社会成本问题-展示-科斯
科斯《企业的性质》和《社会成本问题》相关理论评述-经济思想史论文-经济学论文
科斯《企业的性质》和《社会成本问题》相关理论评述-经济思想史论文-经济学论文——文章均为WORD文档，下载后可直接编辑使用亦可打印——一、引言:科斯经济思想的前因后果一次本科毕业实习引起的经济学变革美国芝加哥大学的科斯教授分别在20 世纪三十年代和发表的《企业的性质》与《社会成本问题》这两篇鸿文中引入了交易成本概念,这不但改变了新古典经济学的研究范式,而且促成了新制度经济学派的产生。
事实上,科斯发现企业的本质是1932 年底的事情。
在1931 年,正在念本科三年级的科斯已经提前修满了毕业所需的全部学分,并在产业组织学大师普兰特的推荐下,获得了英国伦敦经济学院颁发的Ernest Cassel 爵士访问学者奖学金,赴美参观学习。
在美国期间,科斯实地调研了福特、费雪和通用等汽车企业,发现通用的汽车的车身框架是从斯密斯车身生产企业手中购买的,而且后者高度自动化设计的大部分装置都是为通用的汽车特别准备的。
同时,通用又收购了专门从事车身生产的费雪企业。
于是,科斯就思考一个问题:为什么有些交易在市场中完成,为什么有些交易又通过垂直一体化的方式在企业内实现?带着这个问题,科斯又去芝加哥大学旁听了芝加哥学派创始人奈特教授关于社会经济组织的课程。
就是在这样的实践与理论的启发下,科斯在1932 年给布莱克教授的书信中已经初步形成解释上述问题的答案,并在经历五年的反复修改后最终在1937 年发表了一篇名为《企业的性质》的文章。
但是,该文在发表后并没有得到经济学界的重视,直至他发表《社会成本问题》后,人们才开始回头重读《企业的性质》。
因为科斯在1959 年发表的《联邦通讯委员会》,引起了整个芝加哥学派的强烈,大家一致认为科斯的结论与当时占主流地位的新古典经济学完全不一样甚至相反。
为此,科斯应《法律经济学杂志》主编戴德维特教授的邀请在1960 年发表一篇名为《社会成本问题》的长文回应芝加哥学派的质疑。
但问题是,该文不但没有平息这场激烈的争论,反而激起了整个经济学界对科斯论文的关注。
科斯-社会成本问题
The Problem of Social CostR.H.Coase University of Virginia1.The Problem to Be Examined1This paper is concerned with those actions of businessfirms which have harmful effects on others.The standard example is that of a factory the smoke from which has harmful effects on those occupying neighbouring properties.The economic analysis of such a situation has usually proceeded in terms of a di-vergence between the private and social product of the factory,in which econ-omists have largely followed the treatment of Pigou in The Economics of Welfare. The conclusions to which this kind of analysis seems to have led most economists is that it would be desirable to make the owner of the factory liable for the dam-age caused to those injured by the smoke,or alternatively,to place a tax on the factory owner varying with the amount of smoke produced and equivalent in money terms to the damage it would cause,orfinally,to exclude the factory from residential districts(and presumably from other areas in which the emission of smoke would have harmful effects on others).It is my contention that the suggested courses of action are inappropriate,in that they lead to results which are not necessarily,or even usually,desirable.2.The Reciprocal Nature of the ProblemThe traditional approach has tended to obscure the nature of the choice that has to be made.The question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B and what has to be decided is:how should we restrain A?But this is wrong.We are dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature.To avoid the harm to B would inflict harm on A.The real question that has to be decided is:should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A?The 1This article,although concerned with a technical problem of economic analysis,arose out of the study of the Political Economy of Broadcasting which I am now conducting.The argument of the present article was implicit in a previous article dealing with the problem of allocating radio and television frequencies(The Federal Communications Commission,w&Econ.[1959])but comments which I have received seemed to suggest that it would be desirable to deal with the question in a more explicit way and without reference to the original problem for the solution of which the analysis was developed.[Journal of Law and Economics,vol.56(November2013)]᭧1960by The University of Chicago.All rights reserved.0022-2186/2013/5604-0025$10.00837838The Journal of LAW&ECONOMICSproblem is to avoid the more serious harm.I instanced in my previous article2 the case of a confectioner the noise and vibrations from whose machinery dis-turbed a doctor in his work.To avoid harming the doctor would inflict harm on the confectioner.The problem posed by this case was essentially whether it was worth while,as a result of restricting the methods of production which could be used by the confectioner,to secure more doctoring at the cost of a reduced supply of confectionery products.Another example is afforded by the problem of straying cattle which destroy crops on neighbouring land.If it is inevitable that some cattle will stray,an increase in the supply of meat can only be obtained at the expense of a decrease in the supply of crops.The nature of the choice is clear:meat or crops.What answer should be given is,of course, not clear unless we know the value of what is obtained as well as the value of what is sacrificed to obtain it.To give another example,Professor George J. Stigler instances the contamination of a stream.3If we assume that the harmful effect of the pollution is that it kills thefish,the question to be decided is:is the value of thefish lost greater or less than the value of the product which the contamination of the stream makes possible.It goes almost without saying that this problem has to be looked at in total and at the margin.3.The Pricing System with Liability for DamageI propose to start my analysis by examining a case in which most economists would presumably agree that the problem would be solved in a completely satisfactory manner:when the damaging business has to pay for all damage caused and the pricing system works smoothly(strictly this means that the operation of a pricing system is without cost).A good example of the problem under discussion is afforded by the case of straying cattle which destroy crops growing on neighbouring land.Let us suppose that a farmer and a cattle-raiser are operating on neighbouring properties.Let us further suppose that,without any fencing between the properties,an increase in the size of the cattle-raiser’s herd increases the total damage to the farmer’s crops.What happens to the marginal damage as the size of the herd increases is another