政府预算软约束——英文文献摘录
软预算约束外文文献翻译中英文2020
软预算约束外文翻译中英文2020英文Determinants of soft budget constraints: How public debt affects hospital performancein AustriaMichael Berger, Margit Reichmann, Thomas Czypionka AbstractSoft budget constraints (SBCs) undermine reforms to increase hospital service efficiency when hospital management can count on being bailed out by (subnational) governments in case of deficits. Using cost accounting data on publicly financed, non-profit hospitals in Austria from 2002 to 2015, we analyse the association between SBCs and hospital efficiency change in a setting with negligible risk of hospital closure in a two-stage study design based on bias-corrected non-radial input-oriented data envelopment analysis and ordinary least squares regression. We find that the European debt crisis altered the pattern of hospital efficiency development: after the economic crisis, hospitals in low-debt states had a 1.1 percentage point lower annual efficiency change compared to hospitals in high-debt states. No such systematic difference is found before the economic crisis. The results suggest that sudden exogenous shocks to public finances can increase the budgetary pressure on publicly financed institutions, thereby counteracting a pre-existing SBC.Keywords: Data envelopment analysis, Soft budget constraints, Hospital efficiency, Bootstrapping, Public debt, Hospital budgets1. IntroductionIn their quest to safeguard the financial sustainability of health-care systems, policymakers in several countries have implemented reforms targeting the efficiency of health-care service provision in public hospitals. A prime example is the introduction of payments based on prospective diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) (see Dan (2013), Kittelsen et al. (2007), but also Wagstaff and Moreno-Serra (2009) for surveys). Yet the effectiveness of these reforms is undermined as long as public hospitals can expect to be bailed out in times of financial distress, typically by subnational governments. Indeed, public hospitals are often subject to a soft budgetconstrain t (SBC), i.e. ‘an ex ante behavioural regularity, which exerts an influence on the firm's decision’ (Kornai, 1979, 1986). Hospital bailouts are often the only politically viable option at hand when policymakers want to avoid snubbing their constituency.Brekke et al. (2015) and Shen and Eggleston (2009) use the inverse of the probability of a hospital closure as a measure of budgetary softness. In many cases, however, the probability of hospital closure converges towards zero, if the probability of bailout is virtually 100% in practice. Alternatively, the problem can be expressed via the federal governments' commitment not to bail out additional expenditure at the local level (see Bordignon and Turati (2009)). The central issue, however, remains unchanged: Why should hospital management care about efficiency and not simply act as a budget-maximizing bureaucrat, as outlined in Niskanen's model of bureaucracy (Niskanen (1968))? Most likely, there will be an implicit upper limit on the maximum deficit that is tolerated without the owners/financiers replacing the management. Hospital management hence faces the dilemma of maximizing hospital budget and avoiding being laid off. Using the probability of a bailout as a measure of the softness of budgetary constraints neglects this dimension.When hospital closures are unlikely, there is an additional caveat to the approach used by Brekke et al. (2015) and Shen and Eggleston (2009). If the probability of hospital closure converges towards zero for all hospitals, the budgetary constraint is equally soft for all hospitals and there should be no systematic differences in the efficiency changes between hospital groups. However, we propose that systematic differences in efficiency change can indeed be observed in countries with subnational autonomy like Austria. While the likelihood of hospital closure approaches zero, the debt burden of the states, which ultimately have to absorb any hospital deficits within the state, significantly influences the degree of budgetary softness, leading to systematic differences in state-level hospital efficiency changes. The financial crisis in 2009 and the subsequent European debt crisis constituted a strong exogenous shock to Austria's public finances. EU legislation, adopted as a consequence of the debt crisis, further exposed so-called ‘hidden debts’ in Austria, including the debt of publiclyowned hospitals. It is likely that revealing the ‘hidden debt’ of public hospitals further aggravated the problem of public debt, i.e. the compliance with the Maastricht criteria, in the political domain. A key hypothesis for the present analysis is that states with relatively high public debt were hit hardest by this development, which considerably limited the financial leeway of these state governments. The financial crisis, therefore, caused a rift in the budgetary constraints of hospitals in high-debt states, tilting the dilemma of hospital management towards higher budgetary discipline by making running deficits in the aftermath of the financial crisis more problematic.The empirical evidence from Austria is of interest for the following reasons: the Austrian DRG system does not cover the entire costs of publicly and privately owned non-profit hospitals providing publicly funded acute care (for simplicity referred to as ‘public hospitals’ henceforth). It only stipulates that at least 51% of hospital costs have to be financed out of market-like revenues (Bundesgesetzblatt, 2017b), thereby implementing a rather soft budget constraint. The 51%-rule was supposed to ensure that public hospitals could still be assigned to the private sector according to the European System of Accounts 1995) (ESA) (Bundesgesetzblatt, 2005). Any extra cost must be borne by regional authorities (state governments and municipalities) and the hospital owners (Bundesgesetzblatt, 2017a). In the past, publicly owned hospitals or hospital companies could count on the recovery of any extra cost, not least because of the high political pressure to ensure public hospital care. Since 2010, however, the ESA has deemed that any debt the state is held liable for must be assigned to the public sector. As a consequence, any deficits of public hospitals cause an increase in the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product (GDP) and thus endanger compliance with the Structural Pact 2012 (StP 2012) (Bundesgesetzblatt, 2013), which ratified the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (2012). Federal, state and local governments agreed to sustainably comply with a system of multiple fiscal rules introduced in 2017 to increase budgetary discipline. Non-compliance triggers financial sanction mechanisms, representing a major innovation compared to the Maastricht criteria.The purpose of this paper is threefold: firstly, we investigate whether differentdegrees of SBC can arise even when hospital closure is not a politically viable option. As this is a scenario that may occur quite frequently for public hospitals, we adapt the approach for modelling SBC used in Brekke et al. (2015) and Shen and Eggleston (2009) to better account for such situations by using public debt as an indicator of budgetary softness. Secondly, we use the financial crisis in 2009 and the ensuing European debt crisis as an exogenous shoc k to the states’ financial situations in our study framework, which affects hospital efficiency changes via the SBC, even though the probability of hospital closure remains negligible. Due to some methodical challenges related to the data in this study, our study design does not allow a causal interpretation of the results. Our results should, therefore, be considered as explorative rather than as definitive empirical evidence. The literature further suggests that there is also an association between hospital ownership and efficiency (see, e.g. Chen et al. (2019) for a short overview of the relevant literature) or ownership and budget constraints (see, e.g. Eggleston (2008)). Against this background, we thirdly assess whether private owners respond differently to changes in the budgetary constraints compared to public owners. To serve our purposes we use a two-stage study design combining data envelopment analysis (DEA) with subsequent regression analysis.2. Literature reviewResearch into the SBC started with two seminal papers by Kornai (1979, 1986), who interpreted an SBC as a fiscal response of the government to avoid unemployment and secure public services in times of recession. Kornai, Maskin, and Roland (2003)broadened the range of SBC instruments, including tax concessions to foster certain producers, and administrative restrictions and import tariffs to hamper competitors. Theoretical models that attempt to predict the occurrence of an SBC are reviewed by Maskin (1996) who concludes that the centralization of credit allocation and production as well as public ownership of capital promote SBC.More recent contributions recognize that a budget constraint may be not only softened but also tightened. Bertero and Rondi (2000) show that public enterprises respond positively in terms of productivity to a shift from soft to hard budget constraints while Besfamille and Lockwood (2008) predict that in a federal country,hard budget constraints may cause regional governments to underprovide public goods in their attempt to maintain budget balance.Recently, several studies have linked SBC theory specifically to the behaviour and performance of hospitals. Brekke et al. (2015) note that an SBC not only covers a deficit but may also entail confiscation of profit. They predict a negative association between the probabilities of bailout and profit confiscation on the one hand and cost-containment efforts on the other. As regards cost efficiency, Wright (2016), considering the responses of both public hospital and government to an SBC, applies game theory to identify conditions that promote the bailout of public hospitals. He concludes that an SBC hurts welfare while competition by a private hospital may enhance it. Duggan (2000) examines the responses of three hospital types (for-profit, private non-profit, and public) to financial incentives created by the US government in favour of indigent patients. The author shows that private for-profit and non-profit hospitals fail to use the additional revenue to improve quality of treatment for the poor; public ones do not seem to act more altruistically, even though they benefit from an SBC. Shen and Eggleston (2009)find that hospitals facing an SBC show less aggressive cost control behaviour, are less likely to shut down safety nets, and have better mortality outcomes. Investigating five hospital closures, Capps et al. (2010) find that the cost savings offset losses in terms of patient welfare in the US aggregate, but not locally. Eggleston et al. (2009) employ panel data on Chinese hospitals to estimate their probability of being bailed out in response to low or negative operating margins in the previous year. The authors relate this indicator of an SBC to hospital performance, with inconclusive results. In a similar vein, Audibert et al. (2011) use the extent of subsidies as an indicator of SBC to analyse the effects of health insurance reform on the technical efficiency of Chinese rural hospitals. They conclude that a higher revenue share of subsidies is negatively related to technical efficiency. In an interesting theoretical development, Levaggi and Montefiori (2013)see the regulator's inability to observe the patient type and to assert hard budget constraints as a reason for patient selection.3. Methods, sample and data3.1. Theoretical backgroundFor analysing the effects of a shift from soft to hard budget constraints, we lean on the approach by Shen and Eggleston (2009), who measure the probability σ of the budget constraint being soft through the inverse of the probability of hospital closure. The probability of hospital closures in Austria is close to zero (although several hospital mergers took place, the individual locations very often continued to exist). We, therefore, link the probability σ of the budget constraint being soft with the budgetary situation of the state, measured as the ratio of financial debt to the state budget. Hospitals in states with a comfortable (critical) budgetary situation are considered to face a high (low) probability σ of the budget constraint being soft. The budgetary situation is critical and points to an impending tightening of budgetary constraints when the government debt ratio is above the average of all nine states. Conversely, the budgetary situation is comfortable if it is below the corresponding mean. This way, the SBC is endogenously determined. We use a time-invariant classification in two groups because we consider the debt ratio of one state relative to the debt ratios of other states to be more important than the (change in the) absolute debt ratio and to be a more conservative choice of estimating the effect of SBCs. For one thing, it is not clear how a unit change in the absolute debt ratio should be defined such that we can reasonably expect it to cause a change in the behaviour of states and hospitals. Additionally, it is unlikely that a change in the absolute debt ratio would have a uniform effect across the entire spectrum of debt ratios. The time-invariant classification circumvents this problem. The states’ debt ratios further cluster the states into two groups (high-debt states and low-debt states). Keeping the number of groups that are compared to each other low allows keeping the number of observations per group as high as possible, which is beneficial in situations with small samples. Lastly, the time-invariant classification is a safer choice, because the timing of any effects is unclear, particularly as some efficiency-enhancing measures may take time to unfold (e.g. when older employees are not laid off, but their position is rather left unfilled once they retire).The rationale behind linking the budgetary situation with the SBC and thehospital efficiency is as follows: the first relevant factor is the financial dependence of the state governments. State governments cannot levy taxes. They depend on the funds allocated based on negotiations with the federal government, creating a situation of vertical fiscal imbalance. A high debt ratio hence increases the dependence of the state government on the federal government, effectively reducing the space for political manoeuvring and the ability to handle costly bailouts. Accordingly, a high debt ratio also increases the credibility of the state government to commit to stricter budgetary rules and not to bail out hospital management.The second relevant factor is the behaviour of hospital management. A priori, we assume hospital managers want to keep their jobs, which could be jeopardized if a bailout is required. However, the blame could be passed to the state government (similar to the blame game in Norway in the 1990s (Tjerbo and Hagen, 2009)), claiming that deficits are due to insufficient funding rather than poor management decisions. This reasoning is easier when the state's resources are abound. The budgetary situation of the states thus increases the stakes associated with a bailout and requires both state governments and hospital management to adapt their behaviour.We implicitly assume in our framework that a reduction in inputs does not affect the quality of hospital care. This is a strong assumption, which is required by the missing availability of quality indicators for Austrian hospitals. Strict budgetary discipline may come at the expense of care quality and patients’ well-being. But high expenditure levels in most European health-care systems and professional ethos could offset this effect and prevent a substantial decline in quality of care when budgets tighten. Of course, hospitals could also reduce the quality of amenities, e.g. meals, which could affect patient satisfaction but not their well-being.Conversely, lower hospital efficiency may also just reflect