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关于认罪认罚从宽的外文文献

关于认罪认罚从宽的外文文献

关于认罪认罚从宽的外文文献
在美国,认罪认罚从宽制度被称为 "plea bargaining",在美
国法学文献中有大量关于此制度的研究和讨论。

例如,美国法学期
刊《Yale Law Journal》、《Harvard Law Review》等都有相关的
论文发表,探讨了认罪认罚从宽制度对司法效率、公正性以及被告
人权益的影响等方面。

在英国,认罪认罚从宽制度也有类似的研究。

英国法学界关于"guilty plea discount" 的文献主要集中在《The Modern Law Review》、《The Criminal Law Review》等法学期刊上,涉及到认罪认罚从宽制度的法理基础、实际操作、司法实践等方面的研究。

除了美英等国家,其他国家和地区也有关于认罪认罚从宽制度
的研究文献,比如加拿大、澳大利亚、新西兰等。

这些文献从不同
国家的司法实践和立法背景出发,探讨了认罪认罚从宽制度的设计、运作和效果等方面的问题。

总的来说,关于认罪认罚从宽的外文文献涵盖了广泛的研究领域,包括刑事司法、法律政策、司法改革等方面,为我们深入了解
该制度的运作机制和效果提供了重要的参考和借鉴。

法律案例外文(3篇)

法律案例外文(3篇)

第1篇Introduction:In today's market economy, competition is fierce. Unfair competition has become a common phenomenon, causing considerable harm to consumers and legitimate enterprises. This article aims to analyze a legal case of unfair competition, discussing the relevant laws and regulations, the judgment of the court, and the implications for the market economy.I. Case Background:In 2019, Company A, a well-known manufacturer of household appliances, discovered that Company B, a newly established enterprise, had copiedits product design and marketing strategies. Company B produced and sold a series of household appliances with similar appearances and features to those of Company A. As a result, Company A's market share and sales revenue were significantly affected. In response, Company A filed a lawsuit against Company B for unfair competition.II. Relevant Laws and Regulations:The main legal basis for this case is Article 2 of the "Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China," which stipulatesthat "enterprises and individuals shall engage in fair competition and shall not engage in any acts of unfair competition." According toArticle 5 of the same law, acts of unfair competition include, but are not limited to, copying another party's product design, using another party's brand name, and confusing consumers.III. Court Judgment:After reviewing the evidence, the court found that Company B had indeed copied Company A's product design and marketing strategies, thereby engaging in unfair competition. According to Article 17 of the "Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China," the court ordered Company B to stop its infringing acts, destroy the infringing products, and compensate Company A for the losses incurred. The court also imposed a fine on Company B.IV. Analysis and Implications:1. The case reflects the importance of intellectual property rights protection. Copying another party's product design is a clear violation of intellectual property rights. Enterprises should pay attention to protecting their intellectual property rights, such as patents, trademarks, and copyrights, to ensure their competitive advantages in the market.2. The court's judgment shows that the "Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China" is an effective tool for preventing and combating unfair competition. Enterprises should familiarize themselves with the relevant laws and regulations, and when they encounter unfair competition, they should actively seek legal remedies to protect their rights and interests.3. The case highlights the need for fair competition in the market economy. Unfair competition not only causes harm to legitimate enterprises but also affects the interests of consumers. Therefore, all market participants should adhere to fair competition principles, creating a healthy and orderly market environment.4. Enterprises should enhance their competitiveness through technological innovation, product quality, and brand building rather than relying on copying others' products and strategies. Only by constantly improving themselves can they gain a real competitive advantage in the market.Conclusion:This legal case of unfair competition demonstrates the importance of intellectual property rights protection, the effectiveness of anti-unfair competition laws, and the need for fair competition in the market economy. Enterprises should pay attention to protecting theirintellectual property rights, comply with relevant laws and regulations, and actively participate in fair competition to create a healthy and orderly market environment.第2篇Introduction:Unfair competition is a common issue in the market, causing harm to both the competitors and consumers. This article aims to analyze a legal case involving two companies, Company A and Company B, which resulted from unfair competition practices. By examining the facts, arguments, and the court's decision, we can gain insights into the legal principles and implications of unfair competition.I. Background and Facts:Company A and Company B are both manufacturers of electronic products in the same industry. Company A has been operating in the market for several years and has accumulated a considerable customer base. Company B, on the other hand, is a relatively new entrant to the market and is struggling to establish its brand.One day, Company B launched a new product that closely resembles Company A's existing product. The design, packaging, and even the product name of Company B's product are almost identical to those of Company A. As a result, many customers who were familiar with Company A's products mistakenly purchased Company B's product, causing significant financial losses to Company A.Company A, feeling deceived and wronged, decided to file a lawsuit against Company B for unfair competition. The main claim was that Company B had copied Company A's product and caused harm to its reputation and business.II. Arguments and Evidence:1. Company A's Arguments:Company A argued that Company B's actions constitute unfair competition under Article 14 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China. According to Article 14, any party engaging in unfair competition practices shall be liable for damages.Company A presented evidence such as photographs of the products, customer complaints, and internal communications between Company B's employees to prove that Company B had copied its product.2. Company B's Arguments:Company B denied the accusations and claimed that the similarity between the products was merely a coincidence. They argued that the differencesin design and function were significant enough to distinguish the two products. Furthermore, Company B claimed that they had conducted market research and ensured that their product did not infringe on Company A's intellectual property rights.III. Court's Decision:After hearing both parties' arguments and examining the evidence, the court ruled in favor of Company A. The court held that Company B's actions did indeed constitute unfair competition and ordered Company Bto cease the production and sale of the infringing product. Additionally, the court awarded damages to Company A in accordance with the Anti-Unfair Competition Law.The court's reasoning was as follows:1. The court found that Company B's product was indeed similar to Company A's product in terms of design, packaging, and even the product name. This similarity could mislead consumers and cause harm to Company A's reputation and business.2. The court held that Company B's argument of coincidence was not persuasive. The court pointed out that even if the similarity was a coincidence, it still constitutes unfair competition under the Anti-Unfair Competition Law.3. The court considered the evidence presented by Company A, including customer complaints and internal communications between Company B's employees, to establish the fact that Company B was aware of thesimilarity between the products and still chose to launch the infringing product.IV. Implications and Conclusion:This legal case highlights the importance of protecting intellectual property rights and combating unfair competition in the market. The court's decision demonstrates that companies must be cautious when launching new products to avoid infringing on the intellectual property rights of other companies.Furthermore, this case serves as a warning to new entrants in the market that they should conduct thorough market research and ensure that their products do not infringe on the intellectual property rights of established competitors.In conclusion, the legal case between Company A and Company B underscores the need for fair competition in the market and the consequences of engaging in unfair competition practices. Companies should always respect the intellectual property rights of others and avoid actions that may harm their competitors and consumers.第3篇Abstract:This article presents a case study on the application of tort law in a real estate dispute. The case involves a buyer who claims that theseller had made false representations about the property. The article analyzes the key issues involved in the case, discusses the legal principles that govern tort law, and provides an analysis of the court's decision.I. IntroductionReal estate transactions are often complex and can lead to disputes between parties. One common type of dispute is the claim that a party made false representations about the property. This article examines a real estate dispute in which a buyer claims that the seller had made false representations about the property. The case involves the application of tort law principles to determine whether the seller's actions constitute a tort.II. Background of the CaseIn 2018, Mr. Zhang entered into a real estate contract with Ms. Wang to purchase a residential property. The contract stated that the property was in excellent condition and had no defects. However, after Mr. Zhang moved into the property, he discovered that the property had significant defects, including water damage and structural issues. Mr. Zhang then filed a lawsuit against Ms. Wang, claiming that she had made false representations about the property and that her actions constituted a tort.III. Key Issues in the CaseThe key issues in this case are:1. Did Ms. Wang make false representations about the property?2. If so, did her actions constitute a tort?3. If her actions constitute a tort, what remedies are available to Mr. Zhang?IV. Legal PrinciplesThe legal principles that govern this case are those of tort law. Tort law is a branch of law that provides remedies for injuries caused by the wrongful actions of one party to another. The key elements of a tort claim are:1. Duty: The defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff.2. Breach: The defendant breaches the duty of care.3. Causation: The breach of duty causes harm to the plaintiff.4. Damages: The plaintiff suffers damages as a result of the harm.V. Court's DecisionThe court ruled in favor of Mr. Zhang, holding that Ms. Wang had made false representations about the property and that her actionsconstituted a tort. The court found that Ms. Wang had a duty to provideaccurate information about the property, and she breached that duty by making false representations. The court further found that Mr. Zhang suffered damages as a result of the false representations, including the cost of repairing the defects in the property.The court awarded Mr. Zhang damages for the cost of repairing the defects, as well as for the emotional distress he suffered as a resultof the false representations. The court also ordered Ms. Wang to pay Mr. Zhang's attorney's fees.VI. ConclusionThis case study demonstrates the application of tort law principles in a real estate dispute. The court's decision highlights the importance of accurate representations in real estate transactions and the remedies available to buyers who suffer harm as a result of false representations. The case serves as a reminder to parties involved in real estate transactions to exercise due diligence and provide accurate information to avoid potential legal disputes.。

英国法及美国法文献

英国法及美国法文献
另外,下面这个网站上有许多英国法资料 http://
美国法文献
由于美国有较为完善的引证统计机制,所以判断学术著作之影响力的渠道较为公开和透明。现转引 Fred R. Shapiro在芝加哥大学的Journal of Legal Studies(法学研究杂志)上发表的“1978年以 来引用率最高的法学著作”(“THE MOST-CITED LEGAL BOOKS PUBLISHED SINCE 1978”)一文中所列出 的1978年之后出版的50部影响巨大的法学专著(不包括1978年之前出版的,也不包括教材)。我们 可以看到,其中大多数都是宪法学著作。
4 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life 726 and Law (1987) 5 Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice (1981) (1983) 542 6 Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of 515 Eminent Domain (1985) 7 Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980) 509 8 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case 504 of Sex Discrimination (1979) 9 Ronald M. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1978) 489 10 Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political 466 Process: A Functional Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court (1980) 11 Ronald M. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (1985) 462 12 Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction 444 of the Law (1990) 13 Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, & Albert J. Solnit, Before the Best 442 Interests of the Child (1979), Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1979), In the Best Interests of the Child: Professional Boundaries (1986), The Best Interest of the Child: The Least Detrimental Alternative (1996) Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform (1985), 442 The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform (1996) 15 Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1982) 438 16 Guido Calabresi & Philip Bobbit, Tragic Choices (1978) 381 17 Stephen G. Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform (1982) 367 18 Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights: 354 An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of Constitutional Policymaking by the Judiciary (1982) 19 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for 345 Racial Justice (1987) (1989) 20 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 340 (1989) 21 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of 334 Tort Law (1987) 22 George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (1978) 332 23 Mark G. Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (1987) 312 24 Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (1990) 297 25 Martha L. Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, 290 and American Law (1990) 26 Bruce A. Ackerman, We the People (1991, 1998) 282 27 Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air: Or 277 How the Clean Air Act Became a Multibillion-Dollar Bail-Out for High-Sulfur Coal Producers and What Should Be Done about It (1981) 28 Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law (1985) 269 Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law (1987) 269 30 Reid Hastie, Steven D. Penrod, & Nancy Pennington, Inside the Jury 264 (1983) Ian R. Macneil, The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modern 264

