, which were $23.1 trillion.1 The bulk of global stock-market capitalization represents developed-country equity markets, but less developed country markets—which accounted for 14 percent of total capitalization in 2004—are quickly gaining ground. Some emerging market countries, such as Malaysia, Singapore, and South Africa, have total stock-market capitalizations that exceed their respective gross domestic products .Equity markets enhance corporate efficiency, spur innovation, and provide a valuable source of capital for long-term economic development. They also provide a useful mechanism for governments to raise capital through the sale of state-owned enterprises. Moreover, equity-market investments consti tute an important element of individuals’ assets, particularly as governments shift their pension systems toward the private sector. In short, it is clear that equities constitute an increasingly important capital market in the world economy. However, we currentlyknow very little about how government policy choices and political institutions influence equity investors’ decisions.T he few extant analyses of stock markets and politics tend to focus on one or two developed countries, or on sectoral variation within a particular market, rather than on the determinants of national-level market outcomes in a broader cross-country context. For instance, David Leblang and Bumba Mukherjee consider the impact of government partisanship and elections on stock market outcomes in the United States and Great Britain. In a wider study, Fiona McGillivray (2003) considers the impact of partisan changes and electoral institutions on stock-market outcomes in fourteen advanced democracies. Her analyses, however, focus largely on industry-level variation, arguing that shifts in political constellations change investors’ expectationsregarding which sectors will benefit from public policies. Indeed, McGillivray is interested less in equity-market outcomes per se than in using such outcomes as a proxy measure of the expectations of economic actors regarding political decisions. Similarly, William Bernhard and David Leblang consider the impact of politics and political uncertainty on daily market behavior in several advanced democracies. Unlike most analyses, theirs considers outcomes in multiple asset markets, including currencies, equities, and government bonds. Bernhard and Leblang’s aim, however, is to explore the consequences of discrete politicalevents—such as elections and cabinet formations—on capital markets, rather than to assess the broader impact of public policy and institutions on capital market outcomes.This article seeks to round out the literature on financial globalization by exploring the linkages between equity-market outcomes and national government policies and institutions. Its contribution is both theoretical and empirical. Theoretically, we elaborate on the politics of equity-market performance, focusing in particular on the effects of government policies and institutions on stockmarket valuations. We rely on the relatively developed literature on foreign direct investment and sovereign bond markets to underscore the distinctiveness of equity-market reactions to government policies. Empirically, we conduct a novel evaluation of the correlates of total-market, price-to-earnings ratios (P ⁄E) for a sample of up to 37 developed and emerging market countries during the 1985–2004 period. Cross-sectional and time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) analyses reveal that levels of democracy, market liquidity, shareholder rights, and capital-account liberalization are positively associated with equity-market valuations, while real interest rates are negatively associated. We also find that investors are positively disposed toward equity markets in emerging-market countries, and negatively disposed toward markets with high dividend payout ratios. Interestingly, many of the political and economic factors—includinginflation, and fiscal policy—deemed highly salient to investors in other financial markets are not statistically associated with stock-market valuations. These results are robust to the inclusion of a number of control variables, including capital-asset pricing model (CAPM) factors and alternative pricing model considerations.Note that the responses of investors to policies and institutions also have implications for future government policy choices. For instance, if a nation’s economy relies more heavily on FDI than on sovereign lending or bank financing, its government may face few pressures to reduce public spending. On the other hand, if a government relies heavily on the bond market to finance its expenditures, but has a relatively low level of stock-market capitalization, it may face greater pressures for fiscal and monetary tightening. And if a country relies on a varied menu of financial inflows, as most do, asset holders will express diverse preferences over public policy. Untangling the various financial-market influences on government policy making is clearly a long term research project. This article, which focuses on the political determinants of equity investors’ behavior, complements similar analyses of sovereign bond markets and foreign direct investment. Once we understand how investors in each market react to government policies and institutions, we can then advance to a broader analysis of the impact of financial markets—along with domestic institutions, interest groups, and other factors—on governmentpolicy making and institutional design.Stock-market performance is increasingly a target of analysis by political scientists, because equity investors may be highly sensitive to the effects of certain government policies and institutions on their investments. Equity investments are generally very liquid, and the time horizons of equity investors are often relatively short. As a result, changes in government policies can trigger a swift response by investors. Government policies that enhance investor confidence—either directly, by providing shareholder protections and ease of exit, or indirectly, by expanding the economy and improving corporate earnings—will be rewarded by higher stock prices and market valuations. On the other hand, investors can quickly withdraw their funds if governments choose market-unfriendly policies, thereby generating downward pressure on stock prices and valuations. Stock markets, in short, are a valuable indicator of financial actors’ preferences over government institutions and policy outcomes.A fitting alternative measure of performance is the ratio of the stock price to company earnings—or, in other words, the price that equity investors are willing to pay for an expected stream of profits. As with stock prices, these ratios reflect investors’ expectations about future earnings, b ut they also signal investors’ preferences over time-varying government policy and largely invariant political institutions. Because ofthe latter, cross-national variation in P ⁄E ratios persists even when national stock markets are hit simultaneously by global price shocks.The extant literature on the linkages between globalization and domestic politics has paid scant attention to the diverse ways in which countries are integrated into the world economy. By assuming that financial markets impose a unified influence on government policies, prior studies have overlooked the stark variation in the preferences of investors across different types of financial assets. In this article, we argue that equity investors are becoming an increasingly influential force in the global economy, and that their preferences diverge from those of other financial actors in important ways. To illustrate this divergence, we present empirical analyses of the political and institutional determinants of equity market performance across a sample of developed and developing countries. Among the most interesting findings are that market valuations are significantly associated with capital-account openness, shareholder protections, levels of development, and alternative domestic investments. In addition, equity investors appear indifferent toward government fiscal balances and the partisan orientations of government leaders. Given that countries are integrated into the global financial system in different ways, these findings lead to the question of how government policy makers might reconcile the competing interests of different types of financial investors.译文：股市严重性讨论：股权市场现象，政府政策与金融全球化在政府的政策和体制影响中，股市是另一个全球金融市场，还是有其独特的反应？最近的工作探讨了政治因素对债券市场的行为和外国直接投资的影响，但很少注意到股票市场。

