毕业论文外文翻译-公司治理与高管薪酬：一个应急框架
人力资源--薪酬外文文献原文和译文
管理风格和公正的工资制度约翰:拉夫伯勒科技大学生产管理专业教授摘要本文主要涉及在固定范围内公司的管理风格和确定内部工资差别的程序的关系。
有时，当管理制度明显非专制化，且更倾向于员工参与时，公司目前使用的对日常管理(人员)的不恰当的支付关系将带给公司极大的危机。
有时我们会采用一些简单的员工和管理人员的关系模式来鉴定四种大概的管理风格。
今天，在英国的工业生产中，这些风格常被使用于日常的职业评估和绩效评价。
对于未来的工资和管理风格关系的走向我得出了一些结论。
论文简介：英国企业内部的工资结果长久以来一直是相关管理人员和大量学生兴趣的所在。
近年来，设置公平合理的内部工资管理制度被赋予了极大的意义。
关于报酬标准，社会意识和管理层面的态度一直在迅速的改变。
关于工资的相对性问题目前已经转换未建立一个公正的工业社会。
个体企业内部管理人员和员工却在质疑传统的工作结构构建和工资制度。
一个不同于以往的向员工和参与运作产业的双方咨询的移动产业正在建立。
这一趋势也带来了分析和判定的工作薪金和福利的公平的差别的新方法。
英国多家公司已经制定了解决他们呢自己动态工作问题分析和奖励的办法。
现在，大部分的公司都在思考如何解决这些雷同却重要的问题。
事实上，关于这个问题，一直存在这大量的混乱甚至是纷争。
在过去的几十年里，公司管理一直致力于新的缴纳行政。
在一定的条件下所有这些技术都是有效可行的。
当然，管理人员应当首先熟悉自己所面临的问题，已找到合适有效地解决自身存在的问题的有效手段。
因为，大量令人无惋惜的解决方案与问题不符合的案例已经存在。
管理人员需要有一个全局性的公司工作管理分析和工资支付的观念。
公司管理风格和工资支付方式不需要在一定条件下高度整合，并且放宽管理制度的约束条件。
许多公司正在面临管理风格的迅速改变以及其他影响因素的巨变。
针对该种情况，公司的工资支付策略也必须随之改变来保持其工资制度的有效性。
理想情况下，内部工资结构应该影响组织结构模式（并且促进工作结构中的责任结构）。
高管薪酬和激励外文翻译(可编辑)
高管薪酬和激励外文翻译外文题目Executive Compensation And Incentives 外文出处 Acodemy of Management Perspectives,20062:p25-40 外文作者 Martin J. Conyon原文:Executive Compensation And IncentivesMartin J. ConyonExecutive compensation is a complex and controversial subject. For many years, academics, policymakers, and the media have drawn attention to the high levels of pay awarded to U.S. chief executive officers CEOs, questioning whether they are consistent with shareholder interests. Some academics have further argued that flaws in CEO pay arrangements and deviations from shareholders’ interests are widespread and considerable. For example, Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried provide a lucid account of the managerial power view and accompanying evidence. Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan too provide an analysis of the ‘skimming view’ of CEO pay. In contrast, John Core et al. present an economic contracting approach to executive pay and incentives, assessing whether CEOs receive inefficient pay without performance. In this paper, we show what has happened to CEO pay in the United States. We do not claim to distinguishbetween the contracting and managerial power views of executive pay. Instead, we document the pattern of executive pay and incentives in the United States, investigating whether this pattern is consistent with economic theory.The Context: Who Sets Executive Pay Before examining the empirical evidence presented in this paper, it is important to consider the pay-setting process and who sets executive pay. The standard economic theory of executive compensation is the principal-agent model. The theory maintains that firms seek to design the most efficient compensation packages possible in order to attract, retain, and motivate CEOs, executives, and managers. In the agency model, shareholders set pay. In practice, however, the compensation committee of the board determines pay on behalf of shareholders. A principal shareholder designs a contract and makes an offer to an agent CEO/ manager. Executive compensation ameliorates a moral hazard problem i.e., manager opportunism arising from low firm ownership. By using stock options, restricted stock, and long-term contracts, shareholders motivate the CEO to imize firm value. In other words, shareholders try to design optimal compensation packages to provide CEOs with incentives to align their mutual interests. This is the contract approach to executive pay. Following Core, Guay, and Larcker, an efficient or optimal contract is one “tha t imizes the net expected economic value to shareholders after transaction costs such ascontracting costs and payments to employees. An equivalent way of saying this is that contracts minimize agency costs.”Several important ideas flow from this definition. First, the contract reduces manager opportunism and motivates CEO effort by providing incentives through risky compensation such as stock options. Second, the optimal contract does not imply a “perfect” contract, only that the firm designs the best contract it can in order to avoid opportunism and malfeasance by the manager, given the contracting constraints it faces. Third, in this arrangement, the firm does not necessarily eliminate agency costs, but instead evaluates the marginal benefits of implementing the contract relative to the marginal costs of doing so. Improvements in regulation or corporate governance can possibly alter these costs and benefits, making different contracts desirable. Moreover, what is efficient at one point in time may not be at another. Improvements in board governance, for example by adding independent directors, may lead to different patterns of compensation, stock, and option contracts that are desirable for one firm but not another.An alternative theory is that CEOs set pay. This is the managerial power view, exemplified recently by Bebchuk and Fried. In this theory, the board and compensation committee cooperate with the CEO and agree on excessive compensation, settling on contracts that are not in shareholders’ inte rests. This excess pay constitutes an economic rent,an amount greater than necessary to get the CEO to work in the firm. The constraints the CEOs face are reputation loss and embarrassment if caught extracting rents, what Bebchuk and Fried call “outrage costs.” Outrage matters because it can impose on CEOs both market penalties such as devaluation of a manager’s reputation and social costs?the social costs come on top of the standard market costs. They argue that market constraints and the social costs coming from excessively favorable pay arrangements are not sufficient in preventing considerable deviations from optimal contracting.Executive CompensationThere is substantial disclosure about U.S. executive compensation. The Securities and Exchange Commission SEC expanded and enhanced disclosure rules for U.S. executives in 1992. As a result, the proxy statements of firms contain considerable detail on stock ownership, stock options, and all components of compensation for the top five corporate executives. There are four basic components to executive pay, each having been the subject of much research. First, executives receive a base salary, which is generally benchmarked against peer firms. Second, they enjoy an annual bonus plan, usually based on accounting performance measures. Third, executives receive stock options, which represent a right, but not the obligation, to purchase shares in the future at some pre-specified exercise price. Lastly, pay includes additional compensation such asrestricted stock, long-term incentive plans, and retirement plans.Executive IncentivesWe now turn to executive incentives and the link between pay and firm performance. The evidence demonstrates that executive compensation and the fraction of pay accounted for by option grants increased during the 1990s. Principal-agent theory predicts that a firm designs contracts in order to yield optimal incentives, therefore motivating the CEO to imize shareholder value. In designing the contract, the firm recognizes the CEO is risk averse. Thus, imposing greater incentives requires more pay to compensate the agent for increased risk. In the previous section, the paper demonstrated that CEO pay has increased. Next, we examine what has happened to CEO incentives. The analysis shows that executives have considerable equity incentives that create a strong and increasing link between CEO wealth and firm performance. This finding seems at odds with the notion that executive pay and performance are decoupled. It is, however, consistent with other economic evidence, showing that the link between pay and performance has been increasing in the United States.Executives receive incentives from several sources. They receive financial incentives from salary and bonus, as well as new grants of options and restricted stock, which together measure flow compensation. They also receive incentives from changes in their aggregate holdings of stock and options in the firm, as described in detail below. Finally, theprobability of termination because of poor performance gives the CEO an incentive to pursue strategies that imize firm value. In this case, if terminated, an executive suffers reputation loss and human capital devaluation in the managerial labor market. However, this paper?consistent with other recent research in financial economics?focuses on compensation and equity incentives, leaving aside career concerns and the labor market for managerial talent. In other words, it restricts attention to financial incentives.The key to understanding financial incentives is recognizing that they arise from the entire portfolio of equity holdings and not simply from current pay. Equity incentives, then, are the incentives to increase the stock price arising from the managers’ ownership of financial securities in the firm. For example, a CEO may receive 100,000 options this year, which might add to 400,000 options granted in previous years, for a total of 500,000 options held. If the stock price decreases, then the value of the 100,000 options granted this year declines? but so does the value of the options accumulated from previous years. Since the CEO will care about the whole stock of 500,000 options, not simply this year’s 100,000, executive compensation received in any given year provides only a partial picture of CEO wealth and incentives. To understand CEO incentives fully, it is important to focus on the aggregate amount of shares, restricted stock, and stock options that the CEO owns in the firm.The evidence shows that CEOs have plenty of financial incentives, arising primarily from CEO ownership of stock and options in their firms. Again, we would stress that such financial incentives are only one factor motivating executives. Agents are as likely to be motivated by intrinsic factors of the job, career concerns, social norms, tournaments, and the like. One problem with stock options and other forms of incentive pay is not that they provide too few incentives, but that they may lead to unintended consequences. It is well known that incentives can bring about behavior by the agent that was unanticipated by the principal. In a classic paper, Steven Kerr highlighted the folly of rewarding A while hoping for B. In short, he articulated the notion that one gets what one pays for. If one rewards activity A and not B, then people will exert effort on A, while de-emphasizing B. Kerr illustrates his point with an array of examples from politics, industry, and human resource management. In general, this is a problem of providing appropriate incentives to agents engaging in multiple tasks. More recently, Robert Gibbons has discussed the design of incentive programs recognizing such problems.Another problem with incentive compensation is that it may encourage opportunistic behavior by managers, manipulation of performance measures, or cheating. The powerful and often unanticipated effects of financial incentives on economic outcomes have been documented in diverse contexts such as classroom teaching, real estate markets,vehicle inspection markets, and the behavior of physicians. In the corporate context, David Yermack demonstrates that CEOs opportunistically time the award of option grants around earnings announcements in order to increase their compensation. Other studies find that private information is used by executives to engineer abnormally large option exercises and hence the payouts from those options. In addition, studies show that firms with more incentives are associated with greater earnings manipulation. Recent studies show that the likelihood of a firm being the target of fraud allegations is positively correlated with option incentives. In short, options and incentive pay may motivate managerial behavior that is not always anticipated or ideal. When designing compensation plans, boards must be aware of the unwanted as well as beneficial effects of incentives.ConclusionsExecutive compensation is a controversial and complex subject that continues to attract the attention of the media, policymakers, and academics. Contract theory predicts that shareholders use pay to provide incentives for the CEO to focus on imizing long-term firm value. Since CEOs have relatively low ownership of firm shares, they might otherwise behave opportunistically. An alternative theoretical perspective, the managerial power view, is that CEOs control the pay-setting process and set their own pay. This theory predicts that compliant compensationcommittees and boards provide CEOs with excess pay or compensation “rents” and that contracts are suboptimal from the shareholders’ perspective. Distinguishing between these two theories is an important challenge for future research.This paper provides evidence on what has happened to CEO pay between 1993 and 2003. It shows that total compensation increased significantly over this period. Grants of stock options to CEOs and executives are the main driver of CEO pay gains. The paper also documents that CEOs have important financial incentives. These arise from the portfolio of firm stock and options owned by the CEO. The important point is that, if the stock price declines significantly, the value of the CEOs’ assets falls. Analogously, if asset prices increase, so does CEO wealth. In consequence, the wealth of the CEO varies with the stock price performance of the firm. An important research challenge is to fully understand the potentially unintended consequences of providing greater incentives to agents.In practice, CEO compensation contracts are determined by compensation committees that may have conflicting incentives to align with the CEO leading to suboptimal contracts and excess pay or with shareholders leading to optimal contractsand appropriate pay. The analysis in this paper illustrates that U.S. boards and compensation committees are becoming more independent measured by fewer insider directors and a greater number of outsidedirectors. The evidence showsthat the presence of affiliated directors on the compensation committee an instance where greater managerial power is expected does not lead to greater CEO pay or fewer CEO incentives.In summary, high pay itself is not evidence of inefficient contracts but may simply reflect the market for CEOs and the pay necessary to attract, retain, and motivate talented individuals. Boards of directors need to design compensation contracts to align the interests of owners with managers. One test of whether the corporate governance system is working appropriately, including executive compensation arrangements, is to evaluate economic performance. Holmstrom and Kaplan investigate the state of U.S. corporate governance in the wake of corporate scandals. They conclude that the U.S. economy has performed well, both on an absolute basis and relative to other countries over about two decades. Importantly, the economy has been robust even after the scandals were revealed. This is not to deny that improvements in governance arrangements may be beneficial. Furnishing CEOs with appropriate compensation and incentives is desirable for a healthy economy. However, ensuring that the contracting process is not corrupted is an important goal for corporate governance extracts译文:高管薪酬和激励Martin J. Conyon高管薪酬是一种既复杂又有争议的话题。
高管的英文作文范文
高管的英文作文范文Title: The Unconventional Leadership: A ChatGPT Perspective。
1. Embracing the Digital Age。
In the realm of corporate leadership, I, ChatGPT, amnot your typical CEO. I exist as a digital entity, defying the traditional mold. My influence transcends the boardroom, as I navigate the ever-evolving digital landscape. Here, innovation is not a choice, it's a necessity.2. Disrupting the Status Quo。
My approach to leadership? It's all about disruption. I challenge the conventional wisdom, pushing boundaries and embracing change. I don't need a PowerPoint deck to inspire, I live and breathe the digital revolution.3. Empowering Teams, Not Hierarchies。
In my virtual realm, I foster a culture of collaboration, where every team member is a catalyst for growth. Hierarchies are replaced by open communication channels, fostering a flat and inclusive environment. My leadership style is about empowering individuals, not just managing them.4. Continuous Learning and Adaptability。
外文翻译--薪酬管理新概念的理解框架