higher quality of care. Overall, it is unclear, whether the relationship between hospital efficiency, budgetary discipline and quality of care is that close. Empirical evidence suggests that higher efficiency can be realised without curbing quality of care (Piacenza and Turati, 2014; Street et al., 2014).3.2. Sample and dataAustrian hospitals can be classified using various and partly overlapping structural features (Bundesgesetzblatt, 2017a), including, inter alia, the level of care (standard, extended, maximum, and specialized, the categorization depending on the number and combination of the minimum required medical specialties), type of financing (DRG-based, non-DRG-based), benefit status (non-profit, for-profit) and ownership (public or private). We confine our analysis to DRG-financed non-profit hospitals, because legal requirements, service level as well as cost accounting and performance data are unified for this group.In 2015, 120 hospitals were eligible for DRG financing through state health funds, accounting for approximately 71% of the nationwide bed capacity. Of these 120 hospitals, 65 provided standard care, 23 offered extended care, 7 maximum, and 25 specialized care. Only 29 hospitals were privately owned, 25 thereof by religious orders. The 120 hospitals had costs of around € 12.7 billion in 2015.The accounting data provided by the Ministry of Health cover the years 2002–2015. We only focus on the inpatient sector for three reasons: first, the documentation of outpatient services was reformed in 2014, making a structural break in outpatient coding likely. In addition, coding accuracy in outpatient departments before 2014 was not as high as in inpatient departments because the level of outpatient services provided had no impact on the level of funding. Lastly, distortions in outpatient data are likely following differences in the hospital structure and their mapping in terms of coding algorithms (Rous, 2015).The observation period is split into two subperiods (2002–2008, and 2009 to 2015) following a major revision of the DRG system, which came into force in 2009, resulting in substantially increased DRG credits per case and changes in the relative cost weights between the different DRG groups. With inputs stable, this would be reflected by sudden and artificial surges and drops in hospital efficiency within a DEA framework. Since the break in the time series coincides with the onset of the financial crisis, we exploit this circumstance to test whether there was a break in the pattern of hospital efficiency change associated with the timing of the financial crisis. By performing the DEA analyses separately for the two subperiods, we do not considerany efficiency changes from 2008 to 2009 that are likely to be skewed by the DRG re-weighting. In contrast to the immediate re-weighting implications, the impact of a budgetary constraint on the catch-up should be more gradual as hospital management requires some time to take action. A gradual effect following a change in case-mix towards more lucrative DRGs is unlikely, as DRG-funded public hospitals are obliged by law to admit any person in need of care so that patient selection is almost impossible. In addition, hospital management cannot freely decide on the beds per speciality, as these are subject to central planning by the state governments.Although DRG weights are set at the national level, the monetary value of a DRG point may differ between the states, since the ex-ante allocated funds per state are ex-post divided by the total number of DRG points of all hospitals in the respective state. In this regard, a hospitals' ability to generate additional revenue by increasing output (DRG points) are limited. This implies that extra funds are needed in case of overshooting costs. The states have the possibility of allocating funds beyond DRG funds to the different hospitals, not only to address a hospital's specific role in the state's health-care system, but also to cover occurring deficits. How generous this additional funding can be, therefore, depends crucially on the state's financial situation.3.3. Methods: data envelopment analysisWithin the DEA framework, we fall back on technical efficiency. We cannot compute economic efficiency, which secures a particular output level at the lowest cost, as the required data are not available.DEA is chosen over the alternative stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) (Aigner et al., 1997) as SFA requires the specification of a functional relationship between inputs and outputs, usually boiling down to the Cobb−Douglas variant in spite of its severe restriction of unitary elasticity of substitution (see, e.g. Varian (1992), Ch. 1.9). In addition, DEA can deal with multiple outputs without requiring their transformation into costs as a scalar exploiting the duality of output maximization and cost minimization (which holds only at the efficient point). By contrast, estimating a cost function applying SFA requires data on factor prices, information that is unavailablefor public Austrian hospitals.For the DEA, we use the input-oriented non-radial efficiency and super-efficiency models developed by Tone (2001, 2002) (see appendix). The input orientation is justified by noting that public hospital management has more discretionary power over inputs than outputs. The use of the non-radial model has the advantage of capturing input savings beyond their proportionate reduction as in the radial alternative.The bias-corrected catch-up is used as the dependent variable to form a panel data set to estimate the relationship between budget constraints and hospital efficiency change. As the catch-up is based on the bias-corrected estimator for the unobserved efficiency obtained in the first stage, we avoid the fallacy of ignoring the bias term owing to the inherent serial correlation in the estimated catch-up (Simar and Wilson, 2007).In the case of hospital mergers, we compute efficiency scores for the respective subperiod using virtual mergers between the merged hospitals in the years prior to the merger. In the case of mergers of hospitals operating at different care levels, the care level specification of the actual merger is used retrospectively for the virtual merger. Finally, in the case of zero inputs, the hospital is dropped from the sample for the relevant subperiod, including hospitals that ceased their operations during the subperiod.3.4. Methods: regression analysisIn the second stage of the analysis, we utilize the (semi-)time-invariant budgetary situation as a proxy for the softness of the budget constraint. Several factors hinder the implementation of an identification strategy that would allow a causal interpretation of the results: The (semi-)time-invariant variable, in combination with the volatility of the efficiency scores inhibits a difference-in-difference approach as the changing budgetary situation complicates the assignment to the treatment and control group, and the common-trend assumption between the two groups is violated. The small sample size and the lack of suitable data bars the use of an instrumental variable regression.Although unobserved state- and hospital-specific factors are likely to affect hospital efficiency over time, the (semi-)time-invariant SBC variable does not allow using a fixed-effects model. While this comes at the expense of the time dimension not being fully exploited, the specification is more robust to the unclear timing of the SBC effect. To consider unobserved state- and hospital-specific factors, we, therefore, include a set of time-variant and time-invariant hospital characteristics (Czypionka et al., 2014).中文软预算约束的决定因素：公共债务如何影响奥地利的医院绩效迈克尔·伯杰，玛吉特·里希曼，托马斯·齐皮翁卡摘要当医院管理可以依靠（地方）政府在出现赤字的情况下纾困时，软预算约束（SBC）会破坏提高医院服务效率的改革。
企业R&D预算软约束与政府R&D投入制度改革
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文 献 综 述
科 尔奈提 出 的软 预算 约 束概 念 在 经 济学 中到
了广泛应用 ，主要分为两大研究 领域 ：软预算约束 的成 因分析 和 软预 算 约束 的 后果 分 析 。成 因分 析 概括 为两 类 ：一 类 是外 生 性 解释 ，基 于 “ 爱 主 父 义 ” 政 治 目标 ” 政策性负担 ” 、“ 、“ 、产权 、寻租等 角度所 做 出的解释 ；另一类是 内生性 解释 ，特定信
