金融学外文翻译---金融体系的比较
毕业论文(设计)外文文献翻译及原文
金融体制、融资约束与投资——来自OECD的实证分析R.SemenovDepartment of Economics,University of Nijmegen,Nijmegen(荷兰内梅亨大学,经济学院)这篇论文考查了OECD的11个国家中现金流量对企业投资的影响.我们发现不同国家之间投资对企业内部可获取资金的敏感性具有显著差异,并且银企之间具有明显的紧密关系的国家的敏感性比银企之间具有公平关系的国家的低.同时,我们发现融资约束与整体金融发展指标不存在关系.我们的结论与资本市场信息和激励问题对企业投资具有重要作用这种观点一致,并且紧密的银企关系会减少这些问题从而增加企业获取外部融资的渠道。
一、引言各个国家的企业在显著不同的金融体制下运行。
金融发展水平的差别(例如,相对GDP的信用额度和相对GDP的相应股票市场的资本化程度),在所有者和管理者关系、企业和债权人的模式中,企业控制的市场活动水平可以很好地被记录.在完美资本市场,对于具有正的净现值投资机会的企业将一直获得资金。
然而,经济理论表明市场摩擦,诸如信息不对称和激励问题会使获得外部资本更加昂贵,并且具有盈利投资机会的企业不一定能够获取所需资本.这表明融资要素,例如内部产生资金数量、新债务和权益的可得性,共同决定了企业的投资决策.现今已经有大量考查外部资金可得性对投资决策的影响的实证资料(可参考,例如Fazzari(1998)、 Hoshi(1991)、 Chapman(1996)、Samuel(1998)).大多数研究结果表明金融变量例如现金流量有助于解释企业的投资水平。
这项研究结果解释表明企业投资受限于外部资金的可得性。
很多模型强调运行正常的金融中介和金融市场有助于改善信息不对称和交易成本,减缓不对称问题,从而促使储蓄资金投着长期和高回报的项目,并且提高资源的有效配置(参看Levine(1997)的评论文章)。
因而我们预期用于更加发达的金融体制的国家的企业将更容易获得外部融资.几位学者已经指出建立企业和金融中介机构可进一步缓解金融市场摩擦。
金融学专业外文翻译---对简便银行的简单见解
中文3696字本科毕业论文外文翻译出处:Infosys Strategic Vision原文:Insights from Banking SimpleBy Ashok VemuriIntroduction“A simpler way of banking.We treat with you respect. No extraneous features. No hidden fees.” For the unini tiated, this is the mantra of BankSimple, a Brooklyn-based startup which has positioned itself as a consumer-friendly alternative to traditional banks. BankSimple pushes a message of user experience—sophisticated personal finance analytics, a single “do-it-all” card, superior customer service, and no overdraft fees.Though branchless and primarily online-based, BankSimple is also planning to provide some traditional customer service touches, including phone support and mail-in deposits. Interestingly, BankSimple will also likely not be a bank—at least not in the technical, FDIC sense of the word. Rather, BankSimple’s strategy is to be a front-end focused on the customer experience. The back-end core “bank” component will be FDIC-insured partner banks. Unfettered by years of IT investments and entrenched applications, BankSimple’s team has the freedom to build an innovative, user-friendly online interface, customer service program, and the associated mobile and social bells and whistles that more and more consumers are demanding. One way to look at it is as a wrapper insulating the consumer from the accounting, compliance, and technology challenges that many banks face.Like personal finance sites and Wesabe before it, BankSimple is looking to tap into a perceived gap between what major banks provide and what consumers want.A recent survey by ForeSee Results and Forbes found that consumers view online banking as more satisfying than banking done offline. Though good news for the industry as a whole, the survey also found that the five largest banks in the country scored the lowest in the study. Cheaper and more customer friendly, digital banking is the future—but many consumers are finding it is better done with credit unions, community banks, and (down-the-road) startups like BankSimple.As you read, significant investments are being made by banks to improve their online, mobile, and IVR customer-friendliness. Major banks are embracing these channels, and customer satisfaction will likely improve over time. Even so, startups like Bank- Simple should be viewed as a learning opportunity. Their ideas are disruptive and often highlight pain points that need to be addressed. BankSimple’s first two stated philosophies are a good place to start: “A simpler way of banking” and “We treat you with respect.”Ask the Right Questions to Achieve SimplicityBankSimple’s “simpler way of banking” tenet is primarily driven by its business model.A relatively small number financial products and services (bill pay, savings/checking account, loans, account transfers) will allow BankSimple to declutter its offerings.This minimalist approach is embodied in the first planned product—a single card providing checking, savings, rewards, and a line of credit. Obviously, major banks have a much different business model. Higher wallet share is necessary to grow revenue and increase market share. Product innovation and cross selling are two methods used to achieve this.With banks in the midst of a reputation crisis, customer service has taken on more importanceUnfortunately, cross selling efforts often congest and complicate the banking experience. Consumers can get lost in a maze of clicks, confusing products, and fine print. Simplicity and straightforward banking are not easy to implement. If they were, we wouldn’t be having this discussion. However, by asking a few important questions you can set your bank on a path to simplicity:l Where are the headaches? Where are you receiving the most customer service complaints and queries? How long does it take to complete basic activities (i.e., open an account or enroll in online banking)? Once these pain points are identified, process reengineering can be undertaken to improve speed and customer satisfaction.l Are your customers happy with their channel of choice? Certain customers prefer using online banking or mobile banking. Others prefer phone and branch banking. Can all of their needs be met through their channel of choice? Do predominantly mobile bankers have to make unnecessary trips to the bank branch? Availability of products and services through the channel of choice can be a powerful switching mechanism. The usability and simplicity of the online channel is another important consideration. How intuitive is your website? Can customers quickly find what they are looking for? Mapping customer activities while on the site, customer surveys (incentives help encourage participation), and focus groups are some techniques used to identify potential bottlenecks and pain points.l Are the benefits of your products and services clear and understandable? The burgeoning number of products banks offer can be a nightmare for many time and attention-strapped customers. A multitude of channels to navigate through often compounds the complexity. Side-by-side comparisons, easy to understand terms and conditions, and easy access can add a dash of simple to any bank.l Do you really know your customers? Intelligent and effective use of analytics can unlock what products and services are applicable to a given customer. The rise of unstructured analytics allows financial institutions to sift through data outside of the database—blogs, social media sites, emails, wikis, and even audio and video. From unstructured data, banks can derive more complete profiles of their customers. Patterns and preferences can be pinpointed—improving the efficacy of marketing and customer service campaigns.Online Banking: Increasing Adoption, Access, and UsageThe report recommends that banks adopt a more aggressive strategy that will givefinancial institutions a competitive advantage with Internet-savvy and younger consumers who will fuel banks’ profits in the decade ahead. The report surveyed the top 30 U.S. full-service retail bank Web sites and identifies the appropriate level of adoption of four key initiatives that the report recommends. The report also details the current level of Internet access, online banking adoption, and customer satisfaction with the online banking experience. Highlights of this report include: . Internet access now stands at 74 percent and limits the universe of customers who can sign up for onli ne banking. It’s only a matter of time before the younger cohorts who have integrated the Internet into their day-to-day life become an important customer segment and drive online banking adoption higher. Banks have been investing heavily in the online experience and have dramatically increased their online customer satisfaction scores over the past 10 years. Banks now outperform online retailers, once considered the gold standard for quality online experiences.. Banks are executing a number of initiatives that are increasing online banking adoption, access, usage, and relationship depth. Continuing to promote online banking capabilities at every opportunity is essential for success, and, when successful, online banking creates additional “impressions” that enhance brand and cross selling effectiveness.. Mobile banking is an essential ingredient to an online banking strategy and broadens access, increases usage, and provides a platform for innovative products and services in the future. Banks need to expand the capability of their online banking solutions to increase usage and deepen their relationships with customers. In addition to offering mobile banking, banks need to expand their EBPP capabilities with eBills, provide easy to use “lite” personal financial management solutions, and add consumer check image capture to capabilities. “Online banking has continued to gain adoption over the past decade and will eventually outrank branch location in the list of decision criteria when a consumer chooses a bank,” said Bob Landry, vice president of Mercator Advisory Group’s Banking Advisory Service. “While the promise is clear, banks must continue to promote online banking to increase adoption, expand access with mobile banking, and increase usage by adding new capabilities,” Landry added. “Those banks that continue to execute an aggressive online banking strategy will not only reduce costs, they will also be the choice of the next generation of consumers who have integrated the Internet into their lifestyle. They will naturally gravitate to the banks that meet them where they work andMost bank customers (36 percent) prefer to do their banking online compared to any other method, according to a new ABA survey. Last year, 25 percent of customers favored online banking. The annual survey of more than 1,000 consumers was conducted for ABA by Ipsos-Public Affairs, an independent market research firm, on Aug. 14-15, 2010. "Clearly, online banking has fully penetrated the market," says Nessa Feddis, ABA vice president, senior counsel and retail banking expert. "Online banking is the future of banking as more Generation Y-ers enter the marketplace. This means the industry will need to continue investing in technology that supports online banking because consumers see it as quick, convenient, accurate and safe." Survey results showed that the popularity of online banking was not exclusive to the youngest consumers: It was the preferred banking method for all bank customers under the ageof 55. Consumers over 55 still prefer to visit their local branch (33 percent). Online banking for this age group was the second favorite way to conduct banking transactions (20 percent). Among all consumers, the preference for online banking was followed by visiting branches (25 percent), and using ATMs (15 percent). The use of mobile banking (cell phones, PDAs, etc.) was preferred by three percent of consumers, primarily among 18 to 34 year olds. The popularity of ATMs was down in all age groups. Consumers who cited online banking as their favorite banking method were more likely to be under 55 years of age, have an income over $75,000, and live in the Western part of the United States. For the survey, a nationally representative sample of 1,010 randomly-selected adults aged 18 and over residing in the United States was interviewed by telephone via Ipsos' U.S. Telephone Express omnibus. Embrace Social Media to Convey RespectBankSimple promises its cust omers “no more getting passed around the call center.” In other words, “we treat you with respect” boils down to one thing: customer service. From the branch, to the customer service representative, to the IVR, to email and chat, customer service has evolved considerably over the last 50 years. With the banking industry in the midst of a reputation crisis, customer service has taken on even more importance.Traditionally, customer service has been a numbers game. More customer service representatives means more problems solved and questions answered. However, with the growth of social media, banks find themselves with an opportunity to deliver improved customer service with a non-linear cost structure. Online forums provide customers an opportunity to share frustrations, find answers to questions, and help one another out. Twitter and Facebook-based customer service representatives can answer multiple questions at once. Social media can be the catalyst for a customer service revolution if banks approach it with the right mindset.Archaic systems, a lack of integration, and molasses-like processes present a challenge to even the most agile of large banks. As customers become increasingly sophisticated and demanding, these weaknesses are amplified. BankSimple and other digital finance entities should be viewed as a source of inspiration and a guide for innovation and improvement. The future of banking is a blend of simplicity, customer service, digital savvy and product and service diversity. Banking “simple” is just one stone on the path to Bank 2.0.ConvenienceIt’s probably safe to say that most people choose their bank or savings and loan on the basis of location,picking one that’s closest to their home or job.Before you do that,however,drop into the branch you are considering to see how it handles its customer traffic during the peak lunch-hour rush,particularly on Fridays. Is there an express line for customers with simple deposits or withdrawals?Is there a single line that move the people most efficiently to the next available teller?Are there enough tellers?Are there 24-hour automated teller machines?If you work in the city and live in the suburbans,will you be able to do your banking in either place?the answer is obviously.译文:对简便银行的简单见解一、引言本文探讨了简便银行的一些认识和简单的介绍了它的一些功能。
比较中美金融体系的异同
比较中美金融体系的异同第一篇:比较中美金融体系的异同比较中美金融体系的异同中美金融体系的相同点:1金融体系都是由金融市场、银行和外部公司治理及其在金融资源配置中所形成的相互关系和制度特征的总称。
2中美金融体系都包括以金融资产的交易、金融机构的构成和金融活动的监管为基础的多项内容。
中美金融体系的不同:第一,中国金融和美国处在不同的发展阶段。
美国出于金融市场的高度发展阶段,具体表现为市场规模大、金融工具多、产品链条长、资金能量强,这种“高度发展”在一定程度发展到“过度”,不但脱离了实体经济,而且会对实体经济产生负面作用。
而中国处于金融市场发展的初步阶段,具体表现为市场规模小、结构不合理、金融工具少、主体实力差,这种“初步”难以满足实体经济发展的需要,甚至在一定程度上制约了经济的发展,如多年存在的企业融资难、投资渠道狭窄等第二,中国金融和美国的运行机制不同。
美国金融市场化程度极高,华尔街具有超级话语权,具体表现为金融机构的趋利化、金融活动的自由化和金融业务的杠杆化,虽然这些特征目前在一定程度上面临下降和逆转,华尔街的话语权也在下降通道之中,但其高度市场化的根本特征不会改变。
反观中国,中国的金融市场化程度低,行政管制较强,金融压抑较为明显,具体表现在为,金融机构活力不足,例如金融创新严格审批、金融业务较为单一、金融服务能力较弱,等等。
当然,中国金融市场化程度低既有历史和客观原因,也有体制原因,我们需要的是正视这样的现实。
第三,开放程度的比较中国金融市场相对封闭,表现在难以有效运用全球资源,缺乏全球定价权和影响力,金融机构尚未完全参与国际竞争,这和中国经济的开放程度不想符合。
但是,美国的金融市场是完全开放,它是世界上最大的全球市场,表现在其金融机构全球发展、金融体系运用全球资源、金融市场有全球定价权和影响力。
总而言之,从整体角度讲,中国的金融市场还是发展不健全,政府对于银行的管制程度较高,各银行之间的竞争力度较小,整个金融市场的开放程度也较低。
美英日韩等国金融体系比较
一、美国金融体系概要(一)体系框架美国金融制度虽然形成时间不算早,要比英国晚,甚至在某种程度上说是仿效英国组建的。
但作为后来居上者,目前已是世界上金融体制最发达的国家。
美国的中央银行是联邦储备体系。
该体系由五大部分组成:联邦储备委员会、联邦储备银行、联邦公开市场委员会、四个顾问咨询委员会和会员银行。
其中,联储委员会是联邦储备体系的最高决策机构,是实际上的央行总行;联储银行是按经济区域设置的,是央行的执行机构,是实际上的央行分行;联储公开市场委员会是联储体系中专门负责制定执行公开市场业务的决策机构;会员银行是在联邦注册的国民银行和自愿加入的州立银行;四个顾问委员会是:联邦顾问委员会、学术交流顾问委员会、消费者顾问委员会和其他金融机构顾问委员会。
商业银行是美国金融体制中的主体,十分庞大。
但基本上可分为国民银行和州立银行两大类。
一般前者规模都很大,资本雄厚,后者规模不太大。
目前美国大约有5000家国民银行和13000多家州立银行。
商业银行的组织形式有四种:单一制、分支行制、连锁银行制和银行持股公司制,其中,持股公司制是发展最快的一种形式。
除商业银行以外,美国还有大量的为私人和为企业服务的金融机构,如:储蓄贷款协会、互助储蓄银行、信用联合社、人寿保险公司、销售金融公司、商业金融公司、投资银行、养老基金会、货币市场互助基金、信托公司、财务公司、财产保险公司等。
它们实际上属于非银行金融机构。
此外,美国政府也建有永久性的两类政府专业信贷机构:向住宅购买者提供信贷的机构、向农民和小企业提供信贷的机构。
美国的金融监管是多元化的。
负责实施监管的机构具有自上而下、相互配合的特点。
联储委员会是最主要和最权威的金融监管部门。
此外,财政部的货币监理官负责国民银行的注册并对其进行监管;联储体系负责对州立会员银行和银行持股公司的监管;存款保险公司负责对参加存款保险的所有银行的监管;证券交易委员会负责对证券交易的监管;联邦住宅贷款银行委员会负责对住宅贷款系统的各类机构及业务的监管;农业信贷管理署负责对农民贷款系统的监管;各州监理官负责对州立银行的监管。
中美金融体系差异
• 现在的联邦储备银行系统包括联邦储备总裁委员 会;联邦公开市场委员会;12家区域性联邦储备 银行以及数千家私营的会员银行。联邦储备总裁 委员会是联邦储备银行系统的最高权力机构,它 由7名委员组成、负责决定全国货币政策,并对联 邦储备银行各区域性分行、会员银行和商业银行 的活动及业务有广泛的监督和管理职责。 联邦公开市场委员会是联邦储备系统用以执行货 币政策的主要机构,由联邦储备总裁委员会7名委 员和5名区域联邦储备银行的行长(其中必须包括 纽约联邦储备银行行长,其余各分行轮流参加)。 区域性联邦储备银行是按照1913年国会通过的联 邦储备法,在全国划分12个储备区,每区设立一 个联邦储备银行分行。
以完成金融体系解决不确定性风险 功能的方式不同为标准。
• 莱布泽斯基把金融体系分为两种基本形式: 银行导向体系和市场导向体系。他研究不 同金融体系对工业发展的作用,把金融体 系看作是对承受和分配风险的安排。
以完成金融体系解决激励机制功能 的方式不同为标准
• 珀林用“退场/发言”来形容两种体系。在 退场体系中,证券持有者靠出售他们的有 价证券来施加影响;在发言控制体系中, 银行与企业联系紧密,银行提供大量长期 贷款,金融资产缺乏高度发展的二级市场。
