P+F安全栅介绍培训
P+F安全栅
对比齐纳式和隔离式安全栅的特点和性能后可以看出，隔离式 安全栅 有着突出的优点和更为广泛用途，虽然其价格略高于 齐纳式安全栅，但从设计、施工安装、调试及维护成本来考虑 ， 其综合成本可能反而低于齐纳式安全栅。在要求较高的工 程现场几 乎无一例外地采用了隔离式安全栅作为主要本安防 爆仪表， 隔离式安全栅已逐渐取代了齐纳 式安全栅，在安全 防爆领域得到了日益广泛的应用。
路，给设计及现场施工带来 极大方便。 2.对危险 区的仪表要求大幅度降低，现场无需采用隔离式的 仪表。 3.由于信号线路无需共地，使得检测和控制 回路信号的稳定性和抗干扰能力大 大增强，从而提 高了整个系统的可靠性。 4.隔离式安全栅具备更强 的输入信号处理能力，能够接受并处理热电偶、热 电 阻、频率等信号，这是齐纳式安全栅所无法做到 的。 5.隔离式安全栅可输出两路相互隔离的信号， 以提供给使用同一信号源的两台设备使用，并保证 两设备信号不互相干扰，同时提高所连接设备相互 之间的电气安全绝缘性能。
P+F安全栅的组态主要指对温变式安全栅的 组态，下面我们大概了解一下，温变式安全 栅组态软件的安装与一般组态。
2015.11.16
安装位置：安全栅安装于安全场所，接收来自危险区的信号,输 出安全信号到安全区或危险区。 安全栅的结构形式：常见的分为齐纳式和隔离式安全栅 齐纳式安全栅：电路中采用快速熔断器、限流电阻或限压二 极管以对输入的电能量进行限制，从而保证输出到危险区的 能量。 隔离式安全栅：采用了将输入、输出以及电源三方之间相互 电气隔离的电路结构，同时符合本安型限制能量的要求。
隔离式安全栅
隔离式安全栅：带有电流隔离功能的安全栅，称为隔离式安全栅，简称隔 离栅。 构成：通常由回路限能单元、电流隔离单元、信号处理单元 回路限能单元中最核心的电路为安全栅基本限能电路，辅助有用于驱动现 场仪表的回路供电电路和用于仪表信号采集的检测电路。 电流隔离单元包括变压器隔离组件、模频转换和频模转换电路。 信号处理单元则根据各品种隔离栅的功能要求实施信号处理。
P+F安全栅组态 经验分享
在弹出的面板中选择P2P RS232 FDT
双击P2P RS232 FDT，在弹出的窗口中，将
Communication Port 项由COM1修改为USB1。（具体 选项可依据实际使用的接口类型进行选择） 完成后，关闭此窗口。回到主界面。
右键单机左侧出现的“P2P
RS232 FDT”选项，选择 ADD DEVICE
UT2*-FDT”，选择 DISCONNECT 右键点击“P2P RS232 FDT”，选择 DISCONNECT 断开成功后，拆除连 线，组态完毕。
注意：可在ANALOGUE OUTPUT2中进行同样的组态，
即可实现安全栅的一入两出组态。
Analogue output 1：
Analogue output 2：
右键单击“KF*-
UT2*-FDT”选择 STORE TO DEVICE， 将组态信息下装至安 全栅。
右键点击“KF*-
K-ADP-USB组态线
• 装有 PACTware 组态软件 的笔记本 电脑一台
• P+F KADP-Fra bibliotekSB 组态线一 根
笔记本电脑
1.将KADP-USB 组态线USB 端插入电脑 USB口。
2.将KADP-USB 另一端插入 P+F安全栅 组态口。
1.打开pactware组态软件
2.右键HOST PC ，选择ADD DEVICE
单机组态面板左侧“INPUT1”，对输入信号进行组态
SENSOR：一次原件类型，如PT100,CU50等
Unit：测量单位，如℃，F，K等 Connection mode ：接线类型，如三线制，四线制等
P+F安全栅资料
P+F安全栅及现场总线产品德国Pepperl+Fuchs公司成立于1945年。
1958年，P+F发明的世界首例本安型接近开关及与之世界的隔离式安全栅使工业防爆应用领域发生了全新的变革。
如今，P+F公司已发展成为世界上最大、最有经验的本安接口生产商。
其安全栅品种之丰富、处理特殊应用难题之能力一直处于世界领先地位。
其产品应用遍及石油、天然气、化工、石化、医药等存在易燃易爆危险场所的工业领域。
P+F积极推动本质安全技术面向现场总线时代的新变革。
P+F远程I/O型隔离栅RPI和本安型远程I/O系统IS-RPI已经开始对本安接口的应用产生深远的影响。
P+F的FieldConnex现场总线产品家族包含了将现场总线主机与现场仪表相连接的全套配件产品，包括各种网桥、现场总线配电器、现场总线中继器、现场总线I/O模盒、接线盒、现场总线安全栅、快速接插件等现场总线产品，更使本安防爆的现场总线全面进入实用阶段。
P+F公司的产品不仅符合德国、欧洲和国际（IEC）标准，其专业化的研究和开发工作，还曾经并继续为这些标准的制定提供依据。
P+F公司的所有生产和开发机构均获得ISO9001质量保证体系认证。
其产品还获得包括美国（FM）、中国（NEPSI）等世界诸多国家的防爆认证。
为确保完善的就近服务，P+F公司的过程自动化部（PA）和工厂自动化部（FA）在世界各主要国家和地区设立子公司和办事处。
在中国，P+F公司在北京、上海设有代表处和子公司，并在广州等全国各主要大城市设有办事机构。
P+F公司不仅仅是防爆技术专家，其经验和创造力还从其产品本身延伸至系统配套方面。
本样本将详述P+F齐纳栅、隔离栅与DCS和ESD控制系统配合的典型方案，并提供现场总线的配电、防爆和连接的典型方案。
P+F公司备有安全栅产品的详细的原版书面样本和CD-ROM样本及多种应用指南。
P+F 隔离栅的优势：轨道供电大部分隔离栅需要供电.当隔离栅使用数量较大时，给隔离栅配电不是一件轻松的工作.为了简化隔离栅的配电，P+F公司发明了轨道供电方式。
光栅操作手册(P+F)
F A C T O R Y A U T O M A T I O N SLP/SLPC SLP/SLPCM 操作手册安全光栅With regard to the supply of products, the current issue of the following document is applicable: The General Terms of Delivery for Products and Services of the Electrical Industry,published by the Central Association of the Electrical Industry (Zentralverband Elektrotechnik und Elektroin-dustrie (ZVEI) e.V.)in its most recent version as well as the supplementary clause: "Expanded reservation of proprietorship"We at Pepperl+Fuchs/VISOLUX recognize a duty to make a contribution to the future.D a t e o f i s s u e 02/25/0238.3.4Test of error enable connection (RESET)...................................... 27ＳＬＰ／ＳＬＰＣ 和 ＳＬＰ／ＳＬＰＣＭ 安全光栅目录章 页１ 使用目的 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ６２ 产品描述 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ６２．１ 系统特点 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ６２．２ 工作原理 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ７２．３ 原理框图 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ８３ 电气连接 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． １０３．１ ＳＬＰＣ（Ｍ）端子区 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． １０３．２ ＳＬＰＣ（Ｍ）连接器 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． １２３．３ Ｍｕｔｉｎｇ 灯连接 ／ 灯插座（仅对ＳＬＰＣＭ．．．－Ｌ．．．） ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． １３３．４ ＳＬＰ发射器的连接．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． １４４ 状态指示 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． １５５ 工作模式 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． １６５．１ 启动 ／ 重启锁（Ｒｅｓｔａｒｔ）．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． １７５．２ 继电器监控．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． １７５．３ Ｍｕｔｉｎｇ（ＳＬＰＣＭ）．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． １８５．３．１ 工作原理．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． １９５．３．１．１ 平行或连续Ｍｕｔｉｎｇ方式下对Ｍｕｔｉｎｇ传感器的评估．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． １９５．３．１．２ 时间窗口限制或保护光束限制Ｍｕｔｉｎｇ方式下的Ｍｕｔｉｎｇ监控 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ２０５．３．２ Ｍｕｔｉｎｇ传感器．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ２２５．３．２ Ｍｕｔｉｎｇ指示灯．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ２２５．４ 紧急Ｍｕｔｉｎｇ（仅对ＳＬＰＣＭ）．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ２２６ 光栅的安装 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ２３７ 电气安装布置 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ２５８．２ 反射镜的布置．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ２６８．１ 调整保护光束．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ２６８ 调试 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ２６８．３ 功能测试．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ２７８．３．１ ＮＣＳＥ检测能力测试．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ２７８．３．２ Ｍｕｔｉｎｇ功能测试（仅对ＳＬＰＣＭ）．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ２７８．３．３ 启动／重启锁和启动能力测试．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ２７８．３．５ 继电器监控测试．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ２８８．３．６ ＯＳＳＤ工作原则．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ２８D a t e o f i s s u e 02/25/02416.1Construction and equipping of safety equipment......................... 4416.2Use and installation of protective equipment................................ 