银行股票收益与房地产市场风险外文翻译文献

文献信息：文献标题：REAL ESTATE MARKET RISK IN BANK STOCK RETURNS: EVIDENCE FOR 15 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES（银行股票收益中的房地产市场风险：15个欧洲国家的证据）国外作者：António Miguel MARTINS，Ana Paula SERRA，Francisco Vitorino MARTINS文献出处：《International Journal of Strategic Property Management》,2016,20(2):142-155字数统计：英文2383单词，12511字符；中文3898汉字外文文献：REAL ESTATE MARKET RISK IN BANK STOCK RETURNS: EVIDENCE FOR 15 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES Abstract In countries with highly-developed financial systems bank portfolios have high exposure, directly or indirectly, to the real estate sector. Changes in the value of real estate can have a potentially significant impact on the default risk of banks and on their profitability as a result of high exposure to the real estate sector. This is especially critical during real estate crises, when bank losses tend to increase dramatically, placing the entire financial system at risk of collapse, as it was the case of the recent international subprime crisis. This article studies the sensitivity of bank stock returns to real estate returns in 15 European countries. The results indicate that bank stocks are sensitive to real estate market conditions. There is a positive relation between bank stock returns and real estate returns after controlling for general market conditions and interest rates changes.KEYWORDS: Real estate; Mortgage lending; Banks; Asset pricing; Property prices1.INTRODUCTIONIn countries with highly-developed financial systems bank portfolios have high exposure, directly or indirectly, to the real estate sector. He et al. (1996), Lausberg (2004) and Lu and So (2005), indicate the existence of a high concentration of activity and assets in the real estate sector by banks in the USA, Germany, and in some Asian countries.This way, in spite of all bank loans being vulnerable to general market conditions, the default risk on loans is influenced by a specific additional factor: bank real estate loans are affected by movements in the real estate market which are only indirectly related to the general economic conditions. Taking into account that the market value of banks is systematically influenced by the real estate market, the valuation models of bank stocks should include factors which reflect the conditions in the real estate market. Given that the financing of the real estate industry constitutes a significant part of the banks’ loan portfolios, it is likely that real estate market conditions affect their stock prices.The inclusion of realestatemarket conditions as a risk factor has not been thoroughly considered in the literature. Studies looking the behavior of bank share prices focus on market and interest rate risks (see for example, Viale et al. 2009). The Asian financial crisis and, more recently, the subprime crisis highlighted the importance of the real estate risk. Herring and Wachter (1999) and Lu and So (2005) state that, priortothesecrises, there was a tendency for over-investment in the real estate sector due to the high returns associated with this type of investment, potentially driving the occurrence of speculative bubbles in real estate prices in the vast majority of these markets. Furthermore, the increase in real estate prices tends also to bring about an increase in the value of collaterals, resulting in a perceived lower risk by the lender. For these reasons, the increase in real estate prices tends to produce increasing bank credit granting, which in turn, leads to new further rises inrealestateprices.Theexistence of moral hazard, caused by high competition and the emphasis on size growth that followed the liberalization of the banking sector, and the loss of institutionalmemoryregardingthepossibilityof property prices reversals, leadsto banks taking excessive risks whereas the charged risk premium is insufficient to cover the potential losses (Herring, Wachter 1999). Jimenez et al. (2006) state that during booms, riskier borrowers obtain credit more easily and collateral requirements decreases. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) also found evidence of a decrease in lending standards associated with substantial increases in the number of loan applications. The authors show that lending standards declined to a greater extent in areas that experienced faster credit growth. They also note that the entry of new lenders contributed to the decline in lending standards. With specific reference to the subprime experience in the US, Demyanyk and van Hemert (2011) report that loan quality consistently declined for the six years prior to the crisis in 2007. They argue that the high level of house price appreciation observed in the US during this period contributed to the decline in loan quality.A drop in real estate prices brings about a reduction in bank equity, as a consequence of the reduction in the value of the real estate asset and loan portfolios held by banks, and by the corresponding reduction of collaterals. Also, the drop in real estate prices tends to result in greater awareness by banks of the perceived risks of real estate loans. For these reasons, it is very likely that a significant decrease in bank credit granting will occur. Added to this, supervisors and regulators react to the scenario of reduced bank equity with additional requirements of solvability and more stringent rules for the risk evaluation and provisioning for bad loans of real estate assets. These measures result in a further reduction in the bank credit magnifying the downfall movement in real estate prices. This seems to be the mechanism of transmission between real estate market conditions and bank stock risk and returns.In this article, we study the sensitivity of bank returns with regards to real estate returns in 15 European countries (EU-15). In particular, we look at the relationship between the banking industry stock market returns and the returns of real estate companies, for each of the EU-15 countries in our sample, in order to assess the reasonableness of the hypothesis of a priced risk factor in real estate returns of European banks. In our analysis we use a three-factor risk model and an extended Fama-French model (1992 and 1993).Given that there are significant differences between the EU-15 countries and the US banking industry and among the 15 countries in respect to the characteristics of their mortgage markets (Acharya et al. 2011) and other real estate market institutional features, and in the dynamics of real estate prices (Miles, Pillonca 2008), we explore whether bank stocks react differently to real estate market conditions in each of those countries.The results of our research indicate that the stocks of the EU-15 banks are sensitive to the changes in real estate conditions. We find a positive significant relation between bank stock returns and real estate returns, even after controlling for general market conditions and interest rates changes.2.LITERATURE REVIEWStudies looking at the importance of real estate market conditions on bank stock returns are fairly recent and almost exclusively look at the US market. The vast majority of studies that examine common risk factors in bank stock returns uses a two-factor risk model, which implies that bank stock returns are influenced by general market conditions and by movements in interest rates. For example, Flannery and James (1984) and Viale et al. (2009) find a significant negative relation between the change in interest rates and bank stock returns, conditional on the balance-sheet exposure to interest rate risk.Allen et al. (1995) argue that the equity value of banks reacts significantly to real estate market conditions particularly when banks have a significant exposure to the real estate sector and the exposure is significantly influenced by changes in the conditions of the real estate sector.2.1.Real estate market conditions and bank stock returnsAlthough mortgage loans are exposed to interest rate risk, they are also exposed to default risk. As previously stated, the default risk is at least in part a function of changes in the value of real estate. When there is a decrease in the value of loan collaterals, there is an increased probability of default due to the decreased value of loans with collateral. Thus, given that the value of collateral has an impact on thevalue of loans and mortgages, the potential loss to a bank as a result of default risk is inversely related to the value of the collateral.While the real estate market and overall stock market indices are positively correlated, the two markets do not always behave identically. Quan and Titman (1999) study the relation between stock returns and changes in property values and rents for a data of 17 different countries over 14 years. They find, with the exception of Japan, the contemporaneous relation between annual real estate price changes and stock returns is not statistically significant. yet, over longer measurement intervals, they find a significant relation between stock returns and both rents and property value changes. Thus the impact of changes in real estate market conditions, measured by the banks’exposure to this factor, is thus not completely captured by the exposure of bank stocks to the stock market. While a positive correlation between real estate and stock market prices expected, given that both markets are affected by the level of economic activity, several factors can reduce the correlation between the two time series. For example, stock prices may increase because of increased investment opportunities in an economy’s corporate sector. This increase in investment opportunities could in turn lead to increases in real interest rates, which could reduce the value of property.Based on the arguments above, bank stock returns are related to changes in real estate market conditions, conditional on the bank’s asset and loan exposure to the real estate market.2.2. Previous empirical findingsLu and So (2005) present a set of additional studies which show the existence of a significant relationship between the real estate market and the market capitalization of banks. Peek and Rosengren (1994) state that large bank equity losses are the result of exposure to high-risk mortgage loans. Peek and Rosengren (1996) further show that banks with low capital ratios tend to reduce real estate credit grants in a substantial manner after regulatory measures are introduced. Ghosh et al. (1997) show also that the prices of financial institutions react negatively to announcement of adverse newsconcerningtherealestate industry.Hancock and Wilcox (1993, 1994 and 1997) carried out a set of studies on the interaction between loan grants and real estate market activity. They show that the flow of bank loans in the US in 1990 declined primarily due to problems related to the real estate industry, and suggest that the reduction of bank equity had a significant negative effect on the residential and commercial real estate market.2.3. The European marketTsatsaronis and Zhu (2004), Acharya et al. (2011) and Martins et al. (2012), argue that there are significant differences among the EU countries, and between the EU and the US in the case of Acharya et al. (2011), with regard to thecharacteristics of their mortgage markets. For example, while residential mortgage loans in terms of GDP declined in Germany from 55.6% in 1999 to 43.2% in 2008, there was a substantial increase of this asset class in other countries. Specifically, Spain and Ireland almost tripled the value of residentialloansduringthisperiod.Further,there are huge differences in the real estate price dynamics across Europe: Miles and Pillonca (2008) refer the presence of house price bubbles in countries like Spain, Sweden, Belgium and UK, related with different types of mortgage arrangements, while in most of the other European countries the house prices seem to be driven by fundamentals. These and other institutional differences in real estate markets may lead to a different relationship between bank returns and real estate returns across European countries.3.METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE3.1.MethodologyThe literature reviewed above shows the existence of a close relationship between the valuation of banks and banking activity, and the real estate industry, in the U.S. and in Asia. yettheissue was not analyzed for the EU bankingindustry.To carry out the analysis of the relationship between bank stock returns and real estate market conditions we use two models: a three-factor risk model (market risk, interest rate risk and real estate market risk), and an extended Fama-French model with a real estate market risk factor.3.2.SampleWeusedailyandmonthlyreturns.Three time frames are used in the estimates of the two models:(1)Total Period – this time frame differs from country to country, by virtue of the depth of the series used in the model estimates. This period goes from the start date of theindexforeach of the EU-15 countries to 2008；(2)for a sub-period between 2002 and 2006 (five-year time frame); and(3)for a sub-period between 1997 and 2006 (ten-year time frame).4.CONCLUSIONGiven the weight of real estate holdings on the balance sheets of banks, the objective of this study is to assess if bank stock returns are systematically affected by the real estate market conditions. The results show the existence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between bank stock returns and real estate market returns proxies suggesting that real estate risk could be a priced factor. This relationship between the banking industry and real estate is more significant when regional real estate indices are used as benchmark for real estate market conditions, driven by the fact that many European listed banks have significant non-domestic real estate holdings. The results further show an increasing influence of real estate market movements in bank stock returns after the subprime crisis in Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom.our results have two important implications. First, regulators, managers and investors should monitor the exposure of banks to the real estate market, just as they monitor the exposure of banks to interest rates. Second, with respect to event study tests for the banking sector, the results suggest that the underlying return generating models should incorporate an additional risk factor: real estate. Finally, real estate market risk should be included alongside market and interest rate risks to estimate the cost of capital and to evaluate bank performance.In this study, we look at the sensitivities of banking industry indices of the 15 EU countries. In a related working paper we estimate the sensitivities of individual bankstock returns torealestate market conditions and analyze their crosss-ectional differences. We show that individual bank sensitivities to real estate market risk are a negative function of bank size, and a positive function of the degree of bank’s balance-sheet asset and loan exposure to the real estate market. Further, sensitivities are different across countries reflecting different banking and real estate institutional characteristics.中文译文：银行股票收益中的房地产市场风险：15个欧洲国家的证据摘要在金融体系高度发达的国家，银行投资组合对房地产行业有直接或间接的高风险敞口。