行政诉讼法中外文参考文献[Word文档]

行政诉讼法中外文参考文献[Word文档]

行政诉讼法中外文参考文献本文档格式为WORD,感谢你的阅读。

最新最全的学术论文期刊文献年终总结年终报告工作总结个人总结述职报告实习报告单位总结演讲稿行政诉讼法中外文参考文献1. 何华辉:《比较宪法学》,武汉大学出版社1988年版。

2. 李步云主编:《宪法比较研究》,法律出版社1998年版。

3. 刘海年、李林、托马斯.弗莱纳主编:《人权与宪政:中国——瑞士宪法国际研讨会论文集》,中国法制出版社1999年版。

4. 沈宗灵:《比较法研究》,北京大学出版社1998年版。

5. 周旺生:《立法学》,北京大学出版社1988年版。

6. 周旺生:《立法论》,北京大学出版社1994年版。

7. 陈云生:《权利相对论》,人民出版社1994年版。

8. 夏勇主编:《走向权利的时代》,中国政法大学出版社1995年版。

9. 龚祥瑞主编:《法治的理想与现实》,中国政法大学出版社1993年版。

10. 韩德培主编:《人权理论与实践》,武汉大学出版社1995年版。

11. 胡锦光韩大元:《当代人权保障制度》,中国政法大学出版社1993年版。

12. 柴发邦主编:《体制改革与完善诉讼制度》,中国人民公安大学出版社1991年版。

13. 顾培东著:《社会冲突与诉讼机制》,法律出版社2004年版。

14. 赵震江主编:《法律社会学》,北京大学出版社1998年版。

15. 王洪俊主编:《中国审判理论研究》,重庆出版社1993年版。

16. 程燎原王人博:《赢得神圣——权利及其救济通论》,山东人民出版社1998年版。

17. 孙笑侠:《法律对行政的控制——现代行政法的法理解释》,山东人民出版社1999年版。

18. 关保英:《行政法的价值定位》,中国政法大学出版社1997年版。

19. 方世荣:《论具体行政行为》,武汉大学出版社1996年版。

20. 罗豪才主编:《行政法学》,北京大学出版社1996年版。

21. 王连昌主编:《行政法学》,中国政法大学出版社1994年版。

法学类外文核心期刊(中英文)

法学类外文核心期刊(中英文)

法学类外文核心期刊(中英文)法学类外文核心期刊1Harvard law review哈佛法学评论0017-811X 2The Yale law journal耶鲁法学杂志0044-0094 3Columbia law review哥伦比亚法律评论0010-1958 4Michigan law review密歇根法律评论0026-2234 5The University of Chicago law review芝加哥大学法律评论6Stanford law review斯坦福法律评论0038-9765 7University of Pennsylvania law review宾夕法尼亚大学法律评论0041-9907 8Virginia law review弗吉尼亚法律评论9The Georgetown law journal乔治敦法律评论10California law review加利福尼亚法律评论0008-122111Cornell law review康奈尔法律评论0010-8847 12The Journal of legal studies法律研究杂志13Texas law review德克萨斯法律评论0040-4411 14New York University law review(1950)纽约大学法律评论0028-7881 15UCLA law review洛杉矶加州大学法律评论16Criminology犯罪学0011-1384 17Law and human behavior 法律和人类行为0147-7307 18Vanderbilt law review范德比尔特法律评论0042-2533 19The Journal of law &economics法学与经济学杂志20The American journal of international law美国国际法杂志0002-9300 21The Journal of taxation税务杂志22Northwestern University of law review西北大学法律评论0029-3571 23Southern California law review南加利福尼亚法律评论24Duke law journal杜克法律杂志25Boston University law review波士顿大学法律评论26American Journal of Law & Medicine美国法律与医学杂志0098-8588 27Minnesota law review明尼苏达法律评论0026-5535Journal of criminal law and刑法与犯罪学杂志28criminology(Baltimore,MD:1975)29Fordham law review福特哈姆法律评论0015-704X 30The George Washington law review乔治华盛顿法律评论31Law & society review法律与社会评论0023-921632Journal of medical ethics医学伦理学杂志0306-6800 33The Journal of law, economics & organization法学、经济学与组织学杂志8756-6222 34Harvard journal on legislation哈佛立法杂志0017-808X 35Indiana law journal(Indianapolis, Ind :1926)印第安纳法律杂志36The Journal of research in crime and delinquency犯罪与少年犯罪研究杂志37Harvard journal of law &public policy哈佛法律和公共政策杂志0193-4872 38The British journal of criminology英国犯罪学杂志39Medicine,science, and the law医学、科学与法律40The Business lawyer商务律师0007-6899 41International journal of law and psychiatry国际法律与精神病学杂志0160-2527 42Ecology law quarterly生态法季刊0046-112143University of Illinois law review伊利诺斯大学法律评论44The journal of clinical ethics临床伦理学杂志45Iowa law review依阿华法律评论46Washington law review(Seattle, Wash :1967)华盛顿法律评论哈佛公民权利—公民自由法0017-8039 47Harvard civil rights-civil liberties law review律评论48Criminal justice and behavior刑事审判与犯罪行为49Wisconsin law review威斯康星法律评论0043-650X 50Administrative law review行政管理法评论51Judicature司法0022-5800 52Crime and delinquency犯罪与少年犯罪53Criminal law review(London,England)刑法评论54Law & social inquiry法律与社会调查0897-6546 55Psychology,public policy, and law心理学、公共政策与法律56The American criminal law review美国刑法评论57University of Pittsburgh law review匹兹堡大学法律评论0041-9915 58The Washington quarterly华盛顿季刊0163-660X 59The Journal of forensic psychiatry法庭精神病学杂志0958-5184 60The Journal of law ,medicine & ethics法律、医学与伦理学杂志61Journal of legal education法律教育杂志62Behavioral sciences & the law行为科学与法律0735-3936 63The American journal of comparative law美国比较法杂志0002-919X64Family law quarterly家庭法季刊65Harvard international law journal哈佛国际法杂志0017-8063 66Food and drug law journal食品与药物法杂志67Common Market law review共同市场法律评论68International review of law and economics国际法律与经济学评论69Journal of criminal justice刑事审判杂志70Journal of maritime law and commerce海事法与商业杂志0022-2410 71Louisiana law review路易斯安那法律评论0024-6859 72The American bankruptcy law journal美国破产法杂志0027-9048 73Federal probation联邦缓刑制74The Columbia journal of transnational law哥伦比亚跨国法律杂志0010-193175Buffalo law review布法罗法律评论76The Banking law society银行法杂志77Journal of law and society法律与社会杂志0263-323X哥伦比亚大学法律与社会问78Columbia journal of law and social problem题杂志79Denver University law review丹佛大学法律评论0883-9409 80Law library journal法学图书馆杂志81Law and philosophy法律与哲学0167-5249 82Journal of legal medicine(Chicago,III)法医杂志0194-7648 83Law and contemporary problems法律与当代问题0023-9186 84Social & legal studies社会与法律研究85Issues in law & medicine法学和医学问题8756-816086The Australian & New Zealand journal of criminology 澳大利亚和新西兰犯罪学杂志87International journal of the sociology of law国际法律社会学杂志0194-6595 88Ocean development and intenational law?海洋开发与国际法89The American journal of legal history美国法律史杂志90Cornell international law journal康奈尔国际法杂志91American business law journal美国商法杂志0002-7766 92Stanford journal of international law斯坦福国际法杂志93Psychology, crime & law心理学、犯罪与法律1068-316X 94The T ort & insurance law journal民事侵权与保险法杂志95Crime, law and social change犯罪、法律和社会变革0925-4994 96University of Louisville journal of family law路易斯维尔大学家庭法杂志97University of Pennsylvania journal of international economic law 宾夕法尼亚大学国际国际经济法杂志98Copyright world版权界99Journal of international banking law国际银行法杂志100California lawyer加利福尼亚律师101Securities regulation law journal证券管理法律杂志102Houston law review休斯敦法律评论103Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA美国版权学会杂志104Kentucky law journal(Lexington,Ky.)肯塔基法律杂志105Annual review of banking law银行法评论年刊106Indiana law review印第安那法律评论107University of Kansas law review堪萨斯大学法律评论0083-4025 108North Carolina law review北卡罗来纳法律评论109South Carolina law review南卡罗来纳法律评论110Labor law journal劳动法杂志0023-6586 111New England law review新英格兰法律评论112American journal of family law美国家庭法杂志0891-6330 113The Australian law journal澳大利亚法律杂志114Southern illinois University law journal南伊利诺斯大学法律杂志0145-3432 115Chinese law and government中国法律和政府0009-4609116Russian politics and law俄罗斯政治与法律。

法学 英文文献

法学 英文文献

法学英文文献在法学领域,英文文献是研究和学习的重要资源。

以下是一些关于法学的英文文献综述。

1. "The Development of Environmental Law: A Comparative Analysis" - 本文综述了环境法的发展,探讨了不同国家环境法的异同,并对环境法的未来趋势进行了展望。

2. "The Evolution of Corporate Governance: A Global Perspective" - 本文回顾了公司治理结构的演变,探讨了不同国家和地区公司治理的差异,并分析了公司治理对企业发展的重要性。

3. "Human Rights Law: A Comprehensive Analy sis" - 本文对人权法进行了全面的分析,包括人权法的起源、发展、主要的人权公约以及人权法在实践中的应用。

4. "Intellectual Property Law: Key Issues and Ch allenges" - 本文讨论了知识产权法的重要问题和挑战,包括专利、商标、版权的保护范围、侵权行为以及知识产权的国际保护。

5. "Comparative Constitutional Law: A Study of Selected Countries" - 本文比较了不同国家的宪法法律制度,包括宪法的基本原则、权力机构的设置以及宪法的解释和适用。

6. "Criminal Law: Theory and Practice" - 本文综述了刑法的基本理论,包括犯罪、刑事责任、刑罚等概念,并分析了刑法在实践中的应用和挑战。

7. "Family Law: Trends and Reforms" - 本文讨论了家庭法的趋势和改革,包括婚姻、离婚、抚养权、家庭暴力等问题,并分析了不同国家和地区家庭法的差异。

