比较增值税与零售税-毕业论文外文翻译

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企业增值税纳税筹划外文文献翻译最新

企业增值税纳税筹划外文文献翻译最新

外文文献翻译:原文+译文原文The research of corporate V AT planningPhillips J DAbstractEnterprise tax planning is very necessity. But most tax planning of enterprise is so difficult, the manager normally feel do not know how to start it. This is mainly because when doing tax planning personnel breadth and depth of thinking is limited. In fact, in view of the enterprise a certain business, as long as the tax personnel to all business related tax law research understand the relevant rules and regulations are in place, so companies when doing tax planning should be no problem. For example and to increase "camp" the tax planning, the categories of taxes that must be considered including the business tax and value-added tax, the relevant expenses such as urban maintenance and construction tax and educational expenses to add. Of course, the enterprise can not only consider when do tax planning; a business enterprise's business is very broad, so when doing tax planning to overall consideration. Keywords: value-added tax; the individual income tax; Tax rate; Tax planning1 IntroductionEnterprises between the increasingly fierce markets competitions, enterprises want to gain share in the market, a place, you must adapt to the evolution of natural law, has the stronger than other enterprise competitive power, and this kind of competition power depend mainly on market segment and reduce the cost. Undoubtedly tax is an important part in enterprise cost, the main body of enterprise tax include value added tax, income tax, business tax, consumption tax, etc., and occupy the largest proportion of is value added tax, accounting earnings and the realization of the goal of the enterprise plays an important significance. Because different countries have different social and economic development to its policy orientation, so differences exist in different countries and different industries, the tax policy and accounting system for the choice of accounting methods more flexible, which provides a choice of V AT tax conditions and space? The V AT tax planning forenterprise attention, recognition and more and more attention. Tax planning in gradually improve, already have a systematic and market characteristics. And the development of society, market economy unceasing prosperity, has prompted the company constantly innovate oneself production mode, operation concept, management style, etc.For the survival and development to adapt to market competition, enterprises will use every possible method to increase the interest, as far as possible to reduce the amount of unnecessary consumption, so how to reduce the tax burden is the problem that managers must consider carefully. Modern enterprises in pursuit of the enterprise value maximization as the goal development relative to evade taxes and tax risk of higher taxes, so business leaders can choose to reduce the tax, tax planning the implementation of reasonable overall planning can make the company a huge income.2 V AT descriptionsValue-added tax is the enterprise product in the process of production, circulation, and the value added part of the labor service or value added, the additional levy taxes. No matter which country, regardless of its power, as long as it is a value-added tax, to enact specific regulations on value-added tax. Generally divided into three kinds, one is the production, the second is income-producing, and three is a consumer.2.1 Production-type V ATProduction-oriented V AT has relationship with the company's production, it is well known that a mature enterprise need fixed plant, equipment, products used in the production of raw materials, transportation, fuel, fixed assets, product sales and production of profit, the sales revenue minus the production and operation of the balance of the raw materials, fuel and power as prescribed by the state of appreciation, this also is the basis of the production V AT, in principle, value added tax is not to be bought and depreciation of fixed assets, value added tax is a period of time limit, the tax basis by the tax unit labor balance, and used in the production of loss and the balance of sales revenue, which belongs to the category of value-added tax, fixed assets depreciation is used in the process of transfer value, is also a part of value-added tax levy, which is called double taxation. Based on this, with a largeenterprise as an example, the higher its value of fixed assets, to the payment of taxes, the more because of the wear and depreciation is not deducted, in the process of production is also repeat pay; This part of income is almost equivalent to the gross national product, so called the production-oriented V AT, it includes the rent, wages, profits, interest and depreciation of fixed assets, etc.2.2 Consumption-type V ATIn a word, it is not including the current depreciation of fixed assets and net income tax, including the taxpayers' wages, profits, interest, and rent, etc., in terms of a country, relative to the production-oriented V AT is gross national product, net national product. It is deducted for the production of all the value of fixed assets and depreciation forehead, purchased raw materials and labor value of net income, after is the income of the enterprise production and sales, including spending part, such as wages, so called income-producing V AT.2.2 Income-type V ATDue to the use of standard, advanced, has a legal basis, is engaged in the tax accounting practical operation is simple, popular among countries in the world. A category is a one-off deducted for production and operation of the fixed assets value and the value of the purchase raw materials in the tax, that is to say, the taxpayer’s tax products for production and operation, and are not all the outsourcing material to this category. Fixed assets has been imposed production V AT, of course, but the operator is used as a purchase of fixed assets, its tax gold when the purchase has been deducted, relatively, this part of the goods as fixed assets, there would be no tax, as the nature of the V AT collection does not include other production of raw materials, only including the management of all sales of consumer goods. Consumer is a use of special V AT invoices for V AT tax withholding of taxes, occupies a certain advantage, due to its treatment scope strictly enforced, standard, has certain advancement, and are applicable in many countries.3 The characteristics of added-value tax3.1 Wide taxEnterprise engaged in the work of production and sales for the main V ATcollection objects, individuals engaged in business also in the collection and processing, such as small restaurants, small articles of daily use operators, etc., are widely applicable to all kinds of ownership enterprises and individuals, embodies the fairness of the tax system.3.2 Indirect taxV AT calculation is not directly to value multiplied by the applicable tax rate to calculate the tax payable, but by buried output tax and tax balance to determine the tax payable. Although V AT is the value-added tax on appreciation forehead that increases the value or goods, but in the actual execution process, due to the added value of goods or services or goods value is a difficult to calculate the data, so the V AT only by way of indirect tax. Indirect tax measures increased the difficulty of the value-added tax calculation and collection management.3.3 Additional taxGoods have to be sold by pricing, V AT tax refers to the outside valence is not including commodity tax on the original price. When selling goods, should will receive all the money was divided into excluding V AT price sales and value added tax, and on the special V AT invoices to the tomb-sweeping day, respectively, in this way, the V AT on revenues, costs and profits will not occur, also need not collect V AT included in the income statement. Although it is important to note that the V AT is outside valence tax, but the sales direction while receiving payment from buyers tend to be merged charge, through a certain calculation formula of a sales tax were decomposed into will not sales tax and value-added tax, and fill in the V AT special invoice respectively, rather than in the place where has to determine the price of the total sales of value-added tax calculated separately again.3.4 Special invoiceV AT is absolute and levy, in order to avoid only partially and the phenomenon of double taxation, must carry on the effective control of each link, implement V AT is unified, special invoices, and according to the stated on the invoice amount to impose a tax deduction method, this is the main method for effective control. Countries introduced related management way, strengthen the management of the specialinvoice, the rules on the scope of the use of special V AT invoices, the invoice issued the purpose to make clear a regulation, also completed, enterprises have an obligation to give the buyer special invoices for value-added tax, and to do specialized tickets, taxable services shall be paid not, except duty-free goods also. All invoices shall be protected by law. Special invoices for specific use measures enterprises in strict accordance with the provisions of the calculation, on the basis of the in and out of balance of the current period by the enterprise, both reasonable and legitimate, is the duty of the taxpayer. Thus, to strengthen the taxpayer over the use of special V AT invoices highlighted the value-added tax levy management effect.4 The V AT tax planningV AT tax planning is the content of the enterprise according to their own economic activities, on the premise of not illegal, V AT tax matters to the enterprise to seek planning V AT tax minimization of planning and arrangement. It has the following features:4.1The result of V AT tax planningCity building duty and educational expenses to add belongs to attach tax, as the value-added tax falls. But at the same time, if the two tax drops, can lead to enterprise's total profits, so the enterprise income tax will rise. So, the result of the tax planning may be related to some deviation from the ultimate goal of enterprises to reduce tax burden.4.2 V AT special invoices for value-added tax planningInvoice buckle tax law is a common way to calculate the V AT payable taxes, so special invoices for value-added tax management is the key content of value added tax management. Enterprise product sales directly affected by the special invoices for value-added tax, can open will promote the further development of the enterprise; on the other hand, will affect the size of the enterprise. So, V AT tax planning is the need of the development of the enterprise, therefore in the process of V AT tax planning, to consider the problem of special V AT invoices to the enterprise development prospects.4.3 The planning of the tax burden onKnown to value added tax is a turnover tax, also proves that it is the identity ofthe indirect tax, from the nature of the object defined, flow from it this is the flow of goods, the circulation tax included in commodity prices, determines the turnover does not open automatically. And tax excluded in price, taxes are independent in accounting book, looks like has nothing to do with the price, but it is also part of the purchase price, income tax is directly understand hang, V AT tax on hidden is indirectly. Because of V AT qualitative, its scope covers almost all walks of life, can say all the goods in the column, but for taxpayers, because taxes will rise in price is not reasonable publicly, will be opposed by the consumers. So, the taxpayer can only secretly push up commodity prices, will tax include in the price, do not attract the attention of consumers, easy will be passed on to the purchaser, tax and consumers don't know, so don't oppose.文献出处:Phillips J D. The research of corporate V AT planning [J]. The Accounting Review, 2016, 1(3): 40-52.译文企业增值税纳税筹划研究Phillips J D摘要企业进行纳税筹划是非常有必要性的。

增值税作为一种新的收入资源的中英文翻译

增值税作为一种新的收入资源的中英文翻译

外文资料Value-Added Tax as a New Revenue SourceJames M. BickleyVertical EquityThe vertical equity of a tax concerns the tax treatment of households with different abilities-to-pay. Vertical equity may be affected by the measure of ability-to-pay and the tax period. Some economists argue that personal consumption is the best measure of ability-to-pay because consumption is the actual taking of scarce resources from the economic system. The most common measure of ability-to-pay is still income. Proponents of income as a measure of ability-to-pay argue that saving yields utility by providing households with greater economic security.Tax incidence usually is measured by using a one-year period. Data on consumption and income are readily available in one-year increments and the concept of a one-year period is easily understood. But some tax economists believe tax incidence is more accurately determined by measuring consumption and income over a household’s lifetime.If consumption is used as a measure of ability-to-pay, a single-rate V AT with a broad base would be approximately proportional regardless of the time period. In other words, the percentage of consumption paid in V A T by households would be approximately constant as the level of household consumption rises.If disposable income over a one-year period is the measure of ability-to-pay then a VA T would be viewed as extremely regressive; that is, the percentage of disposable income paid in V AT would decrease rapidly as disposable income increases. In most discussions of tax policy, both a one-year period and annual disposable income (or some other annual income measure) are used; consequently, the V AT is viewed as being extremely regressive.If disposable income over a lifetime is the measure of ability-to-pay, a VAT would be mildly regressive. For lower and middle income households, it appears that nearly all savings are eventually consumed. Thus, it may be that for the vast majority of households, lifetime consumption and lifetime income are approximately equal. High income households tend to have net savings over their lifetimes; consequently, they would pay a lower proportion of their disposable incomes in VA T than lower income groups.Some supporters of progressive taxation oppose the VAT primarily because they believe that it is regressive. Some of these critics are especially concerned about the absolute burden of a V ATon low income households. The degree of regressivity, however, can be reduced by government policy. Three often-mentioned policies are exclusions and multiple rates, income tax credits, and earmarking of some revenues for increased social spending (including indexed transfer payments).NeutralityFrom an economic perspective, the greater a source of revenue’s neutrality, the more it is generally preferred; that is, the less it affects economic decisions. Conceptually, a V AT on all consumption expenditures with a single rate that is constant over time would be relatively neutral compared to other major revenue sources.For households, two out of three major decisions would not be altered by this hypothetical V A T. First, this VAT would not alter choices among goods because all goods would be taxed at the same rate. Thus, relative prices would not change. Second, a V AT would not affect the saving-consumption decision because saving would only be taxed once; that is, when savings are spent on consumption. But the third decision, a household’s work-leisure decision, would be affected by a VAT. Leisure would not be taxed, but the returns from work would be taxed when spent on goods. (In contrast, the income tax affects both the saving-consumption decision and the work-leisure decision.)For a firm, the V AT would not affect decisions concerning method of financing (debt or equity), choice among inputs (unless some suppliers are exempt or zero-rated), type of business organization (corporation, partnership, or sole proprietorship), and goods to produce. Other types of taxes may affect one or more of these types of decisions.But this conceptually pure form of a V AT is not feasible. A V AT cannot be levied on all consumer goods; consequently, prices of taxed goods will rise relative to untaxed goods. This change in relative prices would affect consumers’ decisions about which goods to purchase, and, con sequently, firms’ decisions about which goods to produce. Furthermore,most nations with V ATs have more than one rate. Multiple V AT rates alter relative prices of taxed goods. Finally, V AT rates in most nations have tended to rise over time. Despite these deviations from a pure form of VAT, a broad- based V AT is relatively neutral. This neutrality is greater if the tax rate is relatively low, as could be the case for a V A T to reduce the U.S. deficit.InflationA V AT initially would cause a one-time increase in the price level if the Federal Reserve had an expansionary monetary policy to offset the contractionary effects of the tax. or example, a 4% V AT on 75% of consumer outlays might cause an estimated increase in consumer prices of approximately 3%.A VAT would have some secondary price effects. Some goods would rise in price because their factors of production, especially labor, are linked to price indexes. Yet, if the Federal Reservedisregarded these secondary price increases in formulating monetary policy, these secondary price increases would tend to be offset by price reductions in other sectors of the economy. In summary, a V AT would probably cause a one-time increase in the price level but not affect the rate of inflation i.e., increased prices in the future.Balance-of-TradeWith flexible exchange rates, the supply and demand for different currencies determine their relative value. If a country has a deficit in its balance-of-trade, this deficit must financed by a net importation of foreign capital. But net capital inflows cannot continue indefinitely. Thus, over time, this country’s currency will tend to decline in value relative to the currencies of other nations. Consequently, this country’s balance-of-trade deficit will eventually decline as its exports rise and imports fall. Hence, economic theory indicated that a V AT offers no advantage over other major taxes in reducing a deficit in the balance-of-trade.National SavingIf a VAT is levied to replace part of income tax revenue, what would be the effect on the personal saving rate. A V AT taxes savings when they are spent on consumption, allowing savings to compound at a pre-tax rate. But an income tax is levied on all income at the time it is earned, regardless of whether the income is consumed or saved. The income tax is also levied on the earnings from income saved. Consequently, some proponents of the V AT have argued that choosing a VAT rather than an income tax to raise revenue would increase the return from saving, and, consequently, raise the savings rate.The rate of return on savings, however, has never been shown to have a significant effect on the savings rate because of two conflicting effects. First, each dollar saved today results in the possibility of a higher amount of consumption in the future. This relative increase in the return from saving causes a household to want to substitute saving for consumption out of current income (substitution effect). But a higher rate of return on savings raises a household’s income; consequently, the household has to save less to accumulate some target amount of savings in the future (income effect). Thus, this income effect encourages households to have higher current consumption and lower current saving. In summary, there is no conclusive evidence that a V AT would increase the rate of national saving more than another type of major tax increase.中文译文增值税作为一种新的收入资源由比克利·詹姆斯(一)纵向公平一种税的纵向公平涉及不同的能力家庭与薪酬的税务处理问题。