44Please note!This instruction manual contains instruction explaining the intended use of the product and serves as a protection from danger. It must be read and observed by all persons who make use of, care for, maintain and monitor this product. This pro-duct can only accomplish the tasks for which it is intended if it is used, cared for,maintained and monitored in accordance with the instructions of Pepperl+Fuchs/Visolux.The warranty undertaken by Pepperl+Fuchs/Visolux for this product becomes null and void if it is not used, cared for, maintained and monitored in accordance with the instructions of Pepperl+Fuchs/Visolux.Before this product is used, an evaluation must be undertaken to determine whe-ＳＬＰ／ＳＬＰＣ 和 ＳＬＰ／ＳＬＰＣＭ 安全光栅９ 定期检查 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ２８１０ 故障诊断 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ２９１１ 技术参数 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ３０１１．１ 电气参数及特性．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ３０１１．２ 外形尺寸．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ３２１２ 附件 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ３４１２．１ ＳＬＰ安装支架．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ３４１２．２ ＳＬＰ反射镜．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ３５１２．３ ＳＬＰ保护镜．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ３６１２．４ ＳＬＰ保护镜固定架．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ３６１２．５ ＳＬＰ辅助对齐瞄准器．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ３６１２．６ ＳＬＰ激光辅助对齐工具．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ３７１２．７ 电缆连接器．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ３７１２．８ 电缆扎带．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ３７１３ 订购信息 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ３８１４ 电路图示例 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ４０１５ 术语表 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ４３１６ 标准 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ４４１７ 证书 ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ４５D a t e o f i s s u e 02/25/025ther it is suitable for the application at hand. Selection and use are not subject to influence on the part of Pepperl+Fuchs/Visolux. Our liability is thus restricted to consistent quality of the product.The product must be monitored and maintained by competent professionals. A re-cord must be kept of the results of inspections and maintenance tasks. Only ori-ginal Pepperl+Fuchs/Visolux parts must be used for repair jobs.The operator is not permitted to make changes to the machines or components thereof, or make use of defective or incomplete machines or components. Repairs to machines or components must only be performed by Pepperl+Fuchs/Visolux or by authorized workshops. Such workshops are responsible for acquiring the latest technical information about machines and components from Pepperl+Fuchs/Viso-lux.Repair tasks made on the product that are not performed by Pepperl+Fuchs/Viso-lux are not subject to influence on the part of Pepperl+Fuchs/Visolux.Our liability is thus limited to repair tasks that are performed by Pepperl+Fuchs/Visolux.The preceding information does not change information regarding warranty and liability in the terms and conditions of sale and delivery of Pepperl+Fuchs.This device contains sub-assemblies that are electrostatically sensitive. Only competent professional staff members are permitted to open the device for main-tenance and repair jobs. The sub-assemblies must be protected against the dan-ger of electrostatic discharge caused by touching them without protection. In the event that basic components are destroyed as a result of electrostatic discharge,the warranty becomes null and void!Subject to technical modifications.System of symbolsSymbols are used in this manual to provide information on operating and working with the safety light grid SLPC(M) and on safety related to it. The meaning of theseＳＬＰ／ＳＬＰＣ 和 ＳＬＰ／ＳＬＰＣＭ 安全光栅D a t e o f i s s u e 02/25/026This system mustonly be used in accordance with no-contact safety equipment (NCSE) to secure hazardous areas or ranges from being accessed. The operating modes that are set make it possible among other things to operate the SLPCM with the mutingThe SLP/SLPC(M) system is NCSE of Type 4 (EN 61496-1 or IEC 61496-1) or Category 4 (EN 954-1). The special feature of the SLPC(M) is the adjustable ope-rating modes Startup / restart lock and Relay monitor.••••••••••••ＳＬＰ／ＳＬＰＣ 和 ＳＬＰ／ＳＬＰＣＭ 安全光栅１ 使用目的使用目的２ 产品描述２．１ 系统特点ＳＬＰ／ＳＬＰＣ（Ｍ）系列安全光栅包括两个部分：带处理单元的接收器ＳＬＰＣ或ＳＬＰＣＭ以及与之匹配的安全光栅发射器ＳＬＰ．．－Ｔ。
P+F 安全珊Hart管理
eexcellence in dependable automationFMEDA including SFF determinationand PFD calculationProject:HART multiplexer KFD2-HMM-16 together with KFD0-HMS-16 and 2700 HART Signal MultiplexerCustomer:Pepperl+Fuchs GmbHMannheimGermanyContract No.: P+F 02/4-11Report No.: P+F 02/4-11 R006Version V1, Revision R1.2, July 2002Stephan AschenbrennerCONFIDENTIAL INFORMATIONManagement summaryThis report summarizes the results of the analysis carried out on the HART multiplexerKFD2-HMM-16 together with KFD0-HMS-16 and the 2700 HART Signal Multiplexer.The assessment does not contain an evaluation of the correct functioning of the HARTmultiplexer but a statement about the interference freeness on the safety related 4..20mAloop when used for HART communication with regard to the suitability in part for Safety Instrumented System (SIS) usage in a particular Safety Integrity Level (SIL).The failure rates are based on the Siemens standard SN 29500.According to table 2 of IEC 61508-1 the average PFD for systems operating in low demandmode has to be ≥10-4 to < 10-3 for SIL 3 safety functions and ≥10-3 to < 10-2 for SIL 2 