博弈论第五讲
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Signaling Games:
Figure Illustrations
Yongqin Wang CCES, Fudan
Beer – Quiche
2
A Pooling equilibrium
3
A Separating equilibrium
4
A hybrid equilibrium
5
Job Market Signaling
• • • •
16
Course review
Static game of incomplete information
• Incomplete information and imperfect
information
• Harsanyi transformation (nature and types)
• Requirements and definition
• Continuation equilibrium • The importance of beliefs
• Pooling, separating, hybrid equilibrium
• Signaling game
• Costly signaling (job market signaling) • Cheap talk (*)
Used broadly in political economy and politics
How to make yourself influential?
•
Doing good rather than doing well
14
Discussion
The refinement of PBEs The importance of beliefs and correlating devices
• Bayesian Nash Equilibrium • Mechanism design (*)
• Revelation principle • screening
17
Course review
Dynamic game of incomplete information
• Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
18
Good Luck!
19
• • • • •
Different sender-types have different preferences Receiver’s preference depends on sender’s types Receiver’s preferences are not completely opposed to sender’s Usually monetary transfer are not allowed People (senders) are more heterogeneous
• Pure strategy • Mixed strategy
Extensive representation Game tree and subgame Subgame perfection Backward induction and limitations
Dynamic game of complete information
11
A separating equilΒιβλιοθήκη Baidubrium
12
An intuitive separating equilibrium
(Cho-Kreps, 1987)
13
Costless signaling: cheap talk
Heuristics: for cheap talk to be informative:
• You are what you believe • What is dynamics, anyway?
15
Course review
Static Game of complete information
• •
Dominant Strategy Equilibrium Nash Equilibrium
6
Equilibrium
(when mixed strategies are allowed)
7
If t were common knowledge
8
No need to imitate
9
Want to imitate
10
A pooling equilibrium
(e*(L), e*(H) are the first best levels)
Figure Illustrations
Yongqin Wang CCES, Fudan
Beer – Quiche
2
A Pooling equilibrium
3
A Separating equilibrium
4
A hybrid equilibrium
5
Job Market Signaling
• • • •
16
Course review
Static game of incomplete information
• Incomplete information and imperfect
information
• Harsanyi transformation (nature and types)
• Requirements and definition
• Continuation equilibrium • The importance of beliefs
• Pooling, separating, hybrid equilibrium
• Signaling game
• Costly signaling (job market signaling) • Cheap talk (*)
Used broadly in political economy and politics
How to make yourself influential?
•
Doing good rather than doing well
14
Discussion
The refinement of PBEs The importance of beliefs and correlating devices
• Bayesian Nash Equilibrium • Mechanism design (*)
• Revelation principle • screening
17
Course review
Dynamic game of incomplete information
• Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
18
Good Luck!
19
• • • • •
Different sender-types have different preferences Receiver’s preference depends on sender’s types Receiver’s preferences are not completely opposed to sender’s Usually monetary transfer are not allowed People (senders) are more heterogeneous
• Pure strategy • Mixed strategy
Extensive representation Game tree and subgame Subgame perfection Backward induction and limitations
Dynamic game of complete information
11
A separating equilΒιβλιοθήκη Baidubrium
12
An intuitive separating equilibrium
(Cho-Kreps, 1987)
13
Costless signaling: cheap talk
Heuristics: for cheap talk to be informative:
• You are what you believe • What is dynamics, anyway?
15
Course review
Static Game of complete information
• •
Dominant Strategy Equilibrium Nash Equilibrium
6
Equilibrium
(when mixed strategies are allowed)
7
If t were common knowledge
8
No need to imitate
9
Want to imitate
10
A pooling equilibrium
(e*(L), e*(H) are the first best levels)