matter.This depends on whether the cattle tend to follow one another or to roam side by side,on whether they tend to be more or less restless as the size of the herd increases and on other similar factors.For my immediate purpose, it is immaterial what assumption is made about marginal damage as the size of the herd increases.To simplify the argument,I propose to use an arithmetical example.I shall assume that the annual cost of fencing the farmer’s property is$9and that the price of the crop is$1per ton.Also,I assume that the relation between the number of cattle in the herd and the annual crop loss is as follows:2Coase,The Federal Communications Commission,w&Econ.26–27(1959).3G.J.Stigler,The Theory of Price105(1952).The Problem of Social Cost839Number in Herd(Steers)Annual Crop Loss(Tons)Crop Loss per AdditionalSteer(Tons)1112323634104Given that the cattle-raiser is liable for the damage caused,the additional annual cost imposed on the cattle-raiser if he increased his herd from,say,2to 3steers is$3and in deciding on the size of the herd,he will take this into account along with his other costs.That is,he will not increase the size of the herd unless the value of the additional meat produced(assuming that the cattle-raiser slaughters the cattle)is greater than the additional costs that this will entail, including the value of the additional crops destroyed.Of course,if,by the employment of dogs,herdsmen,aeroplanes,mobile radio and other means,the amount of damage can be reduced,these means will be adopted when their cost is less than the value of the crop which they prevent being lost.Given that the annual cost of fencing is$9,the cattle-raiser who wished to have a herd with4 steers or more would pay for fencing to be erected and maintained,assuming that other means of attaining the same end would not do so more cheaply.When the fence is erected,the marginal cost due to the liability for damage becomes zero,except to the extent that an increase in the size of the herd necessitates a stronger and therefore more expensive fence because more steers are liable to lean against it at the same time.But,of course,it may be cheaper for the cattle-raiser not to fence and to pay for the damaged crops,as in my arithmetical example,with3or fewer steers.It might be thought that the fact that the cattle-raiser would pay for all crops damaged would lead the farmer to increase his planting if a cattle-raiser came to occupy the neighbouring property.But this is not so.If the crop was previously sold in conditions of perfect competition,marginal cost was equal to price for the amount of planting undertaken and any expansion would have reduced the profits of the farmer.In the new situation,the existence of crop damage would mean that the farmer would sell less on the open market but his receipts for a given production would remain the same,since the cattle-raiser would pay the market price for any crop damaged.Of course,if cattle-raising commonly in-volved the destruction of crops,the coming into existence of a cattle-raising industry might raise the price of the crops involved and farmers would then extend their planting.But I wish to confine my attention to the individual farmer.I have said that the occupation of a neighbouring property by a cattle-raiser would not cause the amount of production,or perhaps more exactly the amount of planting,by the farmer to increase.In fact,if the cattle-raising has any effect, it will be to decrease the amount of planting.The reason for this is that,for any given tract of land,if the value of the crop damaged is so great that the receipts from the sale of the undamaged crop are less than the total costs of cultivating that tract of land,it will be profitable for the farmer and the cattle-raiser to840The Journal of LAW&ECONOMICSmake a bargain whereby that tract of land is left uncultivated.This can be made clear by means of an arithmetical example.Assume initially that the value of the crop obtained from cultivating a given tract of land is$12and that the cost incurred in cultivating this tract of land is$10,the net gain from cultivating the land being$2.I assume for purposes of simplicity that the farmer owns the land.Now assume that the cattle-raiser starts operations on the neighbouring property and that the value of the crops damaged is$1.In this case$11is obtained by the farmer from sale on the market and$1is obtained from the cattle-raiser for damage suffered and the net gain remains$2.Now suppose that the cattle-raiserfinds it profitable to increase the size of his herd,even though the amount of damage rises to$3;which means that the value of the additional meat production is greater than the additional costs,including the additional $2payment for damage.But the total payment for damage is now$3.The net gain to the farmer from cultivating the land is still$2.The cattle-raiser would be better off if the farmer would agree not to cultivate his land for any payment less than$3.The farmer would be agreeable to not cultivating the land for any payment greater than$2.There is clearly room for a mutually satisfactory bargain which would lead to the abandonment of cultivation.4But the same argument applies not only to the whole tract cultivated by the farmer but also to any subdivision of it.Suppose,for example,that the cattle have a well-defined route, say,to a brook or to a shady area.In these circumstances,the amount of damage to the crop along the route may well be great and if so,it could be that the farmer and the cattle-raiser wouldfind it profitable to make a bargain whereby the farmer would agree not to