safetyfunctions. However, as the modules under consideration are only one part of an entire safetyfunction they should not claim more than 10% of this range, i.e. they should be better than orequal to 10-4 for SIL 3 and better than or equal to 10-3 for SIL 2.The modules under evaluation can be considered to be Type B components. However, the components that can contribute to a disturbance of the safety system are considered to be TypeA components.For Type A components the SFF has to fulfill the requirements as stated in table 2 ofIEC 61508-2 which are the following:Hardware fault tolerance (HFT)0 1 2 SIL 2 60% ≤ SFF < 90% SFF < 60%SIL 3 90% ≤ SFF < 99% 60% ≤ SFF < 90% SFF < 60%The following tables show under which conditions the critical components of the two modulesthat can contribute to a disturbance of the safety system fulfill this requirement (considering onlyone communication line being part of the safety function).Table 1: KFD2-HMM-16 together with KFD0-HMS-16 without additional module interfaceT[Proof] = 1 year T[Proof] = 5 years T[Proof] = 10 yearsPFD AVG = 1.23E-06PFD AVG = 6.13E-06PFD AVG = 1.23E-05than 10% of this range, i.e. to be better than or equal to 10-3. The PFD values even fulfill the requirements of higher SILs but the system does only fulfill the architectural constraints requirements (HFT/SFF) for SIL 2 which are set by table 2 of IEC 61508-2 for type A components having a hardware fault tolerance of 0.If the HART multiplexer KFD2-HMM-16 and KFD0-HMS-16 are used together with the module interface as described in section 4.1 then two de-coupling capacitors have to fail to bring the (sub)system into a dangerous state. This corresponds to a hardware fault tolerance of 1.Table 2: KFD2-HMM-16 together with KFD0-HMS-16 with additional module interface T[Proof] = 1 year T[Proof] = 5 years T[Proof] = 10 yearsPFD AVG = 6.13E-08PFD AVG = 3.07E-07PFD AVG = 6.13E-07than 10% of this range, i.e. to be better than or equal to 10-4. The PFD values even fulfill the requirements of a higher SIL but the system does only fulfill the architectural constraints requirements (HFT/SFF) for SIL 3 which are set by table 2 of IEC 61508-2 for type A components having a hardware fault tolerance of 1.Table 3: 2700 HART Signal MultiplexerT[Proof] = 1 year T[Proof] = 5 years T[Proof] = 10 yearsPFD AVG = 2.50E-07PFD AVG = 1.25E-06PFD AVG = 2.50E-06than 10% of this range, i.e. to be better than or equal to 10-4. The PFD values even fulfill the requirements of higher SILs but the system does only fulfill the architectural constraints requirements (HFT/SFF) for SIL 3 which are set by table 2 of IEC 61508-2 for type A components having a hardware fault tolerance of 1.The calculations are based on the assumption that the HART multiplexer are mounted in an environment that is IP 54 compliant (e.g. housing, control cabinet or control room).Table of ContentsManagement summary (2)1Purpose and Scope (5)2Project management (5)2.1Roles of the parties involved (5)2.2Standards / Literature used (5)2.3Reference documents (6)2.3.1Documentation provided by the customer (6)2.3.2Documentation generated by (6)3Description of the HART communication (7)4Description of the analyzed modules (8)4.1KFD2-HMM-16 and KFD0-HMS-16 (8)4.22700 HART Signal Multiplexer (11)5Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostics Analysis (12)5.1Description of the failure categories (12)5.2Methodology – FMEDA, Failure rates (12)5.2.1FMEDA (12)5.2.2Failure rates (12)5.2.3Assumption (13)6Results of the assessment (13)6.1KFD2-HMM-16 and KFD0-HMS-16 (15)6.22700 HART Signal Multiplexer (17)7Terms and Definitions (19)8Status of the document (20)8.1Liability (20)8.2Releases (20)8.3Release Signatures (20)1 Purpose and ScopeThis report shall describe the results of the FMEDAs carried out on the HART multiplexer KFD2-HMM-16 together with KFD0-HMS-16 and the 2700 HART Signal Multiplexer.It shall be shown that the HART multiplexer do not electrically interfere with the connected safety related system when using the 4..20mA loop for the HART communication.It shall be assessed whether these modules meet the Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) requirements for SIL 2 / SIL 3 sub-systems according to IEC 61508 with regard to the interference freeness on the safety related 4..20mA loop.The assessment does neither consider any calculations necessary for proving intrinsic safety nor an evaluation of the correct functioning of the HART multiplexer.Pepperl+Fuchs GmbH contracted in May 2002 with the FMEDA and PFD calculation of the above mentioned modules.2 Project management2.1 Roles of the parties involvedPepperl+Fuchs Manufacturer of the HART multiplexer. Did the FMEDAs together with the determination of the Safe Failure Fraction (SFF) and calculated the Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD)using Markov models.2.2 Standards / Literature usedThe services delivered by were performed based on the following standards / literature.