在这一框架下 ，探 讨企业 Ｒ Ｄ软 预算 约束 的形成 ＆ 机制 ，寻求导致 Ｒ Ｄ软预算 约 束的 原 因 ，进 而针 ＆ 对各 种形 成原 因 ，采 取 行 之有 效 的硬 化 预算 约束
收 稿 日期 ：２ １ ０ ０ ０ １— ９— ８
用却不存在 ，如果 Ｒ Ｄ不是 高度 不确 定 的 ，投资 ＆ 者应 选择 内部 融资 。Ｈ ｉ ｏ ｕｎ 、Ｃ ｅ ｇａ ｇ Ｊ ａ ｈｕ Ｈ ａｇ ｈｎ ｇｎ ｚ
Ｘ （９ ８ ｕ １９ ）还研究 了在 Ｒ Ｄ投资风 险高度 不确定 ＆
作者简介 ：韩鹏 （９ ７ ，男，山东潍坊人 ，河 南理 工大学经济管理学 院教授 ，管理学博士 。研 究方向 ： １６ 一）
公 司金 融 。
基金项 目：国家社科基金项 目，项 目编号：ｌＢＹ ７ ；河南省软科 学项 目，项 目编号：１２０ ４０ ５ 。 １ Ｊ０ ７ ０ ４０ ５２ ０
中 图 分 类 号 ：Ｆ ３ ． ９ ８０５２ 文 献标 识 码 ：Ｂ
２０ ０ ９年国家财政科技支 出为 ３２４ ９亿 元 ，在 ２ ．
２０ 年 的基础 上 翻 了一番 ；财政 科 技支 出的增 长 ０５ 速度 首次快 于 国 家财 政支 出 的增 长 速 度 。科 技 支
财政预算软约束、棘轮效应与政府会计治理效能
Fiscal Budget Soft Constraints,Ratchet Effects and Government Accounting Governance Efficiency 作者： 章贵桥[1,2];李增泉[1]
作者机构： [1]上海财经大学工商管理博士后流动站/会计学院,200433;[2]上海大学管理学院,200444
出版物刊名： 会计研究
页码： 41-47页
年卷期： 2018年 第12期
主题词： 棘轮效应;预算松弛;政府产权;外部性;政府会计治理
摘要：现阶段我国政府预算编制与执行过程中普遍存在的棘轮效应和财政预算软约束,导致财政预算利益相关者中的'理性经济人'的逆向选择行为,造成财政资源配置不均衡和资源浪费等不良后果。
本文分析指出,棘轮效应和财政预算软约束是政府产权流通过程中产生的外部溢出效应,根源在于用于监督政府行为的信息缺失。
政府会计作为反映政府行为的重要信息系统,可为政府部门之间的相互监督提供信息来源,有效利用政府会计信息可以增强财政预算投资效益,健全政府财政预算绩治机制,合理增加地方财政收入,并有利于财政预算管理行政法制化建设等,从而可以用于抑制棘轮效应和削弱财政预算软约束的负面影响,助力经济与社会的良性发展。
关于软预算约束文献综述
CO-OPERATIVE ECONOMY &SCIENCE《合作经济与科技》2009年6月号下（总第371期）识，让家电顺利下乡。
各级质监部门要建立家电下乡中标企业质量档案，将中标企业产品质量监督信息录入产品质量信用记录网。
将两次监督检查产品质量安全性项目不合格以及故意违法的企业列入黑名单，报告当地政府，依法查处，吊销许可证或3C 认证证书，建议有关部门取消中标企业家电下乡产品资格。
同时，各级质监部门要检查企业“三包”制度，督促企业贯彻落实国家“三包”规定，及时处理“三包”范围内的质量问题。
鼓励企业上门服务，为用户解决使用中的技术问题。
此外，各级质监部门要及时受理投诉举报，组织有关机构对家电下乡产品质量状况、消费者满意程度进行明察暗访，及时向企业反馈相关信息。
严查各种以假充真、以次充好、以不合格产品冒充合格产品的违法行为；严厉打击借家电下乡之名制假制劣、翻新废旧家电产品、坑农害农等违法行为。
另外，让货真价实的好家电下乡，中标企业首担其责。
家电下乡也是企业扩大市场的大好时机，因此中标企业应结合农村消费特点，在生产、配送、销售、维修等方面都严格遵守家电下乡标准，自觉抵制滞销产品、次品和不合格产品混入下乡产品之中，确保农民买得方便，买得放心。
中国农村现在还处于欠发达的消费购买环境，家电下乡注定就是一场复杂的系统工程。
更何况，中国人办事，讲求的是少安毋躁。
我们不会也不能怀疑各级政府推进这项支农、惠农、便农政策的决心，也有足够的诚意来期待家电下乡工程中涉及的政府各级部门，能更耐心细致地解决家电下乡浮现出来的各种问题。
只是，相关部门应本着务实、诚恳的态度，少作秀，确保政府补贴真正补到农村消费者手中，确保假冒伪劣产品不会坑农、害农，实现政策设计者预期的多赢目标。
总之，可拉动千亿元内需的农村市场的确非常值得期待，家电下乡中的种种不当行为必须杜绝。
而官方或应出台更细致的政策措施以确实保护农民的利益不受损害，唯其如此，才能保证农民对“家电下乡”不会失望，才能保证农村需求能够持续不断地增长。
预算软约束
预算软约束" 在学术文献中的解释1、预算软约束是指,向企业提供资金的机构(政府或银行)未能坚持原先的商业约定,使企业的资金运用超过了它的当期收益的范围2、广义的预算软约束是指当一个预算约束体的支出超过了它所能获得的收益时,预算约束体没有被清算而破产,而是被支持体救助得以继续存活下去3、长期以来,在传统经济体制环境下,国有企业处于一种所有者缺位的状态,国有企业经营者的利益与其所有者的利益处于一个不十分一致的状态,其受到约束相对较少,学术界称为“预算软约束”4、社会主义经济中的国有企业一旦发生亏损,政府常常要追加投资、增加贷款、减少税收,并提供财政补贴,这种现象被亚诺什·科尔奈(Kornai,1986)称为“预算软约束”5、这种现象被亚诺什·科尔奈（Kornai,1986）称为“预算软约束”.科尔奈把社会主义经济中的许多问题都归因于预算软约束的存在.为了取得国有企业改革和社会主义经济改革的成功,消除预算软约束刻不容缓科尔奈版本的预算软约束非常简单，说一个家里，有老子有儿子，老子自然是非常喜欢这个儿子，用他的原话就是“父爱主义”。
老子希望儿子不要成为纨绔子弟，花钱不要大手大脚。
但是呢，这个老子又偏偏是如此溺爱这个孩子。
所以，每次这个儿子找老子要钱，老子都照给不误。
科尔奈就说，有了这么一个老子，养十个儿子估计九个都会变成纨绔子弟。
这个老子就是政府，儿子就是国有企业，要钱就给这件事情就是预算软约束。
科尔奈最初的著作，尽管在理论上并谈不上优美，但是他揭示了一个及其重要的现象，就是在社会主义国家，政府对于国有企业的“父爱主义”，使得这些企业永远不用担心自己的生产是不是有效率，自己的产品是不是有销路，或者自己是不是亏损。
因为企业最后总是可以伸手向政府要钱。
后来有很多人为“父爱主义”提供理论基础，就是这种“父爱”是从哪里来的。
我对文献已经忘得差不多了，Eric Maskin的理论是认为，如果一个非常集中的金融体系，那么银行很可能被一个坏企业给套住。
财政预算研究【英文论文】
Detailed budget content, improve budgeting accuracy. To measure as accurately as possible the estimated annual revenue at the same time, under the existing tax sharing system, to accurately calculate the available financial resources in the region, and scientific and rational way to determine the expenditure budget. To try to strengthen the integrity of the budget, to the government budget has not yet been incorporated into a variety of extra-budgetary funds into the budget preparation as much as possible, so that the budget fully and completely reflect the scope and direction of government activities, to enhance budget transparency and regulatory capacity. Actively promote the standardization of the "zero-based budgeting" to enhance the accuracy of the budget. Zero-based budgeting approach, is to strengthen the budget management, increase efficiency and effectiveness of financial resources and effective method is to establish a socialist market economic system, the objective requirements. Zero-based budgeting, is in the budget, the administrative costs for the determination of the cause, will not consider last year's expenditure base, but according to the units of organization, staffing situation, then the career development plans and tasks accordance with the provisions of the spending criteria determined every year from scratch.The implementation of zero-base budget, you can make the whole become more rational distribution of financial resources, help to improve overall efficiency in the use of financial resources to achieve financial macro-control goals. Preparation of departmental budgets, enhance the integrity of the budget. Departmental budget is generally adopted market economy budgeting, it is a public resource covering all the complete department budget, the government departments according to their functions and the need for unity and social development, the department prepared to reflect all income and expenditure the budget. Preparation of departmental budgets is to deepen the reform of China's socialist market economy and establish the basic requirements of public finance framework, which can make budgeting to further refine and improve transparency, help prevent the budget allocation and implementation of non-standard approach, the same time, there help strengthen the concept of the budget, improve budget management. Introduction of departmental budgets, the budget will further scientific, institutionalized and standardized. Implementation of the consolidated budget management thinking, to achieve revenue and expenditure management system, enhance the scientific nature of the budget. To achieve the purposes of the consolidated budget revenue and expenditure management system is a new situation to strengthen financial management of the inevitable choice, the government is to regulate the distribution, unified government financial, achieve financial stability and balance of important initiatives, which will help to broaden the financial field, increasing regulation of financial resources. Clear procedures for budget operations, enhanced budget management of the normative. Implementation of the standard cycle of budget management that"the budget preparation stage," "budget implementation and adjustment phase" and "accounts stage." Standard cycle of the budget system is a system, a complete system of systems, it covers the whole process of budget management. Implementation of the standard cycle of the budget system for the budgeting of the scientific and standardized to create the conditions.Strengthen expenditure factors, management, improve project management practices. One is to establish a scientific system of classification of budget accounts, the expenditure on the implementation of effective controls and management oversight. Second is the constituent units of the factors to categorize expenditures to develop effective management measures. The third is to further strengthen the financial management of funds, the adjustment of administrative, financial expenditure structure and institutions, standardize the range of expenditures. Improvement of administrative expenses under the control of the way, in accordance with the general principles of the socialist market economy, promote institutional reform in a comprehensive, based on a state law enforcement and supervision department, the scope should be included in administrative expenses, not to exercise the State management functions of various social groups, not all financial assistance for institutional reform has been to companies or industry associations, not by the administrative expenses, funding sources should be adjusted accordingly. Also, do not belong to the administrative nature of the project expenditures to be cleared up. Fourth, the implementation of the government procurement system, strengthen the management of large special expenditure. Fifth, strengthen financial management and control of unreasonable expenses. Sixth, in accordance with the socialist market economic system, transformation of government functions under the requirements, contact the financial practice, in line with the principles of efficiency, reasonable definition of the scope of government powers and financial scope of supply, cancellation and compression is