Credit Constraints, Heterogeneous Firms, and International Trade
Financing constraints,business environment and cor
Creative Economy2022,VOL.6,NO.2,52-59DOI:10.47297/wspceWSP2516-251905.20220602Financing Constraints,Business Environment and Corporate Tax AvoidanceMengjie Gao,Hao Zhu,Jinxiu WangBusiness School Foshan University,Foshan Guangdong528000,P.R.ChinaABSTRACTWith the global spread of the COVID-19pandemic,the economy of theworld generally continues to decline.Macroeconomic uncertainty isincreasing,and the external financing environment of enterprises is notgood.Tax avoidance,as an alternative financing method to alleviate thetight internal cash flow of enterprises,can help enterprises reduce cashexpenditure.At the same time,China has always attached greatimportance to the construction of business environment.The motivationof radical tax avoidance of financing constrained enterprises may bemoderated by the business environment.In view of this,this paper selectsA-share listed companies in China from2011to2020as the researchsample and the empirical results show that there is a significant positivecorrelation between financing constraints and corporate tax avoidance,and business environment has an inhibitory effect on the relationshipbetween financing constraints and corporate tax avoidance.KEYWORDSFinancing constraints;Business environment;Corporate tax avoidance;Moderating effect1IntroductionFinancing constraint is a severe test faced by many enterprises in China.At present,China's financial market structure is not reasonable enough,and bank credit is the main way of financing for enterprises.When the external financing environment is not good,enterprises usually prefer to accumulate funds through internal financing channels.Ye Kangtao and Liu Xing[1]proposed that tax avoidance can be regarded as an effective alternative to other financing methodst.It can be seen that financing constraints may become an internal driving force for corporate tax avoidance,and may induce radical tax avoidance behavior.Premier Li Keqiang of the State Council implemented the Regulations on Optimizing the Business Environment from2020,to further improve the business environment.At present,there is no relevant research on how to effectively control the tax avoidance behavior of enterprises facing financing difficulties.Therefore,it is worth further exploring whether the decision of tax avoidance will be affected by the business environment when enterprises face financing constraints.The main contributions of this paper are as follows:Firstly,the economic impact of financing constraints is discussed in depth.Secondly,this paper expands the research perspective of the impact of financing constraints on corporate tax avoidance behavior,considering the heterogeneous impact of business environment,and finally confirms that better business environment can inhibit the impact of financing.Creative Economy53 2Literature review,theoretical analysis and research hypothesis2.1Literature reviewFrom the perspective of the influencing factors of financing constraints,information asymmetry is the primary inducement of financing constraints.Myers and Mailuf[2]found that financing constraints faced by the companies will deepen with the increase of information asymmetry.From the perspective of the economic consequences of financing constraints,Fazzari et al.[3]believes that due to financing constraints,the company's investment level is lower than the best state.As for the influencing factors of tax avoidance,many scholars study how management affects corporate tax avoidance from the perspective of principal-agent.Dai Bin et al.[4]found that the gender of management has a certain impact on the company's tax avoidance w and Mills[5]found that corporate managers with military experience were more disciplined and less aggressive in tax avoidance.With regard to the economic consequences of corporate tax avoidance,Chen and Chu[6]believe that if a company implements tax avoidance,it will not only damage the reputation of the company, but also be punished by the tax authorities and increase the risk of management.It is difficult for the management to compensate for this part of the risk within the company,which weakens the incentive and restraint effect of the compensation contract and reduces the investment efficiency of the company.As for the research on financing constraints,most of the existing literatures mainly focus on the relationship between financial background,financial development,capital holdings and financing constraints.In order to fill the gaps in the existing research,this paper will explore the relationship between financing constraints and corporate tax avoidance,and further study whether business environment can play a moderating role in the relationship between the two.2.2Theoretical analysis and research hypothesis2.2.1The relationship between financing constraints and tax avoidanceThe theory of information asymmetry refers to the fact that the party who knows more and higher quality information is in an advantageous position and can selectively transmit information to obtain greater benefits.Therefore,the cost of external financing is higher than that of internal financing,and external financing can not replace internal financing.Companies with financing constraints need to bear greater market friction costs,and the use of internal capital flows can reduce the cost of market friction.Therefore,financing constraints will lead companies to choose internal financing.Tax avoidance is a means to increase the company's internal cash flow.According to the above,tax avoidance is a kind of endogenous financing behavior. Companies with financing constraints will show a significant tendency of tax avoidance.According to this,we propose hypothesis1:Hypothesis1:The higher the degree of financing constraints faced by enterprises,the higher the degree of tax avoidance.2.2.2The moderating role of the business environmentThe new institutional economics mainly includes transaction cost theory,property rights theory and so on.Coase[7]proposed the concept of transaction cost,which is defined as the cost paid by the production organization in the market transaction.Transaction cost theory expands the extension of this concept and points out that hidden cost is also a part of it.Among the business environment indicators,the government's administrative approval ofMengjie Gao et al enterprises,industry access intervention and other secondary indicators reflect transaction costs, which can reduce social costs and optimize the allocation of resources.Therefore,a good business environment can gradually improve the administrative efficiency of governments,reduce institutional transaction costs,so that enterprises reduce the motivation of radical tax avoidance.Based on the above,this paper puts forward hypothesis2:Hypothesis2:When the business environment is better,the positive impact of financing constraints on corporate tax avoidance will be suppressed.3Research design3.1Sample selection and data sourcesThis paper takes the annual data of China's A-share listed companies from2011to2020as the sample.In order to fit this study,the data are processed as follows:(1)excluding financial companies;(2)excluding ST and ST*companies;(3)excluding companies with missing key financial data in the past ten years.After the above screening,2010sample data were finally obtained.In order to eliminate the influence of extreme values on the results of the study,Winsorize tail-shortening treatment was carried out on all continuous variables at1%and99%quantiles.The data of this paper are from CSMAR database and WIND database,and the data of business environment are from China's Provincial Marketization Index Report(2016)compiled by Fan Gang and Wang Xiaolu.Stata16is used for data processing and analysis.3.2Variable definition3.2.1Explained variableThis paper refers to the practice of Li Chenying and uses the tax difference method to measure tax avoidance.The calculation formula is:BTD=(pretax accounting profit–taxable income)total assets at the end of the period(1)Taxable income=(income tax expense–deferred income tax expense)nominal income tax rate(2)3.2.2Explanatory variableWe refer to the practice of Deng Kebin to measure the degree of enterprise financing constraint with SA index.The calculation method is as follows:SA=-0.737×Size+0.043×Size2-0.040×Age(3)3.2.3Moderating variableReferring to the treatment method of Yu Hongmei et al.,this paper uses the average growth rate to estimate the lack of annual business environment index.This paper refers to the practice of Wang, H and Qian,C,the area larger than the national median is the area with higher marketization process,and the value is1,otherwise it is0.3.2.4Control variableThis paper selects enterprise size,asset-liability ratio,growth ability,period cost rate and executive compensation as the control variables of this study.Finally,the industry and the year are 54Creative Economy also controlled.3.3Model constructionAccording to the hypothesis 1proposed in this paper,the model (3)is constructed:BTD =α0+α1SA +α2Size +α3Growth +α4Lev +α5Sale +α6Comp +ΣYear +ΣInd +ε(4)According to the hypothesis 2proposed in this paper,the model (4)is constructed:BTD =β0+β1SA +β2SA∙BE +β3BE +β4Size +β5Growth +β6Lev +β7Sale +β8Comp +ΣYear +ΣInd +φ(5)4Empirical results and analysis4.1Descriptive statisticsAccording to the regression model,we have conducted descriptive statistics on the variables in the model.The specific results are shown in Table2:It can be seen from Table 5-2that the standard deviation of the degree of tax avoidance (BTD),is 0.024,the minimum value is -0.066,and the maximum value is 0.073,indicating that the level of tax avoidance of different enterprises is quite different.The average value of SA is 3.721,the standard deviation is 0.34,which indicates that the existence of financing constraints has become a common phenomenon.The adjustment variable is the business environment (BE),with an average value of 0.875,indicating that the business environment of 87.5%of enterprises is higher than the average business environment.Tab.1Variable names and definitionsVariable type Explained variable Explanatory variable Moderating variableControl vari‐ableVariable name Degree of tax avoidance Financing con‐straints Business envi‐ronment Enterprise scale Ability to grow Asset-liability ra‐tio Period expenserate Executive com‐pensation Industry YearVariable symbol BTD SABESize Growth Lev Sale Comp Ind YearVariable definitionThe larger the value,the more intense the tax avoidance The larger the absolute value is,the more serious the financing con‐straint isAccording to the provincial marketization index compiled by WangXiaolu and others,when the marketization index of the region wherethe enterprise is located exceeds the median,the value is 1,otherwise it is 0.Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the year (Operating income of current year-operating income of last year)/operating income of last year Total liabilities/total assets Period expenses/sales incomeNatural logarithm of total annual salary of senior executives China Securities Regulatory Commission 2012Industry ClassificationAnnual dummy variable55Mengjie Gao et al4.2Correlation analysisCorrelation coefficients of main variables are shown in Table3below:It can be seen from Table 5-3that the correlation coefficient between the degree of tax avoidance (BTD)and financing constraints (SA)is 0.110,which shows a positive correlation at the significance level of 1%,indicating that the higher the degree of financing constraints,the more likely enterprises are to engage in tax avoidance activities,that is,hypothesis 1has been preliminarily verified.The correlation coefficients between all variables are less than 0.6.Therefore,when these variables are introduced into model (1)and model (2)respectively,the multicollinearity of the model does not need to be considered.4.3Regression analysisFirstly,regression analysis is conducted on financing constraints and corporate tax avoidance.In order to test the change of the relationship between financing constraints and corporate tax avoidance under the influence of business environment,the interaction between financing constraints and business environment is added for regression.Table4shows the regression results of financing constraints and corporate tax avoidance.It can be seen from the table that there is a significant positive correlation between financing constraints (SA)and tax avoidance degree (BTD)at the 1%level,indicating that the more serious the financing constraints faced by enterprises,the higher the tax avoidance degree,which verifies the hypothesis 1of this paper.The coefficient of financing constraints (SA)is significantly positive,and the coefficient of the interaction between financing constraints and business environment (SA _BE)is significantly negative at the 5%level,which verifies the hypothesis 2of this paper.Tab.2Descriptive Statistical ResultsVariables BTD SA BE Size Lev Growth Sale CompMean value 0.00043.7210.87523.530.4870.2960.14415.74Standard deviation0.0240.3400.3311.5200.1850.6790.1030.784Minimum value-0.0662.368020.720.087-0.5140.01813.99Maximum value0.0734.347128.000.8433.8110.54517.80Sample size 22102210221022102210221022102210Tab.3Correlation coefficientVariables BTD SA BE Size Lev Growth Sale CompBTD10.110***-0.0220.026-0.160***-0.056***0.055**-0.007SA1-0.002-0.493***-0.163***-0.0290.163***-0.129***BE10.059***0.040*0.082***-0.0140.094***Size10.558***0.127***-0.292***0.501***Lev10.238***-0.362***0.295***Growth1-0.058***0.117***Sale1-0.020Comp1***p <0.01,**p <0.05,*p <0.1.56Creative Economy 4.4Robustness testIn order to make the above conclusion more reliable,this paper carries out the followingTab.4Financing constraints and corporate tax avoidance Variables SA Size Lev Growth Sale Comp _cons industry year N Adj-R2BTD 0.017***(9.20)0.007***(11.56)-0.047***(-12.77)0.0004(0.54)0.012**(2.25)-0.0005(-0.61)-0.171***(-9.54)control control 22100.211***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1,t-value in brackets.Tab.5Financing constraints,business environment and corporate tax avoidanceVariables SA SA_BE BE Size Lev Growth Sale Comp _cons industry year N Adj-R2BTD 0.018***(9.36)-0.014**(-2.48)-0.002(-1.20)0.006***(11.19)-0.047***(-12.77)0.0004(0.52)0.011*(1.93)-0.0003(-0.39)-0.168***(-9.39)control control 22100.214***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1,t-value in brackets.57Mengjie Gao et alrobustness test:for the explained variable corporate tax avoidance,using the difference between the nominal income tax rate and the actual income tax rate (RATE _diff).On this basis,the empirical results are basically unchanged,indicating that the conclusions of this study are relatively robust.5Research conclusions and policy recommendations5.1Research conclusionThis paper draws the following conclusions:Firstly,the intensification of financing constraints will promote enterprises to implement more aggressive tax avoidance behavior,and there is a positive correlation between them.Secondly,the business environment plays a regulatory role in the relationship between financing constraints and corporate tax avoidance,and a good business environment can reduce corporate tax avoidance caused by financing constraints.5.2Policy recommendations 5.2.1Government levelFirstly,the government need to create a fair,efficient and orderly business environment.Secondly,tax authorities should strengthen the inspection of tax avoidance.Tab.6Regression Results after Changing the Tax Avoidance IndexVariables SA SA_BE BE Size Lev Growth Sale Comp _cons industry year N Adj-R2Rate_Diff 0.030***(4.74)0.015***(7.94)-0.113***(-9.32)0.001(0.29)0.064***(3.33)-0.002(-0.81)-0.256***(-4.30)control control 22100.162Rate_Diff 0.031***(4.90)-0.042**(-2.31)-0.004(-0.87)0.015***(7.61)-0.113***(-9.30)0.001(0.26)0.059***(3.25)-0.002(-0.63)-0.249***(-4.17)control control 22100.165***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1,t-value in brackets.5859 Creative Economy5.2.2Listed company levelFirstly,improve internal cash flow management and broaden external financing channels.Cash flow is the lifeline of enterprise development.Secondly,enhance corporate social responsibility and consciously pay taxes in good faith.About the AuthorMengjie Gao,lecturer,doctoral degree,research direction:corporate governance and financial man‐agement.Hao Zhu,bachelor degree,research direction:financial management.Jinxiu Wang,bachelor degree,research direction:financial management.Funding2022Foshan Social Science Project“Research on the implementation effect and countermeasures of employee stock ownership plan in Foshan high-tech enterprises”References[1]Ye K T,Liu X.Tax avoidance and internal agency cost[J].Financial Research,2014(9):158-176.[2]Myers S C,Majluf N S.Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors donot have[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1984,13(2).[3]Fazzari S M,Hubbard R G,Petersen B.Financing constraints and corporate investment[J].Brooking Papers onEconomic Activity,1988(1):141-195.[4]Dai B,Liu Y,Peng C.Executive gender power allocation and corporate tax aggressiveness[J].Journal of YunnanUniversity of Finance and Economics,2017,33(3):110-123.[5]Kelvin K F L,Lillian F itary experience and corporate tax avoidance[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2017,22(1).[6]Chen K P,Chu C Y C.Internal control versus external manipulation:a model of corporate income tax evasion[J].Journal of Economics,2005,36(1):151-164.[7]Coase R H.The problem of social cost[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1960(3):1-44.。
--CFA一级Notes习题笔记
CFA一级Notes习题笔记EthicsCode of Ethics1.act with integrity, competence, diligence, respect, and in an ethical manner with the public, clients, prospective clients, employers, employees, colleagues in the investment profession, and other participants in the global capital markets2.place the integrity of the investment profession and the interests of clients above their own personal interestse reasonable care and exercise independent professional judgement when conducting investment analysis, making investment recommendations, taking investment actions, and engaging in other professional activities4.practice and encourage others to practice in a professional and ethical manner that will reflect credit on themselves and the profession5.promote the integrity of, and uphold the rules governing, capital markets6.maintain and improve their professional competence and strive to maintain and improve the competence of other ivestment professionals.Standards of Professional ConductI professionalismA.knowledge of the lawB.independence and objectivityC.MisrepresentationD.MisconductII.integrity of capital marketsA.material nonpublic informationB.market manipulationIII.duties to clientsA.Loyalty,Prudence and CareB.Fair DealingC.SuitabilityD.Performance presentationE.preservation of confidentialityIV.duties to employersA.loyaltyB.additional compensation arrangementsC.responsibilities of supervisorsV.investment analysis, reommendations,and actionsA.Diligence and reasonable basismunication with clients and prospective clientsC.record retentionVI.conflicts of interestA.Disclosure of conflictsB.priority of transactionsC.referral feesVII.responsibilities as a CFA institute member or CFA candidateA.conduct as menbers and candidates in the cfa programB.reference to CFA institute, the cfa designation, and the cfa program1.私人投资跟Code无关,但滥用举报违反personal conduct。
“新新国际贸易理论”的最新发展
新新国际贸易理论 的最新发展∗余㊀智内容提要: 新新国际贸易理论 (以M e l i t z (2003)为代表的 异质性企业模型 )及其相关实证研究,是最近10余年来国际贸易研究领域的最重要进展㊂本文介绍近五六年来该理论与相关实证研究中出现的三个新的发展方向:(1)与企业产品质量相结合,解释经典M e l i t z (2003)模型所不能解释的实证研究方面的一些发现;(2)与企业产品多样化相结合,研究企业贸易产品的范围㊁组合与转换㊁广度与深度,及其他相关问题;三是与企业内贸易相结合,研究企业内贸易的决定因素,及其与企业间贸易的区别㊂关键词:新新国际贸易理论㊀产品质量㊀产品多样化㊀企业内贸易㊀㊀ 新新国际贸易理论 (N e w N e w T r a d eT h e o -r y)及其相实证研究的诞生与发展,是过去10余来国际贸易研究领域的最重要进展㊂该理论的核心是以M e l i t z (2003)为代表的 异质性企业模型 (H e t -e r o ge n e o u sF i r m M o d e l s ),主要研究国际贸易环境变化(从封闭到开放㊁开放度的变化)对不同企业的影响,以及由此产生的宏观经济效应㊂本文拟介绍近五六年来该理论及其实证研究的最新发展㊂下面ʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏʏL u o ,Y u l e i (2008),"C o n s u m p t i o nd y n a m i c su n d e r i n f o r m a -t i o n p r o c e s s i n g c o n s t r a i n t s ",R e v i e wo f E c o n o m i cD yn a m -i c s 11(2):366-385.M a ᶄc k o w i a k ,B .&M.W i e d e r h o l t (2009),"O p t i m a l s t i c k y p r i c e su n d e rr a t i o n a li n a t t e n t i o n ",A m e r i c a n E c o n o m i c R e v i e w99(3):769-803.M a ᶄc k o w i a k ,B .&M.W i e d e r h o l t (2010),"B u s i n e s sc y c l e d yn a m i c su n d e rr a t i o n a li n a t t e n t i o n ",C E P R D i s c u s s i o n P a pe r ,7691.M a n k i w ,G.&R.R e i s (2002),"S t i c k y i nf o r m a t i o nv e r s u s s t i c k yp r i c e s :A p r o p o s a lt or e p l a c et h en e w K e y n e s i a n P h i l l i p s c u r v e ",Q u a r t e r l y Jo u r n a l o fE c o n o m i c s117(4):1295-1328.M a n k i w ,G.&R.R e i s (2006),"P e r v a s i v es t i c k i n e s s ",A -m e r i c a nE c o n o m i cR e v i e w96(2):164-169.M a r t i n s ,G.&D.S i n i g a g l i a (2009),"R e a lb u s i n e s sc y c l e d y n a m i c s u n d e r r a t i o n a l i n a t t e n t i o n ",M P R A P a pe r 14089,U n i v e r s i t y L i b r a r y o fM u n i c h ,G e r m a n y .M a t e j k a ,F .(2010),"R a t i o n a l l y I n a t t e n t i v e S e l l e r :S a l e s a n d D i s c r e t eP r i c i n g ",M a n u s c r i pt .M e n k u l a s i y ,J .(2009),"R a t i o n a l i n a t t e n t i o n a n d c h a n ge s i nm a c r o -e c o n o m i c v o l a t i l i t y ",U n i v e r s i t y o fM a r yl a n d ,N o v .09.P a c i e l l o ,L .(2010),"M o n e t a r yp o l i c y a c t i v i s ma n d p r i c e r e -s p o n s i v e n e s st oa g g r e ga t es h o c k su n d e rr a t i o n a l i n a t t e n -t i o n ",M a n u s c r i pt .R o t e m b e r g ,J .J .&M.W o o d f o r d (1996),"R e a l -b u s i n e s s -c y c l em o d e l s a n d t h e f o r e c a s t a b l em o v e m e n t s i n o u t pu t ,h o u r s ,a n d c o n s u m p t i o n ",A m e r i c a nE c o n o m i cR e v i e w86(1):71-89.S i m s ,C .A.(1998),"S t i c k i n e s s ",C a r n e g i e-R o c h e s t e r C o n f e r e n c eS e r i e s o nP u b l i cP o l i c y 49:317-356.S i m s ,C .A.(2003),"I m p l i c a t i o n so f r a t i o n a l i n a t t e n t i o n ",J o u r n a l o fM o n e t a r y E c o n o m i c s 50(3):665-690.S i m s ,C .A.(2006),"R a t i o n a l i n a t t e n t i o n :B e y o n d t h e l i n e a r -q u a d r a t i cc a s e ",T h e A m e r i c a n E c o n o m i c R e v i e w 96(2):158-163.T u t i n o ,A.(2009),"T h er i g i d i t y o fc h o i c e :L i f e c y c l es a v -i n g sw i t h i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g l i m i t s ",M a n u s c r i pt .W o o d f o r d ,M.(2009),"I n f o r m a t i o n-c o n s t r a i n e ds t a t e-d e p e n d e n t p r i c i n g ",J o u r n a lo f M o n e t a r y Ec o n o m i c s56(S ):100-124.(责任编辑:钟培华)211 ∗余智,上海财经大学,邮政编码:200433,电子邮箱:yu .z h i @m a i l .s h u f e .e d u .c n ㊂感谢J .B r a d f o r dJ e n s e n 教授对本文的帮助㊂感谢匿名审稿人的意见,当然文中错误由作者负责㊂首先介绍该理论的产生背景与核心内容,再分别介绍其三个最新的发展方向,最后总结其发展的理论与政策意义㊂一㊁ 新新国际贸易理论 的产生背景与核心内容㊀㊀ 新新国际贸易理论 的正式诞生,以M e l i t z (2003)的发表为标志㊂该理论以克鲁格曼(K r u g-m a n) 新国际贸易理论 为基础,并根据国际贸易微观实证研究的发现做了重大的创新,从而形成了独立的理论㊂(一) 新国际贸易理论 提供的理论基础1980年代初产生的 新国际贸易理论 (N e w T r a d eT h e o r y),以克鲁格曼模型(K r u g m a nM o d e l)为代表㊂这一理论模型与传统国际贸易理论模型 包括李嘉图模型(R i c a r d i a nM o d e l)与赫克歇尔-俄林模型(H e c k s c h e r-O h l i n M o d e l) 主要存在以下几个方面的区别㊂(1)这一模型的基本假设是规模效益递增㊁不完全竞争;而传统国际贸易理论模型的基本假设是规模效益不变㊁完全竞争㊂(2)这一模型的基本结论是,规模效益递增决定了每个国家的贸易模式,即每个国家只集中生产一种产品中的某几个品牌并出口,以此获得规模效益;而传统国际贸易理论的基本结论是,比较优势(李嘉图模型中的劳动生产率比较优势㊁赫克歇尔-俄林模型中的资源禀赋比较优势)决定贸易模式,一个国家会生产与出口其具有比较优势的产品㊂(3)在这一模型中,一个国家从国际贸易中的获益,是专业化分工与贸易带来的消费品种类的增加㊁生产成本与产品价格的下降;而在传统国际贸易理论模型中,一国从国际贸易中的获益,是以进口产品表示的实际工资的增长(李嘉图模型)或充裕型生产要素实际回报率的增长(赫克歇尔-俄林模型)㊂(4)这一模型适用于解释发达国家之间相互贸易的主要形式 产业内贸易,即不同国家出口同种商品中的不同品牌;而传统国际贸易理论模型适用于解释发达国家与发展中国家贸易的主要形式 产业间贸易,即不同国家出口不同产业的产品㊂(5)这一模型中考虑了企业的角色与作用,规模经济与不完全竞争直接影响企业行为选择,但这一模型假设企业是 同质性 的,即企业之间是无差异的;而传统国际贸易理论模型则根本不考虑企业在国际贸易中的角色与作用㊂(二)国际贸易微观实证研究的推动传统国际贸易理论都是在宏观层级(国家)与中观层级(产业)上研究国际贸易问题㊂ 新国际贸易理论 虽然考虑了微观层级(企业),但由于其假设企业的 同质性 ,也没有对企业自身的特殊性㊁特别是企业之间的差异进行特别的研究㊂但自1990年代以后,一些贸易经济学家开始利用国际贸易微观层级(企业)的数据来研究国际贸易问题,从而开创了对国际贸易的微观实证研究㊂这一领域两篇代表性的文献是B e r n a r d&J e n s e n(1995)与B e r n a r d& J e n s e n(1999)㊂其中,B e r n a r d&J e n s e n(1995)利用美国制造业的数据,发现美国出口企业在各方面的表现都要优于非出口企业:相对于非出口企业而言,出口企业规模(销售与就业规模)更大,效率(人均产出㊁全要素效率)更高,支付的工资与福利更高,资本密集度更高㊂B e r n a r d&J e n s e n(1999)则进一步从实证上论证:出口企业在各方面的优异表现,是它们能够出口的原因,而不是其出口后导致的结果㊂(三) 新新国际贸易理论 的核心内容在K r u g m a n 新国际贸易理论 以及国际贸易微观实证研究的推动下,M e l i t z(2003)建立了 异质性企业模型 ,从而正式开创了 新新国际贸易理论 ㊂该模型继承了 新国际贸易理论 的前述第一㊁二㊁四等三个特点,但在第三与第五方面做了重要创新,以解释国际贸易微观实证研究领域的发现㊂该模型的核心内容是:(1)企业是 异质性 的,它们的效率存在差异 这就改变了K r u g m a n 新国际贸易理论 第五个特点中关于企业 同质性 的假设㊂(2)贸易自由化对不同效率的企业产生的影响不同:当一国开放贸易之后,由于竞争加剧,效率最低的企业会被迫从市场上退出,效率稍高的企业会继续在国内市场销售,效率最高的企业则会在国内市场销售的同时㊁通过出口扩大其市场 这就使其理论与B e r n a r d&J e n s e n(1995,1999)的实证发现一致,即出口企业比非出口企业表现优异,而且这种优异表现是其出口的原因而不是结果㊂(3)贸易自由化对不同效率的企业产生的上述不同影响,促使了社会资源从效率低的企业向效率高的企业转移,从而促进了整个行业乃至整个社会的生产效率的提高 贸易自由化的这一作用,是传统国际贸易理论与K r u g m a n 新国际贸易理论 都没有指出的,是对 新国际贸易理论 前述第三个特点的创新㊂除了M e l i t z(2003)模型之外,B e r n a r d,E a t o n, J e n s e n&K o t u m(2003)模型是 新新国际贸易理论 的又一开创性模型㊂该模型以李嘉图模型为基311‘经济学动态“2013年第1期础,并加入不完全竞争等元素,也有力地解释了国际贸易微观实证研究领域的重要发现,例如企业效率的差异㊁出口企业的高效率㊁出口企业在所有企业中的低比重㊁获益企业在出口企业中的低比重㊁出口企业相对较大的规模㊁贸易自由化对不同效率企业以及整体经济效率的影响,等等㊂异质性企业模型 产生之后,立即在国际贸易研究领域产生了重大而深远的影响,被称为 新新国际贸易理论 ㊂该理论及其相关实证研究在过去10来年迅速㊁蓬勃发展,形成了一股研究热潮㊂最近五六年来,该领域的研究出现了几个新的发展方向: (1)与企业产品质量相结合;(2)与企业产品多样化相结合;(3)与企业内贸易相结合㊂下面对这三个发展方向分别展开论述㊂二㊁发展方向之一:与企业产品质量相结合 新新国际贸易理论 发展的方向之一,是将 企业异质性 与企业产品质量(p r o d u c t q u a l i t y)相结合㊂这些融入了产品质量的模型被称为 质量扩展型异质性企业模型 (Q u a l i t y-a u g m e n t e d H e t e r o-g e n e o u sF i r m M o d e l s),主要是用于解释经典 异质性企业模型 (M e l i t z,2003)所不能解释的一些贸易现象,包括出口价格与出口距离的关系㊁出口价格与出口企效率的关系㊁出口状态与企业规模的关系,等等㊂(一)出口价格与出口距离的关系经典 异质性企业模型 以及传统国际贸易理论㊁新国际贸易理论均预测,出口企业要想其产品在远距离的市场上具有竞争力,其出口离岸价格(F. O.B.,不包括运费)应该比较低,这样其加上运费之后的到岸价格(C.I.F)才不至于太高;也就是说,出口离岸价格应该与出口距离成反比㊂但B a l d w i n& H a r r i g a n(2011)从实证上发现美国企业的出口离岸价格与美国同进口国的距离成正比㊂为了解释这一实证发现,他们将产品质量融入M e l i t z(2003)模型之中,并证明:离岸出口价格较高的产品,其质量水平也比较高;在一定的条件下,质量水平提高幅度比价格提高幅度更大,因此,高价格产品的 性价比 更高,因此更有能力出口到远距离的市场上㊂(二)出口价格与出口企业效率的关系经典的 异质性企业模型 预测,企业生产效率越高,成本越低,因此价格越低,即企业出口价格与企业效率成反比㊂但K u g l e r&V e r h o o g e n(2012)利用哥伦比亚企业层级的数据发现,出口价格与企业的规模成正比,而企业规模反映企业生产效率;因此,出口价格与企业效率成正比㊂为了解释这一实证发现,他们将产品质量引入M e l i t z(2003)模型之中,并证明:生产效率高的企业,其产品的质量也越高,因此其价格越高㊂A n t o n i a d e s(2008)将产品质量引入另一个著名的 异质性企业模型 即M e l i t z &O t t a v i a n o(2008)之中,也证明了由于高效率的企业生产高质量的产品,导致出口价格与企业生产效率成正比㊂G e r v a i s(2009)从理论与实证上证明,企业效率对出口价格有方向相反的两种影响:一是直接影响,即企业效率越高,成本越低,价格越低,这是经典M e l i t z(2003)模型所描述的影响;二是间接影响,即企业效率越高,其产品质量越高,因而价格越高㊂M a n d e l(2010)进一步从理论与实证两方面证明,上述两方面影响的相对大小,取决于产品的特性:对产品质量差异比较小的 同质性产品 而言,上述直接影响的效应更大,因此企业效率与价格成反比;但对产品质量差异比较大的 异质性产品 而言,上述间接影响的效应更大,因此企业生产效率与价格成正比㊂L u d e m a&Y u(2012)在此基础上进一步研究了关税传导与企业效率㊁产品质量的关系,并从理论与实证两方面证明:当一国关税变化时,国外出口商会通过调整其税前价格而吸收部分关税变化;效率高的出口企业,税前价格调整即关税吸收的绝对幅度越高;对产品质量差异比较小的 同质性产品 而言,由于效率高的企业原始价格较低,因此其税前价格调整即关税吸收的相对幅度更高,即关税吸收的相对幅度与企业效率成正比;对产品质量差异比较大的 异质性产品 而言,由于效率高的企业原始价格较高,因此当这种 原始价格效应 超越其关税吸收绝对幅度较高的效应时,其关税吸收的相对幅度会比效率低的企业更低,即关税吸收的相对幅度与企业效率成反比㊂(三)出口状态与企业规模的关系经典的 异质性企业模型 预测,企业出口状态与其规模之间是一种单调关系:规模大(效率高)的企业出口,而规模小(效率低)的企业不出口;在企业规模给定的情况下,企业是否出口就是给定的㊂但有关实证研究却发现这两者的关系并非如此简单:有些小的企业会出口,而一些大的企业却不会出口;规模相同的企业,有的出口,有的不出口㊂H a l l a