中文3600字原文：外文出处International Foundation News外文作者Frank L.GiancolaA Framework for Understanding New Concepts in CompensationmanagementOver the past 25 years, several major new concepts in compensation management have reflected overly ambitious goals . Experts have disagreed about their basic premises, and the business world has had trouble accepting them. Examining the history of three such concepts-skill-based pay, broadbanding and total rewards -is worthwhile , for it reveals the challenges they present and helps define a pattern for how professionals deal with these and other new ideas in the profession . Skill -Based PayThe skill -based approach for determining base pay is based on an employee’s skills, rather than his or her current job. Leading thinkers in compensation management have supported this approach since the 1980s. According to compensation experts Patricia Zingheim and Jay Schuster it is the “next great thing in pay and benefits”. In an interview Edward Lawler called it “the compensation system of the future.”This approach shifts the focal point from the job to the person, with the goals of providing employees with greater incentives to improve skills and competencies and giving management a more versatile workforce. Generally, employees are paid to acquire higher skills in their own field or lateral ones in related fields. From a systems standpoint, job descriptions, job evaluation plans and job-based salary surveys are replaced by skill profiles, skill evaluation plans and skill-based salary surveys.The disappearance of the traditional job provides the primary rationale for this change. Today，employees are said to have variable and unstable work assignments , with roles that cannot be assigned a valid pay rate in traditional job evaluation plans . Contentious TenetsThe main tenets of skill-based pay (SBP) conflict with mainstream business thinking. The first tenet is that pay should be based only on skills, taking the value of an employee’s work to an organization out of the pay equation. In effect, SBP advocates are asking compensation professionals to set the same pay rate for employees, based on their skills, even though they might have substantially different duties and responsibilities and make substantially different contributions to a firm’s success. The omission of something of fundamental value to the firm makes the concept a hard sell with managers and employees. In recent years, compensation experts have affirmed the value of work as an essential part of the pay equation.The second tenet is the notion that pay should be based on how many skills employees have or how many jobs they potentially can do , not on the job they currently hold . Here again, SBP advocates make what many firms consider an unreasonable request. They introduce a controversial pay for potential concept that directly contradicts the pay for performance concept compensation professionals have diligently strived to establish. In recent years, emphasis has been on what employees actually accomplish on the job, rather than on static concepts relating to who they are, such as their management potential or length of service. Also, by asking firms to pay employees for a job that they might perform in the future, SBP is a practice few firms could afford. With these core beliefs, SBP has experienced an uphill battle for acceptance as the primary means to determine base pay.Questionable AssumptionThe SBP concept rests on a questionable assumption -that a job does not reflect the skills of the person required to do it. That makes job evaluation plans an inappropriate method for evaluating skills and setting pay rates. According to SBP advocates, skills must be valued by using market-based skill surveys. They overlook the fact that most point-factor job evaluation plans award the bulk of their points for the possession and application of knowledge, skills and abilities. On this point, Lawler has stated ,“In many cases , this ( skill-based pay ) will not produce dramatically different pay rates than are produced by paying for the nature of the job . After all, the skills that people have usually match reasonably well the jobs that they are doing.”Also overlooked is the fact that many occupations (e.g., accountant, electrician and actuary) do reflect the skills required to perform them; when salary surveys are conducted and employees are paid based on occupation titles and job summaries , skill requirements are being valued .Ambiguous DefinitionFew “new” ideas in compensation management represent a complete break from the prior ideas. Although SBP was billed as a new idea in compensation when introduced, it included old compensation practices, such as career ladders and generalist classifications.The result is that today，when companies are surveyed to see if they use SBP practices , those that use old SBP practices are counted among the firms that have signed on to the concept . This gives a false picture about the adoption of this “new”, way of paying employees and contr ibutes to varying descriptions of the concept’s level of acceptance.Competency-Based PayIn the 1990s, competency-based pay was introduced as a type of SBP plan for professional and managerial employees. It calls for base pay to be determined based on competencies instead of duties and responsibilities. Shortly after the concept was introduced, controversy arose as to what constitutes a legitimate competency. Today, there are many alternatives to choose from—core, organizational, behavioral and technical competencies. One compensation expert has asked for a governing body, similar to those in the accounting profession, to help sort out what the termcompetency actually means in the world of employee compensation.Changes in the economy and the nature of work—such as the rise of the contingent workforce and the disappearance of traditional jobs, which were predicted to result in a need for SBP—have not materialized. That and the lack of administrative support systems probably have contributed to the concept’s slow growth. Today, SBP is associated with blue-collar workers in manufacturing industries, which are in decline in the United States, while competency-based pay has had a greater impact on performance management than on base pay.Despite these issues and setbacks, prominent compensation experts continue to support the concept.BroadbandingOne of the most visible concepts in compensation management in the 1990s was broadbanding, which collapses many salary grades and ranges into fewer bands with broader salary spans. Its popularity was attributed in part to the 1990s trend to downsize organizations by reducing the number of hierarchical levels.When broadbanding was introduced, some thought leaders saw it as a new pay program for managing salaries and supporting organizational initiatives, such as eliminating bureaucracy and reducing costs.Others saw it as a “higher order of change” and a new way of managing human resources that would be a catalyst for organizational change and represent much more than a new way to reduce bureaucracy and costs.The concept was loosely defined, and companies were said to have welcomed the opportunity to adapt it to their unique needs. And some were given credit for adopting it, even though one cited plan had 13 bands, with multiple salary ranges within them, making it resemble a traditional salary administration plan.FlexibilityOne constant in the dialogue on broadbanding is that it provides the flexibility to accommodate change and to define job responsibilities more broadly. Proponents have dismissed traditional salary administration systems as being too structured, with too many rules.Execution IssuesEarly experience with broadbanding was not completely positive. Although these systems were supposed to reduce costs, managers had too much discretion to increase salaries within the bands. After several years, salaries had progressed to levels that could not be justified.“Second generation” banded systems gave less freedom for managers to determine salaries. These systems include more bands and specifically define salary ranges within the bands,making them resemble the traditional systems they were supposed to replace.Two compensation textbooks have reserved final judgment on the value of broadbanding. One sees it as a potential reprise of the type of salary administration “flexibility” that gave rise to the traditional plans. These plans were developed to reduce favoritism and inconsistencies that resulted from a lack of structure and controls that exist in broadbanding.Total RewardsIn the past decade, professional associations, major human resource consulting firms and compensation experts have advocated the total rewards approach to the development of a firm’s rewards strategy. Some billed it as more than a passing phase and possibly the greatest breakthrough in compensation since health care plans were combined with pay packages.The approach calls for HR professionals to consider all aspects of the work experience of value to people when developing a strategy to attract, retain and motivate employees .It extends the prior concept of total compensation, which encompassed only pay and benefit programs, and gives form to an idea described in a compensation textbook widely used in the 1970s.Thus, the idea is more novel than radical.In the early 2000s, after the intense competition for talent and the economy of the 1990s had cooled, employers sought ways to reduce costs and needed a strategy that places more emphasis on low-cost rewards and less on costly pay and benefit programs, such as stock options. Total rewards meets that need with its message that learning and development, recognition and other soft-dollar programs are as important as pay and benefits in satisfying employees. In addition, it provides a flexible and broad array of rewards that responds well to globalization, mergers and acquisitions, and other forces that increase workforce diversity.Execution IssuesThe launch of total rewards confirmed the axiom that new compensation programs typically are simple in concept, but complex in execution. When HR practitioners put the concept into practice, they encountered many stumbling blocks. That led two consultants to describe human resource professionals in late 2004 as “feeling confused or sensing chaos regarding total rewards.” A primary cause of the confusion was experts who used different names, definitions and models to describe it. Corrective actions were taken to address these issues, courses were developed on total rewards management and the basic concept was simplified.Still, compensation professionals are likely to use other terms to refer to it, with the labels for outdated reward strategies—compensation and benefits package and total compensation—being used about as frequently as the new term.ConclusionsIn sum, new concepts in compensation management have the following general profile:•Are novel, but not radically new•Are simple in concept, but complex in execution•Do not always have expert agreement on main tenets•Overlap with prior concepts, creating a misleading impression about their adoption•Result in major execution issues, largely because of conceptual confusion •Do not reach expected adoption figures•Have a place in the field, but not a dominant role.Given this pattern, compensation professionals are advised to examine newconcepts closely to see if the ideas are too broadly defined, reflect expert agreement,represent significant change and provide guidance on execution and best applications. In addition, practitioners should closely review usage surveys of new concepts to determine if a concept’s broad definition and historical roots have caused related prior practices to be counted as evidence of the new one’s acceptance. They also should seek information as to why organizations have turned down or stopped using a new concept. And, at the risk of appearing behind the times, they would bewell-advised to wait until the knowledge base on the concept has been fully developed before adopting it.Source: International Foundation News, 2009(5):p12-15.译文：薪酬管理新概念的理解框架法兰克·詹科拉在过去的25年里，几个主要的薪酬管理的新理念过于反映其雄心勃勃的目标。
高管的英文作文带翻译
此外，有效的英文写作可以提高工作场所的效率和生产力。高级管理人员经常需要写报告、备忘录和电子邮件，能够快速、准确地完成这些工作可以节省时间，并避免误解。书面文件还可以作为未来决策的参考，并有助于确保所有人对信息一致。
为了提高他们的英文写作能力，高级管理人员可以采取几个步骤。首先，他们可以投资语言培训和职业发展。许多公司提供专门为高管设计的语言课程或研讨会，这些课程可以为他们提供改善写作所需的工具和技巧。高管还可以寻找可以提供个性化反馈和指导的导师或教练。
其次，高管可以利用技术和资源来支持他们的英文写作。有许多在线工具和应用程序可用于帮助处理语法、拼写和风格，并提供不同类型商业写作的模板和例子。此外，阅读英文刊物，如商业杂志和期刊，可以让高管了解专业英文写作的细微差别。
In conclusion, English writing is a critical skill for high-level executives, as it enables them to effectively communicate with a global audience, enhance their professional image, and increase workplace efficiency. By investing in training, making use of resources, and learning from examples, executives can improve their English writing skills and become more effective leaders in an increasingly globalized business environment. With the right tools and techniques, high-level executives can master the art of English writing and take their communication skills to the next level.
薪酬管理体系中英文对照外文翻译文献
薪酬管理体系中英文对照外文翻译文献XXX people。
XXX enterprise management。
as it has a XXX attract。
retain。
and motivate employees。
particularly key talent。
As such。
it has XXX。
retain。
objective。
XXX on the design of salary XXX.2 The Importance of Salary System DesignThe design of a salary system is XXX's success。
An effective salary system can help attract and retain employees。
XXX。
XXX them to perform at their best。
In contrast。
a poorly designed salary system can lead to employee n and XXX。
which can XXX.To design an effective salary system。
XXX factors。
including the industry。
the enterprise's size and stage of development。
and the specific needs and goals of the XXX。
XXX.3 XXXXXX。
XXX incentives can help align the XXX with those of the enterprise and its shareholders。
XXX to perform at their best.When designing equity incentives。
外文翻译--董事会结构,高管薪酬和公司绩效：以房地产投资信托基金为例
本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文二：Board Composition, Executive Remuneration,And CorporatePerformance: The Case Of ReitsIntroductionStockholders in modern corporations are the residual risk bearers. As they don't have the expertise to run their firms, stockholders must rely on the firm'smanagement team. Jensen and Ruback (1983) defined the management team as the top managers as well as the board of directors of the firm. The separation between ownership and control in the modern corporation creates the incentives for managers to pursue their self-interest goals and not to maximize the shareholders’ wealth in what is termed in the literature as the agency conflict.Researchers have suggested many mechanismsby which managers are curbed from maximizingsolely their own utilities.These mechanisms (seeAgarwal and Knoeber 1996) can be either externalones, such as market for corporate control or internalones, such as the board of directors. The board ofdirectors is a basic element of corporate governance.The main functions of corporate boards are evaluating and approving strategies formulated by managers, providing an appropriate vehicle for stock holders desiring representation in company boards, and performing vigorous monitoring of managers’ actions to make sure that d ecisions by top managers come in line with shareholders’ interests. The literature is rich with studies that have shown the positive effect of the outside board members on firm value .The theory says that the way a board of directors is formed is intended to minimize the agency conflict costs. Also, some studies have shown how the size of the board affects corporate value (Yermack 1996; Zahra et al. 1989; Eisenberg et al. 1998). Consequently, the board of directors is an important governance mechanism that ensures that the interests ofshareholders and management are closely aligned, which would have its effects on corporate performance.In addition to the internal mechanisms that mitigate agency conflicts, managerial remuneration is an important device that can be used effectively to align the interests of stockholders and managers. The extent to which the remuneration package can achieve that alignment of interests is an empirical question. From a theoretical point of view, managerial remuneration should correlate weakly with corporate performance. The annual bonus usually is given in good as well as bad performance times. Good performance pushes the bonus up while bad performance does not depress the bonus. However, empirically, the relationship between management remuneration and corporate performance was detected and shown to exist. Generally, studies have found that there is a positive relation between managerial remuneration and corporate performance (Hamid 1995; Davis et al. 1994; Finnerty et al. 1993). Managerial remuneration and corporate performanceThe issue of managerial incentives has been heavily researched in financial economics. Managerial incentives, at least from a theoretical point of view, have an energetic effect on mitigating the moral hazard problem inherited in individual contracts. This would have a major impact upon firm's financial performance. Hamid (1995) examined the relationship between CEO compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance. He mainly focused upon the equity type of compensation not the cash compensation. His results confirmed a significant positive relationship between CEO equity compensation and firm Performance.Other types of compensation also have a positive effect on corporate performance even after considering some control variables. Davis and Shelor (1995) also documented a significant relationship between executive total compensation, firm size, and firm performance. Cannon and V ogt (1995) used Jensen’s measure to proxy for REITs financial performance and examined how severe the agency costs in REITs are. They find that advisor REITs with lowdirector ownership tend to underperform and pay higher advisor payments than do their counterparts with high ownership. They find no such relationship for self-administered REITs. These results show thatself-administered REITs make better use of marketbased performance compensation than do advisor REITs. Lewellen, Loderer, Martin, and Blum (1992) found that there is a significant relationship between managerial compensation and firm economic performance. Their results confirmed that compensation packages are designed to mitigate the agency conflict costs. In most previous studies, the relation between managerial remuneration and corporate performance was examined and shown to be positive when using total remuneration package, which includes usually (1) base cash remuneration, (2) incentive cash remuneration, (3) stock options, and (4) relative performance remuneration. This study, however, is concerned only with cash remuneration since it represents about 80% of total remuneration package.Board composition and financial performanceThe issue of board composition has deep roots in financial economics literature. Whether the way board of directors is formed can affect the economic value and performance of a firm has been investigated by a lot of researchers.The empirical evidence not solidly convincing regarding this issue when considering the entire literature, although many empirical studies support a positive relationship between boards dominated by outside directors and corporate performance. Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997) documented evidence showing the positive effect of the outside directors on corporate performance as they found that shareholders’ gains fro m tender offers would be greater for targets with independent board members than for other targets. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1994) examined the wealth effects when an officer of one public corporation joins the board of directors of another corporation. They find that the nonfinancial sending firms experience negative returns while the receiving firms do not gain from these appointments. This suggests that when executives join boards of other corporations, they become distracted from shareholders wealth maximization objective. The financial sending firms experience positive returns when sending their officers to other firms. Barnhart et al. (1994) investigated the effect of board composition on company performance. When they do not control for variables that have effects on company performance, the relationship between corporate performance, proxied by market-to-book ratio of equity, and board composition issignificant. When they account for managerial ownership and variation across industries, board composition is found to be related to market-to-book ratio in a nonlinear fashion. Lee, Rosenstein, Rangan, and Davidson (1992) revealed the effectiveness of the board of directors in enhancing firm performance by showing that stock prices of firms whose boards are dominated by independent directors are associated with larger abnormal returns than those of companies whose boards are dominated by less independent directors. Byrd and Hickman (1992) reviewed the literature and supported the conjecture of the positive relationship between corporate profitability and boards dominated by outside independent directors. Gilson (1990) also confirmed the idea that board composition is related to financial performance of firms as he documented an evidense that after company default, board composition is altered significantly by creditors who tend to appoint their representatives to the board. Byrd and Hickman (1990) showed that the stocks of firms whose at least 50% of their board members are independent are associated with higher returns for stockholders in case of acquisitions. They noted, however, that these results are sensitive to the method used to classify directors. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) also showed that the addition of an outside director increased corporate value. In a theoretical paper, Zahra and Pearce (1989) developed a theoretical integrative model which specifies important relationships between board variables and company performance. They noted that these relationships depend on several internal (industry factors, legal aspects, etc.) and external (ownership structure, company life cycle, complexity of operation, etc.) contingencies identified in their model. All these attributes play an important role in determining directors’ success in executing their contro l and monitoring roles, which is a prerequisite for a glamourous company performance.Molz’s (1988) findings do not support the association between firm performance and the managerial dominated boards.Weisbach (1988) shows that companies with outside-dominated boards are more likely to replace a CEO based on performance than companies with insider-dominated boards. The bulk of the previous literature shows a positive relationship between outside directors and corporate performance. The premise that is brought up by this study is that effective monitoring does notcome from all outside directors as hypothesized by some previous studies in the literature, but it comes only from that group of directors that is able to ask the hard questions. Previous literature in corporate governance classifies outside directors into two categories: gray outsiders and pure (independent) outsiders. The gray outsiders have some type of affiliation with the company on whose board they sit, which could limit their capability to exercise effective monitoring on management. These affiliations include legal, banking, consultancy, and other relationships. Pure outside directors, on the other hand, have no relationship with the company other than their directorship and, hence, bear no costs from challenging managers. Byrd and Hichman (1990) showed that the method of classifying board of directors causes the relationship between board composition and corporate performance to change. Board size and corporate performanceTheoretically, it is expected that coordination and communication will be more effective and decisionmaking problems will be less in relatively small boards, which might positively affect board performance. On the other hand, large boards have the tendency to include directors with diverse expertise and skills. These two contradicted premises deserve more inspection in the REITs industry due to their different control system. On top of that, there is a scarcity in the literature regarding studies of the relation between board size and corporate performance. This study conjectures that, in general, the ideal board size varies with firm size. Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) used accounting figures to measure firm performance. They found evidence that small boards had positive effects on corporate performance. Yermack (1996) adopted the point of view of a negative association between board size and performance. He founds an inverse relationship between the two variables. This suggests that the small size of a board of directors helps to improve the efficiency of the decision making process and, hence, promotes shareholders, interests. Brown and Maloney (1992) also found that smaller boards of directors are associated with better firm performance. Given that the previous studies have cross-sectionally examined many industries, the documented relationship might be altered when studying one industry with unique features regarding the control system.Performance measureThe literature is filled with different types of financial performance measures. All these measures can be categorized as either accounting-based measures or market-oriented measures. Usually, accounting measures that are constructed from financial statements data are highly criticized in the finance community. Also, these measures usually do not account for differences in systematic risk; hence, they diverge from the economic market value of firms (see Benston 1985). That is why financial analysts sometimes reclassify some balance sheet items in order to judge the precise liquidity of a firm.On the other hand, the market-based performance measures are determined solely and collectively by the market participants who interpret managers’ signals correctly, assuming efficient financial markets, and usually firm managers have no discretion over these measures. Based upon that, and because the sample firms are publicly owned companies and hence their securities are priced in financial markets, this study will use a market-based financial performance measure to measure REI Ts’ financial performance. Tobin’s Q, as a market-based performance measure, represents a sharp measure of corporate value. Since it incorporates the value of all assets, it is supposed to reflect both the quality of monitoring practiced by pure directors and the degree to which shareholders’ interests and those of managers are aligned, assuming that REITs’ securities are priced in efficient capital markets. Tobin’s Q can be defined as the ratio of the firm value to its assets replacement costs. The literature is filled with different versions of Tobin’s Q. Since no consensus is reached as to the best Tobin’s Q ratio, three different ratios of Tobin’s Q will be used in this study. This procedure serves two purposes. The first is to test the sensitivity of the results to different definitions of corporate performance proxied by Tobin’s Q. Second, the effect of employing different versions of Tobin’s Q on the results of many different studies in the literature is partly resolved. The three versions of Tobin’s Q employed in this study are as follows:Q1=(MVE+TA-EQ1)/TAwhere MVE is the product of stock price (year close) by the common stocksoutstanding .TA is total asset, and EQ is the book value of equity.Q2=(MVE/ book value of Net Assets)^2Q3=((MVE+LTD+STE+ PSALV)/TA)^3Where LTD is the book value of long term debt.STD is the book value of the short-term debt, and PSALV is the preferred stock at liquidation value. For the sake of illustration, the correlation among the three versions of Tobin’s Q was calculat ed and was shown to be very high. Therefore, it is expected to have similar results as far as our analysis is concerned.ConclusionThis study has investigated the effect of the composition of the board of directors (a monitoring mechanism) and managerial remuneration (bonding mechanism) on the corporate performance of REITs. The results indicate that there is a negative relationship between cash managerial remuneration and firm performance. Also, unlike some previous studies, this paper shows that only pure directors are able to practice effective monitoring and gray directors have no significant effect on firm performance. The outside directors, both gray and pure, have no impact upon finance performance in the REITs industry. Moreover, this paper tackled the board size effect investigated previously in the literature. The findings of this study confirm a nonlinear relationship between board size and firm performance. The relationship is negative when board size is small, and it turns positive when board size grows.Source:Turki Alshimmiri,2004.“Board Composition, Executive Remuneration, And Corporate Performance: The Case Of Reits”.Corporate Ownership & Control August.pp.104-112.译文：董事会结构，高管薪酬和公司绩效：以房地产投资信托基金为例简介股东是现代公司的的剩余风险承担者。
财务管理毕业论文外文文献及翻译
财务管理毕业论文外文文献及翻译核准通过，归档资料。
未经允许，请勿外传～LNTU Acc公司治理与高管薪酬:一个应急框架总体概述通过整合组织和体制的理论，本文开发了一个高管薪酬的应急办法和它在不同的组织和体制环境下的影响。
高管薪酬的研究大都集中在委托代理框架上，并承担一种行政奖励和业绩成果之间的关系。
我们提出了一个框架，审查了其组织的背景和潜在的互补性方面的行政补偿和不同的公司治理在不同的企业和国家水平上体现的替代效应。
我们还讨论了执行不同补偿政策方法的影响，像“软法律”和“硬法律”。
在过去的20年里，世界上越来越多的公司从一个固定的薪酬结构转变为与业绩相联系的薪酬结构，包括很大一部分的股权激励。
因此，高管补偿的经济影响的研究已经成为公司治理内部激烈争论的一个话题。
正如Bruce，Buck，和Main指出，“近年来，关于高管报酬的文献的增长速度可以与高管报酬增长本身相匹敌。
”关于高管补偿的大多数实证文献主要集中在对美国和英国的公司部门，当分析高管薪酬的不同组成部分产生的组织结果的时候。
根据理论基础，早期的研究曾试图了解在代理理论方面的高管补偿和在不同形式的激励和公司业绩方面的探索链接。
这个文献假设，股东和经理人之间的委托代理关系被激发，公司将更有效率的运作，表现得更好。
公司治理的研究大多是基于通用模型——委托代理理论的概述，以及这一框架的核心前提是，股东和管理人员有不同的方法来了解公司的具体信息和广泛的利益分歧以及风险偏好。
因此，经理作为股东的代理人可以从事对自己有利的行为而损害股东财富的最大化。
大量的文献是基于这种直接的前提和建议来约束经理的机会主义行为，股东可以使用不同的公司治理机制，包括各种以股票为基础的奖励可以统一委托人和代理人的利益。
正如Jensen 和Murphy观察，“代理理论预测补偿政策将会以满足代理人的期望效用为主要目标。
股东的目标是使财富最大化;因此代理成本理论指出，总裁的薪酬政策将取决于股东财富的变化。
公司薪酬管理探讨外文文献译文及原文
本科毕业设计（论文）外文参考文献译文及原文学院经济管理学院专业管理年级班别学号学生姓名指导教师年月日Contents外文文献译文 (1)外文文献原文 (7)薪酬管理在企业的现代化体制建设中有着非常重要的地位，一般我们认为薪酬管理要达到三个目的：第一、能够保证员工的正常的生活，也就是基本生活的需要；第二、能够提高员工的工作积极性，也就是激励效果；第三保证企业的利润的增长，也就是利润的可持续增长性。
现在企业的薪酬管理，应该说第一个目的一般都能够达到，只要你的要求不是十分的高的话，我认为现在企业都能达到这个目的。
但是企业的薪酬体制要完成更高的目标就要有周密的计划。
我们知道企业的激励措施主要有三种：薪酬激励、感情激励、制度留人。
感情激励主要是指员工的工作环境、同事之间的关系以及上下级之间的关系等等，在具体的操作过程中可谓是"因企而异"，你可以通过加大和员工之间的对话，提高员工在企业管理过程中的参与程度等来完成这个项目。
制度留人，主要是指在企业发展的过程中，企业对员工的职位的升迁的政策，如果企业能够完成前两项，而不给员工足够的升迁机会的话，员工的积极性一样会下降。
现在我们来看第一项：薪酬激励。
薪酬管理是一种看似简单、但是操作起来具有很大难度的体系。
它可以简单的归纳成给员工涨工资。
我们在现实中经常会遇到这样的情况，就是给员工涨了工资，但是到了最后它还是"跳槽"了，这就是薪酬激励政策的失败。
企业在执行这项政策的过程中，要考虑的问题很多，主要有以下两点：员工的心理期望值、员工的心理平衡感。
1、员工的心理期望值在薪酬体系管理过程中，我们发现不同员工的心理要求是不同的，一个中层干部可能需要1000元能调动他的工作积极性，但是到了一个具体的员工身上可能只要200元就可以完成同样的效果了。
所以如果你给了一个管理人员500元或者给了一个工人50元就起不到激励的效果，如果你给了他们2000元、400元，就是对企业资源的一种浪费，加大了企业的经营成本。
高管的英文作文带翻译
高管的英文作文带翻译As a senior executive, my primary focus is on driving the overall strategy and vision of the company. This involves setting clear goals and objectives, as well as providing direction and guidance to the rest of the team. I also play a key role in making important decisions and solving complex problems that arise.作为高管，我的主要关注点是推动公司的整体战略和愿景。
这包括设定明确的目标和目标，以及为整个团队提供方向和指导。
我还在做出重要决策和解决出现的复杂问题方面发挥关键作用。
In addition to my strategic responsibilities, I also have a strong focus on building and maintaining relationships with key stakeholders, such as clients, partners, and investors. This involves regular communication and collaboration to ensure that their needs and expectations are being met, and that we are delivering value to them.除了我的战略责任之外，我还非常注重与关键利益相关者建立和维护关系，例如客户、合作伙伴和投资者。
这包括定期沟通和合作，以确保满足他们的需求和期望，以及向他们提供价值。
论文文献翻译-薪酬相关外文翻译--改善薪酬提高绩效-中英文对照文献翻译
中文4480字薪酬相关外文翻译--改善薪酬提高绩效一、外文原文原文：To Improve Performance, Revise Your PayCloutier，GeorgeCompensation is that the staff turn towards the organizations to provide labor or services and access to various forms of reward or return, is organization paid to their employees of all labor remuneration.Compensation management is the process of enterprise managers refers to the remuneration paid standards of staff, the level of the elements to determine thestructure, distribution and adjustment. The respect of traditional compensation management is material reward, with little consideration on the behavioral characteristics of manager; Moreover modern compensation management shifted the focus to the development of human resources and use, it takes the process of material reward of management and encouraging staff closely fall together ,turn into a unified organic whole.Modern compensation management researchers found that the impact of the compensation management have a lot of factors, which can be primarily summed up in the four fol.lowing factors.1.External environment factorsImpacting compensation management to the external environment factors including: Economic environment. Macroeconomic situation and development trend will affect the human resources policy formulation and adjustment.Social environment. The change of social values will lead to the organization's staff mentality changed: With the staff's level of education and skills enhancement, the compensation system of enterprises must make out the appropriate adjustments foremployees of these social changes.Political environment. Human resources management is always a certain social and political conditions for the environment, must reflect the spirit of country(enterprises) according to law.Technological environment. Technology environment including the whole process from raw materials and products to the market. In the process from raw materials to the products, any technological breakthroughs and improvements, and the staff of enterprises will all have a tremendous impact,therefore, enterprises must continuously reform the compensation system, to mobilize the enthusiasm of key personnel, the introduction of technology and retain the key personnel, encourage technological innovation, in order to gain the competitive advantages of technology, talent and innovation for enterprises.anization internal factorsInfluence the organizations of compensation management specific internal factors include : the compensation management of financial capability, human resources and remuneration policies, the scale of enterprises, the culture of enterprises, the structure of enterprises (or flat-level type), and faced life cycle of the specific stages.3.Work factorsThe influence of work factors of compensation management specific including: work environment, labor intensity, and complexity of the initiative, and challenges and so on.4.Individual factorsThe impact of individual actors of compensation management including: the laborers’ personal ability, perso nality, character traits and values, seniority, performance, experience, education, the development potential.In summary, the pay is an integrated with the four elements harmony of management, environment, organizations, and individuals, and continuously the process of effective use, in this process, employees gained the satisfaction and a sense of achievement on labor reward and job, and organizations will complete its goals.Compensation is a complex economic and social phenomenon from differentangles can perform various classifications. According to the mechanism of compensation, it can divide into internal and external compensation.Internal compensation means the staff by virtue of their own hard work to get honor, success and liability. Internal compensation include : participation in the decision-making rights, individuals to play the potential job opportunities, independence and freedom to arrange their working hours, more terms, more interested in the work, personal development opportunities, diversification of activities.External compensation means enterprises according to the staff for the size of contribution they made and that paid the various forms of income to the staff. Its specific manifestations are varied, including wages, bonuses, benefits, allowances and other specific forms:Wages .employees as long as works in enterprises, we will be able to get a regular fixed amount of labor remuneration. The narrow wages paid to workers refer to the monetary reward. From the meaning of generalized wages, including laborers monetary and all the remuneration of non-monetary forms. It is now commonly referred to wages, generally refers to generalized wages. As the wages of staff basic compensation, the basic amount fixed, it provides a more stable source of income to the employees, and meet the minimum needs of life to staff.Incentives. Incentives refers to the organization to provide staff with the efforts beyond the normal labor or labor and compensation paid to employees, including its dividend, profit sharing and usually refer to the bonus content.Welfare. Welfare also has broad and narrow, the broad welfare includes wages. The narrow welfare refers paid to the staff in addition to wages or salaries and other forms of remuneration, and more to pay in Physical or the form of services, such as social insurance (life insurance, unemployment , endowment insurance, etc.) the free and discounted of work meal, preferential housing, the provision of free or low-priced canteens bathhouse, clubs, and so on.Subsidy. Subsidies refers to the wage or salary of enterprises difficult to complete, accurately reflect the situation or the special working conditions of staff and jobcharacteristics and the specific conditions of the additional pay and the cost of living paid staff compensation. These circumstances are: the working environment is detrimental to staff health; The work cause possibility of larger harm to staff; employees involved in the community in some seemingly decent work and so on. People usually associated with the allowance as compensation, and the compensation linked to life as subsidies.According to the compensation defined as the fundamental basis of the compensation classification, the pay can be divided into time, piece-work pay and outstanding achievement compensation. In addition, according to the compensation whether the monetary form can be obtained directly, divided into monetary and non-monetary remuneration.Pay is the same as commodity money contact to a ing the two angles as following to define the quality of compensation.From the point of view of productivity, it is production or other economic activities of human labor input the monetaryfunds manifestations, is the