cultivate this strip of land.But this raises a further possibility.Suppose that there is such a well-defined route.Suppose further that the value of the crop that would be obtained by cultivating this strip of land is$10but that the cost of cultivation is$11.In the absence of the cattle-raiser,the land would not be cultivated.However,given the presence of the cattle-raiser,it could well be that if the strip was cultivated, the whole crop would be destroyed by the cattle.In which case,the cattle-raiser would be forced to pay$10to the farmer.It is true that the farmer would lose $1.But the cattle-raiser would lose$10.Clearly this is a situation which is not likely to last indefinitely since neither party would want this to happen.The aim of the farmer would be to induce the cattle-raiser to make a payment in return 4The argument in the text has proceeded on the assumption that the alternative to cultivation of the crop is abandonment of cultivation altogether.But this need not be so.There may be crops which are less liable to damage by cattle but which would not be as profitable as the crop grown in the absence of damage.Thus,if the cultivation of a new crop would yield a return to the farmer of$1instead of$2,and the size of the herd which would cause$3damage with the old crop would cause$1damage with the new crop,it would be profitable to the cattle-raiser to pay any sum less than$2to induce the farmer to change his crop(since this would reduce damage liability from$3 to$1)and it would be profitable for the farmer to do so if the amount received was more than$1 (the reduction in his return caused by switching crops).In fact,there would be room for a mutually satisfactory bargain in all cases in which a change of crop would reduce the amount of damage by more than it reduces the value of the crop(excluding damage)—in all cases,that is,in which a change in the crop cultivated would lead to an increase in the value of production.The Problem of Social Cost841 for an agreement to leave this land uncultivated.The farmer would not be able to obtain a payment greater than the cost of fencing off this piece of land nor so high as to lead the cattle-raiser to abandon the use of the neighbouring property.What payment would in fact be made would depend on the shrewdness of the farmer and the cattle-raiser as bargainers.But as the payment would not be so high as to cause the cattle-raiser to abandon this location and as it would not vary with the size of the herd,such an agreement would not affect the allocation of resources but would merely alter the distribution of income and wealth as between the cattle-raiser and the farmer.I think it is clear that if the cattle-raiser is liable for damage caused and the pricing system works smoothly,the reduction in the value of production else-where will be taken into account in computing the additional cost involved in increasing the size of the herd.This cost will be weighed against the value of the additional meat production and,given perfect competition in the cattle industry,the allocation of resources in cattle-raising will be optimal.What needs to be emphasized is that the fall in the value of production elsewhere which would be taken into account in the costs of the cattle-raiser may well be less than the damage which the cattle would cause to the crops in the ordinary course of events.This is because it is possible,as a result of market transactions,to discontinue cultivation of the land.This is desirable in all cases in which the damage that the cattle would cause,and for which the cattle-raiser would be willing to pay,exceeds the amount which the farmer would pay for use of the land.In conditions of perfect competition,the amount which the farmer would pay for the use of the land is equal to the difference between the value of the total production when the factors are employed on this land and the value of the additional product yielded in their next best use(which would be what the farmer would have to pay for the factors).If damage exceeds the amount the farmer would pay for the use of the land,the value of the additional product of the factors employed elsewhere would exceed the value of the total product in this use after damage is taken into account.It follows that it would be desirable to abandon cultivation of the land and to release the factors employed for production elsewhere.A procedure which merely provided for payment for dam-age to the crop caused by the cattle but which did not allow for the possibility of cultivation being discontinued would result in too small an employment of factors of production in cattle-raising and too large an employment of factors in cultivation of the crop.But given the possibility of market transactions,a situation in which damage to crops exceeded the rent of the land would not endure.Whether the cattle-raiser pays the farmer to leave the land uncultivated or himself rents the land by paying the land-owner an amount slightly greater than the farmer would pay(if the farmer was himself renting the land),thefinal result would be the same and would maximise the value of production.Even when the farmer is induced to plant crops which it would not be profitable to cultivate for sale on the market,this will be a purely short-term phenomenon and may be expected to lead to an agreement under which the planting will842The Journal of LAW&ECONOMICScease.The cattle-raiser will remain in that location and the marginal cost of meat production will be the same as before,thus having no long-run effect on the allocation of resources.4.The Pricing System with No Liability for