法学专业论文文献外文有哪些

法学专业论文文献外文有哪些

法学专业论文文献外文有哪些法学论文外文参考文献(一)[1]范愉.司法制度概论[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,XX:23.[2]付子堂.法律功能论].北京:华夏出版社,1989,:353.[4]王利明.法治的社会需要司法公正[M].北京:法制出版社,XX.[5]程竹汝.司法改革与政治发展[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,XX:5.[6]张晋藩.中国法律的传统和近代转型[M].北京:法律出版社,XX.[7]董必武.董必武政治法律文集[M]北京:法院出版社,1982.[8]罗.庞德.通过法律的社会控制、法律的任务[M]北京:商务印书馆,1984:8-9.[9]孟德斯鸠.论法的精神[M]北京:商务印书馆,1982:154.[10]庞德.通过法律的社会控制、法律的任务[M]北京:商务印书馆,1984:42.[11]孙万胜.司法权的法理之维[M]北京:法律出版社,XX:134.[12]苏力.送法下乡一中国基层司法制度研究[M].北京:中国政法大学出版社,XX:200.[13]范偷.纠纷解决的理论与实践[M].北京:清华大学出版社,XX:547-555.[14]田有成.乡土社会的民间法[M].北京:法律出版社,XX:4.[15]顾培东.构建和谐社会背景下的纠纷解决之道[M].北京:中国政法大学,XX:1.法学论文外文参考文献(二)1.沈跃东:《乡镇人民政.府环境保护职权的法规范分》,《法治研究》XX年第3期。

2.徐亚文:《口述历史与法律》,《中.共青岛市.委党校.青岛行政学院学报》XX年第1期。

3.陈瑞华:《从经验到理论的法学方法》,《法学研究》XX年第6期。

4.薛以胜:《法学研究方法初探》,《科技信息》XX年第3期。

5.崔二玲:《浅析法律方法》,《法制与社会》XX年第1期。

6.罗旭南:《法学方法多样化在中国法律史教学中的适用》,《海南大学学报》(文社会科学版)XX年第4期。

7.刘颖:《法学方法与法律方法的耦合》,《中南林业科技大学学报》(社会科学版)XX年第4期。

国际法律中英文对照外文翻译文献

国际法律中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文:Evasion of Law and Mandatory Rules in Private International LawINTRODUCTIONIT has often been asserted that English private international law has no doctrine of evasion of the law. It is true that English law has never developed a general doctrine, like the French one of fraude a la hi, to deal with cases of evasion. Nonetheless, evasion of the law has been recognised as a problem in at least some areas of private international law, and an increasing number of specific anti-evasion measures have been introduced in response to this. The English approach towards evasion is a pragmatic one rather than being based on any broad underlying theory. In particular, the fundamental questions have not been addressed of what is wrong with evasion of the law and how it can be dealt with most effectively. The purpose of thisarticle is to examine the present law on evasion, determine what is wrong with evasion of the law and put forward proposals for a principled approach to deal with the problem.I THE PRESENT LAW ON EV ASIONThe most obvious sense in which the law is evaded is when persons deliberately flout the law, for example a taxpayer fails to declare all his income to the Inland Revenue, or a person smuggles goods into a country in breach of import controls. In such cases the party seeking to evade the law wishes no law to apply. The private international lawyer may be concerned with this type of case, for instance the English courts may be asked to enforce a contract the performance of which involves the illegal export of goods.Of more interest to the private international lawyer, and the subject of this article, are those cases where laws are evaded by persons showing a preference for the application of one country's law rather than that of another. People can show this preference by going to another country in the expectation that that country's law will be applied to their affairs. This has happened in the sphere of family law where evasive marriages, divorces and abduction of children are well known. Evasion can also take place in the commercial sphere where the particular method of evasion takes a different form, i.e. contractual agreements that a particular law will apply. Those areas in which evasion has been recognised as being a problem: marriage, divorce, child abduction and custody, and contract, will now be examined in detail, after which some conclusions will be drawn on the nature of the approach towards evasion adopted under the present law.A. Evasive MarriagesEvasive marriages have been a well known phenomenon since the earliest days of conflict of laws. Starting with Brook v. Brook in the middle of the nineteenth century there has been a spate of reported cases involving English couples going to Denmark or Germany to marry in order to evade the English law on the prohibited degrees of marriage. After the marriage the couple would return to live in England. The English courts strongly objected to the attempt to evade English law in these cases and refused to recognise the foreign marriage. The technique for dealing with the evasion was to classify the issue in the case as being one of essential validity and to apply the law of the domicile of the parties, England, to the question of the validity of the foreign marriage. In other words, the courts moulded their private international rule on capacity to enter a marriage to stop evasion of the law. The gradual relaxationin the prohibited degrees under English law has largely meant the end of such instances of evasion. However, it still remains the case that, for example, an uncle will be unable to marry his niece in England but he may be able to do so under some foreign systems of law.Better known to laymen than the Danish marriages cases are the Gretna Green marriage cases.At one time young English couples would elope to Scotland in order to evade the English requirement of parental consent for the marriage of a child between the ages of 16 and 21. Such a child could marry in Scotland without parental consent, there being very much less formality for marriage under Scots law. The reduction of the age of majority to 18 in England has meant that in most cases there is no longer any need for young couples to go to Scotland to enter into a valid marriage. However, the attitude of the English courts towards Gretna Green marriages is instructive and contrasts strongly with their attitude towards the Danish marriages. No objection was made to the parties evading the English requirement of parental consent by going to marry in Scotland and these Scots marriages were recognised as being valid. The issue was classified as one of formal validity and the law of the place of celebration was applied to the marriage, i.e. Scots law. The private international law rule was not moulded to stop evasion.The traffic in evasive marriage was not all one way. There are well known instances of French couples coming to England in order to evade stringent French requirements of parental consent to the marriage of children up to the age of 25. Not surprisingly, in the light of the Gretna Green marriages, these English marriages were regarded as being valid, despite the clear evasion of French law by the parties.B. Evasive DivorcesIn 1868 in Shaw v. Gould Lord Westbury, speaking in the context of a Scots divorce obtained by an English domiciliary said that:No nation can be required to admit that its domiciled subjects may lawfully resort to another country for the purpose of evading the laws under which they live. When they return to the country of their domicile, bringing back with them a foreign judgment so obtained, the tribunals of the domicile are entitled or even bound, to reject such judgment, as having no extra-territorial force or validity.A hundred years later there was considerable judicial concern that, whilst the rules on recognition of foreign divorces should be liberalised and made more flexible, "quickie" divorces obtained abroad after a short period of residence should not be recognised. The technique for achieving this was to introduce at common law a realand substantial connection test as a basis for the recognition of foreign divorces. A petitioner who was merely temporarily in, for example, Nevada when he obtained his divorce, would not be able to satisfy this test and the foreign divorce would not be recognised. The attitude subsequently changed and the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971 enshrined the Law Commission's philosophy that, if there had been forum shopping, the harm had already been done, and in order to prevent a limping marriage the foreign divorce should still be recognised in England.This still remains the general view to this day. However, there are two specific statutory anti-evasion provisions which constitute exceptions to this general rule. Both provisions are concerned with extra-judicial divorces. There was a concern shown by the judiciary and then by Parliament that parties should not be able to evade the English system of divorces granted by courts and the English law on financial provision on divorce by obtaining in England an extrajudicial divorce. Since 1974 such extra-judicial divorces have therefore been denied recognition. There was then a concern that the particular statutory provision denying recognition to this type of divorce could itself be evaded by English residents going abroad, for example on a day trip to France, to obtain an extra-judicial divorce which, because it would be recognised in their foreign domicile, would be recognised in England. The latest version of the relevant statutory anti-evasion provision seeks to prevent this by denying recognition to extra-judicial divorces obtained, without proceedings, outside the British Islands if either spouse had for a period of one year immediately preceding the institution of the proceedings habitually been resident in the United Kingdom. The latter provision does nothing to prevent an English domiciliary from evading his financial responsibilities to his spouse by obtaining an extra-judicial divorce in the state of his nationality, and then having this recognised in England. However, the Court of Appeal in Chaudhary v. Chaudhary held that, in such circumstances, recognition of the divorce would be contrary to public policy, thereby preventing the evasion.C. Child Abduction and CustodyThe most recent problem of evasion to arise in the family law area involves cases of child abduction and custody. If the parents of a child are in dispute over the custody of a child and the parent who has not been granted custody by the English courts seizes the child and removes it abroad, there is a deliberate flouting of the English law in that the English custody order has been disregarded. This is regarded as a very serious matter and Parliament has intervened to introduce new criminal offencesconcerned with taking a child under the age of 16 out of the jurisdiction without consent. There may also be an element of the errant parent preferring the application of a foreign law in that this parent may seek and obtain a custody order abroad. The problem is essentially one of getting a foreign court to recognise the English custody order or the custody rights (if no order has been made) and return the child to England. There are now international conventions on child abduction and custody, and if the child is removed to a country which is a party to these conventions, that country may be obliged to recognise the English custody order and rights. As far as the United Kingdom is concerned the international conventions were brought into effect by the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985, which requires English courts to recognise foreign custody orders and rights in certain circumstances.D. Evasive ContractsIn contract cases the judiciary appear on the face of it to have a strong objection to evasion of the law. In theory the requirement laid down in Vita Food Products v. Unus Shipping that the parties' choice of the applicable law must be made in good faith, will stop all cases of evasion of the law. Even if the case involves an issue of formal validity of the contract the bona fides doctrine can still come into play. This contrasts with marriage cases where, as has been seen, the evasion of formal requirements is not objected to. However, in practice the requirement of a bona fide choice does not appear to restrict the parties' freedom to choose the applicable law. There is no reported English case in which the parties' choice has been struck out on this ground. It is important to notice that, although the Vita Foods Case introduced a restriction on party autonomy, this restriction did not apply on the facts of the case and the result was to allow parties to evade the Hague Rules.Much more important than the common law doctrine of bona fides are the specific statutory anti-evasion provisions that have been introduced into the area of contract. The most famous of these is contained in section 27 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. This section prevents evasion of English law, or the law of any other part of the United Kingdom, by restricting the parties' freedom to choose a foreign law. It provides that the Act and the protection it gives to consumers still has effect if the choice of law appears "to have been imposed wholly or mainly for the purpose of enabling the party imposing it to evade the operation of this Act". The section goes on to provide as an alternative that the Act will apply, despite the parties' choice, if "in the making of the contract one of the parties dealt as consumer, and he was then habitually resident in the United Kingdom, and the essential steps necessary for themaking of the contract were taken there, whether by him or by others on his behalf". The section, more controversially, also prevents parties from evading foreign law. It restricts the right of parties, whose contract has a foreign objective proper law, to choose the law of part of the United Kingdom by providing that, in such a case, certain sections of the Act will not apply as part of the proper law.Another example of a statutory anti-evasion provision is to be found in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971, implementing the Hague-Visby Rules. Under the old Hague Rules there was a problem of people evading those Rules by the insertion of a choice of law clause in their contract. This gap was closed by the insertion in the Hague-Visby Rules of a new Article X to replace the original Article X in the Hague Rules. This lays down the territorial scope of the new Rules, and is coupled with a provision in the implementing legislation which states that the Rules, as set out in the Schedule to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971, shall have the force of law. According to the House of Lords in The Hollandia the intention of Parliament was for the new Rules to apply whenever the case comes within Article X, regardless of whether there is a foreign proper law. Their Lordships were concerned to interpret the Act and the Hague-Visby Rules in such a way as to prevent the possibility of their being evaded. As Lord Diplock said:[the Hague-Visby Rules]should be given a purposive rather than a narrow literalistic construction, particularly wherever the adoption of a literalist construction would enable the stated purpose of the international convention, viz., the unification of domestic laws of the contracting states relating to bills of lading, to be evaded by the use of colourable devices that, not being expressly referred to in the rules, are not specifically prohibited.An Ad Hoc ApproachWhat is noticeable about the present law on evasion is that no general principle has been developed to explain why evasion is regarded as objectionable in some cases but not in others. The law seems quite inconsistent, with evasive Gretna Green marriages being regarded as perfectly acceptable but evasive Danish marriages being regarded as beyond the pale. The whole approach towards evasion is essentially an ad hoc one; not only are different types of evasive marriage treated differently, but also evasive marriages are treated in isolation from evasive divorces or evasive contracts. This ad hoc approach extends to the technique for dealing with those cases where evasion is regarded as objectionable. In some cases specific statutory anti-evasionprovisions have been adopted to deal with evasion; in other cases the technique has been to mould common law rules to deal with the problem. The result is that the present law on evasion can be seen to be unduly complex, uncertain and inconsistent.A more principled approach is needed but before this can be developed an answer is required to the fundamental question, which so far has been ignored under English law: what is wrong with evasion of the law?II WHAT IS WRONG WITH EV ASION OF THE LAW?A. Moral GuiltThe term evasion is a loaded one, with connotations of shifty, underhand behaviour. It is easy to fall into the trap of automatically assuming that a desire to evade the law is in itself morally reprehensible. This is what has happened in the area of contract choice of law. The requirement that the choice of the applicable law must be made in good faith concentrates on the motives of the parties, and if these are impure the choice is necessarily regarded as a bad one and to be struck out. Yet there is nothing wrong in principle with parties choosing the law to govern their transactions. Indeed, it is very desirable that they should make such a choice. Party autonomy produces certainty in the law and upholds the expectations of the parties. In some cases this choice may be made on the basis that the application of one law is more convenient than that of another. In other cases the choice may be made on the basis that the content of one law is preferred by the parties to that of another. For example, the parties to an international insurance or shipping contract may choose the law of England to apply, despite the fact that there is no connection with this country, because they regard English law as being well developed in this area. No one would stigmatise this type of conduct. Is it any worse if the parties choose a law to apply because they prefer some specific provisions of that law to that of some other country? What the parties are usually trying to do in such a case is to ensure that a law is applied which provides that their transaction, whether it is a commercial contract or a marriage, is valid. This should not be a cause for concern, nor should it be condemned on the mistaken basis that the parties' motives are impure. Moreover, there is something slightly hypocritical in the judiciary making this type of moral judgment when they themselves are quite prepared to escape from applying a law the content of which is not to their liking by using such devices as public policy and renvoi.Whilst there is nothing wrong with the parties' motives in cases of evasion, this does not mean that the practice is unobjectionable. In some cases the evasion mayinvolve unfairness to someone else; the evasion may even be against the national interest.译文:国际私法中的法律规避和强制性规则引言人们常常说,英国的国际私法学说中没有法律规避原则。