k &S i v a d a s a n(2011)将企业生产效率的差异㊁生产高质量产品能力的差异,同时融入其模型之中,以此为基础解释了上述现象,并从理论与实证两方面证明:411在企业规模既定的情况下,出口企业与非出口企业相比,其销售产品的质量与价格更高,支付的工资更高,资本密集度也更高㊂三㊁发展方向之二:与企业产品多样化相结合新新国际贸易理论 发展的方向之二,是将 企业异质性 与企业产品多样化(m u l t i-p r o d u c t f i r m s)相结合㊂这一结合主要是基于企业出口产品多样化普遍存在的现实,研究与此相关的企业贸易的产品范围(p r o d u c ts c o p e)㊁产品组合与转换(p r o d u c t m i x a n ds w i t c h i n g)㊁产品广度与深度(p r o d u c t e x t e n s i v e a n d i n t e n s i v em a r g i n s)㊁贸易自由化对它们的影响,以及其他一些相关问题㊂(一)企业产品多样化的普遍性经典的 异质性企业模型 假设每个企业生产一种产品㊂但现实之中的绝大多数企业都是生产多样化的产品㊂B e r n a r d,J e n s e n,R e d d i n g&S c h o t t (2007)发现,美国所有出口企业中,出口两种或两种以上产品的企业占60%,但这些企业的出口占美国总出口的99%;出口产品超过5个的企业占企业总数的25%,但这些企业的出口占美国总出口的98%;出口产品超过10个的企业占企业总数的17%,但这些企业的出口占美国总出口的94%;因此,出口产品多样化的企业,在美国出口中占据绝度主导地位㊂(二)企业产品范围㊁组合与转换㊁广度与深度B e r n a r d,R e d d i n g&S c h o t t(2010)检视了美国制造业企业中产品组合转换的频率㊁普遍性㊁以及决定因素㊂他们发现:54%的美国企业每隔五年都会转换其S I C(S t a n d a r dI n d u s t r yC l a s s i f i c a t i o n,标准产业分类)5分位产品的组合,并导致41%的企业改变其4分位产品组合㊁16%的企业改变其2分位产品组合;企业增减产品对美国制造业总产出增长的贡献,其大小同企业进入㊁退出的贡献相当;企业产品的转换取决于企业以及企业-产品组合的特性;企业在增减产品过程中,更有可能放弃那些生产时间短㊁产量少的产品,也就是其不善于生产的产品,这就意味着企业会将内部资源更多地转向更有效率的生产,从而提高企业的生产效率㊂在这一实证研究的基础之上,B e r n a r d,R e d d i n g &S c h o t t(2011)将产品多样化融入 异质性企业模型 之中㊂在这一模型中,企业之间能力的差异㊁企业内部产品特性的差异同时并存,这些差异决定了企业的进入与退出选择㊁生产产品种类范围的选择㊂贸易自由化通过两种渠道促进整个社会效率的提高:(1)在企业内部促进资源的更有效配置,即促使所有企业放弃差的产品的生产,促使出口企业增加好的产品的生产㊁提高所有产品中出口产品种类的比例(产品出口广度,即扩展边际)㊁每种产品出口的数量(产品出口深度,即集约边际),从而提高企业的生产效率;(2)在企业之间促进资源的更有效配置,即促使能力低的企业退出市场,增加所有企业中出口企业的比例(企业出口广度),从而提高行业的整体生产效率㊂同时,该模型还预测:企业能力的提高,不仅可以提高企业出口产品种类的比例(产品出口广度),而且可以提高企业每种产品的出口量(产品出口深度),从而使企业的产品出口广度与深度呈现正向关系㊂作者利用美国数据进行的实证分析,为其模型的预测提供了有力支持㊂其他一些研究者用美国以外的数据,研究了产品多样化企业的产品组合变化㊂例如,N a v a r r o (2008)用智利的数据发现:存续企业销售量增长的85%是由那些改变产品组合的企业完成的;但企业产品出口广度与深度直接存在负向关系,与B e r-n a r d,R e d d i n g&S c h o t t(2011)从美国数据中得出的结论不一致㊂G o l d b e r g e ta l(2008)利用印度的数据发现:出口企业在面临的最终产品关税下降之后,并没有显著改变其产品组合;但中间产品关税的下降的确促进了企业产品范围的扩张㊂(三)其他相关研究一些研究者不仅研究进出口企业产品的广度与深度,还研究进出口企业自身㊁以及进出口国家或地区的广度与深度㊂例如,上面提到的B e r n a r d,R e d-d i n g&S c h o t t(2011)从理论与实证两方面全面研究了出口企业㊁产品㊁国家的广度与深度㊂再如, B e r n a r d,J e n s e n,R e d d i n g&S c h o t t(2009)从实证上研究了美国进出口企业㊁产品的广度与深度对美国与不同贸易伙伴之间贸易量及其变化的影响大小,其结论是:进出口企业㊁产品的广度是决定其与不同贸易伙伴之间贸易量大小的主要因素;但进出口企业㊁产品的深度是决定其与不同贸易伙伴之间贸易量短期变化的主要因素㊂A l v a r e z&L o p e z (2008)发现,产品多样化企业在出口过程中,会从自身经验以及其他企业经验学习,从而提高其出口产品广度㊁出口国家广度㊂还有一些研究者研究了与出口广度与深度问题相关的出口存续期(e x p o r ts u r v i v a l/d u r a t i o n)问题,包括出口企业㊁产品㊁国家的存续期㊂例如,511‘经济学动态“2013年第1期B e s e d e s&N a i r-R e i c h e r t(2009),V o l p e&C a r-b a l l o(2008)与G o r g,K n e l l e r&M u r a k o z y(2008)研究了出口企业与产品的存续期;E s t e v e-P e r e z, P a l l a r d o-L o p e z&R e q u e n a-S i l v e n t e(2011)研究了出口企业与出口目的国家的存续期问题㊂四㊁发展方向之三:与企业内贸易相结合新新国际贸易理论 发展的方向之三,是将 企业异质性 与企业内贸易(i n t r a-f i r mt r a d e)即关联企业交易(r e l a t e d-p a r t y t r a n s a c t i o n s)相结合㊂这一结合主要是基于关联企业交易在国际贸易中的重要地位,研究其存在与规模的决定因素,以及在定价与其他方面的特殊性㊂(一)企业内贸易的重要性企业内贸易又称关联企业交易,是指一个跨国公司的国内机构与国外关联机构(相互控股达到一定比例)之间的进出口贸易㊂与此相对应的一家企业与国外非关联机构之间的贸易,称为企业间贸易(I n t e r-f i r m t r a d e)或非关联企业交易(A r m's l e n g t ht r a n s a c t i o n s)㊂B e r n a r d,J e n s e n&S c h o t t (2009)发现:美国跨国公司的对外贸易(无论是在出口还是在进口方面)占美国对外贸易的90%以上;而跨国公司的对外贸易中,关联企业交易占其进口的50%左右㊁出口的30-35%;也就是说,关联企业交易占美国进口总额的45%左右㊁出口总额的30%左右㊂其中,国际化程度最高的企业,即同时从事关联企业进口㊁出口的跨国公司,其进口㊁出口占美国总进口㊁总出口的70-80%㊂关联企业进出口占总进出口比例超过25%的跨国公司,占所有跨国公司的40-60%,而这些公司的关联企业交易量则占所有关联企业交易量的90%以上㊂(二)企业内贸易的决定因素B e r n a r d,R e d d i n g,J e n s e n&S c h o t t(2010)以前人理论研究为基础,从实证上研究了关联企业交易存在可能性与相对规模的决定因素,包括产品特性与国家特性㊂从产品特性方面看,产品越适合于通过合同进行交易(可契约性越强),即越适合于通过中介进行交易(可中介性越强),就越容易通过非关联企业进行交易,那么关联企业交易存在的可能性与规模就越小㊂从国家特性方面看,政府管治质量越高,外国跨国公司在该国设立分支机构的可能性就越大,那么关联企业交易存在的可能性就越大;但在外国跨国公司已经在该国设立分支机构的情况下,政府管治质量越高,也意味着外国企业与该国其他企业进行非关联企业交易越容易,因而关联企业交易的相对规模就会越低㊂该文还讨论了其他产品特性(如要素密集度)与国家特性(要素充裕度)对关联企业交易的影响㊂(三)企业内贸易与企业间贸易的区别B e r n a r d,J e n s e n&S c h o t t(2006)从理论与实证两方面证明,关联企业的交易与非关联企业的交易在定价上明显不同㊂关联企业交易价格(转移定价)比非关联企业交易价格显著地低㊂两者的差价受很多因素影响㊂首先,异质性产品与同质性产品相比,其两种交易差价更大㊂其次,出口对象国企业所得税越低,企业就越愿意将利润更多地向该国转移以减轻所得税负担,因而会将对该国关联企业的出口价格定得越低,从而导致关联企业交易与非关联企业交易的差价越高;出口对象国的关税越高,企业就越愿意将对该国关联企业的出口价格定得越低以减轻关税负担,从而导致关联企业交易与非关联企业交易的差价越高㊂最后,企业的规模越大,市场控制力与定价能力越强,它们对非关联企业出口的定价就会越高,因而关联企业交易与非关联企业交易的差价就会越高㊂此外,文章还研究了汇率变化对这两类交易价差的影响㊂B e r n a r d,J e n s e n,R e d d i n g&S c h o t t(2009)则从实证上发现,关联企业交易与非关联企业交易对外部贸易环境变化的反应也不相同㊂例如,在亚洲金融危机期间,亚洲多国货币对美元贬值,美国非关联企业交易出口深度降低㊁进口深度增加,但关联企业交易无论是在出口还是在进口方面的深度都有强劲增长,从而导致关联企业交易相对于非关联企业交易的比重,在出口与进口两方面都得到了提高㊂五㊁简评以 异质性企业模型 为核心的 新新国际贸易理论 ,是在 新国际贸易理论 的基础上㊁在国际贸易微观实证研究的直接推动下发展起来的㊂该理论及其相关实证研究在过去十余年中迅速发展,并通过与企业产品质量相结合㊁与企业产品多样化相结合㊁与企业内贸易相结合等方式,进行自我修正与完善,使其研究范围不断扩展㊁适用性不断增强㊂新新国际贸易理论 及其相关实证研究的最大贡献,在于将传统国际贸易理论㊁ 新国际贸易理论 及其相关实证研究,从宏观(国家)与中观(产业)领域推进到微观(企业)领域,并着重研究了 企业异质性 在国际贸易中地位与作用㊂这一理论及其相关611实证研究的发展,具有以下两方面的重要意义㊂一方面,它使人们了解到国际贸易如何通过促进生产资源在企业内㊁企业间重新配置,进而促进企业㊁行业生产效率的提高,最终推动社会福利的增长;这就进一步加深了人们对贸易自由化的正面作用的认识,从而对各国政府推动贸易自由化有重要指导作用,因而具有十分重要的理论与政策意义㊂另一方面,它也使人们认识到国际贸易环境与政策的变化对不同企业有不同影响㊁不同企业也会对此做出不同反应,从而加深了人们对开放经济条件下企业行为的认识;这对预测贸易环境与政策变化对不同企业的影响及不同企业的反应,并对政府采取相应的应对措施,有重要指导作用,因而也具有重要的理论与政策意义㊂参考文献:A l v a r e z,R.,H.F a r u q&R.L o p e z(2008), N e w p r o d u c t s i ne x p o r tm a r k e t s ,W o r k i n g P a p e r.A n t o n i a d e s,A.(2008), H e t e r o g e n e o u s f i r m s,q u a l i t y a n d t r a d e ,W o r k i n g P a p e r.B a l d w i n,R.&J.H a r r i g a n(2011), Z e r o s,q u a l i t y a n d s p a c e:T r a d et h e o r y a n dt r a d ee v i d e n c e ,A m e r i c a nE c o-n o m i c J o u r n a l:M i c r o e c o n o m i c s,3:60–88.B e r n a r d,A.B.,J.E a t o n,J.B.J e n s e n&S.K o r t u m(2003), P l a n t sa n d p r o d u c t i v i t y i ni n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e ,T h e A-m e r i c a nE c o n o m i cR e v i e w93(4):1268-1290.B e r n 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财务弹性与企业现金政策(July 2013)
Financial Flexibility and Corporate Cash PolicyTao Chen, Jarrad Harford and Chen Lin*July 2013Abstract:Using variations in local real estate prices as exogenous shocks to corporate financing capacity, we investigate the causal effects of financial flexibility on cash policies of US firms. Building on this natural experiment, we find strong evidence that increases in real estate values lead to smaller corporate cash reserves, declines in the marginal value of cash holdings, and lower cash flow sensitivities of cash. The representative US firm holds $0.037 less of cash for each $1 of collateral, quantifying the sensitivity of cash holdings to collateral value. We further find that the decrease in cash holdings is more pronounced in firms with greater investment opportunities, financial constraints, better corporate governance, and lower local real estate price volatility.JEL classification: G32; G31; G34; R30Keywords: Cash policy; Debt capacity; Collateral; Real estate value; Cash holding; Marginal value of cash; Cash flow sensitivity of cash* Chen is from The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Lin is from the University of Hong Kong. Harford is from the University of Washington. We thank Harald Hau, Gustavo Manso, and Micah Officer for helpful comments and discussion. Lin gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong (Project No. T31/717/12R).1.IntroductionFinancial flexibility refers to a firm’s ability to access financing at a low cost and respond to unexpected changes in the firm’s cash flows or investment opportunities in a timely manner (Denis, 2011). A survey of CFOs in Graham and Harvey (2001) suggests that financial flexibility is the most important determining factor of corporate capital structure decisions, but flexibility has not been studied as a first-order determinant of corporate financial policies until very recently.1 Consequently, as pointed out in Denis (2011), an interesting and unresolved research question remains: “To what extent are flexibility considerations first-order determinants of financial policies?” In this paper, we directly test the effects of financial flexibility on corporate cash holdings by exploiting exogenous shocks to firms’ financing capacity.As the amount of cash U.S. firms hold on their balance sheets has grown, so has interest in how they manage liquidity and access to capital. While the literature documents substantial support for the precautionary savings hypothesis put forth by Keynes (1936), we still know relatively little about how firms tradeoff debt capacity and cash reserves, and specifically the degree to which increases in the supply of credit substitute for internal slack. Answers to such questions are important not only for a better understanding of cash and liquidity policy in general, but also for assessing the impact of the credit channel on real activity.Reflected in cash holding theory, the concept of financial flexibility matters in the presence of financing frictions, under which firms have precautionary incentives to stockpile cash. Specifically, the precautionary savings hypothesis posits that firms hold cash as a buffer to shield from adverse cash flow shocks due to costly external financing. Opler, et al. (1999), Harford (1999), Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009), and Duchin (2010), among others provide1 DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007) discuss preservation of financial flexibility as an explanation for observed capital structure choices. Gamba and Triantis (2008) provide a theoretical analysis of the effect of financial flexibility on firm value. Denis and McKeon (2011) lend further support that in the form of unused debt capacity, financial flexibility plays an important role in capital structure.1evidence of precautionary savings’ role in cash policy. Cash studies typically control for leverage and sometimes cash substitutes such as net working capital. Almeida, et al. (2004) and Faulkender and Wang (2006) have shown that cash policy is more important when firms are financially constrained. Nevertheless, to our knowledge, none of the extant studies have directly tested the role of external financing capacity in shaping corporate cash policies.2 In this paper, we attempt to fill this void by providing a comprehensive understanding of the causal effects of financial flexibility on cash policies.The striking paucity of the research into the effect of debt capacity on cash policy is likely to be partially driven by a lack of readily available measures of financing capacity. Moreover, the fact that financing capacity is endogenous has also hindered such attempts. For instance, firms’ cash balance and liquidity policy might exert feedback effects on firms’ financing capacity. Unobservable firm heterogeneity correlated with both debt capacity and corporate liquidity policies could also bias the estimation results.In this paper, we make use of a novel experiment developed by Chaney,Sraer and Thesmar (2012). Specifically, we use changes in the value of a firm’s collateral value caused by variations in local real estate prices (at state level or Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) level) as an exogenous change to the financing capacity of a firm, increasing its financial flexibility. Existing literature points out that pledging collateral such as real estate assets can alleviate agency costs caused by moral hazard and adverse selection, enhance firms’ financing capacity, and allow firms to borrow more in the presence of incomplete contracting (Barro, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Hart and Moore, 1994; Jimenez et al., 2006). Firms with more tangible assets have higher recovery rate in financial distress, and banks are ex ante more likely to provide looser contract2 Most of the existent research in this area provides at most indirect evidences, by primarily focusing on the relationship between cash flow risk and cash holdings, and papers use industry cash flow volatility to proxy for cash flow risk (e.g., Opler et al., 1999; Bates et al., 2009), and find this measure is positively associated with cash holdings. Han and Qiu (2007) use firm-level measure of cash low volatility and find consistent results. More recently, Duchin (2010) finds that investment opportunity risk increases cash holdings.2terms to firms with more pledgeable assets. Tangible assets thus can alleviate banks’ concern of asset substitution and debt recovery risk, which increases firms’ financial flexibility. As a consequence, it reduces firms’ incentive to save cash. Consistent with theory, recent empirical studies show that firms with greater collateral value are able to raise external funding at lower costs (e.g. Berger et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2011) and to invest more (Chaney et al., 2012).3 If financial flexibility exerts first-order effects on a firm’s financial policy, we would expect that an exogenous shock increasing real estate values translates into a lower precautionary motive to stockpile cash. Likewise, following a large deterioration in collateral value, firms would confront more stringent external financing, and consequently hold more cash. A key advantage of our identifying strategy is that it not only provides variation in exogenous shocks to debt capacity, but also solves the omitted variables concerns by allowing multiple shocks to different firms at different times at different locations (states or MSAs).Primarily, we find that the representative US public firm holds $0.037 less of cash for each additional $1 of collateral over the 1993-2007 period. As Chaney et al. (2012) document that an average firm raises its investment by $0.06 and issues new debt of $0.03 for a $1 increase in collateral value, our results fit perfectly with their findings on the gap between the investment and new debt in the perspective that firms finance approximately half of their new investment using internal accumulated cash. In terms of economic magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in collateral value results in a decrease of about 8.1% of the mean value of cash ratio. To further refine our understanding of the effects of debt capacity on cash holding decisions, we look at heterogeneous firm characteristics that might shape the relationship between debt capacity and cash reserves. Precautionary motives predict that the effects would be more pronounced in firms with more investment opportunities and generally greater financial 3 Berger et al. (2011) use a rough measure indicating whether collateral was pledged at loan origination, and Lin et al. (2011) use tangibility to proxy for collateral value. One pertinent concern is that tangibility itself is a noisy measure of collateral value, while another concern is that collateral requirement and loan spread might be jointly determined by unobservable factors, which results in endogeneity problem.3constraint. Moreover, as agency theory argues that cash is the most vulnerable asset to agency conflicts (Berle and Means, 1933; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers and Rajan, 1998) and Jensen (1986) argues that debt constrains managers, managers of poorly governed firms are unlikely to view debt capacity and cash as substitutes. Additionally, firms located in the areas with high historical real estate fluctuations might be subjective to more uncertainties in the future value of the real estate asset they hold, and thus might not be willing to reduce cash holdings as firms with low historical real estate volatilities. In further subsample tests, we indeed find that the decrease in cash holdings following increased collateral value is more pronounced in firms with greater investment opportunities, more financial constraint, better corporate governance, and lower historical local real estate volatility.Our findings of the strong impact of financing capacity on cash holdings largely rely on two underlying assumptions: 1) higher collateral value reduces the marginal benefit of holding cash, and 2) firms consequently save less cash out of cash flow and display lower cash flow sensitivity of cash. We can test these assumptions by directly test the prediction for the marginal value of cash holdings using the Faulkender and Wang (2006) approach, and the prediction for the cash flow sensitivity of cash using Almeida et al. (2004)’s specification. We find that following exogenous shocks to collateral value, the marginal value of cash decreases. Quantitatively, a shocked firm’s value of a marginal dollar of cash is approximately 25% lower than that of an otherwise similar firm. In further exploration, we find that for firms with prior financial constraint, shareholders value cash less after a positive exogenous shock to the value of the firm’s real estate. In such firms, increasing collateral value provides more benefits to the firms as managers can use collateral to easily access external financing.We next analyze how debt capacity affects the cash flow sensitivity of cash. We find that firms show reduced cash flow sensitivity of cash following an exogenous shock to their debt capacity. Compared to an unaffected firm, the median shocked firm has a 5% lower of cash flow4sensitivity of cash. We further find that the effect on cash flow sensitivity of cash is larger in firms with greater investment opportunities. In addition, all of our empirical results are robust to controlling for the potential sources of endogeneity, as in Chaney et al. (2012) as well.Our paper contributes to and is related to several strands of literature. Foremost, our paper contributes to the cash holding literature by showing how financing capacity causally affects cash holdings, the value of cash, and the cash flow sensitivity of cash. The evidence is consistent with the precautionary motive of cash holdings. In this regard, our paper also contributes to the broader literature of liquidity management (Campello et al., 2010, 2011) by documenting how firms manage liquid resources in response to financing capacity.Moreover, our results also highlight the importance of corporate governance in cash policies. We find that there is a non-trivial gap between the degrees of the decline in the marginal value of cash holdings, and that of the drop in the actual cash balance, following increased collateral value. Through our subsample analysis, we find that the decrease in cash holdings is more pronounced in firms with greater investment opportunities, prior financial constraint, and better corporate governance. This reveals that firms with entrenched managers are reluctant to substitute cash and debt capacity. Further, exogenous changes in credit provision have an immediate impact on firms with strong investment opportunities and firms with some financial constraint.The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our construction of the sample and data. Sections 3 to 5 investigate the effects of collateral shocks on cash holdings, the marginal value of cash holdings, and the cash flow sensitivity of cash, respectively. In each section, we firstly introduce the estimation models and descriptive statistics, and then report our empirical findings. Section 6 concludes.52.Sample and DataThe sample construction and the empirical approach in the first part of the paper closely follow Chaney et al. (2012), who identify local variation in real estate prices as an exogenous and meaningful shock to firms’ debt capacity. Their study focuses exclusively on the credit channel’s effect on real investment. We start from the universal sample of Compustat firms that were active in 1993 with non-missing information of total assets. We require that the firm was active in 1993 as this was the last year when data on accumulated depreciation on buildings is still available in Compustat. We retain firms whose headquarters are in the US, and keep only firms that exist for at least three consecutive years in the sample. We further exclude firms operating in the industry of finance, insurance, real estate, construction, and mining businesses. We also restrict the sample to firms not involved in major acquisitions. We further require that the firms have information for us to calculate the market value of real estate assets and also non-missing information for the major variables in the cash equation. Eventually we obtain a final sample of 26,242 firm-year observations associated with 2,790 unique firms.Our key variable of interest is the market value of real estate assets. First, we define real estate assets as the summation of three major categories of property, plant, and equipment (PPE): buildings, land and improvement, and construction in progress. These values are at historical cost, rather than marked-to-market, and we need to recover their market value. Next, we estimate the average age of those assets using the procedure from Chaney et al. (2012). Specifically, we calculate the ratio of the accumulated depreciation of buildings (dpacb in Compustat) to the historic cost of building (fatb in Compustat) and multiply by the assumed mean depreciable life of 40 years (Nelson et al., 2000), and get the average age of the real estate assets. Thus we obtain the year of purchase for the real estate assets. Finally, for each firm’s real estate assets (fatp+fatb+fatc in Compustat), we use a real estate price index to estimate the market value of these real estate assets for 1993 and then calculate the market6value for each year in the sample period (1993 to 2007). We use both state-level and MSA-level real estate price indices. The real estate price indices are obtained from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). We match the state-level real estate price index with our accounting data using the state identifier from Compustat. For the MSA-level real estate price index, we utilize a mapping table between zip code and MSA code maintained by the US Department of Labor’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP), to match with our accounting data by zip code from Compustat.To be more specific, we obtain the real estate value in 1993 as the book value (fatp+fatb+fatc in Compustat) multiplied by the cumulative price increase from the acquisition year to 1993. For purpose of illustration, consider Johnson & Johnson with an accumulated depreciation of buildings of 808 million USD in 1993, and a historic cost of building of 2,389 million USD in 1993. We get the proportion of buildings used of 0.3382 (dpacb/fatb in Compustat), and obtain the average age of the real estate assets of 13 years by multiplying 0.3382 with the assumed mean depreciable life of 40 years. Consequently, we get the year of purchase for the real estate assets to be 1980. Then we use the cumulative price increase in the state real estate price index and MSA real estate price index from 1980 to 1993, and multiply by the historical cost of real estate assets (fatp+fatb+fatc in Compustat) (3,329 million USD) to get the market value of real estate assets in 1993 for Johnson & Johnson. We further adjust for inflation, divide by total assets, and get our final measure, RE Value. Johnson & Johnson has a value of 63% for RE Value in 1993, using state-level real estate prices. For the subsequent years, we estimate the real estate value as the book value at 1993 multiplied by the cumulative price increase from 1993 to that year.One notable issue is that we do not consider the value of any new real estate repurchases or sales subsequent to 1993. This practice has both advantages and drawbacks. The advantage is that it successfully avoids any endogeneity between real estate purchases and investment7opportunities, while the disadvantage is that it introduces noise into our measure. As illustrated in Chaney et al. (2012), firms are not likely to sell real estate assets to realize the capital gains when confronted with an increase in their real estate value, thus alleviating some of our concerns stemming from measurement error. Finally, we standardize our measure of market value of real estate assets by firms’ total assets. This standardization will help us make dollar-to-dollar economic interpretations of the effect of collateral value on cash policy. For a representative firm over 1993 to 2007, the market value of real estate represents 26% of the firm’s total assets.4 Real estate is therefore a sizable proportion of firm’s assets on balance sheet. More summary statistics will be discussed in section 3.2.3.Collateral Shocks and Cash HoldingsWe begin our analysis by examining the effects of collateral shocks on cash holdings. In this section, we first describe our estimation strategy and summary statistics, and then report the empirical results. Further, we provide instrumental variable analysis to cope with any lingering endogeneity concerns and present additional robustness tests. This initial part of our analysis generally follows Chaney et al.’s (2012) analysis of investment following collateral shocks. Finally, we conduct subsample analysis to look at the effects of investment opportunities, financial constraint, and corporate governance in shaping the relationship between debt capacity and cash holdings.3.1.Estimation Model and Variables4 Our measures differ in magnitude with Chaney et al. (2012) as we are scaling real estate value using total book assets to better interpret in the cash regressions, while Chaney et al. (2012) are using PPE to standardize their major variables of real estate value.8In order to compute the sensitivity of cash reserves to collateral value, we augment the standard cash equation as in the literature (e.g., Opler et al., 1999; Bates et al., 2009) by introducing a variable capturing the value of real estate owned by the firm (RE value). Specifically, for firm i, with headquarters in location j(sate or MSA), in fiscal year t, we construct the following model:Casℎi,j,t=α+β1×RE value i,j,t+β2×RE price index j,t+δ′X+εi,j,t, (1)where the dependent variable Cash refers to the ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets, or to net assets, following Opler et al. (1999) and Bates et al (2009). We also test the robustness of the results using log value of cash to net assets as an alternative measure (Bates et al., 2009). RE value is the market value of real estate assets in the fiscal year t scaled by total assets. For regressions using cash ratios scaled by net assets, RE value is scaled by the value of net assets for ease of coefficient interpretation. RE price index controls for state- or MSA-level of real estate prices in location j in fiscal year t.The vector X includes a set of firm-specific control variables following the cash literature. These parameters are: 1) log firm size, measured as the log of real inflation-adjusted book assets; 2) market to book ratio, as the market value of assets over book value of assets; 3) leverage, as all debt scaled by total assets; 4) Investment as capital expenditures divided by total assets; 5) dividends paying dummy, with one indicating firm pays dividends and zero otherwise; 6) cash flow to total assets; 7) NWC, calculated as non-cash net working capital to total assets; 8) acquisition intensity, as acquisitions divided by total assets; 9) R&D/sales; 10) industry cash flow risk, defined as the standard deviation of industry cash flow to firm’s total assets for the previous ten years; 11) two-digit SIC industry and year fixed effects. The detailed definitions are provided in Appendix A.9We include NWC as an independent variable because net working capital can substitute for cash, and therefore we expect firms with a higher value for net working capital to hold less cash. Market to book ratio and R&D/sales proxy for growth opportunities. For firms with larger growth opportunities, underinvestment is more costly, and these firms are expected to accumulate more cash. Firms with more capital expenditures are predicted to hoard less cash, and thus Capx/assets are predicted to be negatively correlated with the level of cash holdings. Similarly, acquisition intensity also proxies for the investment level of a firm, and it is expected to exert negative effects on cash holdings (Bates et al., 2009). Additionally, acquisition intensity also helps to control for the agency costs that managers of firms with excess cash holdings could conduct acquisitions for their private benefit (Jensen, 1986; Harford, 1999). Leverage is predicted to be negatively associated with cash holdings as interest payments decrease the ability of firms to hoard cash. Also, including leverage in the model helps to control for the refinancing risk of the firm, as Harford et al. (2013) find that firms increase cash holdings to mitigate the refinancing risk. Firms paying dividends are expected to have better access to debt financing, and thus less cash holdings. Industry cash flow risk captures cash flow uncertainty, and one would predict firms with greater cash flow risk to hold more precautionary cash (Opler et al., 1999; Bates et al., 2009).Our primary focus is the coefficient estimate of RE value, β1. A negative and statistically significant β1 in regression (1) would be evidence for the causal effect of financing capacity on cash holdings, as it suggests that firms reduce cash balance after the appreciation of real estate value due to exogenous shocks. Therefore, this would be consistent with the precautionary saving hypothesis, as an analogous impact is expected on the downside of the cycle when adverse shocks occurs to the firm’s real estate assets. Since RE value is at firm level and both cash ratios and RE value are using the same divisor, a clear advantage of this model specification is that β1 could capture how sensitive a firm’s cash holding responds to a $1 increment in the value of real estate owned by the firm.103.2.Baseline Regression ResultsAfter restricting the availability of information in regard to cash holdings and major independent variables in equation (1), we obtain a final sample consisting of 26,242 firm-year observations associated with 2,790 unique firms from 1993 to 2007. Panel A of Table 1 reports the corresponding summary statistics.