上市公司财务风险文献综述中英文资料外文翻译文献

中英文资料外文翻译文献上市公司财务风险的评价及控制的文献综述中国从资本市场建立开始，上市公司也随之不断地发展，上市的公司从行业、类型到地区、规模都呈现多样化趋势。

中国的上市公司，特别是上市公司中的ST公司，存在着严重的财务风险问题，财务风险比较大，对上市公司的发展会有很大的影响。

因此对上市公司财务风险问题的研究是十分重要的。

通过对这一领域大量文献的研究，从企业财务风险的成因、评价体系及控制三个角度综述，加强分析，以期对上市公司财务风险的理论和实践研究提供借鉴和指导。

（一）国外研究综述西方古典经济学家在十九世纪就已经提出了风险的概念，认为风险是经营活动的副产品，经营者的收入是其在经营活动中承担风险的报酬。

从狭义上看，企业的财务风险是指由于利用负债给企业带来的破产风险或普通股收益发生大幅度变动的风险。

这种观点立足于企业筹资时过多举债或举债不当。

西方国家强调全面风险管理的观念是从资金运动到资本经营整个体系的过程，对财务风险的控制包括风险预警、风险识别、危机处理等内容。

美国经济学家富兰克.H.奈特(Frank H.Knight)在1921年出版的(Risk，Uncertainty and Profit)一书中认为：风险是指“可度量的不确定性”。

而“不确定性”是指不可度量的风险。

风险的特征是概率估计的可靠性，概率估计的可靠性来自所遵循的理论规律或稳定的经验规律。

与可计算或可预见的风险不同，不确定性是指人们缺乏对事件的基本知识，对事件可能的结果知之甚少，因此，不能通过现有理论或经验进行预见和定量分析①。

②Ross, Westerfield, Jordan(1995)在《Fundamentals of Corporate Finance》提到①[美] Frank H.Knight,王宇，王文玉译.《风险、不确定性和利润》[M]．中国人民大学出版社．2005；②此段原文如下：“The debt finacing increases the risks borne by the stockholders. The extra risk that arises from the use of debt finacing is called the financial risk of the firm equity. In other word,financial risk is the equity risk债务筹资会增加股东的风险，使用债务筹资所产生的这部分额外风险称为公司股东的财务风险。