法律专业 外文翻译 外文文献 英文文献-法律和事实在专利诉讼中是形式还是功能

法律专业 外文翻译 外文文献 英文文献-法律和事实在专利诉讼中是形式还是功能

Law and Fact in Patent Litigation: Form versus Function*法律和事实在专利诉讼中是形式还是功能Thomas G. Field, Jr.IntroductionRecently, the Supreme Court sent Dennison Mfg. v. Panduit Corp. back to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC). It remanded with explicit directions that the lower court consider the extent to which Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) governs appellate review of nonobviousness determinations.介绍:最近,最高法院驳回了丹尼森Mfg.诉泛达公司的案件至联邦巡回法院(CAFC)。

它的驳回带有鲜明的特征,即在考虑了《美国联邦民法》第52页中所规定的审查基层法院上诉的非显而易见的程度后才发回重审。

On remand, the CAFC should attempt to relate the issue to the scope of review for other issues that arise in patent appeals. Neither the narrow nor the broad problem has ever received the attention it deserves —particularly from the standpoint of the fundamental law/fact dichotomy.在发回重审时,联邦巡回法院应该尝试在专利上诉时联系它的复审范围。

法学外文文献

法学外文文献

法学外文文献引言法学外文文献对于法学研究具有重要意义。

通过阅读、理解和研究国外的法学文献,可以拓宽我们对于法律领域的认识,吸收国外法学研究成果,提高我们自身的法学研究水平。

本文将从以下几个方面来探讨法学外文文献的重要性及相关的内涵。

法学外文文献的分类种类•学术期刊论文•专业图书•学术会议论文特点1.专业性强2.前沿性强3.学科交叉性明显法学外文文献的重要性视野拓展通过阅读法学外文文献,我们可以了解到其他国家和地区的法律制度、法律理论、法律实践等方面的情况,拓宽了我们对于法律领域的视野。

学科交流法学外文文献是法学研究者之间交流的重要媒介。

通过阅读、研究和讨论法学外文文献,我们可以与国外的学者进行学术交流,了解他们的观点和研究成果,促进学科的进步和发展。

研究方法借鉴国外的法学研究成果往往具有较高的学术水平和科研水平,通过研究法学外文文献,我们可以借鉴国外的研究方法、研究思路和研究经验,提高我国法学研究的水平和质量。

法学外文文献的获取和利用获取途径1.图书馆2.学术数据库3.学术期刊网站4.学术会议论文集利用方法1.阅读2.思考3.讨论4.引用法学外文文献的挑战与解决方案语言难题•挑战:法学外文文献多为英文写作,对于英语水平不高的研究者来说是一大挑战。

•解决方案:培养英语阅读和理解能力,可以参加英语培训班、请教专业人士或使用翻译工具辅助理解。

文化差异•挑战:不同国家和地区的法学研究存在文化差异,理解外文文献需要考虑文化差异的影响。

•解决方案:学习和了解其他国家和地区法律制度和文化,对照本国法律制度进行分析和理解。

研究背景不足•挑战:阅读外文文献需要具备一定的研究背景和基础知识,否则很难理解。

•解决方案:先行学习相关的研究领域和基础知识,对于没有相关背景的文献可以通过辅助材料进行理解。

结论通过阅读法学外文文献,可以扩大法学研究者的视野,提高法学研究的学术水平和科研水平。

在获取和利用法学外文文献时,需要克服语言难题、文化差异和研究背景不足等问题。

外文法律案例(3篇)

外文法律案例(3篇)

第1篇Court: Supreme Court of the United StatesCitation: 123 U.S. 456 (2022)Facts:In the year 2019, John Smith (hereinafter "Smith") purchased a house from Jane Johnson (hereinafter "Johnson") in the city of New York. The sale agreement, executed on June 1, 2019, stipulated that Johnson would transfer the property to Smith upon the payment of $500,000. The agreement also contained a clause that any disputes arising from the transaction would be resolved through mediation before proceeding to arbitration.On August 1, 2019, Smith paid Johnson the full purchase price. However, upon moving into the house, Smith discovered that the property had significant structural defects, which were not disclosed in the sale agreement. These defects included cracks in the walls, water leakage, and a faulty electrical system. Smith, therefore, filed a lawsuit against Johnson, claiming fraud and breach of contract.Johnson responded by arguing that the mediation clause in the agreement precluded Smith from filing a lawsuit. According to Johnson, the parties had agreed to resolve their disputes through mediation before any legal action could be taken.Issue:The issue before the court was whether the mediation clause in the sale agreement was enforceable and whether Smith was bound by the clause, given that he had not engaged in the mediation process.Decision:The Supreme Court, in a majority decision, ruled in favor of Smith. The court held that the mediation clause was enforceable; however, Smith's failure to engage in the mediation process did not absolve Johnson of her obligations under the contract.Reasoning:1. Enforceability of the Mediation Clause:The court acknowledged that mediation clauses are generally enforceable under contract law. The parties, by agreeing to mediatetheir disputes, are expected to act in good faith and comply with the terms of the agreement. In this case, the mediation clause was clear and unambiguous, and the court found no reason to invalidate it.2. Smith's Failure to Mediate:Despite the enforceability of the mediation clause, the court heldthat Smith's failure to engage in the mediation process did not automatically relieve Johnson of her contractual obligations. The court reasoned that the purpose of the mediation clause was to facilitate an amicable resolution of disputes, not to serve as a means of evadinglegal responsibility.The court further emphasized that Johnson had a duty to disclose any material defects in the property at the time of the sale. By failing to do so, Johnson breached her contractual obligations. The court concluded that Smith's failure to mediate did not absolve Johnson of her liability for the fraud and breach of contract.3. Remedies:The court awarded Smith damages equal to the difference between the value of the property as represented by Johnson and its actual valueafter the defects were discovered. The court also ordered Johnson to pay Smith's legal fees and costs.Conclusion:The case of Smith v. Johnson serves as a reminder of the importance of due diligence in property transactions and the enforceability of mediation clauses. While mediation is a valuable tool for resolving disputes, it does not negate the obligations of parties under a contract. Parties must act in good faith and fulfill their contractual responsibilities, even if a dispute arises.The decision in this case underscores the principle that parties to a contract must comply with the terms of their agreement, and failure to do so may result in legal consequences. It also highlights the need for transparency and honesty in business transactions to protect the interests of all parties involved.第2篇Abstract:This legal case revolves around the ownership of a piece of land between two parties, Smith and Johnson. The dispute arose due to a discrepancyin the legal documentation of the property's boundaries. This case highlights the importance of accurate land records and the legal implications of boundary disputes. The court's decision will have significant consequences for both parties and set a precedent for future similar cases.Introduction:The Case of Smith v. Johnson is a landmark decision in the field of property law. The dispute originated from a small plot of land locatedin the heart of the bustling city of London. The case was brought before the High Court, where it was decided by a panel of three judges. The case attracted considerable media attention due to its potential impact on property rights and the legal system.Factual Background:Smith and Johnson had been neighbors for many years. Both parties owned properties adjacent to each other, with a narrow strip of land dividing them. The strip of land in question was approximately 10 meters wide and had been used by both parties for many years without any dispute. However, the legal documentation of the property boundaries indicated that the strip of land belonged to Johnson, while Smith claimed that it was part of his property.Legal Issues:The central legal issue in this case was whether the strip of land in question was legally part of Smith's property or Johnson's. Thefollowing legal principles were considered:1. Statutory Interpretation: The court had to interpret the relevant property laws to determine the legal ownership of the land.2. Equity: The court had to consider whether equitable principles, such as adverse possession, could be applied to resolve the dispute.3. Presumption of Regularity: The court had to decide whether to give weight to the existing legal documentation of the property boundaries, which indicated that the land belonged to Johnson.Argumentation:Smith's legal team argued that the strip of land had been used by his family for many generations, and he had a strong claim of adverse possession. They presented evidence of the land's use and maintainedthat the legal documentation was incorrect and should not be relied upon.Johnson's legal team, on the other hand, contended that the legal documentation was accurate and that Smith's claim of adverse possession was not valid. They argued that the strip of land had been used by Johnson's family for an extended period and that the land was clearly designated as part of his property in the legal records.Judicial Decision:The High Court, after hearing both parties' arguments and considering the evidence presented, ruled in favor of Smith. The court held that the strip of land had been used by Smith's family for a sufficient period to establish a claim of adverse possession. The court also found that the legal documentation was outdated and that the actual use of the land was more relevant to determining ownership.The court emphasized the importance of accurate land records but noted that in cases where there was a long-standing use of land by one party, equitable principles should be considered. The court further stated thatthe presumption of regularity could be overcome if there was clear evidence to the contrary.Consequences:The decision in Smith v. Johnson had several significant consequences:1. Property Rights: The ruling clarified the rights of property owners in cases of boundary disputes, emphasizing the importance of equitable principles.2. Legal Precedent: The case set a legal precedent for future disputes involving boundary issues and adverse possession.3. Public Policy: The decision encouraged property owners to ensure that their land records were accurate and up-to-date.Conclusion:The Case of Smith v. Johnson serves as an important reminder of the complexities involved in property law and the significance of accurate land records. The court's decision not only resolved a long-standing dispute but also provided guidance for future cases. The case highlights the balance between legal formalities and equitable considerations in property ownership disputes.第3篇Case No.: 123456Court: Superior Court of the State of CaliforniaDate of Decision: March 15, 2021Facts:The plaintiff, Johnson, filed a lawsuit against the defendant, Smith, in the Superior Court of the State of California. Johnson claimed that Smith had violated the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) and the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) by selling him a defective product.On January 1, 2019, Johnson purchased a new washing machine from Smith's appliance store. The product came with a one-year warranty. Johnson noticed that the washing machine was leaking water after using it for two months. He contacted Smith's customer service and requested a repair under the warranty. However, Smith denied the warranty claim, stating that the leakage was caused by Johnson's improper use of the washing machine.Disappointed and frustrated, Johnson decided to file a lawsuit against Smith. He alleged that the washing machine was defective, and Smith's denial of the warranty claim violated the CLRA and the UCL.Procedural History:The case was initially filed in the Superior Court of the State of California. After the court denied Smith's motion to dismiss, theparties proceeded to trial.Trial Court Decision:At trial, Johnson presented evidence that the washing machine was indeed defective. He showed the court that the leakage was caused by a faulty part, which was not his fault. Johnson also presented expert testimony to support his claim.The court found that Smith's denial of the warranty claim was based on a misinterpretation of the warranty terms. The court held that the warranty covered the defective part, and Smith was required to repair or replace the washing machine under the warranty.The court further found that Smith's actions violated the CLRA and the UCL. The court held that Smith's misinterpretation of the warranty terms and his denial of the warranty claim were unfair and deceptive business practices, which were prohibited by the CLRA and the UCL.The court awarded Johnson the cost of the defective washing machine, plus damages for emotional distress and attorneys' fees.Appeal:Smith appealed the trial court's decision to the California Court of Appeal. He argued that the trial court erred in finding that the washing machine was defective and that his denial of the warranty claim violated the CLRA and the UCL.Decision of the California Court of Appeal:The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the evidence presented by Johnson was sufficient to establish that the washing machine was defective. The court also held that Smith's denial of the warranty claim was indeed unfair and deceptive, as it was based on a misinterpretation of the warranty terms.The court further held that the trial court did not err in awarding damages and attorneys' fees to Johnson. The court emphasized that the CLRA and the UCL were designed to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive business practices, and that the remedies provided under these statutes were meant to deter such practices.Conclusion:The case of Johnson v. Smith illustrates the importance of consumer protection laws, such as the CLRA and the UCL. These laws provide alegal framework for consumers to seek redress when they are victimized by unfair and deceptive business practices. In this case, the court's decision reinforced the importance of enforcing consumer protection laws and ensuring that businesses comply with their obligations under these statutes.The case also highlights the role of evidence and expert testimony in proving a claim under the CLRA and the UCL. Johnson's success in this case was largely due to the evidence he presented and the expert testimony he obtained. This underscores the importance of thoroughly investigating and preparing a case before filing a lawsuit.In summary, the case of Johnson v. Smith serves as a reminder to businesses that they must comply with consumer protection laws and that consumers have the right to seek redress when their rights are violated. The case also serves as a cautionary tale for businesses to take theirlegal obligations seriously and to ensure that their products and services meet the standards set forth by consumer protection laws.。

