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内部审计外文文献翻译

内部审计外文文献翻译

外文文献及原稿原稿IntroductionInt ernal a ud it ef fe ctive n e s s, t h e ext e nt t o whic h an inte r nal a udit offic e me e ts i ts ra ison d'êt re, i s a r guably a result o f the i n t e rpla y a mong four fa c tors: in t erna l audi tq uali t y; management support; or gani z at i onal sett i ng; and attributes of the audi t or.An i nt ern al audit func t ion's capabil i ty to provi de us eful a udi t findi ngs and re commendations w oul d help ra isemanagement'sintere s ti n it s re c omm e ndation s.T he m a na gementsupportw i thresourcesandc om mi t me nt to i mplement t heinternal a udi t reco m me nd ationsi s essenti a l in attainingaudit e ffec t ive ne s s.A l s o,the o rganizati o nals et ting i n w hi c h i ntern a laudit ope rat e s,i.e.t he or ga nizatio na ls t at us ofth eof fi ce,i t si nt erna lor ganizatio n andthepoli c ie s andpr oc edure s applyi ng t o eachaudi t o r, sho ul d enable smooth audi t s t ha t l ea d to reaching us e f ul a udi tfindings.Furth e r,thecapab i li t y,at t itudesandl e velofcoopera t ionoftheaudi t or i mpacton t heeffec t ive ne ss ofaud i ts.T herefore, internal audit ef fe ct i veness s houl d be vie w e d as a dynamicprocessthat is c ontinuously s ha ped by t h e interac t ions among t he fo ur factors me ntionedabove.Thi s s t udy e xami n ed,u singcasestudyan a lysis,t heint e rnala udi ts e rvic eof ala rgepublicsectororganization.Thepaperisstructuredasfollows.Thenextsectionpresents a review of the related literature; introduces a model for analyzingauditeffectiveness; and provides the research question. The third section presentstheresearch methodology; fourth section provides empirical analysis based on acasestudy; and fifth section presents a summary of the findings. The paperthensummarizes the conclusions, noting limitations of the study and suggesting avenuesfor futureresearch. InternalauditeffectivenessThe Instituteof Internal Auditors (IIA, 1999a) defined internal auditing as:an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add valueandimprove an organization's operations. It helps an organization accomplish itsobjectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improvetheeffectiveness of risk management, control, and governanceprocesses.This definition signifies that internal audit has undergone a paradigmshift froman emphasis on accountability about the past to improving future outcomes tohelpauditors operate more effectively and efficiently (Nagy and Canker, 2002; Stern,1994;Goodwin, 2004). Since, the definition equally serves both the private and thepublicsectors (Goodwin, 2004), it is used in this study as a basis to analyze publicsectorinternal auditeffectiveness.Internal audit is effective if it meets the intended outcome it is supposed tobringabout.Sawyer(1995)states,“…internalauditor'sjobisnotdoneuntildefectsarecorrecte d and remain corrected.”Van Hansberger (2005) explains that internalauditeffectiveness in the public sector should be evaluated by the extent to whichitcontributes to the demonstration of effective and efficient service delivery, asthisdrives the demand for improved internal audit services. Based on the results ofaconsultative forum that focused on improving public sector internal audit [1],VanHansberger (2005) identified perceptionsandownership; organizationandgovernance framework; legislation; improved professionalism; conceptualframework;and also resources as factors influencing internal audit effectiveness.Effectiveinternal audit undertakes an independent evaluation of financial andoperatinginformation and of systems and procedures, to provide useful recommendationsfor improvements asnecessary.The effectiveness of internal audit greatly contributes to the effectiveness ofeachauditor in particular andthe organization at large (Dittenhofer, 2001).Dittenhofer(2001) has also observed that if internal audit quality is maintained, it will contributeto the appropriateness of procedures and operations of the auditor, and therebyinternal audit contributes to effectiveness of the auditor and the organization asawhole. Using agency theory, Dingdong (1997) explained the role that internalauditplays in an economy and points out that internal audit has an advantage over externalauditin obtaining information quickly and finding problems at an earlier stage; and Sparkman (1997), applying the theory of transaction cost economics, demonstratedhow internal audit recommendations are important to the management ofgovernmentorganizations.Priorliteraturerelatingtointernalauditeffectivenesshaseitherfocusedontheinternal audit's ability to plan, execute and objectively communicate usefulfindings(Dingdong, 1997 Sparkman, 1997;Dittenhofer, 2001); or taken a broader viewandincluded factors that transcend the boundary of a single organization (VanHansberger,2005). This paper attempts to introduce a new perspective for evaluation of internalaudit effectiveness by identifying factors within an organization that impact onauditeffectiveness. A model, which assumes that there is a common interest to achieveorganizational goals for auditor management, top management and internal audit,isused for analysis of this case study. Since, audit effectiveness fosters theachievementof a common goal; there would be a natural incentive in an organization to improveit.The model considers four potential factors –internal audit quality,managementsupport, organizational setting, and auditor attributes to explain audit effectiveness,and shows how the interaction of these factors improves audit effectiveness.Internal audit quality, which is determined by the internal audit department'scapability to provide useful findings and recommendations, is central toauditeffectiveness. Internal audit has to prove that it is of value to the organization and earna reputation in the organization (Sawyer, 1995). Internal audit has to evaluateitsperformance and continually improve its service .audit quality is a function ofthelevelofstaffexpertise,thescopeofservicesprovidedandtheextenttowhichaudits areprope rlyplanned,executedandcommunicated.Audit findings and recommendations would not serve much purposeunlessmanagement is committed to implement them. Adams (1994) used agency theorytoexplain that it is in the interest of management to maintain a strong internalauditdepartment. Implementation of audit recommendations is highly relevant toauditeffectiveness (Van Hansberger, 2005) and the management of an organization isviewed as the customer receiving internal audit services. As a result,management'scommitment to useaudit recommendations and its support in strengthening internalauditis vital to audit effectiveness (Sawyer,1995).Organizational setting refers to the organizational profile, internal organizationand budgetary status of the internal audit office; and also the organizationalpoliciesand procedures that guide operation of auditors. It provides the context inwhichinternal audit operates. Thus, organizational setting can exert influence on the levelofeffectiveness that internal audit could achieve. The auditor attributes relate tothecapability of the auditor to meet its intended objectives. Auditor attributeswithimplications on audit effectiveness include the auditors' proficiency to efficientlyandeffectively meet organizational sub-goals; their attitude towards internal audit; andthelevel of cooperation provided to the auditor .Since, the four factors discussed aboveare intricately linked, audit effectiveness is a dynamic process that results fromtheeffect of each factor and the interplay among all. audit quality andmanagementsupport strongly affects audit effectiveness. Better audit effectiveness, in turn, hasapositivebearingonthesetwofactors.Ifinternalaudit enhancesqualitytotheextent itelicits management's interest, management support would be a natural quid proquobecause the management would realize the contribution of internal audit totheachievement of organizational goals. This would positively reflecton auditqualityand enhance audit effectiveness. The management's commitment to implementauditrecommendations improves the operation of the auditor, as a result of whichtheauditor attributes would improve to the benefit of audit effectiveness.Further,management retains the authority to improve the organizational setting andinfluencethe auditor towards a positive effect on audit effectiveness, whichin turn,benefitsauditquality.ConcludingcommentsThis study investigated the internal audit service of a large public sectorhighereducational institution, to identify factors influencing internal audit effectiveness,using a model developed for the analysis. The model consisted of fourinterrelatedfactors: internal audit quality; management support; the organizational setting;andattributes of theauditors.The findings of the study reveal that the internal audit office of theorganizationstudied needs to enhance the technical proficiency of the internal audit staffandminimizestaff turnover so as to foster audit effectiveness. The organizational statusand internal organization of the internal audit office are fairly rated, butinternalaudit'slackofauthorityonbudgetsreducesitscontrolofresourceacquisitionandutil ization.The scope of internal audit services is limited to regular activities. Extendingthescopeofservicesbywideningtherangeofsystemsandactivitiesaudited,withappropr iateriskanalysis,wouldimprove auditeffectiveness. Management'scommitment in providing greater attention to internalaudit recommendations andstaffingtheofficewithwell-qualifiedemployeesdeservesattentioninthisstudy.Theinternalauditors,undertheimpressionthat theirreportsarenotsufficientlyutilizedbythe management, may not be encouraged to exert the maximum possible effort in their engagements. In addition, the lack of attention by management may send awrongsignal about the importance of internal audit services to the audited, which in turnadversely affects the auditedattributes.The study has shown that internal audit of the organization studiedneedsimprovement in the areas of audit planning, documentation of audit work,auditcommunications and follow-up of recommendations. Audit effectiveness couldbeenhanced by ensuring consistency in documenting audit work to enableimprovedreview of audit work; proper follow-up of the status of audit findingsandrecommendations; increased distribution of audit reports; and further improvementinthe quality ofreporting.The limitation of this study is readily apparent. As in all case studies,thegeneralisabilityof the findings and the conclusions drawn is limited, althoughthestudy does provide evidence of the problems internal auditors face in providinganeffective service to management. Further, research could be welcome tofullyunderstand the level of internal audit effectiveness in the Ethiopian public sectorvis-à-vis its private sector, with a view to highlighting differences, if any,andconclusively defining the variables affecting internal audit effectiveness inEthiopia.译文简介内部审计的有效性,在何种程度上满足了内部审计处其存在的理由,可以说是一个四因素之间的相互作用的结果:内部审计质量,管理支持,组织设臵,以及受审核方属性。

外文文献翻译内部审计在组织中的作用

外文文献翻译内部审计在组织中的作用

外文文献翻译原文+译文文献来源:Adams C. Role of internal audit in the organisations[J]. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 2017, 1(2): 78-99.原文Role of internal audit in the organizationsAdams CINTRODUCTIONWith the transformations experienced by the corporate world, virtually related to globalization, there has been increased competition between organisations which forced management to take decisions with greater confidence. This does not only mean to keep pace with the rate at which businesses are growing, but also to develop them in a more sustainable manner. Thus, to achieve these goals, it has been necessary to improve the management methods, tools and techniques enhanced by the internal auditing function.The Internal Audit Function (IAF) fits into this scenario because it is an important tool available to stakeholders, internal and externally, as it is construed as an ongoing function, in order to support management in monitoring and surveillance of the planned activities, in both productive and financial areas, evaluating and reporting improvements with respect to the weaknesses, aiming to add value to the organisation.In this context, this study was based on the answers to the followingquestion: what is the perception of management on the role that Internal Audit plays in management practices and decision-making within the organisations? The present study has its relevance in exploring the role IAF is playing to mitigate the dissatisfaction of the business community after accounting and financial scandals which involved auditing as a whole and as has been notoriously publicised. These Media also showed situations where there have been failures by auditing, causing discredit to the activity. Additionally, there is the lack of academic researches on the role that Internal Audit has in management practices and decision making in organisations.This research is aimed at provoking a reflection upon the contribution of Internal Audit Function in decision making in the organisations in order to bring greater credibility to this area of applied social sciences. We hope it inspires further researches on topics addressing Internal Audit Functions in the academic environment.The study focused on non-financial organisations in the State of S o Paulo, whose shares are traded at S o Paulo Stock Exchange, excluding telephone organisations, sanitation, electricity and gas, because these organisations provide services of basic needs to the population and have a different administrative focus.The delimitation of the research to the State of S o Paulo was due to the fact that it is the Brazilian state with the highest concentration oforganisations with shares traded at BM&FBOVESPA. This entity requires of the organisations in its portfolio a good organizational structure and high degree of disclosure, which somehow gave credibility to the data obtained.Concept and objectives of internal auditIt is barely impossible to conceptualise internal audit considering the diversity of its application in business entities. Even so, one would cite the concept provided by the Brazilian Institute of Internal Auditors (AUDIBRA, 1991, p. 33). Internal Audit is an activity of independent evaluation and management assistance, directed to the examination and evaluation of the adequacy, efficiency and effectiveness of the internal control system, as well as of the quality of performance of the operational areas in relation to their tasks and plans, goals, objectives, and policies defined for them.Noteworthy, that effectiveness means adequate exploration of the resources to achieve the goals while efficiency means that required indexes were achieved using the minimum and necessary efforts. Thus, the internal auditor’s opinion should state whether the entity is being effective and efficient in achieving its goals.According to Vasconcelos and Pereira (2004, p. 69-70), the scope of binomial efficiency and effectiveness is a functional view that the organisation’s stakeholders have of the Internal Audit work [...] TheInternal Auditor, in our view, should monitor and seek to understand these dynamics and their effects on the economic and financial status. Therefore, we argue that this professional is the best suited to signal the potential risks of going concern of organisations considering operational anomalies.That is, it would be up to him, based on analysis to provide a straight forward assistance in the monitoring of the financial situation. Our most important argument rests on the following premise: the internal auditor may propose directives and valuable information based on their historical data and rapport with the organisations’ management.Quoting CFC (2005) NBC TI 01, the Brazilian Federal Council of Accountants, characterizes the functions of Internal Audit: [...] as structured with technical, objective, systematic and disciplined procedures, that aims to add value to the results of the organisation, providing data for the improvement of processes, management and internal controls through the recommendation of solutions for nonconformities identified in the reports.In this same way, CFC (2011) emphasizes the managerial support that internal audit has to provide so that business objectives are attained in a more adequate manner. This explicitly defines Internal Audit as an advisory body to the management of the entities, aiming to add value by providing data for improvement of management processes.According to Mendes (1996, p. 9), the objective of the Internal Audit is, in particular, “[...] forming opinion about the criteria, proced ures, methods and quantification, cost rationalization and providing information so that the top management decisions are based on concrete information.” The decisions to be made by management always depend on good information, that is, accurate and timely.The Internal Audit is an instrument of administrative control and systematic verification of the effectiveness and efficiency of occupational activities in the company; it evaluates the entity’s internal controls and its administrative and occupational processes, analyzing the failures and the risk involved and gives broad based recommendations for remediation of anomalies. The Internal Audit work aims to protect the company’s assets against frauds or intentional misstatements. Classified by Moyes et al. (2013) as i) misstatements resulting from fraudulent financial reporting and ii) misstatement resulting from misappropriation of assets. Characteristics of the internal audit function (IAF)The role of Internal Audit is presented through various concepts expressed by scholars with different characteristics of its functions and activities that converge to its main objective, which is to add value to organizations through assessments and advisory support to management.Since WorldCom whistle-blowing and other financial scandals that besieged the stock markets in the last decade, internal audit has assumed amore important role. The NYSE now requires all companies listed there to maintain internal audit functions to provide management and the audit committee w ith ongoing assessment of the company’s risk management process and of internal control, (Harrington, 2004 p. 65).Thus, Internal Audit should be knowledgeable, insightful, have the method, and the intelligence to check the best for the company, aiming to add value with the least resources. Internal Audit should be “[...] a highly qualified adviser, which allows the management to have a systematic view of their organisation. It must be a unit engaged in achievement of end results (Mendes 1996., p. 9).Authors such as Carvalho and Pinho (2004. p. 24), Vasconcelos and Pereira (2004, p. 68), who understand that the Internal Audit has a professional duty to issue independent opinions, justify the assumptions of technical skills and personal attributes required of the auditor, as well as the high level of demand from users and the need to add value to users of their services.The IAF in the organisation is to review, evaluate and produce report containing information on all activities of the organisation, to assist the management in their decision making process. Internal Audit performs a task that shareholders would like to perform in order to be always aware of how their investments are managed.Apart from overseeing the activities, based on the broad knowledgeof the business, IAF could be used to substitute certain strategic functions most importantly when a need for rotation arises. Companies that have an IAF specifically hire internal auditors with the purpose of rotating them into management positions or cycle current employees into the IAF for a short stint before promoting them into management positions (Messier et al., 2011, p. 2131).Vasconcelos and Pereira (2004, p. 70) emphatically point out that “[...] the exercise of Internal Audit is not a commodity. It is not a consumable service much less a mere cog. It is a potential value aggregator. “This characterization clearly demonstrates how valuable the internal function is when fully exerting its activities.Internal audit function adding valueIt is of paramount importance to characterize what adding value is, so that we can analyze the contribution of Internal Audit to the management of the entities. The interpretation of value, in this study, is not only limited to the financial aspects; it is more comprehensive, as it includes human and physical aspects. So, to add value in the internal audit concept is to harness all available resources, within and outside the company, with an aim of assuring gains, which may be financial, material and human, and will assist management in fulfilling their goals.Internal Audit Function may add value in various accounting processes where transactions are originated in an organisation. Forinstance, the evaluation of capital investments and their association with the capital budget when adequately checked to guarantee that such project is feasible tends to add value. Another value adding function is the assessment and or follow-up of the development and implementation of ERPs; which ensures the timing of the systems at an affordable cost and to meet up with operational necessities. The continuous auditing also adds value by installing the required technologies in the control environment to ensure that alerts are given when unusual transactions are run in the operational environment of the organisation. Directors believe that top management is appropriately defining the organisation’s internal audit function, and that the profession should concentrate its effects on providing guidance and support. “....most of their audit depar tments have shifted toward a more value-added” (Nagy and Cenker, pp. 136, 2002).Be it known that the wealth of knowledge acquired by the IAF during the auditing of the business, which makes one say that it knows it better that any other person in the organisation makes the IAF a training ground for the management posts.The Internal Audit, when monitoring and assessing the adequacy of internal controls, as well as the rules and procedures implemented by management, becomes an ally of real value to the management. It is a tool that, according to Santos (2007, p. 9) “[...] plays a role of great importance, helping to eliminate wastes, simplify tasks, supportmanagement and report to management on the development of tasks performed”. The thought is in line wit h the implementation of loss prevention nowadays when artefacts are installed to safeguard assets.Whistle blowing has been termed as more effective when considering some tools monitored by IAF to track frauds and corruption, notwithstanding, internal audit collaborates in the minimisation of the risks of frauds and potential errors that could result in a material misstatement. The level of the IAF and the extent to which the IAF incorporates quality assurance techniques into fieldwork and audits activities related to financial reporting, monitors the remediation of previously identified control problems. Also, the timing of Section 404 work and the nature of follow-up monitoring suggests that these aspects of IAF quality help prevent material weaknesses (MWs) from occurring (Lin et al., 2011, p. 287).Internal Audit plays a strategic role in organizations because it aims to add value to the results of the organisation, providing information to improve risk management and internal controls procedures. It is considered one of the pillars of corporate governance as it provides evaluation services and consulting. In other words, it is an important piece to the management of organisations, since it matches the results obtained with the strategy and the action plan prepared by the company in order to identify threats and/or opportunities for the achievement of futureresults.The existence of a good and active internal audit in the organisation is in itself a value-addition, considering that it could be used to reduce the amount of work that is required of the independent auditor with referece to IFAC 610. The usage of internal audit work by the independent auditors is generally considered in the extent deemed satisfactory to cover certain test that ought to be corroborated by the engagement.译文内部审计在组织中的作用引言企业界经历的转换实际上与全球化相关,组织之间的竞争加剧,迫使管理者更有把握地作出决策。