291.E关于增值税的税收筹划认识与思考 外文原文

291.E关于增值税的税收筹划认识与思考 外文原文

Value-Added Taxes in Developing and Transitional Countries:Lessons and QuestionsRichard M. BirdUniversity of Toronto - Joseph L. Rotman School of ManagementAbstract:The value-added tax has, in recent decades, become the most important single tax in most developing and transitional economies. This paper reviews some problems that have emerged as important as more experience has been gained with how VATs really work in many such countries and suggests some lines of research that need to be explored further to overcome those problems.1. IntroductionFew fiscal issues are more important in developing and transitional economies (DTE) than the value-added tax (V AT). Over the last few decades, V AT has swept the world. The principal reasons for the rapid spread of this form of taxation were, first, the early adoption of this form of taxation in the European Union (EU) and, second, the key role played in spreading the word to DTE by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in particular and by international agencies and advisors more generally. The success of V AT in the EU showed that V AT worked. The consistent support and advocacy of this form of taxation by the IMF and others in a variety of countries, first in Latin America, and then around the world, encouraged and facilitated the adoption of V AT by countries with much less developed economic and administrative structures than those in the original EU member states. At the same time, for various reasons of their own, all the non-EU countries of the OECD apart from the United States have also, one by one, introduced V ATs, most recently Australia in 2000.Of course, to a certain extent, as the background paper (ITD, 2005) observes, the V AT label covers a variety of taxes in different countries. Countries that belong to the EU have necessarily all adopted the same model of V AT, essentially as laid out by the Sixth Directive of 1977, although some important differences remain between V ATs in EU member states (Mathias, 2004). Other countries influenced by the EU such as the recent and prospective ‘accession’ countries of central and eastern Europe have als o largely followed this model. Elsewhere in the world, however, while the influence of the EU model (and some member-state variants) is clear in, for example, some former colonies of EU member states, other models have been developed and adopted, notably in New Zealand and Japan. Equally importantly, the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department, the leading ‘change agent’ in this respec t for in much of the world has over time evolved what is essentially its own ‘model’ of an appro priate V AT for DTE, as set out initially, for instance, in Tait (1988, 1991) and most recently in Ebrill et al. (2001). While V AT countries have introduced many local variations into whatever b asic ‘model’ they mayhave started from1,as Victor Thuronyi (2003, p.312) has recently noted, “ while there are differences in V AT from one country to another, compared with the income tax V AT laws are remarkably similar.”When DTE have a V AT, it is invariably among the most important sources of government revenue. Indeed, anyway one cares to look at it V AT has clearly been an enormous success. Not only has it swept the world almost clear of contending general sales taxes but in many DTE it dominates the income tax as the mainstay of national finances. No previous fiscal innovation has been adopted in such a wide variety of countries so rapidly.Not all is sunshine in V ATland, however. Clouds of varying sizes and shapes seem to be looming on the horizon in all V AT countries but perhaps particularly in DTE that have become increasingly dependent on V AT and hence more vulnerable to potential problems. Some of these problems have always been inherent in the structure and operation of V ATs but are exacerbated by the increased fiscal weight being placed on the many DTE under pressure for new fiscal revenues for example to offset revenue losses from tariff reductions needed to accord with WTO requirements. It is thus perhaps time for a new look at the role of V AT in DTE.Specifically, are the V ATs now in place in most DTE as good as they could be in economic, equity, and administrative terms? Must ‘good’ V ATs i n such countries always follow the same pattern? Must every DTE have a V AT? Can all DTE administer a V AT sufficiently well to make the introduction of the tax worthwhile? Is a V AT always the best way to respond to the revenue problems arising from trade liberalization? Can V ATs be adapted to cope with the rising demands in some countries, especially federal countries, for more access to revenues by local and regional governments? Can they deal with such new problems as those arising fromchanges in business practices with financial innovations and digital commerce? The answers to such questions are not only critical to the fiscal stability of many DTE but also to their economic growth and development. Are the V ATs already in place in many DTE the efficient, simple, revenue-raisers some claim? Or, as others argue, are they so inequitable as to exacerbate social and political tensions? Does V AT provide a way to tap the informal sector or does it instead tend to expand that sector?No brief paper can answer such complex questions, of course, so the objective of this paper is considerably more modest. Taking the background paper prepared for this conference (ITD, 2005) as its starting point, the aim of this paper is simply to provide a few additional reflections on some lessons that seem to emerge from experience to date with V AT in DTE -countries in which, for the most part, tax reality is much more dominated by administrative capacity on one hand and political necessity on the other than in the European home of so much V AT experience and thinking. There is indeed much room and need for sharing experiences between developed countries and DTE, but there are also some important differences that need to be explicitly taken into 1For a small sample of early country experiences, see e.g. Gillis (1990), OEA (1993), Yoingco and Guevara (1988), and OECD (1998), and for a sample of the discussion in an important current case, that of India, see e.g. Shome (1997), Chelliah (2001), and Empowered Committee (2005).account when doing so. To paraphrase the conclusions of the late Jean Jacques Laffont (2004) in a recent survey of public utility regulation in DTE, not only do we as yet have surprisingly little solid empirical knowledge of some critical factors but the relevant economic theory also remains rather sketchy and we know even less about the relevant political economy context. For the most part, this paper simply attempts to flesh out these observations in a little more detail with respect to V AT in DTE. In doing so, it should perhaps be noted that although the points made are stated in general terms for the most part they are inevitably shaped by the author’s limited personal experience with various aspect of V ATs in a number of DTE over the years. In a sense, however, this is perhaps not a limitation since it is precisely through closer analysis of, and reflection on, the experience of such case studies that we can best discern the real challenges facing V AT in DTE and the questions that most need further attention. Such at least, is the approach taken here.22. Lessons from ExperienceAt the risk of repeating some of the many good and sensible things said in the background paper, this section discusses briefly five major lessons that emerge from the extensive experience with introducing and implementing V ATs in DTE. First, and most importantly, as the background paper says, V AT works. Despite some recent criticisms by reputable analysts, for the most part it remains true that, if a country needs or wants a general sales tax, it is well advised to have a V AT. Secondly, nonetheless V AT does not always work well in many DTE, principally because some are simply not ready f or ‘self-assessment’. Thirdly, what this suggests for tax design is what may be called ‘the NOSFA principle’ - No One Size Fits All - although it may be that several ‘sizes’ (patterns) of V AT may prove suitable for different groups of countries in similar circumstances. Fourthly, the major lesson for tax administration that experience in DTE suggests is that the oft-c ited ’18-24 months’ needed for successful V AT implementation vastly understates the nature and time scale of the task in many countries. Many DTE cannot be simply, as it were, ‘given’ a good V AT administration: they need to ‘grow’ it themselves and the process may take a long time in some cases. Finally, since tax policy is always about politics as much or more than it is about tax design and administration, ) once said in a discussion of OECD countries, tax policy “…is about trade-offs, not truths.”To some extent at least, the future of V AT in DTE lies in much closer understanding of the critical politicaleconomy dimension of V AT policy and administration.2.1 V AT WorksAs the background paper shows, V AT is by no means n ecessarily the ‘money machine’ that it has sometimes been called. The effects on revenue of introducing a V AT in particular contexts remains a matter open to interpretation and question, as recently underlined by some who have questioned the capability of V AT to replace 2In contrast to the disclaimer in the background paper, it should perhaps be explicitly noted that, while the author has learned a great deal about these topics from the staff of the World Bank, the IMF, and the OECD and is in addition grateful to Pierre-Pascal Gendron for helpful comments, he alone is solely responsible for all views expressed in this paper.revenues from trade liberalization in some DTE (e.g. Rajaraman, 2004). While it is true that there may indeed be a somewhat stronger case for retaining some taxation on international trade on revenue grounds than has been conventionally asserted, this case rests less on defects of V AT as such than on the assumed relative inefficiency of V AT administration compared to border tax administration (see also section 2.4). If a V AT can be administered adequately, the conventional conclusion that it offers the best way for a country to make up revenue losses from trade liberalization holds, though perhaps in less sweeping terms than originally argued3.Indeed, the equally conventional conclusion that a V AT is the most economically desirable and administratively effective way in which to collect a given share of national income through a general consumption tax also holds -provided, again, that the capacity exists to administer VAT adequately. When a country introduces a V AT, whether to replace another form of general sales tax or as a new tax, there need not necessarily be an aggregate increase in revenues (either from consumption taxes or in general).As a rule, however, the economic cost of collecting revenues will decline, thus making society better off. Similarly, as with any tax, although increasing the rate of an existing V AT rates will neither necessarily increase revenues proportionately nor be costless, it may nonetheless be the economically most sensible way to expand revenue shares in DTE, if that is the policy goal.2.2 But It Does Not Always WorkMore generally, as hinted earlier, what is really at issue in such countries is not so much such specific problems -- all of which may in principle easily be corrected if desired -- but rather the fundamental question of whether they are really ready for the ‘self-assessment’ approach that the background paper properly asserts is how a ‘good’ V AT works. If a country is not ready in this regard, should if have a V AT at all? And, if it does (as many already do), is the best V AT for it always the same as the ‘model’ implicitly set out as a standard in most of the literature? The question is discussed further in the next two sections.2.3. Tax Design: The NOSFA PrincipleA second possibly rewarding approach to explore would be to recast the familiar (if implicit) ‘decision-tree’ approach to V AT by setting out in more detail the i mplications of different nodal decisions (e.g. zero-rating) for other design aspects, then working out the optimal sequence of such decisions for particular countries (or groups of countries), and finally assessing how dependent the ‘rightness’ of particul ar decisions is with respect to different characteristics of the environment within which the V AT is expected to function. While of course many elements of such an approach are to be found in the literature (e.g. Ebrill, 2001), as yet little has been done to set out the relevant decision-points and their interdependence in a systematic fashion or to quantify them in any meaningful way, although the interesting recent work on V AT thresholds (Keen and Mintz, 2003) is a good first step in this direction. Many more such steps are needed.2.4. Tax Administration: Growing into a Good VAT3On this, compare the rigorous analysis in Keen and Ligthart (2002) with the equally rigorous, but different, analysis in Keen and Ligthart (2004).Secondly, as with respect to tax design, more thought seems needed with respect to what one really has to know about a country in order to devise the ‘right’ implementation schedule for its particular circumstances. What matters most and in what ways? Is it the size distribution of the potential tax base? Or the relative importance of ‘key’ base components (such as imports and excise goods) and the degree of administrative control that can realistically be expect with respect to those components? Or the level of accounting skills in the potential taxpayer population? Or the detailed industry-by-industry flow of ‘V ATable’ items between different sectors and different sized firms? Or the capacity of tax officials to administer an accounts- based tax and in particular attention to audit such a tax? Or, perhaps most fundamentally, the degree of existing ‘trust’ between officials and taxpayers and how quickly (and in what ways) that trust can be built up sufficiently to support a self-assessment system? Or is it all of the forgoing and more? Whatever one’s answers to such questions, what seems clear is that one cannot expect success simply by transferring experience from very different developed country settings to DTE with fragmented economies, large informal sectors, low tax morale, rampant evasion, and total distrust between tax administrators and taxpayers. The research agenda with respect to V AT administration in DTE is thus even larger and probably more important than that with respect to V AT design in such countries.2.5. Tax Policy is an Art, Not a ScienceIn the end, what V AT looks like and how it performs in any country inevitably reflects political factors and calculations as much or more than economic and administrative considerations. As a rule, of course, the critical political dimension of the policy process must simply be accepted as given by those directly concerned with tax design and implementation. Nonetheless, it is obviously desirable that they are as fully aware as possible of the manner in which such factors may impact on, and are in turn affected by, such central elements of V AT design and implementation as exemptions (see section 3.2 below).To be forewarned that a particular sector is politically ‘untouchable’ may, for instance, enab le policy designers to be able to work around the problem in a way that does less damage to the tax as a whole than might otherwise be the case4. Somewhat curiously, however, despite the proliferation of real world examples available for study, few careful ‘political economy’studies of V AT implementation appear to have been done in DTE as yet. As such studies begin to appear, they will in all likelihood often suggest still further questions calling for still more scientific (empirical and theoretical) research that may, in the long run, provide more useful advice than can yet be offered to those engaged in the precarious art of policy design and implementation in DTE.4A common joke among development economists years ago was along the following lines: “What difference would it make to development policy in country X if all the political scientists in the wor ld disappeared?” The expected answer, of course, was “No difference at all.” While no doubt serving its intende d purpose of making economists feel perhaps a bit more useful (at least in relative terms), this joke is very wrong indeed. As we have begun to understand with the recent upsurge of the political economy literature, few things matter more for better policy design and implementation in any country than deeper understanding of how politics works in that country.3. Other IssuesMany questions have already been raised about V AT in DTE, and some possible directions in which to search for answers have been tentatively suggested. In this part of the paper, five issues are singled out for a bit more discussion. Section 3.1 raises a prosaic but surprisingly important question: do V AT systems generate the information needed both for sound analysis and good management? Section 3.2 returns to the issue of exemptions mentioned in section 2.2 above, placing it in the more general context of the equity of V AT in the circumstances of many DTE. Section 3.3 focuses on some aspects of the surprisingly controversial questions related to V AT and small business, and section 3.4 continues downward, as it were, into the realm of the ‘shadow’ economy and asks how effective V AT can be in DTE in which such activities constitute a critical sector of the economy. Finally, section 3.5 raises the question of how, if V AT already faces as many problems as discussed here in many DTE, it can possibly cope with such changes as those associated with the looming rise of electronic commerce around the world.3.1. Missing DataOf course, such comments may be applied to any tax. Two features make them especially applicable to V AT, however. In the first place, one unfortunate consequence of the adoption of V AT in replacement of other indirect taxes in many DTE has been the virtual disappearance of any information on the composition of the effective base of consumption taxation. Most studies dealing with this important question infer the tax base indirectly from national income accounts or survey data5.Two simple examples of matters important to understanding how V AT really works in DTE that are amazingly difficult to discover in many countries are the real importance of imports in the V AT base and the importance of excise commodities in that base. Similar data gaps make it difficult in many countries to estimate the likely revenue consequences of base and rate changes in V AT. All these problems are in principle unnecessary, since all the needed information is necessarily generated in the process of administering V AT. But almost never are such data available in a usable form, let alone used.Secondly, V AT is the only tax that involves the government not only in collecting substantial money from the private sector but also in paying a good deal of it back to them in the form of input tax credits. Since any V AT invoice constitutes a potential claim on the treasury, and falsifying such claims is perhaps the most common form of V AT fraud, it is critical from an administrative perspective to have a detailed knowledge of the ‘normal’ or ‘expected’ pattern of credits and liabilities for firms in all the different lines of business subject to V AT. Again, however, although the normal operation of an invoice-credit V AT generates such information, itt is striking how seldom such data are either collected in usable form or used (e.g. for devising a risk management strategy). Perhaps even more surprising is that this whole question has apparently not as yet 5For an interesting recent example, though still a rather simple one, of the information that can be drawn from VAT revenue data about the tax base for EU member states, see Mathis (2004).received much attention from the international community of V AT experts. It should.3.2. Equity IssuesA final point that deserves mention with respect to V AT and equity in DTE is the importance of the shadow economy. Many DTE have a large economic sector that is effectively not subject to direct taxation. This reality clearly should affect how one assesses the effects of different fiscal instruments on equity. It is not at all impossible, for instance, that in some cases even a uniform broad-based V AT may be more progressive than more nominally progressive taxes (such as the personal income tax) that in practice burden only a limited group of wage-earners.The question of V AT and the shadow economy is discussed further in section 3.4 below.3.3. Small ProblemsA quite different approach to the perceived and real problems of dealing with small taxpayers is the so-called ‘V AT withholding’ found in some c ountries (and mentioned in the background paper). In effect, this practice assumes that V AT will not be reported properly by small firms and hence requires those selling to such firms to ‘withhold’ an additional V AT on such sales to make up for the V AT those firms are supposed to collect (but are expected not to remit even if they do collect) on their own sales. Such ‘dual pric e’ systems are usually imposed at arbitrary rates and make no logical or administrative sense; nonetheless, they are sufficiently common, and are suggested sufficiently often in countries in which they do not now exist, to call for closer examination than they seem so far to have received. For example, what is the best way to determine the appropriate ‘withholding’ rates (essentially p resumptive taxes) in different circumstances? Are such ‘withheld’ V AT ever credited agains t V AT actually reported by the firms from whom they have been withheld? What is the net effect on revenue of such systems?Finally, most discussion of the appropriate treatment of small firms appears to assume that there is no difficulty in telling which firms are small. As with giraffes, it appears that one is supposed to know one when one sees one. As discussed in the next section, however, this assumption is probably wrong in many DTE.3.4. Chasing ShadowsOne reason such regimes have been created in some DTE is because the normal tax regime is considered (by those who put it in place, presumably) to be too complex and often also too harshly applied and perhaps unduly prone to corruption, extortion, and harassment. Insulating selected (sometimes self-selected) taxpayers from such problems does not make the problems disappear. On the contrary, it is likely to make them more difficult to deal with, both by complicating tax administration as a whole and by reducing political pressure to fix the basic problems with tax administration. Taking people out of the V AT system is a particularly bad idea since information is the lifeblood of an effective V AT administration. Every effort should be made to avoid breaking the information chain, rather than encouraging firms to do so, as simplified systems in effect do.3.5. Changing with the TimesBy the time this last problem become significant for most DTE, however, perhaps some better way of dealing with it may have been discovered. For the next few years, probably the main advice one should give to DTE with respect to V AT and electronic commerce, as with respect to such other ‘frontier’ issues as the treatment of the f inancial sector and the public sector, is simply not to worry much about such esoterica but rather to concentrate on the difficult task of first getting an appropriate V AT into place and then running it effectively. The basic question in many DTE is not how to deal with ‘new’ issues but rather how one can make a tax like V AT, which essentially depends on self-assessment, function adequately in countries that in many instances do not appear to have satisfied the necessary preconditions for a self-assessment system. The answer, as suggested earlier, may be to spend more time and effort trying to determine what kind of less-than-perfect V AT will function best in such countries and then working out in more detail the best way in which they can move over time from such unsatisfactory (though necessary) initial positions to a good V AT. Good answers along these lines can in all likelihood only really be determined in the context of close study of particular countries.4. A conclusionTo sum up, V AT is of course not ‘the answer’ to the fiscal problems of DTE. Despite the many problems and questions raised above, however, some form of V AT almost certainly constitutes a critical ingredient in such an answer. Even the best possible V AT will not solve all the problems of DTE: the V AT they have may not always work well; in some instances it could be designed better to fit the context of the country; in many instances, it could certainly be administered better, even in the face of adverse political and capacity factors. Nonetheless, so long as a general consumption tax makes sense as a key part of a country’s fiscal system, as is surely true in most DTE, V AT remains the best available fiscal instrument we have. According to the background paper, 136 countries now have a V AT of some sort. Information from the IBFD (Annacondia and van der Corput, 2003) suggests that there remain at least 63 countries that do not have V ATs, 41 of which now have some other form of general consumption tax and 23 of which appear to have thus far been able to avoid facing the problem. When the next Global conference on V AT takes place, it is thus a safe prediction that yet more countries will have V ATs. It remains to be seen to what extent the various issues raised above will have been either dispelled or more adequately dealt with by that time. ReferencesAhmad, Ehtisham and Nicholas Stern (1987) “Alternative Sources of Government Revenue: Illustrations from India, 1979-80,” in David Newbery and Nicholas Stern, eds, The Theory of Taxation for Developing Countries (New York: Published for the World Bank by Oxford University Press).Annacondia, Fabiola and Walter van der Corput (2003) “Overview of General Turnover Taxes and Tax Rates,” V AT Monitor, March/April, pp. 2-12.Auriol, Emmanuelle and Michael Warlters (2004) “Taxation Base in Developing Countries,” ARQADE, Toulouse, July.Baer, Katherine, Olivier P. Benon and Juan A. Toro Rivera (2002) Improving Large Taxpayers’ Compliance: A Review of Country Experience. Occasional Paper 215. (Washington: International Monetary Fund).Bird, Richard M. and Sall y Wallace (2004) “Is It Really So Ha rd to Tax the Hard-to-Tax? The Context and Role of Presumptive Taxes,” in James Alm, Jo rge Martinez-Vazquez and Sally Wallace, eds. Taxing the Hard-to-Tax: Lessons from Theory and Practice (Amsterdam: Elsevier).Chelliah, Raja J. et al. (2001) Primer on Value Added Tax (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications Pvt. Ltd.)Cnossen, Sijbren (2004) “V AT in South Africa: What Kind of Rate Structure?” V AT Monitor, January/February, 19-24.De Ferranti, David et al. (2004) Inequality in Latin America: Breaking with History? World Bank Latin American and Caribbean Studies (Washington: The World Bank). Desai, Mihir A. and James R. Hines, Jr. (2002) “Value-Added Taxes and International Trade: The Evidence,” University of Michigan, Novem ber.Devarajan, Shantayanan and Ritva Reinikka (2003) “Making Services Work for Poor People,” Finance and Development, September, 48-51.Ebrill, Liam, et al. (2001) The Modern V AT (Washington: International Monetary Fund).Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers (2005) A White Paper on State-Level Value Added Tax. New Delhi, January.Emran, M. Shahe and Joseph E. Stiglitz (2002) “On Selective Indirect Tax Reform in Developing Countries,” Stanford University, June.Engelschalk, Michael (2004) “C reating a Favorable Tax Environment for Small Business,” in James Alm, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Sally Wallace, eds. Taxing the Hard-to-Tax: Lessons from Theory and Practice (Amsterdam: Elsevier).Gerhanxi, Klarita (2004) “The Informal Sector in Develope d and Less Developed Countries: A Survey,” Public Choice, 120: 267-300.Gillis, Malcolm, Carl S. Shoup, and Gerardo P. Sicat, eds. (1990) Value Added Taxation in Developing Countries. A World Bank Symposium (Washington: World Bank). Hines, James R., Jr. (2004) “Might Fundamental Tax Reform Increase Criminal Activity?” Economica, 71: 483-92.International Tax Dialogue (ITD) The Value Added Tax: Experiences and Issues,” Prepared for the ITD Conference on the V AT, Rome, March 15-16, 2005.Keen, Michael and Jenny E. Ligthart (2002) “Coordinating Tariff Reductions and Domestic Tax Reform,” Journal of International Economics, 56 (2): 407-25.Keen, Michael and Jenny E. Ligthart (2004) “Coordinating Tariff Reduction and Domest Tax Reform under Imperfect Competi tion,” Unpublished paper, Washington, May.Keen, Michael and Jack Mintz (2003) “The Optimal Threshold for a Value-added Tax,” Journal of Public Economics, 88: 559-76.Laffont, Jean-Jacques (2004) “Management of Public Utilities in China,” Annals of Economics and Finance, 5: 185-210.Mathis, Alexandre (2004) “V AT Indicators,” Working Paper No. 2/2004,。

