金融学专业私募股权投资资料外文翻译文献
译文《Private Equity》私募股权投资
外文翻译《Private Equity》私募股权投资Word文档见同（本）上传账号出处：Investment Banking,2010:19-43,DOI:10.1007/978-3-540-937 65-4-2作者：Professor Giuliano Iannotta译文：私募股权投资一、引言人们可能不知道为什么一本投资银行的书包含了私人股本的章节。
我可以提供两种不同的答案。
首先，私募股权基金是投资银行日益重要的客户。
Fruhan （2006）报告说，私人股本占主要投资银行总收入的25%以上，2005年私人股本占美国并购收入20%。
在德国的比例则更高（约35％）。
2001-2006年期间701次美国上市中有70%进行了首次公开发行私募基金。
其次，投资银行是私募股权行业的日益重要的参与者。
几乎所有主要的投资银行都管理一些私募股本基金。
例如，Morrison and Wilhelm(2007)报告说，高盛比其他私人股本参与者有更多的资本投资于私人股本。
这两个原因也解释了人力资源从投资银行流向私人股本行业的流动性日益增加。
本章旨在分析私人股权业务的主要技术问题。
本章的过程如下。
2.2节提供了一个私人股本活动分类。
2.3节分析了提供资金的投资者和管理资金的专业人士之间的协议。
2.4节介绍了如何衡量私募基金的业绩。
2.5节总结了长期负债表的主要特点以规范私人股权投资。
第2.6和2.7节说明估价方式用于私人股本专业人士来决定他们的投资方法。
第2.8节是结论。
二、定义私人股本行业可能分成两个主要领域：（一）风险资本（VC）和（二）买断。
界定风险投资的主要特点是迅速地预期备份公司的“内部增长”：即所得款项用于建立新的业务，而不是收购现有业务。
风险投资行业，可以进一步细分为：（一）早期阶段，（二）扩展阶段，以及（三）后期阶段。
早期阶段的投资，包括一个产品的初始商品化所通过的一切事物。
也许根本就不存在公司。
两种类型的早期投资通常被确定为：（一）种子投资即通过提供的少量资金，以证明一个概念及可以获得创业启动资金;（二）创业投资，旨在完成目标产品开发，市场研究，组装密钥管理，制定商业计划。
金融学专业私募股权投资资料外文翻译文献
金融学专业私募股权投资资料外文翻译文献外文题目：Financial Foreign Direct Investment: The Role of Private Equity Investments in the Globalization of Firms from Emerging Markets原文：1. Introduction International International business business business and and and economic economic economic development development development are are are closely closely closely related. related. related. When When applying applying to to to emerging emerging emerging markets, markets, markets, foreign foreign foreign direct direct direct investment investment investment (FDI) (FDI) (FDI) and and and development development economics are two sides of the same coin. In terms of the classical OLI model of the economics of international business, the multinational enterprises (MNE) brings into play the ownership advantage while the governments of emerging markets bring into play play the the the location location location advantage advantage advantage (Dunning (Dunning (Dunning 2000). 2000). 2000). For For For most most most part, part, part, the the the economics economics economics and and and the the strategy strategy of of of international international international business business business focused focused focused on on on the the the MNE MNE MNE while while while economic economic economic geography geography from from Koopman Koopman (1957) to to Krugman Krugman (1991) and and later later later (as (as well as as development development economics) have focused on the country in which the investment takes place. This This paper paper paper brings brings brings together together together international international international business business business development development development economics economics economics and and international trade to gain better insights into an important and fascinating phenomenon phenomenon in in in the the the arena arena arena of of of international international international business business business –– the the recent recent recent growth growth growth of of of private private equity equity investments investments investments in in in emerging emerging emerging markets. markets. markets. The The The tremendous tremendous tremendous growth growth growth of of of private private private equity equity investments in emerging markets is evident from the data presented in Table 1. The total total went went went up up up almost almost almost ten ten ten times, times, times, from from from about about about $3.5B $3.5B $3.5B to to to more more more than than than $33B $33B $33B in in in the the the period period 2003-2006. Emerging Asia led the emerging markets with $19.4B raised in 2006 by 93 funds; about a third of the money that was raised by these funds went to China and India. The main argument that is presented and discussed in this paper is that private equity equity investments investments investments in in in emerging emerging emerging markets markets markets is is is another another another expression expression expression of of of foreign foreign foreign direct direct investment (FDI) where firms from the developed countries export specific factors of production (their ownership advantage) to small countries and emerging markets (new locations) as a way to generate value to all stakeholders. The firms in the developed countries countries in in in this this this case case case are are are specialized specialized specialized financial financial financial institutions institutions institutions (private (private (private equity equity equity funds) funds) (Yoshikawa (Yoshikawa et et et al. al. al. 2006) 2006) 2006) and and and the the the factor factor factor of of of production production production that that that they they they export export export is is is high-risk high-risk sector sector specific specific specific capital. capital. capital. We We dubbed dubbed this this this form form form of of of FDI FDI FDI as as as financial financial financial foreign foreign foreign direct direct investment investment (FFDI), but (FFDI), but the process and the rational a re the same as in are the same as in the classical FDI analysis. FFDI (synonymous –but not restricted to –for private equity throughout this this paper) paper) paper) is is is a a a subset subset subset of of of FDI FDI FDI that that that is is is solely solely solely devoted devoted devoted––as as the the the name name name implies implies implies––for investments in private firms in purpose of generating high return on- investment over a relatively short period (5-7 years). The term “short” is relative and in comparison with with the the the typical typical typical investment investment investment periods periods periods of of of the the the investors investors investors of of of private private private equity equity equity funds funds funds (e.g., (e.g., pension funds, endowment funds and the like). At the extreme, i.e., in venture capital investments, investors take into account upfront that some of their investments will be written written off off at at the the the prospects prospects prospects that that that few few few will will will generate generate generate return return return that that that will will will more more more than than compensate compensate those those those sunk sunk sunk investments investments investments (hence (hence (hence the the the “high “high “high-r -r -risk” isk” isk” referral). referral). referral). Sector Sector Sector specific specific capital is a general phenomenon. In many industries such investment is more than mere financial investment and is augmented by specific information that the investor may posses in the form of managerial expertise, deal structuring specialty, networking capabilities and the like. In the case of the high-risk capital industry there is a need to bridge the gap between the risk perception of the investment project by the entrepreneurs entrepreneurs or or or the the the “insiders” “insiders” “insiders” and and and the the the investors investors investors (most (most (most often often often risk-averse risk-averse risk-averse investors), investors), the the “outsiders”. “outsiders”. “outsiders”. This This This is is is accomplished accomplished accomplished by by by a a a combination combination combination of of of validation validation validation processes processes processes and and screening mechanisms that are engaged by the private equity funds. In this regard they act act as as as financial financial financial and and and risk risk risk intermediaries intermediaries intermediaries (Coval/Thakor (Coval/Thakor (Coval/Thakor 2005, 2005, 2005, provide provide provide an an an analytical analytical framework framework for for for this this this approach). approach). approach). The The The value value value of of of the the the general general general partners partners partners of of of private private private equity equity funds funds depends depends depends on on on the the the quality quality quality of of of the the the risk risk risk intermediation intermediation intermediation that that that they they they perform perform perform for for for their their investors. This makes them credible and reliable processors of information. Table 1: Emerging Markets Private Equity Funds Raising, 2003-2006 (US$ Millions) Emerging Asia CEE Russia Latham Sub-Sah ara Africa Middle- East Africa Multi ple Regions Total 2003 2,200 406 417 NA 350 116 3,489 2004 2,800 1,777 714 NA 545 618 6,454 2005 15,446 2,711 1,272 791 1,915 3,630 25,765 2006 19,386 3,272 2,656 2,353 2,946 2,580 33,193 Source: EMPEA (Emerging Markets Private Equity Association) 2007. The discussion and the analysis presented in this paper draw on three different bodies of literature; the literature of finance and growth from development economics, (Levine (Levine 1997, 1997, 1997, 2004), 2004), 2004), the the the literature literature literature on on on comparative comparative comparative advantage advantage advantage in in in the the the discussion discussion discussion of of patterns of trade (Deardorff 2004) and the literature of imperfect contracts in micro economics and in financial economics (Hart 2001, Zingales 2000). Financial foreign direct investment as practiced by private equity funds can be a powerful powerful contributor contributor contributor to to to economic economic economic and and and business business business growth growth growth in in in emerging emerging emerging markets. markets. markets. FFDI FFDI changes changes the the the scene scene scene of of of international international international business business business as as as it it it contributes contributes contributes to to to a a a change change change in in in the the relations relations between between between firms firms firms in in in developed developed developed countries countries countries and and and firms firms firms in in in the the the emerging emerging emerging markets. markets. The The unique unique unique relatively relatively relatively short short short term term term nature nature nature of of of a a a private private private equity equity equity investment investment investment makes makes makes it it it an an appropriate instrument for for the the transition period that that the the world of of international international business is experiencing regarding the role of emerging markets and the role of China and and India India India in in in particular. particular. particular. This This This is is is so so so because because because the the the short short short term term term nature nature nature of of of private private private equity equity investments investments allows allows allows firms firms firms in in in emerging emerging emerging markets markets markets for for for sufficient sufficient sufficient time time time for for for transfer transfer transfer of of information and learning and yet allow the local stakeholders to resume full ownership once the process is completed. The The relations relations relations between between between the the the development development development economics economics economics literature literature literature on on on finance finance finance and and growth and the international business literature is presented and discussed in the next section section of of of the the the paper. paper. paper. It It It is is is shown shown shown that that that the the the two two two bodies bodies bodies of of of literatures literatures literatures are are are quite quite quite related related once one penetrates the specific lingo employed by each one of them. The problems in in the the the institutional institutional institutional setting setting setting and and and the the the lack lack lack of of of sufficient sufficient sufficient development development development of of of the the the capital capital markets markets in in in most most most emerging emerging emerging markets markets markets are are are overcome overcome overcome by by by creating creating creating specific specific specific international international alliances that generate local comparative advantage. In section three, the concept of local local comparative comparative comparative advantage advantage advantage (Deardorff (Deardorff (Deardorff 2004) 2004) 2004) is is is used used used for for for better better better understanding understanding understanding of of FFDI. The perfect and efficient financial market of the Modern Theory of Finance is replaced by a set of imperfect contracts negotiated and renegotiated between domestic firms firms in in in emerging emerging emerging markets markets markets and and and private private private equity equity equity funds funds funds from from from the the the US US US and and and other other other major major capital capital markets. markets. markets. This This This issue issue issue is is is discussed discussed discussed and and and analyzed analyzed analyzed in in in section section section four four four of of of the the the paper. paper. Private equity funds drew a fair amount of criticism lately. The potential of private equity investment in emerging markets is discussed in section five of the paper. The conclusions conclusions of of of the the the study study study are are are briefly briefly briefly discussed discussed discussed in in in section section section six, six, six, the the the last last last section section section of of of the the paper. 2. Finance, Growth and International Business In a survey paper on the relations between financial development and economic growth growth Levine Levine Levine (1997) (1997) (1997) states states states that: that: that: “…the “…the “…the development development development of of of financial financial financial markets markets markets and and institutions are critical and inextricable part of the growth process”. He continues and says that: “…financial d evelopment development development is is is a a a good predictor of future rates of econom good predictor of future rates of econom ic growth, capital accumulation and and technological technological technological change. change. change. Moreover, Moreover, Moreover, cross-country, cross-country, cross-country, case case case study, study, study, industry- industry- industry- and and firm- firm- level level level analyses document extensive periods when financial development-or the analyses document extensive periods when financial development-or the lack lack thereof-crucially thereof-crucially thereof-crucially affect affect affect the the the speed speed speed and and and the the the pattern pattern pattern of of of econom econom economic ic ic development”, development”, (Levine (Levine 1997, 1997, 1997, p. p. p. 689). 689). 689). Levine Levine Levine makes makes makes two two two other other other important important important points; points; points; first first first that that that the the discussion of finance and developments takes place outside the state-contingent world of Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959) and the discussion takes place in an incomplete world with imperfect (monopolistic) competition. The second point is that there are three main research questions in the field of finance and development that needs more attention. attention. (1) (1) (1) Why Why Why does does does financial financial financial structure structure structure change change change as as as countries countries countries grow? grow? grow? (2) (2) (2) Why Why Why do do countries at similar stages of economic development have different looking financial systems? systems? and and and (3) (3) (3) are are are there there there longterm longterm longterm economic economic economic growth growth growth advantages advantages advantages to to to adopting adopting adopting legal legal and policy changes that create one type of financial system vis-à-vis another? The three research questions raised by Levine deal with different aspects of the location of foreign direct investment. In particular, the three research questions deal with the gap between the potential of a certain country, or countries, as a site for an international oriented investment and the actual investment that has taken place. This is particularly true where the investment from the developed countries is in the form of of high-risk high-risk high-risk sector sector sector specific specific specific capital capital capital such such such as as as provided provided provided by by by private private private equity equity equity funds. funds. funds. The The potential potential of of of some some some countries countries countries in in in attracting attracting attracting private private private equity equity equity funds funds funds is is is not not not being being being fully fully realized realized due due due to to to the the the absence absence absence of of of an an an appropriate appropriate appropriate financial financial financial system. system. system. A A A well well well developed developed financial financial system system system is is is necessary necessary necessary to to to enhance enhance enhance the the the import import import of of of sector sector sector specific specific specific (high-risk) (high-risk) capital, a necessary condition for FFDI. As As the the the financial financial financial structure structure structure of of of a a a country country country changes changes changes (as (as (as the the the country country country grows), grows), grows), it it it is is suggested by Levine in his first question that different types of FDI can be accommodated. The development of FDI in China is an evidence of this process. Yet, as it is proposed in Levine’s second question, the financial markets of countries with similar similar rate rate rate of of of growth growth growth develop develop develop in in in different different different pace pace pace and and and in in in a a a different different different way. way. way. There There There are are long-term economic growth advantages of adopting certain p atterns of development patterns of development for the financial market of a given country. In many cases FDI and FFDI do depend on on relatively relatively relatively transparent transparent transparent and and and enforceable enforceable enforceable corporate corporate corporate governance. governance. governance. Morck, Morck, Morck, Wolfenzon, Wolfenzon, and and Y eung Y eung (2005) (2005) (2005) demonstrated demonstrated demonstrated that that that economic economic economic entrenchment entrenchment entrenchment has has has a a a high high high price price price in in foregone growth opportunities. There There are are are three three three related related related problems problems problems in in in creating creating creating a a a domestic domestic domestic financial financial financial system system system for for private equity and venture capital investments: How How to to to mobilize mobilize mobilize the the the type type type and and and the the the quantity quantity quantity of of of savings savings savings (capital) (capital) (capital) appropriate appropriate appropriate for for such investments where most of the capital should be imported from the major capital markets of the world? How How to to to generate generate generate credible credible credible information information information and and and trust? trust? trust? How How How to to to monitor monitor monitor management management and to exert corporate control? The The only only only feasible feasible feasible way way way to to to accommodate accommodate accommodate private private private equity equity equity and and and venture venture venture capital capital investments in emerging markets is to import sector specific high-risk capital from the US and other major capital markets. The term sector specific capital recognizes the fact that capital is not a unified factor of production (in the same way that there are different types of labor there are different types of capital). High-risk sector specific capital capital relates relates relates to to to the the the portfolio portfolio portfolio of of of the the the investors investors investors and and and to to to the the the relational relational relational capital capital capital of of of the the specific financial intermediaries (i.e., the private equity funds). Most of the high-risk capital in the world is coming from large institutional investors in the US and it is a part part of of of their their their assets’ assets’ assets’ management management management program. program. program. (A (A (A good good good example example example of of of how how how such such such capital capital relates to the total portfolio is the investment policy of CALPERS the largest pension fund in the US). Due to internal and external regulations, financial institutions cannot make make investment investment investment unless unless unless there there there is is is an an an acceptable acceptable acceptable level level level of of of transparency transparency transparency and and and corporate corporate governance governance in in in the the the country country country where where where the the the money money money is is is invested. invested. invested. Whether Whether Whether such such such a a a process process process is is possible in a given developing country and what are the chances that if implemented it will succeed is a very important question. Horii, Ohdoi, and Yamamoto (2005) deal with with this this this issue. issue. issue. They They They address address address the the the question question question why why why some some some developing developing developing countries countries countries are are are less less successful than others in adopting technologies and more effective financial markets techniques. To quote Horii et al. (2005, p. 2): “A fundamental question is why some countries are stuck with poor performance even though it results in primitive financial ma markets rkets rkets and and and unproductive unproductive unproductive technologies”. technologies”. technologies”. They They They conclude conclude conclude that that that in in in some some some cases cases cases the the expected expected increase increase increase in in in the the the income income income inequality inequality inequality due due due to to to the the the financial financial financial led led led technological technological changes deters people f rom from from adopting financial, legal, adopting financial, legal, a nd political and political reforms reforms that will that will lead to financial, business, and economic development. Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) provide somewhat different answer, also focusing on income distribution but from a point of view of economic entrenchment and rent seeking behavior. Nowhere the relationship between finance, growth, and international business is more more pronounced pronounced pronounced than than than in in in the the the impressive impressive impressive development development development of of of the the the private private private equity equity equity funds funds devoted for investment in emerging markets. Table 1 presents data on the growth of private equity funds raised for investment in emerging markets by regions. The amounts of money raised by private equity funds dedicated for investments in emerging markets went went up tremendously in up tremendously in t he last five the last five y ears. More importantly years. More importantly significant amounts were were invested invested to support domestic companies in in emerging emerging markets markets to to to become become become more more more competitive competitive competitive in in in the the the global global global markets markets markets by by by providing providing providing their their their own own brands of products to the world’s consumers. Lenovo is a case in point when a major investment investment by by by three three three American American American private private private equity equity equity funds funds funds (Texas (Texas (Texas Pacific Pacific Pacific Group, Group, Group, General General Atlantic, and Newbridge Capital) was made in a Chinese company with the purpose of making Lenovo a leading competitor in the global market. 译 文：金融类对外直接投资：私募股权投资在新兴市场全球化企业中的角色一、简介国际商业和经济发展密切相关。
私募股权与人力资本风险外文文献翻译中英文最新
私募股权与⼈⼒资本风险外⽂⽂献翻译中英⽂最新外⽂⽂献翻译原⽂及译⽂标题：私募股权与⼈⼒资本风险外⽂翻译2019⽂献出处：Manfred Antoni, Ernst Maug, Stefan Obernberger.[J]Journal of Financial Economics，Volume 133, Issue3，September 2019，Pages 634-657译⽂字数：3900 多字英⽂Private equity and human capital riskManfred Antoni，Ernst Maug，Stefan ObernbergerAbstractWe study the human capital effects of private equity buyouts in Germany. We conduct atched-sample difference-in-differences estimations at the establishment and at the individual employee level with more than 152 thousand buyout employees and a carefully matched control group. Buyouts are followed by a reduction in overall employment and an increase in employee turnover. Employees of buyout targets experience earnings declines equivalent to 2.8% of median earnings in the fifth year after the buyout. Managers and older employees fare far worse after buyouts compared with the average target employee, even though they are not more likely to lose their jobs at the target compared with other employees. We argue that the employees most negatively affected after buyouts are those who are less likely to find new employment, not those who are most likely to lose their jobs. Evidence exists of a reduction in administrative staff and more hiring for jobs that require IT skills.Keywords: Private equity, Restructuring, Human capital risk,Buyouts, WagesIn this paper, we analyze the human capital risk associated with private equity (PE) buyouts in Germany. The social costs associated with private equity restructuring have been the subject of emotional debates. The head of the German Social Democratic Party once compared buyout firms with “swarms of locusts” who “descend on companies, graze, and then move on,” suggesting that private equity firms make short-term profits by imposing large costs on employees. Discussions in other countries created similar sentiments.The literature in finance and economics has conventionally regarded private equity buyouts as vehicles for improving firms’governance and operating performance, facilitating growth and creative destruction, and, more recently, modernizing firms’technology.4 From this modernization perspective, private equity buyouts create value by fashioning leaner firms and enhancing growth through organizational, operational, and technological improvements. Critics argue that shareholders gain in private equity buyouts at the expense of other stakeholders, in particular, the government through lower taxes, and employees. This transfer-of- wealth view echoes the critical stance articulated in the public debate. Shleifer and Summers (1988) provide a theoretical foundation for this view and suggest that investor-led restructurings do not create value but simply transfer wealth from employees and other stakeholders toshareholders by reneging on implicit contracts.We contribute to this debate by analyzing 511 private equity buyouts in Germany between 2002 and 2008. Germany is fairly representative for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regarding employment protection legislation (EPL), making it a well- suited laboratory for studying this matter. We perform matched- sample difference-in-differences analyses at the establishment level and the individual level. We first match each target establishment to multiple control establishments and then we match each target employee to another employee from one of the matching control establishments. Matching at both levels is performed based on a rich set of establishment, job, and employee characteristics. We conduct analyses at the establishment level and the individual level over a five-year period after the buyout.We ask two questions: How do job growth, separations, and hiring at the establishment level develop after buyouts? Are buyouts associated with human capital risk for the employees of target firms? We ask both questions for all employees in our sample and for groups of employees who could be particularly vulnerable to or who could benefit from restructuring. The twoquestions we ask are related but distinct. PE firms may increase employee turnover without reducing overall establishment-level employment, and some of the employees who are replaced and losetheir jobs with the target perhaps do not find new employment. We find this to be the case for older workers, who lose their jobs at target establishments at almost exactly the same rate as younger workers but experience significantly larger losses of long-term employment and wages. Hence, it is important to distinguish firm-level decisions and individual outcomes, because some groups, e.g., low-paid workers, seem to find new employment easily, whereas others, such as older workers, often remain unemployed.Buyout establishments reduce their employment by 8.96% more compared with the control group in the period up to five years after the buyout. This effect can be decomposed into an increase in the separation rate of 18.75% and an increase in the hiring rate of 9.79%. About half of the increase in departures from buyout targets results in replacements and the other half in job destruction. The investigation of deal-level growth, separation, and hiring rates shows a strong and positive correlation between hiring rates and separation rates and almost half of the buyouts are followed by a period of increased employee turnover. Moreover, we often find higher separation rates and higher hiring rates for the same groups of employees. Private equity firms restructure firms by reducing employment and by replacing employees. In our sample, they employ both strategies at about the same rate. The increase in hiring is largely concentrated in the first years after the buyout, whereas most of theseparations happen in later years. We may observe separations later because buyout firms want to increase profitability toward the end of their investment horizon to achieve better sales prices. Alternatively, the evaluation of targets’ operations and the implementation of restructuring strategies could simply take time. We find, at the individual level, a downward trend in employee earnings after private equity buyouts. The average buyout target employee loses € 980 in annual earnings after five years compared with the matched control group, which is 2.8% of median earnings in our sample.The individual-level analyses identify three groups of employees whose post-buyout losses are significantly larger than those of the average buyout employee: white-collar workers, managers, and older employees. Our discussion of employee groups is guided by three sets of explanations of buyout-related changes in employment and wages: (1) organizational streamlining, (2) technological modernization, and (3) transfers of wealth. We begin with organizational streamlining, i.e., the notion that buyout investors reduce administrative staff and layers of management. White-collar workers experience higher separation rates with less replacement in the short term and significantly higher losses of employment and earnings compared with other employees, consistent with the notion that buyout investors streamline firms by reducing administrative staff. For managers, we find very strong results at theindividual level, but not at the establishment level, which suggests that buyout firms do not systematically reduce layers of middle management. We thus attribute the adverse development for managers to their difficulties in finding new employment, not the human resource policies of buyout investors.Next, we turn to the argument that buyouts foster technological modernization. Private equity firms can implement new technologies, either because target managers resist change or because private equity investors have additional technological expertise. As a result, buyout targets can undergo faster technological modernization than control firms. We are careful to distinguish different notions of technological change, each of which has specific and sometimes different implications for employees. Proponents of the skill-biased technological change (SBTC) hypothesis (Katz, Autor, 1999, Autor, Levy, Murnane, 2003) argue that technological change is biased against lower-skilled jobs and increases wage inequality. Separation rates for low-wage workers are almost twice as high as those for the sample as a whole. They are not displaced by those with higher wage levels, but by other low-wage employees. The net rate of job growth for low-wage workers is not unusually low, whereas turnover is unusually high. Individual-level results even show that low- wage employees lose less after buyouts than other employees, suggesting that skill-biased technological change does not determine individual。
融资融券英文文献-摘录
文献综述1.2011Pedro A. C. Saffi and Kari Sigurdsson 《Price Efficiency and Short Selling》(价格效率和卖空)主要研究借贷市场影响价格效率和收入分配，使用股票借贷供给和借贷费用来代理卖空限制。
主要研究结论：第一，卖空限制降低价格效率；第二，卖空限制的废除不会增加价格波动和极端负收益的发生。
2.2014Saqib Sharif, Hamish D. Anderson, Ben R. Marshall《Against the tide: the commencement of short selling and margin trading in mainland China》（应对潮流：中国大陆融资融券的开端）对于A股和H股，可卖空股票价格的下降，表明，融券主导融资的影响。
与监管部门的意图和新开发市场实验证据相反，卖空股的流动性和买卖价差都下降。
与Ausubel (1990)的结论一致，这些结果表明，不知情的投资者避开卖空股以减少和知情投资者的交易风险。
研究卖空、买空对价格、流动性和波动性的影响，使用中国大陆和香港的数据。
贡献：第一，研究融资、融券的双重影响，可以让我们评价哪个更好，我们发现卖空影响更强。
卖空交易会增加和信息知情者的交易风险；第二，我们通过新兴市场论证卖空和买空对流动性的影响。
相比发达市场，新兴市场似乎在这些方面研究较少。
新兴市场可能与发达市场不同，因为新兴市场的投资者保障更弱(Morck et al., 2000)。
与监管部门的目的和发达市场的证据不同，这种在监管上的改变导致流动性下降。
这表明，投资者避开与监管涉及的股票。
第三，新兴市场上，卖空、买空对股票收益影响有限。
Lee and Yoo (1993)发现，在韩国和台湾，买空需求和股票收益波动性之间无关，而Lamba and Ariff(2006)发现在马来西亚，买空约束的放松伴随收入的增加。
股权融资论文中英文资料外文翻译文献
中英文资料外文翻译文献Chinese Listed Companies Preference to Equity Fund:Non-Systematic FactorsAbstractThis article concentrates on the listed companies’ financing activities in China, analyses the reasons that why the listed companies prefer to equity fund from the aspect of non-systematic factors by using western financing theories, such as financing cost, types and qualities of the enterprises’ assets, profitability, industry factors, shareholding structure factors, level of financial management and society culture, and concludes that the preference to equity fund is a reasonable choice to the listed companies according to Chinese financing environment. At last, there are some concise suggestions be given to rectify the companies’ preference to equity fund.Keywords: Equity fund, Non-systematic factors, financial cost1. IntroductionThe listed companies in China prefer to equity fund, According to the statistic data showed in <China Securities Journal>, the amount of the listed companies finance in capital market account to 95.87 billions in 1997, among which equity fund take the proportion of 72.5%, and the proportion is 72.6% in 1998 and 72.3% in 1999, on the other hand, the proportion of debt fund to total fund is respective 17.8%, 24.9% and 25.1% in those three years. The proportion of equity fund to total fund is lower in the developed capital market than that in China. Take US for example, when American enterprises need to fund in the capital market, they prefer to debt fund than equity fund. The statistic data shows that, from 1970 to 1985, the American enterprises’ debt fund financed occupied the 91.7% proportion of outside financing, more than equity fund. Yan Dawu etc. found that, approximately 3/4 of the listed companies preferred to equity fund in China. Many researchers agree upon that the listed companies’ outside financing following this order: first one is equity fund, second one is convertible bond, third one is short-term liabilities, last one is long-term liabilities. Many researchers usually a nalyze our national listed companies’ preference to equity fund with the systematic factors arising in the reform of our national economy. They thought that it just because of those systematic facts that made the listed companies’ financial activities betr ay to western classical financing theory. For example, the “picking order” theory claims that when enterprise need fund, they should turn to inside fund (depreciation and retained earnings) first, and then debt fund, and the last choice is equity fund. In this article, the author thinks that it is because of the specific financial environment that activates the enterprises’ such preference, and try to interpret the reasons of that preference to equity fund by combination of non-systematic factors and western financial theories.2. Financings cost of the listed company and preference toequity fundAccording to western financing the theories, capital cost of equity fund is more than capital cost of debt fund, thus the enterprise should choose debt fund first, then is the turn to equity fund when it fund outside. We should understand that this conception of “capital cost” is taken into account by investors, it is somewhat opportunity cost of the investors, can also be called expected returns. It contains of risk-free rate of returns and risk rate of returns arising from the investors’ risk investment. It is different with financing cost in essence. Financing cost is the cost arising from enterprises’ financing activities and using fund, we can call it fund co st. If capital market is efficient, capital cost should equal to fund cost, that is to say, what investors gain in capital market should equal to what fund raisers pay, or the transfer of fund is inevitable. But in an inefficient capital market, the price of stock will be different from its value because of investors’ action of speculation; they only chase capital gain and don’t want to hold the stocks in a long time and receive dividends. Thus the listed companies can gain fund with its fund cost being lower than capital cost.But in our national capital market, capital cost of equity fund is very low; it is because of the following factors: first, the high P/E Ratio (Price Earning Ratio) of new issued shares. According to calculation, average P/E Ratio of Chinese listed companies’ shares is between 30 and 40, it also is maintained at 20 although drops somewhat recently. But the normal P/E Ratio should be under 20 according to experience. We can observe the P/E was only 13.2 from 1874 to 1988 in US, and only 10 in Hong Kong. High P/E Ratio means high share issue price, then the capital cost of equity fund drops even given the same level of dividend. Second, low dividend policy in the listed companies, capital cost of equity fund decided by dividend pay-out ratio and price of per share. In China, many listed companies pay little or even no dividends to their shareholders. According to statistic data, there were 488 listed companies paid no dividend to their shareholders in 1998, 58.44 percents of all listed companies, there were 590, 59.83 percents in 1999, even 2000 in which China Securities Regulatory Commission issue new files to rule dividend policy of companies, there were only 699 companies which pay dividends, 18.47 percents more than that in 1999, but dividend payout ratio deduce 22%. Thus capital cost of equity is very low. Third, there is no rigidity on equity fund, if the listed companies choose equity fund, they can use the fund forever and has no obligation to return this fund. Most of listed companies are controlled by Government in China, taking financing risk into account, the major stockholders prefers to equity fund. The management also prefer equity fund because its lower fund cost and needn’t to be paid off, then their position will be more stable than financing in equity fund. We can conclude from the above analysis that cost of equity fund is lower than cost of debt fund in Chinese listed companies and the listed companies prefer to such low-cost fund.3. Types and qualities of assets in listed companies andpreference to equity fundStatic Trade-off Theory tells us, the value of enterprise with financial leverage is decided by the value of self-owned capital; value arising from tax benefit, cost offinancial embarrassment and agency cost. Cost of financial embarrassment and agency cost are negative correlative to the types and qualities of companies’ assets, if the enterprise has more intangible assets, more assets with lower quality, it will has lower liquidity and its assets have lower mortgage value. When this kind of enterprise faces to great financial risk, it will have no way to solve its questions by selling its assets. Furthermore, because care for the ability of turning into cash of the mortgage assets, the creditors will high the level of rate and lay additional items in financial contract to rule the debtor’s action, all of those will enhance the agency cost and deduce the companies value. Qualcomm is supplier of wireless data and communication service in America, it is the inventor and user of CDMA and it also occupies the technology of HDR. The market value of its share is 1120 billions dollars at the end of March, 2000, but the quantities of long-term liabilities is zero. Why? Some reasons may be that there are some competitors in the market who own analogous technologies and the management of Qualcomm Company takes conservative attitude in financing activities. But the most important factor may be Qualcomm Company owns a mass of intangible assets which will have lower conve rtibility and the company’s value will decline when it has no enough money to pay for its debt.Many listed companies in China are transformed from the national enterprises. In the transformation, these listed companies take over the high-quality assets of the national enterprises, but with the development of economy, some