美国金融体系
• 美国金融体系主要由三部分组成,即联邦 储备银行系统,商业银行系统和非银行金 融机构,由美国联邦储备银行主导。
美国联邦储备银行系统
• 美国联邦储备银行系统起中央银行作用。 具有发行货币、代理国库及对私人银行进 行管理监督职能,更为重要的是为美国政 府制订和执行金融货币政策。联邦储备系 统可以通过它所制订的政策直接影响货币 的供应和信贷的增长,从而影响宏观经济 的各个方面。
美国商业银行
• 美国商业银行在美国金融体系中占有主要 位置,1980年,美国共有商业银行15082 家,总资产为21147亿美元,占金融界资产 总额的30%左右。商业银行以存款和贷款 为主,70年代以来各主要商业银行为扩大 业务经营范围,增强生存能力,积极开展 存贷款以外的业务。由于1933年制定的格 拉斯—斯蒂格尔法禁止商业银行从事投资 业务,也不能经营证券发行和买卖,故许 多商业银行都设立信托部,参与证券经营
国际金融体系和我国银行体系
Page 9
国际间金融事务的协调与管理
各国实行的金融货币政策, 各国实行的金融货币政策,会对相互 交往的国家乃至整个世界经济产生影响, 交往的国家乃至整个世界经济产生影响, 因此如何协调各国与国际金融活动有关的 金融货币政策, 金融货币政策,通过国际金融机构制定若 干为各成员国所认同与遵守的规则、 干为各成员国所认同与遵守的规则、惯例 和制度, 和制度,也构成了国际金融体系的重要内 容。
Page 7
汇率制度的安排
由于汇率变动可直接地影响到各国之间经济 利益的再分配,因此,形成一种较为稳定的、 利益的再分配,因此,形成一种较为稳定的、为 各国共同遵守的国际间汇率安排, 各国共同遵守的国际间汇率安排,成为国际金融 体系所要解决的核心问题。 体系所要解决的核心问题。一国货币与其他货币 之间的汇率如何决定与维持, 之间的汇率如何决定与维持,一国货币能否成为 自由兑换货币,是采取固定汇率制度, 自由兑换货币,是采取固定汇率制度,还是采取 浮动汇率制度,或是采取其他汇率制度,等等, 浮动汇率制度,或是采取其他汇率制度,等等, 都是国际金融体系的主要内容。 都是国际金融体系的主要内容。
国际金融体系和我国银行体系
国际金融体系
国际金融体系(The 国际金融体系(The international financial 是指调节各国货币在国际支付、结算、 system) 是指调节各国货币在国际支付、结算、汇兑与转移 等方面所确定的规则、惯例、政策、 等方面所确定的规则、惯例、政策、机制和组织机构安排的 总称。国际金融体系是国际货币关系的集中反映, 总称。国际金融体系是国际货币关系的集中反映,它构成了 国际金融活动的总体框架。在市场经济体制下, 国际金融活动的总体框架。在市场经济体制下,各国之间的 货币金融交往,都要受到国际金融体系的约束。 货币金融交往,都要受到国际金融体系的约束。
国内外金融学的区别
国内外金融学的区别比较国内和国外对经济学科内的领域设置,需要特别澄清什么是金融学的问题。
我发现国内和国外对金融学(finance)这一领域的理解有很大的不同。
一个国内学生说他是学金融的,到了国外会发现他学的在那里不被称为金融。
相反,在国外是学的金融,在国内又可能不叫金融。
为什么会这样呢?这需要仔细地分析。
首先,国内所说的金融是指两部分内容。
第一部分指的是货币银行学(money and banking)。
它在计划经济时期就有,是当时的金融学的主要内容。
人民银行说我们是搞金融的,意思是搞货币银行。
第二部分指的是国际金融(international finance),研究的是国际收支、汇率等问题。
改革开放后,凡是以“国际”打头的专业招生分数都非常高的,更不要说加上金融二字了。
这两部分合起来是国内所指的金融。
为了避免混乱,我们且称之为“宏观金融”。
有趣的是,这两部分在国外都不叫做finance(金融)。
而国外称为finance的包括以下两部分内容。
第一部分是corporate finance,即公司金融。
在计划经济下它被称为公司财务。
一说公司财务,人们就会把它跟会计联在一起,似乎只是做做表格。
之所以应把corporate finance 译成公司金融而不译成公司财务,就是因为它的实际内容远远超出财务,还包括两方面。
一是公司融资,包括股权/债权结构、收购合并等,这在计划经济下是没有的;二是公司治理问题,如组织结构和激励机制等问题。
第二部分是资产定价(asset pricing),它是对证券市场里不同金融工具和其衍生物价格的研究。
这两部分合起来是国外所指的finance,即金融。
为了避免混乱,我们且称之为“微观金融”。
根据这一分析,我们便清楚了。
国内学生说自己是金融专业的,他们指的是宏观金融,但是按国外的说法,这一部分不叫finance(金融),而是属于宏观经济学、货币经济学和国际经济学这些领域。
国外说的finance(金融),一定指的是微观金融。
金融学融资融券中英文对照外文翻译文献
中英文对照翻译Margin Trading Bans in Experimental Asset MarketsAbstractIn financial markets, professional traders leverage their trades because it allows to trade larger positions with less margin. Violating margin requirements, however, triggers a margin call and open positions are automatically covered until requirements are met again. What impact does margin trading have on the price process and on liquidity in financial asset markets? Since empirical evidence is mixed, we consider this question using experimental asset markets. Starting from an empirically relevant situation where margin purchasing and short selling is permitted, we ban margin purchases and/or short sales using a 2x2 factorial design to a allow for a comparative static analysis. Our results indicate that a ban on margin purchases fosters efficient pricing by narrowing price deviations from fundamental value accompanied with lower volatility and a smaller bid-ask-spread. A ban on short sales, however, tends to distort efficient pricing by widening price deviations accompanied with higher volatility and a large spread.Keywords: margin trading, Asset Market, Price Bubble, Experimental Finance1.IntroductionHowever, regulators can only have a positive impact on the life-cycle of a bubble, if they know how institutional changes affect prices in financial markets. Note that regulation is a double-edged sword since decision errors may lead from bad to worse. Given the systemic risk posed by speculative bubbles and their long history, it may be surprising how little attention bubbles have received in the literature and how little understood they are. This ignorance is partly due to the complex psychological nature of speculative bubbles but also due to the fact that the conventional financial economic theory has ignored the existence of bubbles for a long-time. But even if theories on bubble cycles have empirical relevance, it is clear that the issues surrounding the formation and the bursting of bubbles cannot be analyzed with pencil and paper. Conclusions on bubble cycles must be backed with quantitative data analysis. Given the limited number of observed empirical market crashes and their non-recurring nature, an experimental analysis of bubble formation involving controlled and replicable laboratory conditions seems to be a promising way to proceed.The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the related literature, Section 0 presents the details of the experimental design and section IV reports the data analysis. In section V, we summarize our findings and provide concluding remarks.2. Leverage in asset marketsDo margin requirements have any effects on market prices? Fisher (1933) and also Snyder (1930) mentioned the importance of margin debt in generating price bubbles when analyzing the Great Crash of 1929. The ability to leverage purchases lead to a higher demand, ending up in inflated prices. The subsequently appreciated collateral allowed to leverage purchases even more. This upward price spiral was fueled by an expansion of debt. From the end of 1924, brokers’loans rose four and one-half times (by $6.5 billion) and in the final phase broker’s borrowings rose at more than 100% a year until the bubble crashed. Then, after the peak of the bubble, a debt spiral was initiated. Investors lost trust and started to sell assets. Excess supply deflated prices resulting in a depreciation of collateral. Triggered margin calls lead to forced asset sales pushing supply even further. An increase in defaults on debt, and short sales exacerbated supply and finally assets were being sold at fire sale prices. It only took 6 weeks to extinguish half of the total of brokers’credit. Finally, in 1934, the U.S. Congress established federal margin authority to prevent unjustifiable increases or decreases in stock demand since margin requirements can prevent dramatic price fluctuations by limiting leveraged trades on both sides of the stock market: extremely optimistic margin purchasers and extremely pessimistic short sellers.Recent experimental evidence suggests short sale constraints to increase prices. Ackert et al. (2006)and Haruvy and Noussair (2006) find prices to deflate–even below fundamental value in the latter study –while King, Smith, Williams, and Van Boening (1993) find no effect. In a setting with information asymmetries, Fellner and Theissen (2006) find higher prices with short sale constraints but not depending on the divergence of opinion as predicted by Miller (1977). In a setting with smart money traders, Bhojraj, Bloomfield, and Tayler (2009) report short selling to exacerbate overpricing, even though it reduces equilibrium price levels. Hauser and Huber (2012) find short selling constraints with two dependent assets to distort price levels. Our design deviates from the previous studies in several but one important way: We use a more empirically relevant facility in that traders have to provide collateral facing the threat of margin calls.3. Implementing Margin Purchasing and Short SellingWe conducted four computerized treatments utilizing a 2x2 factorial design as displayed in Table II. Starting from an empirically relevant situation where margin purchases Traders execute margin purchases when they purchase shares by using loan, collateralized with shareholdings evaluated at the current market value.11 In this case, traders make a bull market bet, i.e. they borrow cash to buy shares, wait for the price to rise and sell them with a profit. However, a decline in prices depreciates collateral while keeping loan constant. When prices fall below a certain threshold, such that the loan exceeds the value of the shareholdings (i.e. debt > equity), a margin call is triggered. Immediately, i) the trader’s buttons are disabled, ii) outstanding orders are cancelled, and iii) the computer starts selling shares at the current market price until margin requirements are met again or untilall shares have been sold.12 Traders execute short sales when they sell shares without holding them in their inventory, collateralized with sufficient cash at hand.13 In this case, traders make a bear market bet, i.e. they borrow shares to sell them in the market, wait for the price to decline, buy them back with a profit and return them. Note that the amount of debt equals the total amount the trader has to pay to buy back the outstanding shares. Thus, an increase in prices increases debt and reduces collateral (cash minus value of outstanding shares), simultaneously. When prices exceed a certain threshold, such that the amount to buy back outstanding shares exceeds collateral (i.e. debt > equity), a margin call is triggered. Immediately, i)the trader’s buttons are disabled, ii) outstanding orders are cancelled, and iii) the computer starts buying shares at the current market price until margin requirements are met again or until all short positions have been covered. Note that short sellers have to pay dividends for their short positions at the end of each period.14 After period 15, both long and short positions are worthless.15 In any case, a margin callcan lead to bankruptcy. However, the consequences of a margin call hold even during bankruptcy, i.e. outstanding positions continuously being closed although subjects are bankrupt. This is different to any other asset market experiment considering leverage4. Margin traders tend to make less money than othersBy leveraging purchases and sales, traders take more risks to be able to make more money. But do margin traders make more money at all? To evaluate this question, we classify traders into types, i.e. margin traders, who trade on margin at least once, and others. Table X shows the average end- of round-earnings within types for each treatment along with the number of subjects. The spearman rank correlation between type and end of round earnings is negative in both rounds and in all three treatments. The coefficient is significantly different from zero only in MP|NoSS and NoMP|SS when subjects are once experienced . Subjects, who executed both margin purchases and short sales in MP|SS earned less than subjects who refrained from trading on margin. This is significant only for inexperienced subjects . One final note on the distribution of earnings. Comparing the treatments by evaluating the dispersion of earnings using the coefficient of variation , we find that the average CV in the NoMP|NoSS is lower than any other treatment Although not statistically significant, the results indicate that it is less risky to participate in markets with margin bans than in the markets where margintrading is permitted.5. ConclusionIn an attempt to halt the decline in asset values, recent regulatory measures temporarily banned short sales in financial markets. To assess the impact of banning leveraged trading on market mispricing is a complicated task when being reliant on data from real world exchanges only. it is unclear if possible price increases following a ban on short sales would come from new long positions or from covered short positions, and the announcement of such measures affects an uncontrolled reaction of the market. Owed to the uncontrolled uncertainties in the real world, asset mispricing can be measured only with weak confidence.In comparison to other experimental studies where limits to margin debt and short sales are rare, our design involves margin requirements comparable to the real world. Highly levered investors face margin calls that lead to forced liquidation of positions, affecting a reinforcement of the swings of the market. We have studied the impact of leverage on individual portfolio decisions to find an increase in risk taking characterized by higher concentrations of risky assets eventually resulting in individual bankruptcies. Thus, our experimental results are in line with theories of margin trading by Irvine Fischer (1933) and by recent heterogeneous agents models (Geanakoplos 2009) which conjecture such effects on asset pricing and portfolio decisions. As in any laboratory experiment, the results are restricted to the chosen parameters. The baselineSmith et al. (1988) asset market design has been challenged in recent studies (e.g. Kirchler et al. 2011), arguing that some subjects are confused about the declining fundamental value and believe that prices keep a similar level in the course of time. So it would also be interesting to investigate the effects of bans Jena Economic Research Papers 2012 - 05826 of margin purchases and short sales, to see if our treatment effects can be repeated in an environment with non-decreasing fundamental values. However, recent experiments by Hauser and Huber (2012) show similar effects using multiple asset markets with a complexsystem of fundamental values but without margin calls. It would also be interesting to see how margin requirements change performance in multiple sset markets. We leave these open questions to future research.ReferencesAbreu, D., and M.K. Brunnermeier, 2003, Bubbles and crashes, Econometrica 71, 173–204.Ackert, L., N. Charupat, B. Church and R. Deaves, 2006, Margin, Short Selling, and Lotteries in Experimental Asset Markets, Southern Economic Journal 73, 419–436. Adrangi, B. and A. Chatrath, 1999, Margin Requirements and Futures Activity: Evidence from the Soybean and Corn Markets, Journal of Futures Markets, 19, 433-455. Alexander, G.J, and M.A Peterson, 2008, The effect of price tests on trader behavior and market quality: An analysis of Reg SHO, Journal of Financial Markets 11, 84–111.Bai, Y., E.C Chang, and J. Wang, 2006, Asset prices under short-sale constraints, Mimeo. Beber, A., and M. Pagano, 2010, Short-Selling Bans around the World: Evidence from the 2007-09 Crisis, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers TI 10-106 / DSF 1.Bernardo, A. and I. Welch, 2002, Financial market runs, NBER Working Papers 9251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.Bhojraj, S., R.J Bloomfield, and W.B Tayler, 2009, Margin trading, overpricing, and synchronization risk, Review of Financial Studies 22, 2059–2085.Blau, B. M., B. F. Van Ness, R. A. Van Ness, 2009, Short Selling and the Weekend Effect for NYSE Securities, Financial Management 38 (No. 3). 603-630Boehmer, E., Z.R Huszar, and B.D Jordan, 2010, The good news in short interest, Journal of Financial Economic 96, 80–97.Boehme, R.D, B.R Danielsen, and S.M Sorescu, 2006, Short-sale constraints, differences of opinion, and overvaluation, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 41, 455–487.融资融券禁令在实验资产市场摘要在金融市场,因为专业的交易者杠杆交易允许以较少的保证金进行更大的交易。
金融学外文翻译-----一个国际历史性的比较:2007美国次贷金融危机是否不同