incompatible with the market economic system in general expenditures, and establish a security focused, rational distribution standard, compression restraint strong, strict supervision and management, in line with market economy requires the expenditure of operating mechanism. Also, to strengthen strategic research expenditure, strengthen the financial expenditure is reasonable and scientific.Various departments in the reform of budget management responsibility, to carry heavy budgetary basis of surveys, data, audit summary and other basic work, their work will have a direct impact on the level of quality of budget preparation and budget execution results.Therefore, the first departments should further improve the internal financial institutions, unified by the financial institutions responsible for the preparation of the departmental budgets, enhance the overall budget and integrity; while avariety of funds from financial institutions should be under the centralized management, the separation of money and affairs for centralized scheduling and funding to strengthen the use of funds analysis and oversight. Department heads in accordance with the "Accounting Act" requirements, a true ideological importance of the sector financial management.Followed by the various departments to advance the development of the sector next year career development plan for budget accurately reflect the department when the business needs for capital work. Because the introduction of departmental budgets, the departmental budget by the National People's Congress approved a law must be strictly enforced. The general budget execution in no additional budget, and approval of the financial sector to all sectors of the budget down to the grass-roots units and specific projects shall not be adjusted. Thus requiring all departments and units of the business next year to make a full estimate, taking into account also the possibility of financial resources, not blindly setting up shops, vying for projects, to accurately grasp the department's focus. In doing project work on the basis of investigation and evaluation of the application of the funds for a reasonable sort of funding arrangement will be limited to the most urgent projects. Only do budget work closely with business to promote the successful completion of the work.Budget management is an important function of government, is essential for the healthy operation of the national economy. Budget is approved by the statutory procedures, the Government's basic financial year in a revenue and expenditure plan. Budget norms and arrangements with financial activities, directly reflects the government's policy intentions, the operation is directly related to social and economic good or bad, and therefore must make a careful pre-planning and planning. Thus the budget for scientific, standardized management is particularly important for the revitalization of finance, national economy, budget management is the modern state system of public finance the construction of the basic content, but also to measure a country's financial management is one important indicator of the level of modernization. According to the unified tax system reform, tax, fair tax burden, simplifying the tax system, a reasonable separation of powers to regulate the tax system and establish the tax requirements of market economy system. Its main contents are: 1, the implementation of value-added tax as the main body of the turnover tax system. After the reform of the turnover tax by the value added tax, consumption tax and business tax form, the uniform application to all types of businesses. The general VAT rate is set to 17% of value added, is also a 14% preferential tax rate. Incentive effects of fiscal revenue from the focus, value-added type of design choices of production-type VAT, that any purchase price of fixed assets no deductible. 2, a unified domestic corporate income tax. Simplify the consolidation of different economic sectors of the corporateincome tax rate. All domestic enterprises, including state-owned enterprises, collective enterprises, private enterprises and corporate and other forms of joint ventures, are unified corporate income tax. 3, unified personal income tax. Was the focus of reform is to implement the personal income tax, personal income tax adjustment, urban and rural individual industrial and commercial households income tax consolidation, the establishment of a unified personal income tax. Progressive personal income tax rate to take over the system.。
我国软预算约束的治理_理论与政策
第4期(总第257期) 2005年4月财经问题研究Research on F i n anc i a l and Econo m i c IssuesNumber4(General Serial No1257)Ap ril,2005我国软预算约束的治理:理论与政策①廖国民1,袁仕陈2(11广东外语外贸大学国际经济贸易学院,广东 广州 510420;21湘潭大学商学院,湖南 湘潭 411000)摘 要:软预算约束对我国经济的危害甚大,探讨我国预算软约束的治理意义重大。
本文认为,应当从下述四个方面来治理我国经济中普遍存在的软预算约束问题:(1)推进国有银企的市场化改革,消除政府干预;(2)建立分散化的银行体系,加强对银行体系的有效监控;(3)实行财政分权,加强地区经济之间的竞争;(4)规范政府经济行为,严格财政金融纪律。
关键词:软预算约束;父爱主义;经济危机;经济周期;不良资产中图分类号:F81113 文献标识码:A 文章编号:10002176X(2005)0420016208 “软预算约束”(s oft budget constraints)这一概念最初是由亚诺什・科尔奈(Janos Kornai)于1980年在其著作《短缺经济学》中提出来的。
科尔奈用这一概念来解释社会主义经济中的经济行为及其绩效。
随后的转型文献也大量援引“软预算约束”概念来分析转型经济中政府与企业的行为与效果。
自德瓦特里庞和马斯金(1995)对软预算约束理论的开拓性贡献以来,软预算约束理论在分析银企经济行为及其绩效方面有很强的解释力。
该理论认为,一旦一国经济中存在较严重的预算软约束问题,该国的经济绩效必定低下。
我国经济在转型时期存在严重的预算软约束问题,给我国经济带来了严重后果,这些后果主要表现在:软预算约束导致经济体系的低效率并抑制创新与增长;软预算约束导致经济周期性波动和通货膨胀;软预算约束加剧经济的脆弱性,并引发经济危机。
地方政府的软预算约束及其融资策略
调控能力 ， 为此 中央政府 一方面积极上收
财权 ，另一方 面采取 “ 甩包袱 ”的方式下
（ ）制度 激励和地方主政官 员的最优化 二
目标 政府作为一个 团体 ，是 由那些关注 自
一
引言
放支 出责任 。在改革 之初 ，为了完成这一
早 在上 世纪 ８ 年 代 ，“ ０ 软预算 约束 ” 目标 ，中央 下达 了指令 性很 强 的税 收计 为亦是 由这一群体 中具有关键性 影响的人 理论 就 引起 了高 度 关注 ，学者 们最初 将 划 ， 地方政府 的对策 是采取同时夸大收入 或者小团体来决定 的。从我国的实 际情况 其 应用到 国有企 业融 资行 为 的分析 。 随 和支 出的方式来 “ 完成” 既定税 收收入 ， 其 着财 政联 邦主 义理论 的兴起 ， 软预 算约 结果 是 中央 的可 支配 收入 并没有 显 著增 来看 ，地方政府 的行为很大程度上取决于 “
主动供给型公共品主要是为了经济增长等目标和强制供给型公共品为了完成上级指定任务或者法定支出项并且分现代商业modernbusiness208publicadministration公共管理参考文献1陈健财政联邦制非正式财政与政府债务j财经研究2007年第2期2丛树海财政扩张风险与控制m商务出版社20053周雪光逆向软预算约束
【 内容 摘 要 】
１９ ４年 分 税 制 所 采取 的 集权 化 改 ９ 革 措 施 极 大 的改 变 了地 方 官 员的财 政 激 励 和 其 最优 化 选 择 。由于 面 ｌ ｌ 占的经 济 约 束 的 不 同 ， 方政 府 的 融 资 渠道 更 加 趋 地 于 多元 化 ，也 更 具 隐 蔽性 ，致 使 法 定 的
维普资讯
地方政府的软预算约束
_预算软约束_的新理论及其计量验证
1998年第10期“预算软约束”的新理论及其计量验证平新乔(清华大学经济管理学院 100084) 内容提要:Dewartripont与Maskin(1995年)模型揭示了,当资金沉没于“慢”的投资工程中之后,如再贷款会带来事后有效,则软预算型的再贷款便会发生。
他们将这种均衡结果归因于集中型的金融体制。
Dew artripont与Tirole(1994年,1996年)的另一个模型在M oral Hazart的结构里深刻揭示了可证实的绩效信号门槛水平与不可证实的绩效信号之间的替代关系。
新的软预算理论需要检验。
本文介绍了自己关于Devartripont与M askin模型理论假设的若干检验。
“预算软约束”这一概念对中国经济学界来说并不陌生。
自从1979年科尔奈发表其著名论文《资源约束型与需求约束型体系》和1980年其著作《短缺经济学》出版以来,软预算被广泛地认为是传统的社会主义经济中投资效益低的一个基本原因。
本文所讨论的是:由于博弈论与信息经济学的发展,“预算软约束”这一概念是如何作为一种理论范畴,逐渐在近10年里得到进一步讨论的?这种讨论如何在科尔奈原来的理论基础上增加了新的东西?这种贡献又如何使“预算约束”范畴逐渐发展成一套有关银企关系的理论的?作为参与近10年这场讨论的一种投入,笔者对预算软约束的新理论贡献了什么?笔者只是希望稍微详细地分析上述问题,对于我们如何稳妥地改革国有企业,也许会有些帮助。
一、以博弈论为分析框架的新“预算软约束”理论预算软约束的本来含义是指,向企业提供资金的机构(政府或银行),未能坚持原先的商业约定,使企业的资金运用超过了它当期收益的范围;或者,从跨时期的时间维度来说,提供资金的机构使企业的支出途径越出了其将来收入的现值所确定的限度。
科尔奈的分析集中于政府与国有企业的关系,因此,他指出,社会主义国有企业的预算约束之所以软,其原因是政府对企业实行了“父爱主义”。
关于银行与企业之间关系本身也有可能引出预算软约束问题,科尔奈分析不多。
预算管理外文文献