税收的英文作文高中

税收的英文作文高中

税收的英文作文高中英文:Taxation is an important aspect of any economy. It is the primary source of revenue for governments to fundpublic services and infrastructure. However, taxation is also a sensitive issue as it directly affects individuals and businesses. In this essay, I will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of taxation and give my opinion on its overall impact.One advantage of taxation is that it provides governments with a stable source of revenue. This revenue can be used to fund public services such as healthcare, education, and infrastructure. For example, in the United States, taxes are used to fund public schools, highways, and the military. Without taxation, these services would not be possible.Another advantage of taxation is that it can be used toredistribute wealth. Progressive taxation, where the wealthy pay a higher percentage of their income in taxes, can help reduce income inequality. This can lead to a more equitable society where everyone has access to basic necessities. For example, in Sweden, a progressive tax system has helped to reduce poverty and provide universal healthcare.However, there are also disadvantages to taxation. One disadvantage is that it can be a burden on low-income individuals. Sales taxes, for example, disproportionately affect low-income individuals as they spend a larger percentage of their income on goods and services. This can lead to a regressive tax system where the poor pay a larger percentage of their income in taxes than the wealthy.Another disadvantage of taxation is that it can discourage economic growth. High taxes can discourage businesses from investing and expanding, leading to lower economic growth. For example, in the 1970s, high taxes in the United Kingdom led to a brain drain as many talented individuals moved to countries with lower taxes.In my opinion, taxation is necessary for a functioning society. However, it should be done in a way that is fair and equitable. Progressive taxation can help reduce income inequality, while regressive taxation should be avoided. Additionally, taxes should not be so high as to discourage economic growth. Finding the right balance is key to ensuring that taxation has a positive impact on society.中文:税收是任何经济体系中的重要组成部分。

浙江大学本科毕业论文外文文献翻译

浙江大学本科毕业论文外文文献翻译

核准通过,归档资料。

未经允许,请勿外传!浙江大学本科毕业论文外文文献翻译The influence of political connections on the firm value of small and medium-sized enterprises in China政治关联在中国对中小型企业价值的影响1摘要中小型企业的价值受很多因素的影响,比如股东、现金流以及政治关联等.这篇文章调查的正是在中国政治关联对中小型企业价值的影响。

通过实验数据来分析政治关联对企业价值效益的影响.结果表明政府关联是关键的因素并且在中国对中小型企业的价值具有负面影响。

2重要内容翻译2。

1引言在商业界,有越来越多关于政治关联的影响的经济研究。

它们发现政治关联能够帮助企业确保有利的规章条件以及成功获得资源,比如能够最终提高企业价值或是提升绩效的银行贷款,这种政治关联的影响在不同的经济条件下呈现不同的效果。

在高腐败和法律制度薄弱的国家,政治关联对企业价值具有决定性因素1的作用.中国由高度集权的计划经济向市场经济转变,政府对市场具有较强的控制作用,而且有大量的上市企业具有政治关联。

中小型企业发展的很迅速,他们已经在全球经济环境中变得越来越重要。

从90年代起, 政治因素对中国的任何规模的企业来说都变得越来越重要,尤其是中小型企业的价值。

和其他的部门相比较,中小型企业只有较小的现金流,不稳定的现金流且高负债率.一方面,中小型企业改变更加灵活;另一方面,中小型企业在由于企业规模以及对银行来说没有可以抵押的资产,在筹资方面较为困难。

企业如何应对微观经济环境和政策去保证正常的企业活动,并且政治关联如何影响企业价值?这篇论文调查政治关联和企业价值之间的联系,并且试图去研究企业是否可以从政治关联中获利提升企业价值。

2.2定义这些中小型企业之所以叫中小型企业,是和管理规模有关。

对这些小企业来说,雇员很少,营业额较低,资金一般由较少的人提供,因此,通常由这些业主直接管理企业。

外文资料翻译---税收收入征税的激励效应

外文资料翻译---税收收入征税的激励效应

毕业设计(论文)外文资料翻译学院:经济管理学院专业:会计学姓名:学号:A Tax on Tax Revenue: The Incentive 外文出处:Effects of Equalizing Transfers (用外文写)附件:注:请将该封面与附件装订成册。

附件1:外文资料翻译译文税收收入征税的激励效应Astylized联邦制度的一大特征是政府间转移的存在。

几个类型的转移可以被辨识出来。

联邦政府(或者,更普遍的是,一个更高的目标政府)经常支付水平过渡支持某种支出项目的工程。

政府。

这些转移可以以不同的形式匹配或者综合奖助金。

多研究了近年来的文献的影响,这种类型的转会政策的抱怨。

例如,现在有一个广泛的理论和实证文献,对匹配的影响grants.1与块但是,在许多联邦国家,一个人也可以转让,观察均衡的尝试sub-federal减少收入差距的政府之间相同的水平。

一个系统转移的均衡中,可以发现,例如,在澳大利亚,加拿大和德国。

在这些国家的政府sub-federal 低于平均水平的税收接受一些额外的资金。

例如,在“代表税制”在加拿大,联邦政府支付传输到省的税收收入低于平均水平(人均)税收的(有代表性的取样)省。

最近theoreticalwork(聪明,1998;聪明和鸟,1996年)提出的存在均衡中,转让行为具有重要的影响sub-level政府。

特别是,该文献表明,在加拿大的系统,均衡转LICHTBLAU 632 BARETTI、湖北和将提高税率的“穷人”选择的省份。

其原因是,其负面的影响在更高的税率省的税基部分补偿由于较高的均衡联邦政府的接送。

更普遍的是,这表明均衡转移区域决策可能会扭曲,并由此可能产生各级财政外部性之间政府的权利。

本文的目的是进一步分析的影响subfederal等同于一般的转会政府行为。

我们学习的地方的情况下等同于一般的德国过渡扮演一个重要的角色。

德国的联邦制度在许多方面与不同的系统在美国和加拿大。

企业增值税纳税筹划外文文献翻译最新

企业增值税纳税筹划外文文献翻译最新

企业增值税纳税筹划外文文献翻译最新This article discusses the importance of value-added tax (VAT) XXX is a tax on the value added to a product or service at each stage of n and n。