中文3660字外文原文Is the 2007 U.S. Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So Different? An International Historical ComparisonCarmen M. Reinhart University of Maryland and the NBER and Kenneth S.Rogoff Harvard University and the NBERThe first major financial crisis of the 21st century involves esoteric instruments, unaware regulators, and skittish investors. It also follows a well-trodden path laid down by centuries of financial folly. This time is a problem of sub-prime mortgages, but this time is not different. In fact, there are stunning quantitative parallels across a number of major crisis indicators from the standard literature on international financial crises. For example, the run-up in U.S. equity and housing prices, which Graciela L. Kaminsky and Carmen M. Reinhart (1999) find to the be best leading indicators of crisis in countries experiencing large capital inflows, closely tracks the average of the nineteen major post World War II banking crises in industrial countries. So, too, is the inverted v-shape of real growth in the years prior to the crisis. Despite widespread concern about the effects on national debt of the early 2000s tax cuts, the run-up in U.S. public debt is actually somewhat below the average of other crisis episodes. In contrast, the pattern of United States current account deficits is markedly worse.The book is still open on the how the current dislocations in the United States will play out, but some precedent can be found in the aftermath of other bank-centered financial crises in industrial economies. Depending on the degree of trauma to the banking system, they can be quite severe. A severe banking crisis typically has a far deeper and more protracted effect on growth than does a severe currency crisis, if the latter occurs in isolation. The average drop in (real per capita) output growth is over two percent, and it typically takes two years to return to trend. For the five most catastrophic cases (which include episodes in Finland, Japan, Norway, Spain and Sweden), the drop in annual output growth from peak to trough is over five percent, and growth remained well below pre-crisis trend even after three years. It is, of course, the more catastrophic casesthat policymakers particularly want to steer clear of.1. Post War Bank-Centered Financial Crises: The DataOur main purpose here is to make simple and straightforward comparisons of theUnited States 2007 crisis with other post-war crises, employing a small piece of a much larger and longer historical data set we have constructed (see Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2008.) The extended data set catalogues banking and financial crises around the entire world dating back to 1800 (in some cases earlier). In order to focus here on datamost relevant to present U.S. situation, we do not consider the plethora of emerging market crises, nor industrialized country financial crises from the Great Depression or the 1800s. Nevertheless, it is striking how much the “this time is different” syndrome has already been repeated.First came the rationalizations. This time, many analysts argued, the huge run-upin U.S. housing prices was not at all a bubble, but rather justified by financial innovation (including to sub-prime mortgages, as well as by the steady inflow of capital from Asia and petroleum exporters. The huge run-up in equity prices was similarly argued to be sustainable thanks to a surge in U.S. productivity growth a fall in risk that accompanied the “Great Moderation” in macroeconomic volatility. As for the extraordinary string of outsized U.S. current account deficits, which now soak up roughly two-thirds of all the world’s current account surpluses, many analysts argued that these, too, could be justified by new elements of the global economy. Thanks to a combination of a flexible economy and the innovation of the tech boom, the United States could be expected to enjoy superior productivity growth for decades, while superior American know-how meant higher returns on physical and financial investment than foreigners could expect in the United States.Next came the reality. In the past few month, we have seen a striking contractionin wealth, increases in risk spreads, and deterioration in market functioning. The 2007 United States sub-prime crisis, of course, has it roots in falling U.S. housing prices, which have in turn led to higher default levels particularly among less credit worthy borrowers. The impact of these defaults on the financial sector has been greatly magnified due to complex bundling techniques that were thought to spread risk efficiently, but in fact have made the resulting instruments extremely nontransparent and illiquid in the face of falling house prices.As a benchmark for the 2007 U.S. sub-prime crisis, we draw on data from nineteen bank-centered financial crises from the post-War period. We have included postwar episodes in which an important financial institution or segment of financial sector collapsed in a manner similar to that described by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). For further discussion and documentation, see Reinhart and Rogoff (2008).These crisis episodes include:The Five Big Five Crises: Spain (1977), Norway (1987), Finland (1991), Sweden (1991) and Japan (1992), where the starting year is in parenthesis. Other Banking and Financial Crises: Australia (1989), Canada (1983), Denmark (1987), France (1994), Germany (1977), Greece (1991), Iceland (1985), and Italy (1990), and New Zealand (1987), United Kingdom (1974, 1991, 1995), and United States (1984, 2007).The “Big Five” crises are all protracted large scale fin ancial crises that are associated with major declines in economic performance for a protracted period. Japan (1992), of course, is the start of the “lost decade,” although the Nordic Crises and the Spanish crisis of 1977 all left deep marks on their economies as well.The remaining rich country financial crises represent a broad range of lesser events. The 1984 U.S. crisis is the savings and loan crisis and, of course, the 2007 crisis is thesub-prime crisis, which we have represented as a U.S. crisis though of course it has had asevere impact on banks from Europe to Central Asia.While generally all the crises centrally involved the banking system, we have included the 1995 UK crisis that resulted from the bankruptcy of Barings, which was essentially an investment bank.We note that one crisis episode not encompassed by our selection criteria is the period of severe bank stress in the U.S. and Europe, especially, caused by the developing country debt crisis that began in 1982. We omit it because the bank crisis was not clearly at the epi-center of problem (which had it roots in U.S. disinflation and a drop in world commodity prices). Moreover, it overlaps somewhat with our dating of the thrift crisis. However, including it would not weaken our results.2. ComparisonsWe now proceed to a variety of simple comparisons between the 2007 U.S. crisis and previous episodes. Drawing on the standard literature on financial crises, we look at asset prices, growth and public debt. We begin in Figure 1 by comparing the run-up in housing prices. Period T represents the year of the onset of the financial crisis. So period T-4 is four years prior to the crisis, and the graph in each case continues to T+3, except of course in the case of the U.S. 2007 crisis.1 The chart confirms the case study literature, showing the significant run-up in housing prices prior to a financial crisis, with the affect being particularly pronounced for the “Big five” severe cases. Housing prices in the United States, however, have risen even further.Figure 2 looks at real rates of growth in equity market price indices. (For the United States, the index is the S&P 500; Reinhart and Reinhart, 2008 provide the complete listing for foreign markets.)The U.S. again looks like the archetypical crisis country, only more so. Here, however, the big five crisis countries tended to experience equity price falls earlier on. Of course, each of these crises occurred at different points in the global productivity cycle, which may explain some of the difference. Then, too, the monetary responses differed across these episodes, with the Federal Reserve pumping in an extraordinary amount of stimulus in the early part of the most recent episode.Figure 3 looks at the current account as a share of GDP, again starting four years before the crisis. Again, the United States looks like the typical pre-crisis country, in the capital inflows accelerate going into the crisis. However, the U.S. deficits are more severe, reaching over six percent of GDP. As already mentioned, there is a large and growing literature that attempts to rationalize why it might be beneficial for the United States to a sustained current deficit. The simplest argument is that increasing global trade and financial globalization supports larger current account imbalances (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2001). The various rationales for the massive U.S. current account deficit would be more reassuring if the U.S. deficit were not almost twice the average of the earlier precrisis episodes.Real per capita GDP growth in the run-up to debt crises is illustrated in Figure 4. The United States 2007 crisis follows the same inverted V shape that characterizes the earlier episodes. Growth momentum falls going into the typical crisis, and remains low for two years after. In the more severe “Big Five” cases, however, the growth shoc k is ever larger and more prolonged. Not encouraging for the U.S. economic outlook, the aftermath of a banking crisis tends to have a protracted effect on real growth.Figure 5 looks at public debt as a share of GDP. Rising public debt is a near universal precursor of other post-war crises, not least the 1984 U.S. crisis. Nevertheless, although public debt is rising prior to the 2007 U.S. crisis, it is rising notably more slowly than in the average of the other 18 episodes, and much more slowly than the Big Five. This shallow path of U.S. public debt also makes it clear that the large current account deficits shown earlier owe to factors other than just government excess.The correlations in these graphs are not necessarily causal, but in combination nevertheless suggest that if the United States does not experience a significant and protracted growth slowdown, it should either be considered very lucky or even more “special” that most optimistic theories suggest. Indeed, given the severity of most crisis indicators in the run-up to its 2007 financial crisis, the United States should consider itself fortunate if it can have post-crisis trajectory parallel to the milder banking crises in the comparison set, as opposed to the much larger growth pauses experiences by Spain, Japan, Sweden, Norway and Finland during their severe financial crises.3. ConclusionsTolstoy famously begins his classic novel Anna Karenina with the line “Every happy family is alike, but every unhappy family is unhappy in their own way.” While each financial crisis no doubt has its own distinctions, there are also striking similarities, in the run-up of asset prices, in debt accumulation, in growth patterns, and in current account deficits. The majority of historical crises are preceded by financial liberalization, as documented in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). While in the case of the United States, there has been no striking de jure liberalization, there certainly has been a de facto liberalization. New unregulated, or lightly regulated, financial entities have come to play a much larger role in the financial system, undoubtedly enhancing stability against some kinds of shocks, but possibly increasing vulnerabilities against others.Perhaps the United States will prove a different kind of happy family. Despitemany superficial similarities to a typical crisis country, it may yet suffer a growth lapse comparable only to the mildest cases. Perhaps this time will be different as so many argue.Whatever the long-term outcome, the quantitative parallels to earlier post-war industrialized-country financial crises, at least in the pre-crisis period, is worthy of note. Of course, inflation is lower and better anchored today worldwide, and this may prove an important mitigating factor.One last parallel deserves mention. During the 1970s, the U.S. banking system stood as an intermediary between oil-exporter surpluses and emerging market borrowers in Latin America and elsewhere. While much praised at the time, 1970s petro-dollar recycling ultimately led to the 1980s debt crisis, which in turn placed enormous strain on money center banks.3 It is true that this time, a great deal of petro-dollars are again flowing into the United States, but many emerging markets have been running current account surpluses, lending rather than borrowing. Instead, a large chunk of money has effectively been recycled to a developing economy that exists within the United States’ own borders. Over a trillion dollars was channeled into the sub-prime mortgage market, which is comprised of the poorest and least credit worth borrowers within the United States. The final claimant is different, but in many ways, the mechanism is the same.一、翻译文章一个国际历史性的比较:2007美国次贷金融危机是否不同卡门莱因哈特米马里兰大学和国家经济研究局和哈佛大学肯尼斯罗格夫学和国家经济研究局21世纪的第一次重大金融危机涉及深奥的手段,不易察觉的调整机构和活跃的投资者。
外文翻译--金融发展与经济增长:观点和议程
本科毕业论文(设计)外文翻译外文题目Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda出处:Journal of Economic Literature作者:Ross Levine译文:金融发展与经济增长:观点和议程一、简介:目标和边界经济学家对金融体系对经济增长的重要性持有不同的观点。
沃尔特·白泽特(1873)和约翰·希克斯(1969)认为他通过促进“巨大工程”的资本积累而在英国的工业化中起到了至关重要的作用。
熊彼特(1912)认为促进技术创新运行良好的银行通过识别和资金创业者以最好的机会成功地实施创新的产品和生产过程。
相反,琼·罗宾逊(1952)声称“企业领导金融随之而来。
”根据这个观点,经济发展创造了金融安排的特殊要求,金融系统自动响应这些要求。
因此,很多经济学家不相信金融—增长的重要关系。
罗伯特·卢卡斯(1988)断言金融因素在经济增长中的角色的“不好过应力”,而发展经济学家经常忽略表达了他们对金融体系的作用持怀疑态度。
比如,一本包括三位诺贝尔奖得主的“发展经济学,敢为人先”的散文收集,并没有提到金融。
另外,尼古拉斯·斯特恩(1989)提到发展经济学不需要讨论金融体系,甚至在一节中列出忽略的主题。
在这些相互矛盾的意见中,本文运用现有的理论来组织一个财务增长关系的分析框架,然后评估了金融体系在经济增长中的量化的重要性。
虽然结论毫不犹豫的指出,理论推理和实证证据表明了积极的优势,金融发展与经济增长的第一阶关系。
越来越多的工作导向了一个信念,甚至大多数持怀疑态度,金融市场和机构的发展是一个成长过程中关键和不可分割的一部分,从视图的角度,那些金融体系是一个无关紧要的枝节,被动地应对经济增长和工业化。
甚至有证据表明,金融发展能很好的预测未来经济增长率,资本积累和技术转变。
此外,越野,个案研究,行业和企业层面的分析文件表明,金融发展或缺乏关键影响经济发展的速度和格局。
金融学专业外文翻译---国际货币和金融安排:现状与未来
中文3950字外文原文International Monetary and Financial Arrangements:Present and Future3. National economic policies under the present international monetary systemIn this part, we examine central bank independence and monetary and fiscal policies under the present international monetary system. We also examine global financial integration and the effectiveness of monetary policy.3.1. Central bank independenceIn recent years, many nations have passed laws removing government control on their central bank (i.e., making their central bank more independent) in order to overcome the inflationary bias that was otherwise believed to exist in the conduct of monetary policy. The central banks of some nations, such as Switzerland and Germany, have enjoyed a high degree of independence during most of the postwar period. Recently, Canada, Chile, and New Zealand enacted legislation to make their central banks more independent. In May 1997, England also did so. A common ingredient of economic reforms in Latin America and in the ex-communist nations of Central and Eastern Europe has been the creation of independent central banks—at least legally—if not yet in their actual day-to-day operation. The Maastricht Treaty prohibits central banks from taking instructions from the government, as one of the requirements for monetary union in Europe. To ensure central bank independence, the Treaty also requires that central bank governors be appointed for a term of at leastfive years. More importantly, the Treaty forbids central banks from purchasing debt instruments directly from the government and from providing credit facilities to the government. This is done in the belief that a central bank that is free from political pressure would achieve a lower inflation rate.But what is meant by central bank independence? Fisher (1995) introduced the distinction between goal independence and instrument independence. A central bank has goal independence if it can set its own goals, such as the rate of inflation that the nation should aim for. Instrument independence means that the central bank has control over the levers of monetary policy. That is, it has no obligation to finance government deficits, directly or indirectly, and that it has the power to set interest rates. Of course, a central bank that has goal and instrument independence can set its own monetary goals and is free to use the instruments at its disposal to achieve those goals. Even in nations with the most independent central banks, however, the government rather than the central bank usually has a final say on the type of exchange rate arrangement for the nation to have, and on changing the exchange