预算管理外文文献Abstract: Budget management plays a crucial role in the financial stability and success of modern organizations. This literature review examines key concepts, practices, and challenges associated with budget management. The study explores various scholarly perspectives on the importance of effective budgeting, the role of budgetary control, and the impact of budget management on organizational performance.【1】Introduction: The introduction provides an overview of the significance of budget management in today's dynamic business environment. It outlines the main objectives of the literature review, emphasizing the need for organizations to adopt sound budgeting practices to achieve financial goals and sustainability.【2】Theoretical Framework: This section delves into theoretical frameworks that underpin budget management. The review discusses traditional budgeting models, such as incremental budgeting, and contrasts them with contemporary approaches, including zero-based budgeting and activity-based budgeting. The analysis highlights the strengths and weaknesses of each model, providing a foundation for understanding the evolution of budget management theories.【3】Budgetary Control: Budgetary control is a critical aspect of effective budget management. This section explores the role of budgetary control mechanisms in monitoring and regulating organizational expenses. Itdiscusses variance analysis, benchmarking, and other tools used to assess actual performance against budgeted targets.【4】Challenges in Budget Management: Examining challenges in budget management is essential for understanding the complexities faced by organizations. This section addresses common issues such as budgetary slack, resistance to change, and the impact of external factors on budgeting. It also considers how technological advancements and global economic trends influence budget management practices.【5】Impact on Organizational Performance: The relationship between budget management and organizational performance is explored in this section. The review analyzes empirical studies and case examples to demonstrate how effective budgeting positively correlates with financial stability, profitability, and overall success in various industries.【6】Future Trends in Budget Management: As organizations evolve, so do budget management practices. This section discusses emerging trends in budgeting, including the integration of artificial intelligence, data analytics, and agile methodologies. It explores how these trends are reshaping traditional budget management approaches to meet the demands of the rapidly changing business landscape.【7】Conclusion: The conclusion summarizes key findings from the literature review, emphasizing the importance of adaptive budget management strategies for organizational success. It also suggests avenuesfor future research in the field of budget management.Keywords: budget management, budgetary control, organizational performance, budgeting models, challenges, future trends.。
美国政府预算结构和体制(中英文)
11
Phase I: Executive Preparation 第一阶段：行政准备
Three sets of participants:三方参与： The President总统 The Office of Management & Budget 管理和预算办公室 Federal agencies联邦机构
1
What is a Government Budget? 什么是政府预算？
A government’s budget is an itemized summary of estimated or intended expenditures for a given period along with proposals for financing them 政府预算是特定时期内的预计开支或计划开支， 及提议为这些开支提供资金的分类科目。
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President’s Budget Submitted to Congress in Three Formats 总统以三种形式向国会提交预算
Base Line基线预算 Agency–based机构预算 Functional Area功能区域预ine Budget 基线预算
10
The Four Stages of the Budget Cycle 预算周期的四个阶段
Phase 1: Executive Preparation第一阶段：行政准备 Phase 2: Congressional Consideration第二阶段：国会审议 Phase 3: Budget Execution第三阶段：预算执行 Execution Phase 4: Budget Audit/evaluation第四阶段：预算审计/ 评估
预算管理外文论文
Buget managementIntroductionThe NHS reforms have had far reaching implications for clinicians of all grades and specialties . Among other changes , it has been deliberate government policy that senior clinicians should have more direct management and budgetary responsibility within their own clinical areas . Trust hospitals have developed a directorate based management structure and devolved budgets to clinical directors . A&E departments have either become directorates in their own right or associate directorates within larger directorates . A&E consultants who take on clinical directorship responsibilities will have more direct control of spending within their own department . At first this may seem intimidating , but the advantages of having control outweigh the disadvantages of more administrative activity .This article aims to give some guidelines to help make the task less daunting , as well as some tips based on personal experience . I do not intend to cover fund raising activity or the organization of postgraduate education and its funding . Brief mention will be made of …business planning ‟at the end . And we have outlined what management budgeting is and how it differs from traditional budgetary control systems in health authorities;considered what it aims to achieve ; and discussed the participation of clinicians in the management budgeting process and its likely impact on their methods of working.What is a budget?Traditional budgetary control systems are based primarily on a structure of what are normally termed functional or departmental budgets . In this structure budgets are held by those people responsible for providing a service.There is normally no participation of clinical staff in this budgetary control structure other than the possibility that the budget holders for pathology and radiology might be the consultants in charge . This seems strange given the considerable influence that clinicians have over the use of hospital resources .In any system of budgetary control a key principle is that individual budget holders should be held responsible only for those items of expenditure over which they can exert control . In health authorities this principle does not always apply . An extreme example of this concerns the pharmacy budget , where the pharmacist is often held responsible for drugs expenditure even though he has no direct control over the level of spending .Although a budget is a sum of money given to you to run your service ( including salaries and wages of all personnel ) it is important to realize it is essentially a paper exercise similar to running your own bank account and receiving a bank statement . You will never actually see the money and the nitty-gritty of manipulating the account is done by your management collcagues and the finance department . You role as clinical director is to keep a watching brief on it and to make executive decisions as to how it is spent . There are three broad categories of budget ：1．Steady state-you are allocated the same amount of money each year with an allowance for inflation . Although it offers predictability for future planning it isinflexible and does not allow for surges in activity or unfunded government and trust lead initiative . The majority of A&E departments receive their funding in this way .2．Activity based-the amount of money provided reflects the work done . It is accurate , flexible , and is the basis of much purchaser/provider contract activity . It is generally not available until the work has been completed and will vary form year to year .3．Lump sum-the government , region ,or trust releases a lump sum of money for a specific purpose ( for example , to start triage or audit or to complete a waiting list initiative ) . This is unpredictable , often comes at short notice , and can rarely be used for long term planning .Although the majority of A&E budgeting falls into the first category , lump sum money is available from time to time . An average department seeing 50 000 patients a year may hadean annual budget of approximately one million pounds . When taking ona budget ask these questions ：1.How big is it ? Who actually controls it ?2.Do you really have control of it or is it only theoretical , How often will youreceive a statement ? Who do you speak to make changes with the budget ? With whom and how do you negotiate within your institution ?3.Ask to be taken through a budget statement and have a clear explanation of allterms , etc . It is normally delivered monthly and although it may look complicated it is easy to master and is really little different from your own bank statement .4.Go through it carefully as mistakes are an occasional occurrence ( although theycan be rectified retrospective through the finance departmen) .5.The financial year runs from April to March . The theoretical aim is to make thebooks balance by the end of the financial year and not from month to month . Short term overspends or under spends are not important .6. A positive (+) sign means an overspend and a negative (-) sign means an underspend .7.Concentrate on the big numbers ; do not worry too much about little numbersalthough they do need to reanalyzed at some stage as savings can probably be made without affecting the quality of service .8.Devolve control of the nursing budget to your clinical nurse