[N1] IEC 61508-2:1999 Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/ProgrammableElectronic Safety-Related Systems[N2] ISBN: 0471133019 Electronic Components: Selection and Application Guidelinesby Victor MeeldijkJohn Wiley & Sons[N3] FMD-91, RAC 1991 Failure Mode / Mechanism Distributions[N4] SN 29500 Failure rates of components2.3 Reference documents2.3.1 Documentation provided by the customer[D1] DL0799, DL0800 of 21.04.01 Circuit diagram for KFD2-HMM-16 and KFD0-HMS-16 [D2] 107905 Bill of material for KFD2-HMM-16[D3] ES-984240/1-A1 of 18.11.99 Circuit diagram for 2700 HART Signal Multiplexer(Mother Board Multiplexer / Interface Circuit)[D4] CL-984240/1-A4 of 24.03.99 Bill of material for 2700 HART Signal Multiplexer (MotherBoard)[D5] ES-984240/2-A1 of 18.11.99 Circuit diagram for 2700 HART Signal Multiplexer(µProcessor Board)[D6] CL-984240/2-A3 of 16.03.99 Bill of material for 2700 HART Signal Multiplexer(µProcessor Board)[D7] Datasheet metallized polyester capacitor WIMA MKS 2 2.3.2 Documentation generated by [R1] FMEDA KFD2-HMM-16 V1 R1.0 – Analysis of 24.06.02[R2] FMEDA KFD2-HMM-16 V1 R1.0 – Results of 24.06.02[R3] FMEDA MUX 2700 V1 R1.0 – Analysis of 24.06.02[R4] FMEDA MUX 2700 V1 R1.0 – Results of 24.06.023 Description of the HART communicationThe HART1 protocol is supported by many conventional 4..20 mA field devices, which thus enable digital communication for configuration and servicing purposes. Many device parameters and also the measured values themselves can thus be digitally transferred to and from the device. This digital communication runs in parallel with the 4..20 mA signal on the same cable. This is possible through a current modulation, which is superimposed on the user signal.Figure 1: Modulated HART signalHART is a master-slave protocol: A field device does only respond when requested (except in "Burst mode").The message duration is several hundred milliseconds, so that between two and three messages can be transferred per second.On HART, there are three groups of commands:• The "Universal" commands; these must be supported by all field devices;• The "Common practice" commands; these are pre-defined commands, suitable for many field devices, which, if they are supported by the device, must be implemented in the pre-defined form;• Device-specific commands; these are commands, which are particularly suitable for this field device.1 HART = Highway Addressable Remote Transducer4 Description of the analyzed modulesIn safety-related applications the HART communication is used to provide additional (non safety-related) information about statuses and reading, allow for better preventive maintenance and thus improve the integrity of the field instrumentation.For this purpose the HART multiplexer have to be directly connected to the field wiring of the respective safety-related system (see Figure 2).Figure 2: Connection of the HART multiplexer with the safety-related system4.1 KFD2-HMM-16 and KFD0-HMS-16The HART multiplexer KFD2-HMM-16 can operate up to 256 analog transmitters. The built-in slave unit operates the first 16 loops, and a maximum of further 15 KFD0-HMS-16 slaves can be connected.The power supply (24 VDC nominal voltage) is provided via the power rail or terminals 17 and 18. The optional slave units or the RPI control module are connected with the master via a 14-core flat cable. Its connector is placed on the same housing side as the terminals for the RS 485 interface and the voltage supply.The analog signals for each unit are connected separately via a 26-core cable. 16 leads are provided for the HART signals of the analog instrument circuits, the other 10 are connected to ground.The minimum load resistance of the analog instrument circuits is 230 Ω (min. load resistance in accordance with the HART specification), the max. load resistance is 500 Ω. Load resistances of up to 1000 Ω are possible, however, resistance values greater than 500 Ω can interfere with the HART communication.A process control system or a PC can be connected via a RS 485 interface (terminals 13, 14 and 15). Up to 31 KFD2-HMM-16 can be operated on one RS 485 interface. Terminals 19, 20 and 21 can be used to connect additional stations to the RS 485 interface. The DIP-switch on the housing front is for the setting of the RS 485 address and the baud rate.Figure 3: Block diagram of KFD2-HMM-1626 pin connectorfor up to16 analog signal sources 14 pin connector for up to 15 KFD0-HMS-16 devicesFigure 4: Block diagram of KFD2-HMS-16The HART multiplexer KFD2-HMM-16 (KFD0-HMS-16) has only one de-coupling capacitor for each analog signal as can be seen in Figure 3 and Figure 4, but can be connected to a module interface as shown in Figure 5 to also have the ground de-coupled by a second capacitor. Figure 5: Block diagram HART multiplexer with module interface for loop 1 and 24.2 2700 HART Signal MultiplexerThe Mux2700 HART Multiplexer provides 32 signal channels for connection to “smart” transmitters or control devices supporting digital communication according to the HART standard.Two Decoupling Capacitors are provided, one for each signal connection.Both + Ve (positive) & - Ve (negative) signal wires are therefore decoupled from DC signal. Only the high frequency digital HART protocol signal passes through to the internal Multiplexer circuitry.It acts as a gateway between a workstation - typically a PC - and the field instrumentation.Each Mux2700 is networked simply by connecting the high-speed RS485 output in multidrop configuration. The Mux2700 interrogates each field device, under the supervision of the workstation, retrieving information for storage in its internal database, which can then be accessed at ease.Figure 6: Block diagram of 2700 HART Signal Multiplexer5 Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostics Analysis5.1 Description of the failure categoriesThe fail-safe state is defined as the HART multiplexer is not communicating.Failures are categorized and defined as follows:A safe failure (S) is defined as a single failure that causes the HART multiplexer not to communicate.A dangerous failure (D) is defined as a single failure that disturbs the safety system connected to the HART multiplexer.A “don't care” failure (#) is defined as a single