rates in a fixed exchange rate system, or on foreign exchange market interventions to affect the level of exchange rates if the nation chooses to have a flexible exchange rate system (Capie, 1998).Theoretically, there are two different approaches to central bank independence. One is the conservative-banker approach of Rogoff (1985) and the other is the principal-agent approach of Walsh (1995). In the conservative-banker approach, the central bank has both goal and instrument independence. Presumably, the conservative banker will weigh deviations of both inflation and output from target levels in setting monetary policy, but with a bias in favor of lower inflation, even if this comes at the expense of lower growth. In the principal-agent approach, on the other hand, the central banker has instrument independence, but not goal independence. That is, the government sets the monetary goal, such as the rate of inflation for the nation, and then the central bank is free to employ whatever monetary instruments it has at its disposal in trying to meet the monetary goal. Theprincipal-agent goal is most explicit in the case of New Zealand, where the governor of the central bank formally agrees to meet the inflation target set by the government, with his job on the line if he fails to meet the target. In Canada and England, it is the reputation of the central bank that is on the line if the inflation target is exceeded.Today, there is general agreement that a central bank should have instrument, but not goal independence. There are two reasons for this. The first is that the monetarygoal of the nation should reflect the social welfare function of the nation and not just the preferences of the central bank governor. The second is that there is the need to coordinate monetary and fiscal policies to avoid their operating at cross purposes of each other. Central bank accountability, however, is needed to ensure that the monetary goals of the nation are, in fact, pursued by the nation’s central bank. In the case of New Zealand the governor of the central bank is accountable to the finance minister. In the United States, the Federal Reserve Bank or the Fed (the US central bank) is generally accountable to Congress, which must ratify the choice of the chairman of the Fed and can summon him to explain his policies. In Germany, the Bundesbank is accountable to the public at large for its policies in defense of the currency.In recent years, a growing number of countries are following the lead of New Zealand in setting explicit inflation targets for the central bank. This provides transparency and accountability, which are very important in establishing credibility for the government’s monetary policy. The more credible a central bank is, the more it will be able to cut interest rates in a slowdown without triggering higher inflationary expectations and hence higher long-term interest rates, or raising interest rates to curb emerging inflationary pressures without the fear of triggering a recession. It is to increase transparency and accountability, and hence its credibility and effectiveness, that the central bank of several countries, including the United States, have recently started to explain their decision-making process (including the lagged publication of the minutes of their meetings by the US Fed) and operating procedure in their conduct of monetary policy. The fact, however, that the US Fed, as opposed to most other central banks, is constitutionally required to pursue both price stability and full employment, reduces its effectiveness as an inflation fighter when a conflict arises between its two goals (Salvatore, 1998d).3.2. Central bank independence and inflationAs expected, a number of empirical studies have shown an inverse relationship between central bank independence and the rate of inflation in industrial countries. That is, the more independent the central bank of an industrial country is, the lower the rate of inflation in the nation. One of the most comprehensive of these studies is the one by Alesina and Summers (1993). The authors included the following 16industrial countries in the study: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.The sample period was from 1955 to 1988. As in previous studies, the authors found a negative correlation between the level of central bank independence and the rate of inflation. They also found that the more independent a central bank was, the smaller was the variability of the inflation rate (because of the positive correlation between the level and variability of inflation).As it is well known, however, correlation does not establish causality. That is, the negative correlation between central bank independence and inflation found in empirical studies does not imply that the former causes the latter. It may very well be that countries with a stronger aversion to inflation are more likely to give more independence to their central banks. Thus, it is the inflation aversion in the nation that gives rise both to lower inflation and to a more independent central bank in the nation, rather than a more independent central bank being responsible (i.e., causing) lower inflation. Unless, however, we believe that laws and institutions are entirely irrelevant and have no effect whatsoever on economic performance (here the rate of inflation) we must conclude that a more independent central bank is more likely, other things equal, to lead to lower inflation than a less independent central bank.As support for central bank independence has increased around the world, so has the tendency to entrust to central banks the sole function of achieving a given inflation target or range. This, however, raises the question of whether it would be more appropriate to entrust the central bank with a target that is more directly controllable by the central bank, such as the growth of a narrow money aggregate, rather than a specific inflation target. Setting an inflation target, however, seems more appropriate today in view of the collapse of the relationship between money growth and inflation in one country after another.As a result, it is better to assign an explicit inflation target to the central bank and provide it with instrument independence to pursue the inflation target. As to why the central bank should be given a specific inflation target rather than agrowth-of-real-GDP or rate-of-unemployment target, the answer is that inflation is amonetary phenomenon while the rate of growth of real GDP and the rate of unemployment are real phenomena. Real phenomena are, of course, affected by monetary phenomena, but here the chain of causality depends on policies and institutions that are not under the direct control of the central bank. In giving a specific inflation target to the central bank, it is important to point out that fixed exchange rates are less inflationary than flexible exchange rates.Thus, a country that is trying to move from a high to a low inflation environment would do well to adopt a fixed rather than a variable exchange rate system as a means of anchoring monetary policy and market expectations. Many developing countries, however, have been moving toward greater exchange-rate flexibility in order to cope better with big swings in foreign capital flows.Although many empirical studies have found a negative correlation between central bank independence and inflation in industrial countries, this is not the case for developing countries. Cukierman (1992) found a positive, not a negative, relationship between central bank independence and inflation for a group of 70 developing countries that he studied over the 1950–1989 period. This, however, may be due tothe fact that the central banks of many developing countries are independent legally but not in reality, as evidenced by the fact that they continue to finance government deficits. This has certainly been the case for Mexico and Venezuela. For example, when Venezuela suffered a wave of bank failures in 1994, it decided that the best way to address the problem was to print billions of bolivars and impose capital controls. The same happened in Mexico following the deep financial crisis that started at the end of 1994.3.3. Central bank independence, the real economy, and fiscal deficitsDoes the lower inflation rate with an independent central bank come at the expense of growth of output for the nation? Alesina and Summers (1993) found no negative correlation between central bank independence and average growth of real GDP or the variability of growth of real GDP for the same 16 industrial countries that they used to examine the relationship between central bank independence andinflation over the 1955–1988 period. Barro (1995) and Sarel (1996) confirm this for inflation rates below 8%. Thus, it does not seem that central banks in industrial nations trade a lower growth rate of output for the sake of a lower rate of inflation.The same conclusion was reached for industrial nations in another study by Cukierman, Kalaitzidakis, Summers, and Webb (1992) by regressing the nation’s growth rate of real GDP on the degree of central bank independence, the initial level of real GDP in the nation, the initial level of primary and secondary education in the nation, and the nation’s terms of trade. For developing nations, however, Cukierman, Kalaitzidakis, Summers, and Webb found that central bank independence did have a significantly positive effect on growth. When inflation is high, as in most developing countries, and to the extent that a more independent central bank is associated with a higher inflation rate (which encourages growth), a more independent central bank is then also associated with more rapid growth. Since industrial nations do not generally face high inflation, this vehicle to higher growth is not available to them.Empirical studies were also conducted to examine the relationship between central bank independence and fiscal deficits as a percentage of GDP in the nation. The expectation was that a more independent central bank would be able to resist better government efforts to monetize fiscal deficits and thus lead to lower long-run average fiscal deficits as a percentage of GDP in the nation. Such a negative relationship was in fact found by Parkin (1987) and Grilli et al. (1991) for industrial countries. Thus, the overall conclusion that can be reached from empirical studies to date is that an independent central bank is associated with lower inflation rates and lower fiscal deficits as a percentage of GDP but is unrelated to growth in industrial nations.Although empirical studies have found no relationship between central bank independence and the rate of economic growth in industrial nations, there is a theoretical reason for expecting that a central bank that can set its own inflation target and operate independently of the fiscal authority of the nation can lead to a lower rate of growth in the nation. This can result when there is a conflict between the goals of the monetary and the fiscal authority of the nation.Then monetary and fiscal policies can move at cross purposes from each other and result in suboptimal economicperformance for the nation. Thus, a central bank can be too independent. For example, a central bank that is excessively inflation averse, such as the Bundesbank, may excessively restrain the growth of the nation. Better economic performance for the nation would result with the coordination of fiscal and monetary policies. This can be accomplished by giving the central bank instrument but not goal independence.Thus, the general tendency for economists today of endorsing the separation of power in the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies may not be the best policy to maximize non-inflationary growth in the nation (see Nordhaus, 1994). Better results can be obtained by the coordination of monetary and fiscal policies. It is not just that in the absence of such a coordination, fiscal and monetary authorities might pursue contradictory goals. Suboptimal results may arise simply because of the different time horizon for monetary and fiscal policies. Monetary authorities usually have a longer time horizon than fiscal authorities and often respond only slowly and cautiously to changed economic conditions. Because of this, fiscal authorities might not be willing to adopt deficit-reduction policies and risk an economic slowdown (which may cost them re-election) if they cannot be sure that their contractionary fiscal policies will be offset by sufficiently strong and timely expansionary monetary policies.外文翻译国际货币和金融安排:现状与未来3.在目前的国际货币体系下的国家经济政策在这一部分,我们研究在现行国际货币体系下的中央银行的独立性、货币和财政政策。
金融学专业外文翻译----金融服务外包现象分类
中文2718字外文题目:Classfication of Outsourcing Phenomena in Financial Services 出处:Institute of Information Management作者:Braun Christian,Winter Robert4 CLASSIFICATION OF OUTSOURCING CASESCurrent outsourcing phenomena are described and conceptualized in this section on the basis of the framework proposed above. In addition, these are illustrated using case examples. Table 2 shows a summary of the outsourcing phenomena and cases described in this section in accordance with the four dimensions.4.1 IT OutsourcingIn the case of IT infrastructure outsourcing, the service provider takes on the operation and maintenance of the service customer’s IT systems. T he service provider is responsible for the customer’s computer and/or communications systems as well as their data center. In most cases, the service provider also takes on the company’s internal IT personnel.Long-term contracts of up to ten years and usually a very high order volume are characteristic of IT infrastructure outsourcing. The services provided are very strongly adapted to the needs and requirements of the customer (one-to-one approach). The chosen degree of independence in the case of IT infrastructure outsourcing can be either spin-off or outsourcing. In many cases, the IT infrastructures are not outsourced to a legally independent, external service provider but spun off to form a subsidiary or capital investment. An example of IT infrastructure outsourcing is the contract which the Deutsche Bank concluded with IBM in 2002 (Donath, 2002).Shared Hosting denotes the standardized provision of data center services by a specialized service provider for various customers (Riedl, 2003, p. 8). Unlike IT infrastructure outsourcing, the service individualization between service provider and customer is consequently low (one-to-many approach). In the technical literature the term “platform operations” is normally used for this form of outsourcing. Data center services are often spun off to a subsidiary or capital investment which also offers its services to third parties. At the level of the IT infrastructure, the Winterthur Group, for example, has already been practicing outsourcing for many years (Winterthur, 1999).Another special form of IT outsourcing is application service providing (Kern et al., 2002). In this case, applications and the associated IT infrastructure are outsourced to an external service provider as part of a license agreement (Knolmayer, 2000, p. 443). This usually involves external outsourcing. The external service provider makes standard software with a low level of customizing capability available to various customers (one-to-many approach) and operates this in a central data center. The provider takes care of the license, operation and maintenance of the software, and is responsible for user service. The users access the application via the internet. Theapplication is licensed to the customer and is usually paid for on a per user and per month basis. There are already a large number of ASP solution providers in the market. These include both pure ASP providers who market their own software as an ASP solution, and sales artnerships