股票市场风险研究外文文献翻最新译文

文献出处:Bekaert M. The research of stock market risk [J]. Journal of Econometrics, 2015, 18(2): 181-192.原文The research of stock market riskBekaert MAbstractAsymmetric GARCH model is applied in this article for the post-crisis era of Japan, India and South Korea stock index returns volatility and Asian countries compare the risk of the stock market can be found: of the volatility in the stock index returns of Asia presents a clustering and sustainability, the asymmetry of the stock market exists. The post-crisis era, the Japanese and south Korean stock market returns and risk does not match, reflects the volatility of the stock market in developed countries than developing countries, at the same time, the ability to resist risk of the stock market is gradually strengthened, the information of the stock market impact, tend to be gentle.Key words: The Asia region; The stock market; Risk1 IntroductionIn national economic mutual penetration, interdependence and interaction under the background of economic globalization, especially after a hit from the contemporary international financial crisis, the stock market presents the unprecedented volatility. This increased the uncertainty and risk of the stock market volatility, adverse to the normal operation of the stock market. In order to reduce the negative influence and it is particularly important to accurately measure the stock index returns volatility. At the same time, due to the important position in the global economy in Asia, the healthy development of the stock market has become the focus of attention. The development of the stock market in Asia is not only a regional economic development, more about the economic development of countries around the world. Therefore, the correct measurement of Asia stock index returns volatility has important theoretical and practical significance. At present, as the crisis adversely affected is abate, the nations of the world economy also gradually by the recoveryentered the track of rapid development, how to measure the stock market risk and avoid the post-crisis era become the focus of the academic research problem. It is out of such understanding, using asymmetric GARCH model, the establishment of a stock index returns volatility equation, and in Asia, for example, with the Nikkei 225 index, the Bombay Sensex30 index and composite index as sample data, South Korea, measure the post-crisis Japan, India and South Korea three countries stock index returns volatility, to prevent financial risks and promote the development of the stock market provides certain theoretical guidance.2 Literature reviewThe returns and risk of the stock market has traditionally been the focus of the people. To better avoid risks in order to obtain more profits, people often use the volatility of stock index to quantify risk, this volatility and can be quantified by variance. Around the stock index returns the variance measure, scholars have launched a series of studies. Engle (1982) first proposed the ARCH model, to describe the conditions of the prediction error variance may exist a certain correlation. Bellerose (1986) extends to its, the formation of the generalized autoregressive conditional model (GARCH) model. After their research, get rapid development and application of GARCH model. Y.K.T se (1991) 1986-1989 by examining the Tokyo stock exchange volatility of stock returns, points out that the stock yield sequence has at the same time, he believes that by using the GARCH model not only can well describe the volatility of stock returns, more can predict future stock returns volatility, which provide a basis for effective in preventing the risk of the stock market. Taufiq (1995) using GARCH model research in 1920-1930 five European countries stock return volatility, found that the stock index returns volatility persistence, the impact of external factors, the volatility persistence will be even more significant, high volatility in the stock price also will appear. Robert (2000) to ten countries such as the yield of the stock market and the world index as sample data, studies have shown that PARCH model is a good way to measure the various countries the volatility of stock returns and asymmetry. Basel (2005) using different GARCH model to predict the volatility of the S&P 500 index of equation, the study points out that in the case of informationsymmetry, GARCH model can better depict the stock index volatility, but in the case of asymmetric information, asymmetric GARCH model is optimal. Girard, (2007), and Hung (2009) also think asymmetric GARCH model can well measure of stock index volatility. Sabiruzza etc. (2010) to the Hong Kong stock exchange index as sample, compared the GARCH model and the precision of the TGARCH model in portraying volatility, results show that the TGARCH model can well describe the stock market leverage under asymmetric information, the estimated result is better than GARCH model. Liu and Huang (2010) in different types and distribution under the condition of asymmetric information predict the volatility of the S&P 100 index of equation, and points out that the asymmetric GARCH model in forecasting volatility equation accuracy is higher. Wachter (1995) using garchm model to measure the volatility of the stock market, points out that the prediction precision is stronger, the stock market has a strong speculative, and the volatility of the stock market than the volatility of the stock market. Jacobs (2007) the GARCH model with the method of Risk Metrics standard comparison, find GARCH model can more accurately measure the stock market Risk, scholars in using GARCH model to measure the stock index returns volatility has made many achievements, but most of the literature on empirical research samples is limited to the yield of single or individual countries share index, the lack of research on regional stock index returns volatility, and lack of research on crisis after the outbreak of the Risk of the stock market. In view of this, this article in the region of Japan, India and South Korea share index as samples, analyzes and compares the volatility of the stock index returns. At the same time, considering the stock market on the impact of information asymmetry, this paper respectively using the TARCH model of the asymmetric GARCH model and EGARCH model to estimate volatility equation, in order to better describe the risk in the stock market.3 The construction of a theoretical modelThe volatility of stock index returns not only affected by the current market information, also affected by the historical information and various disturbance factors. Therefore, the stock index returns volatility measurement should be under the condition of known history information, calculate the conditional variance. But beforecalculating conditional variances, the need to eliminate the stock index returns the sequence of the correlation, this requires using the regression equation. Combines the condition of the stock market reaction to real impact, this paper intends to establish asymmetric GARCH model to describe the volatility of stock index returns. TARCH model not only can eliminate the time series data of the ARCH effect, also can depict the characteristics of the financial time series and the impact of asymmetry, effectively for the volatility of financial time series can be estimated. According to the 2009 Asian countries GDP ranking, you can see that Japan, India and South Korea is Asia's economic powerhouse. Therefore, this article will focus on the stock index for empirical research in these countries.4 ConclusionsThis paper USES asymmetric GARCH model, in Japan, India and South Korea in Asia stock market data as sample, empirical research on the stock index returns volatility in Asia, get the following conclusion:The three stock index returns volatility clustering and persistence, and present a different degree of the correlation. At the same time, the asymmetry of the stock market impact of The Three Kingdoms, than the same amount of good news bad news can generate greater volatility; stock index returns volatility has obvious leverage.In the post-crisis era, stock market information than South Korea, Japan and India. At the same time, the Japanese and south Korean stock market returns and risk does not match, reflects the volatility of the stock market in developed countries than developing countries, that developed countries in the international financial crisis the impact is bigger.Model TARCH and EGARCH model considers the impact of asymmetry, the model of setting more accord with the operating rules of the stock market, is an effective tool to measure the stock index returns volatility. This conclusion to a certain extent can reflect the whole situation of stock index returns volatility in Asia, especially the yield fluctuation of leverage. When there is bad news in the stock market, stock prices fell to reduce the rights of the shareholders, so the capital structure of the additional weight will increase in the debt, to increase leverage utilityis greatly increased the risk of holding stocks. When this kind of risk factors by shareholders and investors' expectations after amplification, they will think of the future that there will be a higher stock index returns. Once the universal form expectations, the stock market will appear aggressive selling stock, stock index returns a sharp fluctuation is inevitable. On the contrary, when there is good news in the stock market, investors in the motivation of risk aversion, do not blindly buy lots of stock, so in this case, the stock index returns volatility is very limited, far less than the amount of bad news of volatility.Because each country stock market in scale the openness and development degree of difference is the stock market ability to cope with the impact of external information is different, thus showed different degree of volatility in the stock index returns. At the same time, the national policy factors and by other countries' stock market risk factors of infection, also is the important cause of stock index returns volatility. Therefore, Asian countries should according to their respective national conditions, take corresponding stock market adjustment measures, reduce the stock index returns volatility. The government should strengthen financial supervision, improve the timeliness and accuracy of the stock market information disclosure, avoid caused by psychological panic investors’stock index frequent fluctuations. At the same time, through various channels of education to strengthen the investor's risk prevention awareness, allow investors to develop reasonable expectations of decision making and investment, and scientific evaluation on the risk of the stock market. In addition, to establish risk early warning systems, build firewall preventing the risks of stock market, improve the stock market's ability to resist risk, and gradually establish a set of can adapt to the international market environment changes of risk measurement tools, prevent from other countries' stock market turmoil caused by the country's stock market risk. In a word, by strengthening financial supervision and construction of financial risk early warning system, correctly measure the risk in the stock market, so as to promote the healthy development of the stock market.译文股票市场风险研究Bekaert M摘要本文应用非对称GARCH 模型对后危机时代的日本、印度和韩国的股票指数收益率波动性及亚洲各国股票市场的风险进行比较可发现：亚洲地区股票指数收益率的波动呈现出聚集性和持续性，股票市场存在着冲击的非对称性；后危机时代，日本和韩国股市收益与风险不相匹配，反映出发达国家股票市场的波动性显著大于发展中国家，同时，股票市场的抗风险能力正在逐步加强，股票市场的信息冲击也趋于平缓。