[Table 1 about here]From Panel A of Table 1, we find that the ratio of cash to total assets has a mean of 0.18 and a standard deviation of 0.22, comparable with the literature (Opler et al., 1999; Bates et al., 2009). The ratio of cash to net assets is higher since cash and marketable assets have been subtracted from the denominator. Our major independent variable of interest, RE value, has two versions: one using state-level real estate price index, while the other using MSA-level real estate price index to compute the market value of the firm’s real estate assets. Both of the measures are scaled using total book assets. The two versions yield similar values: the former (using state real estate price index) has a mean value of 0.25 with a standard deviation of 0.40, while the latter has a mean of 0.24 and a standard deviation of 0.39.Table 2 shows the regression results. The dependent variables are Cash/Assets in columns (1) to (3) and Cash/Net Assets in columns (4) to (6). For each dependent variable, we first report the regressions of cash ratios on a set of control variables and our major independent variable of interest RE value calculated using the state real estate price index, and then RE value using the MSA real estate price index. All regressions control for year and two-digit SIC industry fixed11effects, whose coefficient estimates are suppressed. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the state-year or MSA-year level are reported.5 Across the four models, we consistently find that RE value has a statistically significant and negative coefficient (β1) at the 1%level, which is consistent with managers trading off debt capacity and cash reserves in managing their access to capital. More importantly, we can characterize the degree of substitution. Specifically, based on the estimates in column (1) when using state real estate price index to compute RE value, the representative firm reduces cash reserve by $0.037 for each additional $1 of real estate actually owned by the firm, holding other factors constant. The effect is not only statistically significant, but also economically large. A one standard deviation increase in collateral value results in a decrease of 0.015 (=0.037×0.396) in the ratio of cash to total assets, which is about 8.1% of the mean, and 6.8% of one standard deviation of the cash ratio.[Table 2 about here]In column (2), we replicate the estimation performed in column (1) using the MSA real estate price index instead of the state index. As argued in Chaney et al. (2012), using MSA-level real estate prices has both advantages and caveats. The advantage is that it makes our identifying assumption that cash holdings are uncorrelated with local real estate prices milder, and it also offers a more accurate source of variation in real estate value (Chaney et al., 2012). The downside is that as now we assume that all the real estate assets owned by a firm are located in the headquarters city, it might be potentially subject to more measurement error. As5 We follow Chaney et al. (2012), and this clustering structure is conservative given the major explanatory variable of interest RE value is measured at the firm level (See Bertrand et al., 2004). We check the sensitivity by clustering at the firm level, and all the regressions reported in the paper are robust to this alternative clustering strategy.12shown in column (2), the coefficient estimate β1 remains stable, at 0.038, and statistically significant at the 1% level.In columns (4) and (5), we change the dependent variable to the ratio of cash and short-term investments to net assets. The coefficient estimates for RE value are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, and the economic magnitudes are qualitatively similar to columns (1) and (2).The control variables also generate interesting findings, consistent with the prior results in the cash literature. Both the market to book ratio and R&D/sales have positive coefficients, significant at the 1% level across all the models, supporting the hypothesis that firms with larger growth opportunities are more inclined to accumulate a large cash balance to accommodate future investment. The coefficient estimates for Capx/assets and acquisition intensity are both negative and significant at the 1% level for all the model specifications, echoing the results in Bates et al. (2009) that firms with higher level of investment are predicted to hoard less cash. Leverage has a negative and significant coefficient, in support of Harford et al. (2013) that firms with higher level of refinancing risk are more likely to accumulate large cash balance. Firms paying dividends and with a larger size are expected to have easier access to external financing, and that’s why we observe negative and significant coefficients on firm size and the dividend-paying dummy. We also find that NWC has a negative coefficient estimate, statistically significant at the 99% confidence level across all the models, consistent with the substituting role of net working capital to cash reserves. Finally, the high adjusted R-squared of 0.49 provides further support to the trustworthiness of our results, as half of the variation in cash ratio can be explained by our model.3.3.Endogeneity and Instrumental Variable Estimation13。
融资约束与公司投资 FHP_88 简介与分析
PART 1. OutlineMM theory founded the benchmark in corporate finance that firms’financing decision is irrelevant to the investment decision, which relies on the assumption that the market is efficient and frictionless. However, considering the reality of financial market, external financing doesn’t provide a perfect substitute for internal capital. In 1970s, Joseph E. Stiglitz first proved the tax structure has an impact on firms’ financing structure1and came up with the concept of financial constraint.In 1988’s classic paper, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen discussed extra costs of equity financing and debt which caused by capital market imperfections, especially asymmetric information. Via studying the investment behaviours in groups of firms categorised by a ratio of dividends to income, authors attempted to create links between financing constraints and investment varies. Their results supported that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is a reliable indicator of corporates’ financial constraints. FHP’s researches provided several important perspectives on the topic.Kaplan and Zingales’s research challenged FHP’s conclusion. Basically, their study shows that high investment-cash flow sensitivity does not necessarily suggest firms are more financially constrained.Theoretically, even in a one-period model, examining the sensitivities of investment to W (internal funds) and to k (wedge between the internal and external costs of funds), authors could conclude that investment-cash flow sensitivity do not necessarily accord with the extent of financial constraints.Empirical evidence confirms the nonmonotonic relationship between these two factors.KZ analysed the 49 firms with abnormally high investment-cash flow sensitivity; by deeply exploring the fundamentals of sample firms (including operating efficiency, liquidity, financial statements and notes to annual reports for each fiscal-year), authors found that almost 40% of them were capable to increase investment in every year of the observing period.According to qualitative information in the annual reports and quantitative information in the financial statements and notes, KZ classified the 49 observations into five groups (NFC, LNFC, PFC, LFC and FC). Classifications result shows that cash stocks, cash flow, Q, unused lines of credit and interest coverage are monotonically declining from NFC to FC, which supports the validation of classification scheme. Critically, regressions reveal that the NFC firms exhibit the highest investment-cash flow sensitivity (coefficient is statistically greater than that of other firms).Reexamine validity of the finding: when splitting data into subperiods, the results still hold; 1Stiglitz, Joseph E. "Taxation, corporate financial policy, and the cost of capital." Journal of Public Economics 2.1 (1973): 1-34.when grouping firms based on quantitative criteria, the same results still hold.KZ’s conclusion on investment-cash flow sensitivity and financial constrain is conflicted with FHP’s. Possible reasons are as follows:•KZ applied Euler equation, avoiding the mismeasurement of Tobin’s Q2;•Fluctuations of outliers affected the sensitivities;• A few firms used cash flow to repay debt, which contribute to the nonmonotonic relationship.If the nonmonotonic relationship generally exists, further researches on investment behaviours are needed to find out the reason.PART 2. Critical EvaluationFinancial constraints should be considered in two ways. First, weather the internal funds are sufficient; second, whether or not the firm’s intrinsic characteristics make it costly to obtain a certain amount of external funds (KZ 2000). KZ’s research provided both theoretical and empirical views on the invalidity of investment-cash flow sensitivity as a measure of financial constraints.KZ delivered the one-period model to prove the nonmonotonicity; however, FHP (2000) stated the sensitivity to internal funds is likely to be irrelevant to financial constraints.An important contribution of KZ is that they used a multi-factor classification. Essentially, they selected several major indicators of firm’s financial condition, assuming that healthier firm’s may face less financial constraints. But these indicators, in some situations, cannot represent the firms’ true status.Cash--As a measure of liquidity, healthy firms usually hold adequate amount of cash and equivalent. However, this is not absolute because when a firm is in the disadvantage position of supply chain, it must maintain solvency by holding much cash. It’s reasonable to consider these firms are facing high external financing costs.Cash Flow--Cash flow is a good measure of the sufficiency of internal funds. But this indicator is extremely volatile that is not proper to measure a firm’s intrinsic characteristics hence the external financing constraints.Tobin’s Q--It’s an efficient indicator to firm’s investment chances. However, for firms in fast growing stage, investment usually grows in forms of increasing in inventories or account receivables etc. rather than fixed investment.Leverage--Conventionally, low leverage firms are considered facing less financial risk. But2Calculating Q at the beginning of a firm's fiscal year provides a better measurement of investment opportunities according to the regression of I on cash flow and on Q.one has to determine the source of low leverage. Some firms, mainly high-tech firms, which hold little collateral, are likely to be denied by banks; meanwhile do not have access to bond market. This indicator alone is not convincing.Manager’s words--For their own reputation, managers tend to provide good information about the firm.In conclusion, these indicators have limitations separately. However, when considering comprehensively, they can represent a firm’s financial status and thus the level of financial constraints.FHP apply dividend/income ratio as the classification criterion, which emphases on the sufficiency of internal funds. Obviously, KZ’s criteria consider more about the external financing costs via investigating the nature of firms. They focus on distinct perspectives of financial constraints.KZ's research was claimed due to the limit of samples and the lack of heterogeneity in samples. Furthermore, KZ’s samples are all manufacture firms, which in my opinion are potentially affected by some industrial factors or events. It will be more convincing if the author selected firms across different industrial. In 1999, Cleary obtains similar results for a large (over 1300) and undeniable heterogeneous sample of firms.The observation period is across more than one business cycle, which eliminates the disturbing from some special years.Financial constraints are still amount of the hottest topic in this field. Subsequent researches mainly focus on whether the investment-cash flow sensitivity to measure financial constraint is valid under different classification criteria.ReferenceBo, Hong, Robert Lensink, and Elmer Sterken. "Uncertainty and financing constraints." European Finance Review 7.2 (2003): 297-321.Cleary, Sean. "International corporate investment and the relationships between financial constraint measures." Journal of Banking & Finance 30.5 (2006): 1559-1580.Fazzari, Steven, R. Glenn Hubbard, and Bruce C. Petersen. "Financing constraints and corporate investment." (1988).Fazzari, Steven M., R. Glenn Hubbard, and Bruce C. Petersen. Financing constraints and corporate investment: Response to Kaplan and Zingales. No. w5462. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2000.Fazzari, Steven M., R. Glenn Hubbard, and Bruce C. Petersen. "Investment-cash flow sensitivities are useful: A comment on Kaplan and Zingales." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115.2 (2000): 695-705.Kaplan, Steven N., and Luigi Zingales. "Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide useful measures of financing constraints?." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112.1 (1997): 169-215.Kaplan, Steven N., and Luigi Zingales. "Investment-cash flow sensitivities are not valid measures of financing constraints." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115.2 (2000): 707-712.。
经济学专有名词 中英对照之欧阳学文创作
经济学专有名词欧阳学文Aaccounting:会计accounting cost :会计成本accounting profit :会计利润adverse selection :逆向选择allocation 配置allocation of resources :资源配置allocative efficiency :配置效率antitrust legislation :反托拉斯法arc elasticity :弧弹性Arrow's impossibility theorem :阿罗不可能定理Assumption :假设asymetric information :非对称性信息average :平均average cost :平均成本average cost pricing :平均成本定价法average fixed cost :平均固定成本average product of capital :资本平均产量average product of labour :劳动平均产量average revenue :平均收益average total cost :平均总成本average variable cost :平均可变成本Bbarriers to entry :进入壁垒base year :基年bilateral monopoly :双边垄断benefit :收益black market :黑市bliss point :极乐点boundary point :边界点break even point :收支相抵点budget :预算budget constraint :预算约束budget line :预算线budget set 预算集Ccapital :资本capital stock :资本存量capital output ratio :资本产出比率capitalism :资本主义cardinal utility theory :基数效用论cartel :卡特尔ceteris puribus assumption :“其他条件不变”的假设ceteris puribus demand curve :其他因素不变的需求曲线Chamberlin model :张伯伦模型change in demand :需求变化change in quantity demanded :需求量变化change in quantity supplied :供给量变化change in supply :供给变化choice :选择closed set :闭集Coase theorem :科斯定理Cobb—Douglas production function :柯布--道格拉斯生产函数cobweb model :蛛网模型collective bargaining :集体协议工资collusion :合谋command economy :指令经济commodity :商品commodity combination :商品组合commodity market :商品市场commodity space :商品空间common property :公用财产comparative static analysis :比较静态分析compensated budget line :补偿预算线compensated demand function :补偿需求函数compensation principles :补偿原则compensating variation in income :收入补偿变量competition :竞争competitive market :竞争性市场complement goods :互补品complete information :完全信息completeness :完备性condition for efficiency in exchange :交换的最优条件condition for efficiency in production :生产的最优条件concave :凹concave function :凹函数concave preference :凹偏好consistence :一致性constant cost industry :成本不变产业constant returns to scale :规模报酬不变constraints :约束consumer :消费者consumer behavior :消费者行为consumer choice :消费者选择consumer equilibrium :消费者均衡consumer optimization :消费者优化consumer preference :消费者偏好consumer surplus :消费者剩余consumer theory :消费者理论consumption :消费consumption bundle :消费束consumption combination :消费组合consumption possibility curve :消费可能曲线consumption possibility frontier :消费可能性前沿consumption set :消费集consumption space :消费空间continuity :连续性continuous function :连续函数contract curve :契约曲线convex :凸convex function :凸函数convex preference :凸偏好convex set :凸集corporatlon :公司cost :成本cost benefit analysis :成本收益分cost function :成本函数cost minimization :成本极小化Cournot equilihrium :古诺均衡Cournot model :古诺模型Cross—price elasticity :交叉价格弹性Ddead—weights loss :重负损失decreasing cost industry :成本递减产业decreasing returns to scale :规模报酬递减deduction :演绎法demand :需求demand curve :需求曲线demand elasticity :需求弹性demand function :需求函数demand price :需求价格demand schedule :需求表depreciation :折旧derivative :导数derive demand :派生需求difference equation :差分方程differential equation :微分方程differentiated good :差异商品differentiated oligoply :差异寡头diminishing marginal substitution :边际替代率递减diminishing marginal return :收益递减diminishing marginal utility :边际效用递减direct approach :直接法direct taxes :直接税discounting :贴税、折扣diseconomies of scale :规模不经济disequilibrium :非均衡distribution :分配division of labour :劳动分工distribution theory of marginal productivity :边际生产率分配论duoupoly :双头垄断、双寡duality :对偶durable goods :耐用品dynamic analysis :动态分析dynamic models :动态模型EEconomic agents :经济行为者economic cost :经济成本economic efficiency :经济效率economic goods :经济物品economic man :经济人economic mode :经济模型economic profit :经济利润economic region of production :生产的经济区域economic regulation :经济调节economic rent :经济租金exchange :交换economics :经济学exchange efficiency :交换效率economy :经济exchange contract curve :交换契约曲线economy of scale :规模经济Edgeworth box diagram :埃奇沃思图exclusion :排斥性、排他性Edgeworth contract curve :埃奇沃思契约线Edgeworth model :埃奇沃思模型efficiency :效率,效益efficiency parameter :效率参数elasticity :弹性elasticity of substitution :替代弹性endogenous variable :内生变量endowment :禀赋endowment of resources :资源禀赋Engel curve :恩格尔曲线entrepreneur :企业家entrepreneurship :企业家才能entry barriers :进入壁垒entry/exit decision :进出决策envolope curve :包络线equilibrium :均衡equilibrium condition :均衡条件equilibrium price :均衡价格equilibrium quantity :均衡产量eqity :公平equivalent variation in income :收入等价变量excess—capacity theorem :过度生产能力定理excess supply :过度供给exchange :交换exchange contract curve :交换契约曲线exclusion :排斥性、排他性exclusion principle :排他性原则existence :存在性existence of general equilibrium :总体均衡的存在性exogenous variables :外生变量expansion paths :扩展径expectation :期望expected utility :期望效用expected value :期望值expenditure :支出explicit cost :显性成本external benefit :外部收益external cost :外部成本external economy :外部经济external diseconomy :外部不经济externalities :外部性FFactor :要素factor demand :要素需求factor market :要素市场factors of production :生产要素factor substitution :要素替代factor supply :要素供给fallacy of composition :合成谬误final goods :最终产品firm :企业firms’demand curve for labor :企业劳动需求曲线firm supply curve :企业供给曲线first-degree price discrimination :第一级价格歧视first—order condition :一阶条件fixed costs :固定成本fixed input :固定投入fixed proportions production function :固定比例的生产函数flow :流量fluctuation :波动for whom to produce :为谁生产free entry :自由进入free goods :自由品,免费品free mobility of resources :资源自由流动free rider :搭便车,免费搭车function :函数future value :未来值Ggame theory :对策论、博弈论general equilibrium :总体均衡general goods :一般商品Giffen goods :吉芬晶收入补偿需求曲线Giffen's Paradox :吉芬之谜Gini coefficient :吉尼系数goldenrule :黄金规则goods :货物government failure :政府失败government regulation :政府调控grand utility possibility curve :总效用可能曲线grand utility possibility frontier :总效用可能前沿Hheterogeneous product :异质产品Hicks—kaldor welfare criterion :希克斯一卡尔多福利标准homogeneity :齐次性homogeneous demand function :齐次需求函数homogeneous product :同质产品homogeneous production function :齐次生产函数horizontal summation :水平和household :家庭how to produce :如何生产human capital :人力资本hypothesis :假说Iidentity :恒等式imperfect competion :不完全竞争implicitcost :隐性成本income :收入income compensated demand curve :收入补偿需求曲线income constraint :收入约束income consumption curve :收入消费曲线income distribution :收入分配income effect :收入效应income elasticity of demand :需求收入弹性increasing cost industry :成本递增产业increasing returns to scale :规模报酬递增inefficiency :缺乏效率index number :指数indifference :无差异indifference curve :无差异曲线indifference map :无差异族indifference relation :无差异关系indifference set :无差异集indirect approach :间接法individual analysis :个量分析individual demand curve :个人需求曲线individual demand function :个人需求函数induced variable :引致变量induction :归纳法industry :产业industry equilibrium :产业均衡industry supply curve :产业供给曲线inelastic :缺乏弹性的inferior goods :劣品inflection point :拐点information :信息information cost :信息成本initial condition :初始条件initial endowment :初始禀赋innovation :创新input :投入input—output :投入—产出institution :制度institutional economics :制度经济学insurance :保险intercept :截距interest :利息interest rate :利息率intermediate goods :中间产品internatization of externalities :外部性内部化invention :发明inverse demand function :逆需求函数investment :投资invisible hand :看不见的手isocost line :等成本线,isoprofit curve :等利润曲线isoquant curve :等产量曲线isoquant map :等产量族Kkinded—demand curve :弯折的需求曲线Llabour :劳动labour demand :劳动需求labour supply :劳动供给labour theory of value :劳动价值论labour unions :工会laissez faire :自由放任Lagrangian function :拉格朗日函数Lagrangian multiplier :拉格朗乘数,land :土地law :法则law of demand and supply :供需法law of diminishing marginal utility :边际效用递减法则law of diminishing marginal rate of substitution :边际替代率递减法则law of diminishing marginal rate of technical substitution :边际技术替代率law of increasing cost :成本递增法则law of one price :单一价格法则leader—follower model :领导者--跟随者模型least—cost combination of inputs :最低成本的投入组合leisure :闲暇Leontief production function :列昂节夫生产函数licenses :许可证linear demand function :线性需求函数linear homogeneity :线性齐次性linear homogeneous production function :线性齐次生产函数long run :长期long run average cost :长期平均成本long run equilibrium :长期均衡long run industry supply curve :长期产业供给曲线long run marginal cost :长期边际成本long run total cost :长期总成本Lorenz curve :洛伦兹曲线loss minimization :损失极小化1ump sum tax :一次性征税luxury :奢侈品Mmacroeconomics :宏观经济学marginal :边际的marginal benefit :边际收益marginal cost :边际成本marginal cost pricing :边际成本定价marginal cost of factor :边际要素成本marginal physical productivity :实际实物生产率marginal product :边际产量marginal product of capital :资本的边际产量marginal product of 1abour :劳动的边际产量marginal productivity :边际生产率marginal rate of substitution :边替代率marginal rate of transformation 边际转换率marginal returns :边际回报marginal revenue :边际收益marginal revenue product :边际收益产品marginal revolution :边际革命marginal social benefit :社会边际收益marginal social cost :社会边际成本marginal utility :边际效用marginal value products :边际价值产品market :市场market clearance :市场结清,市场洗清market demand :市场需求market economy :市场经济market equilibrium :市场均衡market failure :市场失败market mechanism :市场机制market structure :市场结构market separation :市场分割market regulation :市场调节market share :市场份额markup pricing :加减定价法Marshallian demand function :马歇尔需求函数maximization :极大化microeconomics :微观经济学minimum wage :最低工资misallocation of resources :资源误置mixed economy :混合经济model :模型money :货币monopolistic competition :垄断竞争monopolistic exploitation :垄断剥削monopoly :垄断,卖方垄断monopoly equilibrium :垄断均衡monopoly pricing :垄断定价monopoly regulation :垄断调控monopoly rents :垄断租金monopsony :买方垄断NNash equilibrium :纳什均衡Natural monopoly :自然垄断Natural resources :自然资源Necessary condition :必要条件necessities :必需品net demand :净需求nonconvex preference :非凸性偏好nonconvexity :非凸性nonexclusion :非排斥性nonlinear pricing :非线性定价nonrivalry :非对抗性nonprice competition :非价格竞争nonsatiation :非饱和性non--zero—sum game :非零和对策normal goods :正常品normal profit :正常利润normative economics :规范经济学Oobjective function :目标函数oligopoly :寡头垄断oligopoly market :寡头市场oligopoly model :寡头模型opportunity cost :机会成本optimal choice :最佳选择optimal consumption bundle :消费束perfect elasticity :完全有弹性optimal resource allocation :最佳资源配置optimal scale :最佳规模optimal solution :最优解optimization :优化ordering of optimization(social) preference :(社会)偏好排序ordinal utility :序数效用ordinary goods :一般品output :产量、产出output elasticity :产出弹性output maximization 产出极大化Pparameter :参数Pareto criterion :帕累托标准Pareto efficiency :帕累托效率Pareto improvement :帕累托改进Pareto optimality :帕累托优化Pareto set :帕累托集partial derivative :偏导数partial equilibrium :局部均衡patent :专利pay off matrix :收益矩阵、支付矩阵perceived demand curve :感觉到的需求曲线perfect competition :完全竞争perfect complement :完全互补品perfect monopoly :完全垄断perfect price discrimination :完全价格歧视perfect substitution :完全替代品perfect inelasticity :完全无弹性perfectly elastic :完全有弹性perfectly inelastic :完全无弹性plant size :工厂规模point elasticity :点弹性post Hoc Fallacy :后此谬误prediction :预测preference :偏好preference relation :偏好关系present value :现值price :价格price adjustment model :价格调整模型price ceiling :最高限价price consumption curve :价格费曲线price control :价格管制price difference :价格差别price discrimination :价格歧视price elasticity of demand :需求价格弹性price elasticity of supply :供给价格弹性price floor :最低限价price maker :价格制定者price rigidity :价格刚性price seeker :价格搜求者price taker :价格接受者price tax :从价税private benefit :私人收益principal—agent issues :委托--代理问题private cost :私人成本private goods :私人用品private property :私人财产producer equilibrium :生产者均衡producer theory :生产者理论product :产品product transformation curve :产品转换曲线product differentiation :产品差异product group :产品集团production :生产production contract curve :生产契约曲线production efficiency :生产效率production function :生产函数production possibility curve :生产可能性曲线productivity :生产率productivity of capital :资本生产率productivity of labor :劳动生产率profit :利润profit function :利润函数profit maximization :利润极大化property rights :产权property rights economics :产权经济学proposition :定理proportional demand curve :成比例的需求曲线public benefits :公共收益public choice :公共选择public goods :公共商品pure competition :纯粹竞争rivalry :对抗性、竞争pure exchange :纯交换pure monopoly :纯粹垄断Qquantity—adjustment model :数量调整模型quantity tax :从量税quasi—rent :准租金Rrate of product transformation :产品转换率rationality :理性reaction function :反应函数regulation :调节,调控relative price 相对价格rent :租金rent control :规模报酬rent seeking :寻租rent seeking economics :寻租经济学resource :资源resource allocation :资源配置returns :报酬、回报returns to scale :规模报酬revealed preference :显示性偏好revenue :收益revenue curve :收益曲线revenue function :收益函数revenue maximization :收益极大化ridge line :脊线risk :风险Ssatiation :饱和,满足saving :储蓄scarcity :稀缺性law of scarcity :稀缺法则second—degree price discrimination :二级价格歧视second derivative :--阶导数second—order condition :二阶条件service :劳务set :集shadow prices :影子价格short—run :短期short—run cost curve :短期成本曲线short—run equilibrium :短期均衡short—run supply curve :短期供给曲线shut down decision :关闭决策shortage 短缺shut down point :关闭点single price monopoly :单一定价垄断slope :斜率social benefit :社会收益social cost :社会成本social indifference curve :社会无差异曲线social preference :社会偏好social security :社会保障social welfare function :社会福利函数socialism :社会主义solution :解space :空间stability :稳定性stable equilibrium :稳定的均衡Stackelberg model :斯塔克尔贝格模型static analysis :静态分析stock :存量stock market :股票市场strategy :策略subsidy :津贴substitutes :替代品substitution effect :替代效应substitution parameter :替代参数sufficient condition :充分条件supply :供给supply curve :供给曲线supply function :供给函数supply schedule :供给表Sweezy model :斯威齐模型symmetry :对称性symmetry of information :信息对称Ttangency :相切taste :兴致technical efficiency :技术效率technological constraints ;技术约束technological progress :技术进步technology :技术third—degree price discrimination :第三级价格歧视total cost :总成本total effect :总效应total expenditure :总支出total fixed cost :总固定成本total product :总产量total revenue :总收益total utility :总效用total variable cost :总可变成本traditional economy :传统经济transitivity :传递性transaction cost :交易费用Uuncertainty :不确定性uniqueness :唯一性unit elasticity :单位弹性unstable equilibrium :不稳定均衡utility :效用utility function :效用函数utility index :效用指数utility maximization :效用极大化utility possibility curve :效用可能性曲线utility possibility frontier :效用可能性前沿Vvalue :价值value judge :价值判断value of marginal product :边际产量价值variable cost :可变成本variable input :可变投入variables :变量vector :向量visible hand :看得见的手vulgur economics :庸俗经济学Wwage :工资wage rate :工资率Walras general equilibrium :瓦尔拉斯总体均衡Walras's law :瓦尔拉斯法则Wants :需要Welfare criterion :福利标准Welfare economics :福利经学Welfare loss triangle :福利损失三角形welfare maximization :福利极大化Zzero cost :零成本zero elasticity :零弹性zero homogeneity :零阶齐次性zero economic profit :零利润。