with established software manufacturers such as Microsoft, Peoplesoft and Siebel. The customer profile of ASP providers essentially consists of small and medium-sized businesses for whom own development and own operation of the application would not be commercially viable. The ompany whose customer base includes small businesses in the financial services sector can be cited as a case example of application service providing. They offer their own, customizable online CRM solution (Customer Relationship Management) which can be used to organize and manage customer data (, 2003).In the case of application hosting a customized standard software is made available to a specific customer (one-to-one approach) and operated by the service provider in a central data center. The service provider is responsible for customization, operation, maintenance and user service. Contrary to the ASP approach, however, the customer possesses the software license and accesses the application via a Virtual Private Network (VPN) and a permanent line. In addition, the software is usually customized to suit the special requirements of the customer. The chosen degree of independence in this case is normally outsourcing. Cortal Consors, one of the leading online brokers and financial services specialists in Europe, has concluded an outsourcing contract with TDS, for example, a provider of application hosting for SAP systems (TDS, 2002).4.2 Business OutsourcingA new and as yet not fully mature form of outsourcing is the provision of web services. From a technical point of view, web services are self-descriptive software components which possess a functionality packaged behind standardized interfaces and are loosely linked (Alt et al., 2003, p. 66). From a business point of view, web services perform a clearly definable task in a business process (Alt et al., 2003, p. 66). This means that parts of a business process can be outsourced, i.e. procured externally.In this case, we therefore talk of outtasking and not business process outsourcing. Web services are reusable, largely automated and can be used individually or as a bundle. They thus allow the modularization and flexible grouping of subprocesses to form a complete process. Web services can be charged on a time and usage basis.An enterprise can develop their own web services and offer them through the central directory as well as using web services from other companies. This is therefore a case of a standard solution with a many-to-many approach (n:m). PayNet AG, for example, operates an EBPP (Electronic Bill Presentment and Payment) network in Switzerland for electronic invoice handling (PayNet, 2004). This links billers with their customers (bill recipients) and their banks. The idea of PayNet is that the entire process from issuing the bill, through receipt, booking and authorization, to payment should be performed electronically and as far as possible automatically. The customers of the banks participating in the network can access, check and pay their bills electronically by means of e-banking. The participating banks who have integrated PayNet into their e-banking applications include amongst others Credit Suisse, UBS plus canton and regional banks. Participating billers include e.g. Cablecom, Orange and Swisscom.As already explained in Section 2, business process outsourcing denotes the outsourcing of an entire business process or a complete enterprise function to an external service provider. The service provider takes on the full IT systems which support the business process. The activities of the service provider include both operation and maintenance of the IT systems, and management and execution of the business process. Service individualization between the service customer and the service provider is characteristic of BPO. The service offered is adapted to suit the company’s specific environment (one-to-one approach). As a rule, the outsourcing of business processes results in a stronger business relationship between the service customer and the service provider than is the case with IT outsourcing and the other forms of business outsourcing. The dependence on the service provider, which also exists with the other forms of outsourcing, is increased. The “Life & Health” division of Swiss Re, for example, concluded a business process outsourcing contract with CSC (Computer Sciences Corporation) in December 2003 (CSC, 2003). This is one of the biggest BPO contracts in the area of financial services.Processing services represent another phenomenon of business outsourcing. These involve the outsourcing of heavily automated business processes with a high level of standardization (Riedl, 2003). A feature of automated business processes is that they are extensively supported by IT. Unlike BPO, however, there is no service individualization between service customer and service provider. Processing services thus involve a one-to-many approach. Typical examples of processing services in the case of financial service providers are the handling of payment transactions, trading in securities and credit card payments. At the beginning of 2004, for example, Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank decided to entrust the handling of their payment transactions to Postbank.译文:金融服务外包现象分类4.外包案例的分类当代外包现象在这节中是被描述和概念化为在上面所建议的构造的基础之上的。
金融学专业外文翻译---行为金融学
中文3092字本科毕业论文外文外文题目:Behavioral Finance出处Pacific-Basin Finance Journal V ol.11,No.4,(September 2003)pp.429-437作者:Jay R.Ritter原文: Behavioral FinanceThis article provides a brief introduction to behavioral finance. Behavioral finance encompasses research that drops the traditional assumptions of expected utility maximization with rational investors in efficient markets. The two building blocks of behavioral finance are cognitive psychology (how people think) and the limits to arbitrage (when markets will be inefficient).The growth of behavioral finance research has been fueled by the inability of the traditional framework to explain many empirical patterns, including stock market bubbles in Japan, Taiwan, and the U.S.1. IntroductionBehavioral finance is the paradigm where financial markets are studied using models that are less narrow than those based on Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory and arbitrage assumptions. Specifically, behavioral finance has two building blocks: cognitive psychology and the limits to arbitrage. Cognitive refers to how people think. There is a huge psychology literature documenting that people make systematic errors in the way that they think: they are overconfident, they put too much weight on recent experience, etc. Their preferences may also create distortions. Behavioral finance uses this body of knowledge, rather than taking the arrogant approach that it should be ignored. Limits to arbitrage refers to predicting in what circumstances arbitrage forces will be effective, and when they won't be.Behavioral finance uses models in which some agents are not fully rational, either because of preferences or because of mistaken beliefs. An example of an assumption about preferences is that people are loss averse - a $2 gain might make people feel better by as much as a $1 loss makes them feel worse. Mistaken beliefs arise because people are bad Bayesians. Modern finance has as a building block the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH). The EMH argues that competition between investors seeking abnormal profits drives prices to their “correct” value. The EMH does not assume that all investors are rational, but it does assume that markets are rational. The EMH does not assume that markets can foresee the future, but it doesassume that markets make unbiased forecasts of the future. In contrast, behavioral finance assumes that, in some circumstances, financial markets are informationally inefficient.Not all misvaluations are caused by psychological biases, however. Some are just due to temporary supply and demand imbalances. For example, the tyranny of indexing can lead to demand shifts that are unrelated to the future cash flows of the firm. When Yahoo was added to the S&P 500 in December 1999, index fund managers had to buy the stock even though it had a limited public float. This extra demand drove up the price by over 50% in a week and over 100% in a month. Eighteen months later, the stock price was down by over 90% from where it was shortly after being added to the S&P.If it is easy to take positions (shorting overvalued stocks or buying undervalued stocks) and these misvaluations are certain to be corrected over a short period, then “arbitrageurs” will take positions and eliminate these mispricings before they become large. But if it is difficult to take these positions, due to short sales constraints, for instance, or if there is no guarantee that the mispricing will be corrected within a reasonable timeframe, then arbitrage will fail to correct themispricing.1 Indeed, arbitrageurs may even choose to avoid the markets where the mispricing is most severe, because the risks are too great. This is especially true when one is dealing with a large market, such as the Japanese stock market in the late 1980s or the U.S. market for technology stocks in the late 1990s. Arbitrageurs that attempted to short Japanese stocks in mid- 1987 and hedge by going long in U.S. stocks were right in the long run, but they lost huge amounts of money in October 1987 when the U.S. market crashed by more than the Japanese market (because of Japanese government intervention). If the arbitrageurs have limited funds, they would be forced to cover their positions just when the relative misvaluations were greatest,resulting in additional buying pressure for Japanese stocks just when they were most overvalued!2. Cognitive BiasesCognitive psychologists have documented many patterns regarding how people behave.Some of these patterns are as follows:HeuristicsHeuristics, or rules of thumb, make decision-making easier. But they can sometimes lead to biases, especially when things change. These can lead to suboptimal investment decisions.When faced with N choices for how to invest retirement money, many people allocate using the 1/N rule. If there are three funds, one-third goes into each. If two are stock funds, two-thirds goes into equities. If one of the three is a stock fund, one-third goes into equities. Recently,Benartzi and Thaler (2001) have documented that many people follow the 1/N rule.OverconfidencePeople are overconfident about their abilities. Entrepreneurs are especially likely to be overconfident. Overconfidence manifests itself in a number of ways. One example is too little diversification, because of a tendency to invest too much in what one is familiar with. Thus, people invest in local companies, even though this is bad from a diversification viewpoint because their real estate (the house they own) is tied to the company’s fortunes. Think of auto industry employees in Detroit, construction industry employees in Hong Kong or Tokyo, or computer hardware engineers in Silicon Valley. People invest way too much in the stock of the company that they work for.Men tend to be more overconfident than women. This manifests itself in many ways,including trading behavior. Barber and Odean (2001) recently analyzed the trading activities of people with discount brokerage accounts. They found that the more people traded, the worse they did, on average. And men traded more, and did worse than, women investors.Mental AccountingPeople sometimes separate decisions that should, in principle, be combined. For example, many people have a household budget for food, and a household budget for entertaining. At home, where the food budget is present, they will not eat lobster or shrimp because they are much more expensive than a fish casserole. But in a restaurant, they will order lobster and shrimp even though the cost is much higher than a simple fish dinner. If they instead ate lobster and shrimp at home, and the simple fish in a restaurant, they could save money. But because they are thinking separately about restaurant meals and food at home, they choose to limit their food at home.FramingFraming is the notion that how a concept is presented to individuals matters. For example, restaurants may advertise “early-bird” specials or “after-theatre” discounts, but they never use peak-period “surcharges.” They get more business if people feel they are getting a discount at off-peak times rather than paying a surcharge at peak periods, even if the prices are identical. Cognitive psychologists have documented that doctors make different recommendations if they see evidence that is presented as “survival probabilities” rather than “mortality rates,” even though survival probabilities plus mortality rates add up to 100%.RepresentativenessPeople underweight long-term averages. People tend to put too much weight on recent experience. This is sometimes known as the “law of small numbers.” As an example, when equity returns have been high for many years (such as 1982-2000 in the U.S. and western Europe), many people begin to believe that high e quity returns are “normal.”ConservatismWhen things change, people tend to be slow to pick up on the changes. In other words,they anchor on the ways things have normally been. The conservatism bias is at war with the representativeness bias. When things change,people might underreact because of the conservatism bias. But if there is a long enough pattern, then they will adjust to it and possibly overreact, underweighting the long-term average.Disposition effectThe disposition effect refers to the pattern that people avoid realizing paper losses and seek to realize paper gains. For example, if someone buys a stock at $30 that then drops to $22 before rising to $28, most people do not want to sell until the stock gets to above $30. The disposition effect manifests itself in lots of small gains being realized, and few small losses. In fact, people act as if they are trying to maximize their taxes! The disposition effect shows up in aggregate stock trading volume. During a bull market, trading volume tends to grow. If the market then turns south, trading volume tends to fall. As an example, trading volume in the Japanese stock market fell by over 80% from the late 1980s to the mid 1990s. The fact thatvolume tends to fall in bear markets results in the commission business of brokerage firms having a high level of systematic risk.One of the major criticisms of behavioral finance is that by choosing which bias to emphasize, one can predict either underreaction or overreaction. This criticism of behavioral finance might be called "model dredging." In other words, one can find a story to fit the facts to ex post explain some puzzling phenomenon. But how does one make ex ante predictions about which biases will dominate? There are two excellent articles that address this issue: Barberis and Thaler (2002), and Hirshliefer (2001). Hirshliefer (p. 1547) in particular addresses the issue of when we would expect one behavioral bias to dominate others. He emphasizes that there is atendency for people to excessively rely on the strength of information signals and under-rely on the weight of information signals. This is sometimes described as the salience effect.3. The limits to arbitrageMisvaluations of financial assets are common, but it is not easy to reliably make abnormal profits off of these misvaluations. Why? Misvaluations are of two types: those that are recurrent or arbitrageable, and those that are nonrepeating and long-term in nature. For the recurrent misvaluations, trading strategies can reliably make money. Because of this, hedge funds and others zero in on these, and keep them from ever getting too big. Thus, the market is pretty efficient for these assets, at least on a relative basis. For the long-term, nonrepeating misvaluations, it is impossible in real time to identify the peaks and troughs until they have passed. Getting in too early risks losses that wipe out capital. Even worse, if limited partners or other investors are supplying funds, withdrawals of capital after a losing streak may actually result in buying or selling pressure that exacerbates the inefficiency.本科毕业论文外文翻译外文题目:Behavioral Finance出处Pacific-Basin Finance Journal V ol.11,No.4,(September 2003)pp.429-437作者:Jay R.Ritter译文:行为金融学本文简要介绍了行为金融学。