ns pliance.The first step in XXX includes identifying the VAT rates。

ns。

XXX。

It is also XXX.Once the VAT rules are understood。

ns XXX and report VAT。

as well as training XXX.XXX。

This can include taking advantage of VAT ns and ced rates。

as well as optimizing the timing of VAT payments and refunds.Overall。

XXX their financial performance。

It requires a thorough understanding of the VAT rules and ns。

as well as a XXX.译文本文讨论了对于公司而言,增值税规划的重要性。

增值税是对于每个生产和分销阶段所增加的产品或服务价值的税收。

公司可以通过增值税规划来最小化其税务责任,并避免违规行为的罚款。

增值税规划的第一步是了解公司运营所在国家的增值税规则和法规。

这包括确定增值税率、免税和门槛。

同样重要的是确定增值税注册要求和截止日期。

一旦了解了增值税规则,公司可以制定增值税合规策略。

这包括实施系统和程序来准确计算和报告增值税,以及培训员工以确保合规性。

增值税规划还涉及识别增值税节省的机会。

这可以包括利用增值税免税和减税,以及优化增值税支付和退款的时机。

美国的增值税: 一种解决方案【外文翻译】

美国的增值税: 一种解决方案【外文翻译】

本科毕业论文(设计)外文翻译外文出处Brookings Institution and Tax Policy Center外文作者William G. Gale,Benjamin H. Harris原文:A Value-Added Tax for the United States: Part of the Solution Administrative IssuesA broad-based VAT would cost less to administer than the current income tax. For example, in the United Kingdom, administrative costs of the VAT were less than half of those of the income tax, measured as a share of revenue. Similarly, the New Zealand revenue department was required to intervene in just 3 percent of VAT returns, compared to 25 percent of income tax returns (GAO 2008).The VAT has compliance advantages over a retail sales tax, which aims to collect all revenue at the point of sale from a business to a household. Since revenue collection for the VAT is spread across stages of production, with producers receiving a credit against taxes paid as an incentive for compliance, the VAT in practice is less likely to be evaded.Theory and evidence suggest that the compliance burden would likely fall more heavily –as a percentage of sales –on smaller businesses. Most countries address these concerns by exempting small businesses from collecting the VAT. In 2007, 24 out of the 29 OECD countries with a VAT exempted businesses with gross receipts beneath specified thresholds, varying from $2,159 to $93,558 (OECD 2008).Finally, it is worth noting that, to the extent that administrative costs are fixed with respect to the VAT standard rate, the presence of such costs suggest that the VAT should be set at a relatively higher rate rather than a lower one.The StatesSome analysts express concern that a national VAT would impinge on states’ ability to administer their own sales taxes. In our view, a national VAT could helpstates significantly. State retail sales taxes are poorly designed – they exempt many goods and most services and collect more than 40 percent of their revenue from taxing business purchases, which should be exempt.Converting their sales taxes to VATs and piggybacking on a broad-based federal VAT would offer states several advantages. First, the states could raise substantial amounts of revenue in a less distortionary manner than current sales taxes. Second, administrative costs, which currently exceed 3 percent of state sales tax revenue (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2006), would decline. Many states currently link their income tax to the federal income tax base, with obvious administrative and compliance advantages. Similar savings would accrue from linking federal and state VAT bases. Third, a national VAT would allow states and the federal government to tax previously difficult-to-tax transactions, such as interstate mail order and internet sales. If the U.S. experience followed that of Canada, the federal government could collect revenue on behalf of states and absolve states of the cost of administering consumption taxes altogether (Duncan and Sedon 2010).In 2009, state and local sales tax revenue equaled 2.0 percent of GDP (authors’ calculations based on U.S. Census Bureau 2010). If the federal VAT had the broad base and demogrants described in Table 1, and the states and localities piggy-backed on that structure, an average subnational VAT of about 6 percent would raise the same revenue as existing state and local sales taxes.Alternatively, states could maintain their sales taxes or create their own VAT bases. Following the implementation of a federal VAT in Canada, most provinces maintained their existing tax codes for several years. Some provinces have yet to fully harmonize with the federal VAT, while Quebec administers its own VAT (Duncan and Sedon 2010). Anticipated VAT as StimulusWhile a major tax increase would not be a good idea while the economy is still recovering slowly from recession, it is worth noting that there is potential for the announcement of a future VAT to be stimulative in the current period. By raising the price of consumption goods in the future, or by doing so gradually over time via a phased-in VAT, the announcement would encourage people to spend more now andin the near future, when the economy needs the stimulus. This effect may not be very big – there is little evidence – but it goes in the right direction.Will the VAT fuel expanding government?The VAT has been called a "money machine" in honor of its ability to raise substantial amounts of revenue. That is a helpful feature if the revenues are used to close deficits, but poses a problem if the boost in revenue simply fuels further unsustainable growth in federal spending.Some analysts reject any source of extra revenue –including a VAT –on the grounds that less government revenue leads to smaller government. In general, this ―starve the beast‖ theory does not apply to most taxes, nor does it reflect recent experience. Romer and Romer (2009), for example, find that tax cuts designed to spur long-run growth do not in fact lead to lower government spending; if anything, they find that tax cuts lead to higher spending. This finding is consistent with Gale and Orszag (2004b), who argue that the experience of the last 30 years is more consistent with a "coordinated fiscal discipline" view, in which tax cuts were coupled with increased spending (as in the 1980s and 2000s) and tax increases were coupled with contemporaneous spending reductions (as in the 1990s). Given the widely recognized need for both spending cuts and revenue increases to balance the budget, it is likely that any new revenue stream would be accompanied by reductions in spending.Some observers argue that the V AT is such an efficient and invisible tax that it has been and would be used to fuel government spending increases through a gradually increasing V AT rate. Bartlett (2010a, 2010b) addresses this claim by noting that increased V AT rates in OECD countries were common among early adopters, who operated a V AT in the high-inflation environments in the 1970s, but far less common among countries that adopted a V AT after 1975. Among the 17 countries that instituted a V AT during the post-1975 period of relative price stability, four have not changed their V AT rate and four have decreased the rate; the average rate increase across all late-adopters of the V AT is less than 1 percentage point. The average V AT in OECD countries has been roughly constant since 1984 at or just below 18 percent. Making the VAT transparentA variant of the concern about spending growth is the notion that the VAT is "hidden" in overall prices. As a result, the argument goes, taxpayers won’t notice the VAT the way they do income, sales, or payroll taxes, enabling Congress to increase the VAT rate without much taxpayer resistance.This issue is easily addressed. The VAT doesn’t have to be invisible: for example, Canada simply requires that businesses print the amount of VAT paid on a receipt with every consumer purchase. This is essentially identical to the standard U.S. practice of printing sales taxes paid on each receipt.Another way to make the VAT transparent is to link VAT rates and revenues with spending on particular goods. Aaron (1991) and Burman (2009) propose a VAT related to health spending. Under such a system, the additional health insurance coverage would help offset the regressivity of a VAT and make the costs of both the VAT and government spending more transparent.InflationThe creation of an add-on VAT will create pressure on prices. (If, instead, the VAT were replacing a sales tax, there would be no pressure or need to adjust the price level.) In our view, the Fed should accommodate the one-time price rise inherent in the creation of an add-on VAT. Not doing so would create significant and unnecessary adjustment costs in terms of lost jobs and wages.But there is no theoretical or empirical reason to expect that the VAT would cause continuing inflation. Indeed, the presence of an additional revenue source would reduce the likelihood of the Fed having to monetize the debt. Research has found only a weak relationship between the VAT and continually increasing prices. In a survey of 35 countries that introduced the VAT, Tait (1991) finds that 63 percent exhibited no increase in the consumer price index (perhaps because they were replacing existing sales taxes) and 20 percent had a one-time price rise. In the remaining 17 percent of cases, the introduction of the VAT coincided with ongoing acceleration in consumer prices, but it is not likely – in Tait's view – that the VAT caused the acceleration.The Canadian V ATIn 1991, Canada implemented a 7 percent VAT at the national level to replace a tax on sales by manufacturers. Many of the concerns associated with the VAT in the United States can be assuaged by observing the Canadian experience.Canada addressed distributional concerns by applying a zero rate to certain necessities and adding a refundable tax credit in the income tax. As noted above, we prefer the latter method. The Canadian VAT is completely transparent: it is listed separately on receipts just like sales taxes in the U.S. Perhaps because of the transparency, the VAT has not led to significant growth of government spending. Federal spending in Canada has in fact gradually declined from 22.6 percent of GDP in 1991—when the VAT was implemented—to 14.9 percent in 2009. The standard VAT rate has declined over time to 6 percent in 2006 and 5 percent in 2008. Federal tax revenue in Canada has fallen from 17.6 percent of GDP in 1991 to 16.3 percent of GDP in 2007 (and fell further to 14.6 percent during the 2009 recession). In terms of both revenues and expenditures, the size of the Canadian federal government has shrunk significantly since the introduction of the VAT. Since 1991, Canadian inflation and economic growth rates have been similar to those in the United States.Coordinating provincial sales taxes with the VAT has proven to be challenging, but manageable. After the VAT was introduced, provinces over time began to coordinate their sales taxes with the federal VAT. By July 2010, five of the 10 provinces will have ―harmonized‖ VATs, making their provincial tax bases essentially identical to the federal base. In these cases, the federal government administers the provincial tax on behalf of the province, and the provincial governments set their own VAT rate. Quebec administers its own VAT; three provinces will administer their own retail sales taxes. One province and the three territories have no consumption tax. The U.S. could accommodate a variety of state choices regarding consumption taxes in similar fashion.An American VATThe structure of an American VAT should include:o a very broad base;o rebates or income tax credits (rather than product exemptions) to achieveprogressivity;o efforts to raise transparency (for example, having VAT listed separately on receipts); ando explicit links to spending discipline.While we are not wedded to a particular rate, we do note that a 10 percent VAT with a broad base could raise about 2 percent of GDP in revenues, even after netting out the offsetting adjustments in other taxes and the costs of compensating households for VAT payments on a reasonable level of consumption.Other than the resources used to provide the rebate, VAT revenues should be used largely, if not completely, for deficit reduction. While tax and spending reform require continued attention from policymakers, closing the fiscal gap is a top priority. To the extent that VAT revenues are used for other purposes, there will be fewer options left for balancing the federal budget.We believe the states would benefit from dropping their sales taxes and rapidly harmonizing with a federal VAT, but that is an issue they can decide for themselves. If all states did harmonize and if the federal VAT rate were 10 percent, the resulting combined VAT rate—including the state and federal rate—would be on the order of 15 to 17 percent. This would still be below the OECD average, but would be sufficient to significantly close the long-term gap and replace and improve upon state-level sales taxes. It would also send a strong signal to consumer that public policymakers are aiming to reduce consumption and raise saving.Given current economic challenges, the timing of a VAT is important. Instituting a significant tax on consumption during a recession would be counterproductive. The optimal time to implement a VAT is after the economy has returned to full employment.The V AT is not the only tax or spending policy that can constructively help solve the fiscal problem, nor will it solve the problem by itself. Nevertheless, to oppose the V AT is to argue either (a) there is no fiscal gap, (b) ignoring the fiscal gap is better than imposing a V AT, or (c) there are better ways than the V AT to make policy sustainable. No one disputes the existence of a fiscal gap, though, and the economiccosts of fiscal unsustainability are enormous. As to the notion that there are better ways to put fiscal policy on a sustainable path, we would be excited to learn about them. In the meantime, policy makers should not let the hypothetical—and to date undiscovered—ideal policy get in the way of the time-tested, more-than-adequate V AT.Source: William G. Gale and Benjamin H. Harris. A Value-Added Tax for the United States: Part of the Solution[R]. Brookings Institution and Tax Policy Center, 2010.译文:美国的增值税:一种解决方案行政问题一个税基广泛的增值税将比当前所得税花费更少的管理成本。

增值税外文翻译

增值税外文翻译

中文3837字Value added taxFrom Wikipedia,the free encyclopediAbstractA value added tax(V AT)is a form of consumption tax.It is a tax on the”value added”to a product or material,from an accounting view, at each stage of its manufacture or distribution.The”value added”to a product by a business is the sale price charged to its customer,minus the cost of materials and other taxable inputs.A V AT is like a sales tax in that ultimately only the end consumer is taxed.It differs from the sales tax in that,with the latter,the tax is collected and remitted to the government only once.at the point of purchase by the end consumer.With the V AT, collections,remittances to the government,and credits for taxes already paid occur each time a business in the supply chain purchases products from another business. The reason businesses end up paying no tax is that at the time they sell the product,they receive a credit for all the tax they have paid to suppliers.Personal end-consumers of products and services cannot recover V AT on purchases,but businesses are able to recover V AT(input tax)on the products and services that they buy in order to produce further goods or services that will be sold to yet another business in the supply chain or directly to a final consumer.In this way, the total tax levied at each stage in the economic chain of supply is a constant fraction of the value added by a business to its products,and most of the cost of collecting the tax is borne by business,rather than by the state.Value Added Taxes were introduced in part because they create stronger incentives to collect than a sales tax does.Both types of consumption tax create an incentive by end consumers to avoid or evade the tax.But the sales tax offers the buyer a mechanism to avoid or evade the tax--persuade the seller that he is not really an end consumer,and therefore the seller is not legally required to collect it.The burden of determining whether the buyer’S motivation is to consume or re-sell is on the seller.but the seller has no direct economic incentive to the seller to collect it.The V AT approach gives sellers a direct financial stake in collecting the tax,and eliminates the problematic decision by the seller about whether the buyer is or is not an end consumer.Chapter I Comparison with a sales taxValue added tax(V AT)avoids the cascade effect of sales tax by taxing only the value added at each stage of production.For this reason,throughout the world,V AT has been gaining favor over traditional sales taxes.In principle,V AT applies to all provisions of goods and services.V AT is assessed and collected on the value of goods or services that have been provided every time there is a transaction (sale/purchase). The seller charges V AT to the buyer, and the seller pays this V AT to the government.If however, the purchaser is not an end user,but the goods or services purchased are costs to its business, the tax it has paid for such purchases can be deducted from the tax it charges to its customers.The government only receives the difference;in other words,it is paid tax on the gross margin of each transaction,by each participant in the sales chain.Sales tax is normally charged on end users(consumers).The V AT mechanism means that the end—user tax is the same as it would be with a sales tax.The main difference is the extra accounting required by those in the middle of the supply chain;this disadvantage of V AT is balanced by application of the same tax to each member of the production chain regardless of its position in it and the position of its customers, reducing the effort required to check and certify their status.When the V AT system has few, if any, exemptions such as with GST in New Zealand,payment of V AT is even simpler.A general economic idea is that if sales taxes exceed 1 0%,people start engaging in widespread tax evading activity(1ike buying over the Internet,pretending to be a business,buying at wholesale,buying products through an employer etc. On the other hand.total V AT rates can rise above 1 0%without widespread evasion because of the novel collection mechanism.However,because of its particular mechanism of collection,V AT becomes quite easily the target of specific frauds like carousel fraud, which can be very expensive in terms of loss of tax incomes for states.1.1 Principle of V ATThe standard way to implement a V AT involves assuming a business owes some percentage on the price of the product minus all taxes previously paid on the good. If V AT rates were 10%,an orange juice maker would pay 10%of the£5 per litre price (£0.50)minus taxes previously paid by the orange farmer(maybe£0.20).In this example,the orange juice maker would have a £0.30 tax liability. Each business has a strong incentive for its suppliers to pay their taxes,allowing V AT rates to be higherwith less tax evasion than a retail sales tax.Behind this simple principle are the variations in its implementations,as discussed in the next section.1.2 Basis for V ATsBy the method of collection. V AT can be accounts-based or invoice-based. Under the invoice method of collection, each seller charges V AT rate on his output and passes the buyer a special invoice that indicates the amount of tax charged. Buyers who are subject to V AT on their own sales(output tax),consider the tax on the purchase invoices as input tax and can deduct the sum from their own V AT liability. The difference between output tax and input tax is paid to the government (or a refund is claimed,in the case of negative liability). Under the accounts based method,no such specific invoices are used.Instead,the tax is calculated on the value added, measured as a difference between revenues and allowable purchases. Most countries today use the invoice method, the only exception being Japan, which uses the accounts method.Chapter II CriticismsThe “value-added tax” has been criticized as the burden of it relies on personal end-consumers of products. Some critics consider it to be a regressive tax, meaning the poor pay more, as a percentage of their income, than the rich. Defenders argue that excising taxation through income is an arbitrary standard,and that the value-added tax is in fact a proportional tax in that people with higher income pay more at the same rate that they consume more. The effective progressiveness or regressiveness of a V AT system can also be affected when different classes of goods are taxed at different rates. To maintain the progressive nature of total taxes on individuals, countries implementing V AT have reduced income tax on lower income-earners, as well as instituted direct transfer payments to lower-income groups, resulting in lower tax burdens on the poor.Revenues from a value added tax are frequently lower than expected because they are difficult and costly to administer and collect.In many countries, however, where collection of personal income taxes and corporate profit taxes has been historically weak, V AT collection has been more successful than other types of taxes. V AT has become more important in many jurisdictions as tariff levels have fallen worldwide due to trade liberalization. as V AT has essentially replaced lost tariff revenues. Whether the costs and distortions of value added taxes are lower than the economic inefficiencies and enforcement issues (e.g. smuggling) from high import tariffs is debated, but theory suggests value added taxes are far more efficient.Certain industries(small.scale services,for example)tend to have more V AT avoidance, particularly where cash transactions predominate,and V AT may be criticized for encouraging this. From the perspective of government, however, V AT may be preferable because it captures at least some of the value-added, For example, a carpenter may offer to provide services for cash (i.e. without a receipt, and without V AT)to a homeowner, who usually cannot claim input V AT back. The homeowner will hence bear lower costs and the carpenter may be able to avoid other taxes (profit or payroll taxes). The government, however, may still receive V AT for various other inputs(1umber, paint, gasoline, tools, etc.) sold to the carpenter,who would be unable to reclaim the V AT on these inputs (unless of course the carpenter also has at 1east some jobs done with receipt, and claims all purchased inputs to go to those jobs). While the total tax receipts may be lower compared to full compliance, it may not be lower than under other feasible taxation systems.Chapter III V AT systems3.1 European UnionThe European Union Value Added Tax(EU V AT)is a value added tax encompassing member states in the European Union Value Added Tax Area. Joining in this is compulsory for member states of the European Union. As a consumption tax, the EU V AT taxes the consumption of goods and services in the EU V AT area. The EU V AT’s key issue asks where the supply and consumption occurs thereby determining which member state will collect the V AT and which V AT rate will be charged.Each Member State’s national V AT legislation must comply with the provisions 0f EU V AT law as set out in Directive 2006/112/EC. This Directive sets out the basic framework for EU V AT, but does allow Member States some degree of flexibility in implementation of V AT legislation. For example different rates of V AT are allowed in different EU member states. However Directive 2006/112requires Member states to have a minimum standard rate of V AT of 15%and one or two reduced rates not to be below 5%. Some Member States have a 0%V AT rate on certain supplies-these Member States would have agreed this as part of their EU Accession Treaty(for example, newspapers and certain magazines in Belgium). The current maximum rate in operation in the EU is 25%, though member states are free to set higher rates.V AT that is charged by a business and paid by its customers is known as ”output V AT” (that is,V AT on its output supplies). V AT that is paid by a business to other businesses on the supplies that it receives is known as ”input V AT”(that is, V AT on its input supplies). A business is generally able to recover input V AT to the extent that the input V AT is attributable to(that is, used to make)its taxable outputs. Input V AT is recovered by setting it against the output V AT for which the business is required to account to the government, or, if there is an excess, by claiming a repayment from the government.The V AT Directive (prior to 1 January 2007 referred to as the Sixth V AT Directive) requires certain goods and services to be exempt from V AT (for example, postal services, medical care, lending, insurance, betting), and certain other goods and services to be exempt from V AT but subject to the ability of an EU member state to opt to charge V AT on those supplies (such as land and certain financial services). Input V AT that is attributable to exempt supplies is not recoverable,although a business Can increase its prices SO the customer effectively bears the cost of the ’sticking’ V AT (the effective rate will be lower than the headline rate and dependon the balance between previously taxed input and labor at the exempt stage).3.2 The Nordic countriesIn Denmark,V AT is generally applied at one rate, and with few exceptions is not split into two or more rates as in other countries (e.g. Germany), where reduced rates apply to essential goods such as foodstuffs.The current standard rate of V AT in Denmark is 25%. That makes Denmark one of the countries with the highest value added tax, alongside Norway and Sweden. A number of services has reduced V AT, for instance public transportation of private persons, health care services, publishing newspapers, rent of premises (the lessor can, though, voluntarily register as V AT payer, except for residential premises), and travel agency operations.In Finland,the standard rate of V AT is 23%, along with all other V AT rates, excluding the zero rate. In addition,two reduced rates are in use:12%(reduced in October 2009 from 17% for non-restaurant food, from July 2010 will encompass restaurant food also), which is applied on food and animal feed, and 8%, which is applied on passenger transportation services, cinema performances, physical exercise services, books, pharmaceuticals, entrance fees to commercial cultural and entertainment events and facilities. Supplies of some goods and services are exempt under the conditions defined in the Finnish V AT Act: hospital and medical care; social welfare services; educational. financial and insurance services; lotteries and money games; transactions concerning bank notes and coins used as legal tender; real property including building land; certain transactions carried out by blind persons and interpretation services for deaf persons. The seller of these tax-exempt services or goods is not subject to V AT and does not pay tax on sales. Such sellers therefore may not deduct V AT included in the purchase prices of his inputs.In Sweden, V AT is split into three levels; 25% for most goods and services including restaurants bills, 12% for foods (incl. bring home from restaurants) and hotel stays (but breakfast at 25%) and 6% for printed matter, cultural services, and transport of private persons. Some services are not taxable for example education of children and adults if public utility, and health and dental care, but education is taxable at 25% in case of courses for adults at a private school. Dance events (for the guests) have 25%, concerts and stage shows have 6%, and some types of cultural events have 0%.-References:•(Icelandic)"Lög nr. 50/1988 um virðisaukaskatt". 1988. Archived from the original on 2007-10-09./web/20071009093025/http://rsk.is/skattalagasafn/virdisaukaskattur/log/log_0501988.htm. Retrieved 2007-09-05.• Ahmed. Ehtisham and Nicholas Stern. 1991. The Theory and Practice of Tax Reform in Developing Countries (Cambridge University Press).• Bird, Richard M. and P.-P. Gendron .1998. “Dual VATs and Cross-border Trade: Two Problems, One Solution?” International Tax and Public Finance, 5: 429-42.• Bird, Richard M. and P.-P. Gendron .2000. “CVAT, V IVAT and Dual VAT; Vertical ‘Sharing’ and Interstate Trade,” International Tax and Public Finance, 7: 753-61.•Keen, Michael and S. Smith .2000. “Viva VIVAT!” International Tax and Public Finance, 7: 741-51.• Keen, Michael and S. Smith .1996. "The Future of Value-added Tax in the European Union," Economic Policy, 23: 375-411.• McLure, Charles E. (1993) "The Brazilian Tax Assignment Problem: Ends, Means, and Constraints," in A Reforma Fiscal no Brasil (São Paulo: Fundaçäo Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas).•McLure, Charles E. 2000. “Implementing Subnational VATs on Internal Trade: The Compensating VAT (CVAT),” International Tax and Public Finance, 7: 723-40.• Muller, Nichole. 2007. Indisches Recht mit Schwerpunkt auf gewerblichem Rechtsschutz im Rahmen eines Projektgeschäfts in Indien, IBL Review, VOL. 12, Institute of International Business and law, Germany. Law-and-business.de• Muller, Nichole. 2007. Indian law with emphasis on commercial legal insurance within the scope of a project business in India. IBL Review, VOL. 12, Institute of International Business and law, Germany.• MOMS, Politikens Nudansk Leksikon 2002, ISBN 87-604-1578-9• Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005, Andhra Pradesh Gazette Extraordinary, 25 March 2005, retrieved on 16 March 2007.• OECD. 2008. Consumption Tax Trends 2008: VAT/GST and Excise Rates, Trends and Administration Issues. Paris:OECD.• Serra, J. and J. Afonso. 1999. “Fiscal Federalism Brazilian Style: Some Reflections,” Paper presented to Forum of Federations, Mont Tremblant, Canada, October 1999.增值税From Wikipedia,the free encyclopedi摘要增值税(V AT)是消费税的一种形式。