上市公司股权融资中英文对照外文翻译文献

上市公司股权融资中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文:Chinese Listed Companies Preference to Equity Fund:Non-Systematic FactorsAbstract ：This article concentrates on the listed companies’ financing activities in China, analyses the reasons that why the listed companies prefer to equity fund from the aspect of non-systematic factors by using western financing theories, such as financing cost, types and qualities of the enterprises’ assets, profitability, industry factors, shareholding structure factors, level of financial management and society culture, and concludes that the preference to equity fund is a reasonable choice to the listed companies according to Chinese financing environment. At last, there are someconcise suggestions be given to rectify the companie s’ preference to equity fund. Keywords: Equity fund, Non-systematic factors, financial cost1. IntroductionThe listed companies in China prefer to equity fund, According to the statistic data showed in <China Securities Journal>, the amount of the listed companies finance in capital market account to 95.87 billions in 1997, among which equity fund take the proportion of 72.5%, and the proportion is 72.6% in 1998 and 72.3% in 1999, on the other hand, the proportion of debt fund to total fund is respective 17.8%, 24.9% and 25.1% in those three years. The proportion of equity fund to total fund is lower in the developed capital market than that in China. Take US for example, when American enterprises need to fund in the capital market, they prefer to debt fund than equity fund. The statistic data shows that, from 1970 to 1985, the American enterprises’ debt fund financed occupied the 91.7% proportion of outside financing, more than equity fund. Yan Dawu etc. found that, approximately 3/4 of the listed companies preferred to equity fund in China. Many researchers agree upon that the listed companies’ outside financing following this order: first one is equity fund, second one is convertible bond, third one is short-term liabilities, last one is long-term liabilities. Many researchers usually analyze our national listed companies’ preference to equity fund with the systematic factors arising in the reform of our national economy. They thought that it just because of those systematic facts that made the listed com panies’ financial activities betray to western classical financing theory. For example, the “picking order” theory claims that when enterprise need fund, they should turn to inside fund (depreciation and retained earnings) first, and then debt fund, and the last choice is equity fund. In this article, the author thinks that it is because of the specific financial environment that activates the enterprises’ such preference, and try to interpret the reasons of that preference to equity fund by combination of non-systematic factors and western financial theories.2. Financings cost of the listed company and preference to equity fund According to western financing the theories, capital cost of equity fund is more than capital cost of debt fund, thus the enterprise should choose debt fund first, then is theturn to equity fund when it fund outside. We should understand that this conception of “capital cost” is taken into account by investors, it is somewhat opportunity cost of the investors, can also be called expected returns. It contains of risk-free rate of returns and risk rate of returns arising from the investors’ risk investment. It is different with financing cost in essence. Financing cost is the cost arising from enterprises’ financing activities and u sing fund, we can call it fund cost. If capital market is efficient, capital cost should equal to fund cost, that is to say, what investors gain in capital market should equal to what fund raisers pay, or the transfer of fund is inevitable. But in an inefficient capital market, the price of stock will be different from its value because of investors’ action of speculation; they only chase capital gain and don’t want to hold the stocks in a long time and receive dividends. Thus the listed companies can gain fund with its fund cost being lower than capital cost.But in our national capital market, capital cost of equity fund is very low; it is because of the following factors: first, the high P/E Ratio (Price Earning Ratio) of new issued shares. According to calculation, average P/E Ratio of Chinese listed companies’ shares is between 30 and 40, it also is maintained at 20 although drops somewhat recently. But the normal P/E Ratio should be under 20 according to experience. We can observe the P/E was only 13.2 from 1874 to 1988 in US, and only 10 in Hong Kong. High P/E Ratio means high share issue price, then the capital cost of equity fund drops even given the same level of dividend. Second, low dividend policy in the listed companies, capital cost of equity fund decided by dividend pay-out ratio and price of per share. In China, many listed companies pay little or even no dividends to their shareholders. According to statistic data, there were 488 listed companies paid no dividend to their shareholders in 1998, 58.44 percents of all listed companies, there were 590, 59.83 percents in 1999, even 2000 in which China Securities Regulatory Commission issue new files to rule dividend policy of companies, there were only 699 companies which pay dividends, 18.47 percents more than that in 1999, but dividend payout ratio deduce 22%. Thus capital cost of equity is very low. Third, there is no rigidity on equity fund, if the listed companies choose equity fund, they can use the fund forever and has no obligation to return this fund. Most of listedcompanies are controlled by Government in China, taking financing risk into account, the major stockholders prefers to equity fund. The management also prefer equity fund because its lower fund cost and needn’t to be paid off, then their position will be more stable than financing in equity fund. We can conclude from the above analysis that cost of equity fund is lower than cost of debt fund in Chinese listed companies and the listed companies prefer to such low-cost fund.3. Types and qualities of assets in listed companies and preference to equity fund Static Trade-off Theory tells us, the value of enterprise with financial leverage is decided by the value of self-owned capital; value arising from tax benefit, cost of financial embarrassment and agency cost. Cost of financial embarrassment and agency cost are negative correlative to the types and qualities of companies’ assets, if the enterprise has more intangible assets, more assets with lower quality, it will has lower liquidity and its assets have lower mortgage value. When this kind of enterprise faces to great financial risk, it will have no way to solve its questions by selling its assets. Furthermore, because care for the ability of turning into cash of the mortgage assets, the creditors will high the level of rate and lay additional items in financial contract to rule the debtor’s action, all of those will enhance the agency cost and deduce the companies’ value. Qualcomm is supplier of wireless data and communication service in America, it is the inventor and user of CDMA and it also occupies the technology of HDR. The market value of its share is 1120 billions dollars at the end of March, 2000, but the quantities of long-term liabilities is zero. Why? Some reasons may be that there are some competitors in the market who own analogous technologies and the management of Qualcomm Company takes conservative attitude in financing activities. But the most important factor may be Qualcomm Company owns a mass of intangible assets which will have lower convertibility and the company’s value will decline when it has no enough money to pay for its debt.Many listed companies in China are transformed from the national enterprises. In the transformation, these listed companies take over the high-quality assets of the national enterprises, but with the development of economy, some projects can not coincidewith the market demand and the values of relative assets decline. On the other hand, there are many intangible assets in new high-tech companies. State-owned companies and high-tech companies are the most parts of the capital market. We can conclude that the qualities of listed companies’ assets are very low. This point is supported by the index of P/B (Price-to-Book value) which is usually thought as one of the most important indexes which can weigh the qualities of the listed companies’ assets. According to statistic data coming from Shenzhen Securities Information Company, by the end of November 14, 2003, there were 412 companies whose P/B is less than 2, take the 30% proportions of total listed companies which issue A-share in China, among them, there were 150 companies whose P/B is less than 1.53, and weighted average P/B of the stock market is 2.42. Lower qualities of assets means more cost may be brought out from debt fund and lower total value of the listed companies. Thus the listed companies prefer to equity fund when need outside financial support in China.4. Profitability and preference to equity fundFinancial Leverage Theory tells us that a small change in company’s profit may make great change in company’s EPS (Earnings per share). Just like leverage, we can get an amplified action by use of it. Debt fund can supply us with this leverage, by use of debt fund, these companies which have high level of profitability will get higher level of EPS because debt fund produces more profit for shareholders than interest shareholder shall pay. On the contrary, these companies which have low level of profitability will get lower level of EPS by use of debt fund because debt fund can not produce enough profit for shareholder to fulfill the demand of paying off the interests. Edison International Company has steady amount of customers and many intangible assets, these supply it with high level of profitability and ability to gain debt fund, its debt account to 67.2% proportions of its total assets in 1999.Listed companies in developed countries or regions always have high level of profitability. Take US for example, there are many listed companies which have excellent performance in American capital market when do business, such as J.P Morgan, its EPS is $11.16 per share in 1999. Besides it, GM, GE, Coca Cola, IBM,Intel, Microsoft, Dell etc. all always are profitable. In Hong Kong, most of those companies whose stock included in Hang Sang Index have the level of EPS more than 1 HKD, many are more than 2 HKD. Such as Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited, its EPS is 7.66 HKD. But listed companies do not have such excellent performance in profitability in China inland. Their profitability is common low. Take the performance of 2000 for example, the weighted average EPS of total listed companies is only 0.20 Yuan per share, and the weighted average P/B is 2.65 Yuan per share, 8.55 percents of these listed companies have negative profit. With low or no profit, the benefit nixes, listed companies’ preference to equity fund is a reasonable phenomenon. Can be gained from debt fund is very little; the listed companies can even suffer from the financial distress caused by debt fund. So with the consideration of shareholders’ interest, the listed companies prefer to equity fund when need outside financial support in China.5. Shareholding structure factors and preference to equity fundListed companies not only face to external financing environmental impacts, but also the structure of the companies shares. Shareholding structure of Chinese listed companies shows characteristics as followed: I. Ownership structure is fairly complex. In addition to the public shares, there are shares held with inland fund and foreign stocks, state-owned shares, legal person shares, and internal employee shares, transferred allotted shares, A shares, B shares, H shares And N shares, and other distinction. From 1995 to 2003, Chinese companies’ outstanding shares of the total equity share almost have no change, even declined slightly. II. There are different prices, dividends, and rights of shares issued by same enterprise. III. The over-concentration of shares. We use the quantity of shares of the three major shareholders who top the list of shareholders of the listed companies to measure the concentration of stock. We study he concentration of stock of these companies which issue new share publicly in the years from 1995 to 2003 and focus on the situation of Chinese listed companies over the same period. The results showed that: from 1995 to 2003, the company-Which once transferred or allotted shares-whose top three shareholders’ shareholding ratio are generally high er than the average level of all thelisted companies, and most of these company's top three shareholders holding 40 percent or higher percent of companies’ shares. In some years, the maximum number even is more than 90 percent, indicating that the company with the implementation of transferred and allotted shares have relatively high concentration rate of shares and major shareholders have absolute control over it. In short, transferring allotting shares and the issuance of additional shares have a certain relevance to the company’s concentration of ownership structure; the company's financing policy is largely controlled by the major shareholders.Chinese listed companies’ special shareholding structure effects its financing action. Because stockholders of the state-owned shares, legal person shares, social and outstanding shares, foreign share have a different objective function, their modes of financing preferences vary, and their preference affect the financing structure of listed companies. Controlling shareholders which hold state-owned shares account for the status of enterprises and carry out financing decisions in accordance with their own objective function. When the objective function conflict with the other shareholders benefit, they often damage the interests of other shareholders by use of the status of controlling. As the first major shareholders of the companies, government has multiple objectives, not always market-oriented, it prefers to use safe fund such as equity fund to maintain the value of state-owned assets, thus resulting in listed company’s preference to equity financing. Debt financing bring business with greater pressure to pay off the par value and interests. Therefore, the state-owned companies are showing a more offensive attitude to debt fund, again because of Chinese state-controlled listed companies have the absolute status in all listed company.From: International Journal of Business and Management; October, 2009.译文：中国上市公司偏好股权融资：非制度性因素摘要：本文把重点集中于中国上市公司的融资活动，运用西方融资理论，从非制度性因素方面，如融资成本、企业资产类型和质量、盈利能力、行业因素、股权结构因素、财务管理水平和社会文化，分析了中国上市公司倾向于股权融资的原因，并得出结论，股权融资偏好是上市公司根据中国融资环境的一种合理的选择。