金融体系的比较外文翻译
Comparative Financial Systems1 What is a Financial System?The purpose of a financial system is to channel funds from agents with surpluses to agents with deficits. In the traditional literature there have been two approaches to analyzing this process. The first is to consider how agents interact through financial markets. The second looks at the operation of financial intermediaries such as banks and insurance companies. Fifty years ago, the financial system could be neatly bifurcated in this way. Rich house-holds and large firms used the equity and bond markets,while less wealthy house-holds and medium and small firms used banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions. Table 1, for example, shows the ownership of corporate equities in 1950. Households owned over 90 percent. By 2000 it can be seen that the situation had changed dramatically.By then households held less than 40 percent, nonbank intermediaries, primarily pension funds and mutual funds, held over 40 percent. This change illustrates why it is no longer possible to consider the role of financial markets and financial institutions separately. Rather than intermediating directly between households and firms, financial institutions have increasingly come to intermediate between households and markets, on the one hand, and between firms and markets,on the other. This makes it necessary to consider the financial system as anirreducible whole.The notion that a financial system transfers resources between households and firms is, of course, a simplific ation. Governments usually play a significant role in the financial system. They are major borrowers, particularly during times of war, recession, or when large infrastructure projects are being undertaken. They sometimes also save significant amounts of fun ds. For example, when countries such as Norway and many Middle Eastern States have access to large amounts of natural resources (oil), the government may acquire large trust funds on behalf of the population.In addition to their roles as borrowers or savers, governments usually playa number of other important roles. Central banks typically issue fiat money and are extensively involved in the payments system. Financial systems with unregulatedmarkets and intermediaries, such as the US in the late nineteenth century, often experience financial crises.The desire to eliminate these crises led many governments to intervene in a significant way in the financial system. Central banks or some other regulatory authority are charged with regulating the banking system and other intermediaries, such as insurance companies. So in most countries governments play an important role in the operation of financial systems. This intervention means that the political system, which determines the government and its policies, is also relevant for the financial system.There are some historical instances where financial markets and institutions have operated in the absence of a well-defined legal system, relyinginstead on reputation and other implicit mechanisms. However, in most financial systems the law plays an important role. It determines what kinds of contracts are feasible, what kinds of governance mechanisms can be used for corporations, the restrictions that can be placed on securities and so forth. Hence, the legal system is an important component of a financial system.A financial system is much more than all of this, however. An important pre-requisite of the ability to write contracts and enforce rights of various kinds is a system of accounting. In addition to allowing contracts to be written, an accounting system allows investors to value a company more easily and to assess how much it would be prudent to lend to it. Accounting information is only one type of information (albeit the most important) required by financial systems. Th e incentives to generate and disseminate information are crucial features of a financial system.Without significant amounts of human capital it will not be possible for any of these components of a financial system to operate e ffectively. Well-trained lawyers, accountants and financial professionals such as bankers are crucial for an e ffective financial system, as the experience of Eastern Europe demonstrates.The literature on comparative financial systems is at an early stage. Our survey builds on previous overviews by Allen (1993), Allen and Gale (1995) and Thakor (1996). These overviews have focused on two sets of issues.(1)Normative: How effective are diff erent types of financial system atvarious functions?(2) Positive: What drives the evolution of the financ ial system?The first set of issues is considered in Sections 2-6, which focus on issues of investment and saving, growth, risk sharing, information provision and corporate governance, respectively. Section 7 considers the influence of law and politics on th efinancial system while Section 8 looks at the role financial crises have had in shaping the financial system. Section 9 contains concludingremarks.2 Investment and SavingOne of the primary purposes of the financial system is to allow savings to be invest ed in firms. In a series of important papers, Mayer (1988, 1990) documents how firms obtained funds and financed investment in a number of different countries. Table 2 shows the results from the most recent set of studies, based on data from 1970-1989, using M ayer’s methodology. The figures use data obtained from sources-and-uses-of-funds statements. For France, the data are from Bertero (1994), while for the US, UK, Japan and Germany they are from Corbett and Jenkinson (1996). It can be seen that internal financ e is by far the most important source of funds in all countries.Bank finance is moderately important in most countries and particularly important in Japan and France. Bond finance is only important in the US and equity finance is either unimportant or negativ e (i.e., shares are being repurchased in aggregate) in all countries. Mayer’s studies and those using his methodology have had an important impact because they have raised the question of how important financial markets are in terms of providing funds for i nvestment. It seems that, at least in the aggregate, equity markets are unimportant while bond markets are important only in the US. These findings contrast strongly with the emphasis on equity and bond markets in the traditional finance literature. Bank fina nce is important in all countries,but not as important as internal finance.Another perspective on how the financial system operates is obtained by looking at savings and the holding of financial assets. Table 3 shows the relative importance of banks and markets in the US, UK, Japan, France and Germany. It can be seen that the US is at one extreme and Germany at the other. In the US, banks are relatively unimportant: the ratio of assets to GDP is only 53%, about a third the German ratio of 152%. On the other hand, the US ratio of equity market capitalization to GDP is 82%, three times the German ratio of 24%. Japan and the UK are interesting intermediate cases where banks and markets are both important. In France, banks are important and markets less so. The US and UK are often referred to as market-based systems while Germany, Japan and France are often referred to as bank-based systems. Table 4 shows the total portfolio allocation of assets ultimately owned by the household sector. In the US and UK, equity is a much more important component of household assets than in Japan,Germany and France. For cash and cash equivalents (which includesbank accounts), the reverse is true. Tables 3 and 4 provide an interesting contrast to Table 2. One would expect that, in the long run, household portfolios would reflect the financing patterns of firms. Since internal finance accrues to equity holders, one might expect that equity would be much more important in Japan, France and Germany. There are, of course, differences in the data sets underlying the different tables. For example, household portfolios consist of financial assets and exclude privately held firms, whereas the sources-and-uses-of-funds data include all firms. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that these differences could cause such huge discrepancies. It is puzzling that these diff erent ways of viewing the financial system produce such radically different results.Another puzzle concerning internal versus external finance is the differencebetween the developed world and emerging countries. Although it is true for the US, UK, Japan, France, Germany and for most other developed countries that internal finance dominates external finance, this is not the case for emerging countries. Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) show that, for a range of emerging economies, external finance is more important than internal finance. Moreover, equity is the most important financing instrument and dominates debt. This di fference between the industrialized nations and the emerging countries has so far received little attention.There is a large theoretical literature on the operation of and rationale for internal capital markets. Internal capital markets differ from external capital markets because of asymmetric information, investment incentiv es, asset specificity, control rights, transaction costs or incomplete markets There has also been considerable debate on the relationship between liquidity and investment (see, for example, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen(1988), Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991))that the lender will not carry out the threat in practice, the incentive eff ect disappears. Although the lender’s behavior is now ex post optimal, both parties may be worse off ex ante.The time inconsistency of commitments that are optimal ex ante and suboptimal ex post is typical in contracting problems. The contract commits one to certain courses of action in order to influence the behavior of the other party. Then once that party’s behavior has been determined, the benefit of the commitment disap pears and there is now an incentive to depart from it.Whatever agreements have been enteredinto are subject to revision because both parties can typically be made better off by “renegotiating” the original agreement. The possibility of renegotiation puts additional restrictions on the kind of contract or agreement that is feasible (we arereferring here to the contract or agreement as executed, rather than the contract as originally written or conceived) and, to that extent, tends to reduce the welfare of both parties ex ante. Anything that gives the parties a greater power to commit themselves to the terms of the contract will, conversely, be welfare-enhancing.Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) (included as a chapter in this section) have suggested that financial markets have an advantage over financial intermediaries in maintaining commitments to refuse further funding. If the firm obtains its funding from the bond market, then, in the event that it needs additional investment, it will have to go back to the bond market. Because the bonds are widely held, however, the firm will find it d ifficult to renegotiate with the bond holders. Apart from the transaction costs involved in negotiating with a large number of bond holders, there is a free-rider problem. Each bond holder would like to maintain his original claim over the returns to the project, while allowing the others to renegotiate their claims in order to finance the additional investment. The free-rider problem, which is often thought of as the curse of cooperative enterprises, turns out to be a virtue in disguise when it comes to maintaining commitments.From a theoretical point of view, there are many ways of maintaining a commitment. Financial institutions may develop a valuable reputation for maintaining commitments. In any one case, it is worth incurring the small cost of a sub-optimal action in order to maintain the value of the reputation. Incomplete information about the borrower’s type may lead to a similar outcome. If default causes the institution to cha nge its beliefs about the defaulter’s type, then it may be optimal to refuse to deal with a firm after it has defaulted. Institutional strategies such as delegating decisions to agents who are given no discretion to renegotiate may also be an effective commitment device.Several authors have argued that, under certain circumstances, renegotiation is welfare-improving. In that case, the Dewatripont-Maskin argument is turned on its head. Intermediaries that establish long-term relationships with clients may have an advantage over financial markets precisely because it is easier for them to renegotiate contracts.The crucial assumption is that contracts are incomplete. Because of the high transaction costs of writing complete contracts, some potentially Pareto-improving contingencies are left out of contracts and securities. This incompleteness of contracts may make renegotiation desirable. The missing contingencies can be replaced by contract adjustments that are negotiated by the parties ex post, after they observe therealization of variables on which the contingencies would have been based. The incomplete contract determines the status quo for the ex post bargaining game (i.e., renegotiation)that determines the final outcome.An important question in this whole area is “How important are these relationships empirically?” Here there does not seem to be a lot of evidence.As far as the importance of renegotiation in the sense of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), the work of Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) suggests that little renegotiation occurs in the case of financially distressed firms.Conventional wisdom holds that banks are so well secured that they can and do “pull the plug” as soon as a borrower becomes distressed, leaving theunsecured creditors and other claimants holding the bag.Petersen and Rajan (1994) suggest that firms that have a longer relationship with a bank do have greater access to credit, controlling for a number of features of the borrowers’ history. It is not clear from their work exactly w hat lies behind the value of the relationship. For example, the increased access to credit could be an incentive device or it could be the result of greater information or the relationship itself could make the borrower more credit worthy. Berger and Udell (1992) find that banks smooth loan rates in response to interest rate shocks. Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Berlin and Mester (1997) find that smoothing occurs as a firm’s credit risk changes.Berlin and Mester (1998) find that loan rate smoothing is associat ed with lower bank profits. They argue that this suggests the smoothing does not arise as part of an optimal relationship.金融体系的比较1、什么是金融体系?一个金融系统的目的(作用)是将资金从盈余者(机构)向短缺者(机构)转移(输送)。
世界主要经济体金融体系对比分析
(一)央行把持模式----中国的金融体系