failure of a component that is part of the safety function but has no effect on the safety function of the module / (sub)system.5.2 Methodology – FMEDA, Failure rates5.2.1 FMEDAA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a systematic way to identify and evaluate the effects of different component failure modes, to determine what could eliminate or reduce the change of failure, and to document the system in consideration.An FMEDA (Failure Mode Effect and Diagnostic Analysis) is an FMEA extension. It combines standard FMEA techniques with extension to identify online diagnostics techniques and the failure modes relevant to safety instrumented system design. It is a technique recommended to generate failure rates for each important category (safe detected, safe undetected, dangerous detected, dangerous undetected, fail high, fail low) in the safety models. The format for the FMEDA is an extension of the standard from MIL STD 1629A, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis.5.2.2 Failure ratesThe failure rate data used by in this FMEDA are from the Siemens SN 29500 failure rate database. The rates were chosen in a way that is appropriate for safety integrity level verification calculations. It is expected that actual field failure results with average environmental stress will be superior to the results predicted by these numbers.The user of these numbers is responsible for determining their applicability to any particular environment. Accurate plant specific data is preferable to general industry average data. Industrial plant sites with high levels of stress must use failure rate data that is adjusted to a higher value to account for the specific conditions of the plant.5.2.3 AssumptionThe following assumptions have been made during the Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis of the HART multiplexer.• Failure rates are constant, wear out mechanisms are not included.• Propagation of failures is not relevant.• All component failure modes are known.• The repair time after a safe failure is 8 hours.• The average temperature over a long period of time is 40°C.• The stress levels are average for an industrial environment.• All modules are operated in the low demand mode of operation.• Only one communication line is considered to be part of the safety function.6 Results of the assessment did the FMEDAs supported by Pepperl+Fuchs.The analysis has shown that only a couple of components of the HART multiplexer can be found where potentially dangerous failure exist. All other component failures can only lead to the defined safe state but can never disturb the connected safety-related system. The following critical points were identified:1. Short circuits (to ground, to power or between each other) of the signal lines from theinterconnection terminal to the field side of the de-coupling capacitors;2. Short circuit of the de-coupling capacitor.For the calculation of the Safe Failure Fraction (SFF) the following has to be noted:λtotal consists of the sum of all component failure rates. This means:λtotal = λsafe + λdangerous + λdon’t care2SFF = 1 – λdu / λtotalFor the FMEDAs the following failure modes and below mentioned distributions were used. Capacitor fixed plastic (in accordance with [N3])Failure Mode Distribution (in %)Short 40 Open 42 Change in value 182 These are all failures that have no impact on the safety function. The behavior of the system is neither dangerous nor safe.Capacitor Al-ELKO (in accordance with [N3]) Failure ModeDistribution (in %)Short 38 Open 31 Seal failure31For the calculation of the PFD the following Markov models for a 1oo1 and 1oo2 architecture were used. As there are no explicit on-line diagnostics, no state “dd” – dangerous detected is required. As after a complete proof all states are going back to the OK state no proof rate is shown in the Markov models but included in the calculation.The proof time was changed using the Microsoft® Excel 2000 based FMEDA tool of as a simulation tool. The results are documented in the following sections.Figure 7: Markov model for a 1oo1 architectureAbbreviations: d The system has failed dangerous s The system has failed safe λd Failure rate of dangerous failures λs Failure rate of safe failures βCommon cause factor (set to 5%)T Repair Repair time τRepair Repair rate (1 / T Repair )Figure 8: Markov model for a 1oo2 architecture6.1 KFD2-HMM-16 and KFD0-HMS-16Item 1. of the critical points identified in section 6 can be excluded according to draft IEC 60947-5-3 A.1.2 if:• The HART multiplexer are mounted in a housing of minimum IP 54• The base material used is according to IEC 60249, the design and use of the printed board is according to IEC 60326 T3 and the creepage distances and clearances are designed according to IEC 60664-1 (1992) with pollution degree 2 / installation category III, or• The printed side(s) are coated with an insulation material in accordance to IEC 60664-3 (1992)Clearances and creepage distances according to IEC 60661-1 with pollution degree 2 / installation category II for a nominal voltage of 24 VDC are given in Table 4.Table 4: Clearances and creepage distances according to IEC 60661-1Clearances (table 2) Creepage distances (table 4) Printed wiring material 0,1 mm 0,04 mmAccording to Pepperl+Fuchs the base material used is according to IEC 60249 and the minimum creepage distances and clearances are 0,15 mm. This is considered to be sufficient as the interesting distances are part of an energy-consuming equipment supplied from fixed installation, i.e. installation category II. In addition the HART multiplexer