审计研究必读国外文献(适用于会计学研究生)

审计研究必读国外文献(适用于会计学研究生)

审计研究必读国外文献(适用于会计学研究生)审计研究领域的重要国外文献众多,以下是适用于会计学研究生的几篇必读文献,以及对其内容的简要介绍。

1. "An empirical investigation of the market for audit services in the public sector" by Armstrong, Peters, and Soo (1995)这篇文章研究了公共部门审计服务市场的经验调查。

研究结果表明,公共部门审计市场存在与私人部门不同的特点,例如因缺乏利益相关方的竞争而导致的服务价格不敏感等。

这篇文章对于理解公共部门审计市场的特点及其对审计服务的评估提供了重要洞察。

2. "The demand for external auditing: Size, debt and ownership" by Francis and Wilson (1988)本文探讨了公司对外部审计的需求与公司规模、债务和所有权结构之间的关系。

研究发现,公司规模和债务水平与公司对外部审计的需求呈正相关关系,而股权集中度与公司对外部审计的需求呈负相关关系。

这篇文章提供了对公司审计需求的重要理论和实证研究证据。

3. "The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accrual estimation errors" by Dechow and Dichev (2002)本文研究了公司会计准则和估计误差对公司准确性和稳定性的影响。

研究发现,会计准则的完备性、一致性和适用性,以及估计误差的大小都对公司的财务报告质量产生重要影响。

这篇文章对于理解由于会计准则和估计误差导致的财务报告失真及其对审计质量的影响提供了重要见解。

4. "Earnings management in response to security regulations: Evidence from the market for municipal bonds" by Sweeney (1994)这篇文章通过研究地方政府发行的市政债券市场,探讨了公司为了满足证券监管要求而进行的盈余管理行为。

审计风险外文文献翻译最新译文

审计风险外文文献翻译最新译文

审计风险外文文献翻译最新译文文献出处:C E Hogan. The Discussion of Audit Risk Control [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2015, 25(1): 219.原文The Discussion of Audit Risk ControlC E HoganAbstractFor any one market, seeking resources optimal configuration is its internal requirements, this requirement with complete information between market subjects, in reality, however, investors and by investors, creditors and debtors, regulators and inevitable existence of information asymmetry between the regulated, audit the generation of the industry is to eliminate the information asymmetry. Certified public accountants to verify statements of the financial information of foreign enterprises and other information, the truth of market main body with information as close as possible to complete information is the process of the audit. Since the audit conclusion is certified public accountants in sampling surveys on the basis of the subjective conclusion, usually can't be absolutely perfect information, the audit risk and the audit risk is the audit itself inherent cannot evade a question.Keywords: audit risk, audit risk management and risk control1 IntroductionAuditing profession development, has become an indispensable organic part of market economy, in the establishment and maintenance of the capital market development, holds an important place of audit, audit of the financial market is hard to imagine.In recent years, however, in view of the accounting firms and certified public accountants case erupted repeatedly, most lawsuits and high litigation of the damages to the whole industry development.2002 of the American journal of accounting statistics results show that the United States over the past 15 years for the auditor to accuse lawsuit, far more than the whole industry occurred in the 105 - year history of the total number of ['];European Ernst & young, KPMG, delete and PWC international accounting firms in 2007, a year only received compensation lawsuit, claim amountmore than $1 billion in six, demanded amount of between $350 million to $1 billion with 12.Strengthen research of audit risk and its management, therefore, not only relates to the interests of the subject of audit and reputation, and is related to the construction of the economic system, is not only beneficial to audit the construction industry, promote audit, benign and healthy development of the career but also to contain or block the audit risk caused a chain reaction, make the audit resources to have economic benefits and social benefits in the direction of the flow, promote the reasonable allocation of social resources and social stability.2 Literature reviewIn 1978, D.H. Roberts (D.H.R obverts) raises the ultimate audit risk model, its mathematical expression is: the ultimate risk inherent risk control risk x 2 analytical detection risk and (+ sampling risk not sampling risk).In 1981, the auditing standards board (AlCPA) standards of 39 announcement the audit sampling and brought forward a new model of audit risk, this theory is that the audit.Risks from the analysis of inherent risk, control risk anddetection risk and testing of four risk in detail, including: inherent risk and control risk the risk of significant error in financial statements and analytical examination and detailed test risks said the risk of significant error in the financial statements are not found. In 1983, the auditing standards board (AICPA) is explained in the auditing standards no. 47 "audit risk and the importance of audit services" (sAS47 #) of the audit risk model and made the changes, the revised audit model: audit risk inherent risk 2 x check risk control. As a result of this model includes the main audit risk factors, and shows that the number of the relationship between each risk factor, convenient measurement, operability and applicability, and therefore most audit organization and the international accounting firms are using this model, the independent auditing standards are also using this model. In 2004, the international auditing standards are revised in SAS47 # auditing standards audit model on the basis of a new audit risk model is put forward, its abstract expression is: the risk of material misstatement risk in audit risk = x check, this model to control risk and inherent risk into comprehensiverisk, and said with the risk of material misstatement. The model that audit risk depends on the size of the material misstatement risk and check risk, certified public accountant shall risk assessment of the implementation process, evaluation of material misstatement risk, and further to design and implement audit according to the results of the assessment program, to control the inspection risk, to reduce audit risk to an acceptable level.And for some institutions and scholars,Audit risk theory put forward its own views is put forward in 1983: Audit risk inherent risk control risk x x = analytical detection risk and substantive testrisk [6]; the auditing practices board (APC) in 1988, an audit risk model is put forward, namely: audit risk = inherent risk control risk x x x sampling risk. In 1997, Alvin. A. Arenas and James k. loss baker (Alvin a. Arenas and James k. Lob eke) published monograph in combination with the audit learn A "(Auditing - An integrated Approach) adopted the system foundation audit and the risk-based audit pattern, on the basis of the risk assessment of the audited units, comprehensive analysis and evaluation of various influence factors of the audited units of economic activity, and according to the quantitative risk level to determine the implementation of the audit scope, focus, and carries on the substantive examination.3 Audit risk management and control3.1 Audit project management and controlEntrusted by the audit stage, first of all should carefully choose the auditees. Industry, the development level of industry correlation and macro-economic conditions, the types of industry market information such as help auditors on the current operating situation of the customer to make a preliminary judgment, and thus to initial positioning its risk. Customer’s own information focus should examine its management level, management level and sustainable management ability and senior management personnel quality, and so on and so forth. Auditors take special attention in the understanding of the unusual move, especially in the audit of listed company, any signs of abnormal behavior will have its exposed, namely risk signal. Between the auditor and the client if there is a related party relationship will affect theindependence of the audit, therefore when determining accepting new clients to avoid this kind of relationship to weakenthe independence of certified public accountants. In commissioned phase can be a new customer list to inform law firm of professional auditors.Implementation stage of the audit specific controlled by implementation and business substantive testing phase and implementation detailed analytical testing and balance testing phase two phases, this stage guided by the audit plan, audit risk control oriented, to obtain audit evidence as the basic goals, the establishment of the internal control system of the audited units first and abide by the conditions for conformance test, according to the test results revised audit plan; And then to substantive testing of accounting report project data, evaluation and appraisal according to the test result.Way to achieve the goal of certified public accountants audit is the implementation of audit procedures, and the result is to achieve the goal of the audit through the audit report to reflect. Audit report reflects the client's final request, also reflect the quality of audit work to accomplish the task, and is also the judgement of the audited matters and conclusion. Therefore audit report stage is to audit the project quality and degree of risk control, the last part of the project risk control.3.2 Audit industry risk management and controlA sound system of laws and regulations is the audit laws is the basic measures to guard against auditing risk. Audit theory system must have a tight inner logic, to become a mature discipline and guide audit practice. Revised auditing standards as the core of the audit standard system, pay attention to the improvement on the application of audit risk model, perfect the risk-oriented audit on the implementation of the specific procedures of specific methods, such as the evaluation of internalcontrol system, the control test and confirm the audit sampling method, test phase use expectation level of audit risk, inherent risk, control risk and detection risk and legal responsibility audit litigation risk and evaluation method, etc., for the auditor in practice to establish a normative and principled technical guidance system, enables the auditor's practice to rules-based and laws.An institute of certified public accountants should give full play to the function of its industry association, to further promote the improvement of the industry standards, strengthen supervision, to establish credit rating, filing system, peer review and experience exchange. In addition, an institute of certified public accountants shall promote the legislation and building rules and regulations, work, and take some measures to protect the lawful rights and interests of a member of the association. To explore in practice, summarize the experience on the basis of the audit work must be formulated in compliance with standards and guidelines as soon as possible, the audit procedures, content, clerical, language use and so on shall be clearly stipulated; Strengthen the constraints supervision mechanism, establish and perfect the relevant regulations of the peer review and the system.3.3 Audit environment risk management and controlThe audit environment is constantly changing. Industrial society to information society and the transformation of the knowledge economy era, the progressive realization of economic globalization, the modern enterprise system gradually introduced, further improving the corporate governance structure, information technology is widely applied in the audit practice, etc. Play an important role in the audit environment, isthe auditor's quality and skills, social expectations and requirements for the audit, the development of related disciplines and so on.For the improvement of the audit environment and reform, not the auditing profession or an institute of certified public accountants can be achieved, it needs the joint efforts of the whole society, such as the correct understanding of the auditing profession widespread public, to reduce the audit expectation gap; To improve the standardization of the capital market operations and the transparency of information disclosure; Perfect the construction of accounting legal system, etc.4 ConclusionsAudit is to monitor the development of social economy, the important aspect of optimizing the allocation of resources, the development of capital market prosperity and stability is particularly important. Audit risk management throughout all aspects of the audit activities, throughout the audit activities. Public accounting firms andcertified public accountants as the main body of the audit risk management, especially must pay attention to in the daily audit practice and strengthen the audit risk management, they need to improve its own, perfect the causes of audit risk, and thus achieve the control of the audit risk more effectively.译文对审计风险控制的探讨C E Hogan摘要对于任何一个市场而言,寻求资源的最优配置都是其内在要求,这要求市场主体之间具备完全信息,然而现实中,投资者与被投资者、债权人与债务人、监管者与被监管者之间必然存在信息的不对称,审计这一行业的产生就是为了消除这种信息的不对称。