• • • • 中国金融体系的特点: 1、多元化的金融体系。 2、独立的中央银行制度-------中国人民银行。 3、分业经营的机构体制-------银行不得经营 证券、保险。 • 4、分 主要金融机构 中国人民银行 银行业监督管理委员、 保险监督管理委员会、 证券监督管理委员会 城市信用合作社和农村用 合作社,该两大金融机逐 渐演变为城市商业银行农 村商业银行。 国家开发银行、 中国进出口银行、 中国农业发展银行 中国工商银行、中国农业、 银行、中国银行、中国建 设银行、中国交通银行 中信实业银行、中国光大 银行、深圳发展银行、上 海浦东发展银行、招商银 行、民生银行、福建兴业 银行、广东发展银行、华 夏银行等 财产类保险公司,人身类 保险公司,中国国际信托 投资公司,中国租赁有限 公司,东方租赁公司,华 融、长城、东方、信达资 产管理公司,财务公司, 两小公司等 主营业务 政府的银行、发行的银行、银行的银行,即:1、制定和执行货币金融政策;2、对金融活动实施监督管 理;3、提供支付清算服务;4、发行人民币,管理人民币流通;5、经理国库。 1、银监会:审批银行金融机构,监管银行金融机构,审查银行高管任职资格。 2、保监会:审批保险公司、审查保险高管任职资格,审批险种,监管保险公司。 3、证监会:统一管理证券期货市场,监管股票、债券、基金的发行、交易、托管和清算,监管上市公司、 证券交易所、证券公司。 1、农村信用社属于社员制法人,办理存贷款、票据贴现、国内结算业务,个人储蓄业务,买卖政府债 券,代理发行、代理兑付、承销政府债券,保险箱业务。 2、城市信用社:存贷款,结算业务,票据贴现。吸收单个非社员存款不超过15万元,对同一贷款人贷款 余额不能超过50万元。 1、国开行:支持国家基础设施、基础产业、支柱产业;促进国家经济结构调整,支持自主创新,推动产 业优化升级;支持民生领域和社会事业。 2、进出口银行:进出口信贷,中国政府对外优惠贷款;对外担保;转贷外国贷款;办理国际银行间的贷 款;办理对外承包工程和境外投资贷款。 3、农发行:粮油糖棉储备加工调销收购贷款业务;国内国际支付结算业,债券票据买卖回购业务。 存贷款,国内结算,票据承兑与贴现,发行金融债券,买卖政府债券、金融债券,同业拆借,买卖外 汇,从事银行卡业务,代理收付款项及代理保险业务,提供保管箱服务。 监管机构
金融学专业外文翻译------客户角度下的最优选择:银行与保险公司联盟
中文3056字外文题目: A Customer View on the Most Preferred Alliance Structure between Banks and Insurance Structure出处:Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft作者:Pekka Korhonen, Lasse Koskinen and Raimo Voutilainen原文:OverviewIn this paper, we have studied alternative alliance structures between banks and insurance companies from the point of view of Finnish customer representatives. Seven criteria were introduced for the evaluation of six alternative structure models for such alliances. The evaluation was carried out by an expert panel consisting of customer representatives. As a supporting tool, we used the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP).The alliance models based on plain cross-selling agreements were considered most preferred.We also studied how familiar the customer representatives were with the alliance problem from the point of view of the bank and insurance executives and that of the supervisory authorities. We observed that the customer representatives did not recognize the problem as well from the point of view of the supervisors as that of the executives. In addition,it was interesting to note that the customer representatives did not consider a risk aspect in the control by ownership alternatives as critical as the executives.Comparing the results in this study to our previous studies, we may conclude that the best compromise model from all three points of view could be the financial conglomerate on the condition that certain supervisory and customer criteria are satisfied to a sufficient degree.A. IntroductionAlliance formation in the financial industry has been a growing trend during the last decade.Insurers in an alliance between banks and insurance companies are most often life insurance companies, but also non-life companies can be found. Financialalliances often include units like mutual fund managing companies, asset management companies, securities brokerages and corporate finance companies. In most European countries, banks are allowed to be “universal”. It is customary that they include the above mentioned functions. The same holds more and more often for insurance companies as well (see, eg. Skipper [2000]).That’s why the various types of alliances on the retail market between banks and insurance companies are of special interest.In our previous papers (V outilainen [2005], Korhonen and V outilainen [2005] and Korhonen, Koskinen, and V outilainen [2005]), we have studied alliance structure alternatives from different perspectives. In V outilainen [2005], we introduced six different alliance structure alternatives and nine criteria relevant for evaluating those alternatives from the perspective of the executives of the banks and insurance companies. The alternatives and the criteria were introduced together with bank and insurance experts. Each expert was interviewed individually. The experts were representatives of the top management of Finnish banks and insurance companies.In the second paper (Korhonen and V outilainen [2005]), the same group of experts were used as a panel to find the most preferred model for a financial alliance. As a decision support system we used the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) developed by Saaty [1980].The problem was a typical AHP-problem: few alternatives and few qualitative criteria.The use of the AHP focused the discussions on the relevant aspects of the choice problem.The final solution was found in two meetings. The second meeting was the initiative of the panel. The panel felt that the problem required more considerations. The panel preferred the Control by ownership models. On the other hand, a risk-averse manager might also prefer looser alliance alternatives.In the third paper (Korhonen et al. [2005]), our aim was to find the best financial alliance compromise structure between the executives of the banks and insurance companies and the bank and insurance supervisory authorities in Finland.1 First, we searched for the best alliance structure from the point of view of supervisory authorities. Together with leaders and experts of the supervisory authorities, we introduced eight criteria for the evaluation of the previously defined six alternative alliance structures. The evaluation was carried out by an expert panel consisting of therepresentatives of the supervisory authorities.The alliance alternatives based on plain cross-selling agreements received the highest ranks in the evaluation of supervisory authorities. Under certain conditions, the financial conglomerate might be an acceptable compromise alternative for the supervisory authorities as well.In this paper, we have approached our problem from the point of view of customers.The importance of this perspective has been emphazised by e.g. Belth [2000]. Customer perspective to mergers is taken in Bank Marketing International [2004]. We did not take a sample from the population of customers, because most customers are not familiar with the problem at all. We were interested in the opinions of “advanced or well informed” customers.To represent those customers, we used leaders and experts of Finnish customerorganizations and labour market organizations (see, Acknowledgements at the end of the paper). As before, each customer representative was interviewed individually. Based on the interviews, we initially introduced seven relevant criteria. The final evaluation was carried out with four criteria. In the evaluation meeting, three out of those seven criteria turned out to be insignificant.We have also studied how well the customer representatives know the alliance problem from the point of view of the bank and insurance executives and that of the supervisory authorities. We asked them to play the role of executives and supervisory authorities and to make the evaluations by using their most important criteria. We also asked them which they would think were the most important executive and supervisory criteria. This provided us with interesting information about the knowledge of the problem of the customer representatives from the perspectives of the other parties. The analysis revealed us which aspects are not yet well known to the customer representatives. Finally, we compare the prioritizations of all three decision maker groups considered in this and the earlier papers.The paper is organized as follows. Section B. reviews our main previous results. In Section C., we provide a brief introduction to the theory of the AHP. The decision criteria from the customer point of view are given in Section D., and in Section E., the results are given and discussed. In Section F., we present the results obtained whenasking the experts to assume the roles of executives and supervisors. In section G., we compare the criteria and the prioritizations of all three decision maker groups. Finally, in Section H., we conclude the paper with general remarks.B. Review of our earlier research on alliance structuresSince this paper is founded on our earlier research on alliance structures, we summarize here our key results.I. Structuring the problemV outilainen [2005] studied alliances between banks and insurance companies. His perspective was that of the top management of a financial enterprise in the retail market.Alliance structures were classified into three main categories depending on the degree of co-operation of the partners. These categories were derived together with representatives of the executive management of Finnish banks and insurance companies. The categories in the increasing order of closeness of the partners were Cross-selling agreements. The parties agree to sell each other’s products to their own customers. The cross-selling is frequently one-sided. Most often a bank sells an insurance company’s products to its custome rs. In principle, it could be vice versa as well. The alliance category can still be divided into two subcategories depending on whether the parties’ service channels are overlapping or not. Non-overlapping service channels can be achieved, for example, if the parties actively try to organize cross-selling in such a way that there is no competition between the parties.Here a service channel can be a branch office network, but also a contact center, subside etc. Especially in the case of overlapping branch networks one easily faces channel conflict: the alliance members do not co-operate effectively in the fear of losing their customers to the other party and consequently the sales provisions etc. Non-overlapping service channels often means that the other party has no service channel at all.Thus the two different sub-models are• Cross-selling agreement, no overlapping service channels (abbreviated CSA1) • Cross-selling agreement, overlapping service channels (CSA2)Alliance of independent partners.The alliance type is a special case of a cross-selling agreement where the alliance is tightened by cross-ownership and/orjoint ownership in third parties. Cross-ownership means a minority stake of the other party’s shares. If the ownership were one-sided, it would probably be a sign of asymmetry and one party’s dominance of the alliance. An example of joint ownership is a mutual fund management company owned jointly by a bank (banks) and an insurance company (insurance companies).One could also think about cross-ownership/joint ownership without a cross-selling agreement, but such a model seldom occurs in practice.The degree of overlapping is also used to divide this category into two different subgoals:• Alliance of independent partners, no overlapping service channels (AIP1)• Alliance of independent partners, overlapping service channels (AIP2)Control by ownership. In both the previous models, earnings and costs are divided. The third category means the model, where all the control is in the hand of one party: a bank can simply own (a control of) an insurance company or vice versa, or a third party owns the both ones.This category is divided into two sub-models depending on the controller:• Control by ownership, when a bank owns an insurance company or vice versa (CBO1)• Control by ownership (financial conglomerate): a holding company owns one or severalbanks and one or several insurance companies (FC)We can notice that the classification of the different alternatives is based on the closeness of the alliance and the degree of the overlapping of the service channels. Criteria. The alliance models were compared and eventually prioritized according to the following criteria (the choice of the criteria was also based on the management views).1. Product development (maximize efficiency),2. One-door-principle (implement as effectively as possible),3. Earnings logics (avoid conflicts),4. Customer relationship management (maximize efficiency),5. Cost and revenue synergies (maximize),6. Channel conflicts (minimize),7. Required solvency capital (optimize the balance),8. Investor power (maximize),9. Sales management (maximize efficiency).According to the interviews the overall importance of earnings logics, synergies and channel conflicts was the greatest one.II. Evaluating with management criteriaKorhonen and V outilainen [2005]) studied the above defined six different possible structure models for alliances and the nine criteria. Searching for the most preferred alliance model is a multiple criteria decision making (MCDM) problem. To solve the problem, the AnalyticHierarchy Process (AHP) was used, see Saaty [1980].The use of the AHP focused the discussions on pairwise comparisons. The panel (the same members as in V outilainen [2005]) was also willing to consider its evaluations in case the inconsistency was too high. The second meeting was the initiative of the panel.The panel members felt that the problem required more considerations.During the second meeting the panel first evaluated critically the original criteria and revised some of them. The resulting criteria were1. Earnings logics (avoid conflicts),2. Customer relationship management (maximize efficiency),3. Cost and revenue synergies (maximize),4. Channel conflicts (minimize),5. Required solvency capital (optimize the balance),6. Sales management (maximize efficiency),7. Economies of scale (maximize),8. Economies of scope (maximize),9. Risk.The panel preferred the Control by ownership models. Actually, the Financial conglomerate was the most preferred. On the other hand, a risk-averse manager might also prefer Cross-selling agreement with no overlapping service channels or even Alliance of independent partners with no overlapping service channels to Financial conglomerate.III. Compromise with supervisorsIn the third paper, Korhonen et al. [2005] broaden the analysis to include the search for the best alliance compromise structure between the executives of the banks and insurance companies and the bank and insurance supervisory authorities. First, the alternative alliance structures were studied from the point of view of supervisory authorities. The leaders and experts of the supervisory authorities introduced eight criteria for the evaluation of the above presented alternative alliance structures.1. Equality of the member companies of the alliance,2. System risk management,3. Capability of the authorities to supervise the alliance as well as possible,4. Flexibility of the alliance with respect to changes in its environment,5. Optimal functioning of insurance and finance markets,6. Synergies brought about by the alliance,7. Sufficiency of capital,8. Dependency of the alliance on the competence of executive management.The ultimate goal was to search for the alternative which bank and insurance supervisory authorities and bank and insurance executive management might accept as a solution to the alliance problem. The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) was again used.The loosely connected alliance models Cross-selling agreements received the highest overall priorities largely because they got very high priorities according to the important criteria System risk management and Capability of the authorities to supervise the alliance as well as possible. The control by ownership models were not considered desirable with respect to these criteria.The result differs sharply from the prioritization made above by the bank and insurance executives. They favoured very clearly the control by ownership models (if the risk factor was not specially emphasized). The executive point of view is in many ways opposite to the supervisory point of view. Also the criteria were different in seven cases out of eight.Business-driven consolidation seems to be in conflict with the supervisory interests.Supervisors seem to think that brought synergies do not outweigh the riskthat enters into large and complex financial institutions.However, the differences between the priorities of the different alliance models in this study were essentially smaller than in the previous study with the executives. Therefore it would be definitely interesting to obtain a compromise solution acceptable for both the executives and the supervisors.译文:客户角度下的最优选择:银行与保险公司联盟概述在本文中,作为芬兰客户代表,我们研究了银行与保险公司之间可选择的合作方式。
第五章 两种金融体系的比较:初步的总结
市场对中介的威胁:金融体系的融合?
