资本融资外文文献翻译
融资外文文献
融资外文文献Bank Involvement with SMEs:BeyondRelationship LendingThe financing of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) has attracted much attention in recent years and has become an important topic for economists and policymakers working on financial and economic development. This interest is driven in part by the fact that SMEs account for the majority of firms in an economy and a significant share of employment (Hallberg 2001). Furthermore, most large companies usually start as small enterprises, so the ability of SMEs to develop and invest becomes crucial to any economy wishing to prosper.2The recent attention on SME financing also comes from the perception among academics and policymakers that SMEs lack appropriate financing and need to receive special assistance, such as government programs that increase lending. V arious studies support this perception. A number of papers find that SMEs are more financially constrained than large firms. For example, using data from 10,000 firms in 80 countries,Beck, Demirgü?-Kunt, Laeven, and Maksimovic (2006) show that the probability that a firm rates financing as a major obstacle is 39% for small firms, 38% for medium-size firms, and 29% for large firms. Furthermore, small firms finance, on average, 13 percentage points less of their investments with external finance when compared to large firms.4 Importantly, lack of access to external finance is a key obstacle to firm growth, especially for SM Es (Beck, Demirgü?-Kunt, and Maksimovic 2005). On the policy side, there are a large number of initiatives across countries to foster SME financing including governmentsubsidized lines of credit and public guarantee funds. One example that has been deemed as relatively successful is Chile’s Fondo de Garantía para Peque?os Empresarios (FOGA PE), a fund created to encourage bank lending to SMEs through partial credit guarantees. This fund has many features that make it attractive,including some incentives to reduce moral hazard, promote competition among banks, and encourage self sustainability银行参与中小企业融资：超越关系型贷款近年来，中型和小型企业（中小企业）的融资问题，已成为致力于财政与经济发展工作的经济学家们和政策家们的重要议题，备受关注。
研究中小企业融资要参考的英文文献
研究中小企业融资要参考的英文文献在研究中小企业融资问题时，寻找相关的英文文献是获取国际经验和最佳实践的重要途径。
以下是一些值得参考的英文文献，涵盖了中小企业融资的理论背景、现状分析、政策建议以及案例研究等方面。
“Financing Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: A Global Perspective”, by P.K. Agarwal, A.K. Dixit, and J.C. Garmaise. This book provides an comprehensive overview of the issues and challenges related to financing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) around the world. It presents an analytical framework for understanding the different dimensions of SME financing and outlines best practices and policy recommendations for improving access to finance for these businesses.“The Financing of SMEs: A Review of the Literature and Empirical Evidence”, by R. E. Cull, L. P. Ciccantelli, and J. Valentin. This paper provides a comprehensive literature review on the financing challenges faced by SMEs, exploring the various factors that influence their access to finance,including information asymmetries, lack of collateral, and limited access to formal financial markets. The paper also presents empirical evidence on the impact of different financing strategies on SME performance and outlines policy recommendations for addressing these challenges.“The Role of Microfinance in SME Finance: A Review of the Literature”, by S. Hossain, M.A. Iftekhar, and N. Choudhury. This paper focuses on the role of microfinance in financing SMEs and explores the advantages and disadvantages of microfinance as a financing option for SMEs. It also outlines the potential for microfinance to play a greater role in supporting SME development in emerging markets and provides policy recommendations for achieving this objective.“The Political Economy of SME Finance: Evidence fromCross-Country Data”, by D.J. Mullen and J.R. Roberts. This paper examines the political economy of SME finance, exploring the relationship between government policies, market institutions, and SME financing constraints. Usingcross-country data, the paper finds evidence that government policies can have a significant impact on SME access to finance and that countries with better market institutions are more successful in supporting SME development. The paper provides policy recommendations for improving SME financing in different political and institutional settings.“Financing SMEs in Developing Countries: A Case Study of India”, by S. Bhattacharya, S. Ghosh, and R. Panda. This case study explores the financing challenges faced by SMEs in India and identifies the factors that limit their access to finance, including government policies, market institutions, and cultural traditions. It also presents an in-depth analysis of the various financing options available to SMEs in India, such as informal credit markets, microfinance institutions, and banks, and outlines policy recommendations for enhancing access to finance for these businesses.这些文献提供了对中小企业融资问题的多维度理解，并提供了实用的政策建议和案例研究，有助于更好地解决中小企业的融资需求。
资本结构外文文献翻译
资本结构外文文献翻译外文资料翻译—英文原文How Important is Financial Risk?IntroductionThe financial crisis of 2008 has brought significant attention tothe effects of financial leverage. There is no doubt that the highlevels of debt financing by financial institutions and households significantly contributed to the crisis. Indeed, evidence indicates that excessive leverage orchestrated by major global banks (e.g., through the mortgage lending and collateralized debt obligations) and the so-called “shadowbanking system” may be the underlying cause of the recent economic and financialdislocation. Less obvious is the role of financial leverage among nonfinancial firms. To date, problems in the U.S. non-financial sector have been minor compared to the distress in the financial sector despite the seizing of capital markets during the crisis. For example, non-financial bankruptcies have been limited given that the economic decline is the largest since the great depression of the 1930s. In fact, bankruptcy filings of non-financial firms have occurred mostly in U.S. industries (e.g., automotive manufacturing, newspapers, and real estate) that faced fundamental economic pressures prior to the financial crisis.This surprising fact begs the question, “How important is financialrisk for non-financial firms?” At the heart of this issue is the uncertainty about the determinants of total firm risk as well as components of firm risk.StudyRecent academic research in both asset pricing and corporate finance has rekindled an interest in analyzing equity price risk. A current strand of the asset pricing literature examines the finding of Campbell et al. (2001) that firm-specific (idiosyncratic) risk has tended to increase over the last 40 years. Other work suggests that idiosyncratic risk may be a priced risk factor (see Goyal and Santa-Clara, 2003, among others). Also related to these studies is work by Pástor and Veronesi (2003) showing how investor uncertainty about firm profitability is an important determinant of idiosyncratic risk and firm value. Other research has examined the role of equity volatility in bond pricing (e.g., Dichev, 1998, Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi, 2008).However, much of the empirical work examining equity price risktakes the risk of assets as given or tries to explain the trend in idiosyncratic risk. In contrast, this外文资料翻译—英文原文paper takes a different tack in the investigation of equity price risk. First, we seek to understand the determinants of equity price risk at the firm level by considering total risk as the product of risks inherent in the firms operations (i.e., economic or business risks) andrisks associated with financing the firms operations (i.e., financial risks). Second, we attempt to assess the relative importance of economic and financial risks and the implications for financial policy.Early research by Modigliani and Miller (1958) suggests thatfinancial policy may be largely irrelevant for firm value because investors can replicate many financial decisions by the firm at a low cost (i.e., via homemade leverage) and well-functioningcapital markets should be able to distinguish between financial and economic distress. Nonetheless, financial policies, such as adding debt to the capital structure, can magnify the risk of equity. In contrast, recent research on corporate risk management suggests that firms mayalso be able to reduce risks and increase value with financial policies such as hedging with financial derivatives. However, this research is often motivated by substantial deadweight costs associated withfinancial distress or other market imperfections associated withfinancial leverage. Empirical research provides conflicting accounts of how costly financial distress can be for a typical publicly traded firm.We attempt to directly address the roles of economic and financialrisk by examining determinants of total firm risk. In our analysis we utilize a large sample of non-financial firms in the United States. Our goal of identifying the most important determinants of equity price risk (volatility) relies on viewing financial policy as transforming asset volatility into equity volatility via financial leverage. Thus, throughout the paper, we consider financial leverage as the wedgebetween asset volatility and equity volatility. For example, in a static setting, debt provides financial leverage that magnifies operating cash flow volatility. Because financial policy is determined by owners (and managers), we are careful to examine the effects of firms? asset and operating characteristics on financial policy. Specifically, we examine a variety of characteristics suggested by previous research and, as clearly as possible, distinguish between those associated with the operations of the company (i.e. factors determining economic risk) and those associated with financing the firm (i.e. factors determining financial risk). We then allow economic risk to be a determinant of financial policy in the structural framework of Leland and Toft (1996), or alternatively,外文资料翻译—英文原文in a reduced form model of financial leverage. An advantage of the structural model approach is that we are able to account for both the possibility of financial and operating implications of some factors (e.g., dividends), as well as the endogenous nature of the bankruptcy decision and financial policy in general.Our proxy for firm risk is the volatility of common stock returns derived from calculating the standard deviation of daily equity returns. Our proxies for economic risk are designed to capture the essential characteristics of the firms? operations andassets that determine the cash flow generating process for the firm. For example, firm size and age provide measures of line of- businessmaturity; tangible assets (plant, property, and equipment) serve as ap roxy for the …hardness? of a firm?s assets;capital expenditures measure capital intensity as well as growth potential. Operating profitability and operating profit volatility serve as measures of the timeliness and riskiness of cash flows. To understand how financial factors affect firm risk, we examine total debt, debt maturity, dividend payouts, and holdings of cash and short-term investments.The primary result of our analysis is surprising: factorsdetermining economic risk for a typical company explain the vastmajority of the variation in equity volatility.Correspondingly, measures of implied financial leverage are much lower than observed debt ratios. Specifically, in our sample covering 1964-2008 average actual net financial (market) leverage is about 1.50 compared to our estimates of between 1.03 and 1.11 (depending on model specification and estimation technique). This suggests that firms may undertake other financial policies to manage financial risk and thus lower effective leverage to nearly negligible levels. These policies might include dynamically adjusting financial variables such as debt levels, debt maturity, or cash holdings (see, for example, Acharya, Almeida, and Campello, 2007). In addition, many firms also utilize explicit financial risk management techniques such as the use of financial derivatives, contractual arrangements with investors (e.g. lines of credit, call provisions in debt contracts, or contingencies insupplier contracts), special purpose vehicles (SPVs), or other alternative risk transfer techniques.The effects of our economic risk factors on equity volatility are generally highly statistically significant, with predicted signs. In addition, the magnitudes of the effects are substantial. We find that volatility of equity decreases with the size and age of the firm. Thisis intuitive since large and mature firms typically have more stable lines of英文原文外文资料翻译—business, which should be reflected in the volatility of equity returns. Equity volatility tends to decrease with capital expenditures though the effect is weak. Consistent with the predictions of Pástor and Veronesi (2003), we find that firms with higher profitability and lower profit volatility have lower equity volatility. This suggests that companies with higher and more stable operating cash flows are less likely to go bankrupt, and therefore are potentially less risky. Among economic risk variables, the effects of firm size, profit volatility, and dividend policy on equity volatility stand out. Unlike some previous studies, our careful treatment of the endogeneity of financial policy confirms that leverage increases total firm risk. Otherwise, financial risk factors are not reliably related to total risk.Given the large literature on financial policy, it is no surprise that financial variables are,at least in part, determined by the economic risks firms take. However, some of the specific findings areunexpected. For example, in a simple model of capital structure, dividend payouts should increase financial leverage since they represent an outflow of cash from the firm (i.e., increase net debt). We find that dividends are associated with lower risk. This suggests that paying dividends is not as much a product of financial policy as a characteristic of a firm?s operations (e.g., a maturecompany with limited growth opportunities). We also estimate how sensitivities to different risk factors have changed over time. Our results indicate that most relations are fairly stable. One exception is firm age which prior to 1983 tends to be positively related to risk and has since been consistently negatively related to risk. This is related to findings by Brown and Kapadia (2007) that recent trends in idiosyncratic risk are related to stock listings by younger and riskier firms.Perhaps the most interesting result from our analysis is that our measures of implied financial leverage have declined over the last 30 years at the same time that measures of equity price risk (such as idiosyncratic risk) appear to have been increasing. In fact, measures of implied financial leverage from our structural model settle near 1.0 (i.e., no leverage) by the end of our sample. There are several possible reasons for this. First, total debt ratios for non-financial firms have declined steadily over the last 30 years, so our measure of implied leverage should also decline. Second, firms have significantly increased cash holdings, so measures of net debt (debtminus cash and short-term investments) have also declined. Third, the composition of publicly traded firms has changed with more risky (especially technology-oriented)英文原文外文资料翻译—firms becoming publicly listed. These firms tend to have less debtin their capital structure. Fourth, as mentioned above, firms can undertake a variety of financial risk management activities. To the extent that these activities have increased over the last few decades, firms will have become less exposed to financial risk factors.We conduct some additional tests to provide a reality check of our results. First, we repeat our analysis with a reduced form model that imposes minimum structural rigidity on our estimation and find very similar results. This indicates that our results are unlikely to be driven by model misspecification. We also compare our results with trends in aggregate debt levels for all U.S. non-financial firms andfind evidence consistent with our conclusions. Finally, we look at characteristics of publicly traded non-financial firms that file for bankruptcy around the last three recessions and find evidence suggesting that these firms are increasingly being affected by economic distress as opposed to financial distress.ConclusionIn short, our results suggest that, as a practical matter, residual financial risk is now relatively unimportant for the typical U.S. firm. This raises questions about the level of expected financial distresscosts since the probability of financial distress is likely to be lower than commonly thought for most companies. For example, our results suggest that estimates of the level of systematic risk in bond pricing may be biased if they do not take into account the trend in implied financial leverage (e.g., Dichev, 1998). Our results also bring into question the appropriateness of financial models used to estimatedefault probabilities, since financial policies that may be difficult to observe appear to significantly reduce risk. Lastly, our results imply that the fundamental risks born by shareholders are primarily related to underlying economic risks which should lead to a relatively efficient allocation of capital.Some readers may be tempted to interpret our results as indicating that financial risk does not matter. This is not the proper interpretation. Instead, our results suggest that firms are able to manage financial risk so that the resulting exposure to shareholders is low compared to economic risks. Of course, financial risk is important to firms that choose to take on such risks either through high debt levels or a lack of risk management. In contrast, our study suggeststhat the typical non-financial firm chooses not to take these risks. In short, gross financial risk may be important, but firms can manage it. This contrasts with fundamental economic and business risks that 外文资料翻译—英文原文are more difficult (or undesirable) to hedge because they represent the mechanism by which the firm earns economic profits.References[1]Shyam,Sunder.Theory Accounting and Control[J].An Innternational Theory on PublishingComPany.2005[2]Ogryezak,W,Ruszeznski,A. Rom Stomchastic Dominance to Mean-Risk Models:Semide-Viations as Risk Measures[J].European Journal of Operational Research.[3] Borowski, D.M., and P.J. Elmer. An Expert System Approach to Financial Analysis: the Case of S&L Bankruptcy [J].Financial Management, Autumn.2004;[4] Casey, C.and N. Bartczak. Using Operating Cash Flow Data to Predict Financial Distress: Some Extensions[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,Spring.2005;[5] John M.Mulvey,HafizeGErkan.Applying CVaR for decentralized risk management of financialcompanies[J].Journal of Banking&Finanee.2006;[6] Altman. Credit Rating:Methodologies,Rationale and DefaultRisk[M](RiskBooks,London.译文:财务风险的重要性引言2008年的金融危机对金融杠杆的作用产生重大影响。