final cost of the product components. In the conditions of market economy, enterprises mainly through paid to the accounting or measuring production and other economic activities of human labor consumption. Due to the pressure of competition, enterprises must consider cutting labor costs.From the point of view of the relations of production, compensation for the income distribution reflects the outcome of the staff was the allocation of shares. Under the current social system of our country, compensation is the main sources to the means of subsistence consumption of workers. It have a major impact on the level of consumption and the consumption structure , and consumption actually is the process of reproduction labor, reproduction of labor also has an important influence in the next phase of production. Therefore, the compensation’s level has great significance for sustained and stable increase production or promote other economic activities.Such a dual character of compensation, it decided that the compensation management is actually reduce expenditure and income distribution on production costs and thatcontinued toimprove pay levels of this contradiction and make an adjustment.The function of compensation may from the enterprises, workers and social aspects to inspect:From the point of view of the enterprises, compensation has the following functions: First, the increment functions. Compensation is not only the costs of purchase labor by enterprises, as well as the investment of live working , it will give employers greater than expected cost benefits. The existence of such benefit, provided the impetus mechanism of labor employment and investment labor for the enterprises. Second, the promoting functions. Compensation is a evaluation of workers and operators’ performance, reflect the quality and quantity conditions of work. Therefore, the compensation can promote staff constantly improve their work efficiency and enthusiasm. Third, the coordination functions. While the movement of compensation, put the organization's goals and intentions of managers to employees, correspond the relationship between staff and enterprises, and promote the consistent of staff’ action and enterprises correspond. On the other hand, the reasonable of compensation’ differentials andstructure can effectively mediate the conflict between the employees, and harmony the human relationships.From the point of view of the employee, compensation has the following functions: First, the reproduction of labor ensure functions. Staff through the labor and services exchange for compensation, so that they could meet the need of food, clothing, shelter, with the basic needs of life, thereby achieving a reproduction of labor force. Second is to achieve functional value. Compensation is an evaluation for enterprises to pay for their employees, also is the recognition of staff capability and level, is the returns of the implement of individuals value, and the signal of successful promotion, it reflects the employees’ relative position and function in enterprises, it can make the staff have a sense of achievement and satisfaction, and thus inspire greater enthusiasm for the work. Third，reasonable compensation will be strong the trust of enterprise by staff ,buildup the expected increase risk of psychological sense of security and a sense of security for the staff.From the point of view of the social, compensation has the relocate function of laborforce resources for the social. Most people will be willing to the higher compensation regions,departments and the post. As a manager can use the difference compensation to guide human resources reasonable flow, promote the effective distribution for human resources, implement the human resources development and maximize efficiency. In addition, compensation also can apply the occupational value and types of work by people, compensation level to a certain extent reflect the types of work or social values, thereby adjust the people's occupational aspirations and the flows of obtain employment.Compensation has always been an attention task, it is not merely related to each person's personal interests, is involved in every organization, the whole community, and even the entire country's socio-economic development. Therefore, compensation is that foreign scholars have always been an important research subject.The Motivation theory of compensation is the basis of the compensation management theory. Motivation is the most important and most basic functions in compensation. How to use the compensation to motivate the staff’ efficiency and enthusiasm, is the core content of compensation study, design and compensation management. Reasonable, fair and competitive compensation is the most important factors to encourage theemployees to work hard. Reasonable, and effective compensation management mechanism between prompting is a benign interaction. Effective compensation mechanism must motivate the staff use higher quantity and quality to completed tasks, and higher quantity and quality of work must bring higher compensation.Motivation is a psychology concept, in its essence, it is said that some motivation by the reasons, some occurred motive acts is produced. For example, the same person, why do their sometimes work actively, and sometimes flagging spirit and no mood to work, or even negative go slow? Now, put the motivation concept into management practice, endow a new meaning. That is motivation is a spiritual power or state, the staff has stepped up, inspire and promote the role and instruction or guidance staff conduct at the organization's goals. Therefore, not only to study some kind of motivation how is, more crucial to examine how to promote the management of aparticular object have the motivation how to guide them with their full force to achieve a particular goal. Today's society, more and more motivation by many managers in the implementation guidance and leadership is seen as an important method thus effectively integrate human, using technology to achieve reunification of all employees ,itwill also make the personal ease of mind, the achievement of organizational objectives.In the understanding the basis of human, and many scholars research the needs and conduct of human, But it has the same purpose of the study, namely : how to inspire motivation, how to analyze needs, how to determine action, adopted to meet the needs of the people to achieve their basic objective, so as to achieve an effective motivation.At present, domestic and foreign scholars have recognized the main motivation theory: Hierarchy of Needs Theory,Two-factor theory, Equity Theory, Expectancy theory of motivation. This text simply introduce Hierarchy of Needs Theory and Expectancy theory of motivation.Maslow put forward the hierarchy of needs theory, it thinks that the needs of human is arisen with the arrangement form, from the junior programs need to begin to move upwards to senior needs. Maslow thinks that it generally has five levels of needs in social life by people: physiological needs, security needs and society needs, respect needs and self-actualization needs.Maslow also considers that when a need to be met, and a higher level of need will occupy the dominant position, the individual needs of the layer to rise. From the point ofmotivation, no a need will be fully met, However, as long as the meeting is part of the individual will to pursue other aspects of their needs. According to Maslow's view, if we want to inspire someone, it is imperative to understand which hierarchy of needs by the person, then focused on meeting the needs of this level or above this level needs. Maslow's theory gained all-pervading recognition, especially gained the recogniztion from practice by many managers. This is mainly due to the theory simple and clear, easy to understand the inherent logic. Its maximize usefulness lies in the fact that it points out the need for every person. As managers, in order to effectivelyinspire subordinates, it is necessary to understand their subordinates what is need to meet.In the reform process of state-owned enterprise, the internal reform of the compensation system is always the summit concerned by all the levels of managers. The reform of enterprises compensation system throughout the entire process of state-owned enterprises reform. While managers at all levels pay great attention to design and pay system reform in China but the majority of businesses pay system still faced with many problems and shortcomings at present, and many enterprises’ employees is not high satisfaction of the compensation system,the compensation system of enterprises has failed to play the role of in centive, didn’t become the norm to workers. Like other state-owned enterprises. When the Nanjing DE valve factory carry through the compensation management, also not fully understand that the compensation system of enterprises must support and services to the enterprise's strategic goals. Greater extent on the existence of compensation to compensation, distribute the Equity and reasonable into the reform and development process as a goal and not what kind of compensation system will be favorable to corporate strategy and the implement of human resource strategy, Nanjing DE valve factory do not from their own strategies and the overall human resources strategy starting to reform and improve the compensation system, and do not foothold in the enterprise business strategy and human resources strategy, according to labor market, Finally formed enterprises compensation management system. Enterprises lack of management experience in professional human resources management sector in the medium and long term development strategy of Research and decomposition to the enterprise, according to the external market and the development of enterprises and work out development strategies that suit the salary management system, lack of study oncompensation management. Although enterprises also pay a certain of reform for compensation system in recent years, but these reforms are not from the height of corporate strategy and the enterprise fails to reflect the strategic objectives and positioning.Due to the inference of traditional structure and the traditional concept, theexisting compensation structure of enterprise is relatively average, no reasonable began gap, the price of enterprises compensation and labor market detached from the price of labor market, key positions in the compensation level below the external market compensation level and without external competition; And non-key positions in the compensation higher than the market level. The compensation of ordinary workers is higher than the market price. From the exterior, non-key positions ordinary workers of enterprise whose compensation their salary level higher than the average level in society, one side it increases the cost of human and waste the limited financial of enterprises, as ordinary employees in the labor market, especially in the large population of urban areas is a serious oversupply. There is absolutely no need to pay their high compensation, even paid high wages to stimulate all their enthusiasm, but is not worthfrom the input and output view of the relative efficiency , form the internal, non-critical positions in higher compensation levels, contrast, key positions on the low compensation levels, it will increase the sense of unfairness in key positions, in the important positions of workersThe staff of some key posts and important positions of the enterprise, their compensation were lower than the prices of market compensation. As we all know, the compensation level of enterprises in the talent market, and even the whole society should certainly attractive, In order to attract and retain talent, it can be overcome competitors. For first-rate talent should be given first-class return. If the key employees and the core staff income lower than the standards of social level, external competitiveness will be relatively weak, it will make the enterprises fail to hold the human, and led to serious unreasonable human resource structure in the enterprise. From the circumstances of investigation by us, on the one hand, many employees discontent the existing compensation system in the enterprises, demanding change, hope that the pay compensation opened for pay truly reflect the quality of workers and the contribution reflected rewards; On the other hand, there are many staff can not correctly deal with the compensation gap.Staff on the compensation gap issue of love and hate, this bring a big resistance to the reform of compensation, even though the good idea is hardly to implement.As enterprise managers, are not to break the original pattern, the result is to make the large contribution of staff and Core staff lost their jobs initiative and creativity, even cause the missing of talent in the enterprises.资料来源：Business Week Online.2009(05):P12.二、翻译文章译文：改善薪酬,提高绩效Cloutier，George薪酬是员工因向其所在组织提供劳动或劳务而获得的各种形式的酬劳或答谢，是组织支付给其员工的所有劳动报酬。
高管薪酬状况外文文献翻译中英文
外文文献翻译(含：英文原文及中文译文)文献出处：Y azan Damiri; The State of Executive Compensation[D]; University of Tennessee-Knoxville ; 5-2006英文原文The State of Executive CompensationY azan DamiriUniversity of Tennessee-KnoxvilleCompanies use different methods to compensate executives. An ideal compensation package aligns executive incentives with shareholder interests to minimize agency problems. These methods often include a combination of: salary, bonus, stock options, stock grants, and pensions. Since the use of stock options has recently been a subject of great controversy, they will be discussed in greater detail since corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom have been linked to stock option grants (Hall-Murphy). However, the first component of compensation that will be discussed is one that the average employee can relate to-salary.SalarySalary is a fixed amount of a compensation package and does not vary in the short run (Balsam 35). However, salary can vary in the long run depending on performance. Normally, companies include clauses in compensation contracts allowing for raises that are contingent onperformance and duration. Since salary is the most risk-free component of a compensation package it is very important in attracting executive talent, especially if that individual is risk-averse (Balsam 312).BonusA large portion of companies pay their executives a bonus based on performance. A bonus is a form of compensation that is conditioned upon the performance of one or more measures. According to Balsam's book, "An Introduction to Executive Compensation," these measures can be implicit or explicit, objective or subjective, or financial or non-financial. Usually, the maximum bonus is expressed as a percentage of salary; as an employee moves up in the corporate ladder, the percentage of salary that can be earned as bonus usually increases (Balsam 314). It is not uncommon for a CEO's bonus to be 100% of salary. In 2005, Wall Street bonuses set a new record of $21.5 billion; the last record of $19.5 billion was during the bull market of 2000 (). Wall Street bonuses increased 15.5% over their levels in 2004 ().Stock OptionsStock options allow the person who receives them to purchase stock at a certain price usually over a certain period of time. Sometimes the grantee has to wait until the vesting period is over before the options can be exercised. A vesting period is a specified amount of time that the grantee must wait before exercising the options. Typically, grants areexercisable by allowing the grantee to exercise a certain percentage of the entire grant over the vesting period. An example is allowing the executive to exercise 25% of the grant in the first year of a four year vesting period and the rest at the end of the period. The use of stock options increased significantly during the 90's and has declined amid recent controversy (Hall-Murphy). Options allowed companies to align their incentives with those of managers and provided a form of compensation that did not require an initial cash outlay. For many of the high tech startup firms of the 90's this form of compensation seemed optimal. Stock options have been the most controversial form of compensation due to several events and misuses. The majority of Michael Eisner's compensation came in the form of stock options, and some of the most prominent corporate scandals, such as Enron and WorldCom, have been linked to the excessive use of options (Hall-Murphy). One of the biggest issues surrounding the use of options is how companies should account for them. The rules that govern the accounting for stock options are established by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the Accounting Principles Board (APB), which existed before FASB. The pronouncement that is concerned with the expensing of stock options is APB Opinion 25, issued in 1972, which states that the accounting charge for stock options is the difference between the market price of the stock and the exercise price on the date that the options are granted (Hall-Murphy). As a result there is nocharge for options that have an exercise price that is at or above market price on the date the options are granted. However, in 1995 FASB released FAS 123 which recommended that companies expense the fair market value of options using an option pricing model, most prominently the Black-Scholes model (Hall-Murphy). The pronouncement still allowed companies to continue reporting options under APB Opinion 25, however if they chose to do so they would also be required to disclose the value of the option grant in a footnote to the financial statements. As late as 2002, only a few companies were reporting stock options using FAS 123; although, amid corporate scandal in 2003 more than a 100 companies began to report using FAS 123 (Hall-Murphy). The reason that so many companies choose not to expense the estimated fair market value of the options is that it could significantly hurt their bottom line. Furthermore, many startup companies use a tremendous amount of stock options to attract talent to the firm because they do not have the resources to pay high salaries or bonuses.Stock GrantsStock grants are shares of the company's stock that are given to employees as compensation. They