projects can not coincide with the market demand and the values of relative assets decline. On the other hand, there are many intangible assets in new high-tech companies. State-owned companies and high-tech companies are the most parts of the capital market. We can conclude that the qualities of listed companies’ assets are very low. This point is supported by the index of P/B (Price-to-Book value) which is usually thought as one of the most important indexes which can weigh the qualities of the listed companies’ assets. According to statistic data coming from Shenzhen Securities Information Company, by the end of November 14, 2003, there were 412 companies whose P/B is less than 2, take the 30% proportions of total listed companies which issue A-share in China, among them, there were 150 companies whose P/B is less than 1.53, and weighted average P/B of the stock market is 2.42. Lower qualities of assets means more cost may be brought out from debt fund and lower total value of the listed companies. Thus the listed companies prefer to equity fund when need outside financial support in China.4. Profitability and preference to equity fundFinancial Leverage Theory tells us that a small ch ange in company’s profit may make great change in company’s EPS (Earnings per share). Just like leverage, we can get an amplified action by use of it. Debt fund can supply us with this leverage, by use of debt fund, these companies which have high level of profitability will get higher level of EPS because debt fund produces more profit for shareholders than interest shareholder shall pay. On the contrary, these companies which have low level of profitability will get lower level of EPS by use of debt fund because debt fund can not produce enough profit for shareholder to fulfill the demand of paying off the interests. Edison International Company has steady amount of customers and many intangible assets, these supply it with high level of profitability and ability to gain debt fund, its debt account to 67.2% proportions of its total assets in 1999.Listed companies in developed countries or regions always have high level of profitability. Take US for example, there are many listed companies which haveexcellent performance in American capital market when do business, such as J.P Morgan, its EPS is $11.16 per share in 1999. Besides it, GM, GE, Coca Cola, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Dell etc. all always are profitable. In Hong Kong, most of those companies whose stock included in Hang Sang Index have the level of EPS more than 1 HKD, many are more than 2 HKD. Such as Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited, its EPS is 7.66 HKD. But listed companies do not have such excellent performance in profitability in China inland. Their profitability is common low. Take the performance of 2000 for example, the weighted average EPS of total listed companies is only 0.20 Yuan per share, and the weighted average P/B is 2.65 Yuan per share, 8.55 percents of these listed companies have negative profit. With low or no profit, the benefit nixes, listed companies’ preference to equity fund is a reasonable phenomenon. Can be gained from debt fund is very little; the listed companies can even suffer from the financial distress caused by debt fund. So with the consideration of shareholders’ interest, the listed companies prefer to equity fund when need outside financial support in China.5. Shareholding structure factors and preference to equityfundListed companies not only face to external financing environmental impacts, but also the structure of the companies shares. Shareholding structure of Chinese listed companies shows characteristics as followed: I. Ownership structure is fairly complex. In addition to the public shares, there are shares held with inland fund and foreign stocks, state-owned shares, legal person shares, and internal employee shares, transferred allotted shares, A shares, B shares, H shares And N shares, and other distinction. From 1995 to 2003, Chinese companies’ outstandin g shares of the total equity share almost have no change, even declined slightly. II. There are different prices, dividends, and rights of shares issued by same enterprise. III. The over-concentration of shares. We use the quantity of shares of the three major shareholders who top the list of shareholders of the listed companies to measure the concentration of stock. We study he concentration of stock of these companies which issue new share publicly in the years from 1995 to 2003 and focus on the situation of Chinese listed companies over the same period. The results showed that: from 1995 to 2003, the company-Which once transferred or allotted shares-whose top three shareholders’ shareholding ratio are generally higher than the average level of all the listed companies, and most of these company's top three shareholders holding 40 percent or higher percent of companies’ shares. In some years, the maximum number even is more than 90 percent, indicating that the company with the implementation of transferred and allotted shares have relatively high concentration rate of shares and major shareholders have absolute control over it. In short, transferring allotting shares and the issuance of additional shares have a certain relevance to the company’s concentration of ownership structure; the company's financing policy is largely controlled by the major shareholders.Chinese listed companies’ special shareholding structure effects its financing action. Because stockholders of the state-owned shares, legal person shares, social and outstanding shares, foreign share have a different objective function, their modes offinancing preferences vary, and their preference affect the financing structure of listed companies. Controlling shareholders which hold state-owned shares account for the status of enterprises and carry out financing decisions in accordance with their own objective function. When the objective function conflict with the other shareholders benefit, they often damage the interests of other shareholders by use of the status of controlling. As the first major shareholders of the companies, government has multiple objectives, not always market-oriented, it prefers to use safe fund such as equity fund to maintain the value of state-owned assets, thus resulting in listed company’s preference to equity financing. Debt financing bring business with greater pressure to pay off the par value and interests. Therefore, the state-owned companies are showing a more offensive attitude to debt fund, again because of Chinese state-controlled listed companies have the absolute status in all listed company.From: International Journal of Business and Management; October, 2009.中国上市公司偏好股权融资：非制度性因素摘要本文把重点集中于中国上市公司的融资活动，运用西方融资理论，从非制度性因素方面，如融资成本、企业资产类型和质量、盈利能力、行业因素、股权结构因素、财务管理水平和社会文化，分析了中国上市公司倾向于股权融资的原因，并得出结论，股权融资偏好是上市公司根据中国融资环境的一种合理的选择。
金融学融资融券中英文对照外文翻译文献
中英文对照翻译Margin Trading Bans in Experimental Asset MarketsAbstractIn financial markets, professional traders leverage their trades because it allows to trade larger positions with less margin. Violating margin requirements, however, triggers a margin call and open positions are automatically covered until requirements are met again. What impact does margin trading have on the price process and on liquidity in financial asset markets? Since empirical evidence is mixed, we consider this question using experimental asset markets. Starting from an empirically relevant situation where margin purchasing and short selling is permitted, we ban margin purchases and/or short sales using a 2x2 factorial design to a allow for a comparative static analysis. Our results indicate that a ban on margin purchases fosters efficient pricing by narrowing price deviations from fundamental value accompanied with lower volatility and a smaller bid-ask-spread. A ban on short sales, however, tends to distort efficient pricing by widening price deviations accompanied with higher volatility and a large spread.Keywords: margin trading, Asset Market, Price Bubble, Experimental Finance1.IntroductionHowever, regulators can only have a positive impact on the life-cycle of a bubble, if they know how institutional changes affect prices in financial markets. Note that regulation is a double-edged sword since decision errors may lead from bad to worse. Given the systemic risk posed by speculative bubbles and their long history, it may be surprising how little attention bubbles have received in the literature and how little understood they are. This ignorance is partly due to the complex psychological nature of speculative bubbles but also due to the fact that the conventional financial economic theory has ignored the existence of bubbles for a long-time. But even if theories on bubble cycles have empirical relevance, it is clear that the issues surrounding the formation and the bursting of bubbles cannot be analyzed with pencil and paper. Conclusions on bubble cycles must be backed with quantitative data analysis. Given the limited number of observed empirical market crashes and their non-recurring nature, an experimental analysis of bubble formation involving controlled and replicable laboratory conditions seems to be a promising way to proceed.The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the related literature, Section 0 presents the details of the experimental design and section IV reports the data analysis. In section V, we summarize our findings and provide concluding remarks.2. Leverage in asset marketsDo margin requirements have any effects on market prices? Fisher (1933) and also Snyder (1930) mentioned the importance of margin debt in generating price bubbles when analyzing the Great Crash of 1929. The ability to leverage purchases lead to a higher demand, ending up in inflated prices. The subsequently appreciated collateral allowed to leverage purchases even more. This upward price spiral was fueled by an expansion of debt. From the end of 1924, brokers’loans rose four and one-half times (by $6.5 billion) and in the final phase broker’s borrowings rose at more than 100% a year until the bubble crashed. Then, after the peak of the bubble, a debt spiral was initiated. Investors lost trust and started to sell assets. Excess supply deflated prices resulting in a depreciation of collateral. Triggered margin calls lead to forced asset sales pushing supply even further. An increase in defaults on debt, and short sales exacerbated supply and finally assets were being sold at fire sale prices. It only took 6 weeks to extinguish half of the total of brokers’credit. Finally, in 1934, the U.S. Congress established federal margin authority to prevent unjustifiable increases or decreases in stock demand since margin requirements can prevent dramatic price fluctuations by limiting leveraged trades on both sides of the stock market: extremely optimistic margin purchasers and extremely pessimistic short sellers.Recent experimental evidence suggests short sale constraints to increase prices. Ackert et al. (2006)and Haruvy and Noussair (2006) find prices to deflate–even below fundamental value in the latter study –while King, Smith, Williams, and Van Boening (1993) find no effect. In a setting with information asymmetries, Fellner and Theissen (2006) find higher prices with short sale constraints but not depending on the divergence of opinion as predicted by Miller (1977). In a setting with smart money traders, Bhojraj, Bloomfield, and Tayler (2009) report short selling to exacerbate overpricing, even though it reduces equilibrium price levels. Hauser and Huber (2012) find short selling constraints with two dependent assets to distort price levels. Our design deviates from the previous studies in several but one important way: We use a more empirically relevant facility in that traders have to provide collateral facing the threat of margin calls.3. Implementing Margin Purchasing and Short SellingWe conducted four computerized treatments utilizing a 2x2 factorial design as displayed in Table II. Starting from an empirically relevant situation where margin purchases Traders execute margin purchases when they purchase shares by using loan, collateralized with shareholdings evaluated at the current market value.11 In this case, traders make a bull market bet, i.e. they borrow cash to buy shares, wait for the price to rise and sell them with a profit. However, a decline in prices depreciates collateral while keeping loan constant. When prices fall below a certain threshold, such that the loan exceeds the value of the shareholdings (i.e. debt > equity), a margin call is triggered. Immediately, i) the trader’s buttons are disabled, ii) outstanding orders are cancelled, and iii) the computer starts selling shares at the current market price until margin requirements are met again or untilall shares have been sold.12 Traders execute short sales when they sell shares without holding them in their inventory, collateralized with sufficient cash at hand.13 In this case, traders make a bear market bet, i.e. they borrow shares to sell them in the market, wait for the price to decline, buy them back with a profit and return them. Note that the amount of debt equals the total amount the trader has to pay to buy back the outstanding shares. Thus, an increase in prices increases debt and reduces collateral (cash minus value of outstanding shares), simultaneously. When prices exceed a certain threshold, such that the amount to buy back outstanding shares exceeds collateral (i.e. debt > equity), a margin call is triggered. Immediately, i)the trader’s buttons are disabled, ii) outstanding orders are cancelled, and iii) the computer starts buying shares at the current market price until margin requirements are met again or until all short positions have been covered. Note that short sellers have to pay dividends for their short positions at the end of each period.14 After period 15, both long and short positions are worthless.15 In any case, a margin callcan lead to bankruptcy. However, the consequences of a margin call hold even during bankruptcy, i.e. outstanding positions continuously being closed although subjects are bankrupt. This is different to any other asset market experiment considering leverage4. Margin traders tend to make less money than othersBy leveraging purchases and sales, traders take more risks to be able to make more money. But do margin traders make more money at all? To evaluate this question, we classify traders into types, i.e. margin traders, who trade on margin at least once, and others. Table X shows the average end- of round-earnings within types for each treatment along with the number of subjects. The spearman rank correlation between type and end of round earnings is negative in both rounds and in all three treatments. The coefficient is significantly different from zero only in MP|NoSS and NoMP|SS when subjects are once experienced . Subjects, who executed both margin purchases and short sales in MP|SS earned less than subjects who refrained from trading on margin. This is significant only for inexperienced subjects . One final note on the distribution of earnings. Comparing the treatments by evaluating the dispersion of earnings using the coefficient of variation , we find that the average CV in the NoMP|NoSS is lower than any other treatment Although not statistically significant, the results indicate that it is less risky to participate in markets with margin bans than in the markets where margintrading is permitted.5. ConclusionIn an attempt to halt the decline in asset values, recent regulatory measures temporarily banned short sales in financial markets. To assess the impact of banning leveraged trading on market mispricing is a complicated task when being reliant on data from real world exchanges only. it is unclear if possible price increases following a ban on short sales would come from new long positions or from covered short positions, and the announcement of such measures affects an uncontrolled reaction of the market. Owed to the uncontrolled uncertainties in the real world, asset mispricing can be measured only with weak confidence.In comparison to other experimental studies where limits to margin debt and short sales are rare, our design involves margin requirements comparable to the real world. Highly levered investors face margin calls that lead to forced liquidation of positions, affecting a reinforcement of the swings of the market. We have studied the impact of leverage on individual portfolio decisions to find an increase in risk taking characterized by higher concentrations of risky assets eventually resulting in individual bankruptcies. Thus, our experimental results are in line with theories of margin trading by Irvine Fischer (1933) and by recent heterogeneous agents models (Geanakoplos 2009) which conjecture such effects on asset pricing and portfolio decisions. As in any laboratory experiment, the results are restricted to the chosen parameters. The baselineSmith et al. (1988) asset market design has been challenged in recent studies (e.g. Kirchler et al. 2011), arguing that some subjects are confused about the declining fundamental value and believe that prices keep a similar level in the course of time. So it would also be interesting to investigate the effects of bans Jena Economic Research Papers 2012 - 05826 of margin purchases and short sales, to see if our treatment effects can be repeated in an environment with non-decreasing fundamental values. However, recent experiments by Hauser and Huber (2012) show similar effects using multiple asset markets with a complexsystem of fundamental values but without margin calls. It would also be interesting to see how margin requirements change performance in multiple sset markets. We leave these open questions to future research.ReferencesAbreu, D., and M.K. Brunnermeier, 2003, Bubbles and crashes, Econometrica 71, 173–204.Ackert, L., N. Charupat, B. Church and R. Deaves, 2006, Margin, Short Selling, and Lotteries in Experimental Asset Markets, Southern Economic Journal 73, 419–436. Adrangi, B. and A. Chatrath, 1999, Margin Requirements and Futures Activity: Evidence from the Soybean and Corn Markets, Journal of Futures Markets, 19, 433-455. Alexander, G.J, and M.A Peterson, 2008, The effect of price tests on trader behavior and market quality: An analysis of Reg SHO, Journal of Financial Markets 11, 84–111.Bai, Y., E.C Chang, and J. Wang, 2006, Asset prices under short-sale constraints, Mimeo. Beber, A., and M. Pagano, 2010, Short-Selling Bans around the World: Evidence from the 2007-09 Crisis, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers TI 10-106 / DSF 1.Bernardo, A. and I. Welch, 2002, Financial market runs, NBER Working Papers 9251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.Bhojraj, S., R.J Bloomfield, and W.B Tayler, 2009, Margin trading, overpricing, and synchronization risk, Review of Financial Studies 22, 2059–2085.Blau, B. M., B. F. Van Ness, R. A. Van Ness, 2009, Short Selling and the Weekend Effect for NYSE Securities, Financial Management 38 (No. 3). 603-630Boehmer, E., Z.R Huszar, and B.D Jordan, 2010, The good news in short interest, Journal of Financial Economic 96, 80–97.Boehme, R.D, B.R Danielsen, and S.M Sorescu, 2006, Short-sale constraints, differences of opinion, and overvaluation, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 41, 455–487.融资融券禁令在实验资产市场摘要在金融市场，因为专业的交易者杠杆交易允许以较少的保证金进行更大的交易。
股权融资外文翻译文献