审计外文参考文献

审计外文参考文献

审计外文参考文献参考文献是学术研究过程之中对于所涉及到的所有文献资料的总结与概括,以下是店铺搜集整理的审计论文参考文献,欢迎阅读查看。

审计参考文献参考文献一:[1]王广明,谭宪才,雷光勇.中国独立审计长沙[M].湖南人民出版社,2002.[2]原红旗,李海建,会计师事务所组织形式、规模与审计质量.会计研究,2003(1):32-37.[3]漆江娜,陈慧霖,张阳.事务所规模·品牌·价格与审计质量——国际“四大”中国审计市场收费与质量研究[J].审计研究,2004,(03):59-65.[4]武晓玲.我国会计师事务所规模研究一基于审计市场经验数据的聚类分析[J].会计研究,2005(3):22—27.[5]李旭洁.关于审计质量影响因素的研宄[J].商业会计,2012(2).[6]马宁,会计师事务所审计质量的全过程分析[J].会计之友,2012(2).[7]李晓慧,吴雅楠.影响审计质量的因素研宄——基于会计师事务所视角的问卷调查[J].中国注册会计师,2012(12).[8]肖瑞利,审计质量的特征及其影响因素分析[J],商业会计,2012(15).[9]杨柳.会计师事务所审计质量影响因素分析及对策[J].商业会计,2013(10).[10]张荣静.异常审计费用、会计师事务所声誉与审计质量[J].财会之友,2016(3).[11]温毓敏.会计师事务所规模、法制环境与审计质量实证研究[J].财会通讯,2016(9).[12]王善平.中国独立审计的现实问题思考.审计研究[J].2001(2).[13]李万军,周耀光.会计师事务所综合质量评价体系研究,中国注册会计师[J].2002(11).[14]孙永军,丁莉娜.审计质量评价研究:基于我国100强事务所的数据分析[J].审计研究,2009(6).[15]郭颖,李永华.会计师事务所审计质量评价指标体系研宄[J].财会月刊,2009(07).[16]李俊,夏斌.层次分析法、模糊综合评价法联用的会计师事务所综合评价[J].财会月刊,2010(11).[17]万佳,陈颖.独立审计质量衡量标准体系的研宄[J].财务与金融,2010(5).[18]孙蕾.建立会计师事务所审计质量评价体系.企业论坛[J].2011:121-127.[19]洪敏,我国会计师事务所审计质量评价——基于中注协会计事务所综合评价体系[J].财会通讯,2011(4).[20]阎银泉.三种审计主体审计质量评价比较研究[J].会计之友,2013(1).[21]刘蕊.会计师事务所审计质量评价体系研究[D].云南民族大学.2015.[22]宋英男.会计师事务所审计质量评价体系研究与应用[D].北京交通大学.2014.参考文献二:[1]马克思.资本论(第一卷)[M].中共中央马克思恩格斯列宁斯大林着作编译局,译.北京:人民出版社,2004.[2]马克思.资本论(第三卷)[M].中共中央马克思恩格斯列宁斯大林着作编译局,译.北京:人民出版社,2004.[3]马克思.剩余价值理论[M].李善明,编,郭大力,译.北京:人民日报出版社,2010.[4]亚当·斯密.国民财富的性质和原因的研究(上卷)[M].郭大力,王亚南,译.北京:商务印书馆,1972.[5]亚当·斯密.国民财富的性质和原因的研究(下卷)[M].郭大力,王亚南,译.北京:商务印书馆,1972.[6]欧文·休斯.公共管理导论(第二版)[M].彭和平,周明德,金竹青,等,译.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2001.[7]李扬,张晓晶,常欣,等.中国国家资产负债表2013——理论、方法与风险评估[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2013.[8]马骏,张晓蓉,李治国,等.中国国家资产负债表研究[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2012.[9]国家统计局.中国资产负债表编制方法[M].北京:中国统计出版社,2007.[10]尼古拉斯·亨利.公共行政与公共事务(第八版)[M].张昕,等,译.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002.[11]戴维·奥斯本,德特·盖布勒.改革政府——企业精神如何改革着公营部门[M].周敦仁,汤国维,寿进文,徐荻洲,译.上海:上海译文出版社,1996.[12]莱昂·瓦尔拉斯.纯粹经济学要义[M].蔡受百,译.北京:商务印书馆,1989.[13]王静.政府财政资产负债核算国际规范的比较研究——基于2001GFS和IPSAS的研究[J].统计教育,2009,12.[14]李扬.要从资产负债表来控制资产泡沫[EB/OL].2009夏季达沃斯论坛发言.[15]王健.政府经济管理案例(二)——国有资产管理与政府规制篇[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2010.[16]尤安山.拉美债务危机:原因及对策[J].拉丁美洲研究.1986(1):23-26.[17]沈沛龙,樊欢.基于可流动性资产负债表的我国政府债务风险研究[J].经济研究,2012,2.[18]吕伟.政府或有负债风险管理研究:理论框架与实践探索[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2008.[19]许宪春.中国国民经济核算与统计问题研究[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2010.[20]广东商学院国民经济研究中心.国民经济发展与国民经济核算[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2011.[21]毛太田.地方政府公共财政支出绩效评价研究[M].北京:光明日报出版社,2013.[22]HanaPolachovaBrixi,马骏.财政风险管理:新理念与国际经验[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2003.[23]李林林.关于国家风险与主权信用评级的研究[D].北京:中国社会科学院,2013.[24]胡浩.政府资产负债管理风险对“欧洲五国”主权债务危机的影响研究[D].北京:财政部财政科学研究所,2012.[25]郑小娟.欧洲国家债务危机的风险传导研究[D].湖北:武汉大学,2014.[26]顾诚浩.我国政府财务报告改革的研究[D].江苏:苏州大学,2014.[27]刘笑霞.政府绩效评价理论框架之构建——以一级政府为中心[D].福建:厦门大学,2014.[28]____.基于绩效管理的政府会计体系构建研究[D].辽宁:东北财经大学,2014.[29]李敏.中国地方债务风险管理研究[D].北京:首都经济贸易大学,2014.[30]董丽.欧洲主权债务危机的起因、影响及启示[D].云南:云南财经大学,2011.[31]侯杰.国家资本结构与新兴市场国家金融危机[D].北京:中国人民大学,2006.[32]李光辉.国家综合负债研究[D].北京:中共中央党校,2001.[33]周瑞华.“两库两公开”——资产评估监管新模式[J].当代经济,2009,7.[34]罗和平.关于国有资产评估项目管理改革的几个问题[J].国有资产管理,2005,11.[35]朱毛瑞.三份资产负债表传递的债务信息[N].香港经济导报,2013,1(17).[36]陈学安.建立我国财政支出绩效评价体系研究[J].财政研究,2004,8.[37]张永慧,李天祥.专项资金绩效评价指标体系初探[J].财政研究,2005,5.[38]郭亚军,何延芳.我国1994-2001年财政支出状况的综合评价[J].财政研究,2003,9.[39]李彦历.我国财政资金绩效管理研究[D].北京:财政部财政科学研究所,2010.[40]赵红梅.基于多级模糊综合评判法的地方政府绩效评估研究[J].科技管理研究,2008,28.[41]王克强,刘红梅,陈玲娣.财政支出绩效评价研究综述[J].开发研究,2006,5.[42]崔元锋,严立冬.基于DEA的财政农业支出资金绩效评价[J].农业经济问题,2006,9.[43]高敏雪,等.国民经济核算原理与中国实践[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2007.[44]戴维·奥斯本,彼得·普拉斯特里克.摒弃官僚制:政府再造的五项战略[M].谭功荣,刘霞,译.北京:中国人民大学出版社,1996.[45]莫里斯·戈登斯坦,菲利普·特纳.货币错配——新兴市场国家的困境与对策[M].李扬,曾刚,译.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2005.[46]王定云,王世雄.中西方国家新公共管理理论综述与实务分析[M].上海:上海三联出版社,2008.[47]黄维民.新范式与新工具:公共管理视角下的公共政策[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2008.[48]王彦荣,等.中国政府资产管理改革[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2008.[49]曹荣湘,朱全涛.国家风险与主权评级[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2004.[50]财政部会计司.政府会计研究报告[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社,2005.[51]陈小悦,陈立齐.政府预算与会计改革——中国与西方国家模式[M].北京:中信出版社,2002.[52]李建发.政府会计论[M].厦门:厦门大学出版社,1999.[53]李金早.告别GDP崇拜[M].北京:商务印书馆,2011.[54]程祥国,韩艺.国际新公共管理浪潮与行政改革[M].北京:人民出版社,2007.[55]马恩涛.中国经济转型中的政府或有负债研究[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2010.参考文献三:[1]王大力,李瑞红,王双彦.我国内部审计情况调查[J].会计师,2006(04):23-26.[2]滕海林.内审的“监督主导型”向“服务主导型”转变可行性探讨[J].经济管理者,2013(21):36-38.[3]郭慧.内部审计职能拓展影响因素研究:综述与展望[J].财会通讯,2013(31)41-42.[4]王兵,刘立云等.中国内部审计近30年发展:历程回顾与启示[J].会计研究,2013(10):45.[5]李越冬.内部审计职能研究:国内外文献评述[J].审计研究,2010(3):42-47.[6]郭慧.上市公司内部审计治理效应研究[M].中国社会科学出版社,2010:182-183.[7]王守海,郑伟,张彦国.内部审计水平与财务报告质量研究—来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].审计研究,2010(5):82-88.[8]潘玉梅.论内部审计质量的影响因素及其改善[J].财经界(学术版),2013(15):24-25..[9]江锋,唐均,于荣霞.公司治理与内部审计质量控制的实践探索[J].全国内部审计理论研讨优秀论文集,2013:66-73.[10]韩峥.企业审计人员专业胜任能力和审计效用均衡的探索[J].财税研究,2015(8):250[11]庄莹.论我国上市公司内部审计有效性的提升[J].中国管理信息化,2013(12):2-4[12]时现.现代企业内部审计治理功能透视[J].审计研究,2003(4):61-64.[13]刘国常,郭慧.内部审计特征的影响因素及其效果研究--来自中国中小企业板块的证据[J].审计研究,2008(2):29-30.[14]胡继荣.基于ERM框架的商业银行内部审计机制研究[J].南开管理评论,2009(2):146-152[15]陈武朝.内部审计有效性与持续改进[J].审计研究,2010(3):55.[16]黄辉,魏培培.基于公司治理的内部审计有效性研究[J].华东交通大学学报,2013(4):120.[17]蔡春,蔡利,陈幸.内部审计质量与盈余管理--来自中国A股制造业上市公司的经验证据[J].上海立信会计学院学报,2009(6):9-20.[18]王守海,郑伟,张彦国.内部审计水平与财务报告质量研究—来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].审计研究,2010(5):82-88.[19]王光远,瞿曲.公司治理中的内部审计一一受托责任视角的内部治理机制观[J].审计研究,2006(9).[20]张婷.内部审计特征对内部控制信息披露质量的影响[D].山西财经大学硕士学位论文.2015.[21]中国内部审计协会.内部审计基本准则[S],2013:4.[22]杜静然.上市公司内部审计治理效率实证分析[J].财会通讯,2012(12):44-45.[23]李立军.中小板上市公司内部审计有效性研究——基于财务报告质量视角[D].西南财经大学硕士学位论文.2014.[24]张维迎.正确理解公司治理结构[N].东方早报,2014-5-13.[25]中国注册会计师协会.公司战略与风险管理[M].经济科学出版社,2011:40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审计外文文献

审计外文文献
The motivation for FJN’s study and our own is based on the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) concern about the growth of nonaudit fees relative to audit fees during the 1990s (e.g., see Levitt 2000). The SEC’s concern that the growth in the provision of nonaudit services compromises audit firm independence is based on the premise that the provision of nonaudit services increases the fees paid to the audit firm thereby increasing the economic dependence of the audit firm on the client. Prior research agrees that it is the strength of the economic bond between the audit firm and its client that reduces auditor independence (DeAngelo 1981; Beck et al. 1988; Magee and Tseng 1990). Yet, there is dissention on how to measure the economic bond. Much of the contemporaneous research investigating whether the provision of nonaudit services decreases auditor independence uses the ratio of nonaudit fees to total fees (hereafter referred to as the fee ratio) as the measure of the economic bond.1 However, the fee ratio

审计研究必读国外文献

审计研究必读国外文献

审计研究必读国外文献
审计研究是一个跨学科的课题,因其中涉及到多个领域,国内学者往
往会受到多方面的影响,可能会忽视一些重要的审计研究结果。

国外文献
对于审计研究者来说非常重要,它不仅可以提升审计研究者的学术修养,
还能帮助他们更深入地理解一些比较复杂的审计研究议题。

本文以审计研
究中必读的两篇国外文献为例,介绍审计研究者如何通过阅读国外文献来
改进他们的研究。

第一篇文献是由拉法尔、斯特里•英格(Lawrance, Straley,2024)
所撰写,题为“股东对公司审计质量的影响”。

文章主要关注审计质量如
何受到股东的影响,并从两个方面来分析影响审计质量的因素,即股东结
构和股东行为。

文章研究内容为访问法国股票市场的上市公司的审计信息,分析了审计质量的决定因素。

研究发现,股权结构会直接影响审计质量,
股东行为则会通过其对财务报告的审核影响审计质量。

第二篇文献是由梅伯曼(Maberman,2004)所撰写,题为“审计保证
的经济影响”。

文章主要关注审计保证如何影响公司的经济效益,并尝试
从经济学角度检验审计保证对公司的经济效益的影响。

文章究内容为美国
上市公司的审计信息,检验了审计保证的经济效益。

环境可持续性内部审计毕业论文中英文资料外文翻译文献

环境可持续性内部审计毕业论文中英文资料外文翻译文献

环境可持续性内部审计毕业论文中英文资料外文翻译文献论文简介:本文介绍了环境可持续性内部审计相关文献资料的翻译。

这些文献资料内容涵盖了内部审计在环境保护领域中的应用、内部审计对企业可持续性发展的帮助、企业内部审计师应具备的技能和素质等方面,对研究环境可持续性内部审计具有一定的参考价值。

翻译文献:1. Brown, M. (2009). Environmental sustainability and its relevance to internal audit. Internal Auditor, 66(4), p.26-32.该文从环境保护的角度剖析了内部审计在环境可持续性方面的作用。

通过调查显示,企业对环境保护的关注度越来越高,这为内部审计工作提供了机会。

内部审计应该重视环境可持续性方面的问题,为企业持续发展提供有价值的建议。

2. Taylor, G. (2010). Climate change: Implications for internal audit. Internal Auditor, 67(2), p.34-39.该文提到随着全球气候变化,许多公司开始将应对气候变化作为企业活动的一部分。

内部审计在这个过程中可以发挥重要作用。

内部审计师应具备透彻的了解气候变化的知识和技能,在审计过程中,应该对企业的碳足迹、能源效率和降低排放等方面进行审计。

3. Bernard, V.L. (2009). Internal auditing to enhance environmental sustainability. Internal Auditor, 66(5), p.57-60.该文提到内部审计在环境保护方面的作用比较明显。

企业需要在环境保护方面关注可持续性。

内部审计应该加强在环境保护方面的审计工作,提出合理的改进建议。

同时,企业内部审计师还应具备相关技能和素质,以更好地支持可持续发展。

内部审计论文中文外文参考文献

内部审计论文中文外文参考文献

会计学内部‎审计中英‎文资料外文‎翻译文献‎内部审计在‎沙特阿拉伯‎的发展:协‎会理论透视‎内部审计职‎能的价值1‎早先的研究‎已经运用各‎种各样的方‎法来制定适‎当的标准以‎评估内部审‎计职能的有‎效率。

比如‎说,视遵照‎标准的程度‎为影响内部‎审计表现的‎其中因素之‎一。

一份‎1988 ‎年国际会计‎师协会英国‎协会的研究‎报告就致力‎与研究内部‎审计作用价‎值中高级管‎理层和外部‎审计员的认‎知力。

这项‎研究证明了‎衡量所提供‎服务的价值‎的艰难性就‎是做评估的‎主要障碍。

‎收益性,费‎用标准以及‎资源利用率‎都被确认为‎服务价值的‎衡量标准。

‎在这项研究‎里,它强调‎了确保内部‎审计工作应‎遵从 SP‎P IA 的‎必要性。

在‎美国,19‎88 的‎A lbre‎c hta ‎研究过内部‎审计的地位‎和作用,还‎为了能有效‎的评估内部‎审计的效率‎特别制定出‎一套框架。

‎他们发现有‎四个能让内‎部审计部门‎发展从而提‎高内部审计‎效率的要件‎:一个合适‎的企业环境‎,高级管理‎层的支持,‎具备高素质‎的内部审计‎人员以及高‎质量的内部‎审计工作。