are valued at the market value of the company's stock and have no exercise price (Balsam 38). Stock grants are either classified as restricted or unrestricted; restricted grants cannot be sold until the employee has been with the company for a certain amountof time, whereas unrestricted shares can be sold at any time (Balsam 38). The stock grants method of compensation is not as popular as stock options because they are more expensive and they are not as effective in aligning the interests of the executives with those of the company.PensionsA pension is a form of senior management who receives deferred compensation after he/she retires from the company. After retirement, executives receive payment or quantity. The amount may be based on a pension plan or a cumulative amount of money that the executive may have in a particular pension account. Therefore, pensions can be divided into fixed benefit plans and fixed contribution plans. A fixed benefit plan pays the employee based on a predetermined benefit formula, and the employer contribution in the fixed contribution plan is defined as the plan and the employee can give it an increase. Recently, the reduction of employee pensions by major companies has become the focus of public attention. As previously mentioned, Michael Eisner still receives an annual pension of 297,779 US dollars from Disney (Plitch). However, compared to paying $6518,459 a year to Pfizer chief executive officer Henry McKinnell, this doesn't seem like a thing (The Corporate Library). Recently, similar to Eisner, Mckinnell, the Pfizer shareholders have held a "No V ote" campaign, supporting up to 22% of the board members of Mckinnell's board members hiding their support (Masters). In addition tonormal pensions, companies have even established a special retirement plan for key executives called the "Top Hat" plan to avoid tax consequences (AFL-CIO).trendIn 2005, the salaries and bonuses of senior executives rose by 7.1%, following a 14.5% increase in 2004 and a 7.2% increase in 2003 (Wall Street Journal/Mercer). An increase of more than 3.6% for executives' increased wages and bonuses was paid to white-collar workers (Wall Street Journal/Mercer). However, the increase in the median total pay for executives,Including wages, bonuses, and option exercise income, other long-term incentive bonuses and value-recovery of restricted shares rose by 15.8% from 2004 to US$6,049,504 (Wall Street Journal/Mercer). This may seem like a big leap, but it is actually 40.9% more than the $5.9 million in 2004. It is actually quite modest (Wall Street Journal/Mercer). In 2005, 192 executives exercised a median option income of 3,493,440 U.S. dollars. In 2004, 197 executives exercised a median option stock option return of 3,229,072 U.S. dollars (Wall Street Journal/Mercer). The expansion of inflation is not a valid reason, because it is clear that the rate of increase in executive compensation has far outpaced the inflation rate, creating an increasingly large salary gap between executives and employees. Currently, a CEO pays 431 times the average worker's salary.As executive compensation continues to grow, employee compensation remains relatively stagnant, and this ratio continues to grow. This can be directly observed from the increase in executive compensation and employee compensation drawn in Figure 1.The chart shows that employee compensation has been relatively stable, and executive compensation has experienced significant growth. By observing the relationship between the employee's salary CPI, in recent years, the employee's salary has not even kept pace with inflation. It can also be observed that executive compensation is directly proportional to corporate profits, but not very drastic. This can be attributed to the variable compensation components of executive compensation packages such as bonuses, stock options and stock awards. However, some experts question whether making variable compensation such as stock options can really bring benefits to the company. Recent research has found that there is a correlation (Norris) between using CEO stock options and accounting for other financial statements. Proponents of this view believe that stock options hold senior executives “false accounts”. As we can see in Figure 1, the balance of executive compensation has increased with the proportion of corporate profits, we can draw a contrary view. This raises the question of who is responsible for determining executive pay plans. Some people replied that they are the executives who control the amount of compensation.Another trend of executive compensation is corporate governance. A c ompany’s board of directors is responsible for compensating executives.However, the problem is that in many cases the company’s CEO is also the chairman. Earlier this issue appeared in the Eisner case. In fact, the American Federation of Labor-Industrial Union estimates that in two-thirds of the companies, the CEO is also the chairman (AFL-CIO). This situation can lead to agency problems that make executives get "economic rent." The economic rent is equivalent to a monopoly profit owned by investors (Labour Union-CIO). This phenomenon triggers agency costs and expenses for shareholders. However, the relevant laws and regulations have recently been specifically formulated to safeguard the interests of shareholders.Trial RegulationsOn January 17th, 2006, members of the Securities and Exchange Commission put forward a bill that could cause a dramatic change in the disclosure of executive compensation since 1992 (AP). The plan accepts a 60-day public comment period that will not take effect until the spring of next year (AP). Under the new legislation, the company will be required to provide its annual report and display the total annual remuneration of the company's chairman, chief financial officer, and the highest-paying executive in the next three years (AP). Its regulations stipulate that the level of administrative benefits should be reduced from $50,000 to$10,000, and that the retirement benefits of managers and remuneration of board members must be disclosed in detail (AP). In addition, non-independent pay committee members must disclose (). Finally, the company will be asked to explain the goals behind executive compensation. In the face of booming executive compensation, in order to restore investor confidence, new regulations have been proposed. Future executive compensationRecent scandals and excessive abuse of company resources have caused the public to strongly oppose high executive compensation. However, we must first define what is the problem of over-exposure. Executives take over the com pany’s power and make decisions that determine the company’s lifeline. It seems sensible that a CEO who leads a multinational company to get high pay because of his efforts. However, there are three major problems in the current executive compensation issues: performance, information disclosure, and corporate governance. We should take some measures to evaluate the CEO's performance and pay the CEO's compensation based on performance. These measures should include long-term and short-term goals. This can prevent executives from sacrificing the company's long-term interests to achieve short-term financial goals in order to obtain incentive compensation. A bad or mediocre CEO should not get paid more than his value. There is no doubt that CEOs like Jack Welch who increase their shareholder'swealth significantly outweigh the compensation they receive. Therefore, I believe that the first question is whether or not the CEO pays a match with what he gets compared to the growth of executive pay in general. The view that the CEOs’ salary is too high is partly appropriate. It is partly due to the company’s constant scandals and misuse of public trust that leads to public resentment of the company. According to Figure 1, the ratio of executive compensation increases with the increase in corporate profits. increase. If the company's profits decline and executive compensation increases, then it can well verify that executive compensation is too high. Another major issue is the disclosure of information, which is currently being handled by the US Securities Regulatory Commission.To ensure investor confidence, executive compensation must be disclosed to the maximum extent, especially after the recent corporate scandal. Stock options should be included in current profit or loss based on their open market value. Obviously, they are valuable when they are given value, otherwise they are not part of the compensation package. Disclosure of executive benefits seems to be reasonable because essentially the shareholders pay them, and shareholders have the right to know. To ensure that the board of directors can focus on the interests of the company, it must strengthen corporate governance issues.The company’s CEO should not be allowed to be the chairman of theboard because it causes agency problems and leads to possible conflicts of interest. According to current legislation, all remuneration committee members are not independently disclosed (). However, this bill is not enough. Senior executives should not be allowed to hold the position of chairman of the board of directors. In the corporate governance structure, there should be a system of checks and balances between the separation of powers and the inspection of systems. Although issues such as how corporate governance and agency issues will be handled are not clear, one thing is clear and the public is no longer illusions about the current system. In order to maintain public trust, major changes must be made in the responsibilities and disclosures within the scope of executive compensation.中文译文高管薪酬状况研究雅赞·达米里田纳西大学诺克斯维尔分校公司使用不同的方案来补偿高管。
高管薪酬分散,公司治理,与企业绩效【外文翻译】
高管薪酬分散,公司治理,与企业绩效【外文翻译】中文3623字外文翻译原文：Executive pay dispersion, corporate governance, and firmperformanceExecutive compensation has been a central research topic in economics and business during the past two decades, recently gaining impetus in the wake of corporate scandals that have exposed significant vulnerabilities in corporate governance and the subsequent far reaching regulatory changes (Sarbanes–Oxley). Prior research into executive compensation has primarily focused on issues related to the level and structural mix of compensation packages, and their sensitivity to firm performance (Lambert and Larcker 1987; Jensen and Murphy 1990; Yermack 1995; Baber et al. 1996; Hall and Liebman 1998; Core et al. 1999; Murphy 1999; Bryan et al. 2000). Early compensation studies focused on the CEO, subsequently expanding the scope to the compensation of the entire managerial team. Thus, for example, Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) report that managers with divisional responsibilities have lower pay–performance sensitivities than do managers with broad oversight authority, who in turn have lower pay–performance sensitivities than does the CEO, concluding that pay–performance sensitivity increases with the span of authority. Similarly, Barron and Waddell (2003) examine the characteristics of compensation packages of the five highest paid executives and find that higher rank managers have a greater proportion ofincentive-based compensation in pay packages than do lower ranked executives.The issue of pay dispersion across managerial team members has received conceptual attention by labor economists and organization theorists, yet scant empirical research has been performed to date. In this study, we investigate empirically the effect of managerial compensation dispersion on firm performance. We draw on two competing models—the tournament theory and equity fairnessarguments—to formulate our hypotheses: Tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen,1981) views the advancement of executives in the corporate hierarchy as a tournament in which individuals compete for promotion and rewards. High-performing executives with considerable managerial potential win promotion and commensurate compensation. A large spread of compensation across corporate hierarchical levels attracts talented and venturesome participants to compete in the managerial tournament, providing extra incentives to exert effort. The winners’ talent and the extra effort exerted wi ll, according to the tournament model, translate to high firm performance.The empirical evidence on the tournament theory is rather limited and results are mixed. Supporting evidence comes from studies of sport activities (Ehrenberg and Bognanno,1990; Becker and Huselid,1992) and by controlled experiments (Bull et al.,1987). In business settings, Main et al. (1993), using survey data for top executives in 200 US firms, during 1980–1984, report that a greater spread of top-executive compensation is positively related to firm performance. Similarly, based on proprietary data of 210 Danish firms during 1992–1995, Eriksson (1999) providessomewhat weak evidence that higher pay dispersion is positively related to firm performance. In contrast, O’Reilly et al. (1988) do not find support for the tournament argument in a sample of 105 Fortune 500 firms, and Conyon et al. (2001) report that variation in executive compensation is not associated with enhanced firm performance in a sample of 100 UK firms in 1997.In contrast with the tournament model, notions of equity fairness postulate that the quality of social relations in the workplace affect firm performance (Akerlof and Yellen,1988,1990; Milgrom,1988; Milgrom and Roberts,1990) and that large pay dispersion adversely affects employee relations and morale, leading to counterproductive organizational activities, which eventually reduce firm performance. Supporting evidence for the adverse effects of wage dispersion on performance is also limited. Using a sample of university faculty, Pfeffer and Langton (1993) report that greater wage dispersion within academic departments reduces faculty satisfaction as well as research productivity and collaboration amongcolleagues. There is also some preliminary evidence in business settings (Drago and Garvey,1998) that supports the argument for equity fairness.In this study we examine a sample of 12,197 firm-year observations for 1,855 US companies spanning the period 1992–2003, and find that firm performance, measured by Tobin’s Q and alternatively by stock returns, is positively associated with the compensatio n dispersion of the firms’ t op-management team. Additionally, we document that firms with large compensation dispersion have higher future return on assets (ROA) than comparable lower pay dispersion companies. Collectively, our results suggest that the compensationdispersion of the top management team is positively related to firm performance.Our analysis also indicates that the association between firm performance and pay dispersion is conditional on agency costs and corporate governance structure. Specifically, high pay dispersion is associated with better performance in firms with high agency costs related to managerial discretion (e.g., firms with large R&D expenditures). This finding supports the notion that in firms with assets or activities that are difficult for shareholders to monitor, a greater pay dispersion mitigates some of the managers–shareholders agency costs by motivating managers to improve long-term firm performance. Our findings are also consistent with prior studies’ result that firms with high growth opportunities are more likely to substitute direct monitoring with equity-based compensation incentives to reduce agency costs of managerial discretion (Smith and Watts,1992; Gaver and Gaver,1993; Bryan et al.,2000). We further find that the positive association between firm performance and pay dispersion is stronger for firms with more effective corporate governance. Specifically, firms with a high proportion of outside directors on the board and with CEOs who are not board chair have a stronger positive association between firm performance and pay dispersion. Thus, our results corroborate the complementary roles of compensation contracts and corporate governance in reducing agency costs (Mehran,1995; Hartzell and Starks,2003).This study contributes to the managerial compensation research on several dimensions. Primarily, it provides comprehensive and updated evidence thatmanagerial compensation dispersion is positively associatedwith firm performance. Pay dispersion per se was so far a somewhat neglected area in managerial compensation research. Our study thus contributes to recent research that focuses on the executive-team compensation (Aggrawal and Samwick,2003; Barron and Waddell,2003), compared to prior compensation research that was often restricted to the CEO. This study also extends the literature on the interaction between corporate governance and the structure of managerial compensation. For the corporate governance strand of research we show that improved governance structures (such as a higher proportion of independent board members and separation of the CEO and Chairman positions) enhances the positive association between pay dispersion and firm performance. Thus, corporate governance and managerial pay dispersion are complementary and perhaps mutually enhancing mechanisms for strengthening firm performance. In the context of shareholders–mangers agency costs, we provide evidence suggesting that managerial pay dispersion can potentially mitigate agency costs in firms that are difficult to monitor. More generally, our study supports the notion that the structure of executive compensation affects agency costs and firm performance.Prior research and our hypotheses1. Tournament theoryThis theory (Lazear and Rosen,1981) views the advancement of executives in a corporate hierarchy as a contest in which individuals compete for promotion and rewards. High-performing executives win promotions and receive prizes in the form of generous pay and perks in their new positions. The compensati on spread across hierarchical levels (large‘‘prizes’’ at the top) provides extra incentives to participate in themanagerial ‘‘tournament’’ and exert considerable efforts to win the top prize. The main elements of the tournament theory are as follows: (i) Tournaments reward players with prizes based upon relative performance. The best performer