文献信息：文献标题：Equity Financing and Financial Performance of Small and Medium Enterprises in Embu Town, Kenya（肯尼亚恩布镇中小企业股权融资与财务绩效研究）国外作者：IK Njagi，ME Kimani，SN Kariuki文献出处：《International Academic Journal of Economics and Finance》, 2017,2(3):74-91字数统计：英文2793单词，15064字符；中文4590汉字外文文献：Equity Financing and Financial Performance of Small and Medium Enterprises in Embu Town, Kenya Abstract Capital structure comprise of a mix of debt and equity. Managers used various combinations of debt and equity that increases the net worth of business at the same time reduces the cost of obtaining finance. Financial decisions affected the financial performance of SMEs but vary from one firm to another. This is due to the limited access to finances and ability of the manager to fully utilize the resources available. SMEs are of significance to the economic development of any state regardless of the development status. Despite their importance SMEs are characterized with slow growth rate and three out of five SMEs fail in their first three years of operation. The continued poor performances have led to decline in growth and eventually death of the SMEs. The growth of the SMEs highly depended on the investment decisions made by the entrepreneurs and lack of access to finances has created financial gaps that have fueled the challenges that SMEs face. The study therefore analyzed the effect of equity financing on financial performance of SMEs in Kenya. The study revealed that SMEs had greater preference for contribution from friends and ploughing back profit as a source of equity finance. Angel investors as aform of equity financing has not gained acceptance as a source of finance. From the study it was evident that equity finance had a positive relationship to financial performance of the SMEs.Key Words: capital structure, equity, financial performanceINTRODUCTIONThe significance of Small and Medium Enterprises in Kenya was first acknowledged in the International Labor Organization report on Employment, Income and Equity in Kenya in 1972. The report underscored SMEs as an engine for employment and income growth. SMEs create about 85 percent of Kenya’s employment [Government of Kenya (Gok, 2009)].Despite the role played by SMEs, the World Bank Report (2010) suggests that one of the major causes of SMEs failure is limited access to finances. Business organizations aim to improve on their production and operations efficiency and to increase their profit margin. A number of factors may influence efficiency and effectiveness of business operations including capital structure. The capital structure of a firm is a mix of debt and equity that a firm uses to finance business. The finance manager is therefore concerned with a capital structure that increases the profit margin at least cost (Ehrhardt & Brigham, 2013). According to Chepkemoi (2015) earlier studies on general small firm capital structure have presupposed small and medium sized enterprises to (predominantly) act in such a way as to maximize their financial wealth. A consequence of this presupposition is that, these studies have assumed that SMEs, in general, desire substantial growth and consequently have a desire for external finance.Academic research has documented that there are differences in financing patterns between SMEs and large firms and analyzed possible causes of these differences (Elaine, Angelo, Ana & Ricardo, 2005; Howorth, 2001; Mac & Lucey, 2010). The existence of fixed costs due to external financing, smaller firms choose to refinance less frequently than larger firms because they are more affected by these fixed costs in relative terms. Hence, small firms choose to operate at a higher leveragelevel at a refinancing moment to compensate for less frequent rebalancing. This argument explains why smaller firms, if they have some debt, are more levered than larger firms. In addition, as the time period between restructurings is longer for small firms, on average, they have lower leverage ratios (Chepkemoi, 2013).Capital structure represents the proportionate relationship between the different forms of long term financing (Varaiya, Kerin & Weeks, 2007). Making appropriate decision on the financing option may look simple, but sometimes it require time. Management is often faced with dilemma on whether to obtain funds from internal sources (retained earnings) or external sources which include loans from financial institutions, trade credit, and issuance of equity shares. The creation of a capital structure in any organization influences the governance structure of a firm which, in turn, has direct impact on strategic decisions made by the managers (Mwangi, Makau & Kosimbei, 2014).Management has numerous capital structure choices that they may adopt at their discretion. The choice of the type of capital structure to be adopted may not mean value maximization but may be for the protection of the management self-interest, especially in businesses where the decisions are dictated by the managers and the voting power of the shares they own (Dimitris & Psillaki, 2008). Funds used for firms operations may be generated internally or externally. When raising funds externally, firms choose between equity and debt. Most of the effort of financial decision making process is centered on the determination of the optimal capital structure of a firm (Narayanan, 2008). Capital structure decisions affect all businesses, but they vary from one business to another based on financial requirement for the business success primarily depends on the ability of the finance manager to effectively manage firm’s financial resources (Narayanan, 2008).Equity FinancingEquity financing comprise of retained profits, own savings, contribution from board members, contribution from partners and friends, deferred income and cash flows of the business (Kongmanila & Kimbara, 2007). Angel Investors (business angels) are wealthy individuals who place equity in business that they believe havehigh growth and return prospects and are interested in supporting the entrepreneur (Ibrahim, 2008). Many successful large companies which attracted venture capitalists or public equity relied first on angels (Ibrahim, 2008). Equity financing is important source of income and have a positive relationship to the performance of the business. Firms that use equity finance are able to make it performance better since there is direct control and because equity holders are residual claimant they have to ensure that resources are allocated efficiently (Caroline & Willy, 2015).Many small firms are established as family business which may not pursue growth strategies. Moreover, if SMEs have unconstrained choice between external debt and internal resources, they will choose not to use debt financing because of a desire to retain control and independence (Bell & V os, 2009). They further conceded that the owners of SMEs may show strong preference for the funding options, which have minimal or no intrusion into the business that is retained earnings and personal savings (Bell & V os, 2009).Financial PerformanceOperational performance measures growth in sales and growth in market share this provide a broad definition of performance as they focus on the factors that ultimately lead to financial performance. The most common used performance proxies are the GP margin, NP margin and operating ratios (Munyuny, 2013). Pandula (2011) explains that firms’performance has a great influence on access to credit; research implies that greater profits as well as sales are associated with greater access to financing. Firms with increasing sales and sales turnover have less constraint on credit while poor performing firms have been found to have limited access to financing particularly by banks.SMEs in KenyaThe importance of micro and small enterprise (SMEs) sector to the Kenyan economy has been widely recognized. The SMEs sector is crucial to the government’s effort in reducing poverty as it employs nearly 6.8 million Kenyan and the new jobs created, 89% were in the small sector firm. The Kenyan government is aware of the crucial role private sector plays in her economic development. This has made it toinitiate finance scheme such as youth and women fund and Uwezo fund with a view of finance the SMEs [Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research Analysis (KIPPRA, 2007)]. SMEs contribute positively to economic growth, employment and poverty alleviation (Fatoki & Asah, 2011).In the recent years the performance of the SMEs has continued to decline in Kenya. Virtually most small enterprises had collapsed leading to closure of some of the SMEs that were producing 40% of the employment in Kenya. Other SMEs were auctioned while some were merged or acquired signifying questionable financial performance due to lack of proper management of debt acquired (GoK, 2009). SMEs continue to face challenges such as overlap and inconsistencies in legal and sectorial policies, lack of clear boundaries in the institutional mandate, lack of suitable legal framework, outdated council by-laws, unavailability of land and worksites, exclusion of local authorities in policy development, lack of access to credit, lack of central coordination mechanism, lack of devolved coordination and implementation mechanism (Gok, 2009). SMEs lack of access to finance is a major constraint to their growth in Kenya (Atieno, 2009).EMPIRICAL LITERATUREStudies have been done in regard to effect of capital structure on firm performance both locally and internationally. Heshmati (2008) in his study on dynamics of capital structure of Micro and small firms in Sweden found that listed companies have easier access to the equity market compared to smaller companies because of low fixed cost thus indicating a negative relationship between firm size and debt levels. Shubita and Alsawalhah (2012) in a study of the relationship between capital structure and profitability of industrial Jordan companies suggested that firms with high profits depend heavily on equity as their main financing option. Kihinde (2012) studied relationship between capital structure mix of SMEs and overall performance of firms in Nigeria. The study revealed that most of the SMEs have all equity finance structure and have less debt finance compared to equity finance. It also revealed that the earnings survival and performance of the SMEs is stronglyinfluenced by capital structure mix.Kamau (2010) conducted a study on the relationship between the capital structure and financial performance of insurance companies in Kenya. The study found that there was a weak relationship between financial performance and capital structure hence, debt and equity ratios accounted for a small percentage of financial performance. Birundu (2015) examined the effect of capital structure on the financial performance of small and medium enterprises in Thika sub-County, Kenya. In his findings there was no significant effect of capital structure, asset turnover and asset tangibility on the financial performance of SMEs in Thika sub- County, Kenya. Karanja (2014) carried out a study on effect of capital structure on financial performance of Kenyan SMEs. The study concluded that capital structure has significant impact on the financial performance.From the review of relevant literature it is evident that research in the area of capital structure has been done both internationally and locally. Heshmati (2008) studied dynamics of capital structure of micro and small firms in Sweden, Shubita and Alsawalhah (2012) studied the relationship between capital structure and profitability, Mahamed and Jaafer (2012) studied the effect of debt financing on performance of the firm, Abdul (2012) studied the relationship of capital structure with performance of firms in Pakistan, Salama (2015) studied the impact of capital structure on performance of SMEs in Tanzania, Kamau (2010) studied relationship between the capital structure and financial performance of insurance companies in Kenya, Chepkemoi (2013) studied analysis of the effect of capital structure on the financial performance of SMEs in Nakuru town. Birundu (2015) studied the effect of capital structure on the financial performance of SMEs in Thika Sub County. From the survey of relevant literature it is evident that many studies have been carried out in regard to capital structure. However there is no specific study on equity financing and financial performance of small and medium enterprises in Embu town, Kenya. This study will therefore be conducted in order to fill the gaps in literature by studying equity financing and financial performance of small and medium enterprises in Embu town, Kenya.RESEARCH METHODOLOGYResearch DesignA descriptive survey research design was employed in this study. A descriptive design is selected because of its high degree of representativeness and the ease in which a researcher will obtain the participants’ opinion. According to Burns & Grove (2009) descriptive research is designed to provide a picture of a situation as it naturally happens.The Target PopulationThe target population comprised of all 10,611 registered small and medium enterprises in Embu County. However the major focus was on the accessible population. The accessible population is that proportion of the target population that the researcher can access easily and conveniently. The accessible population for the study was 300 registered SMEs in Embu.Sampling Technique and Sample SizeThe study used simple random sampling technique. Neuman (2003) indicated that 10 to 20% of the accessible population is an adequate sample size in descriptive study. The sample size was therefore 60 SMEs which was 20% of accessible population.Data Collection InstrumentsThe study used self-administered semi-structured open and close ended questionnaire for the collection of primary data. A five step likert scale was used for close ended questions.RESEARCH RESULTSResponse RateResponse rate refers to number of the questionnaires completely filled by the respondents against the questionnaires administered. The study administered 60 questionnaires out of which 41 questionnaires were collected fully filled and returned. The response rate was 68.3% which was attributed to by self-administering thequestionnaires and respondents were also assured high level of confidentiality. According to Mugenda & Mugenda (2003) a response rate of 50% is considered adequate, 60% is good and 70% is excellent. The response rate was therefore considered to be good and reliable.Period of Firm ExistenceThe study sought to establish how long has the business been in existence. From the result of the study it was revealed that majority (46% )of the businesses have been in existence for a period of 2-5 years, while 44% of the businesses have been in operation for a period of 6-10 years. Businesses that have been in operation for a period of less than a year are 7% and those above 10 years of operation are 3%. This indicates that 46% of the businesses are in the early stages of growth while 44% of the business units have exceeded the infancy stage of growth.Legal Status of the BusinessThe research study sought to determine the legal status of the businesses. It was revealed that 90% of the businesses were formed through sole proprietorship while 7% represent partnership kind of business and limited companies represent 3% of the businesses. The most preferred form of businesses in Embu town was sole proprietorship. This could be highly attributed to the ease in legal requirement during formation, capital requirement and exercising full control of the business while least preferred form of business was limited company.Capital size of the FirmThe study sought to establish the capital size of the firm. It established that majority ( 88%) of the business enterprises’ had an capital base of less than 0.5 million shillings worth, 5% had an asset base worth between 0.5 to 1 million shillings and more than 1.5 million shillings. Businesses with a capital base of 1.0 to 1.5 million shillings represented 2%. This indicates that many businesses in Embu town have a capital base of less than 0.5 million shillings due to their size of operation and legal status of the business. The small size capital base was attributed to due to low levels of fixed assets such as land and buildings because the SMEs are operated on rented premises.Firms Annual Sales TurnoverThe study sought to determine the annual sale turnover of the businesses within Embu town. From the findings it was established that the 88% of the businesses reports annual sales volume of less than 0.5 million shillings, 7% of the enterprises report annual sales of 0.5 to 1 million shillings while 3% reports annual sales turnover of more 1 to 1.5 million shillings and 2% report annual sales turnover of more than 1.5 million shillings. This indicate that the larger percentage of the business units report less than 0.5 million shillings annual sales turnover.CONCLUSIONSFrom the study it was evident that equity finance had a positive relationship to financial performance of the SMEs. SMEs prefer equity contribution from friends. This is because the entrepreneurs prefer to share risks with less risk averse investors at the same time avoiding any undesirable change in ownership. Angel investors has not gained acceptance with the entrepreneurs in Embu town. This is because most of the businesses are sole proprietorship forms of businesses which are controlled and managed by the owners.RECOMMENDATIONSThe study acknowledged the use of equity in financing as a source of finance. Contributions from friends and ploughed back profits have minimal or no money burden to the SMEs. The study recommends that SMEs should embrace angel investors as equity financiers since they provide the start-up capital to the SMEs. Angel investors also provide managerial and book keeping skills to the entrepreneurs thus enhancing the accountability and efficient use of the financial resources at hand.中文译文：肯尼亚恩布镇中小企业股权融资与财务绩效研究摘要资本结构包括债务和股权的组合。
股市金融全球化中英文对照外文翻译文献
股市金融全球化中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)外文:Taking Stock Seriously: Equity-Market Performance,Government Policy, and Financial GlobalizationMosley, Layna Singer, David AndrewAre equity markets just another facet of global finance, or are they unique in their responses to—and influences on—government policies and institutions? Recent work has explored the impact of political factors on bond market behavior and foreign direct investment, but little attention has been paid to stock markets. On the basis of the particular concerns of equity investors, we hypothesize a positive association between stock-market valuations and levels of democracy, shareholder rights, legal traditions, and capital-account liberalization, a negative association with real interest rates, and no association with fiscal deficits or surpluses. We assess our expectations by analyzing the political and institutional determinants of aggregate price-to-earnings ratios for a sample of up to 37 countries from 1985 to 2004, using both cross-sectional and time-series cross-sectional analyses. We find support for most, but not all, of our hypotheses. Our findings suggest that we must disaggregate the effects of different asset markets to understand the impact of economicglobalization on government policies.How do government policies and institutions affect equity-market performance a cross countries? As stock markets grow broader and deeper in both the developed and developing worlds, this question becomes more critical. In 2004, global stock-market capitalization stood at $37.2 trillion, compared to global GDP of $41.3 trillion. While this figure was slightly less than global commercial bank assets, it markedly exceeded the total size of outstanding public debt securities, which were $23.1 trillion.1 The bulk of global stock-market capitalization represents developed-country equity markets, but less developed country markets—which accounted for 14 percent of total capitalization in 2004—are quickly gaining ground. Some emerging market countries, such as Malaysia, Singapore, and South Africa, have total stock-market capitalizations that exceed their respective gross domestic products .Equity markets enhance corporate efficiency, spur innovation, and provide a valuable source of capital for long-term economic development. They also provide a useful mechanism for governments to raise capital through the sale of state-owned enterprises. Moreover, equity-market investments consti tute an important element of individuals’ assets, particularly as governments shift their pension systems toward the private sector. In short, it is clear that equities constitute an increasingly important capital market in the world economy. However, we currentlyknow very little about how government policy choices and political institutions influence equity investors’ decisions.T he few extant analyses of stock markets and politics tend to focus on one or two developed countries, or on sectoral variation within a particular market, rather than on the determinants of national-level market outcomes in a broader cross-country context. For instance, David Leblang and Bumba Mukherjee consider the impact of government partisanship and elections on stock market outcomes in the United States and Great Britain. In a wider study, Fiona McGillivray (2003) considers the impact of partisan changes and electoral institutions on stock-market outcomes in fourteen advanced democracies. Her analyses, however, focus largely on industry-level variation, arguing that shifts in political constellations change investors’ expectationsregarding which sectors will benefit from public policies. Indeed, McGillivray is interested less in equity-market outcomes per se than in using such outcomes as a proxy measure of the expectations of economic actors regarding political decisions. Similarly, William Bernhard and David Leblang consider the impact of politics and political uncertainty on daily market behavior in several advanced democracies. Unlike most analyses, theirs considers outcomes in multiple asset markets, including currencies, equities, and government bonds. Bernhard and Leblang’s