中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献
中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献Title: Financing Channels for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises: A Comparative Analysis of Chinese and English LiteratureIntroduction:Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play a crucial role in driving economic growth, job creation, and innovation. However, they often face challenges in accessing finance due to limited assets, credit history, and information transparency. This article aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of financing channels for SMEs, comparing existing literature in both Chinese and English.1. Overview of SME Financing Channels:1.1 Bank Loans:Traditional bank loans are a common financing option for SMEs. They offer advantages such as long-term repayment periods, lower interest rates, and established banking relationships. However, obtaining bank loans may be challenging for SMEs with insufficient collateral or creditworthiness.1.2 Venture Capital and Private Equity:Venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE) attract external investments in exchange for equity stakes. These financing channels are particularly suitable for high-growth potential SMEs. VC/PE investors often provide not only financial resources but also expertise and networks to support SMEs' growth. However, SMEs may face challenges in meeting the stringent criteria required by VC/PE firms, limiting accessibility.1.3 Angel Investment:Angel investors are wealthy individuals who provide early-stage funding to SMEs. They are often interested in innovative and high-potential ventures. Angel investments can bridge the funding gap during a company's initial stages, but SMEs need to actively seek out and convince potential angel investors to secure funding.1.4 Government Grants and Subsidies:Governments offer grants and subsidies to support SMEs' business development and innovation. These resources play a pivotal role in ensuring SMEs' survival and growth. However, the application process can be cumbersome, and the competition for these funds is usually high.1.5 Crowdfunding:Crowdfunding platforms allow SMEs to raise capital from a large poolof individual investors. This channel provides opportunities for SMEs to showcase their products or services and engage directly with potential customers. However, the success of crowdfunding campaigns depends on effective marketing strategies and compelling narratives.2. Comparative Analysis:2.1 Chinese Literature on SME Financing Channels:In Chinese literature, research on SME financing channels focuses on the unique challenges faced by Chinese SMEs, such as information asymmetry, high collateral requirements, and insufficient financial transparency. Studiesemphasize the importance of government policies, bank loans, and alternative financing channels like venture capital and private equity.2.2 English Literature on SME Financing Channels:English literature encompasses a broader range of financing channels and their implications for SMEs worldwide. It highlights the significance of business angel investment, crowdfunding, trade credit, factoring, and peer-to-peer lending. The literature also emphasizes the role of financial technology (fintech) in expanding SMEs' access to finance.3. Recommendations for SMEs:3.1 Enhancing Financial Literacy:SMEs should invest in improving their financial literacy to understand different financing options and strategies. This knowledge will help them position themselves more effectively when seeking external funding.3.2 Diversifying Funding Sources:To mitigate financing risks, SMEs should explore multiple channels simultaneously. A diversified funding portfolio can help SMEs access different sources of capital while reducing dependence on a single channel.3.3 Building Relationships:Developing relationships with banks, investors, and relevant stakeholders is crucial for SMEs seeking financing. Strong networks and connections can provide valuable support and increase the likelihood of securing funding.Conclusion:Access to appropriate financing channels is crucial for the growth and development of SMEs. This analysis of financing channels for SMEs, comparing Chinese and English literature, highlights the diverse options available. By understanding the strengths and limitations of each channel, SMEs can make informed decisions and adopt strategies that align with their unique business requirements. Governments, financial institutions, and other stakeholders should continue to collaborate in creating an enabling environment that facilitates SMEs' access to finance.。
融资融券英文文献-摘录
文献综述1.2011Pedro A. C. Saffi and Kari Sigurdsson 《Price Efficiency and Short Selling》(价格效率和卖空)主要研究借贷市场影响价格效率和收入分配，使用股票借贷供给和借贷费用来代理卖空限制。
主要研究结论：第一，卖空限制降低价格效率；第二，卖空限制的废除不会增加价格波动和极端负收益的发生。
2.2014Saqib Sharif, Hamish D. Anderson, Ben R. Marshall《Against the tide: the commencement of short selling and margin trading in mainland China》（应对潮流：中国大陆融资融券的开端）对于A股和H股，可卖空股票价格的下降，表明，融券主导融资的影响。
与监管部门的意图和新开发市场实验证据相反，卖空股的流动性和买卖价差都下降。
与Ausubel (1990)的结论一致，这些结果表明，不知情的投资者避开卖空股以减少和知情投资者的交易风险。
研究卖空、买空对价格、流动性和波动性的影响，使用中国大陆和香港的数据。
贡献：第一，研究融资、融券的双重影响，可以让我们评价哪个更好，我们发现卖空影响更强。
卖空交易会增加和信息知情者的交易风险；第二，我们通过新兴市场论证卖空和买空对流动性的影响。
相比发达市场，新兴市场似乎在这些方面研究较少。
新兴市场可能与发达市场不同，因为新兴市场的投资者保障更弱(Morck et al., 2000)。
与监管部门的目的和发达市场的证据不同，这种在监管上的改变导致流动性下降。
这表明，投资者避开与监管涉及的股票。
第三，新兴市场上，卖空、买空对股票收益影响有限。
Lee and Yoo (1993)发现，在韩国和台湾，买空需求和股票收益波动性之间无关，而Lamba and Ariff(2006)发现在马来西亚，买空约束的放松伴随收入的增加。
中小企业的融资偏好和资本结构外文文献翻译
文献出处：Kadri Cemil Akyüz, İlker Akyüz, Hasan Serіn, et al. The financing preferences and capital structure of micro, small and medium sized firm owners in forest products industry in Turkey[J]. Forest Policy & Economics, 2016, 8(3):301-311.第一部分为译文，第二部分为原文。
默认格式：中文五号宋体，英文五号Times New Roma，行间距1.5倍。
土耳其林业行业微型以及中小企业的融资偏好和资本结构Kadri Cemil Akyqz, I˙lker Akyqz, Hasan SerJn, Hicabi Cindik卡德里杰米尔，拉克·阿基茨，哈桑·塞尔文，黑卡比克里迪克摘要：资本结构的大多数理论和实证研究都集中于大型企业。
对微型，中小型企业进行了数量有限的资本结构研究，在对影响家族企业主的资金决策的因素的调查是非常少的。
本研究探索MSMS公司所有者的资本结构和融资偏好，并更加侧重于林业产品行业中MSMS 公司的初始和持续融资中披露的债务与股本偏好。
在本研究中，土耳其黑海地区18个城市对林业产品行业的MSMS企业所有者的财务偏好进行了调查。
根据对851家企业的抽样调查，确定了这些部门的一些财务特征和资本结构。
从研究中得出的初步结果表明，MSMS 公司的所有者倾向于内部财务来源，反映在初始和持续的企业设施中，外部市场的成本资本过高。
关键词：土耳其小公司林业产品行业金融偏好财务结构小企业的一般特点五十年代和六十年代，垂直整合的大型企业集团框架内组建的大型生产单位几乎被普遍认为是经济社会发展总体模式中最重要的要素之一。
然而，随着1973年石油和能源价格冲击之后出现的动荡，出现了一些惨烈的案例，大型企业遇到经济困难，为了生存而被迫脱离劳动力（Henrekson和Johanson，1999 ）。
资本结构中英文对照外文翻译文献
中英文对照外文翻译(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)The effect of capital structure on profitability : an empirical analysis of listed firms in Ghana IntroductionThe capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on a firm’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. The capital structure of a firm is actually a mix of different securities. In general, a firm can choose among many alternative capital structures. It can issue a large amount of debt or very little debt. It can arrange lease financing, use warrants, issue convertible bonds, sign forward contracts or trade bond swaps. It can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations; however, it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes its overall market value.A number of theories have been advanced in explaining the capital structure of firms. Despite the theoretical appeal of capital structure, researchers in financial management have not found the optimal capital structure. The best that academics and practitioners have been able to achieve are prescriptions that satisfy short-term goals. For example, the lack of a consensus about what would qualify as optimal capital structure has necessitated the need for this research. A better understanding of the issues at hand requires a look at the concept of capital structure and its effect on firm profitability. This paper examines the relationship between capital structure and profitability of companies listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange during the period 1998-2002. The effect of capital structure on the profitability of listed firms in Ghana is a scientific area that has not yet been explored in Ghanaian finance literature.The paper is organized as follows. The following section gives a review of the extant literature on the subject. The next section describes the data and justifies the choice of the variables used in the analysis. The model used in the analysis is then estimated. The subsequent section presents and discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, the last section summarizes the findings of the research and also concludes the discussion.Literature on capital structureThe relationship between capital structure and firm value has been the subject of considerable debate. Throughout the literature, debate has centered on whether there is an optimal capital structure for an individual firm or whether the proportion of debt usage is irrelevant to the individual firm’s value. The capital structure of a firm concerns the mix of debt and equity the firm uses in its operation. Brealey and Myers (2003) contend that the choice of capital structure is fundamentally a marketing problem. They state that the firm can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations, but it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes market value. According to Weston and Brigham (1992), the optimal capital structure is the one that maximizes the market value of the firm’s outstanding shares.Fama and French (1998), analyzing the relationship among taxes, financing decisions, and the firm’s value, concluded that the debt does not concede tax b enefits. Besides, the high leverage degree generates agency problems among shareholders and creditors that predict negative relationships between leverage and profitability. Therefore, negative information relating debt and profitability obscures the tax benefit of the debt. Booth et al. (2001) developed a study attempting to relate the capital structure of several companies in countries with extremely different financial markets. They concluded thatthe variables that affect the choice of the capital structure of the companies are similar, in spite of the great differences presented by the financial markets. Besides, they concluded that profitability has an inverse relationship with debt level and size of the firm. Graham (2000) concluded in his work that big and profitable companies present a low debt rate. Mesquita and Lara (2003) found in their study that the relationship between rates of return and debt indicates a negative relationship for long-term financing. However, they found a positive relationship for short-term financing and equity.Hadlock and James (2002) concluded that companies prefer loan (debt) financing because they anticipate a higher return. Taub (1975) also found significant positive coefficients for four measures of profitability in a regression of these measures against debt ratio. Petersen and Rajan (1994) identified the same association, but for industries. Baker (1973), who worked with a simultaneous equations model, and Nerlove (1968) also found the same type of association for industries. Roden and Lewellen (1995) found a significant positive association between profitability and total debt as a percentage of the total buyout-financing package in their study on leveraged buyouts. Champion (1999) suggested that the use of leverage was one way to improve the performance of an organization.In summary, there is no universal theory of the debt-equity choice. Different views have been put forward regarding the financing choice. The present study investigates the effect of capital structure on profitability of listed firms on the GSE.MethodologyThis study sampled all firms that have been listed on the GSE over a five-year period (1998-2002). Twenty-two firms qualified to be included in the study sample. Variables used for the analysis include profitability and leverage ratios. Profitability is operationalized using a commonly used accounting-based measure: the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to equity. The leverage ratios used include:. short-term debt to the total capital;. long-term debt to total capital;. total debt to total capital.Firm size and sales growth are also included as control variables.The panel character of the data allows for the use of panel data methodology. Panel data involves the pooling of observations on a cross-section of units over several time periods and provides results that are simply not detectable in pure cross-sections or pure time-series studies. A general model for panel data that allows the researcher to estimate panel data with great flexibility and formulate the differences in the behavior of thecross-section elements is adopted. The relationship between debt and profitability is thus estimated in the following regression models:ROE i,t =β0 +β1SDA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (1) ROE i,t=β0 +β1LDA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (2) ROE i,t=β0 +β1DA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (3)where:. ROE i,t is EBIT divided by equity for firm i in time t;. SDA i,t is short-term debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. LDA i,t is long-term debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. DA i,t is total debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. SIZE i,t is the log of sales for firm i in time t;. SG i,t is sales growth for firm i in time t; and. ëi,t is the error term.Empirical resultsTable I provides a summary of the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables for the sample of firms. This shows the average indicators of variables computed from the financial statements. The return rate measured by return on equity (ROE) reveals an average of 36.94 percent with median 28.4 percent. This picture suggests a good performance during the period under study. The ROE measures the contribution of net income per cedi (local currency) invested by the firms’ stockholders; a measure of the efficiency of the owners’ invested capital. The variable SDA measures the ratio of short-term debt to total capital. The average value of this variable is 0.4876 with median 0.4547. The value 0.4547 indicates that approximately 45 percent of total assets are represented by short-term debts, attesting to the fact that Ghanaian firms largely depend on short-term debt for financing their operations due to the difficulty in accessing long-term credit from financial institutions. Another reason is due to the under-developed nature of the Ghanaian long-term debt market. The ratio of total long-term debt to total assets (LDA) also stands on average at 0.0985. Total debt to total capital ratio(DA) presents a mean of 0.5861. This suggests that about 58 percent of total assets are financed by debt capital. The above position reveals that the companies are financially leveraged with a large percentage of total debt being short-term.Table I.Descriptive statisticsMean SD Minimum Median Maximum━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ROE 0.3694 0.5186 -1.0433 0.2836 3.8300SDA 0.4876 0.2296 0.0934 0.4547 1.1018LDA 0.0985 0.1803 0.0000 0.0186 0.7665DA 0.5861 0.2032 0.2054 0.5571 1.1018SIZE 18.2124 1.6495 14.1875 18.2361 22.0995SG 0.3288 0.3457 20.7500 0.2561 1.3597━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Regression analysis is used to investigate the relationship between capital structure and profitability measured by ROE. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results are presented in Table II. The results from the regression models (1), (2), and (3) denote that the independent variables explain the debt ratio determinations of the firms at 68.3, 39.7, and 86.4 percent, respectively. The F-statistics prove the validity of the estimated models. Also, the coefficients are statistically significant in level of confidence of 99 percent.The results in regression (1) reveal a significantly positive relationship between SDA and profitability. This suggests that short-term debt tends to be less expensive, and therefore increasing short-term debt with a relatively low interest rate will lead to an increase in profit levels. The results also show that profitability increases with the control variables (size and sales growth). Regression (2) shows a significantly negative association between LDA and profitability. This implies that an increase in the long-term debt position is associated with a decrease in profitability. This is explained by the fact that long-term debts are relatively more expensive, and therefore employing high proportions of them could lead to low profitability. The results support earlier findings by Miller (1977), Fama and French (1998), Graham (2000) and Booth et al. (2001). Firm size and sales growth are again positively related to profitability.The results from regression (3) indicate a significantly positive association between DA and profitability. The significantly positive regression coefficient for total debt implies that an increase in the debt position is associated with an increase in profitability: thus, the higher the debt, the higher the profitability. Again, this suggests that profitable firms depend more on debt as their main financing option. This supports the findings of Hadlock and James (2002), Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Roden and Lewellen (1995) that profitable firms use more debt. In the Ghanaian case, a high proportion (85 percent)of debt is represented by short-term debt. The results also show positive relationships between the control variables (firm size and sale growth) and profitability.Table II.Regression model results━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Profitability (EBIT/equity)Ordinary least squares━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Variable 1 2 3SIZE 0.0038 (0.0000) 0.0500 (0.0000) 0.0411 (0.0000)SG 0.1314 (0.0000) 0.1316 (0.0000) 0.1413 (0.0000)SDA 0.8025 (0.0000)LDA -0.3722(0.0000)DA -0.7609(0.0000)R²0.6825 0.3968 0.8639SE 0.4365 0.4961 0.4735Prob. (F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ConclusionsThe capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on an organization’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. This present study evaluated the relationship between capital structure and profitability of listed firms on the GSE during a five-year period (1998-2002). The results revealed significantly positive relation between SDA and ROE, suggesting that profitable firms use more short-term debt to finance their operation. Short-term debt is an important component or source of financing for Ghanaian firms, representing 85 percent of total debt financing. However, the results showed a negative relationship between LDA and ROE. With regard to the relationship between total debt and profitability, the regression results showed a significantly positive association between DA and ROE. This suggests that profitable firms depend more on debt as their main financing option. In the Ghanaian case, a high proportion (85 percent) of the debt is represented in short-term debt.译文加纳上市公司资本结构对盈利能力的实证研究论文简介资本结构决策对于任何商业组织都是至关重要的。