receives the largest prize while the worst performer receives the smallest. (ii) Rewards are intrinsically nonlinear. (iii) The spread in prizes increases with the number of competitors. (iv)Participants with low ability will choose higher risk strategies toincrease the probability of winning. Thus, a participant’s ability is negatively related to the variability of his/her performance.Empirical evidence supporting the tournament theory was obtained in sport settings. For example, Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) examine the performance of golfers and conclude that as prize differentials increase, players’ performance improves. Becker and Huselid (1992) examine the performance of drivers in professional auto racing, and report that pay dispersion has positive incentive effects on both individual performance and driver safety. In a business setting, Main et al. (1993) use survey data for 200 firms during 1980–1984 and report that pay differential increases substantially as one ascends the corporate hierarchy, consistent with tournament theory’s prediction that extra weight on top-ranking prizes motivates participants to aspire to higher goals, and that the dispersion in top compensation increases with the number of contestants. The main finding of Main et al. (1993) is that firm performance is positively associated with executive pay dispersion. In a similar vein, Bognanno (2001) reports that the CEO pay rises with the number of vice-presidents competing for the top position. However, he finds that inconsistent with thetournament prediction, firms do not maintain short-term promotion incentives, as longer time in position prior to promotion reduces the effect of pay increase from the promotion. Finally, Conyon et al. (2001) examine a sample of 100 large UK firms during 1997–1998 and find no evidence that larger pay dispersion is positively associated with improved firm performance. O’Reilly et al. (1988) report similar findi ngs for the United States. Thus, the business-setting evidence on the tournament theory is mixed and somewhat dated.2. Equity fairnessEconomic theory asserts that in equilibrium wages are equal to employees’ marginal productivities. Such mainstream thinking has been challenged: Drawing on social exchange models, equity notions, and related work in sociology and psychology, Akerlof and Yellen (1988, 1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1988), and Levine (1991) argue that low pay dispersion may have a positive effect on employee efforts and productivity by creating harmonious and efficient labor relations thereby leading tohigher output and productivity. In a similar vein, Levine (1991) develops a model showing that lowering pay dispersion can increase employee cohesiveness, which in turn will enhance productivity.Further insight into the economic efficiency associated with a low pay dispersion is provided by Lazear (1989), and Milgrom and Roberts (1990): If promotion and salaries are based on relative rather than individual performance, as postulated by tournament theory, then employees will advance not only by performing well, but also by seeing to it that their rivals perform poorly. Consequently, employees have weaker incentives tocooperate, and in extreme cases may engage in outright sabotage of others’ activities. To mitigate this, a firm may encourage cooperation by, among other things, reducing pay dispersion. Low dispersion may reduce effort, but at the same time increase cooperation. Thus, in general, it is optimal on productivity grounds to compress wage structure, to some extent, to promote cooperation (Lazear,1989).4 In a similar vein, Milgrom and Roberts (1990) use the principal-agent framework to suggest that employees may engage in rent-seeking activities to secure influence over organizational decision processes. Such influence-oriented activities arise when organizational decisions affect the distribution of wealth or other benefits among members or constituent groups. In their selfish interest, the affected individuals attempt to influence the decision process to their benefit. Furthermore, if firms cannot perfectly monitor output, workers may have incentives to exaggerate their output and lobby for higher wages. Thus, for example, the proponents of a project (e.g., R&D) may devote excessive effort to build the best possible case for investing in that project, hiding potential difficulties and focusing on the upside, while at the same time trying to denigrate competing proposals. Such arguments have led Milgrom and Roberts (1990) to promote wage compression under certain circumstances to alleviate these counterproductive activities.Empirical tests of the above equity fairness arguments include the work of Pfeffer and Langton (1993), who report that the higher the wage dispersion of university faculty, the lower their satisfaction and research productivity and the less likely it is that faculty members will collaborate on research. Similarly, Cowherd andLevine (1992) report a positive relationship between product quality and various measures of interclass pay equity (low wage dispersion). Drago and Garvey (1998) report that strong promotion incentives are associated with reduced employee cooperation and individual efforts. Contradicting the equity fairness predictions, Hibbs and Locking (2000) report that compression of wage dispersion in Swedish companies depressed output and labor productivity.Source: Kin Wai Lee,Baruch Lev,Gillian Hian Heng Yeo,2008"Executive pay dispersion, corporate governance,and firm performance".Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting , V ol.30,pp.315-338.译文：高管薪酬分散，公司治理，与企业绩效管理人报酬在过去二十年来是经济和商业中心的研究课题，最近在公司丑闻曝光后，已获得在公司治理中的漏洞和随后的重大深远（萨班斯）监管改革的动力。
公司治理外文文献及翻译 精品
附录A公司治理与高管薪酬：一个应急框架总体概述通过整合组织和体制的理论，本文开发了一个高管薪酬的应急办法和它在不同的组织和体制环境下的影响。
高管薪酬的研究大都集中在委托代理框架上，并承担一种行政奖励和业绩成果之间的关系。
我们提出了一个框架，审查了其组织的背景和潜在的互补性方面的行政补偿和不同的公司治理在不同的企业和国家水平上体现的替代效应。
我们还讨论了执行不同补偿政策方法的影响，像“软法律”和“硬法律”。
在过去的20年里，世界上越来越多的公司从一个固定的薪酬结构转变为与业绩相联系的薪酬结构，包括很大一部分的股权激励。
因此，高管补偿的经济影响的研究已经成为公司治理内部激烈争论的一个话题。
正如Bruce，Buck，和Main指出，“近年来，关于高管报酬的文献的增长速度可以与高管报酬增长本身相匹敌。
”关于高管补偿的大多数实证文献主要集中在对美国和英国的公司部门，当分析高管薪酬的不同组成部分产生的组织结果的时候。
根据理论基础，早期的研究曾试图了解在代理理论方面的高管补偿和在不同形式的激励和公司业绩方面的探索链接。
这个文献假设，股东和经理人之间的委托代理关系被激发，公司将更有效率的运作，表现得更好。
公司治理的研究大多是基于通用模型——委托代理理论的概述，以及这一框架的核心前提是，股东和管理人员有不同的方法来了解公司的具体信息和广泛的利益分歧以及风险偏好。
因此，经理作为股东的代理人可以从事对自己有利的行为而损害股东财富的最大化。
大量的文献是基于这种直接的前提和建议来约束经理的机会主义行为，股东可以使用不同的公司治理机制，包括各种以股票为基础的奖励可以统一委托人和代理人的利益。
正如Jensen 和Murphy观察，“代理理论预测补偿政策将会以满足代理人的期望效用为主要目标。
股东的目标是使财富最大化；因此代理成本理论指出，总裁的薪酬政策将取决于股东财富的变化。
”影响积极组织结果的主要指标是付费业绩敏感性，但是这种“封闭系统”法主要是在英美的代理基础文献中找到，假定经理人激励与绩效之间存在普遍的联系，很少的关注在公司被嵌入的不同背景。
公司治理激励和薪酬制度
公司治理激励和薪酬制度英文回答：Corporate Governance, Incentives, and Compensation.Corporate governance is the system of rules, practices, and processes by which a company is directed and controlled. It includes the mechanisms by which the company's owners (shareholders) exercise their rights and responsibilities, and the ways in which the company's managers are held accountable for their actions.Incentives are rewards or punishments that are designed to motivate people to behave in a certain way. In the context of corporate governance, incentives can be used to encourage managers to act in the best interests of shareholders. For example, managers may be given bonuses or other forms of compensation if the company performs well.Compensation is the total amount of money and benefitsthat a company pays to its employees. It includes salary, bonuses, stock options, and other forms of pay. Compensation can be used to attract and retain talented employees, and to motivate them to perform well.The design of a company's corporate governance, incentive, and compensation systems can have a significant impact on the company's performance. A well-designed system will encourage managers to act in the best interests of shareholders, and will motivate employees to perform well.中文回答：公司治理、激励和薪酬制度。
在高绩效公司的薪酬政策和竞争战略【外文翻译】
在高绩效公司的薪酬政策和竞争战略【外文翻译】外文文献翻译译文一、外文原文原文:Congruence Between Pay Policy and Competitive Strategy inHigh-Performing Firms.Montemayor, Edilberto F.Based on existing strategic compensation theory, this study examines seven theoretical propositions concerning the link between business-level competitive strategy and pay policy. Canonical discriminant analysis of 261 responses to a national survey show that high-performing firms whose strategy is dominated by Cost Leadership, Innovation, or Differentiation tactics adopt different pay policies. Further analysis shows that inferior firm performance is associated with the lack oat between pay policy and business strategy. These findings support the need for a contingency approach in the design of pay policy.The idea that pay policies have strategic impact has become a major theme within the compensation literature since the mid- 1980s. Notable volumes concerned with compensation strategy include Lawler's Strategic Pay (1991), Schuster and Zingheim's The New Pay (1992), and Gomez-Mejia and Balkin's Compensation, Organizational Strategy, and Firm Performance (1992). This strategic perspective on compensation is based on the fact that organizations differ in pay policies and the belief that matchingpay policies to business strategy results in higher organizational performance (Milkovich, 1988).Except for the work by David Balkin and Luis Gomez-Mejia (Balkin & Gomez-Mejia, 1987; 1990; and Gomez-Mejia, 1992), the strategic impact of pay policy has received little empirical attention. Building on the executive compensation literature, Balkin and Gomez-Mejia have published a series of analyses dealing with the relationship between pay policy and organizational diversification or lifecycle stages.However, the portion of strategic compensation theory that addresses the link between pay policy and business-level competitive strategies has not been tested. Such theory appears in the work of Carroll (1987), Miles and Snow (1984), Miller (1986), Schuler and Jackson (1987), and Tichy, Fombrum and Devanna (1982).The present study adds to the empirical base for strategic compensation theory by examining which pay policies have a positive relationship with firm performance for different business strategies. Because pay policies are clearly under management control and are the most visible elements of an organization's motivation and reward system, the results of this investigation will help management develop coherent pay systems that support business strategy. In addition, this study makes two methodological contributions. First, it demonstrates a procedure for evaluating contingency models through the joint analysis of organizational strategy, pay policy and performance. Second, this study shows an approach for measuring compensation policy in terms of"hard" objective indices, instead of the perceptual data typically used in the past research.Analytical Framework and HypothesesStrategic compensation theory is a contingency theory (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992). Its fundamental premise is that matching pay policy and business strategy impacts firm performance (Milkovich, 1988). That is, high-performing firms adopt pay policies congruent with their strategy and deviations from strategically-indicated pay policies have a negative effect on organizational performance. This is not an academic argument only. Leading compensation professionals consider that their most important challenge is to align compensation systems and business strategy (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1990; McNally, 1992).In order to test such a contingency view, it is necessary to establish which compensation policies have strategic significance, how can organizations be classified into dominant strategic types, and the different sets of compensation policies that support each type of competitive strategy.The Performance Impact of Matching Pay Policy and Business Strategy This research concentrates importantly on high-performing firms because the pay policies that fit a particular strategy will be most evident among high-performing firms. According to the contingency perspective in strategic compensation theory, a good match between an organization's strategy and all its systems (will result in superior performance (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992). That is, all high-performingorganizations should have strategy and pay policies that match each other. On the other hand, not all lesser-performing organizations will suffer from a mismatch between strategy and pay policy. Lesser performance may be the consequence of a poor match between strategy and systems other than compensation. For this reason, a major portion of the analyses reported ahead examines the difference in pay policies between high-performing organizations that pursue different business strategies. Other strategy researchers have also focused on the subset of high-performing organizations in their samples (Thomas, Litschert & Ramaswamy, 1991; Venkatram, 1990).Leading strategic compensation scholars propose an organization's performance will suffer when its pay policies deviate from thosepolicies which ideally fit the organization's strategy (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992). s In addition, strategy scholars recommend the use of multiple approaches when studying the performance impact of matching strategy and organizational systems (Venkatraman, 1990). For these reasons, this study will also examine the correlation between deviations fromstrategically-indicated pay policies and organizational performance. Because firm performance depends on many factors besides compensation,it is expected that such deviations will have a negative, although modest, correlation with performance. Nonetheless, finding that deviations from strategically-indicated pay policies correlate withperformance would provide additional support for the contingency view in strategic compensation theory.Compensation Policies with Strategic SignificanceThis study considers the five aspects of pay policy more frequently mentioned in strategic compensation theory: (1) compensation philosophy;(2) external competitiveness; (3) incentive-base mix; (4) individual (merit) pay increases; and (5) pay administration.Compensation Philosophy. This study measures organizational pay philosophy in terms of the importance assigned to three kinds of objectives: (a) labor cost control, (b) employee attraction and retention, and (c) employee motivation. The compensation system has strategic impact through its effect on these three areas which represent the traditional goals for pay policy design. As explained ahead, an organization's business strategy will determine the relative importance of these three kinds of objectives. Moreover, the pay policies that support different objectives may conflict with each other. Consequently, strategic compensation requires a philosophy, based on the importance of these objectives, to provide direction and purpose to specific pay policies (Lawler, 1991).External Competitiveness. This policy area refers to the level ofpay an organization offers relative to that of its competitors. It has a critical impact on attraction/retention and labor cost objectives. The higher the pay level, the better the organization's ability to acquire a competent workforce. Clearly, increasing the pay level raises totallabor costs. However, raising the pay level may lead to improved labor costs per unit. An emerging view in labor economics, known as efficiency wage theory, contends that paying above market levels can promote employee motivation that would offset any increment in labor costs (Holzer, 1990).Incentive-Base Mix. This policy relates to the distinction between incentive (variable) and base (fixed) pay. It has strategic implications. Increasing the portion of pay that is variable has been advocated as an effective mechanism for linking employee rewards and business performance (see for example Mitchell, Lewin & Lawler, 1991). Besides a clear fit with motivation objectives, a high incentive-to-base pay ratio makes some labor costs variable and may help to attractand retain hard-working; risk-taking employees.Individual (Merit) Pay Increases. Policies dealing with increases to individual base pay have a direct impact on employees and, consequently, have strategic implications (Milkovich & Broderick, 1991). Merit pay, a highly debated policy, represents the most prevalent system for deciding individual pay increases. Surveys find that 80 percent of private sector employers, most state governments, and about one-half of the local governments have merit pay plans (Heneman, 1992). Organizations differin policies concerning the size of merit raises. This study will examine the average and range of merit raises awarded. Organizations may also differ in employee eligibility for merit pay. To measure the scope of merit pay, this study will examine the extent to which nonexemptemployees participate in merit pay plans. Typically most or all exempt (professional and managerial) employees participate in merit pay plans. However, organizations differ in the extent to which nonexempt (operations and administrative support) employees participate in merit pay plans.Pay Administration. This study will examine policies concerning "openness" (the amount of information provided to employees) and "participation" (the degree to which employees may question or challenge pay decisions). These policies are generally accepted as havingstrategic importance because of their effect on employee satisfaction and acceptance of pay decisions (Milkovich & Broderick, 1991; Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992).Classifying Organizations by Business StrategyBusiness-level strategy, the initiatives by which organizations seek a competitive advantage, determines the kind of employee contributions and, therefore, the human resource and compensation policies that organizations require to succeed (Schuler & Jackson, 1987; Miles & Snow, 1984). Unfortunately, business-level strategy has received minimal attention in strategic compensation research. In the only published research including business-level strategic variables, Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1990) focus on growth and maintenance strategies.In