f8int-2013-dec-a
Fundamentals Level – Skills Module, Paper F8 (INT)Audit and Assurance (International)December 2013 Answers 1(a)Audit risk and its componentsAudit risk is the risk that the auditor expresses an inappropriate audit opinion when the financial statements are materially misstated. Audit risk is a function of two main components being the risks of material misstatement and detection risk. Risk of material misstatement is made up of two components, inherent risk and control risk.Inherent risk is the susceptibility of an assertion about a class of transaction, account balance or disclosure to a misstatement that could be material, either individually or when aggregated with other misstatements, before consideration of any related controls.Control risk is the risk that a misstatement which could occur in an assertion about a class of transaction, account balance or disclosure and which could be material, either individually or when aggregated with other misstatements, will not be prevented, or detected and corrected, on a timely basis by the entity’s internal control.Detection risk is the risk that the procedures performed by the auditor to reduce audit risk to an acceptably low level will not detect a misstatement which exists and which could be material, either individually or when aggregated with other misstatements. Detection risk is affected by sampling and non-sampling risk.(b)Audit risks and responsesAudit risk Auditor responseMinty has incurred $5m on updating, repairing and replacing a significant amount of the production process machinery.If this expenditure is of a capital nature, it should be capitalised as part of property, plant and equipment (PPE) in line with IAS 16 Property, Plant and Equipment. However, if it relates more to repairs, then it should be expensed to the statement of profit or loss (income statement). If the expenditure is not correctly classified, profit and PPE could be under or overstated.The auditor should review a breakdown of these costs to ascertain the split of capital and revenue expenditure, and further testing should be undertaken to ensure that the classification in the financial statements is correct.At the year end there will be inventory counts undertaken in all 15 warehouses.It is unlikely that the auditor will be able to attend all 15 inventory counts and therefore they need to ensure that they obtain sufficient evidence over the inventory counting controls, and completeness and existence of inventory for any warehouses not visited.The auditor should assess which of the inventory sites they will attend the counts for. This will be any with material inventory or which have a history of significant errors.For those not visited, the auditor will need to review the level of exceptions noted during the count and discuss with management any issues which arose during the count.Inventory is stored within 15 warehouses; some are owned by Minty and some rented from third parties. Only warehouses owned by Minty should be included within PPE. There is a risk of overstatement of PPE and understatement of rental expenses if Minty has capitalised all 15 warehouses.The auditor should review supporting documentation for all warehouses included within PPE to confirm ownership by Minty and to ensure non-current assets are not overstated.A new accounting general ledger system has been introduced at the beginning of the year and the old system was run in parallel for two months.There is a risk of opening balances being misstated and loss of data if they have not been transferred from the old system correctly. In addition, the new general ledger system will require documenting and the controls over this will need to be tested.The auditor should undertake detailed testing to confirm that all opening balances have been correctly recorded in the new general ledger system.They should document and test the new system. They should review any management reports run comparing the old and new system during the parallel run to identify any issues with the processing of accounting information.The finance director of Minty has decided to release the opening provision of $1·5 million for allowance for receivables as he feels it is unnecessary.There is a risk that receivables will be overvalued, as despite having a credit controller, some balances will be irrecoverable and so will be overstated if not provided against. In addition, due to the damaged inventory there is an increased risk of customers refusing to make payments in full.Extended post year-end cash receipts testing and a review of the aged receivables ledger to be performed to assess valuation and the need for an allowance for receivables.(c)Audit strategy documentThe audit strategy sets out the scope, timing and direction of the audit and helps the development of the audit plan. It should consider the following main areas.It should identify the main characteristics of the engagement which define its scope. For Minty it should consider the following:–Whether the financial information to be audited has been prepared in accordance with IFRS.–T o what extent audit evidence obtained in previous audits for Minty will be utilised.–Whether computer-assisted audit techniques will be used and the effect of IT on audit procedures.–The availability of key personnel at Minty.It should ascertain the reporting objectives of the engagement to plan the timing of the audit and the nature of the communications required, such as:–The audit timetable for reporting and whether there will be an interim as well as final audit.–Organisation of meetings with Minty’s management to discuss any audit issues arising.–Location of the 15 inventory counts.–Any discussions with management regarding the reports to be issued.–The timings of the audit team meetings and review of work performed.–If there are any expected communications with third parties.The strategy should consider the factors that, in the auditor’s professional judgement, are significant in directing Minty’s audit team’s efforts, such as:–The determination of materiality for the audit.–The need to maintain a questioning mind and to exercise professional skepticism in gathering and evaluating audit evidence.It should consider the results of preliminary audit planning activities and, where applicable, whether knowledge gained on other engagements for Minty is relevant, such as:–Results of previous audits and the results of any tests over the effectiveness of internal controls.–Evidence of management’s commitment to the design, implementation and maintenance of sound internal control.–Volume of transactions, which may determine whether it is more efficient for the audit team to rely on internal control.–Significant business developments affecting Minty, such as the change in the accounting system and the significant expenditure on an overhaul of the factory.The audit strategy should ascertain the nature, timing and extent of resources necessary to perform the audit, such as:–The selection of the audit team with experience of this type of industry. –Assignment of audit work to the team members.–Setting the audit budget.Tutorial note:The answer is longer than required for four marks but represents a teaching aid.Audit riskAuditor responseMinty has incurred expenditure of $4·5 million ondeveloping a new brand of fizzy drink. This expenditure is research and development under IAS 38 Intangible Assets .The standard requires research costs to be expensed and development costs to be capitalised as an intangible asset.If Minty has incorrectly classified research costs asdevelopment expenditure, there is a risk the intangible asset could be overstated and expenses understated.Obtain a breakdown of the expenditure and undertaketesting to determine whether the costs relate to the research or development stage. Discuss the accounting treatment with the finance director and ensure it is in accordance with IAS 38.A large batch of cola products has been damaged in the production process and will be in inventory at the year end.No adjustment has been made by management.The valuation of inventory as per IAS 2 Inventories should be at the lower of cost and net realisable value. Hence it is likely that this inventory is overvalued.Detailed cost and net realisable value testing to be performed to assess how much the inventory requires writing down by.Due to the damaged cola products, a number of customers have complained. It is likely that for any of the damaged goods sold, Minty will need to refund these customers.Revenue is possibly overstated if the sales returns are not completely and accurately recorded.Review the breakdown of sales of damaged goods, and ensure that they have been accurately removed from revenue.The management of Minty receives a significant annual bonus based on the value of year end total assets. There is a risk that management might feel under pressure tooverstate the value of assets through the judgements taken or through the use of releasing provisions.Throughout the audit the team will need to be alert to this risk. They will need to maintain professional skepticism and carefully review judgemental decisions and compare treatment against prior years.(d)Substantive procedures(i)$5 million expenditure incurred on improving the factory production process–Obtain a schedule of the $5 million expenditure and cast to ensure accuracy.–For those items treated as capital and included with property, plant and equipment, agree to purchase invoices and ascertain whether they are in fact of a capital nature.–For capital items, agree to the non-current assets register to ensure that they are correctly included.–For capital items, recalculate the depreciation charged to ensure it has been appropriately time apportioned.–For items treated as repairs, agree to invoices to ensure they are not of a capital nature and that they have been correctly expensed to the statement of profit or loss (income statement).(ii)Release of $1·5 million allowance for receivables–Discuss with the finance director his rationale for not providing against any receivables.–Review the aged receivable ledger to identify any slow moving or old receivable balances, discuss the status of these balances with the credit controller to assess whether they are likely to pay.–Review whether there are any after date cash receipts for slow moving/old receivable balances.–Review customer correspondence to identify any balances which are in dispute or unlikely to be paid.–Review board minutes to identify whether there are any significant concerns in relation to payments by customers.–Calculate the potential level of receivables which are not recoverable and assess whether this is material or not and discuss with management.(iii)Damaged inventory–Obtain a schedule of the $1 million damaged cola products and cast to ensure accuracy.–During the inventory count identify the quantity of the damaged goods and agree to the schedule.–Discuss with management their plans for disposing of these goods, whether they believe these goods have a net realisable value (NRV) at all or if they will need to be scrapped.–If any of the goods have been sold post year end, agree to the sales invoice to assess NRV.–Agree the cost of the inventory to supporting documentation to confirm the raw material cost, labour cost and any overheads attributed to the cost.–Quantify the level of adjustment required to value inventory at the lower of cost and NRV and discuss with management.2(a)Test of control and substantive procedures(i)T ests of control evaluate the operating effectiveness of controls in preventing, or detecting and correcting, materialmisstatements at the assertion level.Example tests of control over wages and salaries–Inspect numerical sequence of clock cards/timesheets; if any breaks in the sequence are noted, enquire of management as to missing payroll records.–Review a sample of timesheets/clock cards for evidence of authorisation of overtime by a responsible official.–Observe whether there is adequate segregation of duties between human resources and payroll departments.(ii)Substantive procedures are aimed at detecting material misstatements at the assertion level. They include tests of details of transactions, balances, disclosures and substantive analytical procedures.Example substantive procedures over wages and salaries–Perform a proof in total of total payroll taking into account joiners and leavers and any annual pay rise, compare any trends to prior years and discuss significant fluctuations with management.–For a sample of employees, recalculate the gross and net pay and agree to the payroll records to verify accuracy.–Re-perform calculation of statutory deductions to confirm whether correct deductions for this year have been included within the payroll expense.Tutorial note:Marks will be awarded for any other relevant wages and salaries tests/procedures.(b)Reliability of audit evidenceThe following factors or generalisations can be made when assessing the reliability of audit evidence:–The reliability of audit evidence is increased when it is obtained from independent sources outside the entity.–The reliability of audit evidence which is generated internally is increased when the related controls, including those over its preparation and maintenance, imposed by the entity are effective.–Audit evidence obtained directly by the auditor is more reliable than audit evidence obtained indirectly or by inference.–Audit evidence in documentary form, whether paper, electronic or other medium, is more reliable than evidence obtained orally.–Audit evidence provided by original documents is more reliable than audit evidence provided by photocopies or facsimiles, the reliability of which may depend on the controls over their preparation and maintenance.(c)Overall review of financial statementsProcedures an auditor should perform include:–Reviewing the financial statements to ensure compliance with accounting standards and local legislation disclosure. This is sometimes done via the use of a disclosure checklist.–Reviewing the disclosure of the accounting policies to ensure that they are in accordance with the accounting treatment adopted in the financial statements, and that they are sufficiently disclosed.–Reviewing the financial statements to ensure they are consistent with the auditor’s knowledge of the business and the results of their audit work.–Reviewing the financial statements to assess whether they adequately reflect the information and explanations previously obtained and conclusions reached during the course of the audit.–Performing analytical procedures of the financial statements, under ISA 520 Analytical Procedures; this helps the auditor to form an overall conclusion on the financial statements.–Reviewing the aggregate of uncorrected misstatements to assess whether in aggregate a material misstatement arises; if so discuss with management with regards to a potential adjustment.–As part of the overall review, the auditor should assess whether the audit evidence gathered by the team is sufficient and appropriate to support the audit opinion.3(a)Documenting the sales and despatch systemThere are several methods which can be used by the internal audit department of Oregano Co (Oregano) to document their system.Narrative notesNarrative notes consist of a written description of the system; they would detail what occurs in the system at each stage and would include any controls which operate at each stage.Advantages of this method include:–They are simple to record; after discussion with staff members of Oregano, these discussions are easily written up as notes.–They can facilitate understanding by all members of the internal audit team, especially more junior members who might find alternative methods too complex.Disadvantages of this method include:–Narrative notes may prove to be too cumbersome, especially if the sales and distribution system is complex.–This method can make it more difficult to identify missing internal controls as the notes record the detail but do not identify control exceptions clearly.QuestionnairesInternal control questionnaires (ICQ) or internal control evaluation questionnaires (ICEQ) contain a list of questions; ICQs are used to assess whether controls exist whereas ICEQs test the effectiveness of the controls.Advantages of this method include:–Questionnaires are quick to prepare, which means they are a timely method for recording the system.–They ensure that all controls present within the system are considered and recorded; hence missing controls or deficiencies are clearly highlighted by the internal audit team.Disadvantages of this method include:–It can be easy for the staff members of Oregano to overstate the level of the controls present as they are asked a series of questions relating to potential controls.– A standard list of questions may miss out unusual controls of Oregano.FlowchartsFlowcharts are a graphic illustration of the internal control system for the sales and despatch system. Lines usually demonstrate the sequence of events and standard symbols are used to signify controls or documents.Advantages of this method include:–It is easy to view the sales system in its entirety as it is all presented together in one diagram.–Due to the use of standard symbols for controls, they are easy to spot as are any missing controls.Disadvantages of this method include:–They can sometimes be difficult to amend, as any amendments may require the whole flowchart to be redrawn.–There is still the need for narrative notes to accompany the flowchart and hence it can be a time consuming method.Note: Full marks will be awarded for describing TWO methods for documenting the sales and despatch system and explaining ONE advantage and ONE disadvantage for each method.(b)Control objectives for sales and despatch system–T o ensure that orders are only accepted if goods are available to be processed for customers.–T o ensure that all orders are recorded completely and accurately.–T o ensure that goods are not supplied to poor credit risks.–T o ensure that goods are despatched for all orders on a timely basis.–T o ensure that goods are despatched correctly to customers and that they are of an adequate quality.–T o ensure that all goods despatched are correctly invoiced.–T o ensure completeness of income for goods despatched.–T o ensure that sales discounts are only provided to valid customers.(c)Deficiencies and controls for Oregano Co’s sales and despatch systemDeficiency ControlInventory availability for telephone orders is not checked at the time the order is placed. The order clerks manually check the availability later and only then inform customers if there is insufficient inventory available.There is the risk that where goods are not available, order clerks could forget to contact the customers, leading to unfulfilled orders. This could lead to customer dissatisfaction, and would impact Oregano’s reputation.When telephone orders are placed, the order clerk should check the inventory system whilst the customer is on the phone; they can then give an accurate assessment of the availability of goods and there is no risk of forgetting to inform customers.T elephone orders are not recorded immediately on the three part pre-printed order forms; these are completed after the telephone call.There is a risk that incorrect or insufficient details may be recorded by the clerk and this could result in incorrect orders being despatched or orders failing to be despatched at all, resulting in a loss of customer goodwill. All telephone orders should be recorded immediately on the three part pre-printed order forms. The clerk should also double check all the details taken with the customer over the telephone to ensure the accuracy of the order recorded.T elephone orders are not sequentially numbered. Therefore if orders are misplaced whilst in transit to the despatch department, these orders will not be fulfilled, resulting in dissatisfied customers.The three part pre-printed orders forms should be sequentially numbered and on a regular basis the despatch department should run a sequence check of orders received. Where there are gaps in the sequence, they should be investigated to identify any missing orders.Customers are able to place online orders which will exceed their agreed credit limit by 10%. This increases the risk of accepting orders from bad credit risks.Customer credit limits should be reviewed more regularly by a responsible official and should reflect the current spending pattern of customers. If some customers have increased the level of their purchases and are making payments on time, then these customers’ credit limits could be increased.The online ordering system should be amended to not allow any orders to be processed which will exceed the customer’s credit limit.A daily pick list is used by the despatch department when sending out customer orders. However, it does not appear that the goods are checked back to the original order; this could result in incorrect goods being sent out.In addition to the pick list, copies of all the related orders should be printed on a daily basis. When the goods have been picked ready to be despatched, they should be cross checked back to the original order. They should check correct quantities and product descriptions, as well as checking the quality of goods being despatched to ensure they are not damaged.Additional staff have been drafted in to help the two sales clerks produce the sales invoices. As the extra staff will not be as experienced as the sales clerks, there is an increased risk of mistakes being made in the sales invoices. This could result in customers being under or overcharged.Only the sales clerks should be able to raise sales invoices. As Oregano is expanding, consideration should be given to recruiting and training more permanent sales clerks who can produce sales invoices.Discounts given to customers are manually entered onto the sales invoices by sales clerks. This could result in unauthorised sales discounts being given as there does not seem to be any authorisation required.In addition, a clerk could forget to manually enter the discount or enter an incorrect level of discount for a customer, leading to the sales invoice being overstated and a loss of customer goodwill.For customers who are due to receive a discount, the authorised discount levels should be updated to the customer master file. When the sales invoices for these customers are raised, their discounts should automatically appear on the invoice.The invoicing system should be amended to prevent sales clerks from being able to manually enter sales discounts onto invoices.4(a)(i)Steps prior to accepting the audit of Cinnamon Brothers Co (Cinnamon)ISA 210 Agreeing the Terms of Audit Engagements provides guidance to Salt & Pepper & Co (Salt & Pepper) on thesteps they should take in accepting the new audit client, Cinnamon. It sets out a number of processes that the auditorshould perform prior to accepting a new engagement, in addition to considering whether preconditions for the audit arein place.Salt & Pepper should consider any issues which might arise which could threaten compliance with ACCA’s Code ofEthics and Conduct or any local legislation, including conflict of interest with existing clients. If issues arise, then theirsignificance must be considered.In addition, they should consider whether they are competent to perform the work and whether they would haveappropriate resources available, as well as any specialist skills or knowledge required for the audit of Cinnamon.Salt & Pepper should consider what they already know about the directors of Cinnamon; they need to consider thereputation and integrity of the directors. If necessary, the firm may want to obtain references if they do not formally knowthe directors.Additionally, Salt & Pepper should consider the level of risk attached to the audit of Cinnamon and whether this isacceptable to the firm. As part of this, they should consider whether the expected audit fee is adequate in relation to therisk of auditing Cinnamon.Salt & Pepper should communicate with the outgoing auditor of Cinnamon to assess if there are any ethical orprofessional reasons why they should not accept appointment. They should obtain permission from Cinnamon’smanagement to contact the existing auditor; if this is not given, then the engagement should be refused.If given permission to respond, the auditors should reply to Salt & Pepper, who should carefully review the response forany issues that could affect acceptance.(ii)Preconditions for the auditISA 210 Agreeing the Terms of Audit Engagements requires auditors to only accept a new audit engagement when ithas been confirmed that the preconditions for an audit are present.T o assess whether the preconditions for an audit are present, Salt & Pepper must determine whether the financialreporting framework to be applied in the preparation of Cinnamon’s financial statements is acceptable. In consideringthis, the auditor should assess the nature of the entity, the nature and purpose of the financial statements and whetherlaw or regulations prescribes the applicable reporting framework.In addition, they must obtain the agreement of Cinnamon’s management that it acknowledges and understands itsresponsibility for the following:–Preparation of the financial statements in accordance with the applicable financial reporting framework, including where relevant their fair presentation;–For such internal control as management determines is necessary to enable the preparation of financial statements which are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error; and–T o provide Salt & Pepper with access to all relevant information for the preparation of the financial statements, any additional information that the auditor may request from management and unrestricted access to persons withinCinnamon from whom the auditor determines it necessary to obtain audit evidence.If the preconditions for an audit are not present, Salt & Pepper shall discuss the matter with Cinnamon’s management.Unless required by law or regulation to do so, the auditor shall not accept the proposed audit engagement:–If the auditor has determined that the financial reporting framework to be applied in the preparation of the financial statements is unacceptable; or–If management agreement of their responsibilities has not been obtained.(b)Engagement lettersMatters to be included in an audit engagement letter:–The objective and scope of the audit;–The responsibilities of the auditor;–The responsibilities of management;–Identification of the financial reporting framework for the preparation of the financial statements;–Expected form and content of any reports to be issued;–Elaboration of the scope of the audit with reference to legislation;–The form of any other communication of results of the audit engagement;–The fact that some material misstatements may not be detected;–Arrangements regarding the planning and performance of the audit, including the composition of the audit team;–The expectation that management will provide written representations;–The basis on which fees are computed and any billing arrangements;– A request for management to acknowledge receipt of the audit engagement letter and to agree to the terms of the engagement;–Arrangements concerning the involvement of internal auditors and other staff of the entity;。