融资租赁中英文对照外文翻译文献
融资租赁中英文对照外文翻译文献XXX LeasingSmall and medium-sized companies have XXX in the global economy。
In this article。
we will discuss the XXX.2.XXX LeasingXXX it provides them with a number of advantages。
One of the main XXX without having to make a large upfront investment。
This is particularly XXX that may not have access to the capital XXX.XXX it allows companies to keep up with the latest XXX。
which means that companies can stay up-to-date without having to make nal XXX.3.XXX LeasingXXX whether a small company will choose to lease or not。
One of the most important factors is the cost of leasing versus the cost of purchasing。
Small XXX associated with each n in order to make an XXX.Another factor that can XXX is the length of the XXX。
XXX.4.nIn n。
leasing XXX。
it is XXX.At the turn of the 20th century。
mass n methods neered by Ford Motor Company led people to believe that large-scale business enterprises were the way of the XXX well into the late20th century。
融资过程外文翻译外文文献英文文献融资过程中啄食顺序理论的一个
外文原文Management Research News，Volume 25 Number 12，2002A Rational Justification of the Pecking Order Hypothesis to theChoice of Sources of FinancingBy Vuong Duc Hoang Quan外文翻译原文来自：Management Research News，Volume 25 Number 12，2002：74-90融资过程中啄食顺序理论的一个合理证明Vuong Duc Hoang Quan摘要自从被Stewart Myers (1984)发展以来，啄食顺序理论在近期把研究重心从传统静态权衡理论转移到其他理论的研究的趋势中成为了一道亮点，它试图为公司资本结构的行为寻求一个合理的解释。
这篇文章通过建立啄食顺序理论和与之有明显对立的MM定理1之间的关系，提出了啄食顺序理论的一个合理证明。
为支持我们的解释，在推论过程中，我们采用各种各样现有的理论，包括税盾理论、破产成本理论、代理理论、信号理论和管理风险厌恶理论等，这些证明啄食顺序理论的论据，其内涵也被简要地讨论了。
关键词：公司融资；资本结构；啄食顺序理论介绍企业怎样选择资本结构及其影响因素是公司财务上一个很有争议的根本问题。
传统上，资本结构的形成被认为是有利税率之间静态权衡的结果。
税收优势提倡增加债务，它与破产风险相对，破产风险更偏好于股权融资的使用。
尽管如此，近期的研究已经呈现出了从静态权衡理论为焦点到其他理论的研究的转移，从而试图寻找出一个对资本结构行为更进一步的解释。
Myers (1984)谈到的啄食顺序理论最早是由Donaldson (1961)始创的，是用来描述企业管理者为减轻不对称信息引起的投资不足问题的缺陷而优先采取的融资方式的选择这一融资实际。
因此相对于外源融资，任何类型的企业更倾向于内源融资。
金融学融资融券中英文对照外文翻译文献
中英文对照翻译Margin Trading Bans in Experimental Asset MarketsAbstractIn financial markets, professional traders leverage their trades because it allows to trade larger positions with less margin. Violating margin requirements, however, triggers a margin call and open positions are automatically covered until requirements are met again. What impact does margin trading have on the price process and on liquidity in financial asset markets? Since empirical evidence is mixed, we consider this question using experimental asset markets. Starting from an empirically relevant situation where margin purchasing and short selling is permitted, we ban margin purchases and/or short sales using a 2x2 factorial design to a allow for a comparative static analysis. Our results indicate that a ban on margin purchases fosters efficient pricing by narrowing price deviations from fundamental value accompanied with lower volatility and a smaller bid-ask-spread. A ban on short sales, however, tends to distort efficient pricing by widening price deviations accompanied with higher volatility and a large spread.Keywords: margin trading, Asset Market, Price Bubble, Experimental Finance1.IntroductionHowever, regulators can only have a positive impact on the life-cycle of a bubble, if they know how institutional changes affect prices in financial markets. Note that regulation is a double-edged sword since decision errors may lead from bad to worse. Given the systemic risk posed by speculative bubbles and their long history, it may be surprising how little attention bubbles have received in the literature and how little understood they are. This ignorance is partly due to the complex psychological nature of speculative bubbles but also due to the fact that the conventional financial economic theory has ignored the existence of bubbles for a long-time. But even if theories on bubble cycles have empirical relevance, it is clear that the issues surrounding the formation and the bursting of bubbles cannot be analyzed with pencil and paper. Conclusions on bubble cycles must be backed with quantitative data analysis. Given the limited number of observed empirical market crashes and their non-recurring nature, an experimental analysis of bubble formation involving controlled and replicable laboratory conditions seems to be a promising way to proceed.The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the related literature, Section 0 presents the details of the experimental design and section IV reports the data analysis. In section V, we summarize our findings and provide concluding remarks.2. Leverage in asset marketsDo margin requirements have any effects on market prices? Fisher (1933) and also Snyder (1930) mentioned the importance of margin debt in generating price bubbles when analyzing the Great Crash of 1929. The ability to leverage purchases lead to a higher demand, ending up in inflated prices. The subsequently appreciated collateral allowed to leverage purchases even more. This upward price spiral was fueled by an expansion of debt. From the end of 1924, brokers’loans rose four and one-half times (by $6.5 billion) and in the final phase broker’s borrowings rose at more than 100% a year until the bubble crashed. Then, after the peak of the bubble, a debt spiral was initiated. Investors lost trust and started to sell assets. Excess supply deflated prices resulting in a depreciation of collateral. Triggered margin calls lead to forced asset sales pushing supply even further. An increase in defaults on debt, and short sales exacerbated supply and finally assets were being sold at fire sale prices. It only took 6 weeks to extinguish half of the total of brokers’credit. Finally, in 1934, the U.S. Congress established federal margin authority to prevent unjustifiable increases or decreases in stock demand since margin requirements can prevent dramatic price fluctuations by limiting leveraged trades on both sides of the stock market: extremely optimistic margin purchasers and extremely pessimistic short sellers.Recent experimental evidence suggests short sale constraints to increase prices. Ackert et al. (2006)and Haruvy and Noussair (2006) find prices to deflate–even below fundamental value in the latter study –while King, Smith, Williams, and Van Boening (1993) find no effect. In a setting with information asymmetries, Fellner and Theissen (2006) find higher prices with short sale constraints but not depending on the divergence of opinion as predicted by Miller (1977). In a setting with smart money traders, Bhojraj, Bloomfield, and Tayler (2009) report short selling to exacerbate overpricing, even though it reduces equilibrium price levels. Hauser and Huber (2012) find short selling constraints with two dependent assets to distort price levels. Our design deviates from the previous studies in several but one important way: We use a more empirically relevant facility in that traders have to provide collateral facing the threat of margin calls.3. Implementing Margin Purchasing and Short SellingWe conducted four computerized treatments utilizing a 2x2 factorial design as displayed in Table II. Starting from an empirically relevant situation where margin purchases Traders execute margin purchases when they purchase shares by using loan, collateralized with shareholdings evaluated at the current market value.11 In this case, traders make a bull market bet, i.e. they borrow cash to buy shares, wait for the price to rise and sell them with a profit. However, a decline in prices depreciates collateral while keeping loan constant. When prices fall below a certain threshold, such that the loan exceeds the value of the shareholdings (i.e. debt > equity), a margin call is triggered. Immediately, i) the trader’s buttons are disabled, ii) outstanding orders are cancelled, and iii) the computer starts selling shares at the current market price until margin requirements are met again or untilall shares have been sold.12 Traders execute short sales when they sell shares without holding them in their inventory, collateralized with sufficient cash at hand.13 In this case, traders make a bear market bet, i.e. they borrow shares to sell them in the market, wait for the price to decline, buy them back with a profit and return them. Note that the amount of debt equals the total amount the trader has to pay to buy back the outstanding shares. Thus, an increase in prices increases debt and reduces collateral (cash minus value of outstanding shares), simultaneously. When prices exceed a certain threshold, such that the amount to buy back outstanding shares exceeds collateral (i.e. debt > equity), a margin call is triggered. Immediately, i)the trader’s buttons are disabled, ii) outstanding orders are cancelled, and iii) the computer starts buying shares at the current market price until margin requirements are met again or until all short positions have been covered. Note that short sellers have to pay dividends for their short positions at the end of each period.14 After period 15, both long and short positions are worthless.15 In any case, a margin callcan lead to bankruptcy. However, the consequences of a margin call hold even during bankruptcy, i.e. outstanding positions continuously being closed although subjects are bankrupt. This is different to any other asset market experiment considering leverage4. Margin traders tend to make less money than othersBy leveraging purchases and sales, traders take more risks to be able to make more money. But do margin traders make more money at all? To evaluate this question, we classify traders into types, i.e. margin traders, who trade on margin at least once, and others. Table X shows the average end- of round-earnings within types for each treatment along with the number of subjects. The spearman rank correlation between type and end of round earnings is negative in both rounds and in all three treatments. The coefficient is significantly different from zero only in MP|NoSS and NoMP|SS when subjects are once experienced . Subjects, who executed both margin purchases and short sales in MP|SS earned less than subjects who refrained from trading on margin. This is significant only for inexperienced subjects . One final note on the distribution of earnings. Comparing the treatments by evaluating the dispersion of earnings using the coefficient of variation , we find that the average CV in the NoMP|NoSS is lower than any other treatment Although not statistically significant, the results indicate that it is less risky to participate in markets with margin bans than in the markets where margintrading is permitted.5. ConclusionIn an attempt to halt the decline in asset values, recent regulatory measures temporarily banned short sales in financial markets. To assess the impact of banning leveraged trading on market mispricing is a complicated task when being reliant on data from real world exchanges only. it is unclear if possible price increases following a ban on short sales would come from new long positions or from covered short positions, and the announcement of such measures affects an uncontrolled reaction of the market. Owed to the uncontrolled uncertainties in the real world, asset mispricing can be measured only with weak confidence.In comparison to other experimental studies where limits to margin debt and short sales are rare, our design involves margin requirements comparable to the real world. Highly levered investors face margin calls that lead to forced liquidation of positions, affecting a reinforcement of the swings of the market. We have studied the impact of leverage on individual portfolio decisions to find an increase in risk taking characterized by higher concentrations of risky assets eventually resulting in individual bankruptcies. Thus, our experimental results are in line with theories of margin trading by Irvine Fischer (1933) and by recent heterogeneous agents models (Geanakoplos 2009) which conjecture such effects on asset pricing and portfolio decisions. As in any laboratory experiment, the results are restricted to the chosen parameters. The baselineSmith et al. (1988) asset market design has been challenged in recent studies (e.g. Kirchler et al. 2011), arguing that some subjects are confused about the declining fundamental value and believe that prices keep a similar level in the course of time. So it would also be interesting to investigate the effects of bans Jena Economic Research Papers 2012 - 05826 of margin purchases and short sales, to see if our treatment effects can be repeated in an environment with non-decreasing fundamental values. However, recent experiments by Hauser and Huber (2012) show similar effects using multiple asset markets with a complexsystem of fundamental values but without margin calls. It would also be interesting to see how margin requirements change performance in multiple sset markets. We leave these open questions to future research.ReferencesAbreu, D., and M.K. Brunnermeier, 2003, Bubbles and crashes, Econometrica 71, 173–204.Ackert, L., N. Charupat, B. Church and R. Deaves, 2006, Margin, Short Selling, and Lotteries in Experimental Asset Markets, Southern Economic Journal 73, 419–436. Adrangi, B. and A. Chatrath, 1999, Margin Requirements and Futures Activity: Evidence from the Soybean and Corn Markets, Journal of Futures Markets, 19, 433-455. Alexander, G.J, and M.A Peterson, 2008, The effect of price tests on trader behavior and market quality: An analysis of Reg SHO, Journal of Financial Markets 11, 84–111.Bai, Y., E.C Chang, and J. Wang, 2006, Asset prices under short-sale constraints, Mimeo. Beber, A., and M. Pagano, 2010, Short-Selling Bans around the World: Evidence from the 2007-09 Crisis, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers TI 10-106 / DSF 1.Bernardo, A. and I. Welch, 2002, Financial market runs, NBER Working Papers 9251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.Bhojraj, S., R.J Bloomfield, and W.B Tayler, 2009, Margin trading, overpricing, and synchronization risk, Review of Financial Studies 22, 2059–2085.Blau, B. M., B. F. Van Ness, R. A. Van Ness, 2009, Short Selling and the Weekend Effect for NYSE Securities, Financial Management 38 (No. 3). 603-630Boehmer, E., Z.R Huszar, and B.D Jordan, 2010, The good news in short interest, Journal of Financial Economic 96, 80–97.Boehme, R.D, B.R Danielsen, and S.M Sorescu, 2006, Short-sale constraints, differences of opinion, and overvaluation, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 41, 455–487.融资融券禁令在实验资产市场摘要在金融市场，因为专业的交易者杠杆交易允许以较少的保证金进行更大的交易。
资本市场运作相关外文文献翻译中英文
资本市场运作相关外文文献翻译中英文英文THE ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF CAPITAL MARKETOPERATION ON INDUSTRIAL GROWTH IN NIGERIAADEGBITE ADEJARE, AZEEZ AMINATABSTRACTThis study examined the effects of capital market operation on industrial growth in Nigeria from 1981 to 2015. Secondary data were sourced from Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Statistical Bulletins from 1981 to 2015. Multiple regressions analysis and Pearson product moment correlation were employed to examine the relationship, and the effect of independent variables (market capitalization, Market volume, exchange rate, and All-Share index) and dependent variable (INDGRT). Findings reveals that there is a positive effect of Market capitalization on industrial growth, and economic growth (β = .0762594; .3638583; p ≤ 0.05) in Nigeria. All share index (ASI) has negative significant effect on industrial growth (β = -.0197857; p ≤ 0.05) and economic growth (β = -.2413219; p ≤ 0.05) in Nigeria. Also, exchange rate (EXCHNG) has negative significant effect on industrial growth (β =--.124867; p ≤ 0.05). It is concluded that there is a positive significant impact of capital market on industrial and economic growth in Nigeria. Exchange rate has negativeeffect on industrial growth in Nigeria. It is now recommended that government should find all means to reduce exchange rate in Nigeria so that the cost of raw materials imported by industrial sector is reduced so that it will ultimately enhance their performance. Government should also increase the liquidity of capital market in order to quench the financial thirst of the industrial sector in Nigeria.Keywords: Capital Market; Industrial growth; Economic growth; Exchange rate; NigeriaINTRODUCTIONBackground to the studyGovernments and industry raise long-term capital for financing and expanding new projects through capital market in Nigeria. If capital resources are not provided to those economic areas, especially industries where demand is growing and which are capable of increasing production and productivity, the rate of expansion of the economy often suffers. A unique benefit of the stock market to corporate entities is provision of long-term, debt financing and non-debt financial capital. Through the issuance of equity securities, companies acquire perpetual capital for development. In fact, the provision of equity capital in the market enables companies to avoid over-reliance on debt financing which ultimately improving corporate debt-to-equity ratio. Capital formation, however, can only be achieved through conscious efforts at savings mobilization andaccumulation of resources by both the public and private sectors of an economy. Financial markets generally provide avenue for savings of various tenors that are made available for utilization by various economic agents. The capital market, which is a major section of financial markets, has been identified as an institution which contributes to the socioeconomic growth and development of emerging and developed economies. This is made possible through some of the vital roles it play such as channeling resources, promoting reforms to modernize the financial intermediation capacity sector to link deficit to the surplus sector of the economy, mobilization and allocation of savings among competitive uses which are critical to local investment (Alile, 1984). Capital market also channels capital or long-term resources to firms with relatively high and increasing productivity, thus enhancing industrial expansion and growth.The scarcity of long-term capital has caused a great challenge to industrial development in Nigeria. But capital market is the driver of any economy to growth and development which is embedded with industrialization because it is essential for the long-term growth capital formation. It is crucial in the mobilization of savings and channeling of such savings to profitable self-liquidating investment. The liquidity of a stock market relates to the degree of access, which investors have in buying, and selling of stocks in such a market. The more liquid a stockmarket is, the more investors will be interested in trading in the market. The lack of adequate number of investors in the Nigerian stock market is a reflection of problem of illiquidity in the market (Usman and Adegbite 2012)). With this assertion, this study examines the extent at which Nigeria capital market has contributed immensely to industrial development in Nigeria.Objectives of the studyTo examine the effects of capital market operation on industrial growth in Nigeria.To evaluate the impact of capital market on economic growth in Nigeria.