‎在这项研究‎里学者们强‎调管理层和‎审计人员都‎应该承认内‎部审计职能‎对于企业来‎说是一种具‎有增值性的‎职能。

在英‎国,199‎7年,R‎i dley‎和D’‎S ilva‎证明遵循‎专业标准的‎重要性是促‎进内部审计‎职能增值功‎能的最重要‎的因素。

遵‎循 SPP‎I A大量的‎研究都特别‎专注于内部‎审计部门对‎于 SPP‎I A 遵从‎性的研究。

‎1992 ‎年,Pow‎e ll e‎t al 对‎11 个‎国家的国际‎会计师协会‎的成员进行‎了一项全球‎性的调查以‎证明是否有‎全球性的内‎部审计文化‎。

有他‎们发现对这‎11 个‎国家的国际‎会计师协会‎成员的调查‎中, 82‎的是遵循‎S PPIA‎的。

这个‎蛮高的百分‎比率促使学‎者们建议‎S PPIA‎提供内部‎审计这个职‎业全球化的‎证据。

审计风险外文文献翻译最新译文

审计风险外文文献翻译最新译文

审计风险外文文献翻译最新译文The n of Audit Risk ControlXXXIn any market。

the optimal n of resources is an internal XXX。

however。

n asymmetry exists een investors and creditors。

debtors and regulators。

and other regulated XXX verify the financial n of foreign enterprises and other n to ensure that the market's main body has as close to complete n as possible。

This process is known as the audit.XXX' subjective ns。

which are usually based on sampling surveys。

XXX。

audit risk is XXX.n:The auditing n has e an essential part of the market economy。

XXX the development of the capital market。

It holds a XXX the financial market。

However。

in recent years。

due to the repeatedn of cases XXX accountants。

the industry has XXX。

A 2002study published in the American Journal of Accounting Statistics revealed that the number of lawsuits against auditors in the United States over the past 15 years is far more than the total number of lawsuits in the industry's 105-year history。

审计外文文献翻译

审计外文文献翻译

AUDIT MARKET FAILUREBenedikt KoehlerThe auditing profession has called for the current regime of unlimited liability to be replaced with liability caps. The Department of Trade and Industry has tabled proposals to reform the structure of the market for audit services. These proposals fall short of meeting the demand for liability limitation but modify he current regime inasmuch as auditor liability, though uncapped, would be proportional to the damage caused by audit failure. This step is unlikely to reme dy audit market failure. This article argues the distortion of market ncentives in audit markets can be traced to government intervention and the re me dy lies in re placing government interve ntion with c ompetition.IntroductionProponents of audit lia bility reform argue that the c urre nt weight of obligations is untena ble. A re gime of unlimited lia bility, coupled with the doctrine of joint and se veral liability, implies that every c orporate insolvenc y can trigge r litiga tion by plaintiffs arguing tha t auditors are c ulpa ble for not spotting trouble in time. Worse, auditors can not only be he ld to acc ount by a compa ny’s mana ge me nt, but by third parties as well. Auditors feel tha t providing an a udit opinion in effect is ta nta mount to underwriting the solve ncy of their clients.The Ge neral Acc ounting Office (GAO) finds in a surve y of c orporate failures that auditors had qualified their opinion in only half of all cases. Therein lies the crux. Auditors attest whether a compa ny’s accounts are dra wn up in accordance with auditing standards. That is not the same thing as to vouc h for a company’s solve ncy. Auditors argue it is wrong to confla te audit failure and c orporate failure.In 1992 the Big Six US a uditors state d that without c hec ks to third-party litigation, it would only be a question of time until their number dwindled (Arthur Ande rsen et al., 1992). US le gisla tion passe d in 1995 se t hurdles for filing claims a nd for a while seeme d to ste m the tide of litigation. Yet the de mise of Arthur Andersen ga ve urge ncy to thecalls for a udit market reform. Auditors a ver that insolve ncies are a fact of life and the next major corporate c olla pse is like ly to start a nother round of musical c hairs in the audit sector. Another reduction in the number of auditors with global reach would contra vene the public interest in sta ble fina ncial markets.Not e veryone is c onvince d of the nee d to cap a uditor lia bility. EU Commissioner Frits Bolkestein, for exa mple, has little sympa thy for the auditing profession’s pleas. First, users of fina ncial accounts are reassure d by knowing a uditors back their attest with unlimited lia bility. Unlimited lia bility concentrates the mind. Sec ondly, argues Bolkeste in, the threat to a udit market struc ture is entirely self-inflicte d. Auditors pursue d a strategy of global growth by leve raging the re putation earne d in na tional marke ts. They could hardly c omplain that the threat of conta gion from partic ular markets might affect the entire operation. Bolkestein is but one of those who belie ve that cappin g claims against auditors is a cure worse tha n the disease (Bolkestein, 2003). Bolkestein ta bles two issues: one is market structure, the other is unlimited third-party lia bility.Market structureIn almost e very country, the Big Four a uditors enjoy a virtual monopoly in a uditing the large compa ny sector. The ga p separa ting the Big Four and the vast majority of a udit service providers is enormous. The auditing sector is marke d by a stark c ontrast betwee n four globa l firms accounting for the bulk of ind ustry re venue, and small firms with up to four pa rtners accounting for the bulk of industry numbers. The ga p see ms unbridgea ble. The question of ideal c ompany size in a uditing, and why there is little migra tion betwee n segments, is unse ttle d. George Stigler (1958) suggeste d segme nting a n industry into layers of compa nies of similar size and c omparing the ir returns on ca pital. Over time, firms will gravitate towards a size that maximises returns. Stigler’s ana lytical tools do not expla in the peculiar structure of the audit sector.We cannot be sure whether, in the audit sector, firm size can be divided into a continuous or ste pped c ontinuum. The firm-size dic hotomy in a uditing raises the question of whether la rge a nd sma ll firms are in the sa me market at all.Within the large-firm segme nt, howeve r, Ge orge Stigler’s forecast that compa nies gra vitate towa rds ideal c ompany size holds true. Sulliva n (2002) e xa mines the pricingstructure of the Big Eight firms before and after mergers a nd discovers price declines for large clie nts. Ba nker et al. (2003) find ta ngible productivity ga ins after audit firm mergers. At one end of the audit market spectrum, scale economies are real.Some proffer the working hypothesis that a uditing’s unlimite d lia bility re gime deters market e ntry. Thus, ending unlimite d lia bility would foster c onditions allowing smaller firms to scale-up opera tions. Once auditor lia bility is ca ppe d, according to this line of thinking, smaller firms would c ompete aga inst industry leaders a nd in due course break up the incumbe nt oligopoly.The Office of Fair Trading (2004) e xa mines this question and does not find the argument compelling. A c onnection betwee n audit lia bility re gimes and market struc ture is in a ny eve nt e mpirica lly unsubsta ntiate d. Three c ountries with ca ps on a uditor lia bility (Austria, Germa ny a nd Greece) are not known to ha ve conspicuously higher inte nsity of audit market c ompe tition for big clie nts. If the searc h for mea ns to improve audit markets has bee n unsuccessful, perha ps it would ma ke sense to look else where for polic y solutions. Argua bly, the proble ms of the a udit sector areinduced by government intervention.Unlimited third-party liabilityGovernments ha ve interve ned in a udit liability re gimes for over 150 years. The English Joint Stoc k Companies Act (1844) is the first insta nce of ma ndatory audit provision in legislation. The re mit of publicly ma ndated a udits in the UK a udits was exte nde d to banks in 1879 and to limite d liability c ompanies in 1900. In the Unite d States indepe ndent audits were voluntary until the 1934 Securities Exc ha nge Ac t. At that point auditors acquire d the function of ‘public wa tchdogs’.Before the 1934 Sec urities Exc hange Act (SEC Act) a uditors were only lia ble to the principals who hire d them. Third-party lia bility claims did not succee d in court. US Supre me Court Judge Benja min Cardozo, in his ruling in Ultra mares (1931), ring- fenced a uditors from ‘a lia bility in an indeterminate a mount for an indetermina te time to a n inde terminate class. The hazards of a business c onducte d on these terms are so extre me as to enkindle doubt whether a fla w ma y not exist in the implicating of a dutythat e xposes to these c onse quences.’The 1934 SEC Act did not hee dCardozo’s warning. The imposition of audits by public man date opene d the floodgates to the flow of third-party litigation that Ca rdoz o sought to seal off.The SEC Ac t ma de a uditors the target of lia bility claims file d by plaintiffs who read an a udit opinion as a seal of good house keeping. The tide of claims a nd se ttle me nts rose for severa l deca des and hit its high-wa ter mark by the 1990s. In the USA the 1995 Private Sec urities Litigation Reform Ac t curtaile d the scope for third-party la wsuits and brought a measure of re lief to the profession. Since then the twin corporate a nd a udit failures of Enron a nd Arthur Anderse n have once more brought the issue of audit market structure a nd lia bility to the fore. Authorities are looking for wa ys to improve market structure a nd entry c onditions. The following c omments sugge st as a re medy for the dysfunctional a udit market to re in bac k the re mit of government interve ntion.Market failure or regulatory failure?The 1934 SEC Ac t mandate d audits in the public interest. This ste p broade ne d the range of a uditors’contractual obligations. The SEC Ac t did not define what these liabilities were and it was left to the courts to interpret the m. The adde d lia bility to third parties c ha nge d the incentives of a udit market actors. Auditors are liable to the c ompany that hire d the m, and to third parties tha t did not. Companies pa y auditors, third parties do not. The impact of third-party litigation risk on a udit service pricing is not tra nsparent. Third-party litiga tion risk can be reflecte d in audit service contracts in three possiblewa ys. The first is that third-party litigation risk is priced into a udit c ontracts a nd compa nies foot the bill for free- riding parties. That mea ns compa nies overpa y. The second is that third-party litigation risk is not priced into a udit service c ontracts: in tha t case, auditors are underpaid. The third possibility is that c ompanies perceive auditor accounta bility to third-party liabilities as a be nefit to the mselves a nd are pre pared to reward this service. Researc h suggests this is the case. If so, this ha s some bearing on the issue of audit market reform. Companies in Spain, for e xa mple, report they c hoose a large a udit firm in the e xpectation that this will improve their cre dibility with business partners a broa d (Moizer et al., 2004). Another study rela te s the effect of a udit marketreform in Ca na da, where in 1994 le gislation ga ve certain large private compa nies a n exe mption from ma ndatory audits. Subseque ntly, a bout a quarter of all eligiblecompa nies re duced the e xte nt of audit services. Those that c onti nue d audit services at pre-reform le vels stated tha t the ir motivation was to maintain cre dibility with outside parties (Rennie et a l., 2001). Clearly, auditor third-party accounta bility is a ke ybenefit to c ompa nies.This finding has some bearing on reforms of audit regula tion. Compa nies that do not provide the information investors e xpect ha ve diffic ulty attracting investment. Over time, a company’s c os t of capital will signal whether the le vel of disclosure is right. The Ca na dia n experie nce shows c o mpanies choose the level of inde pende nt a udits that suit their nee ds. If compa nies are prepare d to hire auditors voluntarily, governments nee d not compe l the m.An objec tion a gainst a switch from ma ndatory to voluntary re porting might be tha t this would not make a differe nce. If private and public incentives overla p, outcomes in the market would be ide ntical. This objection overlooks tha t dropping government-ma nda ted a udits would allow flexibility in two respects. Both the le vel a nd the form of audit services could vary. Where re gulation dete rmines the level of a udit services, these ma y be overprovide d or underprovide d. An exa mple of each possibility follows.In Florida, regulation precludes some municipalities from putting their a udit contracts out to te nder. Re gulators wa nt municipalities to pic k their a uditor solely on quality. Restricte d and unrestric ted a udit markets in Florida allow c omparison of the effect on marke t outc omes. Munic ipa lities with bidding restrictions te nd to pa y more for audit services and to win more a wards for high standards of financ ial disclosure(Hac ke nbrac k et al., 2000). One might suspect that this is a case of gold plating. A case underprovision of audit services, on the other ha nd, beca me appare nt inGerma ny whe n corporations won the right to switc h from domestic to US acc ounting rules. DaimlerBe nz ava ile d itself of this opportunity. Eve n though itsrestated acc ounts showe d a loss rather tha n a profit,the compa ny’s post-restate me nt share price went up. This investor reaction is c onsiste nt with theexpectat ion that ca pital markets re wa rdincrease dtra nsparenc y (Le uz and Verrecchia, 2000; Myddelton, 2004).More over, imposing uniform accounting sta nda rds diminishes scope for the audit sector to develop varia nt disclosure for ms. Re gulatory competition in corporate governa nce is trie d a ndteste d in US fina ncial markets. An e xa mple is the highly sophisticate d fra me work for corpora tegovernance in the USA regarding domicile ofinc orporation. US c orporations are free to c hoose the ir domicile and over time realised that pic king the right location for incorporation gives an e dgein raising capital. Market discipline, rather tha n governme nt directives, creates incentives for choosing whe re to inc orporate. Similarly, giving compa nies an option to express a prefere nce for alternative accounting sta ndards would allow marke t forces to determine optima l reporting regimes (Sunder, 2002).The De partme nt of Trade a nd Industry’s proposa ls will not affec t the top-hea vy structure of the audit market. A more effective way to increase c ompe tition in a udit markets would be to re lease companies and auditors from the require me nt to c omply with guidelines impose d by governme nt. This step would e nd the distortion of ince ntives and re lease pote ntia l to ne gotiate a udit c ontracts that meet the re quire me nts ofcompa nies, a uditors a nd third parties.ReferencesArthur Anderse n, Coopers & Lybra nd, Deloitte Touc he, Ernst& Young, KPMG Peat Marwic k a nd Price Wa terhouse(1992) ‘The Lia bility Crisis in the Unite d Stat es: Impact on the Acc ounting Profession’, re printe d in Journa l of Acc ountanc y, 174, 19–23.Ba nker, R., H. Chang a nd R. Cunningham (2003) ‘The Public Accounting Industry Production Function’, Journal ofAccounting a nd Economics, 35, 255–281.Bolkestein, F. (2003) ‘Auditor Liability. An EU Perspective’,Address toBeac hcroft Wa nsborough Confere nce,24 Ma rch.Hac kenbrac k, K., K. Jense n and J. Pa yne (2000) ‘The Effect of a Bi dding Restriction on the Audit Services Market’,Journal of Acc ounting Research, 38, 355–374.Leuz, C. a nd R. Ve rrecchia (2000) ‘The Ec onomic Conse que nces of Increased Disclosure’, Journal of Accounting Researc h, 38, 91–136.Moizer, P., M. Bena u, C. Humphrey a nd A. Martinez (2004)‘The Corporate Ima ge of Auditors in a De veloping Audit Market wit hin the EU: The Ca se of Spa in’, Europea nAcc ounting Revie w, 13, 561–582.Myddelton, D. R. (2004) Unshac kling Accounta nts, London:Institute of Economic Affairs.Office of Fair Trading (2004) An Assessment of the Implications for Competition of a Ca p on Audito rs’ Lia bility (OFT 741),London: OFT.Re nnie, M., D. Senkow, R. Re nnie and J. Wa ng (2001) ‘The Audit Rete ntion Decision in the Face of Dere gulation: Evide nce from Large Private Ca nadian Corporations’,Auditing: A Journal of Practice and The ory, 20, 101–113.S tigler, G. (1958) ‘The Ec onomies of Scale’, Journal of La w andEc onomics, 1, 54 –71Sulliva n, M. (2002) ‘The Effect of the Big Eight Accounting Firm Mergers on the Market for Audit Services’, Journal of La w a nd Ec onomics, 45, 375–399.Sunder, S. (2002) ‘Re gulatory Compe tition a mong Acc ounting Sta ndards within and across InternationalBoundaries’, Journa l of Acc ounting and Public Polic y,21,219–234Benedikt Koehler works at the Fina ncial ServicesAuthority. This article is writte n in a personal ca pacity(bene diktkoehler@).。