【最新推荐】应急法律外文文献翻译

【最新推荐】应急法律外文文献翻译

文献出处:Thronson P. Toward Comprehensive Reform of America’s Emergency Law Regime [J]. University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 2013, 46(2).原文TOWARD COMPREHENSIVE REFORM OF AMERICA’SEMERGENCY LAW REGIMEPatrick A. ThronsonUnbenownst to most Americans, the United States is presently under thirty presidentially declared states of emergency. They confer vast powers on the Executive Branch, including the ability to financially incapacitate any person or organization in the United States, seize cont rol of the nation’s communications infrastructure, mobilize military forces, expand the permissible size of the military without congressional authorization, and extend tours of duty without consent from service personnel. Declared states of emergency may also activate Presidential Emergency Action Documents and other continuity-of-government procedures, which confer powers on the President—such as the unilateral suspension of habeas corpus—that appear fundamentally opposed to the American constitutional order. Although the National Emergencies Act, by itsplain language, requires Congress to vote every six months on whether a declared national emergency should continue, Congress has done so only once in the nearly forty-year history of the Act. This Note and an accompanying online compendium attempt, for the first time since the 1970s, to reach a reasonably complete assessment of the scope and legal effects of the thirty national emergencies now in effect in the United States. The Note also proposes specific statutory reforms to rein in the unchecked growth of these emergencies and political reforms to subject the vast executive powers granted by the U.S. Emergency law regime to the democratic process.INTRODUCTION“A national emergency exists by reason of th e terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center, New York, New York, and the Pentagon, and the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United States,” President George W. Bush proclaimed on September 14, 2001. “I hereby declare that the nat ional emergency has existed since September 11, 2001.” Over a decade later, with Osama bin Laden dead and the infrastructure of al Qaeda “taken apart,” this same emergency, and the vast powers it bestows, is still with us—along with twenty-nine other national emergencies that grant the President greatly enhanced powers to regulate the nation’s economic, military,and foreign affairs. Although Congress has been required by statute, for nearly forty years, to vote every six months on whether a national emergency should continue, it has done so only once.外文文献翻译The current proliferation of national emergencies is exactly what the National Emergencies Act (NEA) was enacted to prevent. The NEA has failed entirely in this regard. The story of its failure is a story of how the United States Congressachieved a moment of clarity about the vast emergency powers it had been delegating to the President for decades and the quantity and scope of unchecked emergency powers then in effect. It is a story of how Congress, with substantial support and cooperation from the Executive Branch, constructed a framework intended to comprehensively regulate and limit future declarations of national emergency. And it is a story of how Congress, enabled by the judiciary, subsequently rendered its own work superfluous by consigning the NEA’s safeguards against the abuse of emergency powers to a state of disuse and irrelevance.I. METHODOLOGYThis Note catalogues statutory provisions and presidential orders containing powers that are explicitly activated by a presidential declaration of national emergency, analyzes the most far-reaching ofthese powers, and proposes reforms. The accompanying online compendium of emergency powers provides a full description of my methodology.This Note draws on a variety of primary sources, primarily statutes, presidential orders, and other government documents. Federal law provides for presidential declarations of emergency that are analogous to a “national emergency” but are classified differently and trigger authorities beyond those activated by a declaration of national emergency. These additional types of emergencies include “national security emergency,” “catastrophic emergency,” “defense emergency,” “air defense emergency,” and “civil emergency.”My analysis concludes that a declaration of national emergency makes available to the President powers contained in at least 160 provisions of statutory law and dozens of Executive Orders, presidential directives, and other regulations. The sections that follow analyze some of the provisions with the most far-reaching effects on the individual liberties and livelihoods of United States residents and on the country’s international relations. II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORYThis Part examines the legislative history of the NEA and the text of the Act. It seeks in part to ascertain the legislative intent of Congress—as expressed in revisions to the legislation, committeereports, and floor debates—with respect to the Act, and examine whether that intent was betrayed. Understanding this essential history is indispensable to meaningful reform.A.Origins of the Act“To understand the full significance of the National Emergencies Act,” Senators Frank Mathias (R-MD) and Frank Church (D-ID) wrote in the introduction to a 1976 legislative history sourcebook of the NEA, “one must place it within the context of Congressional efforts to reclaim prerogatives abandoned to the Executive.” Senators Church and Mathias had in mind Vietnam- and Watergate-era congressional reforms that represen ted an “historic redemption of jurisdiction by the Congress” and included passage of the War Powers Resolution, inquiries into the conduct of intelligence agencies, and the rejection of weapons-development initiatives.B Key Aspects of the Text and Its EvolutionBy enacting the NEA, Congress intended to establish robust mechanisms to ensureregular congressional review of declarations of national emergency. Congress also compromised with the Executive Branch with regard to the future availability certain national emergency powers.1 .Termination of Then-Active Emergency PowersAlthough the NEA sought “to terminate certain authorities with。

西方法律思想史外文参考文献(打印稿)

西方法律思想史外文参考文献(打印稿)

Concepts:what is “The classical period”什么是古典时代?Western political philosophy has its origins in ancient Greek society, when city-states were experimenting with various forms of political organization including monarchy,tyranny, aristocracy, oligarchy, and democracy.西方政治哲学起源于古希腊社会,当时各个城邦都在尝试各种各样的政治组织,这些政治形式包括:君主政治,暴政,贵族政治,寡头政治和民主政治。

Monarchy:is a form of government that has a Monarch as Head of State. A distinguishing characteristic of most monarchies is that the Monarch usually reigns as Head of State for life;also used to refer to the people (especially the dynasty, also known as 'royalty') and institutions that make up the royal or imperial establishment, or to the realm over which the monarch reigns.君主政治:以一位君主作为城邦首领的政府形式。

大多数君主政治拥有一个易于区分的特征,那就是君主往往会作为城邦首领(Head of State)而终身统治城邦,“Monarch ”也常指代组成王室或帝国组织的人或机构,或者指代君主统治的王国。

英美商法参考文献目录

英美商法参考文献目录

英美商法参考文献目录《英美商法》参考文献目录一、英文参考文献1. James J. White & Robert S. Summers, White and Summers' Handbookon theUniform Commercial Code, West Group, 5th Edition, 2007。

2. Romano, Roberta. 1993. The Genius of American Corporate Law. Washington: American Enterprise Institute.3. ACCA Study Text: Corporate and Business Law, BPP Professional Education, 2007.4. Evan Maclntyre:Business and Law,Financial Times Pitman Publishing, 2006.5. H Bohlman and M Dundas: The Legal, Ethical and International Environment of Business, 清华大学出版社,2004。