(iii) To determine the relationship between Capital market, Industrial and Economic growth in NigeriaLITERATURE REVIEWCapital market, Industrial Development, and Economic growth in NigeriaThe Nigeria capital market is sub-divided into primary and secondary markets. New securities are issued in the primary market and companies issuing these securities receive the proceeds for the sale. The secondary market provides a forum for the sale of existing securities by one investor to another investor. Thus, the efficient functioning of the market paves way for the primary market by making investors morewilling to purchase new securities in anticipation of selling such in the secondary market. These securities are the major instrument used to raise funds at the capital market. Capital market according to Akingboungbe (1996) is a market where medium to long-term finance can be raised.). Ekezie (2002) asserted that capital market is the market for dealings (that is, Lending and Borrowing) in longer-term loan-able funds. The development of the capital market and apparently the stock market provides opportunities for greater funds mobilization, improved efficiency in resource allocation and provision of relevant information for appraisal (Inanga and Emenuga, 1997).Mbat (2001) describes capital market as a forum through which long-term funds are made available by the surplus to the deficit economic units. It must, however be noted that although all the surplus economic units have access to the capital market, not all the deficit economic units have the same easy access to it. The restriction on the part of the borrowers is meant to enforce the security of the fund provided by the lenders. In order to ensure that lenders are not subjected to undue risk, borrowers in the capital market need to satisfy certain basic requirement. Companies can finance their operations by raising funds through issuing equity (ownership) or debenture bond. Securities are structured to mature in period of years from the medium to the long-term of usually between five and twenty-five years. Capital market offers access to a variety offinancial instruments that enable economic agents to pool, price and exchange risk. It encourages savings in financial form. This is very essential for government and other institutions in need of longterm funds and for suppliers of long-term funds (Nwankwo, 1991).Industrialization has been paid optimum attention to and various development economists have described it to be the prime mover of the economy and potent factor in the development process. Industrialization enhances rapid growth in developing countries such as Nigeria. Industrialization is the system of production that has arisen from the steady development study and use of scientific knowledge. It is based on the division of labour and on specialization and uses mechanical, chemical and power aids in production. All viable, efficient and effective industries must be listed in Nigerian capital market, and their performance can also be measured through the capital market. According to Adewuyi and Olowokere (2011) Capital market has a great impact on the development of Nigeria economy; it promotes an efficient and provides opportunities for investment diversification. The improved delivery and settlement processes has reflected positively on the liquidity of the capital market, as well as put the Nigerian stock market on the same pedestal with some of the leading international stock exchanges. The automation of the clearing, depository and settlement system and the transition to Automated Trading System (ATS) have enhance theopportunity for price discovery in our market and raised overall market efficiency. In the same vein, automation has made our capital market truly international and emerging market, giving the nation a strong and dynamic capital market, which can be relied upon by foreign investors for efficient portfolio management. Moreover, industrialisation is very germane to the development of any nation most especially the underdeveloped ones. Manufacturing activity can only flourish in a good investment climate with the following features in place :physical infrastructure ,financial markets and creation of the enabling environment for investment and determine the opportunities and incentives for firms to invest productively, create job and expand business (Malik,Teal and Baptist 2004). Well-functioning financial markets are an important ingredient for promoting economic growth. Developed financial markets allow access of firms to new markets, and help to promote greater competition, innovation and productivity in the economy. Even when faced with profitable investment opportunities, many firms lack the resources to exploit these. With financial markets unwilling to lend, investment decisions of firms become more dependent on internally generated cash flow or resources from family, friends and the informal sector (Malik,Teal and Baptist 2004).METHODOLOGYMethod of data collectionSecondary data was used in this study. The relevant data were sourced from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) statistical Bulletin from 1981 to 2015. The variables for which data were sourced include: industrial growth, Market capitalisation, All-Share index, market volume, Exchange rate, and Gross Domestic Product from 1981 to 2015.Method of Data AnalysisRegression analysis technique was used to measure the effect of independent variables (Market capitalisation, All-Share index, Market volume and Exchange rate) on dependent variable (Industrial growth). While Pearson product moment correlation was used to measure the relationship between a dependent variable (Industrial growth) and independent variables (Market capitalisation, All-Share index, Market volume and Exchange rate).Model specificationTwo models were employed in this study. The first model examined the effects of the capital market on Industrial growth in Nigeria. Industrial growth was the explained variable while the explanatory variables are market capitalization, real exchange rate, and All-Share index. The second model examined the effects of the capital market on Economic growth in Nigeria. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was the explained variable while the explanatory variables are market capitalisation, All-Share index, and market volume.Table 2 shows the effect of capital market on Industrial growth in Nigeria, 1% increase in all share index (ASI) reduces industrial growth (INDGRT) by 0.19%, this shows that there is a negative insignificant effect of All share index (ASI) on industrial growth. Also, 1% increase in Market capitalization (MCAP) increases industrial growth by 0.076%, this shows that there is positive significant effect of Market capitalization (MCAP) on industrial growth. More so, 1% increase in Market volume (MVOLM) reduces industrial growth (INDGRT) by 0.09%, this shows that there is a negative significant effect of market volume (MVOLM) on industrial growth. In the same vein, 1% increase in Exchange rate (EXCHNG) reduces industrial growth by 0.12%, this indicates that there is a negative significant effect of Exchange rate (EXCHNG) on industrial growth.The R2 coefficient is 0.7183 (71.8%) which is the coefficient of determination indicates that the explanatory variables (All share index , Market capitalization, Market volume and Exchange rate ) accounted for 71.8% of the variation that influence industrial growth, but the remaining 28.2% are for stochastic error. Given the adjusted R2 as 0.6671 (66.7%), it predicts the independence variables incorporated into this model were able to determine the effect of capital market performance on Industrial growth (INDGRT) to 71.96%. It is also indicates that capital market performance accounted for 66.7% of the variation in the influence onIndustrial growth (INDGRT).Table 3 shows the effect of capital market on economic growth in Nigeria, 1% increase in All share index (LOGASI) reduces LOGGDP by 0.24%, this shows that there is a negative significant effect of All share index (LOGASI) on Economic growth (LOGGDP). Also, 1% increases in Market volume (LOGMVOLM) reduces LOGGDP by 0.04%. This specifies that there is an inverse effect of Market volume on Economic growth (LOGGDP). Conversely, 1% increase in Market capitalization (LOGMCAP) increases LOGGDP by 0.36%, this advocates that there is a positive significant effect of Market capitalization (LOGMCAP) on Economic growth (LOGGDP) in Nigeria. More so, 1% increase in Exchange rate (LOGEXCHNG) increases GDP by 0.06%, this shows that there is a positive insignificant effect of exchange rate on Economic growth (LOGGDP).Given the R2 which is the coefficient of determination as 66.4% with high value of Adjusted R2 as 65.8%, it indicates that the independent variables incorporated into this model were able to determine the effect of capital market on economic growth in Nigeria to 65.8%. The F Probability statistic ( Prob > F = 0.0000) also confirms the significant of this model.Table 4 shows the relationship between Capital market, Industrial and Economic growth in Nigeria. The result in table 4 shows thatindustrial growth (INDGRT) has positive significant relationship with Economic growth (GDP) with the value 0.3899*, this implies that an increase in industrial growth (INDGRT) leads to increase in Economic growth (GDP) in Nigeria. All share index (ASI) also has positive significant relationship with Economic growth in Nigeria with the value of 0.9067*. This also indicates that an increase in All share index brings increase in Economic growth (GDP) in Nigeria. Also, Market V olume (MVOLUM) has positive and significant correlation with Economic growth (0.9363*) in Nigeria. This result implies that an increase in Market V olume also leads to increase in Economic growth (GDP) in Nigeria. In the same vein, Market capitalisation also has positive significant relationship with Economic growth (0.9471*) in Nigeria. In addition, Exchange rate also has positive significant relationship with Economic growth (0.8389*) in Nigeria. The table also revealed that all the predictor variables have a positive significant relationship with economic growth in Nigeria.More so, from table 4, All share index (ASI) also has positive relationship with industrial growth (INDGRT) in Nigeria with the value of 0.4029*. This also indicates that an increase in All –share index increases industrial growth (INDGRT) in Nigeria. Also, Market V olume (MVOLUM) has positive correlation with industrial growth (0.2305) in Nigeria. This result implies that an increase in Market V olume alsoincreases industrial growth (INDGRT) in Nigeria. In the same vein, Market capitalisation also has positive significant relationship with industrial growth (0.4132*) in Nigeria. In addition, Exchange rate also has positive relationship with industrial growth (0.6244*) in Nigeria. All the predictor variables have a positive significant relationship with industrial growth (INDGRT) in Nigeria with the exception of Market volume.Summary and ConclusionThis study examined the extent at which Nigeria capital market has contributed immensely to industrial growth in Nigeria, and also investigated the effects of capital market operation on Economic growth in Nigeria from 1981 to 2015. The study used multiple regression analysis technique to estimate the empirical models of the study. However, the results showed that there is a positive effect Market capitalization on industrial growth. All share index (ASI) and market volume also have negative significant on industrial growth in Nigeria. Also, exchange rate (EXCHNG) has negative significant effect on industrial growth. In addition, Market capitalization also has positive significant effect on economic growth in Nigeria. Market volume impacted economic growth negatively.Based on the findings, it is concluded that there is a positive significant effect of capital market on industrial and economic growth inNigeria. Exchange rate has negative significant effect on industrial growth in Nigeria. It is now recommended that government should find all means to reduce exchange rate in Nigeria so that the cost of raw material imported by industrial sector will be reduced which will ultimately enhance the profitability and performance of industrial sector in Nigeria. Also, Government should increase the liquidity of capital market in order to quench the financial thirst of the industrial sector in Nigeria.中文资本市场运营对尼日利亚工业增长的影响分析ADEGBITE ADEJARE，AZEEZ AMINAT摘要这项研究调查了1981年至2015年间资本市场运营对尼日利亚工业增长的影响。
资本结构外文文献翻译
How Important is Financial Risk?IntroductionThe financial crisis of2008has brought significant attention to the effects of financial leverage.There is no doubt that the high levels of debt financing by financial institutions and households significantly contributed to the crisis.Indeed,evidence indicates that excessive leverage orchestrated by major global banks(e.g.,through the mortgage lending and collateralized debt obligations)and the so-called“shadow banking system”may be the underlying cause of the recent economic and financial dislocation.Less obvious is the role of financial leverage among nonfinancial firms.To date,problems in the U.S.non-financial sector have been minor compared to the distress in the financial sector despite the seizing of capital markets during the crisis. For example,non-financial bankruptcies have been limited given that the economic decline is the largest since the great depression of the1930s.In fact,bankruptcy filings of non-financial firms have occurred mostly in U.S.industries(e.g.,automotive manufacturing,newspapers,and real estate)that faced fundamental economic pressures prior to the financial crisis.This surprising fact begs the question,“How important is financial risk for non-financial firms?”At the heart of this issue is the uncertainty about the determinants of total firm risk as well as components of firm risk.StudyRecent academic research in both asset pricing and corporate finance has rekindled an interest in analyzing equity price risk.A current strand of the asset pricing literature examines the finding of Campbell et al.(2001)that firm-specific(idiosyncratic)risk has tended to increase over the last40years.Other work suggests that idiosyncratic risk may be a priced risk factor(see Goyal and Santa-Clara,2003,among others).Also related to these studies is work by Pástor and Veronesi(2003)showing how investor uncertainty about firm profitability is an important determinant of idiosyncratic risk and firm value.Other research has examined the role of equity volatility in bond pricing (e.g.,Dichev,1998,Campbell,Hilscher,and Szilagyi,2008).However,much of the empirical work examining equity price risk takes the risk of assets as given or tries to explain the trend in idiosyncratic risk.In contrast,this paper takes a different tack in the investigation of equity price risk.First,we seek tounderstand the determinants of equity price risk at the firm level by considering total risk as the product of risks inherent in the firms operations(i.e.,economic or business risks)and risks associated with financing the firms operations(i.e.,financial risks). Second,we attempt to assess the relative importance of economic and financial risks and the implications for financial policy.Early research by Modigliani and Miller(1958)suggests that financial policy may be largely irrelevant for firm value because investors can replicate many financial decisions by the firm at a low cost(i.e.,via homemade leverage)and well-functioning capital markets should be able to distinguish between financial and economic distress. Nonetheless,financial policies,such as adding debt to the capital structure,can magnify the risk of equity.In contrast,recent research on corporate risk management suggests that firms may also be able to reduce risks and increase value with financial policies such as hedging with financial derivatives.However,this research is often motivated by substantial deadweight costs associated with financial distress or other market imperfections associated with financial leverage.Empirical research provides conflicting accounts of how costly financial distress can be for a typical publicly traded firm.We attempt to directly address the roles of economic and financial risk by examining determinants of total firm risk.In our analysis we utilize a large sample of non-financial firms in the United States.Our goal of identifying the most important determinants of equity price risk(volatility)relies on viewing financial policy as transforming asset volatility into equity volatility via financial leverage.Thus, throughout the paper,we consider financial leverage as the wedge between asset volatility and equity volatility.For example,in a static setting,debt provides financial leverage that magnifies operating cash flow volatility.Because financial policy is determined by owners(and managers),we are careful to examine the effects of firms’asset and operating characteristics on financial policy.Specifically,we examine a variety of characteristics suggested by previous research and,as clearly as possible, distinguish between those associated with the operations of the company(i.e.factors determining economic risk)and those associated with financing the firm(i.e.factors determining financial risk).We then allow economic risk to be a determinant of financial policy in the structural framework of Leland and Toft(1996),or alternatively, in a reduced form model of financial leverage.An advantage of the structural modelapproach is that we are able to account for both the possibility of financial and operating implications of some factors(e.g.,dividends),as well as the endogenous nature of the bankruptcy decision and financial policy in general.Our proxy for firm risk is the volatility of common stock returns derived from calculating the standard deviation of daily equity returns.Our proxies for economic risk are designed to capture the essential characteristics of the firms’operations and assets that determine the cash flow generating process for the firm.For example,firm size and age provide measures of line of-business maturity;tangible assets(plant,property,and equipment)serve as a proxy for the‘hardness’of a firm’s assets;capital expenditures measure capital intensity as well as growth potential.Operating profitability and