经济学专业必备英语词汇重点
经济学专业必备英语词汇重点经济学专业必备英语词汇重点经济学专业必备英语词汇Aaccounting 会计accounting cost 会计成本accounting profit 会计利润adverse selection 逆向选择allocation 配置allocation of resources 资源配置allocative efficiency 配置效率antitrust legislation 反托拉斯法arc elasticity弧弹性assumption 假设asymmetric information 非对称性信息average 平均average cost 平均成本average cost pricing 平均成本定价法average fixed cost 平均固定成本average product of capital 资本平均产量average product of labour 劳动平均产量average revenue 平均收益average total cost 平均总成本average variable cost 平均可变成本###StudyGet_Info_Pagination_SIGN###Bbarriers to entry 进入壁垒base year 基年bilateral monopoly 双边垄断benefit 收益black market 黑市bliss point 极乐点boundary point 边界点break even point 收支相抵点budget 预算budget constraint 预算约束budget line 预算线budget set 预算集###StudyGet_Info_Pagination_SIGN### Ccapital 资本capital stock 资本存量capital output ratio 资本产出比率capitalism 资本主义cardinal utility theory 基数效用论cartel 卡特尔ceteris paribus assumption “其他条件不变”的假设ceteris paribus demand curve “其他因素不变”的需求曲线Chamberlain model 张伯伦模型change in demand 需求变化change in quantity demanded 需求量变化change in quantity supplied 供给量变化change in supply 供给变化choice 选择closed set 闭集Coase theorem 科斯定理Cobb-Douglas production function 柯布--道格拉斯生产函数cobweb model 蛛网模型collective bargaining 集体协议工资collusion 合谋command economy 指令经济commodity 商品commodity combination 商品组合commodity market 商品市场commodity space 商品空间common property 公用财产comparative static analysis 比较静态分析compensated budget line 补偿预算线compensated demand function 补偿需求函数compensation principles 补偿原则compensating variation in income 收入补偿变量competition 竞争competitive market 竞争性市场complement goods 互补品complete information 完全信息completeness 完备性condition for efficiency in exchange交换的最优条件condition for efficiency in production生产的最优条件concave 凹concave function 凹函数concave preference 凹偏好consistence 一致性constant cost industry 成本不变产业constant returns to scale 规模报酬不变constraints 约束consumer 消费者consumer behavior 消费者行为consumer choice 消费者选择consumer equilibrium 消费者均衡consumer optimization 消费者优化consumer preference 消费者偏好consumer surplus 消费者剩余consumer theory 消费者理论consumption 消费consumption bundle 消费束consumption combination 消费组合consumption possibility curve 消费可能曲线consumption possibility frontier 消费可能性前沿consumption set 消费集consumption space 消费空间continuity 连续性continuous function 连续函数contract curve 契约曲线convex 凸convex function 凸函数convex preference 凸偏好convex set 凸集corporation 公司cost 成本cost benefit analysis 成本收益分析cost function 成本函数cost minimization 成本最小化Cournot equilibrium 古诺均衡Cournot model 古诺模型cross-price elasticity 交叉价格弹性###StudyGet_Info_Pagination_SIGN###Ddead-weights loss 重负损失decreasing cost industry 成本递减产业decreasing returns to scale 规模报酬递减deduction 演绎法demand 需求demand curve 需求曲线demand elasticity 需求弹性demand function 需求函数demand price 需求价格demand schedule 需求表depreciation 折旧derivative 导数derive demand 派生需求difference equation 差分方程differential equation 微分方程differentiated good 差异商品differentiated oligopoly 差异寡头diminishing marginal substitution边际替代率递减diminishing marginal return 收益递减diminishing marginal utility 边际效用递减direct approach 直接法direct taxes 直接税discounting 贴水、折扣diseconomies of scale 规模不经济disequilibrium 非均衡distribution 分配division of labour 劳动分工duopoly 双头垄断、双寡duality 对偶durable goods 耐用品dynamic analysis 动态分析dynamic models 动态模型###StudyGet_Info_Pagination_SIGN###Eeconomic agents 经济行为者economic cost 经济成本economic efficiency 经济效率economic goods 经济物品economic man 经济人economic mode 经济模型economic profit 经济利润economic regulation 经济调节economic rent 经济租金exchange 交换exchange efficiency 交换效率exchange contract curve 交换契约曲线economy of scale 规模经济Edgeworth box diagram 埃奇沃思图exclusion 排斥性、排他性Edgeworth contract curve 埃奇沃思契约线Edgeworth model 埃奇沃思模型efficiency 效率、效益efficiency parameter 效率参数elasticity 弹性elasticity of substitution 替代弹性endogenous variable 内生变量endowment 禀赋endowment of resources 资源禀赋Engel curve 恩格尔曲线entrepreneur 企业家entrepreneurship 企业家才能entry barriers 进入壁垒entry/exit decision 进出决策envelope curve 包络线equilibrium 均衡equilibrium condition 均衡条件equilibrium price 均衡价格equilibrium quantity 均衡产量equity 公平equivalent variation in income 收入等价变量excess-capacity theorem 过度生产能力定理existence 存在性existence of general equilibrium 总体均衡的存在性expansion paths 扩展径expectation 期望expected utility 期望效用expected value 期望值expenditure 支出explicit cost 显性成本external benefit 外部收益external cost 外部成本external economy 外部经济external diseconomy 外部不经济externalities 外部性###StudyGet_Info_Pagination_SIGN### Ffactor 要素factor demand 要素需求factor market 要素市场factors of production 生产要素factor substitution 要素替代factor supply 要素供给fallacy of composition 合成谬误final goods 最终产品firm 企业firms' demand curve for labour 企业劳动需求曲线firm supply curve 企业供给曲线first-degree price discrimination 第一级价格歧视first-order condition 一阶条件fixed costs 固定成本fixed input 固定投入fixed proportions production function 固定比例的生产函数flow 流量fluctuation 波动for whom to produce 为谁生产free entry 自由进入free goods 自由品、免费品free mobility of resources 资源自由流动free rider 搭便车、免费搭车者future value 未来值###StudyGet_Info_Pagination_SIGN###Ggame theory 博弈论、对策论general equilibrium 总体均衡、一般均衡general goods 一般商品Giffen goods 吉芬商品Giffen's Paradox 吉芬之谜Gini coefficient 吉尼系数golden rule 黄金规则government failure 政府失败government regulation 政府调控grand utility possibility curve 总效用可能曲线grand utility possibility frontier总效用可能前沿###StudyGet_Info_Pagination_SIGN###Hheterogeneous product 异质产品Hicks-kaldor welfare criterion 希克斯-卡尔多福利标准homogeneity 齐次性homogeneous demand function 齐次需求函数homogeneous product 同质产品homogeneous production function 齐次生产函数horizontal summation 水平和human capital 人力资本hypothesis 假说###StudyGet_Info_Pagination_SIGN###Iidentity 恒等式imperfect competition 不完全竞争implicit cost 隐性成本income 收入income compensated demand curve 收入补偿需求曲线income constraint收入约束income consumption curve 收入消费曲线income distribution 收入分配income effect 收入效应income elasticity of demand 需求收入弹性increasing cost industry 成本递增产业increasing returns to scale 规模报酬递增index number 指数indifference 无差异indifference curve 无差异曲线indifference map 无差异族indifference relation 无差异关系indifference set 无差异集indirect approach 间接法individual analysis 个量分析individual demand curve 个人需求曲线individual demand function 个人需求函数induced variable 引致变量induction 归纳法industry 产业industry equilibrium 产业均衡industry supply curve 产业供给曲线inelastic缺乏弹性的inferior goods 劣品inflection point 拐点information 信息information cost 信息成本initial condition 初始条件initial endowment 初始禀赋innovation 创新input 投入input-output 投入-产出institution 制度institutional economics 制度经济学insurance 保险intercept 截距interest 利息interest rate 利息率intermediate goods 中间产品internalization of externalities 外部性内部化invention 发明inverse demand function 反需求函数invisible hand 看不见的手isocost line 等成本线isoprofit curve 等利润曲线isoquant curve 等产量曲线isoquant map 等产量族###StudyGet_Info_Pagination_SIGN###Kkinked-demand curve 弯折的需求曲线###StudyGet_Info_Pagination_SIGN###Llabour demand 劳动需求labour supply 劳动供给labour theory of value 劳动价值论labour unions 工会laissez faire 自由放任Lagrangian function 拉格朗日函数Lagrangian multiplier 拉格朗日乘数law of demand and supply 供需法则law of diminishing marginal utility 边际效用递减法则law of diminishing marginal rate of substitution 边际替代率递减法则law of increasing cost 成本递增法则law of one price 单一价格法则leader-follower model 领导者-跟随者模型least-cost combination of inputs 最低成本的投入组合leisure 闲暇Leontief production function 里昂惕夫生产函数licenses 许可证linear demand function 线性需求函数linear homogeneity 线性齐次性linear homogeneous production function 线性齐次生产函数long run 长期long run average cost 长期平均成本long run equilibrium 长期均衡long run industry supply curve 长期产业供给曲线long run marginal cost 长期边际成本long run total cost 长期总成本Lorenz curve 洛伦兹曲线loss minimization 损失极小化lump sum tax 一次性征税luxury 奢侈品###StudyGet_Info_Pagination_SIGN###Mmacroeconomics 宏观经济学marginal benefit 边际收益marginal cost 边际成本marginal cost pricing 边际成本定价marginal cost of factor 边际要素成本marginal period 市场期marginal physical productivity 边际实物生产率marginal product 边际产量marginal product of capital 资本的边际产量marginal product of labour劳动的边际产量marginal productivity 边际生产率marginal rate of substitution边际替代率marginal rate of transformation 边际转换率marginal returns 边际回报marginal revenue 边际收益marginal revenue product 边际收益产品marginal revolution 边际革命marginal social benefit 社会边际收益marginal social cost 社会边际成本marginal utility 边际效用marginal value products 边际价值产品market clearance 市场出清market economy 市场经济market equilibrium 市场均衡market failure 市场失灵market mechanism 市场机制market structure 市场结构market separation 市场分割market regulation 市场调节market share 市场份额markup pricing 加减定价法Marshallian demand function 马歇尔需求函数maximization 最大化microeconomics 微观经济学minimum wage 最低工资misallocation of resources 资源误置mixed economy 混合经济monopolistic competition 垄断竞争monopolistic exploitation垄断剥削monopoly 垄断,卖方垄断monopoly equilibrium 垄断均衡monopoly pricing 垄断定价monopoly regulation 垄断调控monopoly rents 垄断租金monopsony 买方垄断###StudyGet_Info_Pagination_SIGN###NNash equilibrium 纳什均衡natural monopoly 自然垄断natural resources 自然资源necessary condition 必要条件necessities 必需品net demand 净需求nonconvex preference 非凸性偏好nonconvexity 非凸性nonexclusion 非排斥性nonlinear pricing 非线性定价nonrivalry 非对抗性nonprice competition 非价格竞争nonsatiation 非饱和性non-zero-sum game 非零和对策normal goods 正常品normal profit 正常利润normative economics 规范经济学###StudyGet_Info_Pagination_SIGN### Oobjective function 目标函数oligopoly 寡头垄断oligopoly market 寡头市场oligopoly model 寡头模型opportunity cost 机会成本optimal choice 最佳选择optimal consumption bundle 消费束optimal resource allocation 最佳资源配置optimal scale 最佳规模optimal solution 最优解optimization 优化ordering of optimization (social preference(社会偏好排序ordinal utility 序数效用ordinary goods 一般品output 产出output elasticity 产出弹性output maximization 产出极大化###StudyGet_Info_Pagination_SIGN###Pparameter 参数Pareto criterion 帕累托标准Pareto efficiency 帕累托效率Pareto improvement 帕累托改进Pareto optimality 帕累托优化Pareto set 帕累托集partial derivative 偏导数partial equilibrium 局部均衡patent 专利pay off matrix 收益矩阵、支付矩阵perceived demand curve 感觉到的需求曲线perfect competition 完全竞争perfect complement 完全互补品perfect monopoly 完全垄断perfect price discrimination 完全价格歧视perfect substitution 完全替代品perfect inelasticity 完全无弹性perfect elasticity 完全有弹性plant size 工厂规模point elasticity 点弹性positive economics 实证经济学Post Hoc Fallacy 后此谬误prediction 预测preference 偏好preference relation 偏好关系present value 现值price adjustment model 价格调整模型price ceiling 最高限价price consumption curve 价格消费曲线price control 价格管制price difference 价格差别price discrimination 价格歧视price elasticity of demand 需求价格弹性price elasticity of supply 供给价格弹性price floor 最低限价price maker 价格制定者price rigidity 价格刚性price seeker 价格搜求者price taker 价格接受者private benefit 私人收益principal-agent issues 委托-代理问题private cost私人成本private goods 私人用品private property 私人财产producer equilibrium 生产者均衡producer theory 生产者论product transformation curve 产品转换曲线product differentiation 产品差异product group 产品集团production contract curve 生产契约曲线production efficiency 生产效率production function 生产函数production possibility curve 生产可能曲线productivity 生产率productivity of capital 资本生产率productivity of labour 劳动生产率profit function 利润函数profit maximization 利润最大化property rights 产权property rights economics 产权经济学proposition 定理proportional demand curve 成比例的需求函数public benefits 公共收益public choice 公共选择public goods 公共商品pure competition 纯粹竞争pure exchange 纯交换pure monopoly 纯粹垄断###StudyGet_Info_Pagination_SIGN###Qquantity-adjustment model 数量调整模型quantity tax 从量税quasi-rent 准租金###StudyGet_Info_Pagination_SIGN###Rrate of product transformation 产品转换率rationality 理性reaction function 反应函数regulation 调节,调控relative price 相对价格rent 租金rent seeking 寻租rent seeking economics 寻租经济学resource 资源resource allocation 资源配置returns 报酬、回报returns to scale 规模报酬revealed preference 显示性偏好revenue 收益revenue curve 收益曲线revenue function 收益函数revenue maximization 收益最大化ridge line 脊线###StudyGet_Info_Pagination_SIGN###Ssatiation 饱和,满足saving 储蓄scarcity 稀缺性law of scarcity 稀缺法则second-degree price discrimination 二级价格歧视second derivative 二阶导数second-order condition 二阶条件service 劳务shadow prices 影子价格short-run 短期short-run cost curve 短期成本曲线short-run equilibrium 短期均衡short-run supply curve 短期供给曲线shut down decision 关闭决策shortage 短缺shut down point 关闭点single price monopoly 单一定价垄断slope 斜率social benefit 社会收益social cost 社会成本social indifference curve 社会无差异曲线social preference 社会偏好social security 社会保障social welfare function 社会福利函数socialism 社会主义solution 解space 空间stability 稳定性stable equilibrium 稳定的均衡Stackelberg model 斯塔克尔贝格模型static analysis 静态分析stock 存量stock market 股票市场strategy 策略subsidy 补贴substitutes 替代品substitution effect 替代效应substitution parameter 替代参数sufficient condition 充分条件supply schedule 供给表Sweezy model 斯威齐模型symmetry 对称性symmetry of information 信息对称###StudyGet_Info_Pagination_SIGN###Ttangency 相切technical efficiency 技术效率technological constraints 技术约束technological progress 技术进步third-degree price discrimination 第三级价格歧视total cost 总成本total effect 总效应total expenditure 总支出total fixed cost 总固定成本total product 总产量total revenue 总收益total utility 总效用total variable cost 总可变成本traditional economy 传统经济transitivity 传递性transaction cost 交易费用###StudyGet_Info_Pagination_SIGN###Uuncertainty 不确定性uniqueness 唯一性unit elasticity 单位弹性unstable equilibrium 不稳定均衡utility index 效用指数utility maximization 效用最大化utility possibility curve 效用可能性曲线utility possibility frontier效用可能性前沿###StudyGet_Info_Pagination_SIGN### Vvalue judge 价值判断value of marginal product 边际产量价值variable cost 可变成本variable input 可变投入variables 变量vector 向量visible hand 看得见的手vulgar economics 庸俗经济学###StudyGet_Info_Pagination_SIGN###Wwage rate 工资率Walras general equilibrium 瓦尔拉斯总体均衡Walras's law 瓦尔拉斯法则Wants 需要Welfare criterion 福利标准Welfare economics 福利经济学Welfare loss triangle 福利损失三角形Welfare maximization 福利最大化###StudyGet_Info_Pagination_SIGN###Zzero cost 零成本zero elasticity 零弹性zero homogeneity 零阶齐次性zero economic profit 零利润。
德勤国际会计准则口袋版
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Foreword
Deloitte IFRS publications
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哥伦比亚大学佩里梅林货币银行学中英翻译2-货币的自然等级
Natural Hierarchy of Money货币的⾃然等级Always and everywhere, monetary systems are hierarchical.⽆论何时何地,货币体系都是分级的。
One way that economists have tried to get an analytical grip on this empirical fact is to distinguish money (means of final settlement) from credit (promise to pay money, means of delaying final settlement). 1 This is fine so far as it goes. But in one sense it doesn’t go far enough because it posits only two layers of the hierarchy. And in another sense it goes too far because what counts as final settlement depends on what layer we are talking about. What looks like money at one level of the system looks like credit to the level above it.经济学家试图从分析⻆度来理解货币(最终结算⼿段)与信贷(承诺付款-意思是延迟最终结算)有区别的这个事实。
1 就⽬前⽽⾔,这很好。
但从某种意义上讲,这还不够,因为它只提出了两层的层次结构。
从另⼀个意义上讲,它⾛得太远了,因为货币属于那个层级取决于我们谈论的是哪个层次。
在货币体系某⼀层级上类似货币的东⻄,看起来像是⽐它更⾼层级的信⽤。
资产重估中英文对照外文翻译文献
资产重估中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)资产重估研究摘要一般公认会计准则要求用不同方法来对资产的历史成本进行计价。
在这里,我们提供了一个简单的模型,而这种模型的变化,取决于管理目标和经济力量大小的不同。
该模型的主要特点是企业投资的资产依据的是无法沟通的私人信息。
当出现“柠檬问题”时,需要以强制审计的方式对其进行资产价值重估。
我们发现,最佳的升值策略可以通过看似繁多的资产重估方法来达到,这是一般公认会计准则的特点。
一、简介一般公认会计准则提供了一个令人眼花缭乱而又看似矛盾的的资产重估要求。
这些要求包括:成本或市价孰低法,可收回价值以净流量计价,无后续支出的固定资产采用成本与市价孰低计价,金融工具以公允价值计价。
我们研究了一个因现行规则影响的投资规模和资产价格重估模型。
我们发现,因规管目标和模型参数各异,上述政策都可以成为最佳的政策。
这一发现表明,标准的经济因素可能要求同时运用一般公认会计准则中规定的多项资产重估规则。
该模型的主要特色是一个简单的柠檬原理(乔治·阿克洛夫于1970年提出),凡投资者收购一项资产,在转售开放市场之前,双方私下约定遵守“相关价值”的信息。
一些潜在的卖主们迫于清算其持有资产对资金流动性影响的担忧,同时,考虑到其他人可能通过私人信息了解因其流动性约束,进行模拟性投机。
正是这种模拟,形成了市场中的“柠檬问题”。
反过来,这种“柠檬问题”可能会影响预期的投资激励措施,作为企业家要预计“错误定价”,并认识到,如果他们最终成为流动性约束,他们可能无法赚取合理的投资回报。
反过来,强制重估实际上远离历史成本的低价值资产,可以在原则上形成更多的准确的价格,从而保护投资者的利益,提高投资回报。
然而,重估法规还可以要求对提出资产重估的一方承担这些昂贵的重估费用。
这些费用,反过来又可能扭曲投资决策,可能会影响的资产重估机构公正性。
对资产重估法规优化设计需要对这些收益和成本进行平衡考虑。
Paper 5_The Tradeoff between Mortgage Prepayments and Tax-Deferred Retirement Savings
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIESTHE TRADEOFF BETWEEN MORTGAGE PREPAYMENTSAND TAX-DEFERRED RETIREMENT SAVINGSGene AmrominJennifer HuangClemens SialmWorking Paper 12502/papers/w12502NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH1050 Massachusetts AvenueCambridge, MA 02138August 2006We thank Jeff Brown, Keith Brown, John Campbell, Courtney Coile, Gary Engelhardt, Amy Finkelstein, Leora Friedberg, Roger Gordon, Anil Kumar, Brigitte Madrian, Olivia Mitchell, Robert Parrino, Jim Poterba, Josh Rauh, Scott Weisbenner, Michelle White, and seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, the Trans-Atlantic Public Economics Seminar on Public Policy and Retirement in Uppsala (Sweden), the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, and the University of Texas at Austin for helpful comments and discussions. We are very grateful to Kevin Moore of the Board of Governors for support with the SCF data. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.©2006 by Gene Amromin, Jennifer Huang and Clemens Sialm. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.The Tradeoff between Mortgage Prepayments and Tax-Deferred Retirement SavingsGene Amromin, Jennifer Huang and Clemens SialmNBER Working Paper No. 12502August 2006JEL No. G11, G18, H24, H31ABSTRACTWe show that a significant number of households can perform a tax arbitrage by cutting back on their additional mortgage payments and increasing their contributions to tax-deferred accounts (TDA). Using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, we show that about 38% of U.S. households that are accelerating their mortgage payments instead of saving in tax-deferred accounts are making the wrong choice. For these households, reallocating their savings can yield a mean benefit of 11 to 17 cents per dollar, depending on the choice of investment assets in the TDA. In the aggregate, these mis-allocated savings are costing U.S. households as much as 1.5 billion dollars per year. Finally, we show empirically that this inefficient behavior is unlikely to be driven by liquidity considerations and that self-reported debt aversion and risk aversion variables explain to some extent the preference for paying off debt obligations early and hence the propensity to forgo our proposed tax arbitrage.Gene AmrominFederal Reserve Bank of Chicago230 South LaSalle StreetChicago, IL 60604gamromin@Jennifer HuangDepartment of FinanceB6000McCombs School of BusinessUniversity of Texas at AustinAustin, TX 78712jennifer.huang@Clemens SialmUniversity of Michigan Business School701 Tappan StreetD3219Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234and NBERsialm@“Neither a borrower nor a lender be;For loan oft loses both itself and friend,And borrowing dulls the edge of husbandry.”–William Shakespeare 1IntroductionMany households are reluctant to participate infinancial markets either as lenders or as borrowers.According to the2001Survey of Consumer Finances,nearly half of U.S. households do not own stocks and more than one third of the households eligible for employer-sponsored retirement plans do not contribute at all to such plans.Furthermore, some households are also reluctant to carry debt.At afirst glance,this runs counter to stylized facts on the proliferation of consumer borrowing,especially in unsecured credit markets.Yet,a surprising number of households accelerate paydowns of their mortgage loans,which account for a much bigger share of their debt.We show that these choices generate substantial monetary costs for a significant number of households.This paper focuses on two of the most importantfinancial decisions of households: retirement savings and home-ownership borrowing.Many households,at one time or another,face the trade-offbetween paying an extra dollar offthe remaining mortgage on their house and saving that extra dollar in tax-qualified retirement accounts.In a world without frictions,paying offmortgage loans early and investing in retirement accounts would be equivalent saving decisions.In reality,however,taxes and transaction costs play a key role in the determination of the effective borrowing and lending rates. We show that,under certain conditions,it becomes a tax-arbitrage to reduce mortgage prepayments and to increase contributions to tax-deferred accounts(TDA).1 Mortgage interest payments are deductible from taxable income for households that 1Throughout the paper,we use the term“mortgage prepayment”to denote extra payments on an existing mortgage or taking out a mortgage with a maturity shorter than the standard30years.Short maturity mortgages carry higher periodic payments,which can be considered committed“prepayments”in the same sense as writing extra checks to the mortgage company.We do not include mortgage refinancing in our definition of“prepayments,”although this interpretation is common in the industry.1itemize their deductions,while investment income in retirement accounts remains ef-fectively tax-exempt.2Hence,households earn pre-tax returns(r L)in their retirement accounts and pay after-tax rates(1−τ)r B on their mortgage borrowing.Although the borrowing rate(r B)on the mortgage is likely higher than the investment rate(r L)for an asset with similar risk properties,we show that,as long as r L>(1−τ)r B,households are generally better offsaving in a TDA instead of prepaying their mortgage.Given the simplicity of this strategy,it is reasonable to ask whether and to what extent households recognize this tradeoffin their personal decisions.Using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances,we investigate household choices between mortgage prepayments and retirement account contributions.While it is not surprising that some households are not making the right choice,the magnitude of the overall inefficiency is striking.On the margin,38%of households who prepay their mort-gages could benefit from our proposed arbitrage strategy.Depending on the choice of the investment asset in the TDA,the mean gain from such a reallocation ranges between 11and17cents per dollar of“mis-allocated savings.”In the aggregate,correcting this inefficient behavior could save U.S.households as much as1.5billion dollars per year. Thefinding that a significant number of households make substantial mistakes in their financial decisions echoes the conclusions of Campbell(2006).Although there are numerous potential rational reasons for agents either to prepay the mortgage or not to contribute to their retirement accounts–among them interest rate risks,liquidity and default risks,credit constraints,andfixed costs of participation–we show that,given the nature of the tax arbitrage,those reasons are unlikely to explain simultaneously why households prepay and do not contribute.Hence,it is difficult to identify rational reasons for the inefficient behavior of forgoing the substantial tax benefit.2Consider,for example,a Roth account where households pay income tax when they contribute and no more tax is owed upon withdrawal.Also,when tax rates are constant over time,investing in a 401(k)account is equivalent to investing in a Roth account.2Rather,these households seem to be influenced by an aversion to take on debt.Em-pirically,debt aversion and risk aversion explain to some extent the household preference for reducing their debt obligations in spite of incurring considerable monetary losses in the process.The propensity of debt-averse households to forgo such tax arbitrages is related to thefindings in Graham(2000),who shows that many corporations forgo substantial tax benefits by holding too little debt.Our paper is most closely related to the recent literature on the optimal asset location choice which considers the tradeoffbetween savings in taxable vs.tax-deferred accounts. Dammon,Spatt,and Zhang(2004),Shoven and Sialm(2004),Poterba,Shoven,and Sialm(2004),Huang(2005),and Garlappi and Huang(2006)show theoretically that, in order to maximize the tax benefit of retirement accounts,highly-taxed assets should generally be located in tax-deferred accounts and that lightly-taxed assets should be located in taxable accounts.The actual behavior of individuals investing in taxable and tax-deferred accounts is analyzed by Bodie and Crane(1997),Barber and Odean (2003),Bergstresser and Poterba(2004),and Amromin(2004).These papersfind that many households have significant amounts of money in both accounts and that a large proportion of them do not appear to take advantage of the potential benefits of optimal asset location.Similar to this literature,we theoretically compare the tax efficiency of two forms of savings choices,and then document actual household behavior and evaluate the extent of losses relative to the theoretical benchmark.Our main contribution is to introduce mortgage payments as an additional investment option in the tax arbitrage framework.There is also a vast literature on both the retirement savings decisions3and their mortgage choices4.To the best of our knowledge,this is thefirst paper to link these 3For example,Benartzi and Thaler(2001),Madrian and Shea(2001),Choi,Laibson,Madrian,and Metrick(2002),Cunningham and Engelhardt(2002),Agnew,Balduzzi,and Sunden(2003),Duflo and Saez(2003),Choi,Laibson,and Madrian(2004,2005),Mitchell,Utkus,and Yang(2005),Duflo,Gale, Liebman,Orszag,and Saez(2006),Huberman and Jiang(2006),and Brown,Liang,and Weisbenner (2006)consider the determinants of individual TDA participation and portfolio choice.4For example,Quigley(2002),Campbell and Cocco(2003),and Hurst and Stafford(2004)study mortgage choices including type of contract,refinancing,and prepayment decisions.3two strands of research by