普通股票的定价中英文

0.18 0.02
10 500 0.18 9
对有负的NPV的项目进行投资而不是把赢利都作为股利的策略会导致公司股利和赢利的增加，但会降低公司的价值。
红利增长模型适用于对增长机会连续投资的情况。
– 红利稳定增长来源于对一系列增长机会的连续投资，而不是对单一机会的投资。
例子：
C公司在第一年末的EPS为10元，红利每年的Retention ratio 为60%，折现率为16%， Return on retained earnings为20%。公司股票价格为多少？
– Dividend-growth model
P Div
6
100
r g 0.16 0.12
g 0.60 0.20 0.12
4. A Three-stage DDM
例子：A 公司在去年的每股收益和每股红利为1.67元和 0.4元。预计在接下来5年的每股收益和每股红利为
– 影响需求政策：
• 财政政策：最直接刺激经济或者减慢经济方式 • 货币政策：通过对利率的影响来间接影响经济
– 影响供给政策：提高经济系统的生产能力
• 激励机制，提高国民教育水平，基础建设，技术创新
商业周期
行业分析
– 对商业周期的敏感度
• 产品销售的敏感度 • 运营杠杆 • 财务杠杆
– 行业生命周期
– 为了给项目筹资必须保留赢利 – 项目必须有正的净现值
红利和赢利的增长与增长机会
不管项目有正的还是负的NPV，红利都是增加的。
例子：L公司，如果把所有的赢利都作为红利，则每年的赢利为10万元。但是公司计划每年投资赢利的20%在一个回报率为10%的新项目上，公司的折现率为 18%。
g 0.2 0.10 0.02 10 0.8 50