operating profit volatility serve as measures of the timeliness and riskiness of cash flows. To understand how financial factors affect firm risk,we examine total debt,debt maturity,dividend payouts,and holdings of cash and short-term investments.The primary result of our analysis is surprising:factors determining economic risk for a typical company explain the vast majority of the variation in equity volatility. Correspondingly,measures of implied financial leverage are much lower than observed debt ratios.Specifically,in our sample covering1964-2008average actual net financial (market)leverage is about1.50compared to our estimates of between1.03and1.11 (depending on model specification and estimation technique).This suggests that firms may undertake other financial policies to manage financial risk and thus lower effective leverage to nearly negligible levels.These policies might include dynamically adjusting financial variables such as debt levels,debt maturity,or cash holdings(see,for example, Acharya,Almeida,and Campello,2007).In addition,many firms also utilize explicit financial risk management techniques such as the use of financial derivatives, contractual arrangements with investors(e.g.lines of credit,call provisions in debt contracts,or contingencies in supplier contracts),special purpose vehicles(SPVs),or other alternative risk transfer techniques.The effects of our economic risk factors on equity volatility are generally highly statistically significant,with predicted signs.In addition,the magnitudes of the effects are substantial.We find that volatility of equity decreases with the size and age of the firm.This is intuitive since large and mature firms typically have more stable lines of business,which should be reflected in the volatility of equity returns.Equity volatility tends to decrease with capital expenditures though the effect is weak.Consistent withthe predictions of Pástor and Veronesi(2003),we find that firms with higher profitability and lower profit volatility have lower equity volatility.This suggests that companies with higher and more stable operating cash flows are less likely to go bankrupt,and therefore are potentially less risky.Among economic risk variables,the effects of firm size,profit volatility,and dividend policy on equity volatility stand out. Unlike some previous studies,our careful treatment of the endogeneity of financial policy confirms that leverage increases total firm risk.Otherwise,financial risk factors are not reliably related to total risk.Given the large literature on financial policy,it is no surprise that financial variables are,at least in part,determined by the economic risks firms take.However, some of the specific findings are unexpected.For example,in a simple model of capital structure,dividend payouts should increase financial leverage since they represent an outflow of cash from the firm(i.e.,increase net debt).We find that dividends are associated with lower risk.This suggests that paying dividends is not as much a product of financial policy as a characteristic of a firm’s operations(e.g.,a mature company with limited growth opportunities).We also estimate how sensitivities to different risk factors have changed over time.Our results indicate that most relations are fairly stable. One exception is firm age which prior to1983tends to be positively related to risk and has since been consistently negatively related to risk.This is related to findings by Brown and Kapadia(2007)that recent trends in idiosyncratic risk are related to stock listings by younger and riskier firms.Perhaps the most interesting result from our analysis is that our measures of implied financial leverage have declined over the last30years at the same time that measures of equity price risk(such as idiosyncratic risk)appear to have been increasing. In fact,measures of implied financial leverage from our structural model settle near1.0 (i.e.,no leverage)by the end of our sample.There are several possible reasons for this. First,total debt ratios for non-financial firms have declined steadily over the last30 years,so our measure of implied leverage should also decline.Second,firms have significantly increased cash holdings,so measures of net debt(debt minus cash and short-term investments)have also declined.Third,the composition of publicly traded firms has changed with more risky(especially technology-oriented)firms becoming publicly listed.These firms tend to have less debt in their capital structure.Fourth,as mentioned above,firms can undertake a variety of financial risk management activities.To the extent that these activities have increased over the last few decades,firms will have become less exposed to financial risk factors.We conduct some additional tests to provide a reality check of our results.First,we repeat our analysis with a reduced form model that imposes minimum structural rigidity on our estimation and find very similar results.This indicates that our results are unlikely to be driven by model misspecification.We also compare our results with trends in aggregate debt levels for all U.S.non-financial firms and find evidence consistent with our conclusions.Finally,we look at characteristics of publicly traded non-financial firms that file for bankruptcy around the last three recessions and find evidence suggesting that these firms are increasingly being affected by economic distress as opposed to financial distress.ConclusionIn short,our results suggest that,as a practical matter,residual financial risk is now relatively unimportant for the typical U.S.firm.This raises questions about the level of expected financial distress costs since the probability of financial distress is likely to be lower than commonly thought for most companies.For example,our results suggest that estimates of the level of systematic risk in bond pricing may be biased if they do not take into account the trend in implied financial leverage(e.g.,Dichev,1998).Our results also bring into question the appropriateness of financial models used to estimate default probabilities,since financial policies that may be difficult to observe appear to significantly reduce stly,our results imply that the fundamental risks born by shareholders are primarily related to underlying economic risks which should lead to a relatively efficient allocation of capital.Some readers may be tempted to interpret our results as indicating that financial risk does not matter.This is not the proper interpretation.Instead,our results suggest that firms are able to manage financial risk so that the resulting exposure to shareholders is low compared to economic risks.Of course,financial risk is important to firms that choose to take on such risks either through high debt levels or a lack of risk management.In contrast,our study suggests that the typical non-financial firm chooses not to take these risks.In short,gross financial risk may be important,but firms can manage it.This contrasts with fundamental economic and business risks that are more difficult(or undesirable)to hedge because they represent the mechanism by which the firm earns economic profits.References[1]Shyam,Sunder.Theory Accounting and Control[J].An Innternational Theory on PublishingComPany.2005[2]Ogryezak,W,Ruszeznski,A.Rom Stomchastic Dominance to Mean-Risk Models:Semide-Viations as Risk Measures[J].European Journal of Operational Research.[3]Borowski,D.M.,and P.J.Elmer.An Expert System Approach to Financial Analysis:the Case of S&L Bankruptcy[J].Financial Management,Autumn.2004;[4]Casey, C.and ing Operating Cash Flow Data to Predict Financial Distress:Some Extensions[J].Journal of Accounting Research,Spring.2005;[5]John M.Mulvey,HafizeGErkan.Applying CVaR for decentralized risk management of financialcompanies[J].Journal of Banking&Finanee.2006;[6]Altman.Credit Rating:Methodologies,Rationale and Default Risk[M]．Risk Books,London.译文：财务风险的重要性引言2008年的金融危机对金融杠杆的作用产生重大影响。
小微企业融资外文文献翻译
小微企业融资外文文献翻译小微企业融资外文文献翻译(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Micro Enterprise Finance in Uganda: Path Dependence and Other and Determinants of Financing DecisionsDr. Winifred Tarinyeba- KiryabwireAbstractAccess to finance literature in developing countries focuses onaccess to credit constraints of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) micro enterprises because they are considered the drivers of economic growth. However, in low income countries, micro enterprises play a much more significant role than SMEs because of their contribution to non-agricultural self-employment. The predominant use of informal credit rather than formal credit shows that the manner in which micro enterprises are formed and conduct their businesses favors the former over the latter. In addition, other factors such as lengthy credit application procedures, negative perceptions about credit application processes make informal credit more attractive. On the other hand specific factors such as business diversification, the need to acquire business inputs or assets than cannot be obtained using supplier credit are associated with a tendency to use formal credit.IntroductionIt well established that in markets where access to credit is constrained, it is the smaller businesses that have the most difficulty accessing credit. Various policy interventions have been made to improve access to credit including reforming the information and contractual frameworks, macro-economic performance, competitiveness in the financial system, and regulatory frameworks that enablefinancial institutions to develop products for SMEs such as leasing and factoring. Over the past ten years, policy makers in developing and low income countries have focused on microfinance as an intervention to bridge the access to credit gap and improve access to credit for those than cannot obtain credit from mainstream financial institutions such as commercial banks. However, despite, the use of what are often termed as “innovative lending” methods that are designed to ease access to credit, such as use of group lending and other collateral substitutes, micro enterprises continue to rely heavily on informal finance as opposed to formal credit. While other studies have focused broadly on factors that inhibit access to credit, this article seeks to throw some light on specific characteristics of micro enterprises that make them more inclined to use informal credit, as well as specific factors that are more associated with use of formal credit. The former are what I term as path dependence factors.The majority of micro enterprises operate as informally established sole proprietorships. This finding is consistent with the literature on micro enterprises, particularly the fact that they operate in the informal sector. However, nearly all of the enterprises had some form of trading license issued by the local government of the area in whichthey operate. The license identifies the owner of the business and its location, and is renewable every financial year. Most respondents did not understand the concept of business incorporation and thought that having a trading license meant that they were incorporated. Several factors can be attributed to the manner in which micro enterprises are established. First, proprietors generally understand neither the concept of incorporation nor the financial and legal implications of establishing a business as a legal entity separate from its owner. Second, the majority of micro enterprises start as spontaneous business or economic opportunities, rather than as well-thought out business ventures, particularly businesses that operate by the road side, or in other strategic areas, such as telephone booths that operate along busy streets. The owners are primarily concerned with the economic opportunity that the business presents rather than with the formalities of establishing the business. Third, rule of law issues also explain the manner in which businesses generally are established and financed. Although a mechanism exists for incorporating businesses in Uganda, the process and the legal and regulatory burdens, associated with formalizing a business, create costs that, in most cases, far outweigh the benefits or even the economic opportunity created by the business.Commenting on the role of law in determining the efficiency of the economic activities it regulates, Hernando De Soto argues that if laws impede or disrupt economic efficiency, they not only impose unnecessary costs of accessing and remaining in the formal system, but costs of operating informally as well. The former include the time and cost of registering a business, taxes and complying with bureaucratic procedures. On the other hand, the costs of informality include costs of avoiding penalties, evading taxes and labor laws and costs that result from absence of good laws such as not inadequate property rights protection, inability to use the contract system, and inefficiencies associated with extra contractual law.Businesses in Uganda are registered by the Registrar of Companies under the Company’s Act. The office of the Registrar of Companies is located in the capital city of Kampala and this imposes a burden on businesses that operate in other parts of the country that would wish to be registered. However, remoteness of the business registration office was not the primary inhibitor because the tendency not to register was as pronounced in businesses close to the registration office, as it was in those that were remotely placed. In addition, the following fees are required to incorporate a company: a name search andreservation fee of Ugshs. 25,000 ($12.50), stamp duty of 0.5% of the value of the share capital, memorandum and articles of association registration fee of Ugshs. 35,000 ($17.5), and a registration fee ranging from Ugshs. 50,000 to 4,000,000 ($25 to 2000).Legal systems characterized by low regulatory burden, shareholder and creditor rights protection, and efficient bankruptcy processes are associated with incorporated businesses and increased access to finance. On the other hand, inadequate legal protection is associated with limited business incorporation, low joint entrepreneurial activity, and higher financing obstacles. These impediments are what De Soto refers to as the mystery of legal failure. He argues that although nearly every developing and former communist nation has a formal property system, most citizens cannot gain access to it and their only alternative is to retreat with their assets into the extra legal sector where they can live and do business.译文乌干达小微企业融资路径依赖和融资的决定性因素Dr. Winifred Tarinyeba- Kiryabwire摘要通过查阅发展中国家的金融文献，我们往往可以发现由于中小企业是推动发展中国家经济增长的主要动力源，其金融问趣则主要侧重于中小企业的融资受限方面。
中小企业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献
中小企业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Financing of SMEsJan Bartholdy, Cesario MateusOriginally Published in“Financing of SMEs”.London business review.AbstractThe main sources of financing for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are equity, trade credit paid on time, long and short term bank credits, delayed payment on trade credit and other debt. The marginal costs of each financing instrument are driven by asymmetric information and transactions costs associated with nonpayment. According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms will choose the cheapest source in terms of cost. In the case of the static trade-off theory, firms choose finance so that the marginal costs across financing sources are all equal, thus an additional Euro of financing is obtained from all the sources whereas under the Pecking Order Theory the source is determined by how far down the Pecking Order the firm is presently located. In this paper, we argue that both of these theories miss the point that the marginal costs are dependent of the use of the funds, and the asset side of the balance sheet primarily determines the financing source for an additional Euro. An empirical analysis on a unique dataset of Portuguese SME’s confirms that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet has an impact of the type of financing used and the Pecking OrderTheory and the traditional Static Trade-off theory are For SME’s the main sources of financing are equity (internally generated cash), trade credit, bank credit and other debt. The choice of financing is driven by the costs of the sources which is primarily determined by costs of solving the asymmetric information problem and the expected costs associated with non-payment of debt. Asymmetric information costs arise from collecting and analysing information to support the decision of extending credit, and the non-payment costs are from collecting the collateral and selling it to recover the debt. Since SMEs’ management and shareholders are often the same person, equity and internally generated funds have no asymmetric information costs and equity is therefore the cheapest source.2. Asset side theory of SME financingIn the previous section we have suggested that SME’s in Portugal are financed using internal generated cash, cheap trade credits, long and short-term bank loans and expensive trade credits and other loans. In this section the motives behind the different types of financing are discussed.2.1. Cheap Trade creditsThe first external financing source we will discuss is trade-credits. Trade credits are interesting since they represent financial services provided by non-financial firms in competition with financialintermediaries. The early research within this area focused on the role of trade credits in relation to the credit channel or the so called “Meltzer” effect and in relation to the efficiency of monetary policy. The basic idea is that firms with direct access to financial markets, in general large well known firms, issue trade credits to small financially constrained firms . The more recent research breaks the role of trade credits into a strategic motive and financial motive for issuing and using these credits.Strategic motivesThe first theory centers on asymmetric information regarding the firm’s products. Trade credits are offered to the buyers so that the buyer can verify the quantity and quality before submitting payments. By offering trade finance the supplier signals to the buyers that they offer products of good quality. Since small firms, in general, have no reputation then these firms are forced to use trade credits to signal the quality of their products. The use of trade credits is therefore driven by asymmetric information of the products and is therefore more likely to be used by small firms, if the buyer has little information about the supplier, or the products are complicated and it is difficult to asses their quality.The second strategic motive is pricing. Offering trade finance on favorable terms is the same as a price reduction for the goods. Thus firms can use trade credits to promote sales without officially reducing prices or use them as a tool