房地产行业营业税改增值税外文文献翻译最新

房地产行业营业税改增值税外文文献翻译最新

房地产行业营业税改增值税外文文献翻译最新This paper examines the potential impact of replacing business tax with value-added tax (VAT) in the real estate industry。

The study finds that VAT has the potential to increase XXX。

there are also potential drawbacks。

XXX。

the research XXX of such a policy change.n:In recent years。

there has been increasing interest in the useof value-added tax (VAT) as a XXX already widely used in many countries。

its potential use in the real XXX the potential impact of such a policy change.XXX:Business taxes are a significant source of XXX around the world。

but they can also be a XXX。

on the other hand。

is a tax on the value added at each stage of n and n。

and is seen by some as a more XXX.XXX:This XXX replacing business tax with VAT in the real XXX already been implemented in the real estate industry。

such as the United Kingdom and Australia.Results:The study found that replacing business tax with VAT in the real estate industry has the potential to XXX。

营业税改增值税外文文献翻译2014年译文3000多字

营业税改增值税外文文献翻译2014年译文3000多字

文献出处:Norrman A, Henkow O.. The influence of business tax V AT to the international logistics enterprises [J]. Logistics Technology, 2014, 23: 62-71原文The influence of business tax V AT to the international logistics enterprisesNorrman, HenkowBased on the background of the policy "camp to gain" the interpretation of policy and the related solution as a starting point, combined with the practical examples of the tax system reform to the impact of the international logistics and related enterprises.Value added tax and business tax is South Korea two of the most important in the current turnover tax categories of taxes.Taxation scope of V AT in South Korea domestic sales, import goods and providing processing, repairs and replacement services, mainly play a role in the field of industrial production and circulation of commodities;While the scope of the business tax includes other services, transfer of intangible asset and sale of real estate, covers most of the tertiary industry to provide labor services.In short, V AT tax mainly for goods and most services is applicable sales tax, the two parallel in the scope of our tax levy, cross each other.As one of the major tax turnover tax on turnover in full as plan tax basis, according to industry setting different tax rates, calculation is simple, and convenient for collection, it in the balance of the sustainable development of local economy has played a pivotal role.But through long-term practice, the business tax gradually showing its limitations, mainly embodied in the following aspects:Sales tax is a tax on turnover in full, will inevitably produce double taxation. V AT tax only appreciation of this link, especially after the V AT to consumer V AT general taxpayer purchased fixed assets contained can be used as the input V AT tax deduction, thus leading to relatively V AT taxpayer, tax taxpayers tax burden is higher.For companies to buy services or services, as a result of outsourcing servicesincluding business tax cannot get deduction, lead to enterprise more willing to provide the required services rather than outsourcing services, service production internalization, not conducive to the professional division of labor and service outsourcing development of service industry.Based on the background of the policy "camp to gain" the interpretation of policy and the related solution as a starting point, combined with the practical examples of the tax system reform to the impact of the international logistics and related enterprises.Sales tax is a tax on turnover in full, will inevitably produce double taxation.V AT tax only appreciation of this link, especially after the V AT to consumer V AT general taxpayer purchased fixed assets contained can be used as the input V AT tax deduction, thus leading to relatively V AT taxpayer, tax taxpayers tax burden is higher.For companies to buy services or services, as a result of outsourcing services including business tax cannot get deduction, lead to enterprise more willing to provide the required services rather than outsourcing services, service production internalization, not conducive to the professional division of labor and service outsourcing development of service industry.In exports for investigation is the international practice, because South Korea services for business tax, when exports to drawback, lead to tax export service, finally influence of South Korea's service industry in the international market competitiveness.From all over the world can be seen in the history of the development of the business tax, it is the business tax repetition of this disease, resulted in a V AT, and lead.Advantages of value added tax is mainly in the following aspects: don't double taxation, have the feature of tax neutral;Link tax, each link tax deduction, final consumer is all taxes; consideringConvenient for export tax rebates, be helpful for their goods and services fair to participate in international competition;Restrict each other on tax collection and administration, cross audit, avoiding tax evasion.The service lives of taxable sales of more than standard prescribed by the ministry of finance and the total (5 million) of taxpayers for average taxpayer, taxpayer for small-scale taxpayers not in excess of the prescribed standards.Withsound accounting who can provide accurate taxation information small-scale enterprises can also apply for average taxpayer qualification.Pilot policy also specifies the original road, inland waterway cargo transportation since the taxpayer shall be identified in principle of make out an invoice for the general taxpayer.South Korea in 1994, the turnover tax system reform, according to the international common practice to establish the standardization of the production V AT, with value-added tax as the core to establish a new pattern of the turnover tax: a comprehensive value-added tax in the field of the flow of goods production, on the basis of the select few consumer goods cross to impose consumption tax, and for most services trade to impose business tax.At the end of 2008, to ease the impact of the international financial crisis, the central identified the "structural tax cuts" advocate tone, reflected in terms of turnover tax, mainly will be changed from production V AT to consumer V AT tax.Consumption type allows the enterprise cost of purchased fixed assets value contained in the value-added tax is deducted from all.This transition effectively promote the industrial structure adjustment and technology upgrade, improve the domestic products in the international market competitiveness.After the completion of the V AT, the V AT expansion circumference in the sights of south Korean tax reform.The current tax system apply to the practice of different tax system, goods and services between the goods and services in the unification of the tax on property, destroyed the deduction of V AT chain, in South Korea have certain obstacles on the development of modern service industry, is not conducive to further transformation and upgrading of economic structure.To give full play to the advantages of V AT tax burden fair, its basic condition is as far as possible the "full coverage, the whole chain, full deduction".So, it is imperative to change business tax V AT.Business tax to the influence of value added tax it away to the enterprise at present, Beijing camp change increases the pilot program has won the approval of the state council, formal implementation is expected to begin in the near future.The company's main business service for international freight forwarders, belongs to the scope of auxiliary "logistics", so as to pay V AT, as general V AT taxpayers.Apply to thetax rate of 5%, and the difference between tax;After the change of value added tax for 6% of the value-added tax, offset the input tax.Types of taxes, tax rate and tax changes in the way of the development of the enterprise has a long-term impact.Pilot policies also change during the pilot V AT tax belonging to business tax, the continuation of the business tax preferential transitional policy made detailed provisions.Business tax after the change of value added tax, as a result of value added tax is a tax excluded in price, revenue from the customer can't all as enterprise's revenue, and the need to isolate the income part as the output V AT tax, namely: the business income/(1 + 6%) = tax income.Certain cases, this means that the income items change business tax V AT will inevitably lead to the income of business scale, the tax payable, the corresponding change of turnover and profit.The author's international freight forwarding business is mainly decided by the cost price, gross margin is relatively fixed, in order to facilitate more business tax change V AT after each related financial index change under different circumstances, do the following hypothesis: hypothesis after tax reform without tax gross margin (hereinafter referred to as the gross profit margin) level remains the same;Taxes only consider the business tax and value-added tax, does not consider calculated on business tax and value-added tax each additional taxes and fees;Consider only associated with operating revenue and operating cost of V AT, and both contain V AT rates are consistent, to 6%.The company mainly to international trade, commodity circulation link of customer is given priority to, in the industry's average taxpayer clients, for example, after the tax reform, providing international cargo transport agency services to issue special V AT invoices, my company to maintain the price the same or increase (up to Maori constant), the relevant freight cost will be reduced by more than 5% of the clients.In addition, the customer deductible V AT amount increases, the V AT payable will decrease accordingly.Illustrate that: international freight forwarding business by the tax change after paid V AT, will greatly improve the international trade class customer profit space.Is still using the previous example, the company provides international cargo transport agency services customers in commodity production andcirculation field.By the above analysis can be concluded that the business tax after the change of value added tax, in front of the meet the conditions of the four assumptions listed, if you still perform the original price unchanged, the tax reform to cause a decline in revenue, gross margin level of business, should pay tax increases, eventually reduce enterprise profits;If you raise the price to ensure that the gross margin level is constant, the operating income is reduced, should pay tax increase.Business tax changes are confirmed as general taxpayer V AT, input tax can be calculated at to obtain special invoices for value-added tax deduction.If acquire other taxpayers' original belongs to the scope of business tax differences can collect invoices, can be deducted from the sales in the invoice value;Such as the special invoice to invoice to obtain tax authorities must indicate the output tax deduction.The result of the tax increase, on the one hand, further squeeze corporate profits, the development of industry.On the other hand, in the case of its difficult to digest, will cause freight rate rise, which would push up prices.It is reported that many famous international freight companies in Shanghai after issue V AT invoices to the customer request, on the original cost pay more tax.In view of the problems exposed by the Shanghai pilot, the south Korean federation of logistics and purchasing has been made to the relevant state departments including the goods transportation services into logistics support service, and appropriately increase the input tax deductions in eight Suggestions, in case the camp change increases the pilot policy has adverse effects on the entire logistics industry.Business tax change after V AT as small-scale taxpayers, transport, international freight forwarding business taxpayers obtain other taxpayers' original belongs to the scope of business tax differences can collect invoices, can be deducted from the sales in the invoice value.Other industries such as to obtain the original belong to the scope of business tax differences can collect other taxpayers invoice, can also be deducted from the sales of the invoice value, but the pilot average taxpayer or pilot the invoice of small-scale taxpayers shall not deduct the sales.Pilot policies also change during the pilot V AT tax belonging to business tax, the continuation of the business taxpreferential transitional policy made detailed provisions.Business tax after the change of value added tax, international freight forwarding business chain joined the V AT deduction.Although in the short term, the scale of business will decrease, didn't really reduce tax burden, also has the potential to reduce profits.But in the long run, the business tax change of value added tax more significance lies in: eliminate double taxation;Is conducive to the professional division of labor and service outsourcing services,Promote the specialization of social division of labor;Strengthen service industry competition ability.All of this will be conducive to further expand the market, enterprises expand sales.In addition, the "battalion to add" also can impact on the industry standard.Related industries in major and value-added tax management system, to the enterprise financial accounting requirements will be more standardized and rigorous.At the same time, because the customer requirements for legal, compliance V AT deduction vouchers, would force some imperfect management of small enterprises withdraw from the market译文营业税改增值税对国际物流企业的影响诺曼;科诺本文以“营改增”政策的背景及对相关方案政策的解读为出发点,结合本单位实际举例说明该项税制改革给国际物流及相关企业带来的影响。

关于税金的英文作文

关于税金的英文作文

关于税金的英文作文英文:Taxation is an important aspect of any government's revenue system. It is a means by which the government collects funds from its citizens to finance its various projects and programs. Taxes are collected on various goods and services, and the amount of tax paid is determined by the income level of the individual or the business.There are several types of taxes that are levied by the government, including income tax, sales tax, property tax, and excise tax. Income tax is levied on the income earned by individuals and businesses, while sales tax is levied on the sale of goods and services. Property tax is levied on the value of the property owned by individuals and businesses, and excise tax is levied on specific goods and services such as alcohol and tobacco.Taxes are an important source of revenue for thegovernment, and they play a crucial role in funding various social programs such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure development. However, excessive taxation can also have a negative impact on the economy by reducing the disposable income of individuals and businesses.In my personal experience, I have seen how taxes can affect individuals and businesses in different ways. For example, as a small business owner, I have to pay various taxes such as income tax, sales tax, and property tax. These taxes can have a significant impact on my business's profitability, and it is important to manage them effectively to ensure that my business remains financially viable.中文:税收是任何政府财政收入系统的重要组成部分。