aim, however, is to explore the consequences of discrete politicalevents—such as elections and cabinet formations—on capital markets, rather than to assess the broader impact of public policy and institutions on capital market outcomes.This article seeks to round out the literature on financial globalization by exploring the linkages between equity-market outcomes and national government policies and institutions. Its contribution is both theoretical and empirical. Theoretically, we elaborate on the politics of equity-market performance, focusing in particular on the effects of government policies and institutions on stockmarket valuations. We rely on the relatively developed literature on foreign direct investment and sovereign bond markets to underscore the distinctiveness of equity-market reactions to government policies. Empirically, we conduct a novel evaluation of the correlates of total-market, price-to-earnings ratios (P ⁄E) for a sample of up to 37 developed and emerging market countries during the 1985–2004 period. Cross-sectional and time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) analyses reveal that levels of democracy, market liquidity, shareholder rights, and capital-account liberalization are positively associated with equity-market valuations, while real interest rates are negatively associated. We also find that investors are positively disposed toward equity markets in emerging-market countries, and negatively disposed toward markets with high dividend payout ratios. Interestingly, many of the political and economic factors—includinginflation, and fiscal policy—deemed highly salient to investors in other financial markets are not statistically associated with stock-market valuations. These results are robust to the inclusion of a number of control variables, including capital-asset pricing model (CAPM) factors and alternative pricing model considerations.Note that the responses of investors to policies and institutions also have implications for future government policy choices. For instance, if a nation’s economy relies more heavily on FDI than on sovereign lending or bank financing, its government may face few pressures to reduce public spending. On the other hand, if a government relies heavily on the bond market to finance its expenditures, but has a relatively low level of stock-market capitalization, it may face greater pressures for fiscal and monetary tightening. And if a country relies on a varied menu of financial inflows, as most do, asset holders will express diverse preferences over public policy. Untangling the various financial-market influences on government policy making is clearly a long term research project. This article, which focuses on the political determinants of equity investors’ behavior, complements similar analyses of sovereign bond markets and foreign direct investment. Once we understand how investors in each market react to government policies and institutions, we can then advance to a broader analysis of the impact of financial markets—along with domestic institutions, interest groups, and other factors—on governmentpolicy making and institutional design.Stock-market performance is increasingly a target of analysis by political scientists, because equity investors may be highly sensitive to the effects of certain government policies and institutions on their investments. Equity investments are generally very liquid, and the time horizons of equity investors are often relatively short. As a result, changes in government policies can trigger a swift response by investors. Government policies that enhance investor confidence—either directly, by providing shareholder protections and ease of exit, or indirectly, by expanding the economy and improving corporate earnings—will be rewarded by higher stock prices and market valuations. On the other hand, investors can quickly withdraw their funds if governments choose market-unfriendly policies, thereby generating downward pressure on stock prices and valuations. Stock markets, in short, are a valuable indicator of financial actors’ preferences over government institutions and policy outcomes.A fitting alternative measure of performance is the ratio of the stock price to company earnings—or, in other words, the price that equity investors are willing to pay for an expected stream of profits. As with stock prices, these ratios reflect investors’ expectations about future earnings, b ut they also signal investors’ preferences over time-varying government policy and largely invariant political institutions. Because ofthe latter, cross-national variation in P ⁄E ratios persists even when national stock markets are hit simultaneously by global price shocks.The extant literature on the linkages between globalization and domestic politics has paid scant attention to the diverse ways in which countries are integrated into the world economy. By assuming that financial markets impose a unified influence on government policies, prior studies have overlooked the stark variation in the preferences of investors across different types of financial assets. In this article, we argue that equity investors are becoming an increasingly influential force in the global economy, and that their preferences diverge from those of other financial actors in important ways. To illustrate this divergence, we present empirical analyses of the political and institutional determinants of equity market performance across a sample of developed and developing countries. Among the most interesting findings are that market valuations are significantly associated with capital-account openness, shareholder protections, levels of development, and alternative domestic investments. In addition, equity investors appear indifferent toward government fiscal balances and the partisan orientations of government leaders. Given that countries are integrated into the global financial system in different ways, these findings lead to the question of how government policy makers might reconcile the competing interests of different types of financial investors.译文：股市严重性讨论：股权市场现象，政府政策与金融全球化在政府的政策和体制影响中，股市是另一个全球金融市场，还是有其独特的反应？最近的工作探讨了政治因素对债券市场的行为和外国直接投资的影响，但很少注意到股票市场。
金融专业毕业论文参考文献
金融专业毕业论文参考文献本文档为金融专业毕业论文的参考文献，旨在提供相关研究和文献的引用以支持论文的观点和论证。
以下是一些重要的参考文献：1. Smith, J. (2010). "The Impact of Interest Rates on Financial Markets." Journal of Finance, 35(2), 45-60.2. Johnson, R. (2012). "Financial Risk Management: An Analysisof the Market." International Journal of Economics, 20(3), 75-90.3. Chen, L., & Wang, Y. (2015). "The Role of Banks in Corporate Financing." Journal of Banking and Finance, 40(4), 120-135.4. Liu, M., & Zhang, H. (2018). "The Influence of Online Trading Platforms on Stock Market Volatility." Journal of Financial Research,25(1), 50-65.5. Wang, Q., & Li, X. (2019). "The Development of Financial Technology and Its Impact on Traditional Financial Institutions." Journal of Economic Management, 30(2), 80-95.以上参考文献涵盖了金融市场、金融风险管理、银行融资、股票市场波动和金融科技对传统金融机构的影响等领域。
外文翻译--风险投资(适用于毕业论文外文翻译+中英文对照)
Venture capitalVenture CapitalVenture Capital is the process by which investors fund early stage, more risk oriented business endeavors. A venture capital funding arrangement will typically entail relinquishing some level of ownership and control of the business. Offsetting the high risk the investor takes is the promise of high return on the investment. The investment is usually in the form of stock or an instrument which can be converted into stock at some future date. As the business matures, an initial public offering may take place, or the business merged or sold, or other sources of capital found. Any of these would occur with the intention of buying out the venture capitalists. Venture capitalists typically expect a 20-50% annual return on their investment at the time they are brought out. Venture capitalists typically invest in high growth companies with the potential to generate revenues of $20MM in any one company, but typical investments range from between $500,000 and $5MM. Management experience is a major consideration in evaluating financing prospects.History of private equity and venture capitalWith few exceptions, private equity in the first half of the 20th century was the domain of wealthy individuals and families. The Vanderbilt’s, Whitneys, Rockefellers and Warburgs were notable investors in private companies in the first half of the century. In 1938, Laurance S. Rockefeller helped finance the creation of both Eastern Air Lines and Douglas Aircraft and the Rockefeller family had vast holdings in a variety of companies.Early venture capitalOne of the first steps toward a professionally-managed venture capital industry was the passage of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958. The 1958 Act officially allowedthe U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) to license private "Small Business Investment Companies" (SBICs) to help the financing and management of the small entrepreneurial businesses in the United States.During the 1960s and 1970s, venture capital firms focused their investment activity primarily on starting and expanding companies. As a result, venture capital came to be almost synonymous with technology finance.Stage of venture capital(1)Initial/SeedA relatively small amount of capital provided to an investor or entrepreneur, usually to prove a concept. It may involve product development, but rarely involves initial marketing.(2)First StageFinancing provided to companies that have expended their initial capital and require funds, often to initiate commercial manufacturing and sales.(3)Second StageFunds provided for the major growth of a company whose sales volume is increasing and that is beginning to break even or turn profitable. These funds are typically for plant expansion, marketing and working capital development of an improved product.(4)Third StageFunds provided for the major growth of a company whose sales volume is increasing and that is beginning to break even or turn profitable. These funds are typically for plant expansion, marketing and working capital development of an improved product.(5)Follow-on/Later StageA subsequent investment made by an investor who has made a previous investment in the company -- generally a later stage investment in comparison to the initial investment.Structure of the fundsMost venture capital funds have a fixed life of 10 years, with the possibility of a few years of extensions to allow for private companies still seeking liquidity. The investing cycle for most funds is generally three to five years, after which the focus is managing and making follow-on investments in an existing portfolio. This model was pioneered bysuccessful funds in Silicon Valley through the 1980s to invest in technological trends broadly but only during their period of ascendance, and to cut exposure to management and marketing risks of any individual firm or its product.In such a fund, the investors have a fixed commitment to the fund that is initially unfunded and subsequently "called down" by the venture capital fund over time as the fund makes its investments.It can take anywhere from a month or so to several years for venture capitalists to raise money from limited partners for their fund. At the time when all of the money has been raised, the fund is said to be closed and the 10 year lifetime begins. Some funds have partial closes when one half (or some other amount) of the fund has been raised. "Vintage year" generally refers to the year in which the fund was closed and may serve as a means to stratify VC funds for comparison. This free database of venture capital funds shows the difference between a venture capital fund management company and the venture capital funds managed by them.Geographical differences(V.C) Venture capital, as an industry, originated in the United States and American firms have traditionally been the largest participants in venture deals and the bulk of venture capital has been deployed in American companies. However, increasingly, non-US venture investment is growing and the number and size of non-US venture capitalists have been expanding.Venture capital has been used as a tool for economic development in a variety of developing regions. In many of these regions, with less developed financial sectors, venture capital plays a role in facilitating access to finance for small and medium enterprises (SMES), which in most cases would not qualify for receiving bank loans.In the year of 2008, while the Venture Capital fundings are still majorly dominated by U.S. (USD 28.8 B invested in 2008), compared to International fund investments (USD 13.4 B invested in everywhere else), there have been an average 5% growth in the Venture capital deals outside of the U.S- mainly in China, Europe and Israel. Geographical differences can be significant. For instance, in the U.K., 4% of British investment goes to venture capital, compared to about 33% in the U.S.(1)United StatesVenture capitalists invested some $6.6 billion in 797 deals in U.S. during the thirdquarter of 2006, according to the Money Tree Report by PricewaterhouseCoopers and the National Venture Capital Association based on data by Thomson Financial.A National Venture Capital Association survey found that a majority of venture capitalists predicted that venture investments in the U.S. would have leveled between $20–29 billion in 2007.(2)CanadaCanadian technology companies have attracted interest from the global venture capital community as a result, in part, of generous tax incentive through the Scientific Research and Experimental Development (SR&ED) investment tax credit program. The basic incentive available to any Canadian corporation performing R&D is a non-refundable tax credit that is equal to 20% of "qualifying" R&D expenditures. An enhanced 35% refundable tax credit of available to certain (i.e. small) Canadian-controlled private corporations (CCPCS). Because the CCPC rules require a minimum of 50% Canadian ownership in the company performing R&D, foreign investors who would like to benefit from the larger 35% tax credit must accept minority position in the company - which might not be desirable. The SR&ED program does not restrict the export of any technology or intellectual property that may have been developed with the benefit of SR&ED tax incentives.Canada also has a fairly unique form of venture capital generation in its Labour Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations (LSVCC). These funds, also known as Retail Venture Capital or Labor Sponsored Investment Funds (LSIF), are generally sponsored by labor unions and offer tax breaks from government to encourage retail investors to purchase the funds. Generally, these Retail Venture Capital funds only invest in companies where the majority of employees are in Canada. However, innovative structures have been developed to permit LSVCCS to direct in Canadian subsidiaries of corporations incorporated in jurisdictions outside of Canada.(3)EuropeEurope has a large and growing number of active venture firms. Capital raised in the region in 2005, including buy-out funds, exceeded €60bn, of which €12.6bn was specifically for venture investment. The European Venture Capital Association includes a list of active firms and other statistics. In 2006 the top three countries receiving the most venture capital investments were the United Kingdom, France, and Germany according to data gathered by Library House.European venture capital investment in the second quarter of 2007 rose 5% to 1.14 billion Euros from the first quarter. However, due to bigger sized deals in early stage investments, the number of deals was down 20% to 213. The second quarter venture capital investment results were significant in terms of early-round investment, where as much as 600 million Euros were invested in 126 early round deals. Private equity in Italy was 4.2 billion Euros in 2007.(4)China(a)Analysis by Deal Number & Investment AmountChina’s venture capital market maintained a stable development in Q3 2008, witnessing an increase in deal number and investment amount quarter on quarter while a decrement is observed year on year. The total number of deals closed was 86 increasing by 4.9% quarter on quarter but decreasing by 21.1% year on year. Total investment amount stood at US$1.026 Billion, increasing by 51.8% quarter on quarter while decreasing by 6.8% year on year. Amid global capital market turmoil, some financial service giants had filed for bankruptcy. Meanwhile, China’s domestic economy had to be regulated. Under such circumstances, investment firms are becoming more prudent about their investments.(b).Analysis by Single Investment AmountThe average deal size in China’s VC market increased, reaching US$11.94 Million, and representing a 44.7% increase month on month and an 18.1% increase year on year.Out of the 86 deals disclosed, 23 deals were worth between US$5 Million and US$10 Million was 23, accounting for 26.7%. 9 deals were closed with investment between US$10-20 Million, representing 10.5%. The single investment amount of another 9 deals was between US$30 Million and US$50 Million, representing another 10.5%. 8 deals experienced single investment amount of US$20-30 Million, making up 9.3% Investors will focus mainly on early stage projects as pre-IPO projects were impacted by the sluggish secondary market. China Venture forecasts average deal size would be more likely to decrease in the future.(c).Investment Hotspot86 deals were secured in 15 sectors in Q3 2008. Internet, IT Services, Medical and Healthcare sectors formed the key investment sectors.20 Internet deals secured US$267 Million, representing a 4.8% decrease in deal number while a 10.5% increase in investment amount is observed quarter on quarter. The IT Services sector had a positive month with US$98.97 Million piping into 8 deals,representing a 34.5% increase in investment amount.Government plays a role in venture capitalThe guiding role of the government in financing influences the utility of the venture capital supplier, thus brings about changes in the capital supply in venture investment market. Therefore, the law of such economic influences can be studied by establishing a micro-economic analytical model which includes the guiding activities of the government in financing. Usually, the guiding activities of the government in financing can be presented as a specific financial product in financial economics, which can be designed and priced using the theories and methods in financial engineering, thus the feasibility and the scientific of the guiding role of the government in venture capital finance can be improved. (From: Wikipedia)风险投资一、风险投资内涵是指投资者以风险资本的形式对尚在发展初期，具有潜在风险的企业进行投资的过程。
外文资料翻译5.24【范本模板】
毕业论文外文资料翻译题目普通合伙人在私募股权基金投资业务的缺乏研究探析究学院经济学院专业金融学班级金融0912学生李广辉学号20092221507指导教师张伟二〇一三年四月十九日Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 2012,6（3）:10—13. Study on the Lack of the General Partner in the PrivateEquity BusinessWANG JinghuaAbstract: This paper firstly points out the phenomenon and reason of the lack of the general partner （GP）in China's private equity business, and then discusses the risks caused by the lack of the GP。
Based on this，the paper puts forward some relevant policy Suggestions。
This paper's innovations lie in analyzing the reasons and risks of the lack of the general partner (GP) in China’s private equity business。
This paper’s contribution is to discuss the PE’s risk and its controlling from a new Angle。
The conclusion is that the GP lack is a special phenomenon in the PE development，and the lack will produce many risks，so we should implement various measures to develop GP。
英文版复件 修改完整版=如何实施私募股权融资
• Choose the main investors
• Choose the partnership investors (if applicable) • Regulatory investor due diligence • Ready to file
• In place of funds, financing
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6
Private fund main work
Step one: The private preparatory work
§ Strategy determine the introduction of private investors § Determine the expected amount of financing, financing tools, and potential investors § Before the execution of the preparation § Set up project team including senior management to participate in the operation process: § Hire a professional accounting consultancy organize accounting for the company, find out company money (if needed); § Determine the financial adviser, legal advisers, formulate the investment structure; § Contact, screening of accountants, asset appraiser intermediary institutions; and § In-depth valuation measure, in order to confirm value and determine choice investors standard. § Before starting to contact potential investors plan and prepare all the necessary basic documents: confidentiality agreement and the information memorandum, main conditions of private equity investment framework agreement, etc.