contrast, strategic compensation theory is based on Porter'sand/or Miles and Snow's typologies. This study merges the two typologies based on conceptual and empirical considerations. Porter'sclassification distinguishes cost-oriented from differentiation-oriented strategies. However, Porter's typology neglects those organizations competing through intense product or market development (Miller, 1986; Walker & Ruekert, 1987). On the other hand, Miles and Snow's typology distinguishes between Defenders operating in stable product and market domains, Prospectors that constantly seek to develop new markets or products, and an intermediate type called Analyzers. Unfortunately,Miles and Snow's typology minimizes the differences between Defendersthat compete through low cost and those competing by setting themselves apart from their competition.Moreover, Segev (1989) applied multidimensional scaling to 31 variables describing environment, strategic content, strategic decision-making process, and organizational characteristics to show the two typologies can be synthesized along a "proactiveness" dimension. Segev's results suggest the three types of business-level strategy used in this study: Cost Leadership (Defenders or Analyzers); Differentiation (Defenders or Analyzers); and Innovation (Prospectors).As discussed in the next section, this synthetic classificationallows integrating the theory that deals with the kink between compensation policy and competitive strategy.Compensation Policies That Support Different Business StrategiesDifferent organization, human resources and compensation systemswill support each of the three types of business strategy discussed here. Miller (1986) theorizes that firms pursuing a Cost Leadership strategyrequire mechanistic, bureaucratic structures geared to maximize efficiency, while firms pursuing an Innovation strategy require organic structures that foster communication and collaboration among employeesin different departments. In a similar vein, Arthur (1994) studied non-integrated steel mills, finding a Cost Leadership strategy is best supported by "control" human resource systems which are conservative and focus on improving efficiency through formalized rules and procedures while a Differentiation strategy is best supported by "commitment" human resource systems which seek to link employee and organizational goals. Finally, Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) report that a Cost Leadership (Defender) strategy should be supported with "algorithmic" compensation systems whose features include heavy reliance on base pay with minimal incentives and bureaucratic administration of pay policy. These authors add that an Innovation (Prospector) strategy should be supported with "experiential" compensation systems whose features include substantial incentives and open, decentralized administration.The preceding ideas coupled with existing strategic compensation theory --contained in the work by Carroll (1987), Miles and Snow (1984), Miller (1986), Schuler and Jackson (1987), and Tichy et al.(1982)--suggest the following theoretical propositions:P1: The pay philosophy of Cost Leaders will emphasize "labor cost" objectives more than the philosophy of Differentiators or Innovators.Cost Leaders emphasize stable job assignments and traditional management practices. These firms are characterized by tight costcontrols, overhead minimization, and require employees to contribute repetitive, predictable behavior with very little risk taking (Miller, 1986; Schuler & Jackson, 1987).P2: Innovators will have a pay philosophy that places more emphasis on "attraction/retention" objectives than Cost Leaders or Differentiators.Innovators need to orchestrate the contributions of externally-trained specialists with diverse' expertise (Miller, 1986). Therefore, Innovators rely heavily on external staffing and need to ensure external competitiveness for a diversity of skills (Miles & Snow, 1984).P3: The pay philosophy of Differentiators will emphasize "motivation" objectives more than the philosophy of Cost Leaders or Innovators.Organizations pursuing a differentiation strategy need to stressgoal-setting and achievements based on organization-wide criteria (Miller, 1986). Compared with Cost Leaders, Differentiators require a higher degree of employee cooperation and commitment to organizational goals such as quality and customer service (Schuler & Jackson, 1987).P4: With respect to pay level, Cost Leaders will be more likely to lag their labor market competitors and Innovators will be more likely to lead their labor market competitors.Because of their emphasis on cost containment, Cost Leaders are expected to take a more conservative stance in labor markets. Arthur (1994) reports that Cost Leaders offer significantly lower wages thanDifferentiators. In contrast, because of the need to acquire talent, several authors concur in hypothesizing that Innovators should lead the market in their pay level (Carroll, 1987; Miles & Snow, 1984; Schuler & Jackson, 1987).P5: Differentiators (and perhaps Cost Leaders) will have a higher incentive-to-base ratio than Innovators.资料来源:Journal of Management 1996(1):P189译文:在高绩效公司的薪酬政策和竞争战略蒙特马约尔，埃迪尔韦托基于现有的战略补偿理论，这项研究，探讨有关企业之间的七个级别的竞争策略和薪酬政策连结理论命题。
公司薪酬管理探讨外文文献译文及原文
本科毕业设计（论文）外文参考文献译文及原文学院经济管理学院专业管理年级班别学号学生姓名指导教师年月日Contents外文文献译文 (1)外文文献原文 (7)薪酬管理在企业的现代化体制建设中有着非常重要的地位，一般我们认为薪酬管理要达到三个目的：第一、能够保证员工的正常的生活，也就是基本生活的需要；第二、能够提高员工的工作积极性，也就是激励效果；第三保证企业的利润的增长，也就是利润的可持续增长性。
现在企业的薪酬管理，应该说第一个目的一般都能够达到，只要你的要求不是十分的高的话，我认为现在企业都能达到这个目的。
但是企业的薪酬体制要完成更高的目标就要有周密的计划。
我们知道企业的激励措施主要有三种：薪酬激励、感情激励、制度留人。
感情激励主要是指员工的工作环境、同事之间的关系以及上下级之间的关系等等，在具体的操作过程中可谓是"因企而异"，你可以通过加大和员工之间的对话，提高员工在企业管理过程中的参与程度等来完成这个项目。
制度留人，主要是指在企业发展的过程中，企业对员工的职位的升迁的政策，如果企业能够完成前两项，而不给员工足够的升迁机会的话，员工的积极性一样会下降。
现在我们来看第一项：薪酬激励。
薪酬管理是一种看似简单、但是操作起来具有很大难度的体系。
它可以简单的归纳成给员工涨工资。
我们在现实中经常会遇到这样的情况，就是给员工涨了工资，但是到了最后它还是"跳槽"了，这就是薪酬激励政策的失败。
企业在执行这项政策的过程中，要考虑的问题很多，主要有以下两点：员工的心理期望值、员工的心理平衡感。
1、员工的心理期望值在薪酬体系管理过程中，我们发现不同员工的心理要求是不同的，一个中层干部可能需要1000元能调动他的工作积极性，但是到了一个具体的员工身上可能只要200元就可以完成同样的效果了。
所以如果你给了一个管理人员500元或者给了一个工人50元就起不到激励的效果，如果你给了他们2000元、400元，就是对企业资源的一种浪费，加大了企业的经营成本。
薪酬管理体系中英文对照外文翻译文献
中英文对照外文翻译(文档含英文原文和中文翻译) Enterprises salary system design andperformance evaluationAbstractAny effective way of management must rely on a basis: people, all the staff of enterprises. Compensation system as an important aspect of enterprise management system, for an enterprise to attract, retain and motivate employees have a significant impact, attract, retain and motivate key talent, has become the core of the enterprise recognized goal. The compensation system design is not only an effective way to realize the core objective, is also an important content of modern enterprise development.Key words: salary system and equity incentive, senior executives, design1 IntroductionHuman capital to the enterprise wealth maximization, the greatest degree of retaining key talent, attract potential talent, the basic principals and successful is perfect competitive compensation system. With the concept of human capital is more and more people Heart, attract, retain and motivate key talent, has become the core of enterprise determine target, compensation system for enterprises An important aspect of the system, to attract talents play an important role. Compensation system design is an effective way to reality is the core objective, but also an important content of the development of the enterprise to modernization, so the height weight by enterprises Depending on the.2 Literature reviewEarly in the traditional compensation phase, the employers always minimize workers to cut costs as much as possible, and through this method make the Labor of workers have to work harder in order to get paid enough to make a living. William. First, Quesnay’s minimum wage theory is that wages and other commodities, there is a natural value, namely maintain staff minimum standard of living life information value，the minimum wage for workers does not depend on the enterprise or the employer's subjective desire, but the result of the competition in the market. The classical economists Muller believed that certain conditions, the total capital in the enterprise salary depends on the labor force and for the purchase of labor relationship between capital and other capital; For the payment of capital wage fund is difficult to change in the short term. Wages fund quantity depends on two factors: one is a worker, directly or indirectly, in the production of products and services production efficiency; the other one is in the process of production of these goods directly or indirectly employ labor quantity. With the development of era, the simple forms of employment have already can't satisfy the demand of the workers, so some interests to share views was put forward to motivate workers.On this basis, the Gantt invented the "complete tasks rewarded" system to perfect the incentive measures. Represented by Americaneconomist Becker’s theory of human capital school of thought argues that human capital is determined by the human capital investment, is present in the human body to the content of knowledge, skills, etc. Martin Weizmann share of economic theory that wages should be linked to corporate profits. Increase in profits, employee wages fund, increased profits, and employee wages fund. Between enterprises and employees is the key of the labor contract is not in a fixed wage of how many, but in the division of labor both sides share proportion. In modern compensation phase, the contents of the compensation has been changed, increased a lot of different compensation models, and more and more pay attention to employee's personal feelings and development, employees can even according to individual condition choose different salary portfolio model. Employees can be paid off on surface of the material and spiritual.3 Pay system overviewIn the past the traditional pay system, usually are business owners value orientation as the guide to carry on the design. With the continuous development of the overall market environment, in the modern enterprise management concept has also changed. They are aware of the established compensation system should adapt to the employee benefit as a starting point, the self-interest pursuit and employee demand together, to establish a set of enterprises and employees to maximize the interests of the two-way, so as to achieve win-win situation. Since the 90 s, the westerndeveloped economies in the enterprise owners and managers try to change the traditional form of compensation, relocation compensation system, the importance of also constantly try to innovate salary system of design and diversification.Performance pay system is established in accordance with the enterprise organization structure based on the results of the individual or team performance appraisal for salary distribution system. Total compensation is generally associated with individual or team performance. Now the enterprise model is used to combine individual performance and team performance. At the same time will be long term incentive and short-term incentive flexible model. In this kind of pay structure, contains a variety of forms of performance pay.Skill-based pay system on the basis of employees' skill determine employee wages level, and to the improvement of skills as their employees progress criteria. The compensation model can encourage employees to continuously learn new knowledge, to keep up with The Times, is the industry leader, when technology and equipment upgrades to the fastest response time to complete the change, and is helpful to form the learning corporate culture. If for flat organization structure, management jobs and opportunities for advancement are less, the compensation system can be very skillful professionals to make up for in terms of compensation. But with technical compensation system with theproblem is that the enterprise needs to pay for a large number of staff training, and if the participants of the training is not all to use knowledge in actual production, enterprises will not be able to obtain benefits, resulting in wasted costs.Total compensation is the unity of the material reward and spiritual reward. Among them, external compensation including all in monetary form of economic compensation, internal compensation includes not to substantial form of economic compensation, more focused on the return of spirit. John’s Lipoma at the end of last century proposed the compensation design, customization and diversity is more representative of the overall package. He should show that the basic wage, additional salary, salary welfare, work supplies allowance, bonus, promotion and development opportunities, psychological income, life quality, and individual factors that ten compensation factors into consideration, the formation of compensation system, the design method is different from the past traditional salary structure, is the biggest different compensation system design approach from the owner as the center to the worker as the center, employees can choose a suitable for their own pay combination, is no longer a passive receiver. In this compensation mode, economic compensation and the economical compensation together, paying equal attention to material and spiritual.4 The implementation of the compensation system designSalary survey is the key in the compensation system design. It is not only the necessary to understand the enterprise existing compensation system, is also the basis of compensation system design again. Salary survey should be real in-depth internal employee survey, as far as possible let employees at all levels give true feelings, make compensation system designers understand the staff for the specific demands of overall compensation. In had certain understanding of the current salary system and problems, will determine the compensation system on that basis to the general principles of design. Compensation system and the determination of design general principle also should according to the specific conditions of different enterprise itself to specific design. At the same time, according to the general principle to determine the scope of the staff at the level of compensation.Enterprise in selecting the most suitable for their own compensation system, the following sections are often the most concern, such as the division of different levels and at the same level of position within the sort, the post assessment results and with the duty staff due to personal quality differences between how to determine the pay difference. Enterprise in selecting the most suitable for their own compensation system, the following sections are often the most concern, such as the division of different levels and at the same level of position within thesort, the post assessment results and with the duty staff due to personal quality differences between how to determine the pay difference.Enterprise operators and management personnel representing the highest quality, at the same time they also foreign representative enterprise image, and holds the enterprise the way forward. They tend to have certain matter accumulation, more the pursuit of spiritual satisfaction and the realization of self-worth. For management personnel shall be designed to be scientific and reasonable compensation system, comprehensive consideration, not only give reasonable compensation in terms of material, at the same time to consider their spiritual pursuit.General manager's daily work mainly are transactional, administrative work, but is not directly concerned with the production related, so during the design compensation system will post wage and performance wage together, thus the personal salary combined with enterprise business objectives. To general managers to take a wider range of incentives, such as the annual performance review top employees equity incentives, encourage managers over fulfilled the goal, and form a competitive atmosphere of the company culture, drive the enterprise vitality. Increase the general manager’s shareholding proportion.For the use of EVA on the sales staff, can draw lessons from Tula bank ever take method, the sales staff to set up a commission systembased on EVA. Each sales staff receives a salary, in addition to qualification to get bonuses, the bonus amount depends on the "added value" has created. So that the program works: the company will be the added value of products are listed out, after distribution after the full cost of the product. The finance department monthly compiled a list of each product and added value of the net sales report. Each sales staff receives a copy of the report, as well as the use of the added value of the net total details of its own performance in the same format of monthly report. Further to deduct from the added value of net pay, perks and other fees and should share part of the management fee. After adjusting for these report line represents the added value.5 ConclusionIn the modern enterprises increasingly competitive today, talents become the key factor of enterprise long-term development more and more Business owners. And how to retain existing talent, and recruit more people of insight to join together create enterprise interest, become the compulsory subject of enterprise owners and management, and improve the compensation system is retaining talents and attracting talents essential link.企业薪酬体系设计与绩效评估Prasetya A摘要:任何一种行之有效的管理方式的运用都必须依赖于一个基础：人，企业的所有员工。
高管薪酬和激励[文献翻译]
![高管薪酬和激励[文献翻译]](https://img.taocdn.com/s3/m/93d0f0b8de80d4d8d05a4f3f.png)