considering retirement contributions and mortgage payments as two alternative forms of household savings decisions.Ourfinding is also consistent with the explanation that households may not treat these two forms of saving decisions as substitutes.Hoynes and McFadden(1997)find little substitution between retirement savings and other forms of personalfinancial asset saving and housing wealth,and Poterba,Venti and Wise(1995)find that even similar saving vehicles like401(k)s and IRAs are not close substitutes.The paper is structured as follows.Section2describes the tax-arbitrage strategy in detail and Section3discusses the robustness of the tax arbitrage strategy.Section4 describes the data and Section5provides summary statistics for TDA contribution and mortgage payment behavior.Section6calculates the cost of choosing the wrong saving strategy.Section7looks at possible explanations for why households may forgo the tax arbitrage and Section8concludes.2Tax Arbitrage StrategyThis section describes the tax arbitrage strategy between tax-deferred retirement ac-count contributions and mortgage prepayments.We consider a household whose TDA contributions are less than the statutory maximum and who at the same time makes additional mortgage payments.Households that make additional mortgage payments have effectively chosen to save some of their income through a specific savings chan-nel.We analyze the marginal trade-offbetween contributing to a TDA and building up home equity to determine whether these households would be better offreallocating their savings.There exist several different types of retirement accounts.Because of data limita-tions,we restrict our attention to traditional employer-sponsored TDAs,such as401(k) and403(b)plans which allow contributions on a before-tax basis.These contributions4grow tax-deferred until withdrawal when the household pays taxes both on its original contribution amount and the cumulative investment returns.The household is assumed to have a constant tax rateτover time,and faces a penalty κt on TDA withdrawals at time t.Currently,withdrawals by individuals younger than5912years of age generally face a10%penalty.Hence,κt=10%if t<5912andκt=0otherwise.To derive our main result,we make the following simplifying assumptions.First,the household has afixed-rate mortgage with a rate r B and earns a constant rate of return r L on its tax-deferred savings.Second,the household itemizes deductions and can therefore effectively subtract mortgage interest from taxable income.Third,the mortgage has a fixed remaining horizon T,which means that the household never defaults or pays offthe entire mortgage for moving or refinancing purposes.Fourth,each dollar of prepayment in the current year affects only year T cashflow and reduces the after-tax mortgage payment by$(1+(1−τ)r B)T.These assumptions are useful for illustrating the tax arbitrage strategy.We discuss their robustness in Section3.Under these assumptions,we propose a simple tax arbitrage strategy where the household makes the following perturbation to its current savings strategy:(i)decreases the mortgage prepayment by one dollar;(ii)contributes an additionalX≡11−τ−κT1+(1−τ)r B1+r LT(1)dollars to the tax-deferred account which earns a return of r L;(iii)receives an immediate tax credit ofτX dollars for the additional contribution;and(iv)withdraws X(1+r L)T dollars from the tax-deferred account in year T.Since the additional contribution X to the tax-deferred account grows to X(1+r L)T by the end of year T,exactly offsetting the withdrawal amount,the new strategy yields the same wealth in the tax-deferred account as the current strategy.Moreover,the total proceeds from the withdrawal are X(1+r L)T(1−τ−κT)=(1+(1−τ)r B)T,whereτis the5tax rate andκT is the penalty upon withdrawal.5At the same time,we have assumed that reducing the current mortgage prepayment by one dollar increases the mortgage obligation by(1+(1−τ)r B)T dollars in year T.Hence,the withdrawal proceeds exactly offset the additional mortgage liability due to the reduced prepayment of the mortgage loan.Finally,the combination of steps(i)-(iv)implies that the household can walk away with a net profit of1+τX−X in the taxable account,which can be consumed immediately.We simplify its expression and term it the“Marginal Arbitrage Profit”(MAP),MAP≡1+τX−X=1−1−τ1−τ−κT1+(1−τ)r B1+r LT.(2)For any household,as long as the MAP measure is positive,it is better offfollowing the arbitrage strategy of reducing its prepayment and increasing its TDA contributions. Inspection of equation(2)yields the following intuitive results.First,the arbitrage profit decreases with r B and increases with r L.A higher mortgage borrowing rate r B makes it less profitable to stop prepaying,while a higher investment return r L makes it more attractive to invest in the tax-deferred account.Second,the arbitrage benefit increases with the investment horizon T as long as r L>(1−τ)r B,since the money grows tax-deferred for a longer period of time.Finally,this arbitrage strategy is always feasible since it is“self-financed.”The only cash outflow implied by the strategy is the additional mortgage payment on the terminal date,which is exactly covered by the future withdrawal from the tax-deferred account.As a result,the household never needs to put in additional money after pocketing the arbitrage profit(MAP).If households continue to save in the future,this self-financing requirement yields con-servative estimates of the arbitrage profit.In particular,ifκT>0,our strategy requires households to withdraw and pay penalties in order to meet the additional mortgage obligation at time T.However,if they can use other funds in their taxable accounts or 5Note that the household receives$(1−τ−κT)for each dollar withdrawn rather than(1−τ)(1−κT) since the penalty is not tax-deductible under the current tax code.6can reduce their future contributions to retirement accounts to satisfy these obligations, they will be able to delay the withdrawal and avoid the penalty.Even when the penalty is zero,delaying the withdrawal allows households to shelter assets from taxation for a longer time period,and hence improves the arbitrage profit.The MAP further underestimates the benefit of the tax arbitrage strategy if a house-hold does not consume the arbitrage profit immediately.In particular,its current wealth level is increased by the MAP amount.Without reducing its current consumption level or altering any part of its remaining portfolio,it can contribute an additional amount (up to the MAP measure)to its TDA.This additional contribution allows it to further enjoy the benefit of tax-deferred savings.The proposed arbitrage transaction also ig-nores employer matches and deductibility of TDA contributions from state income taxes, which increase its profitability.63DiscussionWe now discuss the robustness of the tax arbitrage strategy by relaxing the assumptions in the previous section.3.1Stochastic Interest RatesIn our derivation of the tax arbitrage strategy in Section2,both the mortgage borrowing rate(r B)and the tax-deferred investment return(r L)are assumed to be constant over time.These assumptions work well in the case of a household with afixed-rate mortgage that never refinances and that buys and holds to maturity Treasury bonds term-matched to the remaining lifetime of its mortgage.While this scenario appears restrictive,we argue below that it likely provides a lower bound on the tax-arbitrage gain.6The proposed strategy may also have an indirect benefit of reducingfixed participation costs as discussed by Vissing-Jorgensen(2002)and encouraging equity market participation.Moving mortgage prepayments to employer-sponsored TDA accounts introduces some households to an environment with lower equity participation costs,either because of employer subsidies or simplified investment options.7First,since we restrict our empirical investigation to households withfixed rate mortgages,the assumption of a constant r B is only violated if the mortgage is refinanced in a year S<T.As long as the refinancing decision is driven purely by interest rateis less than r B.For each dollar following the considerations,the new mortgage rate rBarbitrage strategy today,the mortgage obligation is increased by(1+(1−τ)r B)S at time)T−S at time T.The arbitrage strategy S,which grows to(1+(1−τ)r B)S(1+(1−τ)rBalso yields an extra X(1+r L)T dollars in TDA,which is equal to(1+(1−τ)r B)T by(1), and is higher than the new mortgage obligation.Hence,the arbitrage profit is increased after the refinancing.Second,while buying-and-holding Treasury bonds is generally feasible in the TDA,it is conservative because interest rates on mortgages at origination tend to be significantly higher than interest rates on Treasury bonds due to prepayment and default risks.To get a better sense of the magnitude of the tax benefit,we maintain the overall risk level of the household portfolio by allowing TDA contributions to be invested in pass-through instruments like a Mortgage-Backed Securities(MBS),which pool individual mortgages.Although there is still a mismatch in the default and prepayment risks between an individual mortgage and an MBS,the MBS is generally less risky due to the benefit of diversification.Moreover,an MBS has a variable maturity due to prepayment and default risks,and its yields vary over time since they are typically sold through mutual funds,which change their asset composition each year.In this setting,households are trading offafixed mortgage liability for an asset with variable rate of return and maturity,both of which are affected by general movements in interest rates.Yet,we still expect our estimation of the arbitrage profit to be rather conservative,since interest rates have an asymmetric impact on the benefit of the tax arbitrage strategy.When rates increase,households gain since the newly invested amount earns higher rates than the corresponding liability.On the other hand,when rates go down,households are more8likely to exercise their option to refinance,reducing the downside risk of the arbitrage strategy.3.2Moving-Related Prepayment RisksIn addition to falling interest rates,households may choose to pay offtheir entire mort-gages early when they sell their existing homes,either because of relocations or simply because of changes in tastes and housing needs.We have shown that the tax arbitrage benefit can actually be improved if the pre-payment is driven purely by interest rate considerations.If,on the other hand,interest rates stay constant over time,the perturbation specified by the arbitrage strategy re-mains valid for an exogenous moving shock,as long as households are able to roll over their mortgage debt into the new house.When both the interest rate and moving risks are present,our tax strategy is no longer a risk-free arbitrage.While households are clearly better offif they choose to move when the interest rate goes down,it is also possible that they may need to move>r B. when the interest rate goes up and the new mortgage borrowing rate becomes rBAs a result,the extra mortgage obligation(1+(1−τ)r B)S(1+(1−τ)r)T−S is larger thanBthe potential withdrawal from the tax-deferred saving(1+(1−τ)r B)T,making it less beneficial to follow our strategy.Of course,in this case,the overall loss from replacing a lower-rate mortgage is substantially greater than the change in the value of the tax strategy.To the extent that moving decisions are somewhat endogenous,households may delay their moving and prepayment decisions when the interest rate environment is not favorable.Thus,it is reasonable to conclude that,although the combination of moving and interest rate risks makes the tax strategy risky,its impact on the expected profitability of the strategy is likely to be small.77Quigley(2002)finds that households do,in fact,delay relocating when interest rates are rising.93.3Liquidity RisksOur arbitrage strategy also assumes that households never face large liquidity needs that may require them to take out additional home equity loans.At afirst glance,paying down a mortgage improves household borrowing capacity almost dollar-for-dollar by en-abling higher home equity lines of credit(HELOC).Thus,concerns for future liquidity needs may prompt households to accelerate home equity build-up and forgo implement-ing the arbitrage strategy.However,a comparison of relative liquidity characteristics of HELOCs and TDAs is far from straightforward.Most HELOCs are re-evaluated annually and may indeed be cancelled in the event of job loss,making them a poor source of liquidity when it’s likely to be needed.On the other hand,most households can borrow up to50%of their TDA assets and in worst-case scenarios(e.g.job loss orfinancial hardship)access TDA assets by paying a10%penalty.The tax burden on these hardship withdrawals tends to be low since households will be in relatively low tax brackets under these circumstances.Since the arbitrage strategy simply reallocates assets between accounts,its effect on household’s liquidity is summarized by the difference in transaction costs.TDA withdrawal penalties are likely costlier than the spread on home equity loans.8Still, as long as the probability q of liquidity event is low enough,the ex-ante expected cost (q×10%)is small relative to the expected arbitrage profit,which is in the range of 11-17%(as shown in Section6).Another reason that liquidity risks prove to be less relevant as a rational explanation for forgoing the tax arbitrage profit is thatfluctuations in future housing prices make mortgage prepayments less effective as a mean to provide liquidity when needed.If house prices appreciate significantly over time,then the amount of home equity is likely to be sufficient to meet any liquidity needs even without mortgage prepayment.No 8In our data set,the home equity loan has a mean interest rate of9.3%,while the same household has an average mortgage rate of7.6%.10withdrawal from the tax-deferred account is necessary.On the other hand,if house prices fall drastically to wipe out most of the equity,it is unlikely that the household may be able to take out additional home equity loans,even if it has been diligently prepaying the mortgage.In this case,had the household followed our tax strategy to save in the tax-deferred account instead of prepaying the mortgage,the funds would still be available for liquidity-related withdrawals.Hence,our strategy of saving in the tax-deferred account has the additional benefit of providing a good hedge against the combination of housing price risk and liquidity risk.3.4Default RisksDefault risks are extraordinary liquidity events in the future that may force households to default on mortgage payments and hence lose their houses.A household may prefer to pay offits mortgage before saving in retirement accounts in order to reduce the risk of ever losing the house.Although reasonable on the surface,we argue that this argument does not justify foregoing the tax-arbitrage either.First,following the tax-arbitrage strategy is unlikely to increase the probability of default for a household.Consider the case when the large liquidity event happens after the household would have paid offits mortgage had it followed the accelerated payment schedule.By construction,our tax arbitrage strategy is“self-financed”in the sense that once the original plan would have paid offthe mortgage,households rely solely on the withdrawal from the tax-deferred account to pay for the remaining mortgage.Hence, following the arbitrage strategy does not cause extra defaults in this case.If,on the other hand,the liquidity event happens before the household would have paid offits mortgage even under the accelerated schedule,borrowing or withdrawing from the tax-deferred account is at least as effective as(if not more than,considering housing price risks)prepaying the mortgage in meeting this liquidity need.Again,following the arbitrage strategy does not increase the default risk.11Second,in the unfortunate event of personal bankruptcy,households are generally better offhad they followed the tax-arbitrage.As a federal policy,employer-sponsored retirement savings are exempt from personal bankruptcy.9On the other hand,home-stead exemptions vary by state,with some states(e.g.Florida)allowing nearly unlimited exemptions and others(e.g.Pennsylvania)only a token amount.In the event of large liquidity shocks,our tax arbitrage strategy provides households with the additional op-tion of defaulting on the house and claiming bankruptcy while at the same time retaining their extra TDA savings.While the psychological costs of losing a house may be large, this free option increases the benefit of the tax arbitrage strategy from a pure monetary point of view,especially for residents of states with stringent homestead exemptions.10 3.5Tax EnvironmentsWe have also made several simplifying assumptions regarding tax environments,the most significant one being the constant tax rate over time.11This assumption excludes the possibilities of either changing tax laws or changing tax brackets over a household’s lifetime.Although it is hard to predict the direction of tax law changes,the assumption of a constant tax rate is likely conservative for estimating the tax benefits of our arbitrage strategy.The tax rate for a given household is generally lower during retirement since the taxable income is often lower.According to the1995-2001SCF data,41%of households are in the top four tax brackets(i.e.,at or above28%)before retirement while only 18%of households are in these top brackets after retirement.12The household can also optimally time the withdrawals from its retirement account to minimize the effective tax 9Since the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act in April2005, all IRA assets are fully protected from creditors in the event of bankruptcy.Prior to that,the amount of IRA assets exempt from bankruptcy estate varied by state.10See,for example,White(1998)and Fay,Hurst,and White(2002)for a discussion of the household bankruptcy decision.11See,for example,Sialm(2006)for a discussion of historical tax rates on investment income between 1926-2004.12Households are assumed to be retired if they receive positive Social Security,pension,or disability income in the corresponding years.12。
数据挖掘专业词汇中英对照
1、Bilingual 双语Chinese English bilingual text 中英对照2、Data warehouse and Data Mining 数据仓库与数据挖掘3、classification 分类systematize classification 使分类系统化4、preprocess 预处理The theory and algorithms of automatic fingerprint identification system (AFIS) preprocess are systematically illustrated.摘要系统阐述了自动指纹识别系统预处理的理论、算法5、angle 角度6、organizations 组织central organizations 中央机关7、OLTP On-Line Transactional Processing 在线事物处理8、OLAP On-Line Analytical Processing 在线分析处理9、Incorporated 包含、包括、组成公司A corporation is an incorporated body 公司是一种组建的实体10、unique 唯一的、独特的unique technique 独特的手法11、Capabilities 功能Evaluate the capabilities of suppliers 评估供应商的能力12、features 特征13、complex 复杂的14、information consistency 信息整合15、incompatible 不兼容的16、inconsistent 不一致的Those two are temperamentally incompatible 他们两人脾气不对17、utility 利用marginal utility 边际效用18、Internal integration 内部整合19、summarizes 总结20、application-oritend 应用对象21、subject-oritend 面向主题的22、time-varient 随时间变化的23、tomb data 历史数据24、seldom 极少Advice is seldom welcome 忠言多逆耳25、previous 先前的the previous quarter 上一季26、implicit 含蓄implicit criticism 含蓄的批评27、data dredging 数据捕捞28、credit risk 信用风险29、Inventory forecasting 库存预测30、business intelligence(BI)商业智能31、cell 单元32、Data cure 数据立方体33、attribute 属性34、granular 粒状35、metadata 元数据36、independent 独立的37、prototype 原型38、overall 总体39、mature 成熟40、combination 组合41、feedback 反馈42、approach 态度43、scope 范围44、specific 特定的45、data mart 数据集市46、dependent 从属的47、motivate 刺激、激励Motivate and withstand higher working pressure个性积极,愿意承受压力.敢于克服困难48、extensive 广泛49、transaction 交易50、suit 诉讼suit pending 案件正在审理中51、isolate 孤立We decided to isolate the patients.我们决定隔离病人52、consolidation 合并So our Party really does need consolidation 所以,我们党确实存在一个整顿的问题53、throughput 吞吐量Design of a Web Site Throughput Analysis SystemWeb网站流量分析系统设计收藏指正54、Knowledge Discovery(KDD)55、non-trivial(有价值的)--Extraction interesting (non-trivial(有价值的), implicit(固有的), previously unknown and potentially useful) patterns or knowledge from huge amounts of data.56、archeology 考古57、alternative 替代58、Statistics 统计、统计学population statistics 人口统计59、feature 特点A facial feature 面貌特征60、concise 简洁a remarkable concise report 一份非常简洁扼要的报告61、issue 发行issue price 发行价格62、heterogeneous (异类的)--Constructed by integrating multiple, heterogeneous (异类的)data sources63、multiple 多种Multiple attachments多实习64、consistent(一贯)、encode(编码)ensure consistency in naming conventions,encoding structures, attribute measures, etc.确保一致性在命名约定,编码结构,属性措施,等等。
IB A-LEVEL经济学词汇 中英文对照
经济学词汇--中英文对照A--------------------------------------------------------------------------------accounting:会计accounting cost:会计成本accounting profit:会计利润adverse selection:逆向选择allocation配置allocation of resources:资源配置allocative efficiency:配置效率antitrust legislation:反托拉斯法arc elasticity:弧弹性Arrow's impossibility theorem:阿罗不可能定理Assumption:假设asymetric information:非对称性信息average:平均average cost:平均成本average cost pricing:平均成本定价法average fixed cost:平均固定成本average product of capital:资本平均产量average product of labour:劳动平均产量average revenue:平均收益average total cost:平均总成本average variable cost:平均可变成本B--------------------------------------------------------------------------------barriers to entry:进入壁垒base year:基年bilateral monopoly:双边垄断benefit:收益black market:黑市bliss point:极乐点boundary point:边界点break even point:收支相抵点budget:预算budget constraint:预算约束budget line:预算线budget set预算集C--------------------------------------------------------------------------------capital:资本capital stock:资本存量capital output ratio:资本产出比率capitalism:资本主义cardinal utility theory:基数效用论cartel:卡特尔ceteris puribus assumption:“其他条件不变”的假设ceteris puribus demand curve:其他因素不变的需求曲线Chamberlin model:张伯伦模型change in demand:需求变化change in quantity demanded:需求量变化change in quantity supplied:供给量变化change in supply:供给变化choice:选择closed set:闭集Coase theorem:科斯定理Cobb—Douglas production function:柯布--道格拉斯生产函数cobweb model:蛛网模型collective bargaining:集体协议工资collusion:合谋command economy:指令经济commodity:商品commodity combination:商品组合commodity market:商品市场commodity space:商品空间common property:公用财产comparative static analysis:比较静态分析compensated budget line:补偿预算线compensated demand function:补偿需求函数compensation principles:补偿原则compensating variation in income:收入补偿变量competition:竞争competitive market:竞争性市场complement goods:互补品complete information:完全信息completeness:完备性condition for efficiency in exchange:交换的最优条件condition for efficiency in production:生产的最优条件concave:凹concave function:凹函数concave preference:凹偏好consistence:一致性constant cost industry:成本不变产业constant returns to scale:规模报酬不变constraints:约束consumer:消费者consumer behavior:消费者行为consumer choice:消费者选择consumer equilibrium:消费者均衡consumer optimization:消费者优化consumer preference:消费者偏好consumer surplus:消费者剩余consumer theory:消费者理论consumption:消费consumption bundle:消费束consumption combination:消费组合consumption possibility curve:消费可能曲线consumption possibility frontier:消费可能性前沿consumption set:消费集consumption space:消费空间continuity:连续性continuous function:连续函数contract curve:契约曲线convex:凸convex function:凸函数convex preference:凸偏好convex set:凸集corporatlon:公司cost:成本cost benefit analysis:成本收益分cost function:成本函数cost minimization:成本极小化Cournot equilihrium:古诺均衡Cournot model:古诺模型Cross—price elasticity:交叉价格弹性D--------------------------------------------------------------------------------dead—weights loss:重负损失decreasing cost industry:成本递减产业decreasing returns to scale:规模报酬递减deduction:演绎法demand:需求demand curve:需求曲线demand elasticity:需求弹性demand function:需求函数demand price:需求价格demand schedule:需求表depreciation:折旧derivative:导数derive demand:派生需求difference equation:差分方程differential equation:微分方程differentiated good:差异商品differentiated oligoply:差异寡头diminishing marginal substitution:边际替代率递减diminishing marginal return:收益递减diminishing marginal utility:边际效用递减direct approach:直接法direct taxes:直接税discounting:贴税、折扣diseconomies of scale:规模不经济disequilibrium:非均衡distribution:分配division of labour:劳动分工distribution theory of marginal productivity:边际生产率分配论duoupoly:双头垄断、双寡duality:对偶durable goods:耐用品dynamic analysis:动态分析dynamic models:动态模型E--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Economic agents:经济行为者economic cost:经济成本economic efficiency:经济效率economic goods:经济物品economic man:经济人economic mode:经济模型economic profit:经济利润economic region of production:生产的经济区域economic regulation:经济调节economic rent:经济租金exchange:交换economics:经济学exchange efficiency:交换效率economy:经济exchange contract curve:交换契约曲线economy of scale:规模经济Edgeworth box diagram:埃奇沃思图exclusion:排斥性、排他性Edgeworth contract curve:埃奇沃思契约线Edgeworth model:埃奇沃思模型efficiency:效率,效益efficiency parameter:效率参数elasticity:弹性elasticity of substitution:替代弹性endogenous variable:内生变量endowment:禀赋endowment of resources:资源禀赋Engel curve:恩格尔曲线entrepreneur:企业家entrepreneurship:企业家才能entry barriers:进入壁垒entry/exit decision:进出决策envolope curve:包络线equilibrium:均衡equilibrium condition:均衡条件equilibrium price:均衡价格equilibrium quantity:均衡产量eqity:公平equivalent variation in income:收入等价变量excess—capacity theorem:过度生产能力定理excess supply:过度供给exchange:交换exchange contract curve:交换契约曲线exclusion:排斥性、排他性exclusion principle:排他性原则existence:存在性existence of general equilibrium:总体均衡的存在性exogenous variables:外生变量expansion paths:扩展径expectation:期望expected utility:期望效用expected value:期望值expenditure:支出explicit cost:显性成本external benefit:外部收益external cost:外部成本external economy:外部经济external diseconomy:外部不经济externalities:外部性F--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Factor:要素factor demand:要素需求factor market:要素市场factors of production:生产要素factor substitution:要素替代factor supply:要素供给fallacy of composition:合成谬误final goods:最终产品firm:企业firms’demand curve for labor:企业劳动需求曲线firm supply curve:企业供给曲线first-degree price discrimination:第一级价格歧视first—order condition:一阶条件fixed costs:固定成本fixed input:固定投入fixed proportions production function:固定比例的生产函数flow:流量fluctuation:波动for whom to produce:为谁生产free entry:自由进入free goods:自由品,免费品free mobility of resources:资源自由流动free rider:搭便车,免费搭车function:函数future value:未来值G--------------------------------------------------------------------------------game theory:对策论、博弈论general equilibrium:总体均衡general goods:一般商品Giffen goods:吉芬晶收入补偿需求曲线Giffen's Paradox:吉芬之谜Gini coefficient:吉尼系数goldenrule:黄金规则goods:货物government failure:政府失败government regulation:政府调控grand utility possibility curve:总效用可能曲线grand utility possibility frontier:总效用可能前沿H--------------------------------------------------------------------------------heterogeneous product:异质产品Hicks—kaldor welfare criterion:希克斯一卡尔多福利标准homogeneity:齐次性homogeneous demand function:齐次需求函数homogeneous product:同质产品homogeneous production function:齐次生产函数horizontal summation:水平和household:家庭how to produce:如何生产human capital:人力资本hypothesis:假说I--------------------------------------------------------------------------------identity:恒等式imperfect competion:不完全竞争implicitcost:隐性成本income:收入income compensated demand curve:收入补偿需求曲线income constraint:收入约束income consumption curve:收入消费曲线income distribution:收入分配income effect:收入效应income elasticity of demand:需求收入弹性increasing cost industry:成本递增产业increasing returns to scale:规模报酬递增inefficiency:缺乏效率index number:指数indifference:无差异indifference curve:无差异曲线indifference map:无差异族indifference relation:无差异关系indifference set:无差异集indirect approach:间接法individual analysis:个量分析individual demand curve:个人需求曲线individual demand function:个人需求函数induced