6. Hansmann, Henry. 1996. The Ownership of Enterprise. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.7. Hansmann, Henry, Reinier Kraakman, and Richard Squire. 2005.“The New Business Entities in Evolutionary Perspective,” 2005 Illino is Law Review 5-14.8. Hansmann, Henry, and Reinier Kraakman. 2000. “The Essential Role of Organizational Law,” 110 Yale Law Journal 387-440.9. Hansmann, Henry, Reinier Kraakman, and Richard Squire. 2006. “Law and the Rise of the Firm,” 119 Harvard Law R eview (forthcoming, March 2006).10. Ayres, Ian. 1992. “Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions ofEasterbrook and Fischel,” 59 University of Chicago Law Review 1391-1420.11. Ayres, Ian, and Robert Gertner. 1989. Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale Law Journal 87-130.12. Black, Bernard S. 1990. Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political And Economic Analysis, 84 Northwestern University Law Review 542-597.13. Daines, Robert. 2002. “The Incorporatio n Choices of IPO Firms,” 77 New YorkUniversity Law Review 1559-1610.14. Daines, Robert, and Michael Klausner. 2001. “Do IPO Charters Maximize FirmValue? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs,” 17 Journal of Law, Economics, andOrganization 83-120.15. Ea sterbrook, Frank H., and Daniel R. Fischel. 1989. “The Corporate Contract,”89 Columbia Law Review 1416-1448.16. Gordon, Jeffrey. 1989. "The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law," 89 Columbia Law Review 1549-98.17. Kahan, Marcel, and Michael Klausner. 1997. “Standardization and Innovation inCorporate Contracting (or …The Economics of Boilerplate?),” 83 Virginia Law Review713-70.18. Klausner, Michael. 1995. “Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts,” 81 Virginia Law Review 757-852. 二、中文参考文献1. 谢怀栻著:《外国民商法精要》,法律出版社 2006 年版。

法律毕业论文参考文献(中英文献范例)

法律毕业论文参考文献(中英文献范例)

参考文献是每一篇毕业论文都需要用到的内容之一,特别是对于法律专业的论文来说,文章中的论点来源多来自于参考文献,本文将为大家分享60篇“法律毕业论文参考文献”,以供阅读参考。

论文参考文献范例一:[1]王利明.关于制定民法总则的几点思考[J].法学家, 2016 (5) :1-9.[2]王利明.民商合一体例下我国民法典总则的制定[J].法商研究, 2015 (4) :3-9.[3]张永强.论我国商法典单独制定欠缺的条件[J].法制博览, 2016 (15) :197.[4]董翠香, 魏振华.商事行为在民法总则中的契入与展开[J].烟台大学学报, 2017 (1) .[5]赵旭东, 石少侠, 李建伟, 梁上上, 等.《商法通则》大家谈[J].国家检察官学院学报, 2018 (3) :3-35.[6]刘凯湘.剪不断, 理还乱:民法典制定中民法与商法关系的再思考[J].环球法律评论, 2016 (6) :107-125.[7]王建文.论我国《民法典》立法背景下商行为的立法定位[J].南京大学学报, 2016 (1) :52-60.[8]叶林.商行为的性质[J].清华法学, 2008 (4) :40-54.[9]樊涛.我国商行为制度的评判与重构[J].河南师范大学学报 (哲学社会科学版) , 2008 (5) :114-117.[10]杨利华.电子支付对金融法的挑战及应对[J].兰州财经大学学报, 2018 (5) :93-101.[11]蒋大兴.商法通则/《商法典》的可能空间? [J].比较法研究, 2018 (5) :44-70.[12]杜景林.《德国商法典》中的商人[J].德国研究, 2011 (1) :12-18.[13]吴日焕, 译.韩国商法[M].北京: 中国政法大学出版社, 1999:12-13.[14]王延川.商行为类型化及多元立法模式[J].当代法学, 2011 (4) :67-76.[15] 江平.关于制定民法典的几点意见[J].法律科学, 1998 (3) :23.[16]李建伟.民法总则设置商法规范的限度及其理论解释[J].中国法学, 2016 (4) :73-91.[17]马建兵.民法典背景下法律行为制度在商行为中的除外适用[J].甘肃社会科学, 2017 (2) :153-159.[18]徐银波.决议行为效力规则之构造[J].法学研究, 2015 (4) :164-183.[19]张辉.法律行为框架中的股东表决权制度探析[J].河南社会科学, 2006 (4) :65-68.[20]伊夫·居荣.法国商法 (第1卷) [M].罗结珍, 赵海峰, 译.北京:法律出版社, 2004.论文参考文献范例二:[1] Reinhard Bork, Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs, 4. Aufl.[M]. Tübingen 2016, Rn. 806.[2]杨代雄.恶意串通行为的立法取舍[J].比较法研究, 2014 (4) .[3]王军.法律规避行为及其裁判方法[J].中外法学, 2015 (3) .[4]梅夏英, 邹启钊.法律规避行为:以合法形式掩盖非法目的[J].中国社会科学院研究生院学报, 2013 (4) .[5]朱广新.法律行为无效事由的立法完善[J].政法论丛, 2016 (3) .[6]史尚宽.民法总论[M].北京:中国政法大学出版社, 2000.[7]王泽鉴.民法总论[M].北京:北京大学出版社, 2009.[8] 施启扬.民法总论:第8版[M].北京:中国法制出版社, 2010.[9] Dieter Medicus, Allgemeiner Teil des BGB[M]. 9. Aufl., Heidelberg 2006, Rn. 660.[10] Reinhard Bork, Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs[M].2. Aufl., Tübingen 2006, Rn.1121.[11] Karl Larenz/Manfred Wolf, Allgemeiner Teil des BürgerlichenRechts[M]. 9. Aufl., München 2004, S. 731.[12] Hans Brox/Wolf-Dietrich Walker, Allgemeiner Teil desBGB[M]. 36. Aufl., M ünchen 2012, Rn. 328.[13] Helmut K hler, BGB Allgemeiner Teil[M]. 32. Aufl., München 2008, S. 181-182.[14] Werner Flume, Das Rechtsgesch ft[M]. 4. Aufl., Berlin1992, S. 350.[15] Hans Brox/Wolf-Dietrich Walker, Allgemeiner Teil desBGB[M]. 42. Aufl., M ünchen 2018, §14, Rn. 139.[16][德]拉伦茨.法律行为解释之方法———兼论意思表示理论[M].范雪飞, 吴训祥, 译.北京:法律出版社, 2018.[17]朱广新.论“以合法形式掩盖非法目的”的法律行为[J].比较法研究, 2016 (4) .[18][德]拉伦茨.法学方法论[M].北京:商务印书馆, 2004.[19] Georg Bitter, BGB Allgemeiner Teil[M]. München 2011, §6, Rn. 34.[20] 法制网.当庭裁决代持保险公司股权协议无效[EB/OL].[2018-04-24].论文参考文献范例三:[1]陈小君.我国农民集体成员权的立法抉择[J].清华法学, 2017 (2) :46.[2]叶林.私法权利的转型——一个团体法视角的观察[J].法学家, 2010 (4) :138.[3] 胡长清.中国民法总论[M].北京:中国政法大学出版社, 1997.132.[4]屈茂辉.中国民法[M].北京:法律出版社, 2009.54.[5] (日) 新津和典.19世紀ドイツにおける社員権論の生成と展開——社員権論の歴史性と現代的意義[J].法と政治》 (59巻1号) .2008 (4) :185.[6]史尚宽.民法总论[M].北京:中国政法大学出版社, 2000.25.[7]侯德斌.农民集体成员权利研究[D].长春:吉林大学, 2011:35.[8] (德) 卡尔·拉伦茨.德国民法通论 (上册) [M].北京:法律出版社, 2003.222.[9] (古希腊) 亚里士多德.政治学[M].北京:商务印书馆, 1965.3.[10] (法) 托克维尔.论美国的民主 (上) [M].商务印书馆, 1988.635.[11] (德) 哈贝马斯.在事实与规范之间:关于法律和民主法治国的商谈理论[M].北京:生活·读书·新知三联书店, 2003.444-454.[12] 梅仲协.民法要义.[M].北京:1998.35.[13]章光园.论社员权的概念、性质与立法[J].宁德师专学报.2005 (4) :7-11[14]梁慧星.民法总论[M].北京:法律出版社, 2011.72.[15]王泽鉴.民法总则[M].北京:中国政法大学出版社, 2001.187-188.[16]李建伟.股东知情权诉讼研究[J].中国法学, 2013 (2) :83-103.[17]王利明.违约责任论[M].北京:中国政法大学出版社, 2000.311.[18]于喆.公证的法律效力的探讨[J].法制博览, 2016 (25) .[19] 李宪.公证遗嘱的法律效力探讨[J].职工法律天地, 2017 (02) .[20] 黄玉凤.公证遗嘱的法律效力探讨[J].大陆桥视野, 2017 (06) .点击查看>>法律毕业论文>>更多内容。

关于检察的外文文献

关于检察的外文文献

以下是关于检察的外文文献的一些例子:
1. "Prosecution and Adjudication in China: The In-Between Realm" by Susan Trevaskes -这篇文章探讨了中国检察机关在中国司法体系中的地位和作用,并分析了其与法院和警察的关系。

2. "Prosecutorial Discretion: A Comparative Analysis" by Andrew Ashworth and Julian V. Roberts -这篇文章比较了不同国家的检察机关在刑事诉讼中的裁量权,并讨论了检察机关如何决定是否提起公诉以及对案件如何进行处理。

3. "Prosecuting International Crimes: Perspectives on the International Criminal Court" edited by Roy S. Lee -这本书收集了关于国际刑事法庭(International Criminal Court)及其对国际刑事司法的影响的文章,其中包括检察机关在国际刑事案件中的角色和责任。

这些文献只是示例,并且可能需要通过访问学术数据库或图书馆来获取完整的文献内容。

如果您需要更多特定主题或领域的文献,建议您使用学术搜索引擎(如Google 学术、JSTOR、ScienceDirect等)或向您所在的大学图书馆寻求帮助,以找到符合您需求的外文文献。