融合是弱化两种体系缺陷的有效方式吗? 融合的方式有哪些? 对银行有什么风险? 我国的银行应当如何转型?在转型中克服那
些问题?
参考文献
Canals, Jordi, 1997, Universal Banking: International Comparisons and Theoretical Perspectives, Oxford University Press.
Porter, M.E.(1992),Capital Choices(Washington, DC: Council of Competitiveness).
Short-term evaluation of decisions
Fragmentation of interests
Outside information Porter(1992):The fluid capital system: The Anglo-Saxon model
比较:以银行中介为基础的金融体系
首先,公司主要通过银行中 介的贷款或在其参与下发行 证券来融资
其次,通过银行与企业之间 的显性或隐性的合同关系来 保证企业的融资需求
第三,银行中介与非金融企 业之间存在持股关系并能影 响其决策
最后,在经济发展初期,政 府鼓励银行通过长期贷款或 持有股份的方式参与到特定 企业中。
以市场为主的金融体系的优势
两种金融体系特点的比较
首先,公司主要通过在资 本市场上发行固定或可变 收益的证券来融资
其次,市场上的金融创新 受到长期的培育,能够很 好地满足公司的实际需求
第三,资本市场上的投资 者与非金融企业的管理者 之间完全分离
- 1、下载文档前请自行甄别文档内容的完整性,平台不提供额外的编辑、内容补充、找答案等附加服务。
- 2、"仅部分预览"的文档,不可在线预览部分如存在完整性等问题,可反馈申请退款(可完整预览的文档不适用该条件!)。
- 3、如文档侵犯您的权益,请联系客服反馈,我们会尽快为您处理(人工客服工作时间:9:00-18:30)。
Comparative Financial SystemsFranklin Allen Wharton SchoolUniversity of PennsylvaniaPhiladelphia, PA 19104allenf@Douglas GaleEconomics DepartmentNew York UniversityNew York, NY 10003Douglas.Gale@April 20011 What is a Financial System?The purpose of a financial system is to cha nnel funds from agents with surpluses to agents with deficits. In the traditional literature there have been two approaches to analyzing this process. The first is to consider how agents interact through financial markets. The second looks at the operation of financial intermediaries such as banks and insurance companies. Fifty years ago, the financial system could be neatly bifurcated in this way. Rich house-holds and large firms used the equity and bond markets,while less wealthy house-holds and medium and small firms used banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions. Table 1, for example, shows the ownership of corporate equities in 1950. Households owned over 90 percent. By 2000 it can be seen that the situation had changed dramatically.By then households held less than 40 percent, nonbank intermediaries, primarily pension funds and mutual funds, held over 40 percent. This change illustrates why it is no longer possible to consider the role of financia l ma rkets and financial institu tions separately. Rather than intermediating directly between households and firms, financial institutions have increasingly come to intermediate between households and markets, on the one hand, and between firms and markets,on the o ther. This makes it necessary to consider the financial system as anirreducible whole.The notion that a financial system transfers resources between households and firms is, of course, a simplification. Go vernments usually play a significant role in the financ ial system. They are major borrowers, particularlyduring times of war, recession, or when large infrastructure projects are being undertaken. They sometimes also save significant amounts of funds. For example, when countries such as Norway and many Middle Eastern States have access to large amounts of natural resources (oil), the government may acquire large trust funds on behalf of the population.In addition to their roles as borrowers or savers, governments usually playa number of other important roles. C entral banks typically issue fiat money and are extensively involved in the payments system. Financial systems with unregulated markets and intermediaries, such as the US in the late nineteenth century, oftenexperience financial crises.The desire to eliminate these crises led many governments to intervene in a significant way in the financial system. Central banks or some other regulatory authority are charged with regulating the banking system and other intermediaries, such as insurance companies. So in most countries governments play an important role in the operation of financialsystems. This intervention means that the political system, which determines the government and its policies, is also relevant for the financial system.There are some historical instances wher e financial markets and institu tions have operated in the absence of a well-defined legal system, relyinginstead on reputation and other implicit mechanisms. However, in most financial systems the law plays an important role. It determines what kinds ofcontracts are feasible, what kinds of governance mechanisms can be used for corporations, the restrictions that can be placed on securities and so forth. Hence, the legal system is an important component of a financial system.A financial system is much more than all of this, however. An important pre-requisite of the ability to write contracts and enforce rights of various kinds is a system of accounting. In addition to allowing contracts to be written, an accounting system allows investors to value a company more easily and to assess how much it would be prudent to lend to it. Accounting information is only one type of information (albeit the most important) required by financial systems. The incentives to generate and disseminate information are crucial features of a financial system.Without significant amounts of human capital it will not be possible for any of these components of a financial system to operate effectively. Well-trained lawyers, accountants and financial professionals such as bankers are crucial for an effective financial system, as the experience of Eastern Europe demonstrates.The literature on comparative financial systems is at an early stage. Our survey builds on previous overviews by Allen (1993), Allen and Gale (1995) and Thakor (1996). These overviews have focused on two sets of issues.(1)Normative: How effective are different types of financial system atvarious functions?(2) Positive: What drives the evolution of the financial system?The first set of issues is considered in Sections 2-6, which focus on issues of investment and saving, growth, risk sharing, information provision and corporate governance, respectively. Section 7 considers the influence of law and politics on the financial system while Section 8 looks at the role financial crises have had in shaping the financial system. Section 9 contains concludingremarks.2 Investment and SavingOne of the primary purposes of the financial system is to allow savings to be invested in firms. In a series of important papers, Mayer (1988, 1990) docum ents how firms obtained funds and financed investment in a number of different countries. Table 2 shows the results from the most recent set of studies, based on data from 1970-1989, using Mayer’s methodology. The figures use data obtained from sources-and-uses-of-funds statements. For France, the data are from Bertero (1994), while for the US, UK, Japan and Germany they are from Corbett and Jenkinson (1996). It can be seen that internal finance is by far the most important source of funds in all countries.Bank finance is moderately importantin most countries and particularly important in Japan and France. Bond finance is only important in the US and equity finance is either unimportant or negative (i.e., shares are being repurchased in aggregate) in all countries. Mayer’s studies and those using his methodology have had an important impact because they have raised the question of how important financial markets are in terms of providing funds for investment. It seems that, at least in the aggregate, equity markets are unimportant while bond markets are important only in the US. These findings contrast strongly with the emphasis on equity and bond markets in the traditional finance literature. Bank finance is important in all countries,but not as important as internal fin ance.Another perspective on how the financial system operates is obtained by looking at savings and the holding of financial assets. Table 3 shows the relative importance of banks and markets in the US, UK, Japan, France and Germany. It can be seen that the US is at one extreme and Germany at the other. In the US, banks are relatively unimportant: the ratio of assets to GDP is only 53%, about a third the German ratio of 152%. On the other hand, the US ratio of equity market capitalization to GDP is 82%, three times the German ratio of 24%. Japan and the UK are interesting intermediate cases where banks and markets are both important. In France, banks are important and markets less so. The US and UK are often referred to as market-based systems while Germany, Japan and France are often referred to as bank-based systems. Table 4 shows the total portfolio allocation of assets ultimately owned by the household sector. In the US and UK, equity is a much more important component of household assets than in Japan,Germany and France. For cash and cash equivalents (which includes bank accounts), the reverse is true. Tables 3 and 4 provide an interesting contrast to Table 2. One would expect that, in the long run, household portfolios would reflect the financing patterns of firms. Since internal finance accrues to equity holders, one might expect that equity would be much more important in Japan, France and Germany. There are, of course, differences in the data sets underlying the different tables. For example, household portfolios consist of financial assets and exclude privately held firms, whereas the sources-and-uses-of-funds data include all firms. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that these differences could cause such huge discrepancies. It is puzzling that these different ways of viewing the financial system produce such radically different results.Another puzzle concerning internal versus external finance is the difference between the developed world and emerging countries. Although it is true for the US, UK, Japan, France, Germany and for most other developed countries that internal finance dominates external finance, this is not the case for emerging countries. Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) show that, for a range of emerging economies, external finance is more important than internal finance. Moreover, equity is the most important financing in strument and dominates debt. This difference between the industrialized nations and the emerging countries has so far received little attention. There is a large theoretical literature on the operation of and rationale for internal capital markets. Internal capital markets differ from external capital markets because of asymmetric information, investment incentives, asset specificity, control rights, transaction costs or incomplete markets There has also been considerable debate on the relationship between liquidity and investment (see, for example, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen(1988), Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991))that the lender will not carry out the threat in practice, the incentive effect disappears. Although the lender’s behavior is now ex post optimal, both parties may be worse off ex ante.The time inconsistency of commitments that are optimal ex ante and suboptimal expost is typical in contracting problems. The contract commits one to certain courses of action in order to influence the behavior of the other party. Then once that party’s behavior has been determined, the benefit of the commitment disappears and there is now an incentive to depart from it.Whatever agreements have been entered into are subject to revision because both parties can typically be made better offby “renegotiating” the original agreement. The possibility of renegotiation puts additional restrictions on the kind of contract or agreement that is feasible (we are referring here to the contract or agreement as executed, rather than the contract as originally written or conceived) and, to that extent, tends to reduce the welfare of both parties ex ante. Anything that gives the parties a greater power to commit themselves to the terms of the contract will, conversely, be welfare-enhancing.Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) (included as a chapter in this section) have suggested that financial markets have an advantage over financial inter mediaries in maintaining commitments to refuse further funding. If the firm obtains its funding from the bond market, th en, in the event that it needs additional investment, it will have to go back to the bond market. Because the bonds are widely held, however, the firm will find it difficult to renegotiate with the bond holders. Apart from the transaction costs involved in negotiating with a large number of bond holders, there is a free-rider problem. Each bond holder would like to maintain his original claim over the returns to the project, while allowing the others to renegotiate their claims in order to finance the additional investment. The free-rider problem, which is often thought of as the curse of cooperative enterprises, turns out to be a virtue in disguise when it comes to maintaining commitments.From a theoretical point of view, there are many ways of maintaining a commitment. Financial institutions may develop a valuable reputation for maintaining commitments. In any one case, it is worth incurring the small cost of a sub-optimal action in order to maintain the value of the reputation. Incomplete information about the borrower’s type may lead to a similar outcome. If default causes the institution to change its beliefs about the defaulter’s type, then it may be optimal to refuse to deal with a firm after it has defaulted. Institutional strategies such as delegating decisions to agents who are given no discretion to renegotiate may also be an effective commitment device.Several authors have argued that, under certain circumstances, renegotiation is welfare-improving. In that case, the Dewatripont-Maskin argument is turned on its head. Intermediaries that establish long-term relationships with clients may have an advantage over financial markets precisely because it is easier for them to renegotiate contracts.The crucial assumption is that contracts are incomplete. Because of the high transaction costs of writing complete contracts, some potentially Pareto-improving contingencies are left out of contracts and securities. This incompleteness of contracts may make renegotiation desirable. The missing contingencies can be replaced by contract adjustments that are negotiated by the parties ex post, after they observe the realization of variables on which the contingencies would have been based. The incomplete contract determines the status quo for the ex post bargaining game (i.e., renegotiation)that determines the final outcome.An important question in this w hole area is “How important are these relationships empirically?” Here there does not seem to be a lot of evidence.As far as the importance of renegotiation in the sense of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), the work of Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) suggests that little renegotiation occurs in the case of financially distressed firms.Conventional wisdom holds that banks are so well secured that they can and do “pull the plug” as soon as a borrower becomes distressed, leaving theunsecured creditors and other claimants holding the bag.Petersen and Rajan (1994) suggest that firms that have a longer relationship with a bank do have greater access to credit, controlling for a number of features of the borrowers’ history. It is not clear from their work exac tly what lies behind the value of the relationship. For example, the increased access to credit could be an incentive device or it could be the result ofgreater information or the relationship itself could make the borrower more credit worthy. Berger and Udell (1992) find that banks smooth loan rates in response to interest rate shocks. Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Berlin and Mester (1997) find that smoothing occurs as a firm’s credit risk changes.Berlin and Mester (1998) find that loan rate smoothing is ass ociated with lower bank profits. They argue that this suggests the smoothing does not arise as part of an optimal relationship.This section has pointed to a number of issues for future research.• What is the relationship between the sources of funds for investment,as revealed by Mayer (1988, 1990), and the portfolio choices of investorsand institutions? The answer to this question may shed some light onthe relative importance of external and internal finance.• Why are financing patterns so different in developing and developedeconomies?• What is the empirical importance of long-term relationships? Is renegotiationimportant is it a good thing or a bad thing?• Do long-term relationships constitute an important advantage of bankbasedsystems over market-based systems?金融体系的比较1、什么是金融体系?一个金融系统的目的(作用)是将资金从盈余者(机构)向短缺者(机构)转移(输送)。