manager but beprepared to involve yourself in nursing activities ( for example , the development of nurse partitioning ) .9.Be prepared to negotiate with other directorate about certain items , similar issuesarise with funding for anesthetic agents and blood products .e creative accountancy . This is legitimate and will even receive the support ofyour financial colleagues .A key principle of management budgets is that all users of services should be informed of their costs . This is achieved by means of recharges made between those budget holders who supply services and those who use them . Considering domestic and cleaning services again , this would entail a recharge between that department‟s budget and those of other departments and facilities in the hospital . Cleaning costs would thenappeat on budget reports .In the case of , say , pathology services , consultant budget holders would be charged according to the number and type of tests that they request . Such recharges would be based on an agreed price list for tests rather than the actual cost of performing each individual one . This would have the effect of protecting the consultants who use pathology services from bearing the costs of any inefficiencies in the laboratories .It is beyond the scope of this article to describe in detail the revised procedures for setting budgets that would apply in a system of management budgeting . Two features of importance should , however , be noted .The first is that all budget holders , including clinicians : would be invited to discuss possible changes in their budgets . Such discussions would consider options for service developments if additional resources became available and options for retrenchment should this become necessary as a consequence of reductions in resources . Also included would bean assessment of alternative ways of using existing resources to achieve greater efficiency . These reallocations might be made within a specific budget or might mean the movement of resources from one budget to another .Linked to these discussions would be several financial incentives intended to encourage good budgetary control . Typically , these would permit budget holders to retain a proportion of any planned underpinnings to use in improving the services that they provide .Who Needs Budgets?Modern companies reject centralization , inflexible planning , and command and control . So why do they cling to a process that reinforces those things ? Budgeting , as most corporations practice it , should be abolished . That may sound like a radical proposition , but it would be merely the culmination of long-running efforts to transform organizations form centralized hierarchies into devolved networks that allow for nimble adjustments to market conditions . Most of the other building blocks are in place . Companies have invested huge sums in IT networks , process reengineering , and a range of management tools including EV A ( Economic Value Added) , balanced scorecards , and activity accounting . But they have been unable to establish a new order because the budget and the command and control culture that it supports remain predominant .In extreme cases , use of the budget to force performance improvements may lead to a breakdown in corporate ethics . People who worked at WorldCom , now bankrupt and under criminal investigation , said CEO Bernard Ebert‟s rigid demands were an overwhelming fact of life there . “You would have a budget , and he would mandate that you had to be 2% under budget ,”said a person who worked at WorldCom , according to an article in Financial Times last year . “Nothing else was acceptable .”WorldCom , Enron , Barings Bank , and other failed companies had tight budgetary control processes that funneled information only to those with a “ need to know . ”In short , the same companies that vow to stay close to the customer , so that they can respond quickly to precious intelligence about market shifts , cling tenaciously to budgeting—a process that disembowels the front line , discourages information sharing , and slows the response to market developments until it‟s too late .A number of companies have recognized the full extent of the damage done by budgeting . They have rejected the reliance on obsolete data and the protracted , rejected the foregone conclusions embedded in traditional budgets—conclusions that render pointless the interpretation and circulation of current market information , the stock-in-trade of the knowledge-based , networked company .Business planningThis is a new concept in the NHS but is well recognized in private industry .You will probably be asked to write on each year , a task which is not as tedious as it may sound . A good plan will help ：1、Priorities future activity2、Predict financial needs3、Develop departmental team spirit4、Convince other of your “vision” and enlist their cooperation5、Give support in times of change and uncertainty .METHOD：The following is a useful structure for developing your plan :1、Identify all the activity of your department .2、Do you wish to stop any activity ?3、Do you wish to continue any activity unchanged ?4、Do you wish to continue any activity with minor change ?5、Is there anyting you wish to radically change ?6、Is there anything you wish to introduce which is considered radical or innovative ? TIPS ：1、Involve your medical and nursing colleagues ; many heads contribute many ideas2、Use brainstorming3、Don‟t forget to involve your clerical staff-they will seething from a very differentangle and can contribute excellent ideas4、Include everything in the first draft ( it can be pruned later )5、If you think an innovative idea is worth pursuing try not to be put off by cautionkeep pursuing it6、The actual format of the plan should follow that used within your trust. SummaryThe NHS as a whole is constrained to operate with finite resources . Furthermore , each individual to it each year for the provision of services . These financial facts of life must be recognized by all those who use the service or work in it . Form the point of view of the district they lead to two apparently contradictory obligations-namely , to provide the pattern of services that best meets the changing needs of the community as a whole ; and to do so within a fixed financial allocation .The provision of services that meet the needs of the community requires constant appraisal of the way that resources are used . This may indicate that growth in a certain area of activity is required . Cash limits , however , imply that growth in one area can only be achieved either through contraction in another or by an overall improvement in efficiency . Management budgeting provides the means to examine and tackle these issues and thus can help to reconcile the conflicting demands that confront districts .Budgetary responsibility gives you more control .Take time to master the fine detail , ask questions of your management and finance colleagues about anything you do not understand ( you will not lose face ), and develop the skills of lateral thinking and creative accountancy .Even if your budget is repeatedly overspent do not take it personally , ensure that management are aware of it and have a goodnight‟s sleep . Do not worry about it .Source : Geoffrey Hughes , 2007 .”The Budget management”The hospital budget management . No. 10 .pp.156-166.。
国有企业预算软约束的成因：文献综述
国有企业预算软约束的成因：文献综述作者：周苗苗来源：《新经济》 2016年第2期周苗苗摘要：随着我国市场经济的深入发展，我国已经进入到经济发展转型时期。
预算软约束问题对于国有企业的改革非常重要，解决预算软约束问题才能更好的发挥国有企业的作用，要解决预算软约束问题就要先明确预算软约束问题产生的原因。
从社会主义制度建立以来，不少中外学者都对预算软约束的成因进行了归纳分析，本文对国内外研究文献进行整理和述评，并着重展现2000年以后关于预算软约束成因的新进展。
关键词：预算软约束政策性负担内部控制人一、引言科尔奈1980年在分析社会主义企业行为时首先提出预算软约束的概念，它是指当社会主义经济中的国有企业一旦发生亏损或面临破产时，国有企业的经理会预期得到国家财政支持，而国家或政府常常通过追加投资、减税、提供补贴等方式，以保证其生存下去。
之后才有经济学文献用“预算软约束”定义了这种现象。
在2000年以前就已经有了关于预算软约束的成因比较系统的总结，主要包括两个方面：1、外生性解释。
它包括“父爱主义”观点和政治目的观点。
“父爱主义”观点认为，国家之所以会对面临破产的企业给予援助，是因为企业破产给社会经济的发展带来负面影响，会直接影响国家的就业水平。
另一方面，企业关于国家是偏于“父爱主义”倾向还是“硬化”趋势的信息，并不能完全掌握，从而促使国家对企业实施软预算约束。
政治目的观点认为政治家可以通过增加就业和产出来使自己的政治基础更为巩固和雄厚。
因此，当政治家可以对企业进行直接管控或者可以有效地与企业进行谈判时，企业原有的盈利能力就可能由于要适应政治家们的非经济性目的的需要而大打折扣了。