财务风险管理中英文对照外文翻译文献

财务风险管理中英文对照外文翻译文献译文：[美]卡伦〃A〃霍契.《什么是财务风险管理？》.《财务风险管理要点》.约翰.威立国际出版公司,2005:P1-22.财务风险管理尽管近年来金融风险大大增加，但风险和风险管理不是当代的主要问题。

全球市场越来越多的问题是，风险可能来自几千英里以外的与这些事件无关的国外市场。

意味着需要的信息可以在瞬间得到，而其后的市场反应，很快就发生了。

经济气候和市场可能会快速影响外汇汇率变化、利率及大宗商品价格，交易对手会迅速成为一个问题。

因此，重要的一点是要确保金融风险是可以被识别并且管理得当的。

准备是风险管理工作的一个关键组成部分。

什么是风险？风险给机会提供了基础。

风险和暴露的条款让它们在含义上有了细微的差别。

风险是指有损失的可能性，而暴露是可能的损失，尽管他们通常可以互换。

风险起因是由于暴露。

金融市场的暴露影响大多数机构，包括直接或间接的影响。

当一个组织的金融市场暴露，有损失的可能性，但也是一个获利或利润的机会。

金融市场的暴露可以提供战略性或竞争性的利益。

风险损失的可能性事件来自如市场价格的变化。

事件发生的可能性很小，但这可能导致损失率很高，特别麻烦，因为他们往往比预想的要严重得多。

换句话说，可能就是变异的风险回报。

由于它并不总是可能的，或者能满意地把风险消除，在决定如何管理它中了解它是很重要的一步。

识别暴露和风险形式的基础需要相应的财务风险管理策略。

财务风险是如何产生的呢？无数金融性质的交易包括销售和采购，投资和贷款，以及其他各种业务活动，产生了财务风险。

它可以出现在合法的交易中，新项目中，兼并和收购中，债务融资中，能源部分的成本中，或通过管理的活动，利益相关者，竞争者，外国政府，或天气出现。

当金融的价格变化很大，它可以增加成本，降低财政收入，或影响其他有不利影响的盈利能力的组织。

金融波动可能使人们难以规划和预算商品和服务的价格，并分配资金。

有三种金融风险的主要来源：1、金融风险起因于组织所暴露出来的市场价格的变化，如利率、汇率、和大宗商品价格。

企业风险管理中英文对照外文翻译文献

企业风险管理中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Risk ManagementThis chapter reviews and discusses the basic issues and principles of risk management, including: risk acceptability (tolerability); risk reduction and the ALARP principle; cautionary and precautionary principles. And presents a case study showing the importance of these issues and principles in a practical management context. Before we take a closer look, let us briefly address some basic features of risk management.The purpose of risk management is to ensure that adequate measures are taken to protect people, the environment, and assets from possible harmful consequences of the activities being undertaken, as well as to balance different concerns, in particular risks and costs. Risk management includes measures both to avoid the hazards and toreduce their potential harm. Traditionally, in industries such as nuclear, oil, and gas, risk management was based on a prescriptive regulating regime, in which detailed requirements were set with regard to the design and operation of the arrangements. This regime has gradually been replaced by a more goal-oriented regime, putting emphasis on what to achieve rather than on the means of achieving it.Risk management is an integral aspect of a goal-oriented regime. It is acknowledged that risk cannot be eliminated but must be managed. There is nowadays an enormous drive and enthusiasm in various industries and in society as a whole to implement risk management in organizations. There are high expectations that risk management is the proper framework through which to achieve high levels of performance.Risk management involves achieving an appropriate balance between realizing opportunities for gain and minimizing losses. It is an integral part of good management practice and an essential element of good corporate governance. It is an iterative process consisting of steps that, when undertaken in sequence, can lead to a continuous improvement in decision-making and facilitate a continuous improvement in performance.To support decision-making regarding design and operation, risk analyses are carried out. They include the identification of hazards and threats, cause analyses, consequence analyses, and risk descriptions. The results are then evaluated. The totality of the analyses and the evaluations are referred to as risk assessments. Risk assessment is followed by risk treatment, which is a process involving the development and implementation of measures to modify the risk, including measures designed to avoid, reduce (“optimize”), transfer, or retain the risk. Risk transfer means sharing with another party the benefit or loss associated with a risk. It is typically affected through insurance. Risk management covers all coordinated activities in the direction and control of an organization with regard to risk.In many enterprises, the risk management tasks are divided into three main categories: strategic risk, financial risk, and operational risk. Strategic risk includes aspects and factors that are important for the e nterprise’s long-term strategy and plans,for example mergers and acquisitions, technology, competition, political conditions, legislation and regulations, and labor market. Financial risk includes the enterprise’s financial situation, and includes: Market risk, associated with the costs of goods and services, foreign exchange rates and securities (shares, bonds, etc.). Credit risk, associated with a debtor’s failure to meet its obligations in accordance with agreed terms. Liquidity risk, reflecting lack of access to cash; the difficulty of selling an asset in a timely manner. Operational risk is related to conditions affecting the normal operating situation: Accidental events, including failures and defects, quality deviations, natural disasters. Intended acts; sabotage, disgruntled employees, etc. Loss of competence, key personnel. Legal circumstances, associated for instance, with defective contracts and liability insurance.For an enterprise to become successful in its implementation of risk management, top management needs to be involved, and activities must be put into effect on many levels. Some important points to ensure success are: the establishment of a strategy for risk management, i.e., the principles of how the enterprise defines and implements risk management. Should one simply follow the regulatory requirements (minimal requirements), or should one be the “best in the class”? The establishment of a risk management process for the enterprise, i.e. formal processes and routines that the enterprise is to follow. The establishment of management structures, with roles and responsibilities, such that the risk analysis process becomes integrated into the organization. The implementation of analyses and support systems, such as risk analysis tools, recording systems for occurrences of various types of events, etc. The communication, training, and development of a risk management culture, so that the competence, understanding, and motivation level within the organization is enhanced. Given the above fundamentals of risk management, the next step is to develop principles and a methodology that can be used in practical decision-making. This is not, however, straightforward. There are a number of challenges and here we address some of these: establishing an informative risk picture for the various decision alternatives, using this risk picture in a decision-making context. Establishing an informative risk picture means identifying appropriate risk indices and assessments ofuncertainties. Using the risk picture in a decision making context means the definition and application of risk acceptance criteria, cost benefit analyses and the ALARP principle, which states that risk should be reduced to a level which is as low as is reasonably practicable.It is common to define and describe risks in terms of probabilities and expected values. This has, however, been challenged, since the probabilities and expected values can camouflage uncertainties; the assigned probabilities are conditional on a number of assumptions and suppositions, and they depend on the background knowledge. Uncertainties are often hidden in this background knowledge, and restricting attention to the assigned probabilities can camouflage factors that could produce surprising outcomes. By jumping directly into probabilities, important uncertainty aspects are easily truncated, and potential surprises may be left unconsidered.Let us, as an example, consider the risks, seen through the eyes of a risk analyst in the 1970s, associated with future health problems for divers working on offshore petroleum projects. The analyst assigns a value to the probability that a diver would experience health problems (properly defined) during the coming 30 years due to the diving activities. Let us assume that a value of 1 % was assigned, a number based on the knowledge available at that time. There are no strong indications that the divers will experience health problems, but we know today that these probabilities led to poor predictions. Many divers have experienced severe health problems (Avon and Vine, 2007). By restricting risk to