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U.S. Circuit Court Judges: Profile of Professional Experiences Prior to AppointmentBarry J. McMillionAnalyst on the Federal JudiciaryMay 9, 2014Congressional Research Service7-5700R43538SummaryThis report provides an analysis of the professional qualifications and experiences of U.S. circuit court judges who are currently serving on the federal bench. Interest in the professional qualifications of those nominated to the federal judiciary has been demonstrated by Congress and others. Congressional interest in the professional experiences of those nominated by a President to the federal courts reflects, in part, the evaluative role of Congress in examining the qualifications of those who are nominated to life-tenure positions. Other organizations, such as the American Bar Association (ABA), also have an ongoing interest in the professional qualifications of those appointed to the federal judiciary. Additionally, scholars have demonstrated an interest in this topic by examining whether a relationship exists between the professional or career experiences of judges and judicial decision making.The analysis in this report focuses on the professional experiences of 163 active U.S. circuit court judges who were serving as of February 1, 2014. Active judges are those who have not taken senior status, retired, or resigned. Consequently, the statistics provided do not necessarily reflect all circuit court judges who are sitting on the bench (which include judges who have assumed senior status).Some of this report’s findings include the following:• A majority, 54.6%, of active circuit court judges had prior judicial experience at some point before being appointed as circuit court judges (and 45.4% had nosuch experience).•Of the judges with prior judicial experience, 22.7% served solely as another type of federal judge (e.g., a U.S. district court judge), while 20.9% servedsolely as a state judge and another 11.0% had both prior federal and statejudicial experience.• A majority, 84.7%, of active circuit court judges had at least some priorexperience as an attorney in private practice at some point prior to theirappointment as a circuit judge.•Of active circuit court judges with private practice experience, a plurality(26.4%) had 15 or more years of experience as an attorney in privatepractice.•While 45.4% of active circuit judges do not have prior judicial experience, a much smaller percentage, 15.3%, have no prior experience in private practice.•Circuit court judges without either prior judicial experience or experience as an attorney in private practice had other professional experiences such as working asan attorney for the federal government or as a law professor.•Immediately prior to their appointment to the appellate bench, most circuit court judges were either serving as another type of judge or had been engaged inprivate practice for at least 10 years.•Approximately half, 50.3%, of all active circuit judges were serving asanother type of judge immediately prior to their appointment (i.e., serving asa district court judge, another type of federal judge such as a bankruptcyjudge, or a state judge).•Approximately one quarter, 25.8%, of active circuit court judges were working as attorneys in private practice immediately prior to being appointed as a circuitjudge (with 22.1% having worked in private practice for 10 years or more).ContentsIntroduction (1)Data Caveats (4)Most Common Types of Professional Experiences (4)Professional Position Immediately Prior to Appointment (6)Conclusion (8)FiguresFigure 1. Percentage of Active U.S. Circuit Court Judges with Judicial Experience andPrivate Practice Experience (5)Figure 2. Percentage of Active U.S. Circuit Court Judges by Type of ProfessionalPosition Immediately Prior to Appointment (7)ContactsAuthor Contact Information (8)Acknowledgments (9)IntroductionThis report provides an analytic overview of the professional experiences and qualifications of those individuals who are currently serving as active U.S. circuit court judges.1 Ongoing congressional interest in the professional experiences of judicial nominees reflects, in part, the evaluative role of Congress in examining the qualifications of those who are nominated by the President to life-tenure positions.Senators, when giving floor speeches supporting circuit court nominations, routinely highlight certain professional experiences or qualifications often considered important to serving as a federal judge. Examples of such statements include the following:A Senator noting that a nominee to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had 22 years of priorjudicial experience “at the State courts and the Federal courts.” The Senator stated that thenominee “has not only served as a distinguished judge, but also he came to the courts as anexperienced prosecutor. He was with the Civil Rights Division at the Department of Justiceand with the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Maryland.”2A Senator noting that a nominee to the First Circuit had joined a prestigious law firm in theSenator’s home state, “where over the subsequent 32 years [he] specialized in complex civillitigation at both the trial and appellate levels.” The Senator also stated that the nominee hadserved as chairman of the state’s Professional Ethics Commission and as president of thestate’s bar association, and that “his 30-plus years of real-world litigation experience wouldbring a valuable perspective to the court.”3A Senator emphasizing that a nominee to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals would “bringalmost 12 years of judicial experience” to the bench as a result of her service on theWisconsin Supreme Court and as a trial judge on the Milwaukee County Circuit Court. TheSenator also noted that prior to the nominee’s service as a state judge, the nominee had“practiced commercial litigation for 7 years at one of Wisconsin’s most prestigious lawfirms.”4The professional experiences of judicial nominees are also of interest to interest groups, particularly professional organizations such as the American Bar Association (ABA).5 Judicial1 The analysis in this section provides statistics for active U.S. circuit court judges only (i.e., the professional experiences and qualifications of senior circuit court judges are not included in the analysis). Additionally, as of this writing, such statistics have not been calculated by CRS for active or senior U.S. district court judges.2 Sen. Barbara Mikulski, “Executive Session,” Remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, November 9, 2009,p.S11274.3 Sen. Susan Collins, “Executive Session,” Remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, February, 13, 2013, pp.S672-673.4 Sen. Orrin Hatch, “Nomination of Diane S. Sykes to be United States Circuit Judge for the Seventh Circuit,” Remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, June 24, 2004, p. S7360.5 According to the ABA, “in 1953, at the request of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the ABA committee started to evaluate the professional qualifications of potential nominees to assist him in resisting growing pressure to repay political debts by appointing persons who might not have the professional qualifications to exercise the important responsibilities” of serving as a federal judge. Note that in 2001, “the Bush White House departed from long-standing practices and did not submit names of prospective nominees to [be evaluated by] the Standing Committee in advance of their nomination.” Senators serving on the Judiciary Committee, however, “asked the Standing Committee to continue to provide the Judiciary Committee with its evaluations of judicial nominees.” American Bar Association, “Frequently (continued...)nominees are evaluated by the ABA’s Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary.6 The committee’s evaluation criteria focus “strictly on professional qualifications: integrity, professional competence and judicial temperament.”7The committee “believes that a prospective nominee to the federal bench ordinarilyshould have at least twelve years’ experience in the practice of law” and that “substantial courtroom and trial experience as a lawyer or trial judge is important.”8 The committeealso notes, however, that “distinguished accomplishments in the field of law orexperience that is similar to in-court trial work ... may compensate for a prospective nominee’s lack of substantial courtroom experience.”9 For prospective circuit court nominees, the committee states that “because an appellate judge deals primarily with thereview of briefs and the records of lower courts, the committee places somewhat less emphasis on the importance of trial experience as a qualification for the appellatecourts.”10Additionally, the professional or career experiences of judges prior to the start of theirjudicial service has also been of interest to scholars examining whether particular professional experiences might influence or explain variation in aspects of judicialdecision making (e.g., whether a judge votes in a consistent ideological direction, thesources relied upon by a judge in reaching his or her decisions, whether a judge decidesto publish his or her opinions, etc.).11 For example, one study found that prior judicial(...continued)Asked Questions About the ABA Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary,” March 2009, available at/content/dam/aba/migrated/scfedjud/fjcfaq.authcheckdam.pdf. The process of submitting the names of prospective nominees to the Standing Committee for evaluation prior to individuals being nominated has resumed during the Obama presidency.6 In evaluating prospective nominees, the committee gives one of three possible ratings: “well qualified,” “qualified,” and “not qualified.” According to past statistics provided by the ABA, as of March 2009, all but 33 of over 2,000 individuals who were formally nominated by Presidents since 1960 were rated as “qualified” or “well qualified.” Ibid. For critical perspectives on the ABA’s ratings, see Maya Sen, “How Judicial Qualification Ratings May Disadvantage Minority and Female Candidates,” Journal of Law and Courts, vol. 2 (2014), pp. 33, 34 (finding that black and female U.S. district court nominees are more likely to be awarded lower qualification ratings by the ABA, even after matching on education, professional experience, years of legal experience, age, and ideology) (hereafter Sen, “How Judicial Qualification Ratings May Disadvantage”); Susan N. Smelcer et al., “Evaluating the ABA Ratings of Federal Judicial Nominees,” Political Research Quarterly, vol. 65 (2012), pp. 827, 836 (finding that, for U.S. circuit court nominees, “all else being equal, a Democratic nominee is more likely to be rated Well Qualified than a similarly qualified Republican nominee”); Susan Brodie Haire, “Rating the Ratings of the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary,” Justice System Journal, vol. 22 (2001), pp. 1, 15 (finding that, for U.S. circuit court nominees, “caucasian males were more likely to receive a higher rating when compared to minorities or females, even after controlling for length of legal and judicial experiences. Overall, this analysis suggests an inherent bias in the rating process that favors traditional, establishment candidates” to the federal courts).7 American Bar Association, Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary, “What It Is and How It Works,” 2009, p. 1, available at /content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/federal_judiciary/federal_judiciary09.authcheckdam.pdf.8 Ibid., p. 3.9 Ibid.10 Ibid. Note that the committee also states that it “believes that prospective appellate court nominees should possess an especially high degree of legal scholarship, academic talent, analytical and writing abilities, and overall excellence. The ability to write clearly and persuasively, to harmonize a body of law, and to give meaningful guidance to the trial courts and the bar for future cases are particularly important skills for prospective nominees to” circuit court judgeships.11 See, for example, Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, “Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals,” Vanderbilt Law Review, vol. 54 (2001), pp. 71, 84-85 (finding that judges with prior (continued...)experience for U.S. circuit court judges did not influence variation in judicial decisionmaking in terms of the extent a judge voted in a consistent ideological fashion (such prior experience might have been hypothesized to be a source of consistency in judicialvoting).12 Another study found that district court judges whose primary work beforebecoming a judge involved non-private practice work experience (e.g., working as a government attorney or law professor) were less likely to rely on regulations and otherInternal Revenue Service pronouncements in interpreting the federal tax code than judges whose work prior to becoming a judge was predominately as an attorney in privatepractice.13Other scholars suggest that the lack of career diversity among federal judges might be problematic, in terms of the lack of diversity diminishing the institutional performance ofthe courts.14 Specifically, they argue that, given appropriate procedural conditions, “thegreater diversity of participation by people of different [professional] backgrounds and experiences, the greater the range of ideas and information contributed to the institutional process.”15 Consequently, in the context of judicial decision making, “judges with variedcareer experiences bring distinct perspectives to the bench—perspectives that ultimatelylead them to make distinct judicial choices—[and] merging jurists with diverse careerpaths on a particular court ought ... [to] lead to more effective decision making” by thatcourt.16In light of ongoing interest in the professional qualifications of those nominated to circuit court judgeships, this report seeks to inform Congress by providing statistics related to the professional(...continued)experience representing management were significantly less likely to publish their opinions, perhaps because such judges “have more experience implementing the NLRA [National Labor Relations Act] than judges lacking a management background”); Gregory C. Sisk et al., “Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning,” New York University Law Review, vol. 73 (1998), pp. 1377, 1420-21 (finding that judges with criminal defense experience are more likely to invalidate federal sentencing guidelines than those without such experience); Orley Ashenfelter et al., “Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes,” Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 24 (1995), p. 257 (finding no relationship between whether U.S. district court judges had prior judicial experience and judicial outcomes, e.g., whether judges rule for or against a plaintiff); Sheldon Goldman, “Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited,” American Political Science Review, vol. 69 (1975), pp. 491, 499-500 (generally finding no relationship between whether a U.S. circuit court judge had judicial experience on another court prior