金融学专业外文翻译----私募股权投资在新兴市场全球化企业中的角色
中文3478字本科毕业论文外文原文外文题目：Financial Foreign Direct Investment: The Role of Private Equity Investments in the Globalization of Firms fromEmerging Markets出处：Management International Review, 2009:11-26 DOI:10.1007 /s11575-008-0122-9作者：Tamir Agmon and Avi Messica原文：1. IntroductionInternational business and economic development are closely related. When applying to emerging markets, foreign direct investment (FDI) and development economics are two sides of the same coin. In terms of the classical OLI model of the economics of international business, the multinational enterprises (MNE) brings into play the ownership advantage while the governments of emerging markets bring into play the location advantage (Dunning 2000). For most part, the economics and the strategy of international business focused on the MNE while economic geography from Koopman (1957) to Krugman (1991) and later (as well as development economics) have focused on the country in which the investment takes place.This paper brings together international business development economics and international trade to gain better insights into an important and fascinating phenomenon in the arena of international business –the recent growth of private equity investments in emerging markets. The tremendous growth of private equity investments in emerging markets is evident from the data presented in Table 1. The total went up almost ten times, from about $3.5B to more than $33B in the period 2003-2006. Emerging Asia led the emerging markets with $19.4B raised in 2006 by 93 funds; about a third of the money that was raised by these funds went to China andIndia.The main argument that is presented and discussed in this paper is that private equity investments in emerging markets is another expression of foreign direct investment (FDI) where firms from the developed countries export specific factors of production (their ownership advantage) to small countries and emerging markets (new locations) as a way to generate value to all stakeholders. The firms in the developed countries in this case are specialized financial institutions (private equity funds) (Yoshikawa et al. 2006) and the factor of production that they export is high-risk sector specific capital. We dubbed this form of FDI as financial foreign direct investment (FFDI), but the process and the rational are the same as in the classical FDI analysis. FFDI (synonymous–but not restricted to–for private equity throughout this paper) is a subset of FDI that is solely devoted–as the name implies–for investments in private firms in purpose of generating high return on- investment over a relatively short period (5-7 years). The term “short” is relative and in comparison with the typical investment periods of the investors of private equity funds (e.g., pension funds, endowment funds and the like). At the extreme, i.e., in venture capital investments, investors take into account upfront that some of their investments will be written off at the prospects that few will generate return that will more than compensate those sunk investments (hence the “high-risk” referral). Sector specific capital is a general phenomenon. In many industries such investment is more than mere financial investment and is augmented by specific information that the investor may posses in the form of managerial expertise, deal structuring specialty, networking capabilities and the like. In the case of the high-risk capital industry there is a need to bridge the gap between the risk perception of the investment project by the entrepreneurs or the “insiders” and the investors (most often risk-averse investors), the “outsiders”. This is accomplished by a combination of v alidation processes and screening mechanisms that are engaged by the private equity funds. In this regard they act as financial and risk intermediaries (Coval/Thakor 2005, provide an analytical framework for this approach). The value of the general partners of private equity funds depends on the quality of the risk intermediation that they perform for their investors. This makes them credible and reliable processors of information.Table 1: Emerging Markets Private Equity Funds Raising, 2003-2006 (US$ Millions)Emerging Asia CEERussiaLatham Sub-SaharaAfricaMiddle-EastAfricaMultipleRegionsTotal2003 2,200 406 417 NA 350 116 3,489 2004 2,800 1,777 714 NA 545 618 6,454 2005 15,446 2,711 1,272 791 1,915 3,630 25,765 2006 19,386 3,272 2,656 2,353 2,946 2,580 33,193 Source: EMPEA (Emerging Markets Private Equity Association) 2007.The discussion and the analysis presented in this paper draw on three different bodies of literature; the literature of finance and growth from development economics, (Levine 1997, 2004), the literature on comparative advantage in the discussion of patterns of trade (Deardorff 2004) and the literature of imperfect contracts in micro economics and in financial economics (Hart 2001, Zingales 2000).Financial foreign direct investment as practiced by private equity funds can be a powerful contributor to economic and business growth in emerging markets. FFDI changes the scene of international business as it contributes to a change in the relations between firms in developed countries and firms in the emerging markets. The unique relatively short term nature of a private equity investment makes it an appropriate instrument for the transition period that the world of international business is experiencing regarding the role of emerging markets and the role of China and India in particular. This is so because the short term nature of private equity investments allows firms in emerging markets for sufficient time for transfer of information and learning and yet allow the local stakeholders to resume full ownership once the process is completed.The relations between the development economics literature on finance and growth and the international business literature is presented and discussed in the next section of the paper. It is shown that the two bodies of literatures are quite related once one penetrates the specific lingo employed by each one of them. The problems in the institutional setting and the lack of sufficient development of the capitalmarkets in most emerging markets are overcome by creating specific international alliances that generate local comparative advantage. In section three, the concept of local comparative advantage (Deardorff 2004) is used for better understanding of FFDI. The perfect and efficient financial market of the Modern Theory of Finance is replaced by a set of imperfect contracts negotiated and renegotiated between domestic firms in emerging markets and private equity funds from the US and other major capital markets. This issue is discussed and analyzed in section four of the paper. Private equity funds drew a fair amount of criticism lately. The potential of private equity investment in emerging markets is discussed in section five of the paper. The conclusions of the study are briefly discussed in section six, the last section of the paper.2. Finance, Growth and International BusinessIn a survey paper on the relations between financial development and economic growth Levine (1997) states that: “…the development of financial markets and in stitutions are critical and inextricable part of the growth process”. He continues and says that: “…financial development is a good predictor of future rates of economic growth, capital accumulationand technological change. Moreover, cross-country, case study, industry- and firm- level analyses document extensive periods when financial development-or the lack thereof-crucially affect the speed and the pattern of economic development”, (Levine 1997, p. 689). Levine makes two other important points; first that the discussion of finance and developments takes place outside the state-contingent world of Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959) and the discussion takes place in an incomplete world with imperfect (monopolistic) competition. The second point is that there are three main research questions in the field of finance and development that needs more attention. (1) Why does financial structure change as countries grow? (2) Why do countries at similar stages of economic development have different looking financial systems? and (3) are there longterm economic growth advantages to adopting legal and policy changes that create one type of financial system vis-à-vis another?The three research questions raised by Levine deal with different aspects of the location of foreign direct investment. In particular, the three research questions dealwith the gap between the potential of a certain country, or countries, as a site for an international oriented investment and the actual investment that has taken place. This is particularly true where the investment from the developed countries is in the form of high-risk sector specific capital such as provided by private equity funds. The potential of some countries in attracting private equity funds is not being fully realized due to the absence of an appropriate financial system. A well developed financial system is necessary to enhance the import of sector specific (high-risk) capital, a necessary condition for FFDI.As the financial structure of a country changes (as the country grows), it is suggested by Levine in his first question that different types of FDI can be accommodated. The development of FDI in China is an evidence of this process. Yet, as it is proposed in Levine’s second question, the financial markets of countries w ith similar rate of growth develop in different pace and in a different way. There are long-term economic growth advantages of adopting certain patterns of development for the financial market of a given country. In many cases FDI and FFDI do depend on relatively transparent and enforceable corporate governance. Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) demonstrated that economic entrenchment has a high price in foregone growth opportunities.There are three related problems in creating a domestic financial system for private equity and venture capital investments:How to mobilize the type and the quantity of savings (capital) appropriate for such investments where most of the capital should be imported from the major capital markets of the world?How to generate credible information and trust? How to monitor management and to exert corporate control?The only feasible way to accommodate private equity and venture capital investments in emerging markets is to import sector specific high-risk capital from the US and other major capital markets. The term sector specific capital recognizes the fact that capital is not a unified factor of production (in the same way that there are different types of labor there are different types of capital). High-risk sector specific capital relates to the portfolio of the investors and to the relational capital of thespecific financial intermediaries (i.e., the private equity funds). Most of the high-risk capital in the world is coming from large institutional investors in the US and it is a part of their assets’ management program. (A good example of how such capital relates to the total portfolio is the investment policy of CALPERS the largest pension fund in the US). Due to internal and external regulations, financial institutions cannot make investment unless there is an acceptable level of transparency and corporate governance in the country where the money is invested. Whether such a process is possible in a given developing country and what are the chances that if implemented it will succeed is a very important question. Horii, Ohdoi, and Yamamoto (2005) deal with this issue. They address the question why some developing countries are less successful than others in adopting technologies and more effective financial markets techniq ues. To quote Horii et al. (2005, p. 2): “A fundamental question is why some countries are stuck with poor performance even though it results in primitive financial markets and unproductive technologies”. They conclude that in some cases the expected increase in the income inequality due to the financial led technological changes deters people from adopting financial, legal, and political reforms that will lead to financial, business, and economic development. Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) provide somewhat different answer, also focusing on income distribution but from a point of view of economic entrenchment and rent seeking behavior.Nowhere the relationship between finance, growth, and international business is more pronounced than in the impressive development of the private equity funds devoted for investment in emerging markets. Table 1 presents data on the growth of private equity funds raised for investment in emerging markets by regions.The amounts of money raised by private equity funds dedicated for investments in emerging markets went up tremendously in the last five years. More importantly significant amounts were invested to support domestic companies in emerging markets to become more competitive in the global markets by providing their own brands of products to the world’s consumers. Lenovo is a case in point when a major investment by three American private equity funds (Texas Pacific Group, General Atlantic, and Newbridge Capital) was made in a Chinese company with the purpose of making Lenovo a leading competitor in the global market.译文：金融类对外直接投资：私募股权投资在新兴市场全球化企业中的角色一、简介国际商业和经济发展密切相关。
金融专业英文参考文献
金融专业英文参考文献金融专业英文参考文献[1]Microfinance Consensus Guide lines. Robert Peck Christen,Richard Rosenberg. . 2003[2]Micro success story:Transformation of NGOs into Regulated Financial Institution. NimalA.Fernando. . 2004[3]Micro success story:Transformation of NGOs into Regulated Financial Institution. Nimal A Fernando. . 2004[4]"Access for All: Building Inclusive Financial Systems". CGAP. . 2006[5]"Building Inclusive Financial Systems: Donor Guidelines on GoodPractice in Microfinance". CGAP. . 2004[6]Microfinance ConsensusGuidelines: Guiding Principles on Regulation and Supervision ofMicrofinance. Christen R P,Lyman T R,Rosenberg R. . 2003[7]Regulations,market structure,institutions, and the cost of financial intermediation. Demirguc-Kunt A,Laeven L,Levine R. . 2003[8]Financial structure and economic growth: A cross-country comparisonof banks, markets, and development. . 2004[9]Access for all: building inclusive financial systems. HelmsB. . 2006[10]Where is credit due? Companies, banks, andlocally differentiated investment growth in Vietnam. Malesky E J,Taussig M. . 2005[11]Commercialization of microfinance: A framework forLatin America. Poyo J,Young R. . 1999[12]Access for all: building inclusive financial systems. HelmsB. . 2006[13]Commercialization of microfinance: A framework for Latin America. Poyo J,Young R. . 1999[14]"Building Inclusive Financial Systems: Donor Guidelines on Good Practice inMicrofinance". CGAP. . 2004[15]"Access for All: Building Inclusive Financial Systems". CGAP. . 2006[16]Occupational choice and the process of development. Banerjee A V,Newman A F. .[17]Financial Stability As a Policy Goal. Chant J. Bank of Canada Technical Report . 2003[18]TheRushto Regulate:Legal Frameworks for Microfinance. Robert Peck Christen,Richard Rosenberg. CGAP Occa-sional Paper No.4 . 2000[19]"The Rush to Regulate:Legal Frame-works for Microfinance,". CGAP. CGAP Occasional Papers, No. 4 . 2000[20]Building Inclusive Financial Sectors for Development. UNCDF . 2006[10]Financial and LegalConstraints to Growth: Does Firm Size Matter. Thorsten beck,Asli Demirguee–kunt,Vojislav Maksimovic. The Journal of Finance . 2005[22]Occupational choice and the process ofdevelopment. Banerjee A V,Newman A F. Journal of Politics . 1993[23]Credit Bureaus: A Necessity forMicrofinance?. Campion A,Valenzuela L. Microenterprise Best Practices . 2001[24]Credit Bureaus:A Necessity for Microfinance?. Campion A,Valenzuela L. MicroenterpriseBest Practices . 2001[25]"Financial Institutions witha ’’Double Bottom Line’’". Christe n,Rosenberg,Jayadeva. Occasional Paper,No.8, CGAP . 2004[26]"Financial Institutions with a ’’Double Bottom Line’’". Christen,Rosenberg,Jayadeva.Occasional Paper,No.8, CGAP . 2004[27]Microfinance as a Grass-Roots Policy for International Development. Gary M. Woller,,Warner Woodworth. Policy Studies Journal . 2001[28]Income distribution and macroeconomics. Galor O,Zeira J. Review of Economics Studies . 1993[29]Maximizing the outreach of microenterprisefinance. Christen R P,Rhyne E,V ogel R C, et al. USA ID Program and Operations Assessment Report . 1995[30]Maximizing the outreachof microenterprise finance. Christen R P,Rhyne E,V ogel R C, et al. USA ID Program and Operations AssessmentReport . 1995。
金融学专业外文翻译原文
毕业设计/论文外文文献翻译系别专业班级姓名评分指导教师20 年月日金融衍生工具和流通量的上升流通的社会结构性成因激增的短期投机资本,通过这种承受风险的衍生物的流通而变得具体和富有生气,似乎从正在进行的全球经济的基本社会结构的变革中反映，放大和升华(Eatwell and Taylor 2002)。
上述现象更是使重要性日益增强的流动性与金融机构及工具的发展特别是在流动性资本方面的关系得到了不断的发展(Pryke and Allen 2000)。
这似乎是现代资本主义的内在动力强迫他们趋向于追逐更高的，更具全球范围意义的生产标准，那似乎是在产生那样一种能够连接自身成为社会结构价值的，逐渐上升的复杂标准。
虽然在当时并没有发现,从二十世纪七十年代开始欧美工业生产的潜力已经耗尽了(Brenner 1998)，需要一定的空间来补救和修复(Harvey 2000; James 2001)。
许多行业需要探索新的途径来对更边缘的地区进行一体化（特别是南亚地区），以此来支撑受过度的产品生产和过多的资本积累强制驱动的，从而引发的关键性矛盾。
正如斯皮罗所说(1999)，欧美资本主义所产生和吸收的资本量（尤其是欧佩克成员国），在大部分现有的工业部门，已经超过了它能有利润的进行资本再投资的需求量。
因此哈维(1982)所评论说“如果平衡被重新恢复，需要一个过程，即通过运行生产系统消除过剩的资本，那么资本过度积累的趋势将被自动抵消。
”宗主国响应的一个关键性方面是欧美公司全球性的重组，开始把大量工业原材料的生产和原件的制造外包给那些较先进的发展中国家的较发达地区。
通常是南亚，特别是中国是这次重组的主要受惠者(Singh 2002)。
那些先进地区边缘的内陆地区也包括整个国家，比如巴基斯坦，也成为了原材料和手工劳动产品（例如：纺织品）的外包中心。
尽管还有一些国家，特别是虽然不是只在沙哈拉以南的非洲地区，他们参加这个过程仅仅给人以边缘的和偶然的感觉。
投资基金财务风险文献综述中英文资料外文翻译文献
投资基金财务风险文献综述中英文资料外文翻译文献摘要本文综述了有关投资基金财务风险的中英文资料外文翻译文献。
文献说明了投资基金面临的财务风险种类、风险管理策略以及对投资者的影响。
本文旨在为研究投资基金财务风险的学者提供相关资料，以促进对该领域的进一步研究。
文献1：《Investment fund financial risks and their implications》本文研究了投资基金面临的财务风险以及这些风险对投资者和市场的影响。
研究发现，投资基金的财务风险包括市场风险、信用风险和流动性风险。
为了管理这些风险，投资基金公司可以采取多种策略，如多元化投资组合和使用衍生工具。
然而，财务风险仍然存在，并可能对投资者的收益产生负面影响。
本文综述了投资基金的财务风险管理策略。
研究发现，投资基金公司可以通过风险度量、风险分散、风险对冲和流动性管理等方法来管理财务风险。
然而，有效的财务风险管理需要综合考虑投资目标、风险承受能力和环境因素等因素。
因此，投资基金公司应该定期评估和调整其财务风险管理策略。
文献3：《The impact of financial risks on investor behavior in investment funds》本文研究了财务风险对投资者行为的影响。
研究发现，投资基金的财务风险可能导致投资者的情绪波动和投资行为的变化。
投资者在面临财务风险时可能更加保守，减少风险敏感的投资，并选择更稳健的投资策略。
因此，理解财务风险对投资者行为的影响对于投资基金公司和投资者都非常重要。
结论综合上述文献，投资基金面临的财务风险种类多样，包括市场风险、信用风险和流动性风险。
为了管理这些风险，投资基金公司可以采取多种策略，如多元化投资组合和使用衍生工具。
然而，财务风险仍然存在，并可能对投资者的收益产生负面影响。
此外，财务风险还可能影响投资者的行为，导致投资决策的变化。
因此，投资基金公司应该认识到财务风险的存在并采取适当的风险管理策略。
私募股权投资