is not a safety critical system itself but is connected to one. Thus there are no to special requirements with regard to reliability and availability (see section 2.2.2.1.1 of IEC 60664-1) and installation category III does not apply.Item 2. of the critical points identified in section 6 was analyzed in form of a FMEDA under the assumptions described in section 5.2.3 and 6.The following failure rates and SFF were calculated for the de-coupling capacitor:λtotal = 7,00E-10 1/hλsafe = 2,94E-10 1/hλdangerous = 2,80E-10 1/hλdon’t care = 1,26E-10 1/hSFF = 60,00% (HFT = 0)NOTE: As all faults of the additional electronic will either contribute to λsafe or λdon’t care with regard to the interference freeness on the 4..20mA signal the failure modes of the different components were not explicitly analyzed and are not part of the above mentioned failure rates.The PFD was calculated for three different proof times using the Markov model as described in Figure 7.T[Proof] = 1 year T[Proof] = 5 years T[Proof] = 10 yearsPFD AVG = 1.23E-06PFD AVG = 6.13E-06PFD AVG = 1.23E-05than 10% of this range, i.e. to be better than or equal to 10-3. The PFD values even fulfill the requirements of higher SILs but the system does only fulfill the architectural constraints requirements (HFT/SFF) for SIL 2 which are set by table 2 of IEC 61508-2 for type A components having a hardware fault tolerance of 0.The following figure shows the result of the PFD calculation for T[Proof] = 1 year.Figure 9: PFD for T[Proof] = 1 yearIf the HART multiplexer KFD2-HMM-16 and KFD0-HMS-16 are used together with the module interface as described in section 4.1 then two de-coupling capacitors have to fail to bring the (sub)system into a dangerous state. This corresponds to a hardware fault tolerance of 1.The PFD was calculated for three different proof times using the Markov model as described in Figure 8.T[Proof] = 1 year T[Proof] = 5 years T[Proof] = 10 yearsPFD AVG = 6.13E-08PFD AVG = 3.07E-07PFD AVG = 6.13E-07than 10% of this range, i.e. to be better than or equal to 10-4. The PFD values even fulfill the requirements of a higher SIL but the system does only fulfill the architectural constraints requirements (HFT/SFF) for SIL 3 which are set by table 2 of IEC 61508-2 for type A components having a hardware fault tolerance of 1.The following figure shows the result of the PFD calculation for T[Proof] = 1 year and β = 5% (maximum common cause factor for a logic sub-system according to IEC 61508-6).Figure 10: PFD for T[Proof] = 1 year and β = 5%6.2 2700 HART Signal MultiplexerItem 1. of the critical points identified in section 6 can be excluded according to draft IEC 60947-5-3 A.1.2 if:• The HART multiplexer are mounted in a housing of minimum IP 54• The base material used is according to IEC 60249, the design and use of the printed board is according to IEC 60326 T3 and the creepage distances and clearances are designed according to IEC 60664-1 (1992) with pollution degree 2 / installation category III, or• The printed side(s) are coated with an insulation material in accordance to IEC 60664-3 (1992)Clearances and creepage distances according to IEC 60661-1 with pollution degree 2 / installation category II for a nominal voltage of 24 VDC are given in Table 5.Table 5: Clearances and creepage distances according to IEC 60661-1Clearances (table 2) Creepage distances (table 4) Printed wiring material 0,1 mm 0,04 mmAccording to Pepperl+Fuchs the base material used is according to IEC 60249 and the minimum creepage distances and clearances are 0,25 mm. This is considered to be sufficient as the interesting distances are part of an energy-consuming equipment supplied from fixed installation, i.e. installation category II. In addition the HART multiplexer is not a safety critical system itself but is connected to one. Thus there are no to special requirements with regard to reliability and availability (see section 2.2.2.1.1 of IEC 60664-1) and installation category III does not apply.Item 2. of the critical points identified in section 6 was analyzed in form of a FMEDA under the assumptions described in section 5.2.3 and 6.The following failure rates and SFF were calculated for the two de-coupling capacitors: λtotal = 3,70E-09 1/h λsafe = 1,22E-09 1/h λdangerous = 1,42E-09 1/h λdon’t care = 1,06E-09 1/h SFF = 61,62% (HFT = 1)NOTE: As all faults of the additional electronic will either contribute to λsafe or λdon’t care with regard to the interference freeness on the 4..20mA signal the failure modes of the different components were not explicitly analyzed and are not part of the above mentioned failure rates. As two de-coupling capacitors have to fail to bring the (sub)system into a dangerous state a hardware fault tolerance of 1 is considered.The PFD was calculated based on the failure rate of the Al-ELKO as a worst case assumption for three different proof times using the Markov model as described in Figure 8.T[Proof] = 1 yearT[Proof] = 5 yearsT[Proof] = 10 yearsPFD AVG = 2.50E-07PFD AVG = 1.25E-06PFD AVG = 2.50E-06than 10% of this range, i.e. to be better than or equal to 10-4. The PFD values even fulfill the requirements of a higher SIL but the system does only fulfill the architectural constraints requirements (HFT/SFF) for SIL 3 which are set by table 2 of IEC 61508-2 for type A components having a hardware fault tolerance of 1.The following figure shows the result of the PFD calculation for T[Proof] = 1 year and β = 5% (maximum common cause factor for a logic sub-system according to IEC 61508-6).Figure 11: PFD for T[Proof] = 1 year and β= 5%7 Terms and DefinitionsFMEDA Failure Mode Effect and Diagnostic AnalysisHFT Hardware Fault ToleranceLow demand mode Mode, where the frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-related system is no greater than one per year and no greater than twicethe proof test frequency.