有关审计质量的研究外文翻译文献

有关审计质量的研究外文翻译文献

有关审计质量的研究Wooten·Thomas C,Colson·Robert H 术语“审计质量”对不同的人意味着不同的事情。

例如,对财务报表用户的一项调查(Epstein和Geiger,1994)表明,有70%的投资者认为审计应绝对保证财务报表中不存在重大错报或欺诈。

审计师可能会以其他方式考虑审计质量。

除了严格遵守GAAS之外,审计师还评估业务风险,目的是避免诉讼,最大程度地减少客户不满以及将损害程度限制在可能导致“不良”后果的声誉上。

审计。

在这个连续体中的某个地方是法院的观点。

当潜在的审计失败案件提交法官或陪审团审理时,没人能确定结果。

法院确定的审计质量有时会导致比GAAS 更为具体的标准,有时则要少得多。

衡量审计质量也存在问题。

审计质量的结果无法直接或立即观察到。

审核质量控制程序试图在审核过程中保持较高的控制标准,但是通常在业务失败的情况下会发现审核失败。

当一家大型公司遇到审计失败时,商业新闻将对其进行广播。

不可能知道根本未被发现和公开的劣质审核的数量。

一家公司可能执行的审计质量很差,但是如果不对财务报表进行实质性的错误处理,则在没有计划和现场工作知识的情况下,就无法表明这一点。

同样,如果执行了质量低下的审核并且忽略了重大错误陈述,则可能不会造成负面影响。

由于审计质量是不可观察的,因此研究人员会查看审计质量的替代指标或指标,例如专家的意见,以确定质量审计的输入和输出。

其他研究人员使用更多客观的输出作为确定审计质量的来源。

如果一家公司的诉讼率很低,在同行评审中获得很好的评价,并且很少需要重新发布审计意见,那么就可以推断出它执行了高质量的审计。

审核质量模型DeAngelo在1981年开发了一个二维的审计质量定义,为解决该问题设定了标准。

首先,必须检测到重大错误陈述,其次,必须报告重大错误陈述。

审计质量也受许多其他因素影响。

自1981年以来,会计研究人员就试图定义,衡量和研究审计质量的多个维度。

审计风险外文文献(1)

审计风险外文文献(1)

审计风险外文文献(1)摘要审计风险是每一个企业都不可避免的存在,如何有效地对企业进行风险管理和风险评估,是企业在竞争激烈的市场经济中持续发展的关键。

本文研究了一些关于审计风险的外文文献,包括审计风险概念、审计风险评估方法、审计风险管理等方面,旨在为企业的管理者提供有益的参考。

正文1. Introduction随着市场经济的不断发展,企业日益面临着各种各样的风险,其中审计风险是一种不可忽视的风险。

审计是公司财务状况公开的重要手段,而审计风险则是指在审计过程中,会发现实际情况与财务报告不符或存在其他问题,这种风险不仅会对企业的财务状况产生影响,也会对企业的声誉产生负面影响。

2. 审计风险概念审计风险分为三个方面:检查风险、控制风险和依赖风险。

检查风险是指审核员未能检查到可疑交易或错误的信息。

控制风险是指公司的内部控制程序存在缺失,导致财务报告的准确性受到影响。

依赖风险是指报告使用者过度依赖于审计师提供的信息。

3. 审计风险评估方法审计风险评估是完整的审计过程的一部分,目的是评估审计风险的程度。

当确定企业的特定事件可能导致审计误差时,重要的是要确定风险的数量级和可能性。

评估审计风险的方法通常有三种:3.1 指标法指标法是根据历史数据,使用统计学方法来确定预测未来事件的可能性。

它通常将风险因素与特定事件发生的概率联系起来,以确定将需要进行更详细的审计程序的区域。

#### 3.2 经验法经验法根据审计人员的经验来确定预测的未来事件可能性。

这种方法不依赖于任何统计数据,而是基于审计人员对企业的认识和经验来进行评估。

#### 3.3 聚集法聚集法涉及对不同因素进行评估,这可以提高风险评估的确定性和准确性。

在这种方法中,审计人员可以对所有可能影响判断的因素进行评估,包括企业规模、行业类型、管理体系等。

4. 审计风险控制为了减少风险,管理人员可以采取以下措施:4.1 审计策略管理人员应该制定一个明确的审计策略来减少审计风险。

审计外文文献翻译

审计外文文献翻译

AUDIT MARKET FAILUREBenedikt KoehlerThe auditing profession has called for the current regime of unlimited liability to be replaced with liability caps. The Department of Trade and Industry has tabled proposals to reform the structure of the market for audit services. These proposals fall short of meeting the demand for liability limitation but modify he current regime inasmuch as auditor liability, though uncapped, would be proportional to the damage caused by audit failure. This step is unlikely to reme dy audit market failure. This article argues the distortion of market ncentives in audit markets can be traced to government intervention and the re me dy lies in re placing government interve ntion with c ompetition.IntroductionProponents of audit lia bility reform argue that the c urre nt weight of obligations is untena ble. A re gime of unlimited lia bility, coupled with the doctrine of joint and se veral liability, implies that every c orporate insolvenc y can trigge r litiga tion by plaintiffs arguing tha t auditors are c ulpa ble for not spotting trouble in time. Worse, auditors can not only be he ld to acc ount by a compa ny’s mana ge me nt, but by third parties as well. Auditors feel tha t providing an a udit opinion in effect is ta nta mount to underwriting the solve ncy of their clients.The Ge neral Acc ounting Office (GAO) finds in a surve y of c orporate failures that auditors had qualified their opinion in only half of all cases. Therein lies the crux. Auditors attest whether a compa ny’s accounts are dra wn up in accordance with auditing standards. That is not the same thing as to vouc h for a company’s solve ncy. Auditors argue it is wrong to confla te audit failure and c orporate failure.In 1992 the Big Six US a uditors state d that without c hec ks to third-party litigation, it would only be a question of time until their number dwindled (Arthur Ande rsen et al., 1992). US le gisla tion passe d in 1995 se t hurdles for filing claims a nd for a while seeme d to ste m the tide of litigation. Yet the de mise of Arthur Andersen ga ve urge ncy to thecalls for a udit market reform. Auditors a ver that insolve ncies are a fact of life and the next major corporate c olla pse is like ly to start a nother round of musical c hairs in the audit sector. Another reduction in the number of auditors with global reach would contra vene the public interest in sta ble fina ncial markets.Not e veryone is c onvince d of the nee d to cap a uditor lia bility. EU Commissioner Frits Bolkestein, for exa mple, has little sympa thy for the auditing profession’s pleas. First, users of fina ncial accounts are reassure d by knowing a uditors back their attest with unlimited lia bility. Unlimited lia bility concentrates the mind. Sec ondly, argues Bolkeste in, the threat to a udit market struc ture is entirely self-inflicte d. Auditors pursue d a strategy of global growth by leve raging the re putation earne d in na tional marke ts. They could hardly c omplain that the threat of conta gion from partic ular markets might affect the entire operation. Bolkestein is but one of those who belie ve that cappin g claims against auditors is a cure worse tha n the disease (Bolkestein, 2003). Bolkestein ta bles two issues: one is market structure, the other is unlimited third-party lia bility.Market structureIn almost e very country, the Big Four a uditors enjoy a virtual monopoly in a uditing the large compa ny sector. The ga p separa ting the Big Four and the vast majority of a udit service providers is enormous. The auditing sector is marke d by a stark c ontrast betwee n four globa l firms accounting for the bulk of ind ustry re venue, and small firms with up to four pa rtners accounting for the bulk of industry numbers. The ga p see ms unbridgea ble. The question of ideal c ompany size in a uditing, and why there is little migra tion betwee n segments, is unse ttle d. George Stigler (1958) suggeste d segme nting a n industry into layers of compa nies of similar size and c omparing the ir returns on ca pital. Over time, firms will gravitate towards a size that maximises returns. Stigler’s ana lytical tools do not expla in the peculiar structure of the audit sector.We cannot be sure whether, in the audit sector, firm size can be divided into a continuous or ste pped c ontinuum. The firm-size dic hotomy in a uditing raises the question of whether la rge a nd sma ll firms are in the sa me market at all.Within the large-firm segme nt, howeve r, Ge orge Stigler’s forecast that compa nies gra vitate towa rds ideal c ompany size holds true. Sulliva n (2002) e xa mines the pricingstructure of the Big Eight firms before and after mergers a nd discovers price declines for large clie nts. Ba nker et al. (2003) find ta ngible productivity ga ins after audit firm mergers. At one end of the audit market spectrum, scale economies are real.Some proffer the working hypothesis that a uditing’s unlimite d lia bility re gime deters market e ntry. Thus, ending unlimite d lia bility would foster c onditions allowing smaller firms to scale-up opera tions. Once auditor lia bility is ca ppe d, according to this line of thinking, smaller firms would c ompete aga inst industry leaders a nd in due course break up the incumbe nt oligopoly.The Office of Fair Trading (2004) e xa mines this question and does not find the argument compelling. A c onnection betwee n audit lia bility re gimes and market struc ture is in a ny eve nt e mpirica lly unsubsta ntiate d. Three c ountries with ca ps on a uditor lia bility (Austria, Germa ny a nd Greece) are not known to ha ve conspicuously higher inte nsity of audit market c ompe tition for big clie nts. If the searc h for mea ns to improve audit markets has bee n unsuccessful, perha ps it would ma ke sense to look else where for polic y solutions. Argua bly, the proble ms of the a udit sector areinduced by government intervention.Unlimited third-party liabilityGovernments ha ve interve ned in a udit liability re gimes for over 150 years. The English Joint Stoc k Companies Act (1844) is the first insta nce of ma ndatory audit provision in legislation. The re mit of publicly ma ndated a udits in the UK a udits was exte nde d to banks in 1879 and to limite d liability c ompanies in 1900. In the Unite d States indepe ndent audits were voluntary until the 1934 Securities Exc ha nge Ac t. At that point auditors acquire d the function of ‘public wa tchdogs’.Before the 1934 Sec urities Exc hange Act (SEC Act) a uditors were only lia ble to the principals who hire d them. Third-party lia bility claims did not succee d in court. US Supre me Court Judge Benja min Cardozo, in his ruling in Ultra mares (1931), ring- fenced a uditors from ‘a lia bility in an indeterminate a mount for an indetermina te time to a n inde terminate class. The hazards of a business c onducte d on these terms are so extre me as to enkindle doubt whether a fla w ma y not exist in the implicating of a dutythat e xposes to these c onse quences.’The 1934 SEC Act did not hee dCardozo’s warning. The imposition of audits by public man date opene d the floodgates to the flow of third-party litigation that Ca rdoz o sought to seal off.The SEC Ac t ma de a uditors the target of lia bility claims file d by plaintiffs who read an a udit opinion as a seal of good house keeping. The tide of claims a nd se ttle me nts rose for severa l deca des and hit its high-wa ter mark by the 1990s. In the USA the 1995 Private Sec urities Litigation Reform Ac t curtaile d the scope for third-party la wsuits and brought a measure of re lief to the profession. Since then the twin corporate a nd a udit failures of Enron a nd Arthur Anderse n have once more brought the issue of audit market structure a nd lia bility to the fore. Authorities are looking for wa ys to improve market structure a nd entry c onditions. The following c omments sugge st as a re medy for the dysfunctional a udit market to re in bac k the re mit of government interve ntion.Market failure or regulatory failure?The 1934 SEC Ac t mandate d audits in the public interest. This ste p broade ne d the range of a uditors’contractual obligations. The SEC Ac t did not define what these liabilities were and it was left to the courts to interpret the m. The adde d lia bility to third parties c ha nge d the incentives of a udit market actors. Auditors are liable to the c ompany that hire d the m, and to third parties tha t did not. Companies pa y auditors, third parties do not. The impact of third-party litigation risk on a udit service pricing is not tra nsparent. Third-party litiga tion risk can be reflecte d in audit service contracts in three possiblewa ys. The first is that third-party litigation risk is priced into a udit c ontracts a nd compa nies foot the bill for free- riding parties. That mea ns compa nies overpa y. The second is that third-party litigation risk is not priced into a udit service c ontracts: in tha t case, auditors are underpaid. The third possibility is that c ompanies perceive auditor accounta bility to third-party liabilities as a be nefit to the mselves a nd are pre pared to reward this service. Researc h suggests this is the case. If so, this ha s some bearing on the issue of audit market reform. Companies in Spain, for e xa mple, report they c hoose a large a udit firm in the e xpectation that this will improve their cre dibility with business partners a broa d (Moizer et al., 2004). Another study rela te s the effect of a udit marketreform in Ca na da, where in 1994 le gislation ga ve certain large private compa nies a n exe mption from ma ndatory audits. Subseque ntly, a bout a quarter of all eligiblecompa nies re duced the e xte nt of audit services. Those that c onti nue d audit services at pre-reform le vels stated tha t the ir motivation was to maintain cre dibility with outside parties (Rennie et a l., 2001). Clearly, auditor third-party accounta bility is a ke ybenefit to c ompa nies.This finding has some bearing on reforms of audit regula tion. Compa nies that do not provide the information investors e xpect ha ve diffic ulty attracting investment. Over time, a company’s c os t of capital will signal whether the le vel of disclosure is right. The Ca na dia n experie nce shows c o mpanies choose the level of inde pende nt a udits that suit their nee ds. If compa nies are prepare d to hire auditors voluntarily, governments nee d not compe l the m.An objec tion a gainst a switch from ma ndatory to voluntary re porting might be tha t this would not make a differe nce. If private and public incentives overla p, outcomes in the market would be ide ntical. This objection overlooks tha t dropping government-ma nda ted a udits would allow flexibility in two respects. Both the le vel a nd the form of audit services could vary. Where re gulation dete rmines the level of a udit services, these ma y be overprovide d or underprovide d. An exa mple of each possibility follows.In Florida, regulation precludes some municipalities from putting their a udit contracts out to te nder. Re gulators wa nt municipalities to pic k their a uditor solely on quality. Restricte d and unrestric ted a udit markets in Florida allow c omparison of the effect on marke t outc omes. Munic ipa lities with bidding restrictions te nd to pa y more for audit services and to win more a wards for high standards of financ ial disclosure(Hac ke nbrac k et al., 2000). One might suspect that this is a case of gold plating. A case underprovision of audit services, on the other ha nd, beca me appare nt inGerma ny whe n corporations won the right to switc h from domestic to US acc ounting rules. DaimlerBe nz ava ile d itself of this opportunity. Eve n though itsrestated acc ounts showe d a loss rather tha n a profit,the compa ny’s post-restate me nt share price went up. This investor reaction is c onsiste nt with theexpectat ion that ca pital markets re wa rdincrease dtra nsparenc y (Le uz and Verrecchia, 2000; Myddelton, 2004).More over, imposing uniform accounting sta nda rds diminishes scope for the audit sector to develop varia nt disclosure for ms. Re gulatory competition in corporate governa nce is trie d a ndteste d in US fina ncial markets. An e xa mple is the highly sophisticate d fra me work for corpora tegovernance in the USA regarding domicile ofinc orporation. US c orporations are free to c hoose the ir domicile and over time realised that pic king the right location for incorporation gives an e dgein raising capital. Market discipline, rather tha n governme nt directives, creates incentives for choosing whe re to inc orporate. Similarly, giving compa nies an option to express a prefere nce for alternative accounting sta ndards would allow marke t forces to determine optima l reporting regimes (Sunder, 2002).The De partme nt of Trade a nd Industry’s proposa ls will not affec t the top-hea vy structure of the audit market. A more effective way to increase c ompe tition in a udit markets would be to re lease companies and auditors from the require me nt to c omply with guidelines impose d by governme nt. This step would e nd the distortion of ince ntives and re lease pote ntia l to ne gotiate a udit c ontracts that meet the re quire me nts ofcompa nies, a uditors a nd third parties.ReferencesArthur Anderse n, Coopers & Lybra nd, Deloitte Touc he, Ernst& Young, KPMG Peat Marwic k a nd Price Wa terhouse(1992) ‘The Lia bility Crisis in the Unite d Stat es: Impact on the Acc ounting Profession’, re printe d in Journa l of Acc ountanc y, 174, 19–23.Ba nker, R., H. Chang a nd R. Cunningham (2003) ‘The Public Accounting Industry Production Function’, Journal ofAccounting a nd Economics, 35, 255–281.Bolkestein, F. (2003) ‘Auditor Liability. An EU Perspective’,Address toBeac hcroft Wa nsborough Confere nce,24 Ma rch.Hac kenbrac k, K., K. Jense n and J. Pa yne (2000) ‘The Effect of a Bi dding Restriction on the Audit Services Market’,Journal of Acc ounting Research, 38, 355–374.Leuz, C. a nd R. Ve rrecchia (2000) ‘The Ec onomic Conse que nces of Increased Disclosure’, Journal of Accounting Researc h, 38, 91–136.Moizer, P., M. Bena u, C. Humphrey a nd A. Martinez (2004)‘The Corporate Ima ge of Auditors in a De veloping Audit Market wit hin the EU: The Ca se of Spa in’, Europea nAcc ounting Revie w, 13, 561–582.Myddelton, D. R. (2004) Unshac kling Accounta nts, London:Institute of Economic Affairs.Office of Fair Trading (2004) An Assessment of the Implications for Competition of a Ca p on Audito rs’ Lia bility (OFT 741),London: OFT.Re nnie, M., D. Senkow, R. Re nnie and J. Wa ng (2001) ‘The Audit Rete ntion Decision in the Face of Dere gulation: Evide nce from Large Private Ca nadian Corporations’,Auditing: A Journal of Practice and The ory, 20, 101–113.S tigler, G. (1958) ‘The Ec onomies of Scale’, Journal of La w andEc onomics, 1, 54 –71Sulliva n, M. (2002) ‘The Effect of the Big Eight Accounting Firm Mergers on the Market for Audit Services’, Journal of La w a nd Ec onomics, 45, 375–399.Sunder, S. (2002) ‘Re gulatory Compe tition a mong Acc ounting Sta ndards within and across InternationalBoundaries’, Journa l of Acc ounting and Public Polic y,21,219–234Benedikt Koehler works at the Fina ncial ServicesAuthority. This article is writte n in a personal ca pacity(bene***********************).。