What Drives Venture Capital Fundraising?Paul A. Gompers and Josh Lerner*December 1997Within the past few years, numerous nations have encouraged the formation of venture capital funds. The determinants of venture capital fundraising, however, are little understood. This paper explores the world’s largest venture capital market, the United States. We examine both industry aggregate and firm-specific fundraising to determine if macroeconomic, firm-specific, or regulatory factors determine commitments to venture capital funds. We find that decreases in capital gains tax rates appear to have a positive and important impact on commitments to new venture capital funds. Fund performance and reputation also lead to greater fundraising by venture organizations. At the aggregate industry level, commitments by taxable and tax-exempt investors seem equally sensitive to changes in capital gains tax rates. The evidence is consistent with decreases in capital gains tax rates increasing the demand for venture capital as more workers are incented to become entrepreneurs, leading to increasing commitments to venture capital.* Harvard University and National Bureau of Economic Research. We would like to thank Gabe Biller and Qian Sun for excellent research assistance. Chris Allen helped in collecting data. James Poterba provided helpful comments. Support for this project was provided by the Advanced Technology Program and the Division of Research, Harvard Business School.1. IntroductionOver the past decade, there has been a dramatic expansion of public programs around the globe to encourage the formation of venture capital funds. Governments, attracted by the technological innovation and job growth that the venture capital sector has apparently spurred in the Untied States, have sought to stimulate this financial intermediary. These programs, many of which are summarized in the appendix, have employed a variety of structures. Among other promotion mechanisms, venture funds (and their investors) have received direct capital investments, loan guarantees, and targeted tax breaks [for a detailed discussion, see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1996)].Despite the proliferation of these programs, they have received little empirical scrutiny. This appears to be an important omission, particularly in light of the intensive examination of other aspects of public economic policy, such as privatization initiatives. This omission is particularly surprising in light of the purported successes of some of these programs. Among the three most-cited examples are:•the Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) program in the United States was established in 1958 to fund private organizations to make equity and debtinvestments into young firms. Many founders of pioneering independent ventureorganizations in the 1960s received their initial experience in SBICs. Observersalso attribute much of the initial formation of high-technology firms and businessintermediaries in the “Silicon Valley” and “Route 128” regions to this program.•after offering tax incentives and subsidies to high-technology firms for several decades, the Israeli government initiated two programs to encourage the formationof venture capital funds in 1991. Many analysts claim that the Yozma and Inbalinitiatives, which subsidized the establishment of dedicated funds, led to not onlyan increase in venture capital fundraising (from $29 million raised in 1991 to $550million in 1997), but to a burst of investment by foreign high-technologycompanies in Israeli R&D and manufacturing facilities.•Singapore began aggressively promoting venture capital funds in 1985. Among the key policy measures were tax incentives for venture funds, subsidies for thetraining of new venture capital professionals, and direct investments in newventures and university spin-offs. The impact on venture capital activity has beendramatic—in 1996, over 100 funds managed over $7.7 billion, up from two fundsand $42 million in 1985—and a number of observers have argued that theseprograms have led to a more general increase in high-technology R&D activity.This paper takes a first step towards assessing these policies. It examines not the success of the overseas initiatives themselves, but rather the determinants of venture capital inflows in the country where this sector is the most developed on either a per capita or absolute basis: the United States.During the past twenty years, commitments to the U.S. venture capital industry have grown dramatically. This growth has not been uniform: it has occurred in quite concentrated areas of the country and peaks in fundraising have been followed by major retrenchments. Despite the importance of and interest in the venture capital sector, the underlying causes of these dramatic movements in venture fundraising are little understood. In this paper we examine the forces that affect both overall industry fundraising patterns and the fundraising success of individual venture organizations. We find that regulatory changes affecting pension funds and capital gains tax rates—as well as firm-specific performance and reputation—affect fundraising by venture capital organizations. The results are potentially important for understanding and promoting venture capital investment.Various factors may affect the level of commitments to venture capital organizations. Poterba (1989) argues that many of the changes in fundraising could arise from changes in either the supply of or the demand for venture capital. For example, decreases in capital gains tax ratesmight increase commitments to venture capital funds not through increases in the desire for commitments to new funds by taxable investors, but rather through increases in the demand for venture capital investments when workers have greater incentives to become entrepreneurs. Our research methodology attempts to distinguish between supply and demand factors that affect the quantity of venture capital.We find that regulatory changes have had an important impact on commitments to venture capital funds. The Department of Labor’s clarification of prudent man rule, which enabled pension funds to freely invest in venture capital, had a generally positive effect on commitments to the industry by increasing the supply of funds. Capital gains tax rates have an important effect at both the industry and firm-specific level. Decreases in the capital gains tax rates are associated with greater venture capital commitments. The effect, however, appears to occur through the demand for venture capital: rate changes affect both taxable and tax-exempt investors. We also find that performance and reputation influence fundraising. Finally, we examine factors that affect venture organizations’decisions to raise funds targeted at early-stage, start-up firms. These funds are potentially the most important for generating new firms and innovation. We find that smaller, West Coast venture organizations are more likely to have raised an early-stage venture fund.The rest of the paper is organized as follows: A brief history of the venture capital industry is presented in Section 2. Section 3 develops theoretical considerations about factors that might affect venture capital fundraising. Industry-wide fundraising patterns are explored in Section 4. Section 5 explores fundraising by individual venture organizations in an exhaustive database of venture capital funds. Section 6 concludes the paper.2.The Venture Capital IndustryMany start-up firms require substantial capital. A firm’s founder may not have sufficient funds to finance these projects alone and might therefore seek outside financing. Entrepreneurial firms that are characterized by significant intangible assets, expect years of negative earnings, and have uncertain prospects are unlikely to receive bank loans or other debt financing. Venture capital organizations finance these high-risk, potentially high-reward projects, purchasing equity stakes while the firms are still privately held. Venture capitalists have backed many high-technology companies including Sun Microsystems, Netscape, Cisco Systems, Apple Computer, and Genentech. A substantial number of service firms (including Staples, TCBY, Starbucks, and Federal Express) have also received venture financing.Venture capitalists are often active investors, monitoring the progress of firms, sitting on boards of directors, and meting out financing based on the attainment of milestones. Venture capitalists often retain important control rights that allow them to intervene in the company’s operations when necessary. In addition, venture capitalists provide entrepreneurs with access to consultants, investment bankers, and lawyers.The first modern venture capital firm, American Research and Development (ARD), was formed in 1946 by MIT President Karl Compton, Harvard Business School Professor Georges F. Doriot, and local business leaders. A small group of venture capitalists made high-risk investments into emerging companies that were based on technology developed for World War II. The success of the investments ranged widely: almost half of ARD's profits during its 26-year existence as an independententity came from its $70,000 investment in Digital Equipment Company (DEC) in 1957, which grew in value to $355 million. Because institutional investors were reluctant to invest, ARD was structured as a publicly traded closed-end fund and marketed mostly to individuals [Liles (1977)]. The few other venture organizations begun in the decade after ARD's formation were also structured as closed-end funds.The first venture capital limited partnership, Draper, Gaither, and Anderson, was formed in 1958. Imitators soon followed, but limited partnerships accounted for a minority of the venture pool during the 1960s and 1970s. Most venture organizations raised money either through closed-end funds or small business investment companies (SBICs), federally guaranteed risk-capital pools that proliferated during the 1960s. While the market for SBICs in the late 1960s and early 1970s was strong, incentive problems ultimately led to the collapse of the sector. Even so, the annual flow of money into venture capital during its first three decades never exceeded a few hundred million dollars and usually was substantially less.One change in the venture capital industry during the past twenty years has been the rise of the limited partnership as the dominant organizational form. Limited partnerships have an important advantage which makes them attractive to tax-exempt institutional investors: capital gains taxes are not paid by the limited partnership. Instead taxes are paid only by the (taxable) investors. These venture partnerships have pre-determined, finite lifetimes, usually of ten years though extensions are often allowed.3.Theoretical Considerations3.1. Firm performance and fundraisingA substantial body of research examines the relationship between past performance and investment. Within the financial sector, we find that allocations across asset classes seems to be driven by, in part, the relative performance of various sectors over the recent past. If there is short-run momentum in returns—as shown by Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1993)—this response may be rational.The flow of money into and out of various types of financial institutions in response to performance has been documented extensively in mutual funds. While the early research on mutual funds [Jensen (1968); Ippolito (1989)] indicated that mutual fund managers as a group do not significantly outperform the market, recent work has shown that performance is related to new cash flows into a mutual fund. Sirri and Tufano (1993) find that performance relative to peers in the same investment category is an important determinant of new capital commitments to mutual funds. They examine 690 equity mutual funds and rank the funds by their performance relative to funds that have the same investment focus. They find that the top performing funds in any particular investment style have substantial new commitments to their funds in the subsequent year. The relation between performance and commitments, however, is not linear. Funds that perform poorly do not appear to be penalized in the following year. Money does not leave poor performing funds. Sirri and Tufano (1993) find that one exception to these findings is new funds. Money does seem to leave a new fund if it is a poor performer.Chevalier and Ellison (1997) examine how these patterns affect investment incentive functions. They find that funds which have underperformed their peers in the first part of the year have anincentive to increase the riskiness of their portfolios in order to increase the chances that they will end up near the top of the performance charts. If they bet wrong and fail, they will lose few of their current investors. If the evidence from mutual funds has implications for venture capital, then we would expect that recent performance would be positively related to commitments to new funds.As in Sirri and Tufano’s (1993) mutual fund results, reputation of the venture organization may influence the flow of new commitments when it raises a new fund. Several measures of reputation may be important. These include venture organization age and capital under management. Older and larger venture organizations are likely to have more established reputations. They may therefore receive larger capital commitments than similar younger funds.3.2. Capital gains taxes and venture capital fundraisingThe effect of capital gains tax rates on commitments to the venture capital industry has been debated in the academic literature as well as political circles. The effect of reductions in the capital gains tax rate on commitments to venture capital was one of the intended benefits of the reduction of the tax from 28% to 14% on investments in small companies held for five years that was enacted in 1993.1Poterba (1989) analyzes factors within the venture capital industry which might affect the impact of capital gains tax rates on commitments to venture capital funds. He argues that the effect is probably not on the supply side. Most investors in venture capital after 1980 have been tax-exempt1 For a discussion of various aspects of capital gains taxation see Auerbach (1988), Poterba (1987), and Stiglitz (1983).institutions. The relative contribution from tax-sensitive investors has been declining over time. Poterba argues that it is unlikely that taxable entities are the marginal investors in the industry or that the capital gains tax rate would have a dramatic impact on the supply curve for venture capital.Poterba then develops a model of the decision to become an entrepreneur. He argues that the capital gains tax rate could have a dramatic effect on this choice. Lower capital gains tax rates make it relatively more attractive for a manager or worker to become an entrepreneur and start his or her own company. Most of a manager’s compensation comes in the form of salary and cash bonuses which are taxed at the ordinary income tax rate. Most of the compensation from being an entrepreneur is in the form of capital appreciation on the equity of their company. Poterba argues that it is possible that reductions in the capital gains tax rates could have a first order effect on the demand for venture capital as more people are induced to become entrepreneurs. This would increase the quantity of venture capital supplied.Anand (1996) examines the effects of capital gains tax rates on investment in the communications industry. He examines investments by venture capital firms into private communication companies and finds that the level and composition of investment appears to be affected negatively by increases in the capital gains tax rate. The author’s ability to draw conclusions, however, is limited by the fact that he looks only at one industry. Investments in one industry may be affected by myriad other factors including technology shifts, tastes, etc. Examining the impact of capital gains tax rates on the quantity of venture capital raised appears to be a much more satisfactory way to address the issue.If the capital gains tax rate has an important impact on commitments to venture capital funds, then we would expect a significant relation at the industry level and at the firm-specific level. Lower capital gains taxes should lead to increases in commitments to the industry as a whole as well as to individual funds. We can also shed light on whether Poterba’s argument about supply or demand effects is valid. If capital gains taxes affect commitments to venture capital primarily through the demand for venture capital, then we expect that reductions in the capital gains tax rate should have a positive impact on the commitments of both tax-exempt and tax-sensitive investors. If the effect is primarily due to supply changes, then contributions by tax-exempt investors should be unrelated to the capital gains tax rate.3.3.Other macroeconomic factors and venture fundraisingVenture capital fundraising is potentially affected by other macroeconomic factors as well. One policy decision that potentially had an effect on commitments to venture funds was the clarification by the U.S. Department of Labor of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act’s (ERISA) prudent man rule in 1978. Prior to 1978, the rule stated that pension managers had to invest with the care of a “prudent man.” Consequently, many pension funds avoided investing in venture capital. In 1978, the Department of Labor said that portfolio diversification was a consideration in determining the prudence of an individual investment. That clarification specifically opened the door for pension funds to invest in venture capital. We might expect that after 1978, the additional capital provided by pension funds led to a dramatic shift in commitments to venture capital.Other macroeconomic factors might affect commitment levels through both the cost of alternative funds and the general health of the economy. If the economy is growing quickly, then theremay be more attractive opportunities for entrepreneurs to start new firms and hence, more investment opportunities for venture capitalists. This greater investment opportunity set might be associated with greater commitments to the venture capital industry. GDP growth and returns in the stock market might proxy for such investment opportunities.Finally, the level of interest rates in the economy may affect the demand for venture capital. If interest rates rise, then the attractiveness of venture financing versus credit of any kind increases. This increase in demand may lead to a greater quantity of venture capital being provided in the economy.4. Venture Industry-Wide ResultsWe examine the implications of performance and capital gains tax rates for commitments to venture capital funds by performing two layers of analysis: industry-wide flows and commitments to individual funds. The first level of analysis examines the aggregate flow of venture capital commitments into the industry. We examine the commitments to new venture capital funds from 1969 through 1994. Data on annual commitments come from various issues of the Venture Capital Journal. This magazine, published by Venture Economics, has tracked venture fundraising since the 1960s. Venture Economics is also the source of individual fundraising data analyzed in Section 5. Commitments to venture capital funds are not the amount of money that is actually invested in a given year. Venture Economics counts all the money that was committed to be invested during the life of a venture fund in the year in which the fund was raised. Typically, venture funds draw on the committed capital over a two- to three-year time period. We examine annual issues of the Venture Capital Journal and code information on the amount of venture capital committed in a particular year.We also need some measure of returns in the venture capital industry. Ideally, we would have year-by-year performance data for individual funds. These data present several problems. Calculation of returns is hampered by policies of many venture organizations that potentially delay the write-up or write-down of assets: portfolio firms that are still private are often not revalued. In addition, practices of reporting valuations of companies across various venture organizations is often quite different. Finally, information on fund returns is closely guarded, and even the intermediaries who specialize in compiling this data do not have very comprehensive coverage.As a proxy for performance of the venture organizations, we use a measure of the market value of equity held by venture capitalists in firms that have gone public in a particular year. This measure will be highly correlated with returns on venture funds. Most money in venture capital is earned on firms that eventually go public. In Venture Economics' (1988) review of returns on venture capital investments, venture capital-backed companies that eventually did initial public offerings yielded the highest return for venture investors, an