variable:引致变量induction:归纳法industry:产业industry equilibrium:产业均衡industry supply curve:产业供给曲线inelastic:缺乏弹性的inferior goods:劣品inflection point:拐点information:信息information cost:信息成本initial condition:初始条件initial endowment:初始禀赋innovation:创新input:投入input—output:投入—产出institution:制度institutional economics:制度经济学insurance:保险intercept:截距interest:利息interest rate:利息率intermediate goods:中间产品internatization of externalities:外部性内部化invention:发明inverse demand function:逆需求函数investment:投资invisible hand:看不见的手isocost line:等成本线,isoprofit curve:等利润曲线isoquant curve:等产量曲线isoquant map:等产量族K--------------------------------------------------------------------------------kinded—demand curve:弯折的需求曲线L--------------------------------------------------------------------------------labour:劳动labour demand:劳动需求labour supply:劳动供给labour theory of value:劳动价值论labour unions:工会laissez faire:自由放任Lagrangian function:拉格朗日函数Lagrangian multiplier:拉格朗乘数,land:土地law:法则law of demand and supply:供需法law of diminishing marginal utility:边际效用递减法则law of diminishing marginal rate of substitution:边际替代率递减法则law of diminishing marginal rate of technicalsubstitution:边际技术替代率law of increasing cost:成本递增法则law of one price:单一价格法则leader—follower model:领导者--跟随者模型least—cost combination of inputs:最低成本的投入组合leisure:闲暇Leontief production function:列昂节夫生产函数licenses:许可证linear demand function:线性需求函数linear homogeneity:线性齐次性linear homogeneous production function:线性齐次生产函数long run:长期long run average cost:长期平均成本long run equilibrium:长期均衡long run industry supply curve:长期产业供给曲线long run marginal cost:长期边际成本long run total cost:长期总成本Lorenz curve:洛伦兹曲线loss minimization:损失极小化1ump sum tax:一次性征税luxury:奢侈品M--------------------------------------------------------------------------------macroeconomics:宏观经济学marginal:边际的marginal benefit:边际收益marginal cost:边际成本marginal cost pricing:边际成本定价marginal cost of factor:边际要素成本marginal physical productivity:实际实物生产率marginal product:边际产量marginal product of capital:资本的边际产量marginal product of1abour:劳动的边际产量marginal productivity:边际生产率marginal rate of substitution:边替代率marginal rate of transformation边际转换率marginal returns:边际回报marginal revenue:边际收益marginal revenue product:边际收益产品marginal revolution:边际革命marginal social benefit:社会边际收益marginal social cost:社会边际成本marginal utility:边际效用marginal value products:边际价值产品market:市场market clearance:市场结清,市场洗清market demand:市场需求market economy:市场经济market equilibrium:市场均衡market failure:市场失败market mechanism:市场机制market structure:市场结构market separation:市场分割market regulation:市场调节market share:市场份额markup pricing:加减定价法Marshallian demand function:马歇尔需求函数maximization:极大化microeconomics:微观经济学minimum wage:最低工资misallocation of resources:资源误置mixed economy:混合经济model:模型money:货币monopolistic competition:垄断竞争monopolistic exploitation:垄断剥削monopoly:垄断,卖方垄断monopoly equilibrium:垄断均衡monopoly pricing:垄断定价monopoly regulation:垄断调控monopoly rents:垄断租金monopsony:买方垄断N--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Nash equilibrium:纳什均衡Natural monopoly:自然垄断Natural resources:自然资源Necessary condition:必要条件necessities:必需品net demand:净需求nonconvex preference:非凸性偏好nonconvexity:非凸性nonexclusion:非排斥性nonlinear pricing:非线性定价nonrivalry:非对抗性nonprice competition:非价格竞争nonsatiation:非饱和性non--zero—sum game:非零和对策normal goods:正常品normal profit:正常利润normative economics:规范经济学O--------------------------------------------------------------------------------objective function:目标函数oligopoly:寡头垄断oligopoly market:寡头市场oligopoly model:寡头模型opportunity cost:机会成本optimal choice:最佳选择optimal consumption bundle:消费束perfect elasticity:完全有弹性optimal resource allocation:最佳资源配置optimal scale:最佳规模optimal solution:最优解optimization:优化ordering of optimization(social)preference:(社会)偏好排序ordinal utility:序数效用ordinary goods:一般品output:产量、产出output elasticity:产出弹性output maximization产出极大化P--------------------------------------------------------------------------------parameter:参数Pareto criterion:帕累托标准Pareto efficiency:帕累托效率Pareto improvement:帕累托改进Pareto optimality:帕累托优化Pareto set:帕累托集partial derivative:偏导数partial equilibrium:局部均衡patent:专利pay off matrix:收益矩阵、支付矩阵perceived demand curve:感觉到的需求曲线perfect competition:完全竞争perfect complement:完全互补品perfect monopoly:完全垄断perfect price discrimination:完全价格歧视perfect substitution:完全替代品perfect inelasticity:完全无弹性perfectly elastic:完全有弹性perfectly inelastic:完全无弹性plant size:工厂规模point elasticity:点弹性post Hoc Fallacy:后此谬误prediction:预测preference:偏好preference relation:偏好关系present value:现值price:价格price adjustment model:价格调整模型price ceiling:最高限价price consumption curve:价格费曲线price control:价格管制price difference:价格差别price discrimination:价格歧视price elasticity of demand:需求价格弹性price elasticity of supply:供给价格弹性price floor:最低限价price maker:价格制定者price rigidity:价格刚性price seeker:价格搜求者price taker:价格接受者price tax:从价税private benefit:私人收益principal—agent issues:委托--代理问题private cost:私人成本private goods:私人用品private property:私人财产producer equilibrium:生产者均衡producer theory:生产者理论product:产品product transformation curve:产品转换曲线product differentiation:产品差异product group:产品集团production:生产production contract curve:生产契约曲线production efficiency:生产效率production function:生产函数production possibility curve:生产可能性曲线productivity:生产率productivity of capital:资本生产率productivity of labor:劳动生产率profit:利润profit function:利润函数profit maximization:利润极大化property rights:产权property rights economics:产权经济学proposition:定理proportional demand curve:成比例的需求曲线public benefits:公共收益public choice:公共选择public goods:公共商品pure competition:纯粹竞争rivalry:对抗性、竞争pure exchange:纯交换pure monopoly:纯粹垄断Q--------------------------------------------------------------------------------quantity—adjustment model:数量调整模型quantity tax:从量税quasi—rent:准租金R--------------------------------------------------------------------------------rate of product transformation:产品转换率rationality:理性reaction function:反应函数regulation:调节,调控relative price相对价格rent:租金rent control:规模报酬rent seeking:寻租rent seeking economics:寻租经济学resource:资源resource allocation:资源配置returns:报酬、回报returns to scale:规模报酬revealed preference:显示性偏好revenue:收益revenue curve:收益曲线revenue function:收益函数revenue maximization:收益极大化ridge line:脊线risk:风险S--------------------------------------------------------------------------------satiation:饱和,满足saving:储蓄scarcity:稀缺性law of scarcity:稀缺法则second—degree price discrimination:二级价格歧视second derivative:--阶导数second—order condition:二阶条件service:劳务set:集shadow prices:影子价格short—run:短期short—run cost curve:短期成本曲线short—run equilibrium:短期均衡short—run supply curve:短期供给曲线shut down decision:关闭决策shortage短缺shut down point:关闭点single price monopoly:单一定价垄断slope:斜率social benefit:社会收益social cost:社会成本social indifference curve:社会无差异曲线social preference:社会偏好social security:社会保障social welfare function:社会福利函数socialism:社会主义solution:解space:空间stability:稳定性stable equilibrium:稳定的均衡Stackelberg model:斯塔克尔贝格模型static analysis:静态分析stock:存量stock market:股票市场strategy:策略subsidy:津贴substitutes:替代品substitution effect:替代效应substitution parameter:替代参数sufficient condition:充分条件supply:供给supply curve:供给曲线supply function:供给函数supply schedule:供给表Sweezy model:斯威齐模型symmetry:对称性symmetry of information:信息对称T--------------------------------------------------------------------------------tangency:相切taste:兴致technical efficiency:技术效率technological constraints;技术约束technological progress:技术进步technology:技术third—degree price discrimination:第**价格歧视total cost:总成本total effect:总效应total expenditure:总支出total fixed cost:总固定成本total product:总产量total revenue:总收益total utility:总效用total variable cost:总可变成本traditional economy:传统经济transitivity:传递性transaction cost:交易费用U--------------------------------------------------------------------------------uncertainty:不确定性uniqueness:唯一性unit elasticity:单位弹性unstable equilibrium:不稳定均衡utility:效用utility function:效用函数utility index:效用指数utility maximization:效用极大化utility possibility curve:效用可能性曲线utility possibility frontier:效用可能性前沿V--------------------------------------------------------------------------------value:价值value judge:价值判断value of marginal product:边际产量价值variable cost:可变成本variable input:可变投入variables:变量vector:向量visible hand:看得见的手vulgur economics:庸俗经济学W--------------------------------------------------------------------------------wage:工资wage rate:工资率Walras general equilibrium:瓦尔拉斯总体均衡Walras's law:瓦尔拉斯法则Wants:需要Welfare criterion:福利标准Welfare economics:福利经学Welfare loss triangle:福利损失三角形welfare maximization:福利极大化Z--------------------------------------------------------------------------------zero cost:零成本zero elasticity:零弹性zero homogeneity:零阶齐次性zero economic profit:零利润。
贸易信贷、担保清算和借款的约束【外文翻译】
外文翻译原文Trade credit,collateral liquidation and borrowing constraint sMaterial Source:National Centre of Competence in Research Financial Valuation and Risk Management Working Paper No.251Author:AnnaMaria C.Menichini The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 provides a sketch of the related literature. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyses the determinants of trade credit, distinguishing between liquidation and incentive motives. Section 4 presents and discusses the results. Section 5 explores the effect of incorporating the specific content of the bankruptcy and commercial laws on our predictions. Section 6 concludes.1 Related literatureOne of the main objectives of the literature on trade credit has been to explain why agents should want to borrow from firms rather than from financial intermediaries. The traditional explanation has been that trade credit serves a non financial role. More precisely, it allows to reduce transaction costs (Ferris, 1981), implement price discrimination across customers with different creditworthiness (Brennan et al., 1988), facilitate the establishment of long term relationships with customers (Summers and Wilson, 2002), and even provide a warranty for product quality when customers cannot observe product characteristics (Long et al., 1993).Although these non-financial theories can explain the existence of trade credit, they do not deliver any prediction on how borrowing constraints affect the demand for trade credit, since credit rationing is not explicitly modeled in any of these papers. Financial theories have attempted to fill this gap (Biais and Gollier, 1997; Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004, among others). In these theories the supplier has an information advantage over financial institutions in lending to the buyer. Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), whose analysis is closest to ours, construct a model in which banks have an intermediation advantage, while suppliers have an information advantage which mitigates their exposure to borrowers’ opport unistic behaviour. Itturns out that sufficiently rich firms, facing no incentive problems, never use trade credit, while, poorer firms, which do face incentive problems, experience bank credit rationing. For these firms, suppliers’ information advantage b ecomes relevant, as they can relax borrowing constraints by extending trade credit to their customers. Similarly, Biais and Gollier (1997) construct a screening model in which the seller’s provision of trade credit signals the creditworthiness of the buyer and thus mitigates credit rationing.Hence,both of these papers,and more generally existing financial theories of trade credit,fail to explain:(i)why trade credit is used also by financially unconstrained firms;and (ii) why reliance on trade credit does not necessarily increase with the severity of financial constraints, as documented by the empirical literature (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Marotta, 2001). In order to distinguish between rationed and non-rationed firms, we model the information advantage as in Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) but interact it with a liquidation advantage, which can explain why even wealthy firms may wish to use trade credit. The liquidation advantage of suppliers, when it exceeds the bank’s intermediation advantage, warrants relia nce on trade credit by rationed and unrationed firms alike. This squares withthe evidence that firms facing different degrees of credit rationing tend to rely to the same extent on trade credit.The idea that trade credit can offer a way to exploit the sup plier’s liquidation advantage has been proposed and tested in various empirical contributions (Mian and Smith,1992; Petersen and Rajan,1997, among others). Frank and Maksimovic (2004) have also theoretically modeled the effects of such advantage, and shown that it makes trade credit cheaper than bank financing. However, in their setting bank credit is never rationed, so that no prediction regarding the demand for trade credit by financially unconstrained firms can be derived.Finally,the existing literature has disregarded the relations between financing and input decisions and has offered no explanation for why firms only lend inputs. The use of a multi-input technology allows us to fill these gaps.2 The modelA risk-neutral entrepreneur has an investment project which uses a tangible and an intangible input to produce a verifiable output. The tangible input can be interpreted as raw material as well as physical capital, while intangibles as skilled labour, for example employees working in R&D units. Let qk and qL denote the purchased amount of tangible and intangible inputs respectively and Ik qk, ILqL, the amount of such inputs that is invested. The purchase of inputs is observable only to their respective suppliers. The amount invested is unobservable to any party and is transformed into a verifiable state contingent output y, with 2 {G,B} and yG > yB = 0. The good state (= G) occurs with probability p. Uncertainty affects production through demand (i.e., production is demand-driven). At times of high demand, invested inputs produce output according to the increasing and strictly concave production function fG (Ik, IL). At times of low demand, no output is produced and the firm is worth only the scrap value of unused inputs, which can therefore be pledged as a collateral to financiers. Inputs are substitutes, but a positive amount of each is essential for production. The entrepreneur is a price taker both in the inputs and in the output markets. The output priceis normalised to 1, as well as the prices of tangible and intangible inputs.Although the entrepreneur has observable internal wealth(A),this is not large enough to finance the first-best investment. Hence,the entrepreneur needs external funding from competitive banks (LB≥0)and/or suppliers(LS≥0)to undertake the project.Banks and suppliers of each input play different roles.Banks lend cash.The supplier of intangibles provides the input,which is fully paid for in cash.The supplier of tangibles,instead,not only sells the input,but can also act as a financier,lending both inputs and cash.Moral hazard.Unobservability of investment to all parties and of input purchases to parties other than the respective suppliers introduce a problem of moral hazard for the entrepreneur:the funds raised,either in cash or in kind,might not be invested in the venture,but diverted to private uses.If diversion occurs,creditors get paid only to the extent that project returns are eventually available.However,the supplier can observe whether inputs have been purchased.This advantage together with the lower li quidity of inputs relative to cash imply that the entrepreneur’s moral hazard problem is less severe if funding is raised from the supplier rather than from the bank.In particular,one unit of cash gives the entrepreneu r a returnφ<1 if diverted,where can be interpreted as the degree of vulnerability of creditor rights.One unit of the tangible input qk gives instead a returnφβk if diverted,whereβk<1 denotes the tangible input liquidity.Whenβk is close to 1,the input can be resold at a price close to its purchase price and transformed into monetary benefits.This applies to standardised products,which can be used by many di?erent customers and thus have a high re-sale value.Conversely,perishablegoods,services or inputs tailored to the specific needs of the buyer(di?erentiated)are less liquid and thus have a lowβst,one unit of the intangible input qL gives a zero return if diverted.This implies that it is not possible to extract monetary benefits from workers by assigning them to tasks different from those they were employed for. In many countries,such practices are indeed prohibited by the employment protection legislation.Collateral value.Inputs are also valuable if repossessed in the event of firm’s default.We assume that only tangible inputs can be pledged to financiers,while intangibles have zero collateral value.Hence,the total value of pledgeable collateral is C=βkIk.However,financiers have diff erent liquidation abilities.We defineβiC as the liquidation value extracted by each financier in case of default,with i=B,S referring to the bank or the supplier,respectively.Since the supplier has a better knowledge of the resale market,we assume that she has a better liquidation technology relative to the bank,i.e.βS>βB.Finally,the cost of raising one unit of funds on the market is assumed to be higher for the supplier than for the bank(rB<rS).This appears realistic for several reasons:first,it is consistent with the role of banks as specialised financial intermediaries.Second,suppliers are likely to be themselves credit constrained and to face a higher cost of funds than banks.Finally,it might be the e?ect of the supplier hacing bargaining power due to her cost advantages over other financiers.Contracts.The entrepreneur-bank contract specifies:the credit granted by the bank LB;the entrepreneur’s repayment obligation R≥0,which depends on the realised revenues and on the size of the loan;the share of the collateral obtained in case of defaultγ.The contract between the entrepr eneur and the supplier of the tangible input specifies:the credit granted by the supplier LS;the input provision qk;the entrepreneur’s repayment obligation R≥0,which depends on the realised revenues and on the size of the loan;the share of the collateral obtained in case of default.Notice that,unlike the bank,the supplier can condition the contract also on the input purchase st,given that the intangible input is fully paid for when it is purchased,the contract between entrepreneur and supplier specifies the purchased amount of the input qL.We assume that each party is protected by limited liability.Time linepetitive banks and suppliers make contract o?ers,given entrepreneur’s wealth;2.the entrepreneur accepts or rejects;3.conditional on acceptance,the investment and diversion decisions are taken;4.uncertainty resolves;5.the payo?realises and repayments are made.译文贸易信贷、担保清算和借款的约束资料来源:国际研究中心在财务风险评估与管理中的工作报告第251期作者:安娜玛丽亚本文的其余部分安排如下:第1节相关文献的概述。
CFA_L3_B3_Fixed-Income
Fixed-Income & Equity Portfolio注意:1. PART I 讲固定收益组合的构建,是考试重点,PART II 讲风险管理,与衍生风险管理部分有较大重叠。
2. 上下午加起来2-3个case :2013年上午两个case ,下午1个,其他年份一般上下午各1个3. 删除了MBS 相关内容RA21 Fixed-Income Portfolio Management —Part I一、整体结构1. AO :可以选择index 作为benchmark ,一般考下午题从passive 到active 有三步,共有5种方法2. ALM :选择liabilities 作为benchmark ,上午下午都可能考按照liabilities 特点分为两类single-liability, multiple-liability3. 复习二级内容(1)债券风险管理(前三种是primary risk factor ,后两种是minor risk factor ) ①interest risk :一般指Benchmark (国债)利率的改变衡量指标duration :单位利率变动对portfolio 价值的变化, portfolio 中每个债券收益率都变动同样大小,收益率曲线平行移动。
(可以解释90%); ②yield curve risk收益率曲线非平行移动,twist (非平行移动,不同债券利率变化不同,解释8.5%), butterfly (曲度改变,解释1.5%),本部分主要关注twist ;衡量指标是i i KeyRate duration w D =∑ ,只考虑了本金部分的现金流。
更精细的指标是PV distribution of cash flow (PVD ),考虑所有的cash flow ,以其PV 为权重 ③spread risk由于spread 上升带来的债券价格的下降。
Firms in International Trade
Firms in International Trade1Andrew B. BernardTuck School of Management at Dartmouth & NBERJ. Bradford JensenPeterson Institute for International EconomicsStephen J. ReddingLondon School of Economics & CEPRPeter K. SchottYale School of Management & NBERApril 2007AbstractDespite the fact that importing and exporting are extremely rare firm activities, economists generally devote little attention to the role of firms when discussing international trade. This paper summarizes key differences between trading and non-trading firms, demonstrates how these differences present a challenge to standard trade models and shows how recent “heterogeneous-firm” models of international trade address these challenges. We then make use of transaction-level U.S. trade data to introduce a number of new stylized facts about firms and trade. These facts reveal that the extensive margins of trade – that is, the number of products firms trade as well as the number of countries with which they trade – are central to understanding the well-known role of distance in dampening aggregate trade flows.1 Bernard, Jensen, and Schott thank the National Science Foundation (SES-0241474, SES-0552029 and SES-0550190) and Redding thanks Princeton University and the Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) for research support. We are grateful to Jim Davis of the Census Bureau for timely disclosure of our data analysis and to Jim Tybout, Jim Hines and the JEP editorial board for extremely helpful comments and suggestions. The research in this paper was conducted while Bernard, Jensen and Schott were Special Sworn Status researchers of the U.S. Census Bureau at the Boston Research Data Center, New York Research Data Center, and Center for Economic Studies. We thank the NSF for infrastructure grants that support Census Research Data Centers (SES-0550190 and ITR-0427889). Research results and conclusions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Census Bureau, the NBER, or any other institution to which the authors are affiliated.Firms in International TradeIn discussing the origins and implications of international trade, economists emphasize comparative advantage, increasing returns to scale and consumer love of variety but pay relatively little attention to the firms that actually drive trade flows. Yet engaging in international trade is an exceedingly rare activity: of the 5.5 million firms operating in the United States in 2000, just 4 percent were exporters. Among these exporting firms, the top 10 percent accounted for 96 percent of total U.S. exports.Since the mid-1990s, a large number of empirical studies have provided a wealth of information about the important role that firms play in mediating countries’ imports and exports. This research, based on micro datasets that track countries’ production and trade at the firm level, demonstrates that trading firms differ substantially from firms that solely serve the domestic market. Across a wide range of countries and industries, exporters have been shown to be larger, more productive, more skill- and capital-intensive, and to pay higher wages than non-trading firms. Furthermore, these differences exist even before exporting begins. A large literature documenting these findings has emerged, beginning with Bernard and Jensen (1995).The ex ante productivity advantage of exporters suggests self-selection: exporters are more productive, not as a result of exporting, but because only the most productive firms are able to overcome the costs of entering export markets. This sort of microeconomic heterogeneity can influence macroeconomic outcomes. When trade policy barriers fall or transportation costs decline, high-productivity exporting firms survive and grow, while lower-productivity non-exporting firms are more likely to fail. This reallocation of economic activity across firms raises aggregate productivity and provides a non-traditional source of welfare gains from trade.We highlight the challenges new empirical research poses for traditional models and discuss how these challenges have shifted the focus of the international trade field from countries and industries towards firms and products. We show how observed differences between trading and non-trading firms have led to the development of a series of heterogeneous-firm models, and that these models offer new insights into the causes and consequences of international trade. Table 1 summarizes key stylized facts about international trade as well as the ability of various models to explain them. These models are discussed throughout the paper.We also make use of recently available transaction-level U.S. trade data to introduce new stylized facts about firms’ participation in international markets. These data show that the extensive margins of trade – that is, the number of products firms trade as well as the number of countries they trade with – are central to understanding the well-known role of distance in dampening aggregate trade flows. We conclude with suggestions for further theoretical and empirical research.Empirical Challenges to Old and New Trade TheoryTraditional or “old” theories of international trade explain the flow of goods between countries in terms of comparative advantage (differences in opportunity costs of production). Comparative advantage can arise because of productivity differences (“Ricardian” comparative advantage) or because of a combination of cross-industry differences in factor intensity and cross-country differences in factor abundance (“Heckscher-Ohlin” comparative advantage). In either case, as summarized in Table 1, a key implication of old trade theory is“inter-industry trade”: that is, countries will export one set of industries and import another. Endowment-driven “old” trade theory models also provide a mechanism through which international trade can influence relative factor rewards (and hence income distribution), as specialization across industries that differ in factor intensity changes the relative demand for the various factors of production.A large share of international trade, however, takes place between relatively similar trading partners, apparently within industries (Grubel and Lloyd, 1975). Germany and the United States, for example, exchange automobiles. This fact and others led to the creation of “new” trade models by Paul Krugman (1980), Elhanan Helpman (1981) and William Ethier (1982). In these models, a combination of economies of scale and consumer preferences for variety lead otherwise identical firms to “specialize” in distinct horizontal varieties, spurring two-way or “intra-industry” trade between countries. In contrast to old trade theories, where the welfare gains arise from the differences in opportunity costs of production across industries and countries, “new” trade theories have welfare gains accruing from the wider set of varieties that trade makes available to consumers.In a seminal contribution, Helpman and Krugman (1985) integrated old and new trade theory by embedding horizontal product differentiation and increasing returns to scale in a model featuring endowment-based comparative advantage. This “integrated” framework soon became a standard paradigm for analysis in the field. When modified to allow for technology differences, factor price inequality and trade costs, this integrated framework provides a reasonably successful explanation of aggregate international trade patterns, as Helpman (1999) discussed in this journal.Both old and new trade theory typically assume a representative firm, at least within each industry. This assumption facilitates the general equilibrium analysis that is core to international trade, but it is inconsistent with the substantial variation in productivity, capital intensity and skill intensity observed across firms within narrowly defined industries.2 Of course, the mere existence of heterogeneity is not necessarily a problem for theories of international trade. The assumption of a representative firm could