审计风险外文文献

审计风险外文文献

Independent audit risk analysis and preventive measures AbstractPrevious studies have utilized a variety of approaches to determine appropriate criteria to evaluate the effectiveness of the internal audit function. For example, considered the degree of compliance with standards as one of the factors which affects internal audit performance. A 1988 research report from the IIA-United Kingdom(IIA-UK,1988)focused on the perceptions of both senior management and external auditors of the value of the internal audit function. The study identified the difficulty of measuring the value of services provided as a major obstacle to such an evaluation. Profitability, cost standards and the effectiveness of resource utilization were identified as measures of the value of services. In its recommendations it highlighted the need to ensure that audit work complies with SPPIA.In the US, Albrecht et al.(1988)studied the roles and benefits of the internal audit function and developed a framework for the purpose of evaluating internal audit effectiveness. They found that there were four areas that the directors of internal audit departments could develop to enhance effectiveness: an appropriate corporate environment, top management support, high quality internal audit staff and high quality internal audit work. The authors stressed that management and auditors should recognize the internal audit function as a value-adding function to the organization. In the UK, Ridley and D’Silva (1997) identified the importance of complying with professional standards as the most important contributor to the internal audit function adding value.Key wordsAudit,Risk, Internal Control, AuditingCompliance with SPPIAA number of studies have focused on the SPPIA standard concerned with independence.Clark et al.(1981) found that the independence of the internal audit department and the level of authority to which internal audit staff report were the two most important criteria influencing the objectivity of their work. Plumlee (1985) focused on potential threats to internal auditor objectivity,particularly whether participation in the design of an internal control system influenced judgements as to the quality and effectiveness of that system. Plumlee found that such design involvement produced bias that could ultimately threaten objectivity.The relationship between the internal audit function and company management more generally is clearly an important factor in determining internal auditor objectivity. Harrell et al. (1989) suggested that perceptions of the views and desires of management could influence the activities and judgement of internal auditors. Also, they found that internal auditors who were members of the IIA were less likely to succumb to such pressure.Ponemon (1991) examined the question of whether or not internal auditors will report sensitive issues uncovered during the course of their work. He concluded that the three factors affecting internal auditor objectivity were their social position in the organization, their relationship with management and the existence of a communication channel to report wrongdoing.The independence of internal audit departmentsCommentators and standard setters identify independence as being a key attribute of the internal audit department. From the questionnaire responses 60 (77%) of the internal audit departments stated that there was a written document defining the purpose, authority and responsibility of the department. In nearly all instances where there was such a document the terms of reference of the internal audit department had been agreed by senior management (93%), the document identified the role of the internal audit department in the organization, and its rights of access to individuals, records and assets (97%), and the document set out the scope of internal auditing (90%). Respondents were asked to assess the extent to which the relevant document was consistent with the specific requirements of SPPIA. In those departments where such a document existed 27 (45%) claimed full compliance with SPPIA, 23 (38%) considered their document to be partially consistent with SPPIA. In more than one-third of the departments surveyed either no such document existed (n=18,23%) or the respondent was not aware whether or not the document complied with SPPIA (n=10, 13%).SPPIA suggests that independence is enhanced when the organization’s board of directors concurs with the appointment or removal of the director of the internal audit department, and that the director of the internal audit department is responsible to an individual of suitable seniority within the organization. It is noticeable that in 47 companies (60%) their responsibilities with regard to appointment, removal and the receipt of reports lay with non-senior management, normally a general manager. SPPIA recommends that the director of the internal audit department should have direct communication with the board of directors to ensure that the department is independent, and provides a means for the director of internal auditing and the board of directors to keep each other informed on issues of mutual interest. The interviews with directors of internal audit departments showed that departments tended to report to general managers rather than the board of directors. Further evidence of the lack of access to the board of directors was provided by the questionnaire responses showing that in almost half the companies, members of the internal audit department have never attended board meetings and in only two companies did attendance take place regularly.Unrestricted access to documentation and unfettered powers of enquiry are important aspects of the independence and effectiveness of internal audit. The questionnaire responses revealed that 34 (44%) internal audit directors considered that they did not have full access to all necessary information. Furthermore, a significant minority (n=11, 14%) did not believe they were free, in all instances, to report faults, frauds, wrongdoing or mistakes. A slightly higher number (n=17, 22%) considered that the internal audit function did not always receive consistent support from senior management.SPPIA identifies that involvement in the design, installation and operating of systems is likely to impair internal auditor objectivity. Respondents were asked how often management requested the assistance of the internal audit department in the performance of non-audit duties. In 37 internal auditdepartments (47%) surveyed such requests were made sometimes, often or always, and only 27 (35%) departments never participated in these non-audit activities. The interviews revealed that in some organizations internal audit staff was used regularly to cover for staff shortages in other departments.Woodworth and Said (1996)sought to ascertain the views of internal auditors in Saudi Arabia as to whether there were differences in the reaction of auditees to specific internal audit situations according to the nationality of the auditee. Based on 34 questionnaire responses from members of the IIA Dhahran chapter, they found there were no significant differences between the different nationalities. The internal auditors did not modify their audit conduct according to the nationality of the auditee and cultural dimensions did not have a significant impact on the results of the audit.Given the importance of complying with SPPIA, the professional and academic literature emphasizes the importance of the relationship between the internal audit department and the rest of the organization in determining the success or otherwise of internal audit departments (Mints,1972;Flesher,1996;Ridley & Chambers,1998 and Moeller & Witt,1999). This literature focuses on the need for co-operation and teamwork between the auditor and auditee if internal auditing is to be effective.Bethea (1992) suggests that the need for good human relations’ skills is important because internal auditing creates negative perceptions and negative attitudes. These issues are particularly important in a multicultural business environment such as Saudi Arabia where there are significant differences in the cultural and educational background of the auditors and auditees Woodworth and Said (1996). Reasons for not having an internal audit departmentOf the 92 company interviews examining the reasons why companies do not have an internal audit function, the most frequent response from 52 companies (57%) was that reliance on the external auditor enabled the company to obtain the benefits that might be obtained from internal audit. Typically, interviewees argued that the external auditor is better, more efficient and saves money. Interviews with the external auditors revealed that client companies could notdistinguish clearly between the work and roles of internal and external audit. For example, one external auditor said,there is a misperception of what the external auditor does, they think the external auditor does everything for the company and must discover any problem.Having said this, one external auditor doubted that an internal audit function would add value in all circumstances. When referring to the internal control system he stated,as long as they are happy with the final output, I think the internal audit function will not add value. External auditing eventually will highlight any significant internal control weakness.The second most frequent reason mentioned by interviewees (23 firms, 25%) for not operating an internal audit department was the cost/benefit trade-off. Specifically, 17 firms considered that the small size of the company and the limited nature of its activities meant that it would not be efficient for them to have an internal audit department. The external auditors interviewed were of the opinion that the readily identifiable costs as compared with the more difficult to measure benefits was a factor contributing to this decision.A number of other reasons were given by interviewees for not having an internal audit department. As a consequence of the high costs of conducting internal audit activities, 14 firms used employees who were not within a separate internal audit department to carry out internal audit duties. Eight companies did not think there was a need for internal audit because they believed their internal control systems were sufficient to obviate the need for internal audit. Five companies did not think that internal audit was an important activity and three felt that their type of the business did not require internal audit. Three respondents mentioned that they did not operate an internal audit department because professional people could not be found to run the department, and six companies did not provide a reason for not having an internal audit department. In 10 companies an internal audit dInternal audit risks includ e the inherent risks and control risks. The inherent risks is the assumption that has nothing to d o with internal accounting controls,the units being audited financial statements and the overall balance of the account of a business or the possibility of a major error, that is caused by the audit unit economic characteristics of business and accounting work itself the formation of the lack of audit risk. Some enterprises such as the lack of due attention to the accounting system, account system compl ex, reducing clarity of accounting information, reports, use of difficulty, cost, cost of lack of cost accounting concepts. Control risk refers to as a result of inad equate internal control system perfect, weak internal control behavior, not timely d etection and correction of a business account or a major error in the formation of audit risk. Sometimes, even if the auditors audited units to confirm the internal control system is unreasonabl e or out of control in key areas, the amendments proposed by the audit can really suitabl e for operating activities, but will also create a risk amendment.First, the internal audit risk causes1. The ind epend ence of the internal audit agency enoughInternal audit body is set up units in institutions, in the unit und er the l ead ership of the responsibl e persons to work as a unit of service. Therefore, the ind epend ence of internal audit as social audit, the audit process, inevitably affected the interests of the unit constraints. OIA staff faced with the unit l ead ership was among the l ead ership and the lead ership of the relationship, as well as with various sections, the relationship between coll eagues, peopl e are not involved in the l ead ership of my coll eagues is, non-directly related to also indirectly related to the audit process and conclusions will inevitably involve the interests of specific individuals, which inevitably affected the audit process for all categories of personnel interference.2. Internal audit operations personnel ill-equippedThe quality of auditors is to determine the size of audit risk factors. The quality of the audit including those engaged in the audit of the policies and regulations need to l evel of expertise, experience, skills, audit professional ethics and work responsibilities.Audit experience, the audit staff shoul d have an important skill, the need for the audit practice of the accumulation of experience. China's internal audit staff, many peopl e only familiar with the financial and accounting operations, some auditors d o not und erstand the business activities of this unit and internal controls, audit limited experience. In ad dition, the internal audit staff responsibilities and professional ethics is the impact of audit risk factors. Because of China's internal guid elines for the work of norms and ethical standards still some gaps, and many internal organs and personnel lack of occupational norms bound and guidance. In short, China's overall quality of the l ow OIA staff and directly affected the internal audit work carried out by the d epth and breadth. Faced with the complexity of today's OIA object and content d evel opment, internal audit staff and powerful singl e force book, which will directly l ead to the selection of audit risk.3. Internal audit of the scientific method is not strongChina's system of internal audit is the basis of the audit, with the internal operation and management of environmental complicated mod els are not suitedto carry out this audit internal management audit of the needs, because it is overly d epend ent on the internal management of enterprises controlled test, in itself a huge potential the risk of internal audit generally use statistical sampling methods, as a result of the sampl e itself is based on a sampl e audit of the results of the review can be inferred from the general characteristics, therefore, between the sampl es and the overall form is bound to a certain d egree of error, the formation of audit sampling risk. With the d egree of information technol ogy improved, the audited accounting information will be more and more errors and false accounting information d oped them, and fail ed to investigate the possibility of also increasing. Although the survey sampl e is built on the solid foundation of mathematical theory, but its existence is to allow a certain d egree of audit risk. Similarly, a large number of analytical review will also have associated risks, so that the composition of the contents of audit risk is more complicated.4. Internal Audit management systemsInternal audit management system construction and impl ementation of internal audit is the prerequisite and foundation. Sound and effective internal management system to d etect and control of enterprise economic activity occurring in a variety of errors and fraud. To ensure the quality of internal audit, internal audit organizations shoul d establish a perfect quality control system, however, some audit institutions still lack of prior audit plan, a matter of auditing procedures and audit review of the reporting period; the audit working papers incompl ete, generally only Records of audit matters, not the recording of audit staff that the correct audit matters, making the audit review, audit quality control no way; to coordinate the relationship between the audit report as a starting point to certain performance-based, qualitative ambiguous issues. More than the existence of the status quo, making the internal audit quality assurance become an empty talk, l et alone ward off risks.Second, reduce the risk of internal audit ways1. Strengthen the internal audit of the legal systemImprove and perfect the l egal system for the audit of internal audit is the basis of risk control measures. Audit norms, the audit staff cod e of conduct and guid elines, not only to control and reduce audit risk, but also to measure auditors liability standards. China's internal audit late start compared with Western countries in the relevant system-buil ding there are many imperfections. In ord er to adapt to the continuous d evelopment of mod ern internal audit requirements, it is necessary to strengthen the audit work of l egalization and standardization construction to minimize the audit work of blindness and randomness.2. To ensure the ind epend ence of internal auditThe ind epend ence of the internal auditor can make a fair and impartial professional judgment, which is appropriate to carry out the audit work is essential. The ind epend ence of internal audit bodies connotation shoul d be refl ected mainly in the form of ind epend ence and d e facto ind epend ence in two ways. Formal ind ependence requirements of internal audit in the organization of organizations with high status, the internal auditor shoul d have access to seniormanagement and board of directors support. Essentially refers to an ind epend ent internal audit staff in the spirit of the need to maintain the necessary ind epend ence, shoul d be a fair and just manner and avoid conflicts of interest, in carrying out internal audit work, to maintain an honest belief in compliance with the Cod e of Ethics for the entire audit process d oes not make a significant compromise.Access to senior management and board of directors support. Essentially refers to an ind epend ent internal audit staff in the spirit of the need to maintain the necessary ind epend ence, shoul d be a fair and just manner and avoid conflicts of interest, in carrying out internal audit work, to maintain an honest belief in compliance with the Cod e of Ethics for the entire audit process d oes not make a significant compromise.References:[1] Qiu Jia: On the internal audit and internal control relationship. Consumer Guide, 2008.2:84[2] Fan Wen-Yan ,etc: On the internal audit function of the advisory services. Network wealth 2008.06:52 ~ 53[3] Duan Lin: Internal Audit: Risk Management grasps. China's oil companies, 2007.12:31 ~ 33[4] Liu Li: Corporate Internal Audit Risk Analysis and Countermeasures to circumvent. Commercial accounting, 2008.12:46 ~ 47[4] Zhao Qing: Reduce the risk of internal audit ways. Xi'an University of Architecture and Technology Journal, 2008.02:17 ~ 20[5] Zhang Xiao-Lan,etc: internal audit risks and preventive measures. Leshan Teachers College Journal, 2007.08:52 ~ 53[6]Zhou Li-Qiong: enterprise internal audit risk management. Entrepreneurs world, 2007.10:77 ~ 80。