会计学专业增值税与零售销售税之比较大学毕业论文外文文献翻译及原文

会计学专业增值税与零售销售税之比较大学毕业论文外文文献翻译及原文

毕业设计(论文)外文文献翻译文献、资料中文题目:增值税与零售销售税之比较文献、资料英文题目:Comparing the Value-Added Tax to the Retail Sales Tax 文献、资料来源:文献、资料发表(出版)日期:院(部):专业:会计学班级:姓名:学号:指导教师:翻译日期: 2017.02.14本科毕业论文外文文献及译文文献、资料题目:Comparing the Value-Added Taxto the Retail Sales Tax文献、资料来源:Journal of Public Economics外文文献:Comparing the Value-Added Tax to the Retail Sales Tax For Richard F. Dye , Therese J. McGuireJournal of Public EconomicsApril 2011Overview of V ATMore than 130 countries use V AT as a key source of government revenue. V AT is a general, broad-based consumption tax assessed on the value added to goods and services. V AT is generally levied on value added at every stage of production, with a mechanism allowing the sellers a credit for the tax they have paid on their own purchases of goods and services (input tax) against the taxes collected on their sales of goods and service (output tax). Generally, V AT is: A general tax that applies to all commercial activities involving the production and distribution of goods and the provision of services; A consumption tax ultimately borne by the consumer; An indirect tax levied on the consumer as part of the price of goods or services; A multistage tax visible at each stage of the production and distribution chain; and A fractionally collected tax that uses a system of partial payments whereby a seller charges V AT on all of its sales with a corresponding claim ofcredit for V AT that it has been charged on all of its purchases.There are three methods of calculating V AT liability: the credit-invoice method, the subtraction method, and the addition method. This column deals with only the credit-invoice method, which is the most widely used. The credit-invoice method highlights the V AT defining feature: the use of output tax (tax collected on sales) and input tax (tax paid on purchases). A taxpayer generally computes its V AT liability as the difference between the V AT charged on taxable sales and the V AT paid on taxable purchases. This method requires the use of an invoice that separately lists the V AT component of all taxable sales. The sales invoice for the seller becomes the purchase invoice of the buyer. The sales invoice shows the output tax collected and the purchase invoice shows the input tax paid. To summarize, taxpayers use the credit-invoice method to calculate the amount of V AT to be remitted to the taxing authorities in the following manner: Aggregate the V AT shown in the sales invoices (output tax); Aggregate the V AT shown in the purchase invoices (input tax); Subtract the input tax from the output tax and remit any balance to the government; and In the event the input tax is greater than the output tax. The United States is the only member of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development that does not levy a V AT on a national level; however, V AT has become widely recognized as an important option in federal tax reform debates.Indirect taxes such as value added taxes (VAT) generate a substantial part of tax revenue in many countries. In fact, VAT systems generate a quarter of the world’s tax revenue. Nearly 130 countries now have a VAT system (with over 70 countries having adopted the system during the last 10 years) (Keen and Mintz 2004). More focus on internationally mobile tax bases has drawn attention to directing more of the tax burden to indirect taxes such as consumption taxes or VAT systems, and less to income taxes, especially capital income (Gordon and Nielsen 1997). During the harmonization of EU taxes, indirect taxes, and VAT systems received much attention (Fehr et al. 1995). A general VAT law covering all private goods and services characterizes the current EU system, but there are still many exemptions from this general instruction.Such a VAT system also exists in Norway as a consequence of the Norwegian VAT reform in 2001. The reform introduced a general VAT law on services, but many exemptions are still specified.There are several arguments in favor of a general and uniform VAT system, compared with imperfect, nonuniform (and nongeneral) systems.Such a system may improve economicefficiency and reduce administration costs, rent-seeking and fraud activities by industries thatlobby for lower rates and zero ratings (Keen and Smith 2006). A general and uniform VAT system equals a uniform consumer tax on all goods and services.Such a system also implies that the producers’ net VAT rate on material inputs equals zero, irrespective of the rate structure. This is optimal according to the production efficiency theorem (Diamond and Mirrlees 1971a,1971b).A VAT system with exemptions violates the production efficiency theorem because taxation of intermediates will differ between industries. On the other hand, industries that are covered by the VAT system but have lower rates or zero ratings on their sales are favored because they can withdraw expenditures to VAT on intermediates at full rates and only levy reduced or zero rates on their sales.A general and uniform VAT system may also have positive effects on the distribution of welfare among households. If the initial situation is characterized by a VAT on most goods but only on a few services, the introduction of a uniform rate on all goods and services may improve the distribution of welfare because servic es’ share of consumption increases with income.Keen (2007) points to the lack of interest in value added taxation from the theoretical second-best literature in spite of the VAT’s popularity in practical tax policy. As mentioned above, VAT systems are in general not uniform. Theoretical analyses demand relatively simple models and simple tax structures to be analytically tractable.In practical policies, the structures of the economy and the tax systems are quite complex, and there is a need for detailed numerical models in order to analyze the effects of different VAT systems. This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing the welfare effects of an imperfect extension of a nonuniform VAT system, and comparing different imperfect, nonuniform VAT systems with a uniform and generalVAT system within an empirically based dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for a small open economy. This model mirrors a real economy, Norway, and differs in many respects from the more simple theoretical model s that fulfill the assumptions of normative tax theory and recommend uniform commodity taxes, combined with no input taxation.In our analyses, we ask the following questions. Can the introduction of a nonuniform VAT system including only some services make the economy worse off than having a VAT system only covering goods and in that case, why? Such reforms characterize both the Norwegian VAT reform of 2001 and the EU VAT reform from the late 1990-ties. Will an additional extension to a uniform and general VAT system be welfare superior to the nonuniform (and nongeneral) VAT systems and what are important preconditions? As will be explained below, one cannot on purely theoretical grounds establish the welfare rankings of such VAT systems when there are preexisting distortions as tax wedges and market power in the economy. The baseline VAT system is a nonuniform VAT system mainly covering goods. This baseline VAT system is thencompared with (1) the extended nonuniform Norwegian VAT reform of 2001, and (2) a general VAT system characterized by a uniform VAT rate on all goods and services, including public goods and services. The Norwegian VAT reform of 2001 was a step in the direction of a general VAT system by including many services, but there are still many exemptions, zero ratings and lower rates. In particular, the VAT rate on food and nonalcoholic beverages is half the general VAT rate. The policy reforms are made public revenue neutral, and changes in lump sum transfers as well as in the system specific VA T rate are studied. With a revenue-neutral change in the system-specific VAT rate, the VAT systems can be ranked with respect to welfareeffects.Ballard et al. (1987) and Gottfried and Wiegard (1991) analyze the welfare effects of different VAT systems including tax exemptions and zero ratings in static CGE models. The separability and homogeneity assumptions in their consumer demand models favor a uniform VAT system, which is supported in their policy simulations. In contrast, our model is an intertemporal CGE model for a small open economy without strict homogeneity assumptions in consumer demand. Our model is well designed for analyzing VAT reforms because it distinguishes between many industries, input factors and consumer goods and services. The modeling and parameters in the consumer demand system and the production technology are all the results of comprehensive micro- and macroeconometric analyses of Norwegian data. The model has a detailed description of the Norwegian system of direct and indirect taxes.Specifically, net V AT rates on the input factors and gross V AT rates on the consumer goods and services are included in the model. We disregard the effects on costs of administration,rent-seeking and distribution of welfare among households. The model emphasizes the small open economy characteristics by using given world market prices and interest rates. Imperfect competition is present in the domestic markets. A uniform and general V AT system is not a priori the most efficient in our model.When comparing the two different nonuniform V AT systems, our analysis shows that an imperfect extension of the V AT system to cover more services is welfare inferior to the baseline nonuniform V AT system only covering goods. Obtaining efficiency in production is empirically important for the welfare effects of the different V AT systems. An imperfect extension of the V AT system reduces efficiency in production because intermediates will be taxed differently for different industries. Consumer efficiency is also reduced due to lower V AT on inelastic goods and higher V AT on elastic services. Introducing a general and uniform V AT system is not obviously welfare superior in a distorted economy, but we find that such a system improveswelfare compared to the other imperfect regimes. A significant empirical advantage of the generaland uniform system, which is revealed by the computations, is also its ability to reduce initial wedges in deliveries to the export and domestic markets.General V AT ComputationTo see V AT in action, consider Exhibit 1 on p. 612, which provides a simple illustration of how V AT is implemented in the production of bread. A farmer grows and sells wheat to a miller, who grinds the wheat into flour. The miller sells the flour 2 to a baker, who makes the dough and bakes the bread. The bread is then sold to the grocer, who sells the bread to the final consumer. In each stage of bread production, value is added by the seller, and V AT is levied on that amount. To ensure that V AT is levied only on the value added by the producer, V AT uses the credit-invoice mechanism. Thus, on selling the bread to the grocer, the baker collects $30 in V AT and claims an input credit of $15, the V AT paid when the baker purchased flour from the miller. The baker ends up remitting a net V AT liability of $15 to the tax authorities. The total revenue created by V AT is the sum of V AT liability collected in each stage of bread production, in this case $50. Although V AT is a broad-based general consumption tax (i.e., it applies to all final consumption), there are instances when the application of V AT is avoided. For example, in a pure V AT state, the tax base would theoretically include services rendered by the government, isolated sales of one's personal effects, and sales of personal services; however, no nation employs a V AT with this tax base for administrative, political, or social reasons (Schenk and Old man at 46). Thus, V AT provides exemptions or applies zero tax rating to certain transactions. "Exemption" means that the trader does not collect V AT on its sales and does not receive credits for V AT paid on its purchases of inputs. "Zero rating" means that a trader is liable for an actual rate of V AT, which happens to be zero, and receives credit for input V AT paid. Like transactions, potential taxpayers can be exempt or zero rated. An exempt trader is not part of the V AT system and is instead treated as a final purchaser. A zero-rated business does not collect V AT on sales but is compensated for any input V AT it pays.However, if the exemption occurs at the last stage of production, there is a corresponding decrease in V AT revenue because there is no shifting and increase of tax burden; the value added at the final stage simply escapes from V AT. As shown in Exhibit 3, exempting the grocer from V AT means the grocer would not collect V AT and would not be able to claim credit for the tax it paid on its purchase. The exemption at the last stage means that the grocer would become the。

关于税的英文作文

关于税的英文作文

关于税的英文作文1. Taxes are a necessary evil. They are the fees we pay for living in a civilized society. Without taxes, we would not have access to public services like roads, schools, and hospitals. However, taxes can also be a burden on individuals and businesses, especially when they are too high or poorly designed. It is important for governments to strike a balance between raising revenue and promoting economic growth.2. The types of taxes that individuals and businesses pay vary depending on the country and jurisdiction. Some common types of taxes include income tax, sales tax, property tax, and corporate tax. Each of these taxes hasits own set of rules and regulations, and it can bedifficult for taxpayers to navigate the system. Governments should strive to make their tax codes as simple and transparent as possible, so that taxpayers can understand their obligations and comply with the law.3. Tax evasion is a serious problem that undermines the integrity of the tax system. When individuals or businesses fail to pay their fair share of taxes, it puts an unfair burden on those who do. Governments have a responsibilityto enforce their tax laws and ensure that everyone paystheir fair share. This can be done through audits, penalties, and other measures. However, it is alsoimportant for governments to address the root causes of tax evasion, such as corruption and inequality.4. Tax policy can have a significant impact on economic growth and social welfare. For example, a well-designed tax system can encourage investment and entrepreneurship, while a poorly designed system can discourage these activities. Similarly, tax policies can be used to promote social goals, such as reducing inequality or protecting the environment. However, tax policy is often subject to political pressures and special interests, which can make it difficult to achieve these goals.5. In conclusion, taxes are an important part of modern society. They allow governments to provide public servicesand promote economic growth. However, taxes can also be a burden on individuals and businesses, and governments must strive to strike a balance between raising revenue and promoting economic growth. By designing simple and transparent tax systems, enforcing tax laws, and using tax policy to promote social goals, governments can ensure that taxes serve the common good.。

关于税收的英文作文

关于税收的英文作文

关于税收的英文作文英文:Taxation is an important aspect of any economy. It is the process by which the government collects money from its citizens in order to fund public services and infrastructure. The money collected through taxation is used to build roads, hospitals, schools, and other public facilities that benefit everyone in the society.However, taxation can also be a source of controversy. Some people believe that taxes are too high and that they unfairly burden the middle and lower classes. Others argue that taxes are necessary in order to maintain a functioning government and provide essential services to citizens.Personally, I believe that taxation is necessary for a functioning society. Without taxes, it would be impossible to fund public services and infrastructure. However, I also believe that taxes should be fair and equitable. The burdenof taxation should not fall disproportionately on any one group of people.One example of an unfair tax system is the flat tax. This is a system in which everyone pays the same percentage of their income in taxes, regardless of how much they earn. While this may seem fair on the surface, it actually places a greater burden on those with lower incomes. For example, if someone earns $20,000 a year and pays 10% in taxes, they are left with only $18,000 to live on. However, if someone earns $200,000 a year and pays the same 10% in taxes, they are left with $180,000 to live on. This is a much more significant difference in quality of life.In conclusion, while taxation can be controversial, it is necessary for a functioning society. However, taxes should be fair and equitable, and the burden of taxation should not fall disproportionately on any one group of people.中文:税收是任何经济体系中的重要组成部分。

营业税改征增值税中英文对照外文翻译文献

营业税改征增值税中英文对照外文翻译文献

营业税改征增值税中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)营业税改征增值税试点方案的进一步扩围2012年7月25日国务院总理温家宝主持召开国务院常务会议正式决定,自2012年8月1日起至年底,将自2012年1月1日起已在上海进行的交通运输业和部分现代服务业营业税改征增值税试点方案("试点方案")范围,分批扩大至其他10个省市:北京、天津、江苏、浙江、安徽、福建、湖北、广东、厦门和深圳("10个新试点地区")。

不仅如此,会议还决定,明年继续扩大试点地区,并选择部分行业作全国试点。

在本期《中国税务/商务新知》中,我们将分析试点方案进一步扩围至10个新试点地区后带来的潜在影响,并分享我们的观察。

普华永道观察根据公开统计信息,2012年上半年10个新试点地区的生产地区的生产总值超过50%。

地理上,这10个新试点地区各广布在中国北部、中部、东部和南部地区。

因此,试点方案的进一步扩围无疑会对中国下半年的宏观经济发展产生很大影响。

总体而言,10个新试点地区的试点方案应与上海的试点方案一直。

自2012年1月1日上海开展试点方案以来,财政部和国家税务总局出台了一系列关于试点方案的政策和实施细则。

理论上来说,除非将来有专门针对10个新地区的不同政策出台,这些已出台的政策文件应该适用于所有试点地区。

在10个新试点地区开展试点方案可能要面临更为复杂的问题。

与上海国税合一的情形不同,这些地区的国税局和地税局各自管理,分别负责增值税和营业税的征管。

这样可能出现各方对试点服务范围有不同的理解,尤其是对那些未在现有规定中有清楚定义的试点服务。

这可能对这些新试点地区的纳税人带来更大的挑战,特别是在营业税改增值税的过渡时期。

同时,我们也期待上海试点中遇到的实际问题能够进一步予以明确。

例如,进一步明确某些在现行办法和法规中没有明确定义的试点服务的范围,特别是认定某项咨询服务是否属于试点服务的范围,从而向境外方提供上述咨询服务时能够享受免增值税的处理;如何具体实施对符合条件的试点企业出口实行免抵退税方法等问题以及如何将这10个新试点地区的基础实际操作与上海保持一致。