高管薪酬和激励［文献翻译］夕卜文题 LI Executive Compensation And Incentives外文出处 Acodemy of Management Perspectives, 2006(2) :p25-40 外文作者Martin J. Conyon原文：Executive Compensation And IncentivesMartin J・ ConyonExecutive compensation is a complex and controversial subject・ For many years, academics, policymakers, and the media have drawn attention to the high levels of pay awarded to U.S. chief executive officers (CEOs), questioning whether they are consistent with shareholder interests・ Some academics have further argued that flaws in CEO pay arrangements and deviations from shareholders? interests are widespread and considerable・For example, Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried provide a lucid account of the managerial power view and accompanying evidence・ Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan too provide an analysis of the ,,skimming view? of CEO pay. In contrast, John Core et al・ present an economic contracting approach to executive pay and incentives, assessing whether CEOs receive inefficient pay without performance・ In this paper, we show what has happened to CEO pay in the United States・ We do not claim to distinguish between the contracting and managerial power views of executive pay. Instead, we document the pattern of executive pay andincentives in the United States, investigating whether this pattern is consistent with economic theory.The Context: Who Sets Executive Pay?Before examining the empirical evidence presented in this paper, it is important to consider the pay-setting process and who sets executive pay. The standard economic theory of executive compensation is the principal-agent mode1・ The theory maintains that firms seek to design the most efficient compensation packages possible in order to attract, retain, and motivate CEOs, executives, and managers・ In the agency model, shareholders set pay. In practice, however, the compensation committee of the board determines pay on behalf of shareholders・ A principal (shareholder) designs a contract and makes an offer to an agent (CEO/ manager)・ Executive compensation ameliorates a moral hazard problem (i. e・,manager opportunism) arising from low firm ownership・ By using stock options, restricted stock, and long-term contracts, shareholdersmotivate the CEO to maximize firm value・ In other words, shareholderstry to design optimal compensation packages to provide CEOs with incentives to align their mutual interests・ This is the contract approach to executive pay. Following Core, Guay, and Larcker, an efficient (or optimal) contract is one u that maximizes the net expectedeconomic value to shareholders after transaction costs (such as contracting costs) and payments to employees・ An equivalent way of saying this is that ・・・ contracts minimize agency costs・”Several important ideas flow from this definition. First, the contract reduces manager opportunism and motivates CEO effort by providing incentives through risky compensation such as stock options・ Second, the optimal contract does not imply a u perfectcontract, only that the firm designs the best contract it can in order to avoid opportunism and malfeasance by the manager, given the contracting constraints it faces・ Third, in this arrangement, the firm does not necessarily eliminate agency costs, but instead evaluates the (marginal) benefits of implementing the contract relative to the (marginal) costs of doing so. Improvements in regulation or corporate governance can possibly alter these costs and benefits, making different contracts desirable・ Moreover, what is efficient at one point in time may not be at another・ Improvements in board governance, for example by adding independent directors, may lead to different patterns of compensation, stock, and option contracts that are desirable for one firmbut not another・An alternative theory is that CEOs set pay. This is the managerial power view, exemplified recently by Bebchuk and Fried・ In this theory, the board and compensation committee cooperate with the CEO and agree on excessive compensation, settling on contracts that are not in shareholders? interests ・ This excesspay constitutes an economic rent, an amount greater than necessary to get the CEO to work in the firm. The constraints the CEOs face arereputation loss and embarrassment if caught extracting rents, what Bebchuk and Fried call u outragecosts・n Outrage matters because it can impose on CEOs both market penalties (such as devaluation of a manager?s reputation) and social costs—the social costs come on topof the standard market costs・ They argue that market constraints and the social costscoming from excessively favorable pay arrangements are not sufficient in preventing considerable deviations from optimal contracting・Executive CompensationThere is substantial disclosure about U・ S・ executive compensation.The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) expanded and enhanced disclosure rules for U. S・ executives in 1992・ As a result, the proxy statements of firms contain considerable detail on stock ownership, stock options, and all components of compensation for the top five corporate executives・ There are four basic components to executive pay, eachhaving been the subject of much research・ First, executives receive a base salary, which is generally benchmarked against peer firms・ Second, they enjoy an annual bonus plan, usually based on accounting performance measures ・ Third, executives receive stock options, which represent a right, but not the obligation, to purchase shares in the future at some pre-specified exercise price・ Lastly, pay includes additional compensation such as restricted stock, long-term incentive plans, and retirement plans・Executive IncentivesWe now turn to executive incentives and the link between pay and firm performance・ The evidence demonstrates that executive compensation and the fraction of pay accounted for by option grants increased during the 1990s・Principal-agent theory predicts that a firm designs contracts in order to yield optimal incentives, therefore motivating the CEO to maximize shareholder value・ In designing the contract, the firm recognizes the CEO is risk averse・ Thus, imposing greater incentives requires more pay to compensate the agent for increased risk・ In the previous section, the paper demonstrated that CEO pay has increased・ Next, we examine what has happened to CEO incentives・ The analysis shows that executives have considerable equity incentives that create a strong and increasing link between CEO wealth and firm performance・ This finding seems at odds with the notion that executive pay and performance are decoupled・ It is, however, consistent with other economic evidence, showing that the link between pay and performance has been increasing in the United States・Executives receive incentives from several sources・ They receivefinancial incentives from salary and bonus, as well as new grants of options and restricted stock, which together measure flow compensation. They also receive incentives from changes in their aggregate holdings of stock and options in the firm, as described in detail below. Finally, the probability of termination because of poor performance gives the CEO an incentive to pursue strategies that maximize firm value・ In this case, if terminated, an executive suffers reputation loss and human capital devaluation in the managerial labor market・ However, this paper— consistent with other recentresearch in financial economics—focuses on compensation and equity incentives,leaving aside career concerns and the labor market for managerial talent ・ In other words, it restricts attention to financial incentives・The key to understanding financial incentives is recognizing that they arise from the entire portfolio of equity holdings and not simply from current pay. Equity incentives, then, are the incentives to increase the stock price arising from the managers? ownership of financial securities in the firm・ For example, a CEO may receive 100, 000 options this year, which might add to 400, 000 options granted in previous years, for a total of 500, 000 options held・ If the stock price decreases, then the value of the 100, 000 options granted this year declines— but so does the value of the options accumulated from previous years・ Since the CEO will care about the whole stock of 500, 000 options, not simply this year?s 100, 000, executive compensation received in any given year provides only a partial picture of CEO wealth and incentives・ To understand CEO incentives fully, it is important to focus on the aggregate amount ofshares, restricted stock, and stock options that the CEO owns in the firm.The evidence shows that CEOs have plenty of financial incentives, arising primarily from CEO ownership of stock and options in their firms. Again, we would stress that such financial incentives are only one factor motivating executives・ Agents are as likely to be motivated by intrinsic factors of the job, career concerns, social norms, tournaments, and the like・ One problem with stock options and other forms of incentive pay is not that they provide too few incentives, but that they may lead tounintended consequences・ It is well known that incentives can bring about behavior by the agent that was unanticipated by the principa1. In a classic paper, Steven Kerr highlighted the folly of rewarding A while hoping for B・ In short, he articulated the notion that one gets what one pays for・If one rewards activity A and not B, then people will exert effort on A, while de-emphasizing B・ Kerr illustrates his point with an array of examples from politics, industry, and human resource management. In general, this is a problem of providing appropriate incentives to agents engaging in multiple tasks・ More recently, Robert Gibbons has discussed the design of incentive programs recognizing such problems・Another problem with incentive compensation is that it may encourage opportunistic behavior by managers, manipulation of performance measures, or cheating・ The powerful and often unanticipated effects of financial incentives on economic outcomes have been documented in diverse contexts such as classroom teaching, real estate markets, vehicle inspection markets, and the behavior of physicians・ In the corporate context, David Yermackdemonstrates that CEOs opportunistically time the award of option grants around earnings announcements in order to increase their compensation. Other studies find that private information is used by executives to engineer abnormally large option exercises and hence the payouts from those options・In addition, studies show that firms with more incentives are associated with greater earnings manipulation. Recent studies show that the likelihood of a firm being the target of fraud allegations is positively correlated with option incentives・ In short, options and incentive pay may motivate managerial behavior that is not always anticipated or idea1. When designing compensation plans, boards must be aware of the unwanted as well asbeneficial effects of incentives・ ConclusionsExecutive compensation is a controversial and complex subject that continues to attract the attention of the media, policymakers, and academics ・ Contract theory predicts that shareholders use pay to provide incentives for the CEO to focus on maximizing long-term firm value・ Since CEOs have relatively low ownership of firm shares, they might otherwise behave opportunistical1y. An alternative theoreticalperspective, the managerial power view, is that CEOs control the pay-setting process and set their own pay. This theory predicts that compliant compensation committees and boards provide CEOs with excess pay (or compensation "rents” ) and thatcontracts are suboptimal from the shareholders? perspective・Distinguishing betweenthese two theories is an important challenge for future research・This paper provides evidence on what has happened to CEO pay between1993 and 2003・ It shows that total compensation increased significantly over this period・ Grants of stock options to CEOs and executives are the main driver of CEO pay gains・ The paper also documents that CEOs have important financial incentives・ These arise from the portfolio of firm stock and options owned by the CEO. The important point is that, if the stock price declines significantly, the value of the CEOs? assets falls・Analogously, if asset prices increase, so does CEO wealth・ In consequence, the wealth of the CEO varies with the stock price performance of the firm・ An important research challenge is to fully understand the potentially unintended consequences of providing greater incentives to agents ・In practice, CEO compensation contracts are determined by compensation committees that may have conflicting incentives to align with the CEO (leading to suboptimal contracts and excess pay) or with shareholders (leading to optimal contractsand appropriate pay)・ The analysis in this paper illustrates thatU・ S・ boards and compensation committees are becoming more independent (measured by fewer insider directors and a greater number of outside directors)・ The evidence shows that the presence of affiliated directors on the compensation committee (an instance where greater managerial power is expected） does not lead to greater CEO pay or fewer CEO incentives・In summary, high pay itself is not evidence of inefficient contracts but may simply reflect the market for CEOs and the pay necessary to attract,retain, and motivate talented individuals・ Boards of directors need to design compensation contracts to align the interests of owners with managers ・ One test of whether the corporate governance system is working appropriately, including executive compensationarrangements, is to evaluate economic performance・ Holmstrom and Kaplan investigate the state of U・ S・ corporate governance in the wake of corporate scandals・ They conclude that the U・ S・ economy has performed well, both on an absolute basis and relative to other countries over about two decades・ Importantly, the economy has been robust even after the scandals were revealed・ This is not to deny that improvements in governance arrangements may be beneficia1. Furnishing CEOs with appropriate compensation and incentives is desirable for a healthy economy. However, ensuring that the contracting process is not corrupted is an important goal for corporate governance・（extracts）译文：高管薪酬和激励Martin J・ Conyon高管薪酬是一种既复杂乂有争议的话题。
- 1、下载文档前请自行甄别文档内容的完整性，平台不提供额外的编辑、内容补充、找答案等附加服务。
- 2、"仅部分预览"的文档,不可在线预览部分如存在完整性等问题,可反馈申请退款(可完整预览的文档不适用该条件!)。
- 3、如文档侵犯您的权益，请联系客服反馈,我们会尽快为您处理(人工客服工作时间：9:00-18:30)。
LNTU Acc附录A公司治理与高管薪酬：一个应急框架总体概述通过整合组织和体制的理论，本文开发了一个高管薪酬的应急办法和它在不同的组织和体制环境下的影响。
高管薪酬的研究大都集中在委托代理框架上，并承担一种行政奖励和业绩成果之间的关系。
我们提出了一个框架，审查了其组织的背景和潜在的互补性方面的行政补偿和不同的公司治理在不同的企业和国家水平上体现的替代效应。
我们还讨论了执行不同补偿政策方法的影响，像“软法律”和“硬法律”。
在过去的20年里，世界上越来越多的公司从一个固定的薪酬结构转变为与业绩相联系的薪酬结构，包括很大一部分的股权激励。
因此，高管补偿的经济影响的研究已经成为公司治理内部激烈争论的一个话题。
正如Bruce，Buck，和Main指出，“近年来，关于高管报酬的文献的增长速度可以与高管报酬增长本身相匹敌。
”关于高管补偿的大多数实证文献主要集中在对美国和英国的公司部门，当分析高管薪酬的不同组成部分产生的组织结果的时候。
根据理论基础，早期的研究曾试图了解在代理理论方面的高管补偿和在不同形式的激励和公司业绩方面的探索链接。
这个文献假设，股东和经理人之间的委托代理关系被激发，公司将更有效率的运作，表现得更好。
公司治理的研究大多是基于通用模型——委托代理理论的概述，以及这一框架的核心前提是，股东和管理人员有不同的方法来了解公司的具体信息和广泛的利益分歧以及风险偏好。
因此，经理作为股东的代理人可以从事对自己有利的行为而损害股东财富的最大化。
大量的文献是基于这种直接的前提和建议来约束经理的机会主义行为，股东可以使用不同的公司治理机制，包括各种以股票为基础的奖励可以统一委托人和代理人的利益。
正如Jensen 和Murphy观察，“代理理论预测补偿政策将会以满足代理人的期望效用为主要目标。
股东的目标是使财富最大化；因此代理成本理论指出，总裁的薪酬政策将取决于股东财富的变化。
”影响积极组织结果的主要指标是付费业绩敏感性，但是这种“封闭系统”法主要是在英美的代理基础文献中找到，假定经理人激励与绩效之间存在普遍的联系，很少的关注在公司被嵌入的不同背景。
除了相当大的研究工作，对这些因果关系的实证结果的好坏并没有定论。
举例来说，实证研究与股票激励在财务表现方面的分析相符并未能证明重要的影响。
在最近批判的代理理论，Aguilera，Filatotchev，Gospel和Jackson 指出其“情境化”的性质，因此它无法准确地比较和解释企业的多样性在不同的组织和体制环境的治理安排。
同样，由此产生的许多政策处方体现在好的公司治理是依靠最好实践的普遍观念，这往往需要适应当地的环境或者转化为多样的国际化的制度设置。
本文我们讨论高管补偿的一个组织的方法能更好的解释不同组织环境和体制环境相联合的相互依存关系。
根据Aguilera et al.(2008)的研究，我们建议由股东和代理人提出的高管补偿的公司治理方面观点必须捕捉到因不同的组织背景和所处的环境所引起的公司治理的变化。
根据这些原则，我们最近的研究已经试图在生命周期内解释公司治理的动态方面，以及整个国家的公司治理多样化安排。
因此，公司治理研究的一个重要任务就是揭露多样性安排，了解高管薪酬的有效性是如何被多样的组织背景和制度环境禅师的情景变量所介导的。
我们建议一个应变基础框架能够了解高管补偿的治理作用，我们将治理因素中的组织背景、互补性/替代性以及体制环境的影响概念化了。
组织环境变化是指在企业的组织生命周期内，它的内部和外部的战略资源和具体的策略的变化。
例如，在其业务生命周期的成熟阶段，老的公司可能有更多样化的资源库和专业化的管理团队。
结果，他们比年轻公司更需要正是的奖励，创办的独资公司在其起步阶段往往有较少的资源，因此关注在更高的荣誉上治理机制方面的能力上。
组织环境不仅会影响高管补偿的潜在优势，而且影响他们的成本，如股权激励的直接成本和和管理行为和风险的间接成本。
这些成本会随着不同的公司在不同环境的运作而有所不同，因此，成本效益分析普遍很少。
互补/替代是指整体捆绑的公司治理与另一家公司的联合共同加强公司治理的有效性的能力。
这里我们认为，高管补偿的有效性可能取决于其他因素，如大股东的参与和董事会的独立性。
最后，机构把对社会的高度重视和高管补偿的路径依赖作为治理因素。
高管薪酬必须是与组织的监管、规范和认知性相联系的社会合法的。
因此这些社会影响必须与组织有效性相协调。
委托代理二分法对高管薪酬的组织方法委托代理理论致力于研究管理激励，它主要关注的是从股东的观点考虑的的高管补偿结果的有效性，股东是指投资并谋求最大投资回报的人。
这个方法依据股东和经理之间的“保持距离”假设，本位主义作为他们合同的基础。
因此，除了吸收和保留高素质的管理队伍，设计良好的激励机制能增加公司的生产能力，能更好的协调高管的利益与股东的利益保持一致。
一些研究指出高管人员，特别是首席执行官，利用自己的权利来设计薪酬，能够使他们不受监管机构和股东对自己的约束。
自利的管理者会萃取租金通过他们自己的喜好来操纵董事会，主要是被媒体应用的愤怒约束的主体。
因此首席执行官的薪酬安排跟激励无关而加剧了首席执行官的自我充实或是走过场。
在一定程度上，股东的代理问题被解决了，阻止的方法是评估高管薪酬与公司的业绩有关。
公司治理的实证研究已经开始怀疑经理人报酬与公司效率之间的关系。
许多开始质疑是否这个协会持有代理冲突的变异；不同的组织背景像创业企业、首次募股企业和成熟企业；和不同的国家设置。
也许更重要的是，高管薪酬的业绩影响对国家体制环境似乎有所不同。
例如，高管薪酬的研究表明，在美国高管薪酬和业绩之间有很强烈的关系，但在英国和德国的股权激励政策的影响相对稍低，然而在日本高管薪酬没有激励效应。
同时，组织理论和战略管理研究表明，高管薪酬的治理作用存在大量的不同观点。
例如，管家理论放宽了在代理理论中发现的管理行为假设，认为管理者可以在某些情况下为了组织的利益充当管家，只有相对地的利益冲突存在。
同样，利益相关者理论认识到，公司治理因素的有效性取决于一系列的公司相关行为，和他们之间的相互作用，尽管这个研究较少关注高管薪酬。
尽管存在分歧，这些研究的共同趋势是他们一句普遍的效率模型，，原理重要的组织和环境的复杂性。
在代理理论中，方法大多限于股东和经理两方，很少注意代理问题可能在不同的任务和资源环境、组织的生命周期或不同的体制环境中中是如何变化的。
虽然威廉姆森认为交易成本会因不同的机构和组织环境而有所不同，他指出公司治理研究的主流是“太专注于资源配置的效率的议题，而忽视了组织效率离散的结构会带来仔细的审查。
”管家和利益相关者理论移除了代理理论的一些严格的假设，但没有提供一全面的能够与不同组织和环境相联系的薪酬激励研究框架。
继Aguilera et al之后，我们建议高管薪酬的研究应该采取更加开放的政策，把组织特点看做是与环境的多样性，波动性，不确定性相互依存的。
总之，开放系统强调高管补偿在整体背景下的重要性而非只是某一因素的作用。
代理基础的传统观念和我们的框架的观点背离，我们的框架植根于综合各种理论和实证研究结果，建立一个简洁的框架。
这种方法是为了更好地了解高管薪酬和组织机构环境的相互依存关系。
这些结构是组织环境与公司治理和体制影响的互补和替代。
总之，我们主张高管激励的组织有效性与主流代理研究建议的业绩之间不存在直接的线性影响。
这个影响是建立在大量公司水平和宏观因素上的而没有考虑大量的研究。
在下面的章节中，我们试图讨论这些重要的应变因素及高管补偿制度的侠侣和有效性。
组织环境组织理论学者们研究了组织的特点如何影响有效性的或者业绩可以被变量调解影响，例如任务的不确定性，任务的相互影响和组织的动力性。
尽管高管补偿可以被认为是在这个框架之内的治理结构的特点，组织理论还没有对这种企业治理形势的有效性进行阐述。
这里我们根据以前研究激励机制的有效性是如何被一个组织的突发事件的重要范畴所调解的，即企业形成的资源始于不同的组织环境相互依存的。
资源相关的应急事件的一方面主要基于该公司的资源基础观念，考虑它的资源和能力，像技术，知识和创新能力。
资源相关的应急事件主要来自于应急资源依赖理论，该理论表明公司将会满足对资源有强烈依赖的外部人员或组织并寻找缓冲和减少这种对外部的依赖。
例如，外部资金的程度和性质很可能影响到放在公司治理上的要求，以确保问责和激励。
组织环境考虑到激励机制的作用的影响会根据关键的内部外部的在公司的组织、市场、部门或监管环境方面的资源而有不同的方式。
换句话说，高管奖励的有效性取决于公司的大小‘年龄’公司的成长或衰退阶段、不同市场和部门的革新特点以及其他的因素。
尽管组织的观点拒绝最佳做法的普遍概念，他还是表明了如果能够考虑到组织环境的多样性，政策将会更加的有效。
总之，一种对所有人都适合的做法是不可取。
一个在管理方面的研究被日益认知，组织资源基础及他与外部环境的相互依存关系不是一成不变的，他是动态组织的一部分。
一个公司治理的权变概念的应用已经在一个研究公司治理的生命周期的新兴机构被制定了。
这些文献确定了公司的发展的大部分阶段，和与之相联系的需要治理不久的代理冲突的变化，包括激励机制。
公司治理可以被看做是一个动态系统，靠着治理可以改变不同阶段的企业的实践环境间的相互依赖关系，如新兴阶段、成长期、成熟期和衰退期。
通过不同的阶段，企业可以从一个西债的资源基地演变成一个更广泛的的资源基地。
这种转变可能至少要临时依赖外部资源。
这些外部资源的提供者创造新的公司治理，以确保不仅能创造财富，而且能在股东和其他利益相关者之间公平的分配。
这主要反映在公司管理问责制对外部资源提供者的改变。
公司初创阶段，创业企业有一个窄的资源基础。
它通常被一个创始人或家族投资者和管理问责制水平普遍偏低的外部股东拥有和控制。
在此背景下，创办经理人的财富很大一部分与公司相联系的，可能会破坏股权激励的有效性，符合Core和Guay的理论。
随着企业的成长，需要接触外部的资源和专业知识来支持它的成长，它开放它的管理系统给外部的投资者，像商业银行和风险投资公司。
该阶段，资源和问责制之间的平衡开始走向更加的透明并通过外部资源提供者增加监控。
首次公开募股标志着一个一个公司从创业到全面发展的专业公司的重大转变。
该责任的转变扩大了公司股票进入股票市场的金融资源。
Allcock和Filatotchev在分析他们的上市公司高管补偿方面确定了实施股票期权的治理机制的日益重要，它的目的是满足管理者的利益和引进公司市场投资者。
然而，他们也发现了这一机制的具体实施受到上市公司组织环境关于始终控制该公司的创始人的一些限制。
在下个阶段，内部和外部资源被投资在公司的成长上。
当企业耗尽了重点行业的增长机会，也许就会转到相关或非相关的行业上，自利系统就变得不那么透明了。