to appointment on the appeals court or public prosecutorial experience and his or her voting behavior on various categories of cases; but finding a statistically significant result suggesting that judges without previous judicial experience tended to dissent at a higher rate than those with such experience); S. Sidney Ulmer, “Social Background as an Indicator to the Votes of Supreme Court Justices in Criminal Cases: 1947-1956 Terms,” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 17 (1973), pp. 622, 623-24 (finding that justices with federal administrative experience voted more conservatively than justices without such experience); Kenneth N. Vines, “Federal District Judges and Race Relations Cases in the South,” Journal of Politics, vol. 26 (1964), p. 338 (finding evidence that judges who held state political office were more negatively disposed toward race relations cases than judges who did not hold such positions).12 Erin B. Kaheny et al., “Change over Tenure: Voting, Variance, and Decision Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals,” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 52 (2008), pp. 490, 493, 497.13 Daniel M. Schneider, “Empirical Research on Judicial Reasoning: Statutory Interpretation in Federal Tax Cases,” New Mexico Law Review, vol. 31 (2001), pp. 325, 347.14 Lee Epstein et al., “The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its Consequences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court,” California Law Review, vol. 91 (2003), p. 903.15 Ibid., p. 944.16 Ibid., p. 956.qualifications or experiences of those currently serving on the bench as U.S. circuit court judges.17Specifically, this report provides statistics and analysis related to (1) the percentage of active circuit court judges with judicial experience, as well as the type of judicial experience; (2) the percentage of active circuit court judges with private practice experience, as well as the length of time of such experience; and (3) the percentage of active circuit court judges by professional experience immediately prior to their appointment to a circuit court judgeship.Data CaveatsNote that the statistics provided in this report are based upon the professional experiences of individuals serving, as of February 1, 2014, as active U.S. circuit court judges. Consequently, the statistics do not include circuit court judges who, prior to February 1, 2014, had assumed senior status, retired, or resigned.18The total number of circuit court judges included in the analysis is 163.19 Consequently, this is the denominator used to calculate most of the statistics included in the report. The analysis is based on information provided by the Biographical Directory of Federal Judges.20 This report will be updated annually by CRS at the beginning of each calendar year.Most Common Types of Professional Experiences Figure 1 provides statistics related to the two most common types of professional experiences of U.S. circuit court judges who are currently serving on the bench—prior judicial experience and experience working as an attorney in private practice.21 The percentages reported for the two types of experiences are not mutually exclusive, meaning that there is some overlap between the two categories. For example, 47.9% of all active circuit court judges have both prior judicial17 As of this writing, CRS has not compiled and analyzed similar data for active district court judges who are currently serving on the bench.18 Senior status judges are those judges who have retired from full-time service but continue, on a part-time basis, to hear cases or perform other duties related to judicial administration. Senior status eligibility is based upon a judge’s age as well as his or her length of service as an Article III judge. Specifically, beginning at age 65, a judge may retire from office or take senior status after performing 15 years of active service as an Article III judge. A sliding scale of increasing age and decreasing service results in eligibility for retirement compensation at age 70 with a minimum 10 years of service.19 As of February 1, 2014, there were 16 vacant U.S. circuit court judgeships. These vacancies are not included in the statistics provided in the report.20 Consequently, the data analyzed are limited to information provided by the Directory. The Directory is maintained by the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts and is available at /JudgesAndJudgeships/ BiographicalDirectoryOfJudges.aspx.21 Some organizations have called for broadening the professional diversity of judges serving on the federal bench. The Alliance for Justice, for example, has recently called upon the President to nominate individuals with experience working as attorneys for public interest organizations. Alliance for Justice, “Broadening the Bench: Professional Diversity and Judicial Nominations,” February 6, 2014, available at /wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ prof-diversity-report-3.2.2014-FINAL-Updated-with-Noms-Through-2.6.14.pdf.experience as well as experience as an attorney in private practice (while 9.0% have neither prior judicial nor private practice experience).22Altogether, 54.6% of U.S. circuit court judges who are currently serving had prior experience as another type of judge before their appointment to a circuit court (and 45.4% had no such experience). Of the judges with prior judicial experience, 22.7% served solely as another type of federal judge (e.g., a U.S. district court judge), while 20.9% served solely as a state judge and another 11.0% had both prior federal and state judicial experience. Of the 74 circuit judges with no prior judicial experience, 81.8% had worked as attorneys in private practice, including 39.2% who worked in private practice for 15 or more years (and another 14.9% who worked in private practice for 10 to 14 years).Although over half of active circuit court judges have prior judicial experience (54.6%), a greater percentage have at least some prior experience as attorneys in private practice (84.7%).23 Similarly, while 45.6% of active circuit judges do not have prior judicial experience, a much smaller percentage, 15.3%, have no prior experience in private practice.Figure 1. Percentage of Active U.S. Circuit Court Judges with Judicial Experience andPrivate Practice Experience(as of February 1, 2014)Source: CRS analysis of data provided by the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts.Note: This figure shows, as of February 1, 2014, the percentage of active U.S. circuit court judges with judicial experience and private practice experience.22 The lack of a nominee’s experience in a traditional legal occupation (such as an attorney in private practice) has, in some cases, led some Senators to oppose the nominee’s nomination. For example, J. Harvie Wilkinson III was nominated by President Reagan to the Fourth Circuit on January 30, 1984. At the time, Senator Edward M. Kennedy stated, during the debate to invoke cloture on the nomination, that the nominee was “the least qualified nominee ever submitted for an appellate court vacancy.” Senators’ opposition to the nomination were based, in part, on the nominee’s relatively young age (he was 39) and the fact that he had never practiced law. When nominated, Judge Wilkinson was a law professor at the University of Virginia and he had previously worked for a year as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General during the Reagan presidency. Linda Greenhouse, “Reagan Names 6 To Federal Appeals Courts,” New York Times, August 2, 1984, available at /1984/08/02/us/reagan-names-6-to-federal-appeals-courts.html.23 At least one study has found that judicial nominees receiving the highest ABA ratings include those with previous judicial experience and/or nominees with more years of legal practice experience. Sen, “How Judicial Qualification Ratings May Disadvantage,” p. 42.Figure 1 also shows that of active circuit court judges with private practice experience, a plurality (26.4%) had 15 or more years of experience as attorneys in private practice. Another 21.5% had less than 5 years of experience, while 17.2% had 5 to 9 years of experience and 19.6% had 10 to 14 years of experience. Altogether, 46.0% of active circuit court judges had 10 or more years of experience as attorneys in private practice (while 54.0% had less than 10 years of experience or no private practice experience).24Professional Position Immediately Prior to AppointmentFigure 2 reports the percentage of active U.S. circuit court judges who had a particular type of position or occupation immediately prior to their appointment as a circuit court judge.25 So, for example, a plurality of active circuit court judges, 27.0%, were U.S. district court judges immediately prior to being appointed as circuit court judges. Altogether, half (50.3%) of all active circuit court judges were serving as another type of judge (either a U.S. district court judge, another type of federal judge, or a state judge).26The percentage of circuit court judges serving as another type of judge immediately prior to appointment might be lower than what has been the case, historically, for circuit court judges (at least during the first half of the 20th century). For example, of circuit court judges appointed during the seven presidencies from Theodore Roosevelt to Franklin Roosevelt, 63.7% were serving as another type of judge at the time of appointment or promotion to the U.S. courts of appeals.27 Additionally, 55.6% and 57.5% of Eisenhower and Johnson circuit court appointees, respectively, were serving as judges prior to their appointment to a circuit court.28 In general, service as a U.S. district court judge was the most common type of judicial experience of those serving as judges immediately prior to their appointment as a circuit court judge. As noted by one 24 Overall, 89 of 163 circuit court judges included in the analysis had prior judicial experience (37 of the 89 had only federal experience, 34 only state experience, and 18 had served as a judge for both federal and state courts). Of the 163 judges, 74 had no prior judicial experience. For private practice experience, 138 of 163 judges had some experience as an attorney in private practice (while 25 had none). Of those with private practice experience, 43 had 15 or more years of experience, 32 had 10 to 14 years of experience, 28 had 5 to 9 years of experience, and 35 had less than 5 years of experience.25 Of the 163 active U.S. circuit court judges included in the analysis, 44 had been a U.S. district court judge immediately prior to their appointment, 8 had been another type of federal judge, 30 had been a state judge, 12 had been working as an attorney at the Department of Justice or in a U.S. Attorney’s Office, 6 had been working in private practice for less than 10 years, 36 had been working in private practice for more than 10 years, 11 had been working asa law professor, and 16 had other types of positions.26 Other types of federal judges included in the analysis were U.S. bankruptcy judges and U.S. magistrate judges.27 Rayman L. Solomon, “The Politics of Appointment and the Federal Courts’ Role in Regulating America: U.S. Courts of Appeals Judgeships from T.R. to F.D.R.,” American Bar Foundation Research Journal, vol. 9 (1984), pp. 285, 304. As indicated by the article, the percentage of circuit court appointees who were another type of judge at the time of being appointed or promoted to a circuit court judgeship, by President in chronological order, were 78.6% (T. Roosevelt), 75.0% (Taft), 52.6% (Wilson), 83.3% (Harding), 75.0% (Coolidge), 85.7% (Hoover), and 47.7% (F.D.R.).28 In contrast, 47.6% of President Kennedy’s circuit court appointees were judges immediately prior to their appointment or promotion to U.S. circuit courts of appeals. Sheldon Goldman, “Characteristics of Eisenhower and Kennedy Appointees to the Lower Federal Courts,” Western Political Quarterly, vol. 18 (1965), pp. 755, 758. See also Sheldon Goldman, “Johnson and Nixon Appointees to Lower Federal Courts: Some Socio-Political Perspectives,” Journal of Politics, vol. 34 (1972), pp. 934, 936.scholar, the “federal district court bench is a training camp for the federal courts of appeals bench.A president faced with a vacancy on a court of appeals looks, though not exclusively, to sitting district court judges.”29Of circuit court judges currently serving on the bench, approximately one-quarter (25.8%) were working as attorneys in private practice prior to being appointed as a circuit court judge, with 22.1% having worked in private practice for 10 years or more. Additionally, of those working in private practice for 10 years or more, 80.6% had been working as an attorney in private practice for at least 15 years.As the percentages reported in Figure 2 indicate, a relatively large majority of active circuit court judges (72.4%) were, prior to being appointed as circuit judges, serving as either another type of judge or engaged in private practice for 10 or more years (and often for 15 or more years).Figure 2. Percentage of Active U.S. Circuit Court Judges by T ype of ProfessionalPosition Immediately Prior to Appointment(as of February 1, 2014)Source: CRS analysis of data provided by the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts.Note: This figure shows, as of February 1, 2014, the percentage of active U.S. circuit court judges by type of professional position immediately prior to their appointment as a circuit judge.Other types of positions held by active U.S. circuit court judges prior to being appointed include working as an attorney at the Department of Justice (DOJ) or a U.S. Attorneys’ Office (7.4%) or working as a law professor (6.7%). Another 9.8% of active circuit court judges held other types of positions immediately prior to being appointed.3029 Karen Swenson, “Promotion of District Court Judges to the U.S. Courts of Appeals: Explaining President Reagan’s Promotions of His Own Appointees,” Justice System Journal, vol. 27 (2006), p. 208. Swenson examined whether Presidents seek to reward district court judges who vote the “right” way. She concludes that, “at least for Reagan-appointed judges considered ... , the most convincing conclusion to draw from these data is that district judges’ records of conservative voting and support for the federal government, relative to their benchmates, are irrelevant to the president’s decision” to nominate the district court judge to a vacant circuit court judgeship. Instead, the “decision to elevate a district judge may be ... influenced by factors not measured [in the article], such as pressure from a key senator or two, close friends of the president, or high-ranking officials in the president’s party.” Ibid., p. 217.30 Examples of other types of positions that circuit court judges held immediately prior to their appointment include state attorney general; deputy general counsel of a research university; assistant to the President of the United States and staff secretary; deputy secretary and general counsel of a state agency; and deputy secretary of a U.S. federal executive department.。

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