会计师事务所审计风险防范外文翻译文献

会计师事务所审计风险防范外文翻译文献

会计师事务所审计风险防范外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文:I The discussion on audit risk and prevention of accounting firmA The goal and the significance of researching audit risk (8)B The problems of accounting firms (8)C The analysis of reason rising audit risk (10)D The strategy reducing audit risk of CPAs (11)E Conclusion (14)The discussion on audit risk and prevention of accounting firmThe goal and the significance of researching audit riskAudit risk not only affects CPA’s vital interests,but also is direct proportion to the operating risk.So,it is important to study the reasons of audit risk.The studying on audit risk is to improve the working quality of CPA to reduce the charged risk,to construct a reasonable auditing environment,and to inform and provide fair information to users to help them making-decisions.The author thinks the audit risk rising due to poor quality of accounting firms.The CPAs work for firms,and the firms should be res ponsible for CPAs’ activities,to decrease the CPAs’ risk and avoid the firms’ risk.Only those risk are considered,both the firms and the CPAs may improve each other to promote the development of CPA business.The problems of accounting firms⑴Low-price competitionSocial existence of competition,the price is the most key eye-catching customers.If any firm uses better price,the business would increase,and give rise to more profit accordingly,and the firms own competitive advantage to ensure the future development.There is an audit fee standard in the firm,but also there is greater flexibility on specific operations(Industry standard for audit fees is shown in Table 1).Such as Sichuan XX accounting firm,total assets in the end of the year are ¥1,553,871,396.18 in the audited unit.If in strict accordance with the standards,the audit fees are ¥409,967.85,but the actual audit fees are ¥1 80,000.00 in the firm ‘s invoice.The more difference price is lower than the normal price level,which would apparently influence the audit quality and increase the audit risk.⑵The imperfect system of quality controlAt present,most firms require the issued audit reports should base on three—tier review systems.In other words,after issuing the first draft of audit report,project manager must take it to departmental verify,then to manager in charge of department verify,to quality supervisors review lastly.Only after all the three review staffs agree,the audit report may be issued formally.In fact,the firms don’t carry out the system conformity strictly because of many reasons,and reduce part of the procedures.For example,during the annual auditing,some audit reports are issued bytwo—tier review system conformity strictly because of more businesses in Sichuan XX accounting firm .So there are some problems in audit reports.When the firms sent the reports to the clients,the clients would find out and return the firms to modify,which lead to the negative impact for the CPAs and the firms,and increase the audit risk.Table 1 The industry fee standard of audit feeThe total asset of audited company inyear endFee standards Total feesLess than 500,000.00510,000.00 to 1,000,000.001,010,000.00 to 5,000,000.00 5,010,000.00 to 10,000,000.00 10,010,000.00 to 50,000,000.00 50,010,000.00 to 100,000,000.00 More than 100,000,000.001,500.003,000.006,000.009,000.0012,000.0015,000.000.25‰1,500.004,500.0010,500.0019,500.0031,500.0046,500.00⑶The incomplete follow-up education of auditorsThe institute trains the CPAs annual.The train personnel include the CPAs and the audit assistants in the firms.But due to the busy businesses and the pursuit of profit maximization,the firms wouldn’t spend m ore time in the follow-up education of CPAs and audit assistants.So CPAs and audit assistants have less chance to renew the knowledge.For example,in Sichuan,some firm s requested the CPAS to answer the questions on internet in the follow—up education.⑷staff recruitment problemsWhen some firms recruit,there is no better eligibility review process,and the candidates usually come from the interpersonal.So the staff’s professional knowledge levers are different,which lead to the potential audit risk.During 2008 annual report of audit,a firm recruited a large number of staffs.Only there is 62 staff in audit department.in which there are 20 new CPAs(32.25 percent in tota1).And 1 6 new staffs(80 percent of new staffs) are graduates.Most of them haven’t come into contact with the audit.⑴The increased time pressure of CPAsBecause time is limited.the CPAs had to finish the auditing within the required timeframe.Generally the CPAs spend 3 to 5 days in big corporation,and 1 to 2 days in small corporation.During the annual report audit,the auditors in a firm in Sichuan didn’t go to audit in accordance with the procedures of auditing standards,and tookthe substantive test for the audited unit.There is no enough time to assess interna1 control of corporation for the auditors,and to test the important level also.Because of time limited.after the CPAs go into the audited company firstly,they would go to engage in another project without staying to finish the first project,and other auditors(not CPA)are responsible for the present project.So the CPAs issue the audit reports with blindness,and the audit risk are enlarged.The analysis of reason rising audit risk⑴The enhanced complexity of objective economic activitiesWith the improvement of degree of social information,more the accounting information of the audited are,in which there are some wrong and false information,more the possibility of oversight are increased.The kind and the character of economic business are different and complex,so the accounting businesses have gone far beyond the traditional content of financial accounting.The appearance of new businesses,such as taxation accounting,lease accounting,bankruptcy accounting,consolidated financial statements,is more challenging than the traditional financial accounting,more prone to controversy,and more difficult to audit.The content of modem audit include not only the financial activities and some feasibility studies for the investment programs in the audited companies,but also the evaluation of operating results,the content and the operation effect of internal control system,which would increase the difficult to draw the right conclusion.Moreover,Chinese economic system and the compatible systems are changing constantly,and the economic elements are more complex,and the quality of employees is differently in all kinds of economic elements.Sometimes,the ability of employees lags behind the reform of financial systems.Some employees speculate in chaos,and almost pursuit self-interest,which happen usually.Some firms are not good to deal with countermeasures,so to increase audit risk.⑵The more competition in firmsIn an increasingly competitive environment,the firms always reduce price in order to the business,which lead to serious unfair competition in audit industry.With the increasing firms and the tender,low-cost competition becomes more intense.Some firms in Sichuan took part in low—cost competition toself-development.The audit fees influence directly inputs of resource in auditing procedure,especially the test procedure and the score,so to affect the quality and the social vale of independent audit.In case of low audit fees.the auditors will finish a lot of auditing in short time to reduce costs,which give the auditors more pressure or can’t ensure the auditing qual ity.⑶The low quality of auditors①The limited experience and the abilities of the auditorsThe limited audit abilities lead to complete the audit businesses is even worse,orthe audited content and request between the community and the audit occupation sector are disagreed,which put them involve in the responsibility of unpleasant litigation.For a long time,the audit occupation sectors have thought the implementation of auditing according to auditing standards is to fulfill their duties,and the accountability and the audit responsibilities may be distinguished.The public not only desire the auditors issue the report for financial information,and require they can discover all the false and the wrong information in the audited department.The increased audit responsibilities are adapted to the demand for the public,but increase the audit risk.So,the audit abilities are relative to meet the demand for the public,and not absolute.The audit abilities are always different from the public demand.②The poor of audit staff and professional responsibilityThe auditing is a kind of specialized technical service,so the auditors have the responsibility to plan their auditing to discover the false that maybe cause significant impact on financial statements.In the same time,the auditors ought to apply the personal technology and career concerns in the process of auditing.The responsibility and the career concern s of auditors are important to the auditing conclusion.The responsibility request the auditors to own high moral characters,integrity personality,and meticulous work spirit,with a solid accounting,auditing,legal knowledge and basic audit skills,keen analytical skills and the ability to determine accurate.In China,CPAs is less;both the age structure and knowledge structures of most CPAs are more unreasonable.In order to get more CPAs,the heads of firm s tried their best.So many CPAs are linked to the firms,such as in Sichuan.The linked CPAs decreased their auditing independent.③Flawed method of modern auditModem audit methodology emphasis the balance between audit costs and audit risk,so admitting the existence of a little audit risk is the necessary premise in audit procedures;audit sampling methods and methods of application of analytical review throughout the audit process.And therefore the result of the review is bound to a certain degree of error.The developing auditing is facing more competitions,and competitions result in margin profit reduced.In order to maintain margin profit,the auditing career must keep the balance between efficiency and effects,which is to strive for maximum audit efficiency in the time of maintaining the auditing effects.Consequently,the auditors put audit strength focused on all important projects,to give up some procedures that the auditors think unnecessary.The auditors also are willing to bear certain risks taken based on reviewing the part of all operations.Although sampling theory has studied the deep,in specific application to the audit,the auditors did not quite grasp the sample can be taken by the representative of the overall,subjective conclusions can be drawn between objective fact and the deviation from the always exist.④Time pressureUnder more competition in audit service market,the CPAs are facing thepressure from different sources,such as competition,the firms’ internal management,the clients,and the third—party(e.g.SFC),and the pressure is increased by the request of reducing time to finish the auditing.Time pressure is as an environmental factor influencing on the audit performance,which importance are increasing,and are paid attention to.Due to customers’ own demand,they require firms finish the audit work within the period provided,time pressure are transacted to the CPAs,and the audit risk are increased accordingly.The strategy reducing audit risk of CPAs⑴Regulate the functions of law enforcement and government supervision departmentsIn reasonable regulation and control of“two hands”of both the market and the government,many economic activities of accounting entity operate progressively with market--oriented;many non-standard economic activities are reduced;the disclosure of accounting information are becoming increasingly standardized;CPAs will not be difficult to make decisions by dilemma faced;audit risk will be reduced naturally.When CPAs find in practice that policy is inconsistencies of the legislation,administrative law enforcement and regulation are weak,accounting activities of the entity are non—standard,CPAs should communicate with the relevant functional departments timely,to enhance the normative and operational of policy-making.Such CPA reduces the audit risks,and increases the efficiency of the audit..⑵Accounting firms should be improved①Accounting firm to establish a sound internal operational mechanism,an d improve the quality of theinternal control system,and to establish the risk of liability systemFrom the perspective of risk control,the firm should establish and improve the internal total qualitymanagement systems,in particular ensure to perfect the implementation process.The establishment and improvement of audit quality control system are the powerful measures to reduce the fraud and control audit risk.Quality control is an important component of internal control of the system in the firms,and locates in the core position of the system.Strict assessment methods for audit quality,and reducing or eliminate staff errors,timely detecting and resulting problems arising in the course of auditing,are to ensure audit quality and reduce audit risk.Everything must be checked,operated,responded and accessed by some people;a problem can be reflected in a timely manner,and can clearly define the responsibilities.Accounting firm should also establish mechanisms to transfer risk to circumvent their own risk in process of auditing.②Establishing and use the mechanisms of professional guidanceThe firm should establish the mechanisms of professional guidance to ensureCPAs in the situation beyond own knowledge to acquire advisory services timely and appropriate operational guidance.For example,the accounting firm will be able to employ legal,economic,technical expels;the auditors make judgments and decisions for the authority backed by professionals,so that it can enhance the findings of the audit risk respectability.⑶To improve the overall quality of CPAsIt should be noted that accounting firms have to do a good job within the work of two aspects:one is in the recruitment of professionals,the strict quality,and not employ the candidates without the conditions.On the other hand,attention should be paid to the existing CPAs’ continually follow—up education.For extremely complex elements in the Chinese economy,the new requirements and the new policy are emerging.Object and content of the audit are constantly changing,so there should be a system that each of CPAs has the opportunity to learn new knowledge and continuously improve their operational capacity.At the same time,we must also strengthen the rigid constraints of professional ethics.Institute of Certified Public Accountants must strengthen the supervision of the accounting firms and CPAs,to ensure the healthy development of the industry.⑷CPAs perfect themselves①Strictly abide by professional ethics and industry standardsSO far.China has formulated and promulgated a 48 independent auditing standards and related professional norms,has established basically a system of professional norms for CPAs.CPAs practice only in strict accordance with professional standards and the audit procedures necessary,they are possible to form the correct audit findings Therefore,it is particularly important to control risk,to maintain good work ethics,to strictly comply with the requirements of professional standards for the implementation of audit operations and issuing the audit report.②Focus on the important auditing activity of the quality controlBefore the audit CPAs in the audit is necessary to correctly handle the relationship between audit risks and the importance concept,the collection of evidence,use the model of audit risk to analyze factors,and accurate estimate effectively audit risk,the risk of material misstatement.Considering the principle of cost an d profit,CPAs may determine audit methodology within the cost of evidence collection,to prepare the implementation plan.In phase of control,the main things is to review the plan in line with the clien ts’ requests,including the contents of the audit,scope,completion time and the division of labor,and according to the actual situation to the revised scheme to enhance the timeliness of audit work and effects.CPAs should check the adequacy of audit methodology,the correct of audit basis,the adequacy of audit evidence,audit determination is appropriate or is not appropriate,the integrity and the logic of data.At the same time,prepare high-quality audit work papers,the auditors must exchange views with audited units about audit reports,and listen to the views of the clients and the parties.Such audit risk of CPAswill be reduced naturally in accounting firms.③T0 maintain the sensitivity of the audit environmentIt is the important matter that CPAs should comprehend the customers and all aspects about audit project to find audit risk and to avoid lega1.Before auditing,auditors should be aware of the following environmental matters and maintain the sensitivity:The region’s financial and economic situation and de velopment trend of change,the impact of existing policies,laws and regulations on the operation and management of customers and the extent,client’s legal representative and its major internal changes in management personnel and external flows,the improvement situation of internal control system of client,accounting systems,The auditing standards and their application situation,the knowledge and the development trend of related technology.④Audit responsibilities must be clearIn the audit process,on specific project tasks,it is necessary to refine the division of labor,and the responsibility of the audit team members put in place.At the same time,the project manager has to do well the work of supervision and inspection in the entire audit process,and gives recognition to the excellent project team,and holds the team fault liability for the audit risk in violation of the provisions an d slack work.ConclusionIn China,auditing is high-risk profession.The main bearer of the risk is CPA,and the goal every accounting firm need to pursuit is to reduce the audit risk of CPA.Only reduce the audit risk of CPA,the development of accounting firm can be achieved continuously.目录1.有关会计师事务所审计风险和防范的探讨1.1审计风险研究的目标和意义 (1)1.2会计师事务所存在的问题 (1)1.3审计风险增加的原因 (3)1.4注册会计师降低审计风险的策略 (5)1.5结论 (7)1.有关会计师事务所审计风险和防范的探讨1.1审计风险研究的目标和意义审计风险不仅影响注册会计师的切身利益,而且跟经营风险是成正比的。