the probability assignments alone, important aspects of uncertainty and risk are hidden. There is a lack of understanding about the underlying phenomena, but the probability assignments alone are not able to fully describe this status.Several risk perspectives and definitions have been proposed in line with this realization. For example, Avon (2007a, 2008a) defines risk as the two-dimensional combination of events/consequences and associated uncertainties (will the events occur, what the consequences will be). A closely related perspective is suggested by Avon and Renan (2008a), who define risk associated with an activity as uncertaintyabout and severity of the consequences of the activity, where severity refers to intensity, size, extension, scope and other potential measures of magnitude with respect to something that humans value (lives, the environment, money, etc.). Losses and gains, expressed for example in monetary terms or as the number of fatalities, are ways of defining the severity of the consequences. See also Avon and Christensen (2005).In the case of large uncertainties, risk assessments can support decision-making, but other principles, measures, and instruments are also required, such as the cautionary/precautionary principles as well as robustness and resilience strategies. An informative decision basis is needed, but it should be far more nuanced than can be obtained by a probabilistic analysis alone. This has been stressed by many researchers, e.g. Apostolicism (1990) and Apostolicism and Lemon (2005): qualitative risk analysis (QRA) results are never the sole basis for decision-making. Safety- and security-related decision-making is risk-informed, not risk-based. This conclusion is not, however, justified merely by referring to the need for addressing uncertainties beyond probabilities and expected values. The main issue here is the fact that risks need to be balanced with other concerns.When various solutions and measures are to be compared and a decision is to be made, the analysis and assessments that have been conducted provide a basis for such a decision. In many cases, established design principles and standards provide clear guidance. Compliance with such principles and standards must be among the first reference points when assessing risks. It is common thinking that risk management processes, and especially ALARP processes, require formal guidelines or criteria (e.g., risk acceptance criteria and cost-effectiveness indices) to simplify the decision-making. Care must; however, be shown when using this type of formal decision-making criteria, as they easily result in a mechanization of the decision-making process. Such mechanization is unfortunate because: Decision-making criteria based on risk-related numbers alone (probabilities and expected values) do not capture all the aspects of risk, costs, and benefits, no method has a precision that justifies a mechanical decision based on whether the result is overor below a numerical criterion. It is a managerial responsibility to make decisions under uncertainty, and management should be aware of the relevant risks and uncertainties.Apostolicism and Lemon (2005) adopt a pragmatic approach to risk analysis and risk management, acknowledging the difficulties of determining the probabilities of an attack. Ideally, they would like to implement a risk-informed procedure, based on expected values. However, since such an approach would require the use of probabilities that have not b een “rigorously derived”, they see themselves forced to resort to a more pragmatic approach.This is one possible approach when facing problems of large uncertainties. The risk analyses simply do not provide a sufficiently solid basis for the decision-making process. We argue along the same lines. There is a need for a management review and judgment process. It is necessary to see beyond the computed risk picture in the form of the probabilities and expected values. Traditional quantitative risk analyses fail in this respect. We acknowledge the need for analyzing risk, but question the value added by performing traditional quantitative risk analyses in the case of large uncertainties. The arbitrariness in the numbers produced can be significant, due to the uncertainties in the estimates or as a result of the uncertainty assessments being strongly dependent on the analysts.It should be acknowledged that risk cannot be accurately expressed using probabilities and expected values. A quantitative risk analysis is in many cases better replaced by a more qualitative approach, as shown in the examples above; an approach which may be referred to as a semi-quantitative approach. Quantifying risk using risk indices such as the expected number of fatalities gives an impression that risk can be expressed in a very precise way. However, in most cases, the arbitrariness is large. In a semi-quantitative approach this is acknowledged by providing a more nuanced risk picture, which includes factors that can cause “surprises” r elative to the probabilities and the expected values. Quantification often requires strong simplifications and assumptions and, as a result, important factors could be ignored or given too little (or too much) weight. In a qualitative or semi-quantitative analysis, amore comprehensive risk picture can be established, taking into account underlying factors influencing risk. In contrast to the prevailing use of quantitative risk analyses, the precision level of the risk description is in line with the accuracy of the risk analysis tools. In addition, risk quantification is very resource demanding. One needs to ask whether the resources are used in the best way. We conclude that in many cases more is gained by opening up the way to a broader, more qualitative approach, which allows for considerations beyond the probabilities and expected values.The traditional quantitative risk assessments as seen for example in the nuclear and the oil & gas industries provide a rather narrow risk picture, through calculated probabilities and expected values, and we conclude that this approach should be used with care for problems with large uncertainties. Alternative approaches highlighting the qualitative aspects are more appropriate in such cases. A broad risk description is required. This is also the case in the normative ambiguity situations, as the risk characterizations provide a basis for the risk evaluation processes. The main concern is the value judgments, but they should be supported by solid scientific assessments, showing a broad risk picture. If one tries to demonstrate that it is rational to accept risk, on a scientific basis, too narrow an approach to risk has been adopted. Recognizing uncertainty as a main component of risk is essential to successfully implement risk management, for cases of large uncertainties and normative ambiguity.A risk description should cover computed probabilities and expected values, as well as: Sensitivities showing how the risk indices depend on the background knowledge (assumptions and suppositions); Uncertainty assessments; Description of the background knowledge, including models and data used.The uncertainty assessments should not be restricted to standard probabilistic analysis, as this analysis could hide important uncertainty factors. The search for quantitative, explicit approaches for expressing the uncertainties, even beyond the subjective probabilities, may seem to be a possible way forward. However, such an approach is not recommended. Trying to be precise and to accurately express what is extremely uncertain does not make sense. Instead we recommend a more openqualitative approach to reveal such uncertainties. Some might consider this to be less attractive from a methodological and scientific point of view. Perhaps it is, but it would be more suited for solving the problem at hand, which is about the analysis and management of risk and uncertainties.Source: Terje Aven. 2010. “Risk Management”. Risk in Technological Systems, Oct, p175-198.译文：风险管理本章回顾和讨论风险管理的基本问题和原则，包括：风险可接受性（耐受性）、风险削减和安全风险管理原则、警示和预防原则，并提出了一个研究案例，说明在实际管理环境中这些问题和原则的重要性。