外文翻译--用增值税代替工资税或企业所得税的影响

外文翻译--用增值税代替工资税或企业所得税的影响

中文3120字外文翻译外文出处Tax Policy Center外文作者Eric Toder, Joseph Rosenberg原文:Effects of Imposing A Value-added tax to Replace Payroll taxes orCorporate taxesEconomic Effects and Behavioral ResponsesThese revenue estimates assumed no behavioral responses. We have estimated the effects of behavioral responses on receipts or the effects of the various policy options on economic efficiency and output, but provide below some qualitative discussion.Benefits of a VAT Relative to a Payroll TaxA value-added tax is neutral between present and future consumption, so it does not adversely affect the incentive to save. It does, however, reduce the return from working in the same manner as an individual income tax or payroll tax, although the mechanism for remitting the VAT is very different than the collection mechanism for direct taxes.The result is that the net effect of substituting a VAT for payroll tax on the incentive to work is not large.The substitution of a broad-based VAT for a portion of the employer payroll tax that we simulate would raise the after-tax wage (lower the total tax rate on the employee’s work product) for workers in the 15 and 25 percent brackets, but lower the after-tax wage (increase the total tax rate on work) for high-wage employees who earn more than the maximum wage subject to OASDI tax (Table 8).In the examples shown, all workers contribute an additional $107.65 to the value of an employer’s sales. The worker’s marginal product is as sumed to be invariant under different tax regimes. Under current law, there is no VAT, but employerswithhold from wages $7.65 in employer payroll taxes, leaving $100 of taxable money wages. They also withhold the employee’s $7.65 payroll tax contribution and the employee in the 15 (25) percent bracket pays an additional $15 ($25) of income taxes.The employee in the 35 percent bracket is assumed to have earnings above the Social Security wage threshold, so she and her employer both pay only the 1.45 percent ($1.54) Medicare payroll tax on a money wage that is now $106.11 for every $107.65 of worker product. The 35 percent income tax rate raises $37.14 on the higher money wage base. The total tax rate (as a share of marginal product) paid by the workers in the 35 percent bracket is about the same as the tax rate in the 25 percent bracket, as the reduced marginal payroll tax rate (from crossing the OASDI threshold) almost exactly offsets the higher marginal income tax rate.Introducing a 5 percent VAT on a base that includes just 78.6 percent of consumption (see appendix) is equivalent (in terms of its effect on after-tax income) to introducing a VAT of 3.93 percent on all consumption. Because VAT is expressed in tax-exclusive terms (on sales excluding the tax), the tax on rate on sales including the tax is somewhat lower (3.78 percent). The VAT reduces the gross compensation that can be paid to employees, therefore, by 3.78 percent of the worker’s contribution to sales (including tax). In the example, this comes out to a VAT of $4.07. The VAT revenues are used to reduce the employer payroll tax rate by 5.9 percentage points to 1.75 percent.For workers in the 15 and 25 percent marginal income tax bracket, the employer payroll tax collected equals $1.81 on the $103.58 of gross compensation net of VAT.The remaining $101.77 of money wages is then subject to employee payroll tax on $7.79 (7.65 percent) and income tax of $15.27 (in the 15 percent bracket) and $25.44 (in the 25 percent bracket). Note that the net increase in money wages from substituting a VAT for employer payroll tax contributions raises income tax revenues slightly. The bottom lines, combining all the taxes, are fairly modest declines in the total marginal tax rates on the worker’s product. For the wo rker in the 15 percent income rate bracket,substituting VAT for payroll taxes reduces the total marginal tax rate from 28.1 percent to 26.8 percent. For the worker in the 25 percent income taxbracket, the total marginal rate falls from 37.4 percent to 36.3 percent.Thus, for the workers in lower marginal tax brackets, substituting a VAT for the employer payroll tax slightly increases the after-tax return from working more. Both the VAT and payroll tax adversely affect work effort, but because part of the VAT also falls on consumption from old wealth, the net return to work from the payroll tax substitution is slightly higher.Table 8Example: Taxation of Sample Employees, Partial Substitution of a VAT for a Payroll TaxNotes: VAT is the 5 percent broad-based VAT. It includes 77 percent of consumption, so the VAT rate on all sales is 3.93%. This is a tax exclusive rate; the tax inclusive rate equals (3.93/1.0393) = 3.78%.The payroll tax rates under current law are 7.65% for both the employer and employee.The VAT revenues are used to reduce the employer payroll tax rate by 5.9 percentage points to 1.75%.For taxpayers in the 35 percent income tax rate bracket, it is assumed that their wages are above the Social Security thresholds, so only the Medicare tax (1.45 percent of the money wage for both the employer and employee) applies at the margin. In the VATsimulations we perform, only the OASDI tax is reduced.These calculations assume the workers views the payroll tax as a "tax," and do not take into account any increase in future Social Security benefits from higher payroll tax contributions.The story is different for the worker in the 35 percent bracket, however. She gets no incentive to work more from the reduction in the OASDI payroll tax rate because she is already over the wage threshold for OASDI taxes. The employer payroll tax collected from her declines slightly only because the VAT reduces her gross compensation. The resulting decline in her money wages also lowers her income tax payment. But, after these offsets, the VAT raises the total marginal tax rate she faces on an additional dollar of earnings from 37.4 percent to 39.8 percent.Benefits and Costs of Corporate Rate ReductionsThe effects of substituting a VAT for part of the corporate income tax are very different than the effects of substituting it for part of the payroll tax. The corporate income tax does not distort the choice between working for current consumption and leisure, but it does either reduce the after-tax return on capital or increase the return investors must receive from a corporate investment. Thus, substituting VAT for a portion of the corporate income tax should increase incentives to save and invest.In an open economy with international capital flows, different ways of taxing capital income may affect incentives to save and invest differently. Most corporate income tax is paid by large multinational corporations. For those companies, the tax is largely a source-based tax on their profits from investments in the United States. Both U.S. and foreign-owned multinational corporations are taxable on their U.S.-source income, but U.S. multinational corporations pay little additional tax on profits from overseas investments because of provisions such as deferral and foreign tax credits (Grubert and Altshuler, 2006). This means that the corporate level tax may raise the cost of corporate capital in the United States by raising required pretax returns on investments in the United States by internationally mobile investors, by much more than it lowers after-tax returns to U.S. savers, who can escape the U.S. corporate tax by investing in foreign assets. Beyond this, even if the after-tax return to U.S. saversfalls, some research shows this may not reduce their saving much because savers respond little to changes in after-tax returns (Bernheim, 2002).This analysis suggests that the main benefit of lowering the corporate income tax would be to attract more investment to the United States. In addition, because corporations can use transfer pricing and other techniques to shift the source of reported income among countries, a lower corporate tax rate could lead to more reported profits in the United States. A shift of reported corporate profits to the United States would raise revenue collected from U.S. corporations, partially or fully offsetting the direct loss in revenue from a lower corporate rate, even if domestic investment does not increase.Increased Domestic Investment. Many studies find that the location of investment of multinational corporations is sensitive to the local effective tax rate on corporate income (de Mooij and Ederveen, 2003). This means that reducing the U.S. corporate income tax would encourage U.S. companies to substitute domestic for foreign investment and foreign-owned companies to invest more in the United States. The increased investment would also raise the corporate income tax base, therefore offsetting some of the revenue loss from the lower corporate tax rate. More investment would raise real wages in the United States and lower pretax returns to capital, shifting some of the benefits of the tax reduction from capital owners to workers.Reduction in tax-motivated Income Shifting. A lower U.S. corporate tax rate would also reduce income-shifting within multinational corporations from U.S. to foreign affiliates (Clausing, 2007). With a higher corporate rate in the United States than in other countries, companies have an incentive to manipulate transfer prices between their affiliates, overstating the value of goods and services purchased from foreign affiliates and understating the value of goods and services sold or licensed to them (especially unique intangibles, for which it is difficult to establish a comparable “arms-length” price). Companies may also engage in other transactions, such as debt-equity swaps, that shift reported income among their affiliates.Responses of Other Advanced Countries. Since enactment of the 1986 tax reformact, the U.S. federal statutory corporate rate has remained virtually unchanged, rising from 34 to 35 percent in 1993. (The deduction for domestic production activities enacted in 2004 reduced the tax rate to 31.85 percent for certain domestic investments.) Most other countries in the OECD reduced their corporate tax rates substantially over the same period. Currently the U.S. federal-state average top corporate rate of 39.3 percent (excluding the domestic production deduction) is substantially above the average statutory rates for the rest of the G7 (32.2 percent) and the rest of the OECD (26.2 percent) (Altshuler, Harris, and Toder, 2009).Reducing the U.S. corporate tax rate would help correct this imbalance. But if other countries react to a lower U.S. corporate tax rate by reducing their tax rates further, the benefit to the United States of lower rates would be substantially reduced. Instead of a lower rate shifting investment to the United States, its net effect could instead be a loss in revenue to all OECD treasuries.Potential Erosion of Individual Income Tax Base. In an income tax system, a corporate income tax is necessary to prevent individuals from accruing tax-free profits within corporations. A neutral rule for taxing investment income under an income tax would tax corporations the same ways as partnerships. There would be no separate corporate income tax, but corporate profits would be allocated to shareholders in proportion to share ownership and taxed as accrued under the individual income tax. The partnership method of taxing corporate income, however, is administratively impractical for large corporations with many shareholders and frequent changes of share ownership.Lowering the corporate rate below the top individual income tax rate would provide an incentive for many small closely held businesses that are currently taxed as flow-through enterprises (limited partnerships or subchapter S corporations) to choose to be taxed as corporations. With an additional individual income tax of 15 percent on dividend income and a top individual tax rate of 35 percent, the combined corporateindividual rates on dividends would be lower than the tax rate on partnership income for corporate rates below 23.6 percent. And if individuals wanted to accrue and reinvest profits or could find ways to convert labor income to corporate income,the lower corporate rate would make corporations an attractive tax shelter that would erode the individual income tax base. Special rules would need to be devised to limit the ability of small or closely-held businesses to be taxed as corporations and to prevent shifting of reported income from labor compensation to profits (Halperin, 2009).Source: Eric Toder, Joseph Rosenberg. Effects of Imposing A Value-added tax to Replace Payroll taxes or Corporate taxs[R].Tax Policy Center,2010.译文:用增值税代替工资税或企业所得税的影响经济效应及行为反应这些税收预算被认为没有行动上的回应。

营业税改增值税外文文献翻译2014年译文3000多字

营业税改增值税外文文献翻译2014年译文3000多字

营业税改增值税外文文献翻译2014年译文3000多字The article "The Influence of Business Tax VAT to the nal Logistics Enterprises" by Norrman and Henkow discusses the impact of the policy "camp to gain" on nal logistics and related enterprises。

The authors use practical examples to explain the effects of tax system reform on these industries.The policy "camp to gain" has been implemented in many countries。

and it has had a significant impact on nal logistics and related enterprises。

The authors explain that this policy has resulted in changes to the tax system。

particularly the n of the value-added tax (VAT)。

The authors then provide practical examples of how these changes have affected logistics companies.One of the main effects of the VAT on nal logistics enterprises is increased costs。

The authors explain that companies must now pay VAT on all goods and services they purchase。

消费税,生产型和消费型增值税【外文翻译】

消费税,生产型和消费型增值税【外文翻译】

外文翻译原文consumption tax, and wages type and consumption type of value-addedtaxMaterial Source:National Tax Journal Author: Carl S.Shoup ⅠThe value-added tax, consumption type (CVAT) has the same aggregate base as a retail sales tax on consumer goods and services (CT, for consumption tax) and so should seem to exert the same economic effects, including the effect on allocation of resources between production of capital goods and production of consumer goods. This latter conclusion has been declared erroneous by Professor William H. Oakland ("The Theory of the Value-Added Tax: I—A Comparison of Tax Bases," National Tax Journal, June, 1967), whose general equilibrium model yields an inference of different allocations under the two taxes. Oakland's finding is, however, not substantiated by his analysis, for it is based on an incorrect method of arriving at a CT rate that will leave the same real disposable income as will a given CVAT rate.A supporting argument, that the CVAT is more nearly like a wages tax than is the CT, is in error, because of a failure to specify the base of the CVAT as an identity that includes terms for wages and profits. We take up first the method of arriving at the rate of the CT.ⅡOakland's mathematical argument is said to be one of proof by contradiction. He assumes that the two taxes, CVAT and CT, are imposed at rates that make them fully equivalent in the sense of leaving the economy with the same real disposable income, and appears to find that the rate of the consumption tax implied by this equating of real disposable incomes is not high enough to yield the government the same real tax revenue that it obtains under that rate of the CVAT that makes real disposable incomes equal. Thus, if the two tax rates are set so that, the taxes are equivalent in the one sense (same real disposable income under the two taxes) they are, it seems, not equivalent in the other sense (same real revenue); the CT rate must be set at a higher level, to yield the same real revenue as the CVAT rate, and so mustresult in a smaller real disposable income, and so in a different allocation of output between capital goods and consumer goods. The conclusion thus reached is supplemented by two intuitive arguments. But they seem so difficult to follow that one is led to reexamine the mathematical argument. It turns out that what Oakland takes to be the rate of the CT is not that at all, but simply a part of a deflator that is applied to the economy's entire income (not just to that part of the income spent on consumption goods). A CT, that is, a tax imposed on consumption spending and not on spending on investment goods, if imposed at a rate appropriately higher than the rate in the entireeconomy deflator, will both (a) result in the same real disposable income as does either the economy-wide deflator or the CVAT, and (b) yield the same real revenue as the CVAT. Oakland has therefore not proved that the CVAT and the CT are not equivalent as to real disposable income, real tax revenue, and allocation of resources, and that I and others committed an error, one which he says "stems primarily from the failure to probe deeply enough into the general equilibrium system." 1 I return to the details of this analysis in Section V below. Meanwhile, the equivalence of base may be shown for a two-factor closed economy by noting that (1) the base of the CVAT (computed under the addition method) is W + P + D -1, where W is wages, P is net profit after depreciation, D is depreciation, and I is gross investment, while (2) the base of the CT is Y-I + D≡W+P-I + D, since Y≡W+ P.2 In an extreme case where all income of a certain year is invested, consumption being zero, I = W + P + D, so that the base of the CVAT is zero. The tax rebates given to the investing firms just offset the tax on the wages and cash flow from investment. The base of the CT is of course also zero in these circumstances.ⅢOakland goes on to remark 3 that "There is yet another major difference between a consumption tax and a CVA," namely, that "The consumption tax would approximate a wage tax only if all wages were consumed and all returns to capital were saved," whereas a CVAT is implied to be equivalent to a wage tax even without this condition (abstracting from the treatment of owners of capital goods already in existence when the tax is introduced, a matter that is not central to the point now to be discussed).If Oakland's implication is intended to apply to the tax base for any given year, it is incorrect. Both the CVAT base and the CT base are equal to wages (in a two-factor economy) in any given year if and only if gross investment (I) less depreciation (D) equals profits (P), i.e., I = P + D.4 The two taxes are alike in thisrespect. The CVAT base, computed under the addition method, as already noted, is W + P + D-I, and this expression will equal W only if P + D - 1 = 0.There is a type of value-added tax the base of which does equal wages in any given year, in a two-factor economy: the type that I have elsewhere referred to as the interest-exclusion type of value-added tax (this type is not mentioned by Oakland).6 No deduction is allowed for capital outlay in the year of outlay, but the entire gross return from the capital outlay is exempt from tax in each subsequent year. The base of this value-added tax is Y – P≡W. In a two-factor world, this tax may be termed the wages type of value-added tax, or simply a wages tax, provided we recall that this is only an approximation to real life, where there are other factors: land, assets existing when the tax is imposed and which for present purposes yield Marshallian quasi-rent, and human capital that yields income not always counted under either wages or profit. Since Y≡P + W≡I-D + C, we have W = C only if I=P + D. The condition given earlier is now seen to be necessary if the wages type of value-added tax is to have the same base as a CT or a CAVT for any one year.Value-added taxes may therefore be classified as follows, in terms of national income definitions, with respect to the aggregate tax base for any particular year. In this classification the interest-exclusion variant is given a status equal to that of the consumption type; it is termed a wages type of value-added tax(for a two-factor economy). Both the consumption type and the wages type of value-added tax grant exemption to capital and may therefore be grouped under the heading, "Capital-exemption types of value-added tax."The symbolic definitions below apply only to a two-factor closed 7 economy.1. Gross-product value-added tax (no deduction for either depreciation or initial outlay).8 Base ≡C + I, where C is consumption and I is gross investment ≡W + P + D where W is wages, P is net profits after depreciation, and D is depreciation.2. Income type of value-added tax (deduction allowed for depreciation as it occurs). Base≡C + I -D ≡W + P.3. Capital-exemption types of value-added tax:A. Consumption type of value-added tax (deduct capital outlay in year of outlay, disallow depreciation in subsequent years). Base≡W + P + D – I≡C. The base is W only if P + D = I.B. Wages type of value-added tax(deduct depreciation as it occurs and also deduct the remainder, the net income after depreciation). Base≡Y-P≡C + I- D - P ≡W. The base is C only if P + D = I.ⅣThe comparisons of tax bases in Section III above have been in terms of national income accounting identities for a given year. These identities, not being behavioral relations, tell us nothing about incentives, which must be considered if the several types of tax are to be compared for their economic effects. Let us see how the bases of the taxes compare when these bases are expressed in terms of behavioral relations. To express them, it is necessary to deal with a particular venture that stretches over a period of years, not with a single year's summation of: the beginning-year result for some ventures, an intermediate-year result for earlier ventures, and an end-year result for still other ventures-the kind of summation that the national income identities require.In a riskless, perfectly competitive system any given investment must, in terms of its cost in the year of investment, equal the present value of the future cash flow from that investment, i.e., it must equal the stream of profits net of depreciation, plus the stream of depreciation, all discounted to a present value, at the market rate of interest. If the cost of the investment were less than present value, competing entrepreneurs would enter and drive the future profits down, and perhaps the cost of the present investment up. If it exceeded that value, the entrepreneur would not make the investment. Let the stream of future net profits, discounted to a present value, be designated Pf,d, and the stream of that part of the cash flow that represents depreciation be designated by Df,d: then the cost of the investment in the year of investment, Ip = Pf,d+ Df,d.A series of investments undertaken in successive years give rise to streams of P's and D's that overlap in any one year (except the first). For any given year, the national income definitions supply no reason to expect that the aggregate amount in that year of I and P and D will be such that I = P + D. For any given year the summation of the P's and the D's represents a mixing of the components of various ventures started at various points in time and of varying lengths of life. There is no discounting involved. This procedure is essential for describing the events of that particular year, which is what national income accounting does, but it throws no light on the incentives needed to induce investment. These incentives must be stated in terms of the I for a single investment or venture, and the future-years' P's and D's that it gives rise to, discounted to a present value for the year in which the investment I is made. For example, if the national income accounts for Year 100 are being made up, there may be summed the P for that year from Venture 1, which wasstarted in Year 1, the P for that same year from Venture 2, which was started in Year 2, and so on. In this summation each dollar of the first P of course accounts for as much as each dollar of the second P. But for an understanding of behavior, the P dollars in Year 100 deriving from Venture 1 count for less than the P dollars in Year 100 deriving from Venture 2, since an explanation of why Venture 1 was undertaken must discount the P dollars of Year 100 received from that venture back 100 years, while to explain the undertaking of Venture 2 we need discount the P dollars of Year 100 from that venture back only 99 years. The behavioral relation asserts, not that I = P + D, but that Ip = Pf,d + Df,d.In present-value terms, if a concern employs only labor in the present year to create some consumer goods that will be consumed in the present year and in addition employs only labor to create a capital good, its wage payments, under competition, will be such that Wp = Cp +Ip = Cp + Pf,d+ Df,d, where Wp is wages paid this year, and Cp is consumer goods consumed this year produced by the labor that received part of the Wp.As this firm considers what its CVAT base will be, in present-value terms, it sees that the base can be expressed as follows: Wp - Ip + Pf,d + Df,d. This expression equals Wp, that is, the CVAT base in present-value terms for a given firm equals its wage payments of this year(the base of a wages tax), where the cost of the investment is wages, if and only if Ip = Pf.d + Df,d. We have seen that this behavioral relation must hold to induce the investment. Accordingly, in such an economy, for any given firm the base of a wages tax is the same as the present value of the base of a CVAT译文消费税,生产型和消费型增值税资料来源: 国家税务期刊作者:Carl S.ShoupⅠ消费型增值税,与零售税一样在消费产品及服务方面(消费税)有着相同的税基,似乎因此发挥了相同的经济效应,包括资本产品的生产与消费产品之间的资源分配。