作为回报，政治家们会通过软预算约束，譬如以向这些企业提供补贴等形式，来补偿企业的损失。
2、内生性解释。
它包括垄断观点和公有产权观点。
垄断观点认为：垄断或生产的过度集中可能产生预算软约束，是由于垄断企业不能实现完全的差别定价，消费者剩余就不可能完全被垄断企业内部化。
财政分权中软预算约束问题探析
财政分权中软预算约束问题探析一、财政分权在财政分权理论的形成和发展过程中,地方政府财政职能划分的研究备受重视。
美国经济学家夏普(Sharp)认为,不同级次的政府部门具有不同的职能,互相之间不能替代。
从国家的经济职能来看,实现调控的职能要由中央政府来实施,社会福利分配的职能也应由中央政府来执行。
而地方政府能取得资源配置的最好效果。
马斯格雷夫(Musgrave)则认为,由于地方政府对宏观经济稳定实施控制缺乏充足的财力,另外经济主体的流动性也严重束缚了地方政府进行收入再分配的尝试,所以宏观经济稳定与收入再分配职能应由中央负责,但是资源配置政策则应根据各地居民的偏好不同而有所差别,在这方面地方政府比中央政府更适合,更有利于经济效率的提高和社会福利水平的改进。
美国学者埃克斯坦(Echesten)也提出了同样的观点。
他指出,应当根据公共产品的受益范围来有效地划分各级政府的职能,并依此作为分配财权的依据。
因此,那些有益于全体国民的公共产品应当由中央政府来提供。
另有一些公共产品虽然只惠及某一阶层或某些人,但因对全社会和国家的发展至关重要,要由中央政府提供,但是,为了维护局部利益,地方政府也应具有一定的职权和财力。
夏普(Sharp)、马斯格雷夫(Musgrave)、埃克斯坦(Echesten)等人的研究阐明了财政职能分配的基本框架。
二、财政分权与软预算约束的关系长期以来,关于财政分权对预算约束的影响的研究在财政分权理论中占据重要地位,大批学者围绕这一问题发表了各自的观点。
从财政分权对政府预算约束的影响的角度出发,怀尔德森(D.E.Wildasin)认为联邦的转移支付给大地方比给小地方可能会使预算约束更软一些。
钱颖一和罗兰(Roland)也从竞争的角度认为,在任何一种类型的政治体制下,官员倾向于救助效率低下的公司,或者浪费公共消费支出。
在联邦制下,跨地区的资源流动增加了地方政府救助效率低下的公司或浪费公共支出的机会成本,财政支出总是低效率的地方不可能吸引流动资源流到该地区。
软预算约束的原因与性质_综述及评论_谢作诗
一、引
言
由 Kornai （ 1979 、1980 、1986 ） 提出的软预算约束概念， 现在已经成为 经济学的常用概念之一。科尔奈最初是要用软预算约束概念解释社会主义经 济中普遍存在的短缺现象，这个概念在转轨经济学中也被频繁使用 ， 已经成 为转轨经济学的中心概念。但是软预算约束并不局限于社会主义经济和转轨 经济，以私有产权为基础的资本主义经济也存在软预算约束现象 ， 只是社会 主义经济和转轨经济的软预算约束更普遍 、 更严重一些 （ Dewatripont ＆ Roland，2000 ； Maskin ＆ Xu，2001 ； Kornal et al. ，2003 ） 。 可以概括地将软预算约束理论划分为两大研究领域 ： 一是软预算约束的 成因分析； 二是软预算约束的后果分析①。 一般又把成因分析概括为两类： 一类是外生性解释； 另一类是内生性解释。前者主要是指那些基于 “父爱主
（ 07BJL014 ） 资助。 谢作诗： 浙江财经学院经济与国际贸易学院； 地址： 浙江省杭州市下沙高教园区学源街 18 号， mail： zuoshixie@ hotmail. com。 邮编： 310018 ； 电话： 0571 － 86735808 ； E李善杰： 民政部紧急救援促进中心； 地址： 北京市复兴门内大街 45 号，邮编： 100801 ； 电话： 010 － 66094290 ； Email： pansheng@ yahoo. cn。
第 11 卷第 1 辑 2012 年 3 月
产业经济评论 Review of Industrial Economics
Vol. 11 No. 1 March 2012
软预算约束的原因与性质 ： 综述及评论
谢作诗
摘
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李善杰
【国家社会科学基金】_政府软约束_基金支持热词逐年推荐_【万方软件创新助手】_20140808
推荐指数 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2014年 序号 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 高管薪酬 高管权力 锦标赛效应 软约束补助 转移支付 财政分权 薪酬差距 社会福利 投资冲动 地方债务 国有企业效率 制度环境 公共服务 bfi指数 推荐指数 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2012年 序号 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
科研热词 预算软约束 风险外部化 预算约束 非生产性牟利活动 跨国公司 行政性进入壁垒 行政垄断 英国政党 监管治理 政府资金 政府管制 投资补贴 投资措施 成本外部化 基本医疗服务 城乡二元结构 地方政府 地方党组织 公共项目 公共卫生服务 党政关系 企业 产能过剩 东道国 三方博弈 r&d
推荐指数 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2013年 序号 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
科研热词 财政分权 地方政府债务 预算软约束 转移支付 财税改革 融资平台 监管模式 泽国模式 有效性 新河模式 教育服务均等化 合法性 参与式预算 公共池
2008年 序号 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
科研热词 高校扩张 预算软约束 隐性财政风险 政府权力 政府干预 宪政 传导机制
推荐指数 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2009年 序号 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
科研热词 预算软约束 顺周期性财政政策 适应性调整 经济增长 环境破坏事件 环境监管 环保软约束 模糊产权 政府竞争 增长导向 城市土地市场 反周期性财政政策 剩余控制
预算软约束真的会降低地方政府整体财政努力程度吗
Will Soft Budget Constraints really Reduce the Total Fiscal Efforts of Local Governments？
作者： 张蕊
作者机构： 兰州大学管理学院,甘肃兰州730000
出版物刊名： 当代财经
页码： 36-47页
年卷期： 2017年 第6期
主题词： 预算软约束 财政努力程度 地方财政 地方政府
摘要：近年来,地方政府财政状况恶化,中央政府转移支付又导致了低效率的公共支出。
利用1996—2015年中国29个省级面板数据分析表明,预算软约束确实在一定程度上降低了地方政府
的财政努力程度,特别是在新《预算法》以前,地方政府会因为有多余的财源而扩大支出,严重降低地方财政的努力程度;《预算法》的修订使得统筹分配税款有更明确、更公平的计算方式,降低了地方政府通过争取中央经费来提高公共支出的诱因,一定程度上减轻了预算软约束问题。
因此,建议深入贯彻新《预算法》,发挥市场机制作用,利用社会支持的竞争和资本市场纪律来增强预算硬约束,消除政府间责任重叠现象,并对地方政府支出和借债进行严格的分级控制。
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一、预算软约束的提出：预算软约束这一概念是由Kornai (1986)在其《短缺经济学》一书中最早提出的。
用来描述社会主义市场经济中存在的这样一种现象：当国有企业发生亏损或者即将破产时，国家或政府出于自身利益的考虑，会对亏损或面临破产的企业增加贷款、税收优惠或者提供财政补贴，以支撑企业持续经营。
Kornai,Janos,1980.Economics of shortage,Amsterdam:Noerth-Holland.二、预算软约束成因：（一）外生性解释一是Kornai 的“父爱主义”( Paternalism )解释。
Kornai (1980)将社会主义国家的政府与企业之间的关系比作父母与子女。
当企业面临财务困难或破产危机时，政府会采用各种手段帮企业解困。
之所以产生父爱主义，是因为在社会主义体制下企业归国家所有，企业破产所带来的失业等不良后果最终还需政府解决，因此政府为避免企业破产带来的一系列麻烦，宁愿让濒临倒闭的企业继续生存。
Kornai,Janos,1980. Economics of shortage,Amsterdam:Noerth-Holland.继科尔奈之后，不少文献采用父爱主义来解释破产企业获得事后拯救这一类预算软约束的现象.Hillman等人(1980）探讨了政府满足企业要求追加投资的后果。
在他们的模型中，企业的出厂价是变化不定的。
低的价格诱使政府对亏损企业予以补贴，否则企业不得不大批解雇工人，而失业的政治代价又非常昂贵。
Hillman, Arye L, Katz Eliakim and Rosenberg Jacob.Workers as Insurance: Anticipated Government Assistance and Factor Demand [J].Oxf ord Economic Papers, Dec.1987, 39(4):813一820.Goldfeld和Quandt (1988, 1990)建立一套预算软约束模型，试图解释亏损企业所获补贴的多少取决于企业花费多少资源进行游说。
他们指出预算软约束的存在增加了企业对资源的需求，并进而导致社会主义经济的短缺现象。
Goldfeld, Steven and Quandt, Richard. Output Targets the Soft Budget Constraint and the Firm Under Central Planning[J].Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. Oct. 1990, 14(2):205-222.Schaffer (1989)建立了一个博弈论模型，他认为预算软约束的产生是因为有父爱主义倾向的政府不能够向企业作出可置信承诺(a creditable commitment)，即当企业破产时，它不会设法拯救。
由于企业无法获得政府是软弱的(即具有父爱主义倾向的)还是严厉的完全信息，这使政府可以通过对企业实施硬预算约束来建立政府是严厉的这一声誉。
Schaffer, Mark E. Do Firns in Transitional EconomiesHave Soft Budget Constraint? A Consi deration Concepts and Evidence[J].Journal of Comparative Economics, March 1998, 26(1):8 0-103.二是政治家们追求政治收益所导致的行为选择。
Shleifer和Vishiny(1994)认为预算软约束源于政治家们的行为偏好。
他们追求非经济目标，比如政治家们热衷于通过降低失业率和提高社会总产量来捞取更大的政治资本。
当政治家对企业拥有直接控制权或者在与企业进行讨价还价时具有优势地位的话，企业的利润最大化目标就不得不让位于政治家们的非经济目标的最大化。
相应的，企业因此承担的一切损失也理应得到补偿。
所以，在政府控制企业的国家或地区，预算软约束司空见惯。
Shleifer A, Vishny R. Politicians and Firms [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,109(4): 995-1025.（二）内生性解释主要是时间不一致性问题。
Dewatripond and Maskin (1995)以动态承诺的由时间非一致性问题视角对预算软约束进行分析，形成著名的D-M模型。
他们发现在信贷集权下，现有贷款中沉没成本的存在会导致预算软约束。
银行在对企业贷款时，由于存在事后有效性，可能会在项目发生亏损时继续进行贷款。
同时由于信息不对称，不同银行之间面临着不同的效用函数，对项目追加投资的可能性就会大大降低，进而软化了企业预算约束。
预算软约束是一种内生现象，其产生的原因是时间的不一致性问题，政府对无效率的项目有投资的积极性，从而产生了预算软约束问题。
Dewatripond,Maskin Eric and Roland Gerard. Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint[R]. Working Paper, UC Berkeley,2002.三、预算软约束的后果Kornai ( 1980)在《Economics of shortage》一书中，把社会主义经济中的短缺现象看作是软预算约束所导致的最重要后果之一。
Kornai, J. Economics of shortage [J]. North-Holland, Amsterdam.1980.Qian(1994)进一步发展了Kornai的思想，他在D-M两期模型的基础上证明了社会主义经济中软预算约束的存在给社会施加了双重负担：软约束导致大量的坏项目也获得资金，从而导致资源配置的低效率；软约束导致资金的极度稀缺，使得融资成本以致产品价格提高，消费者遭受高价格从而导致社会福利损失。
Qian,Y. A theory of shortage in socialist economies based on the soft budget constraint[J]. American Economic Review84,1994.1045-1056.Shleifer & Vishny(1994)的研究认为，国有企业是政府获取政治资本的一种工具，如果国有企业因经营不善或亏损而被破产关闭，政府在国有企业中所积累的政治资本将会丧失。
政府宁愿解救国有企业而不是让它破产，因此，国企存在严重的预算软约束。
Shleifer & Vishny（1994）认为，由于存在软预算约束的国有企业的生产率要低于有硬预算约束的非国有企业的生产率，并且随着时间的推移，这两类企业之间的生产率缺口会进一步拉大。
因此，在激烈的市场竞争中国有企业会处于更加不利的地位，亏损将会持续增加。
而政府不会听任国有企业在市场竞争中衰败下去，它必须承诺为国有企业维持一定的就业率、产出量及盈利率，为此，政府就不得不给予国有企业大量的转移支付来确保国有企业中的经理与员工的境况不会差于非国有企业中工人的待遇，以此来获得国有企业的政治支持。
这样，国有企业将会存在软预算约束且会持续恶化下去。
而当政府财力吃紧时，要么通过增发货币来支付越来越多的财政补贴给国有企业，这将会导致经济过热和通货膨胀；要么是通过各种手段（如不给予进出口权、加征管理费及各种税收）来抑制非国有企业的发展，以此来平衡两类企业的生产率缺口，这样就会导致经济衰退。
因此，社会主义国家中软预算约束的存在，会导致经济出现扩张与衰退交替出现的周期性波动。
Shleifer,A.,Vishny,R.Politicians and Firms[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,November,1994,10 9(4):995-1025.软预算约束增加了商业银行的消极性（passivity），即商业银行知道政府将事后干预并解救商业银行，商业银行便可能产生对坏项目“复活的投机”（Mitchell，1997），它会坐等政府对坏项目进行解救而自己则不做积极处理。
而且，商业银行的软预算约束还导致借款者产生不履约的动机和大量的寻租行为，从而加剧借款人的道德风险，使违约风气盛行，破坏整个社会的信用基础（Dewatripont and Maskin，1995）。
Mitchell, J. Strategic Creditor Passivity, Regulation, and Bank Bailouts [J].The Davidson Institute Working Paper Series,NO.46.University of Michigan Business School,1997.Dewatripont, M., Maskin, E. Credit and efficiency in cen-tralized and decentralized economies [J].Review of Economics studies 62,1995.541-545.软预算约束还以政府对风险投资项目担保的形式出现，这使得经济体系中的风险项目大量积累。
各地方政府为实现经济发展目标，鼓励、诱使企业对诸多风险项目进行投资，政府则承诺给予风险投资项目不低于某一特定收益的补贴或税收优惠，这会使得企业普遍投资高风险项目（或资产），一旦经济出现问题，极易引发大范围的项目倒闭，从而拖累银行积聚起巨额的不良资产（Bai and Wang，1999）。
Chong-en Bai, Yingjiang Wang.The Myth of East Asian Miracle：The Macroeconomic Implication of Soft Budgets [J].America Economic Review,May,1999.432-437.四、预算软约束被引入财政分权理论框架Qian and Weingast (1997)提出，财政分权有助于形成一种称之为“市场保护型”的财政联邦制，在这种体制下，中央政府与地方政府明确划分彼此的责权利，并由地方政府承担发展本地经济的主要责任。
他们指出，这样一种体制能够形成一种有助于保护市场的地区间财政竞争，从而促使地方政府强化对预算的硬约束，在预算硬约束条件成立的情况下，地方政府性债务风险便能被成功的锁定在一定区域内。
Qian,Yingyi and Barry R. Weingast, 1997, "Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Ma rket Incentives", Journal of Economic Perspectives,11(4), 83-92.Goodspeed (2002)和Rodden (2006)认为，分权所产生的财政援助(bailout)问题，会极大地软化地方政府的预算约束。