average 59.5% per year (7.1 times invested capital returned over 4.2 years). Acquisitions offered average returns of only 15.4% per year (1.7 times invested capital returned over 3.7 years) while liquidations lost 80% of their value over 4.1 years. Using the IPO measure also makes sense because marketing documents for venture capital funds often highlight the successful companies which have been backed by the venture organization. We therefore expect that the amount of venture capital raised will be a function of the value of firms taken public by venture capitalists in the previous year.We identify potential venture-backed IPOs using three sources. The first is the listings of venture-backed IPOs published in Venture Economics' Venture Capital Journal. This is the samesource used by Barry, et al. (1990) and Megginson and Weiss (1991). These listings are an extract from the Venture Intelligence Database (marketed by Venture Economics' parent, Securities Data Corporation [SDC]), which documents the private and public financings of venture-backed firms. The Venture Capital Journal's listings of IPOs are not complete. First, as Barry and his co-authors note, the Journal excludes very small offerings. Second, the underlying Venture Intelligence Database does not include approximately 15% of all venture-financed firms [Lerner (1995)].We consequently use two additional sources to identify IPOs that may be venture-backed. The first is listings of the securities distributions by venture funds. Venture capitalists typically unwind their successful investments by distributing the shares to their limited partners. They avoid selling the shares themselves and distributing the proceeds to their limited partners because their investors include both tax-exempt and tax-paying parties. To sell the shares would generate an immediate tax liability, which some of the limited partners may wish to avoid. We obtain lists of the distributions received by a pension fund which is among the largest venture investors and by three investment managers [Gompers and Lerner (1997b)]. (These investment managers allocate funds from numerous pension funds into venture capital and other asset classes.) These investors had received distributions from 135 venture funds, most of which are managed by the oldest and most established venture organizations in the industry. Most of the successful investments by these funds can be identified from these lists.The final source used to identify IPOs for the sample are the offering documents used by venture capitalists to raise new funds from investors. Venture organizations will often list in theseoffering memorandums their past investments which either went public or were acquired on favorable terms. We examine over four hundred of these memorandums in the files of Venture Economics [Gompers and Lerner (1997a)]. We identify any investments listed as having gone public. Most of the offering documents compiled by Venture Economics are from young venture organizations. This is because their Fund Raiser Advisory Service counsels less experienced firms on strategies for raising capital.Not all firms identified from these sources are venture-backed IPOs. For instance, in some cases, the Venture Capital Journal mistakenly lists a follow-on stock offering as an IPO. In other cases, venture capitalists distribute shares that were purchased in the open market after a firm has gone public. We consequently examine the "Management" and "Principal and Selling Shareholders" sections of each IPO prospectus to determine whether these firms had received venture financing while privately held.2 We examine each prospectus to determine if any venture capital organizations were investors in the firm and if any individuals affiliated with these organizations were on the board.We include in the IPO sample all firms with a venture investor listed in the database. In many cases, it is not immediately obvious whether a venture investor or director is an exact match2When the prospectus is missing from the HBS library, we order it from Disclosure. In about five percent of the cases, Harvard's collection only includes a preliminary version of the IPO prospectus. As a cost-cutting measure, we employ the preliminary prospectus rather than ordering the final version. In a few instances, Disclosure did not microfiche the IPO prospectus, but did copy the registration statement that was filed in conjunction with the offering. In these cases, we order and use the last amendment to the registration statement, which contains a reproduction of the final version of the prospectus.with a venture organization listed in the database.3 To address these ambiguities, we consult the edition of Venture Economics' Pratt's Guide to Venture Capital Sources (1996) published in the year of the IPO. We compare the addresses and key personnel of each of these ambiguous venture organizations with the information reported in the prospectus. If we are not virtually certain that the venture organizations in the prospectus and the database are the same, we do not code it as a match. This process leads to the identification of 885 IPOs in which a venture capitalist served as a director or a venture capital fund was a blockholder.In each year we calculate the market value of the equity stakes in firms going public held by the venture capital organizations. This value is the number of shares held by the venture organization multiplied by the IPO offering price. We then sum the market values for each IPO in a given year to obtain an annual performance number for each venture capital organization. We then sum across all venture organizations in a given year to get a measure of venture industry performance.If IPO market value is a good proxy for returns, the value of equity held by the venture organization in firms which went public in a given year or the previous year should be positively related to the probability of raising a new fund and the size of that new fund. The aggregate level of equity in IPOs held by all venture capitalists should be positively related to aggregate industry funding.3In many cases, individual investors (often called "angels") will describe themselves as venture capitalists. Groups of individual investors often make their investments through partnerships, which frequently are given a name not unlike those of venture capital organizations.。
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金融学专业私募股权投资资料外文翻译文献外文题目：Financial Foreign Direct Investment: The Role of Private Equity Investments in the Globalization of Firms fromEmerging Markets原文：1. IntroductionInternational business and economic development are closely related. When applying to emerging markets, foreign direct investment (FDI) and development economics are two sides of the same coin. In terms of the classical OLI model of the economics of international business, the multinational enterprises (MNE) brings into play the ownership advantage while the governments of emerging markets bring into play the location advantage (Dunning 2000). For most part, the economics and the strategy of international business focused on the MNE while economic geography from Koopman (1957) to Krugman (1991) and later (as well as development economics) have focused on the country in which the investment takes place.This paper brings together international business development economics andinternational trade to gain better insights into an important and fascinating phenomenon in the arena of international business –the recent growth of private equity investments in emerging markets. The tremendous growth of private equity investments in emerging markets is evident from the data presented in Table 1. The total went up almost ten times, from about $3.5B to more than $33B in the period 2003-2006. Emerging Asia led the emerging markets with $19.4B raised in 2006 by 93 funds; about a third of the money that was raised by these funds went to China and India.The main argument that is presented and discussed in this paper is that private equity investments in emerging markets is another expression of foreign direct investment (FDI) where firms from the developed countries export specific factors of production (their ownership advantage) to small countries and emerging markets (new locations) as a way to generate value to all stakeholders. The firms in the developed countries in this case are specialized financial institutions (private equity funds) (Yoshikawa et al. 2006) and the factor of production that they export is high-risk sector specific capital. We dubbed this form of FDI as financial foreign direct investment (FFDI), but the process and the rational are the same as in the classical FDI analysis. FFDI (synonymous–but not restricted to–for private equity throughout this paper) is a subset of FDI that is solely devoted–as the name implies–for investments in private firms in purpose of generating high return on- investment over a relatively short period (5-7 years). The term “short” is relative and in comparison with the typical investment periods of the investors of private equity funds (e.g., pension funds, endowment funds and the like). At the extreme, i.e., in venture capital investments, investors take into account upfront that some of their investments will be written off at the prospects that few will generate return that will more than compensate those sunk investments (hence the “high-r isk” referral). Sector specific capital is a general phenomenon. In many industries such investment is more than mere financial investment and is augmented by specific information that the investor may posses in the form of managerial expertise, deal structuring specialty, networking capabilities and the like. In the case of the high-risk capital industry there is a need to bridge the gap between the risk perception of the investment project by theentrepreneurs or the “insiders” and the investors (most often risk-averse investors), the “outsiders”. This is accomplished by a combination of validation processes and screening mechanisms that are engaged by the private equity funds. In this regard they act as financial and risk intermediaries (Coval/Thakor 2005, provide an analytical framework for this approach). The value of the general partners of private equity funds depends on the quality of the risk intermediation that they perform for their investors. This makes them credible and reliable processors of information.Table 1: Emerging Markets Private Equity Funds Raising, 2003-2006 (US$ Millions)Emerging Asia CEERussiaLatham Sub-SaharaAfricaMiddle-EastAfricaMultipleRegionsTotal2003 2,200 406 417 NA 350 116 3,489 2004 2,800 1,777 714 NA 545 618 6,454 2005 15,446 2,711 1,272 791 1,915 3,630 25,765 2006 19,386 3,272 2,656 2,353 2,946 2,580 33,193 Source: EMPEA (Emerging Markets Private Equity Association) 2007.The discussion and the analysis presented in this paper draw on three different bodies of literature; the literature of finance and growth from development economics, (Levine 1997, 2004), the literature on comparative advantage in the discussion of patterns of trade (Deardorff 2004) and the literature of imperfect contracts in micro economics and in financial economics (Hart 2001, Zingales 2000).Financial foreign direct investment as practiced by private equity funds can be a powerful contributor to economic and business growth in emerging markets. FFDI changes the scene of international business as it contributes to a change in the relations between firms in developed countries and firms in the emerging markets. The unique relatively short term nature of a private equity investment makes it an appropriate instrument for the transition period that the world of international business is experiencing regarding the role of emerging markets and the role of China and India in particular. This is so because the short term nature of private equity investments allows firms in emerging markets for sufficient time for transfer ofinformation and learning and yet allow the local stakeholders to resume full ownership once the process is completed.The relations between the development economics literature on finance and growth and the international business literature is presented and discussed in the next section of the paper. It is shown that the two bodies of literatures are quite related once one penetrates the specific lingo employed by each one of them. The problems in the institutional setting and the lack of sufficient development of the capital markets in most emerging markets are overcome by creating specific international alliances that generate local comparative advantage. In section three, the concept of local comparative advantage (Deardorff 2004) is used for better understanding of FFDI. The perfect and efficient financial market of the Modern Theory of Finance is replaced by a set of imperfect contracts negotiated and renegotiated between domestic firms in emerging markets and private equity funds from the US and other major capital markets. This issue is discussed and analyzed in section four of the paper. Private equity funds drew a fair amount of criticism lately. The potential of private equity investment in emerging markets is discussed in section five of the paper. The conclusions of the study are briefly discussed in section six, the last section of the paper.2. Finance, Growth and International BusinessIn a survey paper on the relations between financial development and economic growth Levine (1997) states that: “…the development of financial markets and institutions are critical and inextricable part of the growth process”. He continues and says that: “…financial development is a good predictor of future rates of econom ic growth, capital accumulationand technological change. Moreover, cross-country, case study, industry- and firm- level analyses document extensive periods when financial development-or the lack thereof-crucially affect the speed and the pattern of econom ic development”, (Levine 1997, p. 689). Levine makes two other important points; first that the discussion of finance and developments takes place outside the state-contingent world of Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959) and the discussion takes place in an incomplete world with imperfect (monopolistic) competition. The second point is that there arethree main research questions in the field of finance and development that needs more attention. (1) Why does financial structure change as countries grow? (2) Why do countries at similar stages of economic development have different looking financial systems? and (3) are there longterm economic growth advantages to adopting legal and policy changes that create one type of financial system vis-à-vis another?The three research questions raised by Levine deal with different aspects of the location of foreign direct investment. In particular, the three research questions deal with the gap between the potential of a certain country, or countries, as a site for an international oriented investment and the actual investment that has taken place. This is particularly true where the investment from the developed countries is in the form of high-risk sector specific capital such as provided by private equity funds. The potential of some countries in attracting private equity funds is not being fully realized due to the absence of an appropriate financial system. A well developed financial system is necessary to enhance the import of sector specific (high-risk) capital, a necessary condition for FFDI.As the financial structure of a country changes (as the country grows), it is suggested by Levine in his first question that different types of FDI can be accommodated. The development of FDI in China is an evidence of this process. Yet, as it is proposed in Levine’s second question, the financial markets of countries with similar rate of growth develop in different pace and in a different way. There are long-term economic growth advantages of adopting certain patterns of development for the financial market of a given country. In many cases FDI and FFDI do depend on relatively transparent and enforceable corporate governance. Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) demonstrated that economic entrenchment has a high price in foregone growth opportunities.There are three related problems in creating a domestic financial system for private equity and venture capital investments:How to mobilize the type and the quantity of savings (capital) appropriate for such investments where most of the capital should be imported from the major capital markets of the world?How to generate credible information and trust? How to monitor managementand to exert corporate control?The only feasible way to accommodate private equity and venture capital investments in emerging markets is to import sector specific high-risk capital from the US and other major capital markets. The term sector specific capital recognizes the fact that capital is not a unified factor of production (in the same way that there are different types of labor there are different types of capital). High-risk sector specific capital relates to the portfolio of the investors and to the relational capital of the specific financial intermediaries (i.e., the private equity funds). Most of the high-risk capital in the world is coming from large institutional investors in the US and it is a part of their assets’ management program. (A good example of how such capital relates to the total portfolio is the investment policy of CALPERS the largest pension fund in the US). Due to internal and external regulations, financial institutions cannot make investment unless there is an acceptable level of transparency and corporate governance in the country where the money is invested. Whether such a process is possible in a given developing country and what are the chances that if implemented it will succeed is a very important question. Horii, Ohdoi, and Yamamoto (2005) deal with this issue. They address the question why some developing countries are less successful than others in adopting technologies and more effective financial markets techniques. To quote Horii et al. (2005, p. 2): “A fundamental question is why some countries are stuck with poor performance even though it results in primitive financial ma rkets and unproductive technologies”. They conclude that in some cases the expected increase in the income inequality due to the financial led technological changes deters people from adopting financial, legal, and political reforms that will lead to financial, business, and economic development. Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) provide somewhat different answer, also focusing on income distribution but from a point of view of economic entrenchment and rent seeking behavior.Nowhere the relationship between finance, growth, and international business is more pronounced than in the impressive development of the private equity funds devoted for investment in emerging markets. Table 1 presents data on the growth of private equity funds raised for investment in emerging markets by regions.The amounts of money raised by private equity funds dedicated for investmentsin emerging markets went up tremendously in the last five years. More importantly significant amounts were invested to support domestic companies in emerging markets to become more competitive in the global markets by providing their own brands of products to the world’s consumers. Lenovo is a case in point when a major investment by three American private equity funds (Texas Pacific Group, General Atlantic, and Newbridge Capital) was made in a Chinese company with the purpose of making Lenovo a leading competitor in the global market.译文：金融类对外直接投资：私募股权投资在新兴市场全球化企业中的角色一、简介国际商业和经济发展密切相关。