λtotal Total failure rate λ (overall failure rate of all components)λsafe Failure rate λ of all safe failuresλdangerous Failure rate λ of all dangerous failuresλdu Failure rate λ of dangerous undetected failuresPFD Probability of Failure on DemandPFD AVG Average Probability of Failure on DemandSFF Safe Failure Fraction summarizes the fraction of failures, which lead to a safe state and the fraction of failures which will be detected bydiagnostic measures and lead to a defined safety action.SIF Safety Instrumented FunctionSIL Safety Integrity LevelSIS Safety Instrumented System8 Status of the document8.1 Liability prepares FMEDA reports based on methods advocated in International standards. Failure rates are obtained from a collection of industrial databases. accepts no liability whatsoever for the use of these numbers or for the correctness of the standards on which the general calculation methods are based.8.2 ReleasesVersion: V1Revision: R1.2Version History: V0, R1.0: Initial version, June 19, 2002V0, R1.1: Failure rates for the de-coupling capacitors of the MUX 2700corrected; section 2.3.2 completed; failure modes of Al-ELKO insection 6 added; June 24, 2002V1, R1.0: Comments after review integrated, June 27, 2002V1, R1.1: Management summary corrected; section “Purpose and Scope”modified, June 28, 2002V1, R1.2: Management summary changed; section “Purpose and Scope”modified, July 3, 2002AschenbrennerAuthors: StephanReview: V0, R1.0: Werner Bansemir (P+F), June 24, 2002V0, R1.1: Peter Müller (), June 26, 2002Release status: released to Pepperl+Fuchs8.3 Release SignaturesDipl.-Ing. (Univ.) Stephan Aschenbrenner, Senior Project ManagerDipl.-Ing. (Univ.) Rainer Faller, Principal Partner。
安全栅知识
• 信号分配。可以实现一进二出功能，对于频率信号可以实现一路信号进，一 路输出4-20mA信号，一路输出频率信号。
• 报警设定，隔离栅和报警设定器合二为一，简化了系统配置。 • DIN导轨安装。具有安装拆卸方便，同时与其他品牌具有互换性。 • 可插拔接线端子。 • 轨道供电方式。减少配线，方便简单实现供电冗余功能。
常用有源隔离栅
• KFD2-STC1-EX1 单通道有源4-20mA信号输入控制系统。（输入） • KFD2-STV1-EX1 单通道有源1-5V信号输入控制系统。 （输入） • KFD2-STC3-EX1 单通道有源4-20mA信号输入控制系统。 （输入） • KFD2-STV3-EX1 单通道有源1-5V信号输入控制系统。 （输入） • KFD2-STC4-EX2 双通道有源4-20mA信号输入控制系统。 （输入） • KFD2-STV4-EX2-1 双通道有源1-5V信号输入控制系统。 （输入） • KFD2-STC4-EX1 单通道有源4-20mA信号输入控制系统。 （输入） • KFD2-STV4-EX1.20-1 一进二出有源1-5V信号输入控制系统。 （输入） • KFD2-STC4-EX1.20 一进二出有源4-20mA信号输入控制系统。 （输入） • KFD2-CD-EX1.32 单通道控制系统输出4-20mA。（输出） • KFD2-CD-EX1.32-3 单通道控制系统输出1-5V。 （输出） • KFD2-CD-EX1.32-8 单通道控制系统输出0-10V。 （输出） • KFD2-VR-EX1.50m单通道mV信号进控制系统。±50mV （热偶输入） • KFD2-UT-EX1单通道有源4-20mA进控制系统。 （热阻热偶输入） • KFD2-UT-EX1-1单通道有源1-5V进控制系统。 （热阻热偶输入，热偶信号需配置冷端补偿器） • KFD2-SR2-EX1.W 数字量输入，接受干接点。单通道 • KFD2-SR2-EX1.W .LB数字量输入，接受干接点，单通道。一进二出。 • KFD2-EB2 电源模块。每台配电容量为4A。最多可为49台导轨安全栅供电。一般为24台安全栅供电。 • KFD2-EB.R2A.B 冗余电源模块。每台配电容量为2A，为23台安全栅供电。
常用安全栅介绍及P+F温变设置(江朝均160601)
接近开关简介
接近开关又称无触点行程开关。它能在一定的距离（几毫 米至几十毫米）内检测有无物体靠近。当物体与其接近 到设定距离时，就可以发出“动作”信号。
接近开关的核心部分是“感辨头”，它对正在接近的物体 有很高的感辨能力。
性能特点
接近开关与被测物不接触、不会产生机械磨损和疲劳损伤、 工作寿命长、响应快、无触点、无火花、无噪声、防潮、防 尘、防爆性能较好、输出信号负载能力强、体积小、安装、 调整方便； 缺点是 触点容量较小、输出短路时易烧毁。
开路故障，并将故障以干接点信号送入DCS或者PLC。 适合此应用的DI隔离栅有: KFD2-SR2-EX2.2S KFD2-SRA-EX4 KFD2-ST2-EX1.LB KFD2-ST2-EX2
KFD2-SOT2-EX2 KFD2-DU-EX1.D 适合此应用的DO隔离栅有： KFD2-SL2-EX1 KFD2-SL2-EX2 此应用是通过电源模块7和10端子输出一个干接点到DCS或者PLC系统。（继电
KFD2-UT-EX1-1单通道有源1-5V进控制系统。 （热阻热偶输入，热偶信号需配 置冷端补偿器）
KFD2-SR2-EX1.W 数字量输入，接受干接点。单通道 KFD2-SR2-EX1.W .LB数字量输入，接受干接点，单通道。一进二出。 KFD2-EB2 电源模块。每台配电容量为4A。最多可为49台导轨安全栅供电。一
控制引爆源
人为地消除引爆源，既消除足以引爆的火花，又消除足以引爆的仪表表面温升 。就是利用安全栅技术，将提供给现场仪表的电能量限制在既不能产生足以引爆 的火花，又不能产生足以引爆仪表表面温升的安全范围内。按照国际标准和国内 标准，当安全栅安全区一侧所接设备发生任何故障（不超过250V电压）时，本 质防爆方法确保现场的防爆安全。典型代表：EX i。EX ia级本质安全设备在正 常工作、发生一个故障、发生两个故障时均不能点燃爆炸性气体混合物。显而易 见，本质安全法是最可靠安全的防爆方法。
P F倍加福安全栅分类使用原理及选用
P+F倍加福安全栅分类使用原理及选用行业工程师与大家分享P+F倍加福倍加福安全栅分类使用原理。
如何选择P+F倍加福倍加福安全栅，使用P+F倍加福倍加福安全栅时应该注意哪些事项，P+F倍加福安全栅安装注意事项，P+F倍加福倍加福安全栅如何维护？东莞市巴菲特专业为您提供P+F倍加福倍加福安全栅相关问题解答。
除了要选择合适的安全栅外，使用P+F倍加福安全栅的时候要注意以下几个方面：第一，要注意线缆和现场设备的容抗和感抗，本安防爆是系统防爆，除了安全栅需要达到所需的防爆等级外，线缆和现场设备的蓄能也是一个关键问题。
特别是在参量认证替代系统认证后，工程商尤其要注意这个问题。
第二，要注意本安接地，齐纳安全栅需要本安接地，接地电阻应小于1。
第三，本安线缆与非本安线缆应分开敷设在不同的线槽里。
并应有明显标识。
第四，更换时应注意断电。
倍加福安全栅又称安全限能器，是本安系统中的重要组成部分。
倍加福安全栅主要有P+F齐纳式安全栅和P+f隔离式安全栅两大类。
倍加福齐纳式安全栅的核心元件为齐纳二极管，限流电阻及快速熔断丝。
P+f隔离式安全栅信号和电源隔离单元、信号处理单元组成。
倍加福安全栅的主要功能为限流限压，保证现场仪表可得到的能量在安全范围内。
倍加福安全栅是介于现场设备与控制室设备之间的一个限能电路，用来把控制室供给现场仪表的电能量限制在既不能产生足以引爆危险气体的火花，又不能产生足以引爆危险气体的仪表表面温度，从而消除了引爆源。
在选择倍加福安全栅时必须考虑其型号与现场仪表类型相适应，还须考虑倍加福安全栅与本质安全仪表要求相兼容及形成的本安系统中阻抗匹配的问题。
我国采用“回路认证”这种方式认证本安系统，即根据危险环境使用仪表的联合取证情况，选择已与其联合取证的倍加福安全栅，一经联合取证，现场仪表与倍加福安全栅便固定组合构成本安系统。
实践中，这种方式对倍加福安全栅和现场仪表的选择有很大的局限性。
广泛采用是进年来逐渐形成的一种本质安全认证技术，即“参量认证”。
P+F安全栅说明书(中文)
K 系列隔离栅、隔离器及报警设定器常用型号选型表
一、常用隔离式安全栅
现场信号 类型
型号
通道数
பைடு நூலகம்智 能
SIL
系统侧应用说明
AI，
4-20mA 2 线制智能 (或非智能) 变送器
KCD2-STC-Ex1
KFD2-STC4-Ex1 KFD2-STC4-Ex2 KFD2-STC4-Ex1.2O
单通道
是
SIL2
有源或无源 4-20mA 信号，或 1-5V 信号。
单通道 是 SIL2 有源 4-20mA 信号。智能型，
双通道 是 SIL2 支持 HART。
一进二出 是 SIL2
KFD2-STC4-Ex1-Y122583 单通道 是 SIL2 无源 4-20mA 信号。智能型，
KFD2-STC4-Ex1.2O-Y122582 一进二出 是 SIL2 支持 HART。
回路限 能单元
电流隔 离单元
信号处 理单元
P+F 公司已有 40 年研发和生产隔离栅的 经验。现共有 4 个系列的隔离栅畅销世界各地。 1. KF 系列隔离栅。这是销售量最大、应用最广
泛的隔离栅系列。本样本将详细介绍。 2. KS 系列远程 I/O 型隔离栅。这是最新型的隔
离栅系列。它在隔离栅基础上又集成了远程 I/O 的功能。可安装在现场危险区 Zone 2。多 达 125 台隔离栅可通过一根通讯总线与 DCS 系统联接。其应用可为用户节省控制系统的总 体投资。另有样本做专门介绍。 3. E-Card 系列隔离栅。其特点为欧洲 19” 标 准 机架的安装方式。机柜整洁、美观、高雅。维 护十分方便。深得欧洲用户喜爱。在我国也得 到很多用户的青睐。另有样本做专门介绍。 4. HiD 系列隔离栅。其特点为完全的母板安装方 式。现场侧和系统侧的接线均在母板上完成， 隔离栅上没有接线。维护隔离栅时完全不触动 任何接线端子。可采用 DCS 系统电缆与隔离 栅母板联接。特别适用于 DCS 和隔离栅总成 调试验收后，需要拆散、搬运至现场，再重新 安装联接的场合。有关 HiD 隔离栅另有样本 做专门介绍。
P+F安全栅培训ppt课件