for price discrimination between different buyers.Trade credits are most advantageous to risky borrowers since their costs of alternative financing are higher than for borrowers with good credit ratings. Thus trade credits can be used as tool for direct price discrimination but also as an indirect tool (if all buyers are offered the same terms) in favor of borrowers with a low credit standing.Trade credits are also used to develop long term relationships between the supplier and the buyers. This often manifests itself by the supplier extending the credit period in case the buyer has temporary financial difficulties. Compared to financial institutions suppliers have better knowledge of the industry and are therefore better able to judge whether the firm has temporary problems or the problems are of a more permanent nature.The last motive in not strictly a strategic motive but is based on transactions costs. Trade credits are an efficient way of performing the transactions since it is possible to separate between delivery and payment. In basic terms the truck drive r delivering the goods does not have to run around to find the person responsible for paying the bills. The buyer also saves transactions costs by reducing the amount of cash required on“hand” .Financing motivesThe basis for this view is that firms compete with financial institutions in offering credit to other firms. The traditional view offinancial institutions is that they extend credit to firms where asymmetric information is a major problem. Financial institutions have advantages in collecting and analyzing information from, in particular, smaller and medium sized firms that suffer from problems of asymmetric information. The key to this advantage over financial markets lies in the close relationship between the bank and the firm and in the payment function. The financial institution is able to monitor the cash inflow and outflows of the firm by monitoring the accounts of the firm.But with trade credits non-financial firms are competing with financial institutions in solving these problems and extending credit. How can non-financial institutions compete in this market? Petersen and Rajan [1997] briefly discusses several ways that suppliers may have advantages over financial institutions. The supplier has a close working association with the borrower and more frequently visit s the premises than a financial institution does. The size and timing of the lenders orders with the supplier provides information about the conditions of the borrowers business. Notice that this information is available to the supplier before it is available to the financial institution since the financial institution has to wait for the cash flow associated with the orders. The use of early payment discounts provides the supplier with an indication of problems with creditworthiness in the firm. Again the supplier obtains the information before the financial institution does. Thus the supplier maybe able to obtain information about the creditworthiness faster and cheaper than the financial institution.The supplier may also have advantages in collecting payments. If the supplier has at least a local monopoly for the goods then the ability to withhold future deliveries is a powerful incentive for the firm to pay. This is a particular powerful threat if the borrower only accounts for a small fraction of the suppliers business. In case of defaults the supplier can seize the goods and in general has a better use for them than a financial intermediary sizing the same goods. Through its sales network the supplier can sell the reclaimed goods faster and at a higher price than what is available to a financial intermediary. These advantages, of course, depend on the durability of the goods and how much the borrower has transformed them.If asymmetric information is one of the driving forces the explanation of trade credits then firms can use the fact that their suppliers have issued them credits in order to obtain additional credit from the banks. The banks are aware that the supplier has better information thus the bank can use trade credits as signal of the credit worthiness of the firm.That trade credits are in general secured by the goods delivered also puts a limit on the amount of trade credits the firm can obtain, thus the firm cannot use trade credits to finance the entire operations of the firm.In summary the prediction is that the level of asymmetric information is relatively low between the providers of trade credit and the borrowers due to the issuer’s general knowledge of the firm and the industry. In the empirical work below the variables explaining the use of trade credit are credit risk factors and Cost of Goods Sold. Since these trade credits are secured by the materials delivered to the firm, firms cannot “borrow” for more than the delivery value of the goods and services.2.2 Bank loansBanks have less information than providers of trade credit and the costs of gathering information are also higher for banks than for providers of trade credit. Providers of trade credits also have an advantage over banks in selling the collateral they have themselves delivered, but due to their size and number of transactions banks have an advantage in selling general collateral such as buildings, machinery etc. Banks therefore prefer to issue loans using tangible assets as collateral, also due to asymmetric information, they are less likely to issue loans to more opaque firms such as small and high growth firms. Banks are therefore willing to lend long term provided that tangible assets are available for collateral. In the empirical work below tangible assets and credit risk variables are expected to explain the use of long-term bank loans and the amount of long-term bank loans are limited by the value of tangibleassets.The basis for issuing Short Term Bank Loans is the comparative advantages banks have in evaluating and collecting on accounts receivables, i.e. Debtors. It is also possible to use Cash and Cash equivalents as collateral but banks do not have any comparative advantages over other providers of credit in terms of evaluating and collecting these since they consist of cash and marketable securities. In terms of inventories, again banks do not have any comparative advantages in evaluating these. Thus, we expect the amounts of debtors to be the key variable in explaining the behaviour of Short Term Bank Loans.ConclusionsCurrently there exist two theories of capital structure The Pecking Order Theory where firms first exhaust all funding of the cheapest source first, then the second cheapest source and so on. The differences in funding costs are due to adverse selection costs from asymmetric information. The second theory is the Tradeoff Theory where firms increase the amount of debt as long as the benefits are greater than the costs from doing so. The benefits of debt are tax-shields and “positive agency costs” and the costs of debt are the e xpected bankruptcy costs and the “negative agency costs”. In both of these theories, the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet is not important and in this paper, thatproposition is strongly rejected. So the main conclusion is that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet influences the composition of the liability side of the balance sheet in terms of the different types of debt used to finance the firm, or that the use of the funds is important in deciding the type of financing available.We further argue that it is asymmetric information and collateral that determines the relationship between the asset side and liability side of the balance sheet. The theory works reasonable well for Cheap Trade Credits and Long Term Bank Loans but the tests for Short Term Bank Loans are disappointing.译文：中小企业融资摘要中小企业融资的主要来源有：股权融资、按时兑现的贸易信贷融资、中长期银行信贷融资、延迟兑现的贸易信贷融资以及其他债务融资，每种融资方式的边际成本取决于与其滞纳金相关的信息不对称成本和交易成本。
融资问题外文翻译文献
融资问题外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文:Chinese Listed Companies Preference to Equity Fund:Non-Systematic FactorsAbstract ：This article concentrates on the listed companies’ financing activities in China, analyses the reasons that why the listed companies prefer to equity fund from the aspect of non-systematic factors by using western financing theories, such as financing cost, types and qualities of the enterprises’ assets, profitability, industry factors, shareholding structure factors, level of financial management and society culture, and concludes that the preference to equity fund is a reasonable choice to the listed companies according to Chinese financing environment. At last, there are someconcise suggestions be given to rectify the companies’ prefer ence to equity fund. Keywords: Equity fund, Non-systematic factors, financial cost1. IntroductionThe listed companies in China prefer to equity fund, According to the statistic data showed in <China Securities Journal>, the amount of the listed companies finance in capital market account to 95.87 billions in 1997, among which equity fund take the proportion of 72.5%, and the proportion is 72.6% in 1998 and 72.3% in 1999, on the other hand, the proportion of debt fund to total fund is respective 17.8%, 24.9% and 25.1% in those three years. The proportion of equity fund to total fund is lower in the developed capital market than that in China. Take US for example, when American enterprises need to fund in the capital market, they prefer to debt fund than equity fund. The statistic data shows that, from 1970 to 1985, the American enterprises’ debt fund financed occupied the 91.7% proportion of outside financing, more than equity fund. Yan Dawu etc. found that, approximately 3/4 of the listed companies preferred to equity fund in China. Many researchers agree upon that the listed companies’ outside financing following this order: first one is equity fund, second one is convertible bond, third one is short-term liabilities, last one is long-term liabilities. Ma ny researchers usually analyze our national listed companies’ preference to equity fund with the systematic factors arising in the reform of our national economy. They thought that it just because of those systematic facts that made the listed companies’ financial activities betray to western classical financing theory. For example, the “picking order” theory claims that when enterprise need fund, they should turn to inside fund (depreciation and retained earnings) first, and then debt fund, and the last choice is equity fund. In this article, the author thinks that it is because of the specific financial environment that activates the enterprises’ such preference, and try to interpret the reasons of that preference to equity fund by combination of non-systematic factors and western financial theories.2. Financings cost of the listed company and preference to equity fund According to western financing the theories, capital cost of equity fund is more than capital cost of debt fund, thus the enterprise should choose debt fund first, then is theturn to equity fund when it fund outside. We should understand that this conception of “capital cost” is taken into account by investors, it is somewhat opportunity cost of the investors, can also be called expected returns. It contains of risk-free rate of returns and risk rate of returns arising from the investors’ risk investment. It is different with financing cost in essence. Financing cost is the cost arising from enterprises’ financing activities and using fund, we can call it fund cost. If capital market is efficient, capital cost should equal to fund cost, that is to say, what investors gain in capital market should equal to what fund raisers pay, or the transfer of fund is inevitable. But in an inefficient capital market, the price of stock will be different from its value because of investors’ action of speculation; they only chase capital gain and don’t want to hold the stocks in a long time and receive dividends. Thus the listed companies can gain fund with its fund cost being lower than capital cost.But in our national capital market, capital cost of equity fund is very low; it is because of the following factors: first, the high P/E Ratio (Price Earning Ratio) of new issued shares. According to calculat ion, average P/E Ratio of Chinese listed companies’ shares is between 30 and 40, it also is maintained at 20 although drops somewhat recently. But the normal P/E Ratio should be under 20 according to experience. We can observe the P/E was only 13.2 from 1874 to 1988 in US, and only 10 in Hong Kong. High P/E Ratio means high share issue price, then the capital cost of equity fund drops even given the same level of dividend. Second, low dividend policy in the listed companies, capital cost of equity fund decided by dividend pay-out ratio and price of per share. In China, many listed companies pay little or even no dividends to their shareholders. According to statistic data, there were 488 listed companies paid no dividend to their shareholders in 1998, 58.44 percents of all listed companies, there were 590, 59.83 percents in 1999, even 2000 in which China Securities Regulatory Commission issue new files to rule dividend policy of companies, there were only 699 companies which pay dividends, 18.47 percents more than that in 1999, but dividend payout ratio deduce 22%. Thus capital cost of equity is very low. Third, there is no rigidity on equity fund, if the listed companies choose equity fund, they can use the fund forever and has no obligation to return this fund. Most of listedcompanies are controlled by Government in China, taking financing risk into account, the major stockholders prefers to equity fund. The management also prefer equity fund because its lower fund cost and needn’t to be paid off, then the ir position will be more stable than financing in equity fund. We can conclude from the above analysis that cost of equity fund is lower than cost of debt fund in Chinese listed companies and the listed companies prefer to such low-cost fund.3. Types and qualities of assets in listed companies and preference to equity fund Static Trade-off Theory tells us, the value of enterprise with financial leverage is decided by the value of self-owned capital; value arising from tax benefit, cost of financial embarrassment and agency cost. Cost of financial embarrassment and agency cost are negative correlative to the types and qualities of companies’ assets, if the enterprise has more intangible assets, more assets with lower quality, it will has lower liquidity and its assets have lower mortgage value. When this kind of enterprise faces to great financial risk, it will have no way to solve its questions by selling its assets. Furthermore, because care for the ability of turning into cash of the mortgage assets, the creditors will high the level of rate and lay additional items in financial contract to rule the debtor’s action, all of those will enhance the agency cost and deduce the companies’ value. Qualcomm is supplier of wireless data and communication service in America, it is the inventor and user of CDMA and it also occupies the technology of HDR. The market value of its share is 1120 billions dollars at the end of March, 2000, but the quantities of long-term liabilities is zero. Why? Some reasons may be that there are some competitors in the market who own analogous technologies and the management of Qualcomm Company takes conservative attitude in financing activities. But the most important factor may be Qualcomm Company owns a mass of intangible assets which will have lower convertibility and the company’s value will decline when it has no enough money to pay for its debt.Many listed companies in China are transformed from the national enterprises. In the transformation, these listed companies take over the high-quality assets of the national enterprises, but with the development of economy, some projects can not coincidewith the market demand and the values of relative assets decline. On the other hand, there are many intangible assets in new high-tech companies. State-owned companies and high-tech companies are the most parts of the capital market. We can conclude that the qualities of listed companies’ assets are very low. This point is supported by the index of P/B (Price-to-Book value) which is usually thought as one of the most important indexes which can weigh the qualities of the listed companies’ assets. According to statistic data coming from Shenzhen Securities Information Company, by the end of November 14, 2003, there were 412 companies whose P/B is less than 2, take the 30% proportions of total listed companies which issue A-share in China, among them, there were 150 companies whose P/B is less than 1.53, and weighted average P/B of the stock market is 2.42. Lower qualities of assets means more cost may be brought out from debt fund and lower total value of the listed companies. Thus the listed companies prefer to equity fund when need outside financial support in China.4. Profitability and preference to equity fundFinancial Leverage Theory tells us that a small change in company’s profit may make great change in company’s EPS (Earnings per share). Just like leverage, we can get an amplified action by use of it. Debt fund can supply us with this leverage, by use of debt fund, these companies which have high level of profitability will get higher level of EPS because debt fund produces more profit for shareholders than interest shareholder shall pay. On the contrary, these companies which have low level of profitability will get lower level of EPS by use of debt fund because debt fund can not produce enough profit for shareholder to fulfill the demand of paying off the interests. Edison International Company has steady amount of customers and many intangible assets, these supply it with high level of profitability and ability to gain debt fund, its debt account to 67.2% proportions of its total assets in 1999.Listed companies in developed countries or regions always have high level of profitability. Take US for example, there are many listed companies which have excellent performance in American capital market when do business, such as J.P Morgan, its EPS is $11.16 per share in 1999. Besides it, GM, GE, Coca Cola, IBM,Intel, Microsoft, Dell etc. all always are profitable. In Hong Kong, most of those companies whose stock included in Hang Sang Index have the level of EPS more than 1 HKD, many are more than 2 HKD. Such as Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited, its EPS is 7.66 HKD. But listed companies do not have such excellent performance in profitability in China inland. Their profitability is common low. Take the performance of 2000 for example, the weighted average EPS of total listed companies is only 0.20 Yuan per share, and the weighted average P/B is 2.65 Yuan per share, 8.55 percents of these listed companies have negative profit. With low or no profit, the benefit