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外文文献:Comparing the Value-Added Tax to the Retail Sales Tax For Richard F. Dye , Therese J. McGuireJournal of Public EconomicsApril 2011Overview of V ATMore than 130 countries use V AT as a key source of government revenue. V AT is a general, broad-based consumption tax assessed on the value added to goods and services. V AT is generally levied on value added at every stage of production, with a mechanism allowing the sellers a credit for the tax they have paid on their own purchases of goods and services (input tax) against the taxes collected on their sales of goods and service (output tax). Generally, V AT is: A general tax that applies to all commercial activities involving the production and distribution of goods and the provision of services; A consumption tax ultimately borne by the consumer; An indirect tax levied on the consumer as part of the price of goods or services; A multistage tax visible at each stage of the production and distribution chain; and A fractionally collected tax that uses a system of partial payments whereby a seller charges V AT on all of its sales with a corresponding claim of credit for V AT that it has been charged on all of its purchases.There are three methods of calculating V AT liability: the credit-invoice method, the subtraction method, and the addition method. This column deals with only the credit-invoice method, which is the most widely used. The credit-invoice method highlights the V AT defining feature: the use of output tax (tax collected on sales) and input tax (tax paid on purchases). A taxpayer generally computes its V AT liability as the difference between the V AT charged on taxable sales and the V AT paid on taxable purchases. This method requires the use of an invoice that separately lists the V AT component of all taxable sales. The sales invoice for the seller becomes the purchase invoice of the buyer. The sales invoice shows the output tax collected and the purchase invoice shows the input tax paid. To summarize, taxpayers use the credit-invoice method to calculate the amount of V AT to be remitted to the taxing authorities in the following manner: Aggregate the V AT shown in the sales invoices (output tax); Aggregate the V AT shown in the purchase invoices (input tax); Subtract the input tax from the output tax and remit anybalance to the government; and In the event the input tax is greater than the output tax. The United States is the only member of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development that does not levy a V AT on a national level; however, V AT has become widely recognized as an important option in federal tax reform debates.Indirect taxes such as value added taxes (VAT) generate a substantial part of tax revenue in many countries. In fact, VAT systems generate a quarter of the world’s tax revenue. Nearly 130 countries now have a VAT system (with over 70 countries having adopted the system during the last 10 years) (Keen and Mintz 2004). More focus on internationally mobile tax bases has drawn attention to directing more of the tax burden to indirect taxes such as consumption taxes or VAT systems, and less to income taxes, especially capital income (Gordon and Nielsen 1997). During the harmonization of EU taxes, indirect taxes, and VAT systems received much attention (Fehr et al. 1995). A general VAT law covering all private goods and services characterizes the current EU system, but there are still many exemptions from this general instruction.Such a VAT system also exists in Norway as a consequence of the Norwegian VAT reform in 2001. The reform introduced a general VAT law on services, but many exemptions are still specified.There are several arguments in favor of a general and uniform VAT system, compared with imperfect, nonuniform (and nongeneral) systems.Such a system may improve economicefficiency and reduce administration costs, rent-seeking and fraud activities by industries that lobby for lower rates and zero ratings (Keen and Smith 2006). A general and uniform VAT system equals a uniform consumer tax on all goods and services.Such a system also implies that the producers’ net VAT rate on material inputs equals zero, irrespective of the rate structure. This is optimal according to the produc tion efficiency theorem (Diamond and Mirrlees 1971a,1971b).A VAT system with exemptions violates the production efficiency theorem because taxation of intermediates will differ between industries. On the other hand, industries that are covered by the VAT system but have lower rates or zero ratings on their sales are favored because they can withdraw expenditures to VAT on intermediates at full rates and only levy reduced or zero rates on their sales.A general and uniform VAT system may also have positive effects on the distribution of welfare among households. If the initial situation is characterized by a VAT on most goods but only on a few services, the introduction of a uniform rate on all goods and services may improve the distribution of welfare because services’ share of consumption increases with income.Keen (2007) points to the lack of interest in value added taxation from the theoretical second-best literature in spite of the VAT’s popularity in practical tax policy. As mentionedabove, VAT systems are in general not uniform. Theoretical analyses demand relatively simple models and simple tax structures to be analytically tractable.In practical policies, the structures of the economy and the tax systems are quite complex, and there is a need for detailed numerical models in order to analyze the effects of different VAT systems. This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing the welfare effects of an imperfect extension of a nonuniform VAT system, and comparing different imperfect, nonuniform VAT systems with a uniform and generalVAT system within an empirically based dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for a small open economy. This model mirrors a real economy, Norway, and differs in many respects from the more simple theoretica l models that fulfill the assumptions of normative tax theory and recommend uniform commodity taxes, combined with no input taxation.In our analyses, we ask the following questions. Can the introduction of a nonuniform VAT system including only some services make the economy worse off than having a VAT system only covering goods and in that case, why? Such reforms characterize both the Norwegian VAT reform of 2001 and the EU VAT reform from the late 1990-ties. Will an additional extension to a uniform and general VAT system be welfare superior to the nonuniform (and nongeneral) VAT systems and what are important preconditions? As will be explained below, one cannot on purely theoretical grounds establish the welfare rankings of such VAT systems when there are preexisting distortions as tax wedges and market power in the economy. The baseline VAT system is a nonuniform VAT system mainly covering goods. This baseline VAT system is then compared with (1) the extended nonuniform Norwegian VAT reform of 2001, and (2) a general VAT system characterized by a uniform VAT rate on all goods and services, including public goods and services. The Norwegian VAT reform of 2001 was a step in the direction of a general VAT system by including many services, but there are still many exemptions, zero ratings and lower rates. In particular, the VAT rate on food and nonalcoholic beverages is half the general VAT rate. The policy reforms are made public revenue neutral, and changes in lump sum transfers as well as in the system specific VAT rate are studied. With a revenue-neutral change in the system-specific VAT rate, the VAT systems can be ranked with respect to welfareeffects.Ballard et al. (1987) and Gottfried and Wiegard (1991) analyze the welfare effects of different VAT systems including tax exemptions and zero ratings in static CGE models. The separability and homogeneity assumptions in their consumer demand models favor a uniform VAT system, which is supported in their policy simulations. In contrast, our model is an intertemporal CGE model for a small open economy without strict homogeneity assumptions in consumer demand. Our model is well designed for analyzing VAT reforms because itdistinguishes between many industries, input factors and consumer goods and services. The modeling and parameters in the consumer demand system and the production technology are all the results of comprehensive micro- and macroeconometric analyses of Norwegian data. The model has a det ailed description of the Norwegian system of direct and indirect taxes.Specifically, net V AT rates on the input factors and gross V AT rates on the consumer goods and services are included in the model. We disregard the effects on costs of administration,rent-seeking and distribution of welfare among households. The model emphasizes the small open economy characteristics by using given world market prices and interest rates. Imperfect competition is present in the domestic markets. A uniform and general V AT system is not a priori the most efficient in our model.When comparing the two different nonuniform V AT systems, our analysis shows that an imperfect extension of the V AT system to cover more services is welfare inferior to the baseline nonuniform V AT system only covering goods. Obtaining efficiency in production is empirically important for the welfare effects of the different V AT systems. An imperfect extension of the V AT system reduces efficiency in production because intermediates will be taxed differently for different industries. Consumer efficiency is also reduced due to lower V AT on inelastic goods and higher V AT on elastic services. Introducing a general and uniform V AT system is not obviously welfare superior in a distorted economy, but we find that such a system improveswelfare compared to the other imperfect regimes. A significant empirical advantage of the general and uniform system, which is revealed by the computations, is also its ability to reduce initial wedges in deliveries to the export and domestic markets.General V AT ComputationTo see V AT in action, consider Exhibit 1 on p. 612, which provides a simple illustration of how V AT is implemented in the production of bread. A farmer grows and sells wheat to a miller, who grinds the wheat into flour. The miller sells the flour 2 to a baker, who makes the dough and bakes the bread. The bread is then sold to the grocer, who sells the bread to the final consumer. In each stage of bread production, value is added by the seller, and V AT is levied on that amount. To ensure that V AT is levied only on the value added by the producer, V AT uses the credit-invoice mechanism. Thus, on selling the bread to the grocer, the baker collects $30 in V AT and claims an input credit of $15, the V AT paid when the baker purchased flour from the miller. The baker ends up remitting a net V AT liability of $15 to the tax authorities. The total revenue created by V AT is the sum of V AT liability collected in each stage of bread production, in this case $50. AlthoughV AT is a broad-based general consumption tax (i.e., it applies to all final consumption), there are instances when the application of V AT is avoided. For example, in a pure V AT state, the tax base would theoretically include services rendered by the government, isolated sales of one's personal effects, and sales of personal services; however, no nation employs a V AT with this tax base for administrative, political, or social reasons (Schenk and Old man at 46). Thus, V AT provides exemptions or applies zero tax rating to certain transactions. "Exemption" means that the trader does not collect V AT on its sales and does not receive credits for V AT paid on its purchases of inputs. "Zero rating" means that a trader is liable for an actual rate of V AT, which happens to be zero, and receives credit for input V AT paid. Like transactions, potential taxpayers can be exempt or zero rated. An exempt trader is not part of the V AT system and is instead treated as a final purchaser. A zero-rated business does not collect V AT on sales but is compensated for any input V AT it pays.However, if the exemption occurs at the last stage of production, there is a corresponding decrease in V AT revenue because there is no shifting and increase of tax burden; the value added at the final stage simply escapes from V AT. As shown in Exhibit 3, exempting the grocer from V AT means the grocer would not collect V AT and would not be able to claim credit for the tax it paid on its purchase. The exemption at the last stage means that the grocer would become the final consumer of the bread. As a final consumer, the grocer would pay the V AT as part of the purchase price. No shifting and increase of tax burden would occur because the grocer would not be able to pass on the tax it paid from its input. An exemption occurring at the last stage of production means that the chain of input credits would cease at the stage prior to the last stage. Any value added after the baker's stage would simply escape the V AT, resulting in a decrease in government revenue due to the exemption.Overview of Retail Sales and Use TaxBefore considering some of the similarities and differences between V AT and the retail sales tax (RST), this column next considers a typical retail sales tax system. The retail sales and use tax imposed by U.S. states is generally levied on all retail sales of tangible personal property that are not explicitly exempted. For services, only those explicitly enumerated are taxable (Warren, Gorham and Lamont 1998)). The tax is generally stated on the sales receipt and is collected from the consumer at the point of sale. The retailer is responsible for remitting the tax collected to thetax authorities. In 3 theory, retail sales tax is a single-stage tax imposed on the ultimate consumer, which means that the tax should apply only to final sales for personal use and consumption. Accordingly, intermediate transactions in the economic process are excluded from the scope of the sales tax. Using the same bread production example above, sales tax would be imposed only on the final stage of production as the grocer is selling the bread to the ultimate consumer. However, under the U.S. sales tax system, the general sales tax is not confined to transfers to ultimate consumers of final products manufactured in the economic process. For example, absent an exemption, sales tax is imposed on the baker's purchases of supplies for the trucks it uses to deliver the bread to the grocer. The reason behind the taxation is that the truck supplies do not form part of the bread and the baker is considered the ultimate consumer of the supplies. However, to achieve some semblance of a balanced retail sales tax, many states' sales taxes exclude or exempt many intermediate transactions.The 1994 Tax Sharing ReformThe fiscal reform of 1994 was a fairly comprehensive package of measures designed to address three areas of concern: to stem the fiscal decline and provide adequate revenues for government, especially central government; eliminate the distortionary elements of the tax structure andincrease its transparency; and revamp central-local revenue sharing arrangements. Among its key provisions was a major reform in indirect taxes that extended the value-added tax (V AT) to allturnover, eliminating the product tax and replacing the business tax in many services. It simplified the tax structure and unified treatment of taxpayers for some taxes.The centerpiece of the package was introduction of the Tax Sharing System (fenshuizhi), which fundamentally changed the way revenues are shared between the central and provincial governments. Under the Tax Sharing System (TSS), taxes were reassigned between the centraland local governments. Central taxes (or "central fixed incomes") include customs duties, the consumption tax, V AT revenues collected by customs, income taxes from central enterprises,banks and nonbank financial intermediaries; the remitted profits, income taxes, business taxes ,and urban construction and maintenance taxes of the railroad, bank headquarters and insurance companies; and resource taxes on offshore oil extraction. Local taxes (or "local fixed incomes")consist of business taxes (excluding those named above as central fixed incomes), income taxesand profit remittances of local enterprises, urban land use taxes, personal incometaxes, the fixedasset investment orientation tax, urban construction and maintenance tax, real estate taxes, vehicle utilization tax, the stamp tax, animal slaughter tax, agricultural taxes, title tax, capitalgains tax on land, state land sales revenues, resource taxes derived from land-based resources, and the securities trading tax. Only the V AT is shared, at the fixed rate of 75 percent for the central government, and 25 percent for local governments.The second important change under the 1994 reform was that to avoid the problem of poor local effort in collecting central government taxes, tax administration was also reformed, with the establishment of a national tax system (NTS) to collect central government revenues, and a local tax system to collect local taxes. This was achieved by splitting the existing tax bureaus intonational and local tax offices. The main responsibility of the NTS is the collection of V AT and consumption tax -- they collect all of both taxes and then transfer 25 percent of the V AT revenue to the local government. In most localities the split was achieved by reassigning staff according to their current functions: those in charge of turnover taxes were assigned to the NTS, and those assigned to local taxes went to the local tax bureaus.China will not overcome the regional disparities in service delivery without further revision of TSS. The 1994 reforms did too little to redistribute resources across provinces, and this situation will likely persist for a long time unless the rules are changed. To reduce horizontal disparities more quickly, the central government must be able to use an increasing share of the tax refunds for equalization in order to finance improvements in service delivery in poorer provinces.中文译文:比较增值税与零售税理查德费冉,泰蕾兹德麦圭尔公共经济学杂志2011 年4 月增值税概述作为政府收入的主要来源的增值税正在被130 多个国家所使用。

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