中国国家级石油和化学工业电气产品防爆质量监督检验中心 （PCEC）是中华人民共和国地区监督生产安全防爆产品的权威机构， 对本安型安全栅产品有着严格、科学、详细的规定，只有通过该监 督站认证的企业及其所开发生产的产品才具备符合标准的安全性能， 否则可能会给使用方的设备、人员和生产造成无可估量的损害。
24
25
无源隔离栅和sink信号
26
其它类安全栅
27
安全供电方式
外部供电
导轨供电
28
29
齐纳安全栅
AI型30齐Fra bibliotek安全栅AO型
31
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35
36
37
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P+F安全栅 组态
P+F安全栅的组态主要指对温变式安全栅的组态 ，下面我们大概了解一下，温变式安全栅组态软 件的安装与一般组态。
P+F安全栅的基础知识 与接线组态、故障判断
及处理方法
1
主要内容
1.安全栅的简介 2.齐纳式安全栅 3.隔离式安全栅 4.P+F安全栅名称含义 5.常用的隔离式P+F安全栅 5.常用齐纳安全栅 6.温变式安全栅的组态 7.安全栅的常见故障及处理方法
2
安全栅简介
本安型安全栅介绍： 本安型安全栅应用在本安防爆系统的设计中，它是安装于安全
(安全生产)PHP齐纳安全栅
（简介）本质安全型保护无极性平衡／非平衡传输AC／DC兼容目录一、概述二、HAS系列齐纳安全栅使用要求三、产品型号命名四、HSA系列齐纳安全栅参数表五、通用技术参数六、安装连接与接地七、HSA系列齐纳二极管安全栅外形尺寸八、注意事项一、概述安全栅是本质安全型防爆电子设备的关联设备，在非安全环境中使用本安型防爆电子设备时，必须采用安全栅防爆措施与安全区的设备及线路连接，实现本安防爆系统，用以防止因连接线路上和本安防爆电子设备出现故障时造成的过量能量（电能）窜入危险场所，将窜入危险场所的电能限制在安全值内。
保证在危险环境中安全使用本安型防爆电子设备，保证工作现场安全。
HSA系列齐纳二极管安全栅是根据我研究所多年来，在石油化工行业实际工作中应用安全栅的经验，结合齐纳安全栅特性，自行设计研发的最新产品。
HSA系列齐纳二极管安全栅具有无极性，交直流通用的特点，产品分为平衡和非平衡两种连接方式，即适合于单独应用，也适合于较大的，多组合安全栅本安型防爆电子设备系统工作。
本产品符合GB3836.1 - 2000，《爆炸性气体环境用电器设备》第一部分通用要求和GB3836.4 - 2000《爆炸性气体环境用电气设备》第四部分本质安全型的规定，并取得了国家CEC《石油和化学工业电气产品防爆质量监督检验中心》颁发的防爆电气产品防爆合格证。
二、HSA系列齐纳二极管安全栅使用要求1、在使用HSA系列齐纳二极管安全栅时，应将安全栅放置在安全工作区，必须在危险工作环境使用时，应采用隔爆方式，将安全栅放置在隔爆装置内，按隔爆装置要求连接使用。
2、HSA系列齐纳二极管安全栅属于一次性使用装置，不得修复使用，如必须修复，应由专业技术人员修复后，经重新检测鉴定合格后方可使用。
3、HSA系列齐纳二极管安全栅与本安型防爆电子设备配套使用时，所选用安全栅与本安型防爆电子设备都应取得国家防爆质量监督检验中心颁发的防爆合格证，并经防爆检验单位确认后，可组成本安防爆系统。
P+F安全栅说明书(中文)
KF 系列隔离栅致力与在完成本安防爆的 基本功能的同时，帮助用户获得更多的信息。 • 全面支持模拟量输入输出回路的智能通讯。该
系列隔离栅支持目前市场上应用的所有智能通 讯协议，如 HART、Brain、Foxcom、DE， 等等。 • 在支持 HART 智能通讯方面，KF 系列隔离栅 设计得几乎无微不至。不仅普通的单通道 AI 和 AO 型号支持 HART，双通道 AI 和 AO、一 进二出 AI 同样支持 HART。不仅支持二线制 変送器的 HART 通讯，还支持 4 线制変送器 的 HART 通讯。 • KF 系列隔离栅还细致地照顾到用户在全面应 用智能通讯时地一些特殊问题。比如，用户有 时希望支持 HART 通讯地隔离栅能兼容非智 能仪表。又如，用户希望在 DCS 系统尚未连
有源或无源 4-20mA 信号，或 1-5V 信号。
单通道 是 SIL2 有源 4-20mA 信号。智能型，
双通道 是 SIL2 支持 HART。
一进二出 是 SIL2
KFD2-STC4-Ex1-Y122583 单通道 是 SIL2 无源 4-20mA 信号。智能型，
KFD2-STC4-Ex1.2O-Y122582 一进二出 是 SIL2 支持 HART。
AO，
KCD2-SCD-Ex1
单通道 是 SIL2 4-20mA 信号。兼容智能/非智
4-20mA 驱动电气转 换器或电气 阀门定位器
KFD2-SCD-Ex1.LK KFD2-SCD2-Ex2.LK KFD2-CD-Ex1.32 KFD2-CD2-Ex2
单通道 双通道 单通道 双通道
是 SIL2 能仪表。带线路故障检测功 是 SIL2 能。 否 SIL2 4-20mA 信号。 否 SIL2 4-20mA 信号。
(安全生产)PHP齐纳安全栅
（安全生产）PHP齐纳安全栅（简介）本质安全型保护无极性平衡／非平衡传输AC／DC兼容目录一、概述二、HAS系列齐纳安全栅使用要求三、产品型号命名四、HSA系列齐纳安全栅参数表五、通用技术参数六、安装连接和接地七、HSA系列齐纳二极管安全栅外形尺寸八、注意事项一、概述安全栅是本质安全型防爆电子设备的关联设备，在非安全环境中使用本安型防爆电子设备时，必须采用安全栅防爆措施和安全区的设备及线路连接，实现本安防爆系统，用以防止因连接线路上和本安防爆电子设备出现故障时造成的过量能量（电能）窜入危险场所，将窜入危险场所的电能限制在安全值内。
保证在危险环境中安全使用本安型防爆电子设备，保证工作现场安全。
HSA系列齐纳二极管安全栅是根据我研究所多年来，在石油化工行业实际工作中应用安全栅的经验，结合齐纳安全栅特性，自行设计研发的最新产品。
HSA系列齐纳二极管安全栅具有无极性，交直流通用的特点，产品分为平衡和非平衡俩种连接方式，即适合于单独应用，也适合于较大的，多组合安全栅本安型防爆电子设备系统工作。
本产品符合GB3836.1-2000，《爆炸性气体环境用电器设备》第壹部分通用要求和GB3836.4-2000《爆炸性气体环境用电气设备》第四部分本质安全型的规定，且取得了国家CEC《石油和化学工业电气产品防爆质量监督检验中心》颁发的防爆电气产品防爆合格证。
二、HSA系列齐纳二极管安全栅使用要求1、在使用HSA系列齐纳二极管安全栅时，应将安全栅放置在安全工作区，必须在危险工作环境使用时，应采用隔爆方式，将安全栅放置在隔爆装置内，按隔爆装置要求连接使用。
2、HSA系列齐纳二极管安全栅属于壹次性使用装置，不得修复使用，如必须修复，应由专业技术人员修复后，经重新检测鉴定合格后方可使用。
3、HSA系列齐纳二极管安全栅和本安型防爆电子设备配套使用时，所选用安全栅和本安型防爆电子设备都应取得国家防爆质量监督检验中心颁发的防爆合格证，且经防爆检验单位确认后，可组成本安防爆系统。
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K-System Introduction
The K-System … …is the interface between field
and control side 现场侧和控制侧的接口模块 …has large product portfolio 非常广泛的产品组合 …has 3-port isolation
倍加福公司拥有现今市场上最广泛的隔离式安全栅和信号调节器
The K-System interface technology has all the great features that make selecting modules a clear and simple choice.
K系列的接口产品有很多优点，选型也非常清晰和简单。
Control system 控制系统
Field side 现场侧
Interface 接口
Control side 控制侧
Sheet 12
K-System Product Range
P+F has the most extensive range of intrinsic safe isolated barriers and signal conditioners in the market today.
IZsoelnaeter erirer
2019/12/20
DCS ESD
What is interface technology ?
Point to Point – in non-Ex applications
Signal Conditioner
2019/12/20
DCS PLS
Sheet 13
K-System 3-port isolation 三端隔离
Field side 现场侧
Control side 控制侧
Power supply 电源
3-port isolation 3端隔离
Input, output and power supply are galvanically isolated 输入，输出和供电三端隔离 This avoids ground loops and support reliable signals 预防接地回路，增加信号的可靠性
Sheet 6
What is interface technology ?
What is interface technology ?
Point to Point connection between field side and control side
Field side
Interface module
CAD-Files CAD 文件 Marketing Material Marketing材料
Sheet 4
K-System Content
Part 1
Sheet 5
K-System Content
Part 1
Introduction 简介 Housing of the K-System Mounting options Supply and error message via Power Rail Setup of modules
三端隔离
…can be mounted on DIN Rail DIN 导轨安装 … is up to SIL 3 安全等级最高达到SIL3
Sheet 10
K-System Introduction The K-System …
Sheet 11
K-System Introduction
Sheet 14
K-System Isolated Barriers 隔离栅
Intrinsic Safety Area
本质安全区域
Isolated barriers—隔离栅
Intrinsic safety power limitation to field side 去现场的本质安全的能量限制 Intrinsic Safety Isolation between field and control side 现场侧和控制侧本质安全的隔离
K-System
导轨式安全栅的介绍及选型
K-System 主要内容
Part 1
Introduction 简介 Housing of the K-System K系列的外壳 Mounting options 安装方式 Supply and error message via Power Rail
Sheet 3
K-System Content
Part 3
Accessories---附件
Accessories for Power Rail 电源导轨 Surge Protection Barriers 浪涌保护器 HART Interface Solutions HART采集方案 Terminal Blocks 端子
Sheet 15
K-System Signal Conditioners 信号调节器
Field Area 现场侧
Signal conditioners 信号调节器
3-port Isolation 3端隔离 Signal conditioning of field signals 对现场侧的信号进行调节 Same system features like isolated barriers系统特征和隔离栅相同
Interface module
DCS
Interface module
ESD
Interface module
Interface technology Control side
2019/12/20
What is interface technology ?
Point to Point – in Ex-applications
通过电源导轨来供电和传递故障信息 Setup of modules 模块的设置
Sheet 2
K-System Content
Part 2
Field and Control side signals 现场侧和控制侧的信号 Modules of K-System K系列模块
Digital---开关量 Analog---模拟量