中国经济形势分析

Pinball policy政策变化如弹球

by Paul Cavey, Head of China Economics, Macquarie Securities

作者：保罗•凯维，麦格理证券中国经济研究部

Beijing’s agenda is nothing if not complex: a rise in the RMB that is enough to satisfy global critics but not derail domestic growth; domestic demand that raises imports to cut the trade surplus and create jobs without stoking inflation; inflation high enough for rebalancing without cutting real interest rates and inflating asset bubbles; and interest rates attractive enough to keep money in banks without causing hot money inflows and hurting indebted local authorities.

中国政府可谓是左支右绌：人民币升值幅度不能太小，否则没法堵住国际批评者的嘴，但同时不能破坏国内增长；必须扩大内需，以便增加进口，减少贸易盈余，创造就业机会，但又不能给通胀火上浇油；经济再平衡需要保持适度的通胀，但不能通过压低实际利率来做到这一点，否则会吹大资产泡沫；要想把钱圈在银行，那么利率就不能太低，但同时不能吸引热钱流入，不能加重地方政府的债务负担。

This was a tough act pre-crisis, and now is trickier still. Growth of 8–9%, inflation of 4–5%, and deposit rates of 5–6% is one option, but risks capital flows. They can be avoided with low deposit rates, but to prevent asset bubbles, inflation must be depressed too, which is difficult without lower GDP. Beijing struggles to meet all aims simultaneously, creating volatility in financial markets and the economy.

即使在经济危机发生前，这样的任务也算是相当棘手，何况现在。中国的一个选择是实现8–9%的经济增长率、4–5%的通胀率和5–6%的存款利率，如果要规避这样做带来的资金流风险，就需要保持较低的存款利率。但为了预防资产泡沫，就必须压低通胀率，其前提条件是GDP增长不能太快。中国政府希望面面俱到，却为金融市场和经济带来了诸多变数。

The post-crisis challenge后危机时代的挑战

Lending controls

控制放贷量

Official control of bank credit is less secure than it once was, and bank domination of total financing is less complete. The consequences of these trends will play out gradually, however, and certainly didn’t cause the spectacular lending growth of 2009. While there is some weakening at the edges, the government retains the ability to manage credit: the root of last year’s loan boom was a deliberate policy decision to ensure credit counteracted the effect of the economic downturn.

政府控制银行信贷已经不如过去那样稳妥了，而且银行在融资领域的主导地位也有所下降。但是，这些趋势的影响尚需时日才能全部显露，而且2009年放贷量激增并非由这些趋势所造成。尽管有所减弱，但是政府管理信贷的能力仍然不容小觑：去年贷款如流水，这是政府有意为之，希望通过政策调控，确保信贷能够抵消经济下滑的影响。

Lower nominal rates名义利率进一步下降

Beijing’s ability to control lending has weakened a bit, but not disappea red entirely. The bigger challenge to the framework of monetary control involves a second channel through which money leaves the banks, depositor withdrawals. The reason is simple: real interest rates have fallen.

中国政府信贷控制的能力有所下降，但并未完全消失。货币控制框架面临着一个更为严峻的挑战，这涉及到资金流出银行的第二个渠道，即储户的取款。原因很简单：实际利率有所下降。

This is partly a function of nominal rates. The 2009 surge in lending left the economy far more leveraged than before. This will mean a much bigger rise in debt repayments when interest rates go up, especially for the local governments and state-owned enterprises that were the biggest borrowers. This apparently has now become a factor for the State Council when considering whether to raise rates. But as Beijing doesn’t want to squeeze bank margins too much (in part to give them the profitability to cope with any fall-out in bad loans resulting from last year’s excesses), a ceiling on lending rates implies limits on deposit rates too.

在某种程度上而言，这是名义利率的功能所在。2009年信贷闸门大开，经济的杠杆率随之飙升。这意味着一旦加息，还贷额将大幅增加。银行最主要的借款方——地方政府和国有企业将首当其冲。显然，现在这已经成为了国务院考虑是否加息的一个因素。但由于中国政府不希望把银行的利润率压得太低（一部分原因是，银行要有足够的利润率才能应对去年信贷狂欢后可能出现的坏账），因此贷款利率设置上限即意味着同时限制存款利率。

At least during the boom years the Fed was steadily raising rates, which gave China some room to follow suit. Now, by contrast, the Fed is stuck at zero. This means that from a capital flows perspective, China’s 2.5% one-year deposit rate seems rather high, even though domestically it is very low.

至少在经济繁荣时期美联储一直在稳步提高利率，这给了中国跟进的空间。而现在形成鲜明对比的是，美联储一直在零利率附近徘徊。这意味着从资金流的角度来看，中国2.5%的一年期存款利率相对算比较高，但与中国往年比较，这是非常低的一个水平。

Such rates might be just high enough if inflation in China was to remain at the low levels recorded in the boom years, but surging perishable food prices and higher costs for inputs such as labour indicate that inflation is accelerating.

如果中国的通胀能够保持在经济繁荣期的低位水平，这样的利率可能比较适中，但是高涨的食品价格和不断攀升的投入品成本（例如劳动力成本）显示通胀正在愈演愈烈。

Lower credibility失信于民

In addition to the structural reasons that seem likely to push inflation higher, it also seems to us that Beijing is finding it harder to control inflationary expectations. The reason is the reserve of credibility that was so painfully built up by Zhu Rongji in the 1990s, and proved so useful to the authorities in controlling overheating in 2007, was run-down by the policy turnaround following the 2008 downturn.

一些结构性原因可能会进一步推高通胀，除此之外，我们认为中国政府越来越难以控制通胀预期。上世纪九十年代，朱镕基辛辛苦苦建立起政府的威信。在控制2007年的经济过热时，这种威信的力量发挥了非常大的作用。但是2008年经济下滑时期的政策转变严重挫伤了政府威信。

The consequences of this loss of credibility now seem to be at work in real estate. After the policy U-turn of 2008-09, buyers j ust don’t believe the government’s pledges that property prices will be kept stable.

在房地产领域，这种失信于民的后果可见一斑。2008-2009年政策出现了180°转弯后，购房者就不再相信政府稳定房价的承诺了。

Lower real deposit rates实际存款利率进一步下降

Given the changes happening in China’s economy, it seems reasonable t o assume a 4-5% structural rate of inflation through the coming years. This is not high relative to either the real rate of GDP growth or the inflationary experience of other high-growth economies. But this moderate inflation rate still promises to produce consistently negative real interest rates for China’s bank savers.

鉴于中国经济正在经历诸多变化，未来几年中国很可能出现4-5%的结构性通胀率。相对中国的实际GDP增长率或其它快速增长经济体的通胀经验，这样的通胀率并不算高，但仍会带来持续的实际负利率。

The policy choices政策选择