nixes, listed companies’ preference to equity fund is a reasonable phenomenon. Can be gained from debt fund is very little; the listed companies can even suffer from the financia l distress caused by debt fund. So with the consideration of shareholders’ interest, the listed companies prefer to equity fund when need outside financial support in China.5. Shareholding structure factors and preference to equity fundListed companies not only face to external financing environmental impacts, but also the structure of the companies shares. Shareholding structure of Chinese listed companies shows characteristics as followed: I. Ownership structure is fairly complex. In addition to the public shares, there are shares held with inland fund and foreign stocks, state-owned shares, legal person shares, and internal employee shares, transferred allotted shares, A shares, B shares, H shares And N shares, and other distinction. From 1995 to 2003, Chinese companies’ outstanding shares of the total equity share almost have no change, even declined slightly. II. There are different prices, dividends, and rights of shares issued by same enterprise. III. The over-concentration of shares. We use the quantity of shares of the three major shareholders who top the list of shareholders of the listed companies to measure the concentration of stock. We study he concentration of stock of these companies which issue new share publicly in the years from 1995 to 2003 and focus on the situation of Chinese listed companies over the same period. The results showed that: from 1995 to 2003, the company-Which once transferred or allotted shares-whose top three shareholders’ shareholding ratio are generally higher than t he average level of all thelisted companies, and most of these company's top three shareholders holding 40 percent or higher percent of companies’ shares. In some years, the maximum number even is more than 90 percent, indicating that the company with the implementation of transferred and allotted shares have relatively high concentration rate of shares and major shareholders have absolute control over it. In short, transferring allotting shares and the issuance of additional shares have a certain relevanc e to the company’s concentration of ownership structure; the company's financing policy is largely controlled by the major shareholders.Chinese listed companies’ special shareholding structure effects its financing action. Because stockholders of the state-owned shares, legal person shares, social and outstanding shares, foreign share have a different objective function, their modes of financing preferences vary, and their preference affect the financing structure of listed companies. Controlling shareholders which hold state-owned shares account for the status of enterprises and carry out financing decisions in accordance with their own objective function. When the objective function conflict with the other shareholders benefit, they often damage the interests of other shareholders by use of the status of controlling. As the first major shareholders of the companies, government has multiple objectives, not always market-oriented, it prefers to use safe fund such as equity fund to maintain the value of state-owned assets, thus resulting in listed company’s preference to equity financing. Debt financing bring business with greater pressure to pay off the par value and interests. Therefore, the state-owned companies are showing a more offensive attitude to debt fund, again because of Chinese state-controlled listed companies have the absolute status in all listed company.From: International Journal of Business and Management; October, 2009.译文：中国上市公司偏好股权融资：非制度性因素摘要：本文把重点集中于中国上市公司的融资活动，运用西方融资理论，从非制度性因素方面，如融资成本、企业资产类型和质量、盈利能力、行业因素、股权结构因素、财务管理水平和社会文化，分析了中国上市公司倾向于股权融资的原因，并得出结论，股权融资偏好是上市公司根据中国融资环境的一种合理的选择。
融资租赁中英文对照外文翻译文献
中英文对照外文翻译文献中英文资料外文翻译附录1：（原文）The Determinants of the Leasing of Small Companies1, international for small and medium-sized companies were discussedAt the beginning of the 20th century, appear with ford motor as a representative of the mass production methods, people believed in the enterprise of large-scale business is the trend of The Times. But last of the twentieth century ago in economics leading view also think big enterprise is efficient, the scale become the pronoun of efficiency, enterprise's economic development of large-scale become direction. Yet the century in the 1970s, a kind of traditional ideas beganchallenged. In 1973, the British scholar schumacher (E.F.S chumacher) published a small is a good book. Quickly and has caused a great echo. The author thinks that the western countries specialization, large-scale production pattern looks is solved "production problem", but actually is an illusion. This mode of production caused economic inefficiency, environmental pollution, resource exhaustion, and fostered many social problems. Therefore, must choose again a development pattern or way. Schumacher pointed out the development of large-scale and automation error, advocated the development of small and medium-sized intermediate technology. He thinks. To make the society "enduring" development, must go miniaturization, among the development of roads, especially to the development of small and medium-sized enterprises and "intermediate technology". British prime minister Tony Blair also put forward by 2005 to the development of small businesses of British construction become heaven ".2, small and medium-sized enterprises in China's economy contributionSmall and medium-sized enterprises is an important means of technical innovation. Before world war ii, the century with different since the 1960s and 1970s gradually arisen on information technology and biotechnology as the core of the new technology revolution is mainly in small and medium-sized enterprises, and at least in lots of small and medium-sized enterprises tody develops. In the middle of the century ago, rich economies in the proportion ofsmall and medium-sized enterprises has been declining trend; In the middle of the century especially after the 1960s and 1970s, and small and medium-sized enterprises and started mass development (see Storey, D.J., 1994). This suggests that small and medium-sized enterprise is to adapt to this new trend of technological progress. According to statistics, so far, small and medium-sized enterprises in China has more than 800 thousand, accounts for the enterprise 99% of all. In since 1960s of rapid economic growth, industrial output value of new 76% above is created by small and medium-sized enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprise output and realize profits tax have accounted for 60% of the national respectively and 407., in recent years in the total export, small and medium-sized enterprises accounted for about 60 percent. "no doubt, small and medium-sized enterprises has become the new growth point of boosting the national economy, promoting China's economic boom is the main driving force of uplink. About smes in the country's economy, the importance of roughly boils down to:First, provide employment opportunity, absorbing surplus labor force. Compared with large enterprises and small and medium sized enterprises are using more labor-intensive technology, so the development of small and medium-sized enterprises can help alleviate current employment pressure. In fact, although small and medium-sized enterprise role far more than that, but it is small and medium-sized enterprises of this feature, to medium and small-sized enterprisesfor people increasingly attention. Our country the industry and commerce registration of small and medium-sized enterprises, more than 1,500 million, accounts for the total enterprises ninety-nine percent, to be town provides seventy-five percent of the jobs.Second, create the mainstay of GDP. According to the above information: small and medium-sized enterprises in the national industrial output account for about 60, realize profits tax of up to 40%. Table 3-1 for our independent accounting industrial enterprises in 1995-2000 some data, including various types of enterprise of gross industrial output and the proportion of total assets, value added of industry and the proportion of total assets and profit tax amount to total assets ratio (namely fund LiShuiLv). We can find that, regardless of in the output value on the proportions still in proportion of small and medium-sized enterprises are superior to large enterprises. This shows that every unit fund of small and medium-sized enterprises than large enterprise creates more social wealth. But, in addition to 2000, small and medium-sized enterprises outside the capital LiShuiLv below large enterprises. So, in proportion with capital value LiShuiLv appears between some contradictions. Because the latter reflects the former distribution relationship, this is because of hard to get the bank low-interest loans to small and medium-sized enterprises to use capital interest of proportion of those enterprises.Lease financing background is socialized production developed market economydevelopment to a higher level, industrial products, developed countries and its relative surplus of industrial capital seek and develop new market, therefore in the investigation of its function and advantages, cannot be separated from the historical background. Only understand this historical background, can answer financing lease why produced in the 1950s and to worldwide development, rather than creating and developing in other time periods. Financing lease improved social reproduction pace, acceleration of capital goods circulation and consumption, drive investment demand and the fellowship demand expanded. Eventually have a promotion aggregate demand growth, and thus to promote full employment and economic development.3. Move investment demandBritish lease experts, the bott who specially in the world on the lease yearbook of literary theory and the effect. He said: "in fact, some governments are shifting in full-scale lease to stimulate domestic investment. They moved to increase employment desire from an" '. He in investigating the German and British examples. Conclusion: lease industry in ensuring the role of main domestic investment was profound. Governments also encourage leasing company for capital equipment finance to expand exports, in order to improve their producers in the international market competition in position. Lease financing are able to expand domestic demand, increase employment in plays a unique role, reason mainly has two sides, the first, the financing lease of the equipment suppliedwhatever is located where requires some personnel, this undoubtedly will increase employment; Second, governments for lease provides preferential tax reduced leasing companies and enterprise's financing cost, thus make many enterprises want to use lease form to carry on an investment, investment increase is apparent.4 our experienceOur country economy in the 1990s, has maintained a strong growth momentum. During this decade, there are eight years is the Clinton administration office. China's President economic commission chairman is 2001 Nobel Prize winner Joseph. SiDiGeLiCi as he died, but also by the Nobel Prize winner, lemon, the author of the article George gram rove lady janet "Aaron, which are both as a new Keynesian representative figures, they advocate information asymmetry theory that completely on market economic regulation is not solve all problems. As a free economy does not guarantee during the trade information symmetry, causing some areas of adverse selection (vicious circle) and moral hazard (credit crisis), this shows that our country was inclined to conditionally government intervention and control the market. Our country government to use tax and interest rate leverage to regulate the market, with investment policy caused investment direction. These again and lease have internal relations. Our so-called tuyuhun equipment leasing the financing lease of by the financing involving rates, strong city in the policy has led to $rising interest rates to leasebring the opportunity of the development. Our tax on rental industry has certain preferential, while rental industry is more relying on talent advantage and control the ownership of the lease objects legal status, make full use of our country to encourage investment preferential policies, and designed the system "lease", such as: "leveraged lease", "tax leasing", etc in accord with the government encourages investment direction lease modes, enlarged policy efforts, promote the economic development of our country. From our lease data can be found in a decade ago our lease permeability (leasing forehead occupies equipment investment proportion) is 32%, lease the forehead is $120 billion, after 10 years (1999), the leasing of statistical data, the lease 34.4% permeability is the forehead is 2260 billion dollars. Lease lease frontal doubled. Its economic permeability (rental amount of GDP) 30% of the proportion of GDP of China accounts for almost a third. Lease with the China economic double forehead, but no major permeability changes show that lease is not omnipotent, just a economic levers, from our own experience, lease for economic development in the ability to move around." Lease has so magical function, it mainly in the operation of the real rights and use "separation" concept in action, property and rights separation gave lease activities to enlarge government control of the will, become market between government and market between effective macro-control measures. From since 9/11, our country and take several rate cuts and tax adjustment policy, as well as expand access to war, lay particular stresson government input control economy components.Lease financing background is socialized production developed market economy development to a higher level, industrial products, developed countries and its relative surplus of industrial capital seek and develop new market, therefore in the investigation of its function and advantages, cannot be separated from the historical background. Only understand this historical background, can answer financing lease why produced in the 1950s and to worldwide development, rather than creating and developing in other time periods. Financing lease improved social reproduction pace, acceleration of capital goods circulation and consumption, drive investment demand and the fellowship demand expanded. Eventually have a promotion aggregate demand growth, and thus to promote full employment and economic development.附录2：（译文）小型公司融资租赁的决定因素l、国际对中小型公司的探讨20世纪初，出现以福特汽车为代表的大规模生产方式，人们相信企业的大规模经营是大势所趋。
创业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献
创业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Entrepreneurial FinancingThe financing of startups entails potentially extreme adverse selection costs given the absent track record of the firms seeking capital, and given the risky nature of the industries in which many of them operate. Exacerbating the problem, this scenario often involves an innovator who has extensive technical knowledge but has neither the accumulated reputation nor the bondable wealth necessary to convey this information credibly.Barry characterizes venture capital as having evolved precisely to fill this startup financing niche:At the level of small, risky ventures, access to capital markets is restricted. Not all entrepreneurs can self-finance their projects, and not all can find bankers or angels who will carry the shortfall. Venture capitalists offer them a source of funds that is specifically designed for use in risky settings. The venture capitalists themselves perform due diligence prior to investing, and information gleaned in that process can greatly reduce the adverse selection problem..This outlook raises several questions. Why is it assumed that banks cannot (or choose not to) perform the same level of due diligence as venture capitalists (VCs)? In what sense is venture capital “designed” for risky settings? The puzzle deepens when one notes that straight debt is typically advocated as a solution to the adverse selection problem whereas in practice VCs often hold convertible preferred equity. Indeed, a defining characteristic of the venture capital market is that contracts are fairly high-powered in the sense that expected payoffs come disproportionately from the equity component or “upside”.These questions can be addressed by reflecting upon the costly due diligence to w hich Barry refers. By directly revealing the project’s quality, due diligence reduces information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and the VC. By contrast, if quality were signaled—the traditional solution to the adverse selection problem—costly due diligence would be unnecessary since there would be no more information to convey.In otherwise, either signaling or costly due diligence can solve the adverse selection problem. The two mechanisms are substitutes; the question then becomes which is more cost-effective.The first contribution of the paper is to show that signaling can be prohibitively expensive in entrepreneurial financing markets, and so costly due diligence dominates. The “cost” of signaling is driven by the incentives of bad firms to pool. Yet,for startups, if funding is not obtained then the firm may have almost no value. With such low reservation values, bad entrepreneurs attempt to pool at nearly any cost. As the analysis shows, securities is unattractive enough to drive out bad entrepreneurs—and thus to serve as a credible signal—tend to be unattractive to good entrepreneurs as well. Costly due diligence emerges as the preferred solution.As testament to the empirical importance of due diligence costs in venture capital markets, Fried and Hans characterize the VC funding process as composed of six distinct, progressively rigorous stages of screening. This due diligence takes an average of 97 days to complete even before the first round of funding is initiated. The majority of funding proposals do not successfully pass through the first screen, let alone subsequent screens, and the full process is described as “much more involved in bank loan reviews.The second contribution of the paper is to illustrate a link between costly due diligence and high-powered (or equity-like) financial contracts. The intuition behind this link is simple. By definition, low-powered contracts are safe; i.e., expected payoffs vary little across firms. High-powered contracts magnify the differential in payoff between funding good and bad projects, and hence magnify the incentives to screen out bad projects. In effect, high-powered contracts make the VC bear the cost of choosing entrepreneurs unwisely. Therefore high-powered contracts encourage due diligence.To summarize, this model is designed to make three simple points: (1) upside sharing is to be expected given costly evaluation, (2) such costly evaluations serve as a substitute