be a convenient, if not perfectly realistic, simplification. However, as we will show, the interaction of firm characteristics and the export orientation of the firm introduces a channel for international trade to influence aggregate productivity.Firm Exporting is Relatively RareExporting is a relatively rare firm activity. Of the 5.5 million firms operating in the United States in 2000, just 4 percent engaged in exporting. Even within the smaller set of U.S. firms active in industries more predisposed to exporting – like those in the manufacturing, mining or agricultural sectors that produce tradable goods – only 15 percent were exporters.Table 2 illustrates this point more broadly with data from the 2002 U.S. Census of Manufactures. The second column of the table summarizes the distribution of manufacturing firms across three-digit NAICS industries, while the third column reports the share of firms in each industry that export. These columns reveal that the overall share of U.S. manufacturing firms that export is relatively small, at 18 percent.3 However, the share of firms that export2 Micro datasets vary in terms of the amount of information available on firms and plants within firms. Unless otherwise noted, our discussion and empirical analysis focuses on firms as the relevant unit of analysis. Only recently have researchers begun to examine how production within firms is allocated across plants and how this is influenced by international trade (Bernard and Jensen, 2007).3 Similar results are observed at the plant-level. See Appendix Table A1. In the period since the early 1970s, there is a rise in the percentage of firms and plants that export, consistent with the multilateral and regional trade liberalization that has occurred.within each industry category ranges rather widely. Thirty-eight percent of Computer and Electronic Products firms export, for example, while the share among Apparel firms is just 8 percent.The fourth column of Table 2 shows that exporting firms ship a relatively small share of their total shipments abroad. Here, too, substantial variation exists across industries, ranging from a high of 21 percent in Computers to a low of 7 percent in Beverages. Across all firms, the share is 14 percent.The information in Table 2 is consistent with old and new trade theories in some ways, but not in others. For example, exporting is more likely and export intensity is higher in more skill-intensive sectors like Computers than in more labor-intensive sectors like Apparel. This aspect of the data accords with endowment-driven old trade theory: that is, a relatively skill-abundant country like the United States should be relatively more likely to export in skill-intensive industries in which it possesses comparative advantage. However, while old trade theory can explain why a country is a net importer in one set of industries and a net exporter in another set, it cannot explain why some firms export and others produce solely for the domestic market, or how the firm-level decision to export interacts with comparative advantage.Although Table 2 shows that exporting is a relatively rare activity, it also shows that exporting occurs in all manufacturing industries. This pervasiveness is consistent with new trade theory's emphasis on variety-motivated trade, although it is not clear in new trade models why a few firms in an industry would export but most would not. Similarly, the presence of exporters in comparative disadvantage industries where the United States is a net importer overall is consistent with the spirit of Helpman and Krugman's (1985) “integrated” old and new trade framework, but again this framework does not explain why only some firms export or why the fraction of firms exporting varies with comparative advantage.Exporters are DifferentFirms that export look very different from non-exporters along a number of dimensions. We highlight these differences by reporting U.S. manufacturing exporters’ “export premia” for 2002 in Table 3. Each row of the table summarizes the average percent difference between exporters and non-exporters for a particular firm characteristic.4 For example, the first column of the table reports the results of a series of bivariate ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variables are employment, shipments, value-added per worker, and the other variables noted in the first column, all in logs. The explanatory variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is involved in exporting or not. Since the dependent variable data are in logarithms, the coefficients can be interpreted as percentages. In other words, exporting firms have 119 percent more employment, 148 percent higher shipments, 26 percent higher value-added per worker, and so on.5 The second column repeats these regressions, but now includes industry fixed effects in the explanatory variables to control for differences in firm characteristics across industries. Because export participation is correlated with industry characteristics, controlling for industry effects typically reduces these coefficients. However, exporters remain different from non-exporters even in the same detailed industry. Exporters are significantly larger than non-exporters, by approximately 97 percent for employment and 108 per cent for shipments; they are more productive by roughly 11 per cent for value-added per worker and 3 per cent for total factor productivity; they also pay higher wages by around 6 percent. Finally,4 Similar premia are observed at the plant level. See Appendix Table A2.5 Since the differences between exporters and non-exporters are often large, the log approximation can understate considerably the size of these differences. Taking exponents of the coefficients in Table 2, exporting firms have 229 percent more employment.exporters are relatively more capital- and skill- intensive than non-exporters by approximately 12 and 11 percent, respectively. These findings are emblematic of what is typically found in this literature.The observed differences between exporters and non-exporters are not driven solely by size. When we control for firm size as measured by log employment as well as industry effects in column 3, the differences between exporters and non-exporters within the same industry on all other economic outcomes continue to be statistically significant at the 1 percent level.The finding that exporters are systematically more productive than non-exporters raises the question of whether higher-productivity firms self-select into export markets, or whether exporting causes productivity growth through some form of “learning by exporting.” Results from virtually every study across industries and countries confirm that high productivity precedes entry into export markets. These findings are suggestive of the presence of sunk entry costs into export markets that only the most productive firms find it profitable to incur, as emphasized in Roberts and Tybout (1997).6 Most studies also find little or no evidence of improved productivity as a result of beginning to export; for example, the work of Bernard and Jensen (1999) on U.S. firms and the work of Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) on firms in Mexico, Colombia and Morroco find no differential growth in firm productivity among exporters versus non-exporters. However, some recent research on low-income countries finds productivity improvement after entry. Van Biesebroeck (2005), for example, reports evidence that exporting raises productivity for sub-Saharan African manufacturing firms.In contrast to the scarcity of studies finding improved firm productivity following entry into export markets, an abundance of evidence indicates that firms entering export markets grow substantially faster in employment and output than non-exporters. The combination of higher initial productivity and faster growth after commencing exporting points to an important role for trade liberalization in enhancing aggregate productivity through reallocation across firms, which will be examined further in the next section.While much of the existing empirical literature has concentrated on differences in productivity and size between exporters and non-exporters, Table 3 also shows that exporters and non-exporters also display marked differences in factor intensity. The finding that U.S. exporters are more capital- and skill-intensive suggests that “old” trade theory concepts of comparative advantage may be at work within industries. Specifically, if the intensity with which firms use inputs reflects the characteristics of the goods they produce, then firms which are more capital- and skill-intensive are producing goods that are more consistent with U.S. comparative advantage (Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2006b).Harder to explain in terms of old trade theory concepts of comparative advantage is the finding that exporters are also more capital- and skill-intensive in developing countries, which are likely to be abundant in unskilled labor (Alvarez and Lopez, 2005). If exporting firms in labor-abundant developing countries were specializing in goods consistent with comparative advantage, they would be labor-intensive rather than capital- and skill-intensive.How Trade Liberalization Raises Industry ProductivityIn old trade theory, the welfare gains from trade are due to specialization according to comparative advantage. In new trade theory, the welfare gains from trade accrue from a combination of economies of scale and the expansion of product varieties available to consumers. Empirical analyses of trade liberalization at the firm level, however, provide6 Recent estimates suggest that these sunk costs may be sizable. Das, Roberts and Tybout (2006) estimate values of over $300,000 for Columbian manufacturing plants during 1981-91.evidence for an additional source of welfare gains: that is, aggregate productivity growth driven by the contraction and exit of low-productivity firms and the expansion and entry into export markets of high-productivity firms. This reallocation of resources from low- to high-productivity establishments raises average industry productivity. These welfare gains may be magnified if the increase in product market competition induced by trade liberalization leads to lower mark-ups of price over marginal cost. In this case, the fall in mark-ups and rise in average productivity both contribute to lower prices and higher real incomes.In an influential paper, Pavcnik (2002) finds that roughly two-thirds of the 19 percent increase in aggregate productivity following Chile's trade liberalization of the late 1970s and early 1980s is due to the relatively greater survival and growth of high-productivity plants. Similar findings emerge from a large number of studies of trade liberalization reforms in developing countries, as surveyed in Tybout (2003). The within-industry reallocations of resources found by these studies dominate the across-industry reallocations of resources emphasized by old theories of comparative advantage. Therefore, in the labor market, the net changes in employment between industries implied by comparative advantage are small relative to the gross changes in employment caused by simultaneous job creation and destruction within industries.One concern is that the link from increased trade to the relative expansion of higher-productivity firms in developing-country results might not be driven solely by changes in trade policy, since trade liberalization is often part of a broader package of economic reforms. However, similar patterns of productivity gains from the expansion of high-productivity exporting firms have been found in response to reductions in trade barriers in both Canada (Trefler, 2004) and the United States (Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2006a).For example, Trefler (2004) finds effects of Canadian tariff reductions on industry productivity that are roughly twice as large as those on plant productivity, implying market share reallocations favouring high-productivity plants. The resource reallocation effects of reductions in U.S. trade costs are examined by Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006a). They consider a number of dependent variables including the probability of plant death. Their key explanatory variable is a measure of trade costs, including both tariff rates and shipping costs at the industry level. Controlling for a number of other plant characteristics, they find that plant death is more likely to occur as trade costs fall, and that reductions in trade costs have the greatest impact on plant death for the lowest-productivity plants.The relationship between trade liberalization and aggregate productivity growth is not limited to the relative growth and expansion of high-productivity firms. In Pavcnik (2002), one-third of the increase in aggregate productivity following the Chilean liberalization was due to within-plant productivity gains, potentially from the reallocation of resources across activities within plants. Qualitatively similar evidence is reported by Trefler (2004), who finds that the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement raised the labor productivity of Canadian manufacturing plants by 7.4 percent or by an annual compound growth rate of 0.93 percent.Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006a) also find evidence supporting a link between falling trade costs and within-plant productivity growth in U.S. data. One of their specifications uses plants’ total factor productivity as the dependent variable. The key explanatory variable is again the changes in industry trade costs described above. In their preferred specification (column 3 of Table 6 of their paper), changes in industry-level trade costs are negatively and significantly associated with plant-level productivity growth, with a one standard deviation fall in trade costs (a drop of 1 percentage point) implying a productivity increase of 2.3 percent.Standard trade models emphasizing comparative advantage and the proliferation of product variety have little to say about firm or aggregate productivity growth. However, a growing body of evidence shows that trade liberalization causes relatively faster output andemployment growth among high-productivity exporting firms within an industry. A smaller body of results suggests a less pronounced but still important effect of trade liberalization on firm productivity.Heterogeneous-Firm Trade TheoriesEmpirical challenges to old and new trade theory have led to the development of richer theoretical models emphasizing the importance of firm heterogeneity in generating international trade and inducing aggregate productivity growth.7 These models provide natural explanations for some of the empirical challenges noted above, and their analysis currently occupies a large portion of international trade research. One framework, developed by Bernard et al. (2003), introduces stochastic firm productivity into the multi-country Ricardian model of Eaton and Kortum (2002). A second class of models initiated by Melitz (2003) introduces firm heterogeneity into Krugman’s (1980) model of intra-industry trade. The Melitz framework has proved to be particularly tractable and has stimulated a great deal of analysis into the implications of firm heterogeneity for a wide range of issues in international trade.In the Melitz (2003) model, a competitive fringe of potential firms can enter an industry by paying a fixed entry cost, which is thereafter sunk. Potential entrants face uncertainty concerning their productivity in the industry. Once the sunk entry cost is paid, a firm draws its productivity from a fixed distribution. Productivity remains fixed thereafter, but firms face a constant exogenous probability of death. Firms produce horizontally differentiated varieties within the industry under conditions of monopolistic competition. The existence of fixed production costs implies that firms drawing a productivity level below some lower threshold (the “zero-profit productivity cutoff”) would make negative profits if they produced, and therefore these firms choose to exit the industry. Fixed and variable costs of exporting ensure that, of the active firms in an industry, only those who draw a productivity above a higher threshold (the “export productivity cutoff”) find it profitable to export in equilibrium. There is a steady-state mass of firms active in the industry, which implies that the mass of new firms who enter and draw a productivity level above the zero-profit productivity cutoff equals the mass of existing firms that die.In this model, reductions in world-wide barriers to trade increase profits that existing exporters can earn in foreign markets and reduce the export productivity cutoff above which firms export. Labor demand within the industry rises, due both to expansion by existing exporters and to new firms beginning to export. This increase in labor demand bids up factor prices and reduces the profits of non-exporters. This reduction in profits in the domestic market induces some low-productivity firms who were previously marginal to exit the industry. As low-productivity firms exit, and as output and employment are reallocated towards higher-productivity firms, average industry productivity rises.Heterogeneous-firm models address a number of the empirical challenges facing old and new trade theory. They capture the interaction between firm heterogeneity and international trade, with the productivity advantage of exporters explained by the self-selection of the most productive firms into exporting. The shift in resources from low- to high-productivity firms generates improvements in aggregate productivity. During this shift, exporters grow more rapidly than non-exporters in terms of size and employment. The models feature simultaneous job creation and job destruction within industries as low-productivity firms exit and high-productivity firms expand. In the models of Bernard et al. (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2005), the mark-up of price over marginal cost is7 A related literature has concentrated on contracting issues and the international boundaries of the firm. See Helpman (2006) for a recent survey.endogenous and decreases as import competition intensifies following reductions in trade costs.Heterogeneous firms are integrated into the standard trade paradigm of Helpman and Krugman (1985) in Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007). The resulting framework explains why some countries export more in certain industries than in others (endowment-driven comparative advantage); why nonetheless two-way trade is observed within industries (firm-level horizontal product differentiation combined with increasing returns to scale); and why, within industries engaged in these two forms of trade, some firms export and others do not (self-selection driven by trade costs). Consistent with the empirical findings reported in Table 2, the fraction of exporting firms and the share of exports in firm shipments varies systematically across industries and countries with comparative advantage.Although trade liberalization in this framework induces within-industry reallocation and raises aggregate productivity in all industries, productivity growth is stronger in the comparative advantage industry. The greater export opportunities in that industry lead to a larger increase in factor demand than in the comparative disadvantage industry, which bids up the relative price of the factor used intensively in the comparative advantage industry, and so leads to greater exit by low-productivity firms than in the comparative disadvantage industry. This differential productivity growth across industries gives rises to differences in average industry productivity that magnify factor-abundance-based comparative advantage, and so provide an additional source of welfare gains from trade.Trade liberalization in this framework not only generates aggregate welfare gains but also has implications for the distribution of income across factors. Increases in average industry productivity arising from trade liberalization drive down goods prices and therefore raise the real income of all factors. If productivity increases are strong enough, the real income of a country’s scarce factor may even rise during trade liberalization (a contradiction of the well-known Stolper-Samuelson theorem). More generally, the productivity gains induced by the behavior of heterogeneous firms dampen the decline of the real income of the scarce factor that occurs in more neoclassical settings.New Transaction-Level Data on Firms and TradeRecently available transaction-level trade data permit examination of a number of new dimensions of international trade, including the concentration and scarcity of firms’ exports, the range of products that firms export, and the variety of destinations to which firms’ exports are shipped. In this section we analyze the Linked-Longitudinal Firm Trade Transaction Database (LFTTD) that is based on data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Customs Bureau. This dataset captures all U.S. international trade transactions between 1992 and 2000. For each flow of goods across a U.S. border, this dataset records the product classification(s) of the shipment, the value and quantity shipped, the date of the shipment, the destination or source country, the transport mode used to ship the goods, and the identity of the U.S. firm engaging in the trade. Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (forthcoming) provide a more detailed description of the LFTTD and its construction.We use these data to distinguish between the firms' extensive margins – that is, the number of products that firms trade and their number of export destinations – and their intensive margin – that is, the value they trade per product per country. We show that adjustment along the extensive margins is central to understanding the well-known “gravity model” of international trade, which emphasizes the role of distance in dampening trade flows between countries. More generally, we find that while some aspects of the LFTTD illuminate directions in which recent theories of heterogeneous firms and trade can be extended, others pose additional challenges that have yet to be explored.。
日本经济词汇
mixed economy 混合经济
protectionism 保护主义
autarchy 闭关自守
primary sector 初级成分
devastate 蹂躏,破坏;使荒废;毁灭
level 推倒,夷平
flatten 夷为平地
seismology 地震学
seismograph 地震仪
seismographer 地震学家
free exchange rates 自由汇兑市场
foreign exchange certificate 外汇兑换券
hard currency 硬通货
speculation 投机
depreciation 减价,贬值
震后经济
public construction works in affected areas ---受灾地区公共建设工程
government budget---政府预算
income gain 股利收入
par value 股面价格,票面价格
bull 买手, 多头
bear 卖手, 空头
capitalist economy 资本主义经济
collectiveeconomy 集体经济
planned economy 计划经济
controlled economy 管制经济
ruraleconomics 农村经济
non-essential needs 可有可无的需求
soar ---变坏,恶化
economic cycle ---经济周期
showdown---摊牌,最后的决战
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CREDIT CONSTRAINTS, HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE Kalina Manova Working Paper 14531 /papers/w14531 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 December 2008
1
Introduction
A growing body of work has argued that, in the presence of credit constraints, …nancially advanced economies have a comparative advantage in …nancially vulnerable industries. These studies have emphasized the variation in export values across countries and sectors, but ignored the e¤ects of …nancial frictions on di¤erent trade margins and on overall production. On the other hand, a large literature has highlighted the importance of reallocations across …rms and across products and trade partners within …rms for aggregate trade and the adjustment to trade reforms. While …rm heterogeneity has been successfully used to rationalize aggregate export outcomes, its consequences in the presence of imperfect …nancial markets have not been explored. This paper provides an overall treatment of the e¤ect of …nancial frictions on international trade in order to elucidate the mechanisms through which it operates. I develop a heterogeneous…rm model with countries at di¤erent levels of …nancial development and sectors of varying …nancial vulnerability. Using model-consistent estimation, I show empirically that credit constraints severely impede …rm selection into exporting and restrict …rms’sales abroad. Financial development thus allows countries to expand aggregate exports, broaden their export product scope, enter more foreign markets, and reduce product churning. These e¤ects are magni…ed in …nancially vulnerable industries. Importantly, the impact of credit constraints on trade goes above and beyond that on overall production. These results have signi…cant policy implications for less developed economies, many of which rely heavily on exports for economic growth but su¤er from ine¢ cient …nancial markets. In the model, credit constraints a¤ect manufacturers in di¤erent countries and sectors unevenly. First, for technological reasons, producers in certain industries require more external …nance to fund their export activities. Sectors also di¤er in …rms’endowments of tangible assets that can serve as collateral. Second, …nancial frictions vary across countries because contracts between entrepreneurs and investors are more likely to be enforced at higher levels of …nancial development. Exporters in …nancially vulnerable sectors are thus less credit constrained in economies with stronger …nancial contractibility. Credit constraints also interact non-trivially with …rm heterogeneity and reinforce the selection of only the most productive …rms into exporting: Because more e¢ cient suppliers earn higher revenues, they can o¤er …nanciers greater returns and are more likely to secure the external capital necessary to sell abroad. As a result, the productivity cut-o¤ for exporting as well as …rm-level exports vary systematically across exporting countries and sectors. These movements in turn in‡ uence a number of other trade features. I …nd strong support for the model’ s predictions in a panel of bilateral exports for 107 countries and 27 ISIC 3-digit sectors in 1985-1995. I study how interactions of country measures of …nancial development (private credit, contract repudiation, accounting standards, risk of expropriation) and sector indicators of …nancial vulnerability (external …nance dependence, asset tangibility) predict di¤erent export outcomes. Exploiting the variation across both cpe Aghion, Pol Antras, Elhanan Helpman, and Marc Melitz for their invaluable guidance. I also thank Andrew Bernard, Doireann Fitzgerald, Dirk Jenter, and Luigi Zingales for insightful conversations, and seminar participants at Boston College, Brown, Cornell, Dartmouth, Harvard, Harvard Business School, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Kellogg Northwestern, London School of Economics, New York Federal Reserve Bank, MIT Sloan School of Management, Ohio State, Pennsylvania State, Stanford, Toronto, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, University of California at Davis, San Diego and Santa Cruz for their comments. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. © 2008 by Kalina Manova. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.