审计外文文献

审计外文文献

INFORMATION PLEASEI read Annie Beaudin's article "Changes ahead" (August) with interest, but noted a major omission. "One of the requirements of CAS 265 is the communication of all internal control deficiencies noted during the audit" (p.4Ι). In fact, the CAS specifies which deficiencies identified during the audit the auditor is required to communicate to management and those charged with governance. Under paragraph 9 of the CAS, the auditor is required to communicate in writing significant deficiencies in internal control identified during the audit to those charged with governance on a timely basis.According to paragraphs Ⅰ0and A22,the auditor must communicate to management significant deficiencies in internal control that have been referred to those charged with governance, and other deficiencies in internal control identified during the audit that, in the auditor's professional judgment, are of sufficient importance to merit management's attention, taking into account the likelihood and potential magnitude of misstatements that may arise in the financial statements as a result of those deficiencies. The author did not address the matter of professional judgment.In preparing for the transition to CASs, auditors should be able to rely on the in-formation published in CAmagazine.Jacques Grenier, CA Quebec CityTechnical editor's reply:The purpose of "Changes ahead" was to briefly describe the most significant differences between the Canadian auditing standards (CAS) and current generally accepted auditing standards, including the standard on communicating deficiencies in internal control (CAS 265). The article mentions one of the requirements of CAS 265, which is to communicate all internal control deficiencies noted during the audit. This requirement can also be found in The CICA's Guide to ISAs in Canada.In his letter, Jacques Grenier provides some relevant, albeit more detailed, explanations on the application of this standard, which was not the objective of the article. Its purpose was only to provide an overview of the major differences. Yves Nadeau, CA.FRAUD PREVENTIONIn "The fraudster next door" (Value added, September), James Hunter, KPMG's national leader of forensic practice, says that to prevent and detect fraud, a companyshould focus on three things. The No. Ⅰmethod, he suggests, is tohave an effective whistleblowing hotline. The other two things are a code of business conduct and a system for prescreening new hires.Perhaps I have been removed from the audit business for too long, but I would still hang my hat on a robust system of internal control to prevent and detect fraud in my business. The three methods suggested by Hunter have their place but more as a complementary way to the core internal control system. Chris Eivers, CABrantford, Ont.OUT OF THE OFFICEAs a CA who teaches the skills of connect-ing (networking), I was delighted to read in Yan Barcelo's "Ten ways to add value" (August) that access to networks was one of the Ⅰ0 ways accountants add value to SMEs. As part of our workshops, we ask participants to complete an online anonymous survey to rate their networking skills, attitudes and networks in work and life in addition to sharing their networking challenges. I am always amazed to see how many accountants are uncomfortable in a networking situation and hence do not make the effort to build a network of depth, breadth and reach. They go to aprofessional development course and sit with people they know. They go to a conference and at the break get on their BlackBerrys instead of talk-ing with the people around them.We find most people are uncomfortable because they think networking is about selling. We have a philosophy called Positive Networking that focuses on discovering what you can do for someone else. It is about having a natural curiosity about people, asking them questions to determine how you might be able to add value to their lives. At a recent workshop for CAs, I read them Barcelo's comments.。

审计研究必读国外文献(适用于会计学研究生 )

审计研究必读国外文献(适用于会计学研究生 )
3
★(1)Craswell, A. T., J. R. Francis, and S. L. Taylor. 1995. Auditor brand name reputations and industry specialization.Journal of Accounting and Economics20(3): 297-322.
★(2)Hogan, C. E., and D. C. Jeter. 1999. Industry Specialization by Auditors.Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory18 (1)Байду номын сангаас 1-17.
4
The Determinants ofAuditor Choice/ Auditor Quality
★(1)Francis, J. and E. Wilson. 1988. Auditor changes: A joint test of theories relating to agency costs and auditor differentiation.The Accounting Review63 (4): 663-682.
Audit Research
PROPOSED CLASS SCHEDULE
Topic
Date
Content
1
Conceptual foundation and economics of auditing
★(1)DeAngelo, L. (1981a), “AuditorIndependence, ‘Low Balling’, and Disclosure Regulation”,Journal of Accounting & Economics, December, pp. 113-127.
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审计外文文献注册会计师审计拜因顿J R美国注册会计师协会独立审计的财务报表是最好的知名会计师事务所提供的服务之一,然而,它也是最不被理解的项目。

那些投资超过47万,公开举行的美国公司本身的股份超过14600的投资者从事注册会计师给予保证财务报表符合一般公的这些公司需要发行的财务报表。

认会计原则进而添加信誉,对管理的财务进行交涉。

独立审计的概念已经在越来越多成为的股东愿意投资并且在这个国家的企业的未来的关键要素。

会计师事务所已获得的专业知识,需要符合下列要求公司的财务报表的整体公平的专业意见:获得至少大专程度或同等程度的认可;通过严格的,正式的国家考试;并取得资格的注册会计师证书和国家许可证的具体经验。

注册会计师的独立性,客观性和完整性是会计专业的基本原理的进一步指导。

之前,投资者或者其他利害关系人都能够依靠核数师的报告来决定投资多少,但是他们必须先获得的一般理解的审计是什么和它不是什么。

一、什么是审计基于审计的财务资料后,准备由核数师,但不管理。

核数师不会表达对可取的投资或贷款公司的管理能力的判断,但必须确保员工是诚实的和主管。

注册会计师采用先进的测试技术和专业判断,在既定标准的参数,以达到按照一般公认会计原则的财务报表的整体公平知情意见的要求。

虽然审计的目的不是为了发现所有欺诈,但是审计师需要设计审核,以提供合理的保证,在财务报表中存在的重大错误或违规行为被发现。

二、审计的特点对于注册会计师来说审查财务报表中记录的所有交易几乎是不可能的。

核数师通常根据他或她的意见,选择测试使用采样技术。

审计提供保证财务报表重大错报,而不是绝对精度的保证,通常是基于经济和合理的水平。

对于之前形成的意见,审计师必须考虑公司的内部控制结构,分为控制环境,会计制度和控制程序。

核数师使用这方面的知识,在财务报表重大错报风险的识别和设计程序,以降低风险。

核数师在所有审计的规划和最后审查阶段也需要使用的分析方法,这是对于财务信息的评价。

此外,审计师有义务考虑是否对总体审计结果提出了有关该公司的能力留在企业的重大疑问。

如果有疑问,该公司可以继续为“持续经营”,说明这段期间内的审计报告中必须包括。

三、审计员的标准报告当审核完成后,核数师发出的一份报告,指出注册会计师的责任,执行工作的性质,得出的结论达成。

标准核数师的报告分为三段:引言段,范围段,意见段。

入门款的是区别管理的责任,为区分财务报表的核数师的责任,以表达对他们的看法。

范围段明确指出,计划和执行审计,以获取有关财务报表是否无重大错误或违规的合理保证。

它还为形成核数师作为一个整体的财务报表发表意见的审计和状态的简要说明提供了参考。

四、意见段提出的核数师的结论1.最近的专业发展质量控制是审计的重要组成部分,它有助于确保注册会计师的做法是否遵循适当的标准。

自1988年一来,AICPA的成员投票的会计和审计实务的需要定期的独立审查。

1988年4月,中注协审计准则委员会回应市民的关注和有关审计和审计师发出九个新审计准则报表的误解。

其中大部分的标准是有效的,1989年1月1日或以后开始的财务报表期间的审计,旨在提高核数师的性能及核数师通信。

规范修订的核数师报告的标准是新的标准之一,以划分为核数师的责任和核数师做的工作,并保证核数师提供更清晰的描述。

这是四十年来在核数师的报告标准的最重大的变化。

其他新的标准包括支付欺诈和非法行为的检测等,是为了更有效的进行审计,并改进内部沟通。

2.总结审计报告是为了沟通的核数师的责任和得出的结论。

该报告载于标准化的措辞,有特定的含义。

某些特殊情况下,核数师可能会修改报告。

在这种情况下,应当对任何修改的原因进行说明。

当存在错误追究注册会计师的责任是,这些报告中他们的意见便是证据,这也进而影响着他们的职业操守和声誉。

3.审计的目的审计的主要目标是为由管理层编制的相当符合一般公认会计原则财务报表和不包含重大错报提供合理保证。

这些措施包括金融的错误,无意的失实陈述或遗漏报表和违规行为,故意虚报或遗漏。

(虚报被认为是物质,如果他们是足以让在一个合理的财务报表使用者决策的差异。

)是为注册会计师的意见的形式和获得潜在的财务状况提供保证,是公司经营成果和现金流量的测试数据。

要做到这一点,应当以注册会计师审计准则审计准则委员会美国注册会计师协会(AICPA的)发出的声明作为指导。

此外,主观专业判断也是参与手段之一。

4.核数师形成的专业意见包含以下几种类型:不合格(影响审计工作,并没有很大的局限性,无重大缺陷存在的财务报表)合格(核数师的工作范围已大幅限制,或有一个普遍接受的会计原则的材料出发) 声明(限制在审计的范围是如此普遍,审计师不能形成上演示的公正性的意见) 不利(偏离一般公认会计原则,财务报表不公平目前该公司的财务状况是如此显着) 基本的一点是要记住,看来是只是一个民意调查显示,专业判断,并不能保证,已管理的财务报表。

任何用户必须仔细审核的财务报表和所有相关的注脚,除了核数师的报告。

A CPA is An AuditorByington J RThe American Institute of Certified Public AccountantsIndependent auditing of financial statements is one of the best known services that certified public accountants provide; however, it is also the least understood.Over 47 million investors own shares in more than 14,600 publicly held U.S. companies. Such companies are required to issue financial statements. CPAs are engaged to add credibility to management'sfinancial representations by giving assurance that the financial statements conform to generally accepted accounting principles. The concept of the independent audit has been a key element in the growing number of shareholders willing to invest in the future of this nation's businesses.CPAs have acquired the expertise to give a professional opinion on the overall fairness of a company's financial statements from having metthe following requirements: obtained at least a college degree or its equivalent; passed a rigorous two-and-a-half day national examination; and obtained specific experience to qualify for the CPA certificate and a state license. CPAs are further guided by the accounting profession's basic tenets of independence, objectivity, and integrity.Before investors or other interested parties can determine how much they are able to rely on the auditor's report, they must first gain a general understanding of what an audit is and what it is not.What an Audit is NotThe financial information upon which the audit is based is prepared not by the auditor, but by management.An auditor does not express a judgment on the competence of management, advise on the desirability of investing in or lending to a company, nor assure that employees are honest and competent.The CPA uses sophisticated testing techniques and professional judgment, within the parameters of established standards, to reach an informed opinion on the overall fairness of the financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.Although the purpose of an audit is not to uncover all fraud, the auditor is required to design the audit to provide reasonable assurance that material errors or irregularities that exist in the financial statements are detected. Characteristics of an AuditIt is virtually impossible for a CPA to examine all transactions recorded in financial statements. The auditor bases his or her opinionon selective testing using sampling techniques. Audits provide an economical and reasonable level of assurance that the financial statements are free of material misstatements, rather than a guarantee of absolute accuracy.Before forming an opinion, the auditor must consider the company's internal control structure, which is divided into the control environment, accounting system, and control procedures. The auditor uses this knowledge to identify the risk of misstatement in the financial statements and then designs procedures to reduce that risk.The auditor also is required to use analytical procedures, which are evaluations of financial information, in the planning and final review stages of all audits.In addition, the auditor is obligated to consider whether theoverall audit results raise substantial doubt about the company'sability to stay in business. If there is doubt that the company can continue as a "going concern", an explanatory paragraph must be included in the audit report.The Auditor's Standard ReportWhen an audit is completed, the auditor issues a report that states the CPA's responsibility, the nature of the work performed, and the conclusions reached.The auditor's standard report consists of three paragraphs: an introductory paragraph, a scope paragraph, and an opinion paragraph. The introductory paragraph differentiates management's responsibilities forthe financial statements from the auditor's responsibility to express an opinion on them.The scope paragraph explicitly states that the audit was planned and performed to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material errors or irregularities. It also provides a brief description of what is involved in an audit and states that the auditor formed an opinion on the financial statements taken as a whole.The third or opinion paragraph presents the auditor's conclusions.Recent Professional DevelopmentsQuality control is a vital part of a CPA's practice in that it helps ensure that appropriate standards are followed. In 1988, AICPA members voted to require regular independent reviews of their accounting and auditing practices.In April 1988, the AICPA Auditing Standards Board responded to the public's concerns and misperceptions about what an audit is and what auditors do by issuing nine new statements on auditing standards. These standards, most of which are effective for audits of financial statements periods beginning on or after January 1, 1989, are designed to improve auditor performance and auditor communications.One of the new standards revised the auditor's standard report so that it gives clearer descriptions of the auditor's responsibility, the work the auditor does, and the assurance the auditor provides. This isthe most substantial change in the auditor's standard report in forty years.Other new standards cover the detection of fraud and illegal acts, more effective audits, and improved internal communications.In SummaryThe auditor's report is intended to communicate the auditor's responsibility and conclusions reached. The report is set forth in standardized wording that has a specificmeaning. At times, because of particular circumstances, the auditor may modify the report. In such cases, the reasons for any modification are noted. When CPAs affix their names to these reports, their opinions are not to be treated lightly. Their professional integrity and reputation are at stake.The Purpose of an AuditThe primary objective of an audit is to provide reasonable assurance that the financial statements prepared by management are fairly presented in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles and do not contain material misstatements. These include errors-unintentional misstatements or omissions in financial statements-and irregularities-intentional misstatements or omissions. (Misstatements are considered material if they are significant enough to make a difference in the decisions of a reasonable financial statement user.) This assurance, in the form of the CPA's opinion, is obtained by testing the data underlying financial position, results of operations,and cash flows. To do this, the CPA is guided by statements on auditing standards issued by the Auditing Standards Board of the AmericanInstitute of CPAs (AICPA). Also, subjective professional judgment is involved.The auditor then forms one of the following types of professional opinions:, Unqualified (no significant limitations affected audit performance and nomaterial deficiencies exist in the financial statements), Qualified (the scope of the auditor's work is significantly restricted, or there isa material departure from generally accepted accounting principles), Disclaimer (restrictions in the audit's scope are so pervasivethat the auditorcannot form an opinion on the fairness of the presentation), Adverse (departures from generally accepted accounting principles are sosignificant that the financial statements do not fairly present the company'sfinancial position)The basic point to remember is that an opinion is just that-an opinion indicating that a professional judgment, not a guarantee, has been given on management's financial statements. Any user must carefullyreview such financial statements and all related footnotes, in addition to the auditor's report.。

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