traditional solutions to the adverse selection problem, and (3) traditional solutions are dominated for parameterizations of the model that correspond to venturecapital markets.Following the path-breaking empirical work of Saar, a theoretical literature on VC contract design emerged. One common feature of these papers is that they rationalize the optimality of convertible securities. A second common feature of these models is the admission of agency costs. For example, VCs and entrepreneurs may have different preferences regarding project risk or exit strategy.In part, the literature’s relia nce on agency costs owes to a widespread belief in their empirical relevance. It is also presumably related to the aforementioned consensus: since debt is considered the optimal response to adverse selection, non-debt securities must imply the presence of another market friction. On the other hand, it is clear how agency costs could lead to equity-like securities. Conflicts-of-interest over future actions are mitigated by granting both parties roughly symmetrical payoffs, which leads to upside-sharing. Of course, the omission of agency problems from the current model is not intended to suggest that they are unimportant empirically. Rather, the lesson is that agency costs are not a necessary condition for equity-like securities.Perhaps surprisingly, the theoretical results most closely related to this paper are contained in analyses of publicly traded securities. Assuming liquidity is exogenous and that prices are set by competitive market makers, Boot and Thakor show that splitting securities into an information-sensitive piece and a safer piece may either increase or decrease traders’ incentives to produce information. Fulghieri and Lukin study a similar environment but split the firm’s claims into a piece sold to outside investors and another piece that is retained, again analyzing the interaction between security design and information acquisition.Two important distinctions set my results apart from these models of public trading. First, their models exogenously rule out signaling, so it not possible to examine whether traditional solutions to adverse selection are dominated and, if so, under what conditions. Second, it is not clear how the results of these public trading models might be extended to entrepreneurial finance markets since the assumption that drives their results—losses by liquidity traders with perfectly inelasticdemand—has no obvious counterpart in an entrepreneurial finance setting.The economy consists of entrepreneurs with projects requiring capital investment K. The value of funded projects is 1 with probability πτ, where τ∈{G, B} is an indicator of project quality, and λ< 1 otherwise.Funded projects have expected value Vi = πτ 1 + (1 − πτ)λ. It is assumed thatλ< K. Otherwise the model would admit riskless debt, which would eliminate the adverse selection problem.Entrepreneurs have reservation value V; that is, contracts are acceptable only if the residual claim has expected value V or higher. In a model of mature firm financing, V is most clearly interpreted as the value of assets-in-place, because this is the continuation value of the firm in the absence of new investment. Such an interpretation is valid in entrepreneurial settings as well because without attracting financing the entrepreneur owns the existing assets outright. The key difference is one of magnitude. Compared to models of mature firms, in entrepreneurial settings the value of assets-in-place is small relative to other parameters.The net present value of projects, Vτ−V − K, is assumed to satisfyEVG − V − K ≥0 ≥EV B − V − K. (1) Equation (1) justifies the nomenclature “good” and “bad.” The net present value of a project is positive if and only if the project is good. Finally, it is assumed that net present values satisfyθ(EG − V − K) + (1 −θ)(EB − V − K) ≥0, (2) where θis the proportion of good projects in the economy. Because net present values are positive (on average), the model admits pooling equilibrium.One source of capital is an uninformed investor who conducts a mechanical credit evaluation based on observable characteristics. This investor may be thought of as a proxy for the competitive commercial banking market. Consistent with this interpretation, it will be shown that this investor takes debt in equilibrium. Briefly, the intuition is that when one is uninformed, one solves the adverse selection problem in the traditional way. As mentioned in the introduction, this solution is debt.An alternative source of capital is an investor endowed with technology that canevaluate project quality. This investor is referred to as a VC. Consistent with this identification, it will be shown that the VC takes high-powered contracts in equilibrium. Likewise, it needs to be shown that the VC actually employs the screening technology. A priori, this usage is not obvious. In particular, if the financial contract is very generous (if it leaves the VC with a large stake), then it may be profitable to forego the costly evaluation in favor of funding all projects. Such an outcome would benefit bad entrepreneurs, because they too would like to attract funding provided they can pool with good firms and thereby obtain mispriced financing. By limiting this pooling, costly due diligence effects a transfer from bad entrepreneurs to good entrepreneurs, and in the process, directs real investment toward better projects.Entrepreneurs seeking venture capital finance form a (randomly ordered) queue, and the VC sequentially evaluates them. For each entrepreneur, upon paying a cost C the VC receives a signal s ∈{G, B} withPr{s = G | entrepreneur is bad} = Pr{s = B | entrepreneur is good} =ε(3) The unconditional probability of a good signal is θ(1 − ε) + (1 − θ)ε, so VCs expect to evaluate 1/(θ(1 − ε) + (1 − θ)ε) entrepreneurs before a goo d one is found. The financial contract must be sufficiently generous (ex ante) as to compensate the VC for both capital contribution K and expected evaluation costs C= C/(θ(1 − ε) + (1 − θ)ε) incurred in the process of obtaining each good signal.This game admits three types of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In separating equilibrium, good entrepreneurs offer a security which bad entrepreneurs find too unpleasant to mimic (choosing instead to receive reservation utility V). Adverse selection in the queue becomes degenerate since only good firms are active. VC equilibrium serve as a second solution. In this scenario, the entrepreneurs’ contracts induce the investor to evaluate all firms in the queue. Finally, pooling can be thought of as the case in which good entrepreneurs find both of the aforementioned solutions to adverse selection too expensive.In this paper, I limit attention to debt and equity. Earlier drafts consideredarbitrary securities, with similar resulting intuition: high-powered securities promote due diligence, whereas low-powered securities are more effective signaling devices. The restriction to standard securities simplifies the presentation, retains the crucial intuition, and facilitates comparison of my results with those of the existing literature.This paper argues that in entrepreneurial finance markets, direct revelation of project quality (via the due diligence of VCs) is more cost-effective than signaling quality. This theme ties into an empirical literature showing that the due diligence process in those markets is quite extensive. Indeed, due diligence is a defining feature of the VC market.Several features of the model are quite strong and give the appearance that the mechanisms considered for resolving adverse selection are perfect substitutes. In a richer model, the two mechanisms could work as partial complements as well. Generally, a role exists for both entrepreneurial signaling and VC due diligence. Earlier drafts of the paper show complement may be motivated in multiple ways. For example, suppose entrepreneurs have noisy private information. Then the optimal security may involve signaling, thus eliminating entrepreneurs with bad information. But to the extent that the pool has residual uncertainty even after this self-selection, costly due diligence may still add value.Information acquisition occurs outside venture capital markets, of course. This model may shed light on the usage of unit IPOs, which are bundles of stocks and warrants often used for particularly small, risky offerings. The inclusion of warrants is puzzling from an adverse selection perspective, since the existing literature argues that securities should emphasize payoffs in bad states. The logic of this paper suggests that these securities, which emphasize good states to an extreme, motivate investors to evaluate projects and might be used when other mechanisms of dealing with adverse selection are too expensive.Finally, the model’s conclusions are not tied to the assumption that good entrepreneurs choose the contract. A connection between information acquisition incentives and the shape of the security exists independently of the contract’s origins. One could equivalently model a general partner in a venture capital fund raisingmoney from limited partners, announcing what securities the fund intends to hold. The more equity-like the securities are, the stronger the general partner’s information acquisition incentives.Source: Chris Yung. Entrepreneurial Financing And Costly Due Diligence. The Financial Review, 2009(44),pp137-149.译文：创业融资由于缺乏融资的信用记录以及所经营公司存在的风险性，初创企业的融资通常情况下都需要很高的逆向选择成本。
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文献出处：Cumming D, Fleming G, Schwienbacher A. Liquidity risk and venture capital finance [J]. Financial Management, 2005, 34(4): 77-105.原文Liquidity Risk and Venture Capital FinanceDouglas; Grant; SchwienbacherThis article provides theory and evidence in support of the proposition that venture capitalists adjust their investment decisions according to liquidity conditions on IPO exit markets. We refer to technological risk as a choice variable in terms of the characteristics of the entrepreneurial firm in which the venture capitalist invests, and liquidity risk as the current and expected future external exit market conditions. We show that in times of expected illiquidity of exit markets (high liquidity risk), venture capitalists invest proportionately more in new high-tech and early-stage projects (high technology risk) in order to postpone exit requirements. When exit markets are liquid, venture capitalists rush to exit by investing more in later-stage projects. We further provide complementary evidence that shows that conditions of low liquidity risk give rise to less syndication. Our theory and supporting empirical results facilitate a unifying theme that links related research on illiquidity in private equity.Policymakers around the world often express concern about why there is not more investment in privately held early-stage companies. Further, the extreme cyclically of early-stage investment, and what the drivers are, remains a relatively unexplored issue in private equity and venture capital research. This article introduces a new and somewhat counterintuitive theory to facilitate an understanding of these issues. The US data examined herein support the theory.Venture capitalists ("VCs") invest in small private growth companies that typically do not have cash flows to pay interest on debt or dividends on equity. VCs invest in private companies over a period that generally ranges from two to seven years prior to exit. As such, VCs derive their returns through capital gains in exit transactions. IPO exits typically provide VCs with the greatest returns andreputational benefits (Gompers, 1996 and Gompers and Lerner, 1999,2001 ). Liquidity risk in the context of VC finance therefore refers to exit risk, particularly IPO exit risk. That is, liquidity risk refers to the risk of not being able to effectively exit and thus being forced either to remain much longer in the venture or to sell the shares at a high discount.4 The risk of not being able to effectively exit an investment is an important reason why VCs require high returns on their investments (Lerner, 2000, 2002; Lerner and Schoar, 2004, 2005). It is therefore natural to expect that exit market liquidity affects VCs' incentives to invest in different types of entrepreneurial firms.Liquidity risk is, of course, not the only type of risk that VCs face when deciding to invest in a particular project. The other types of risk may be grouped into a broad category of what we refer to in this article as technological risk, or the risk of investing in a project of uncertain quality (particular types of technological risk could include the quality of the product technology as well as the quality of entrepreneurs' technical and managerial abilities). This article considers whether changes in external conditions of liquidity risk give rise to adjustments in VCs' undertaking of projects with different degrees of technological risk.In particular, we investigate whether exit market liquidity affects the frequency of VC investment in nascent early-stage firms and hightech firms with intangible assets.5 We provide a theory and supporting empirical evidence that show the willingness of VCs to undertake projects of high technological risk is directly related to conditions of liquidity risk. We further provide complementary evidence that shows that external conditions of high liquidity risk give rise to more prevalent syndication, which in turn shows that while VCs assume more technological risk in periods of low liquidity, they take steps to mitigate this risk through syndication. We show that the theory and evidence in regards to liquidity risk introduced herein provides a unifying theme that links the results in a number of related papers on venture capital finance.It is important to point out that the ultimate source of the liquidity risk analyzed in this article is the difference in time preferences between VCs and management, since there is a greater incentive for VCs to cash out earlier than management. Thetime horizon of a VC is typically shorter because of his exit requirements. If Cs were long-term investors and would not wish to exit already after a few years, liquidity risk would not matter and incentives between VCs and management would probably be better aligned (provided managers are capable and wish to remain in place).With respect to early-stage investments, there are therefore two opposite effects documented in this article. On the one hand, more liquidity increases the likelihood of investing in new ventures; but on the other hand, it reduces the likelihood that these new ventures are in the early stage. In other words, liquidity increases the absolute number of new investments, but reduces the proportion of ventures that get early-stage finance relative to the total number of investments. These results thus indicate that VCs adjust their expected demand for liquidity to the expected supply. If they expect low liquidity in the future, they reduce their future demand for liquidity by reducing the absolute number of new ventures and by postponing the demand for liquidity for a portion of the new investments by financing ventures in their early stages.For such financial assets as publicly listed equity, there seems to be consensus about the concept of liquidity. Four different dimensions have been suggested to define the concept for traded assets (Harris, 2003; Kyie, 1985): width, immediacy, depth, and resiliency. Loosely speaking, liquidity refers to the ability to trade at low (explicit and implicit) transaction costs. KyIe (1985) further stresses the importance of continuous trading and frictionless markets to achieve perfect liquidity of assets.As for real estate or art objects, private equity is infrequently traded and thus the standard concept of liquidity hardly applies. Private equity investments are not continuously traded, since by definition they are private prior to the IPO. An important element that distinguishes private from public equity is that IPO markets are characterized by "hot" and "cold" issue phases and by clustering waves. In this article, liquidity is related to the possibility of exiting by either listing the company on a stock market or finding a strategic buyer. The notion of liquidity used here is closest to the dimension of immediacy, since here liquidity represents the likelihood of being able to divest (cost of immediacy). Das et al. (2003) show that this illiquidity mayinduce a substantial non-tradability discount.Finally, our evidence is consistent with the view that illiquidity is one reason why VCs require high returns on their investments (Gompers and Lerner, 1999a, 2001 ; see also Barry, Muscarella, Perry, and Vetsuypens, 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Lerner and Schoar, 2004; Cochrane, 2005; Das et al., 2003). Our evidence is consistent, in that the greater assumption of technological risk occurs at times when we may infer that the relative cost of financing innovative deals is lower. That is, in bust periods when illiquidity is high, it is generally viewed that the deal cost (in terms of the amount that a VC must pay for a given equity share in a company) is low; therefore, in bust periods, the cost of financing the more innovative companies is lower. This is consistent with our finding of a higher proportion of financings of early-stage firms in periods of exit market illiquidity.The issues considered in this article give rise to a number of questions and further research issues. Our sample was based on data from a randomly selected group of limited partnership VCs in the United States over the period 1985 - 2004. We considered a large number of robustness checks, many of which we have provided. An earlier version of this article reported other robustness checks, such as the exclusion/inclusion of Internet firms, and hot and cold markets; those excluded results were very supportive of the results explicitly reported herein. In Tables V-VII, we showed the robustness of the results to the inclusion and exclusion of the years 1999 and 2000, as well as of the years 1998-2001. We also explicitly showed the robustness of the results to numerous different explanatory variables.This article puts forth a theoretical model whereby VCs time their investments according to exit opportunities. When exit markets become less liquid, VCs invest proportionately more in new early-stage projects (relative to new projects in other stages of development) in order to postpone exit requirements and thus invest in riskier projects. As such, VCs trade-off liquidity risk against technological risk when exit markets lack liquidity. In contrast, when liquidity is high, VCs invest more in expansion-stage and later-stage projects where time until exit (investment duration) is reduced.译文流动性风险和风险资本融资道格拉斯;格兰特; 斯科威巴彻风险投资家会根据IPO退出市场的流动性状况来适时地调整他们的投资决策，本文对这一观点提供了理论和实证上的支持。