奥斯特罗姆贡献

(seeYang and Wu, 2009a, p. 2412)
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（二）奥斯特罗姆以前的解决方案：国家和市场理论

Baidu Nhomakorabea
1. The Central Authority or Leviathan Model
(Hardin, 1978; Hobbes, 1991; Pigou, 1932; Olson 1971),
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2. 博弈理论分析

Fig. 1. The five games in Ostrom (1990). A) Game 1— the Hardin herder game. B) Game 2—the central authority game with complete information. C) Game 3— the central authority game with incomplete information. D) Game 4—an example of the central authority game with incomplete information. E) Game 5—self-financed contract-enforcement game. While all these game are illustrated by Ostrom using extensive forms, we recast them as normal forms. （Yang and Wu, 2009, p. 2414）


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2. 英文领域其他相关描述
(1) State of nature (Hobbes, 1991);


(2) The tragedy of the commons (Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968);
(3) The tragedy of public land (Lüshi Chunjiu, 2000; Shijing, 2003; Yang, 2007b);
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二、埃莉诺· 奥斯特鲁姆的最重要贡献：挑战国家和市 场理论的自主治理(self-governance)理论
Ostrom, E. (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge University Press, 298 p. Ostrom, E. et al. (1999) Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges, Science 284: 278–282. 诺贝尔奖委员会的评价（Nobel-Ostrom）


(4) The prisoner‘s dilemma (Dawes, 1973, 1975; Pareto, 1935; Tucker, 1983);
(5) The free-rider problem (Hume, 1978; Pasour, 1981); (6) Externalities (spill-over effects); (7) Underprovided public goods (Samuelson, 1954, 1955).
“Now let's assume that the central government has complete information on the carrying capacity of the meadow (L) but incomplete information on the particular actions of the herders, that the probability of the central agency punishing defections is y, and that the probability of the central agency falsely punishing cooperative actions is x (see Fig. 1, Game 3). Several errors made by the central agency include “setting the carrying capacity or the fine too high or too low,” “sanctioning herders who cooperate,” or “not sanctioning defectors” (Ostrom, 1990, p. 10). If x=0 and y=1, Game 3 becomes Game 2. If the central agency does not have complete information about the herders' actions, say x=0.3, y=0.7, Game 3 becomes Game 4 (see Fig. 1, Game 4), which makes the herders face a prisoner's dilemma game again. Furthermore, the equilibrium outcome (−1.4, 1.4) for Game 4 is even lower than (1, 1) in Game 1. The method proposed by Ostrom (1990) is one of self-governance. Under the players' self-governance, the players can negotiate various strategies for sharing the meadowand the costs of implementing the agreement, even though a binding contract is still needed to be enforced by an external actor. When both Player 1 and Player 2 agree upon and conform to a contract, the solution to the fifth gamebecomes (10−e/2,10−e/2) (here e is the cost of implementing an agreement). Otherwise, they repeat Game 1(see Fig. 1, Game 5).” (Yang and Wu, 2009a, p. 2413)
奥斯特罗夫妇及其主要贡献
杨立华 北京航空航天大学公共管理学院
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主要内容
一、埃莉诺· 奥斯特罗（Elinor Ostrom）和文森特· 奥斯特罗姆（Vincent Ostrom）生平 二、埃莉诺· 奥斯特鲁姆的最重要贡献：挑战国家和市场理论的自主治理 (self-governance)理论 三、奥斯特鲁姆夫妇的其他贡献 四、 奥斯特鲁姆的语言体系 五、 奥斯特鲁姆夫妇的两个研究所 六、奥斯特鲁姆夫妇的影响 七、奥斯特鲁姆精神及其对我们的启示 八、参考文献
Collective action at the core of social science and policy. 集体行动及其困境问题，其核心是冲突竞争和集体合作问题。 最经典的OLSON M．The Logic of Collective Action：Public Goods and the Theory of Groups[M]．Cambridge：Harvard University Press， 1971(1965)． No one will cooperate because they fear others will free ride! Citizens are thus presumed to be trapped in a social dilemma “In general, the collective action dilemma is a setting in which individuals, as a group, share a common output but have choices for actions based on their own expectation for maximum short-term individual benefits. Then, the rational choice of an individual is to “free-ride” if other individuals in the group can share regardless of their contribution (Olson, 1971). That is, a collective action dilemma involves conflicts between individual rationality and optimality for a group (Schelling, 1978), and its core problem is how the participants in social dilemmas can avoid the temptation of suboptimal equilibria and move closer to optimal outcomes to gain a cooperators‟ dividend (Lichbach, 1996).” (see Yang and Wu, 2009a, p. 2412)

Other humans – public officials rather than the public– are supposed to impose optimal policies based on models that academics devise Tend to recommend panaceas
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第二部分的主要内容 （一）关注的问题背景及其发展理路
（二） 奥斯特罗姆以前的解决方案：国家和市场 理论 （三） 奥斯特鲁姆方法: 自治或自主治理
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（一）关注的问题背景及其发展理路

1. 集体行动及其困境（collective action dilemma or social dilemma）

2. The Privatization Model (Buchanan, 1965; Coase, 1960, 1974; Demsetz, 1970; Gordon, 1954; Savas, 2000; Smith, 1981),

(see, Yang and Wu, 2009a, p. 2412)
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（三） 奥斯特鲁姆方法: 自治或自主治理


1. 假定（Assumption）
(1) Theory of rational but helpless individuals not supported (2) We are now working with a behavioral theory of individual choice Boundedly rational, but learn through experience Use heuristics but update over time Learn norms and potentially value benefits to others (3) Trusting others is central to cooperation and affected by context (Ostrom, 2011)
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一、埃莉诺· 奥斯特罗（Elinor Ostrom）和文森 特· 奥斯特罗姆（Vincent Ostrom）生平
埃莉诺：1933年8月7日 文森特：1919年 9月25日 The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization published a special issue, "Polycentric Political Economy: A Festschrift for Elinor and Vincent Ostrom", as the proceedings of a 2003 conference held in their honor, at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. 个人简历（其他文件）