DamageI now turn to the case in which,although the pricing system is assumed to work smoothly(that is,costlessly),the damaging business is not liable for any of the damage which it causes.This business does not have to make a payment to those damaged by its actions.I propose to show that the allocation of resources will be the same in this case as it was when the damaging business was liable for damage caused.As I showed in the previous case that the allocation of resources was optimal,it will not be necessary to repeat this part of the argument.I return to the case of the farmer and the cattle-raiser.The farmer would suffer increased damage to his crop as the size of the herd increased.Suppose that the size of the cattle-raiser’s herd is3steers(and that this is the size of the herd that would be maintained if crop damage was not taken into account). Then the farmer would be willing to pay up to$3if the cattle-raiser would reduce his herd to2steers,up to$5if the herd were reduced to1steer and would pay up to$6if cattle-raising was abandoned.The cattle-raiser would therefore receive$3from the farmer if he kept2steers instead of3.This$3 foregone is therefore part of the cost incurred in keeping the third steer.Whether the$3is a payment which the cattle-raiser has to make if he adds the third steer to his herd(which it would be if the cattle-raiser was liable to the farmer for damage caused to the crop)or whether it is a sum of money which he would have received if he did not keep a third steer(which it would be if the cattle-raiser was not liable to the farmer for damage caused to the crop)does not affect thefinal result.In both cases$3is part of the cost of adding a third steer, to be included along with the other costs.If the increase in the value of production in cattle-raising through increasing the size of the herd from2to3is greater than the additional costs that have to be incurred(including the$3damage to crops),the size of the herd will be increased.Otherwise,it will not.The size of the herd will be the same whether the cattle-raiser is liable for damage caused to the crop or not.It may be argued that the assumed starting point—a herd of3steers—was arbitrary.And this is true.But the farmer would not wish to pay to avoid crop damage which the cattle-raiser would not be able to cause.For example,the maximum annual payment which the farmer could be induced to pay could not exceed$9,the annual cost of fencing.And the farmer would only be willing to pay this sum if it did not reduce his earnings to a level that would cause him to abandon cultivation of this particular tract of land.Furthermore,the farmer would only be willing to pay this amount if he believed that,in the absence of any payment by him,the size of the herd maintained by the cattle-raiser wouldThe Problem of Social Cost843 be4or more steers.Let us assume that this is the case.Then the farmer would be willing to pay up to$3if the cattle-raiser would reduce his herd to3steers, up to$6if the herd were reduced to2steers,up to$8if one steer only were kept and up to$9if cattle-raising were abandoned.It will be noticed that the change in the starting point has not altered the amount which would accrue to the cattle-raiser if he reduced the size of his herd by any given amount.It is still true that the cattle-raiser could receive an additional$3from the farmer if he agreed to reduce his herd from3steers to2and that the$3represents the value of the crop that would be destroyed by adding the third steer to the herd. Although a different belief on the part of the farmer(whether justified or not) about the size of the herd that the cattle-raiser would maintain in the absence of payments from him may affect the total payment he can be induced to pay, it is not true that this different belief would have any effect on the size of the herd that the cattle-raiser will actually keep.This will be the same as it would be if the cattle-raiser had to pay for damage caused by his cattle,since a receipt foregone of a given amount is the equivalent of a payment of the same amount. It might be thought that it would pay the cattle-raiser to increase his herd above the size that he would wish to maintain once a bargain had been made, in order to induce the farmer to make a larger total payment.And this may be true.It is similar in nature to the action of the farmer(when the cattle-raiser was liable for damage)in cultivating land on which,as a result of an agreement with the cattle-raiser,planting would subsequently be abandoned(including land which would not be cultivated at all in the absence of cattle-raising).But such manoeuvres are preliminaries to an agreement and do not affect the long-run equilibrium position,which is the same whether or not the cattle-raiser is held responsible for the crop damage brought about by his cattle.It is necessary to know whether the damaging business is liable or not for damage caused since without the establishment of this initial delimitation of rights there can be no market transactions to transfer and recombine them.But the ultimate result(which maximises the value of production)is independent of the legal position if the pricing system is assumed to work without cost.5.The Problem Illustrated AnewThe harmful effects of the activities of a business can assume a wide variety of forms.An early English case concerned a building which,by obstructing currents of air,hindered the operation of a windmill.5A recent case in Florida concerned a building which cast a shadow on the cabana,swimming pool and sunbathing areas of a neighbouring hotel.6The problem of straying cattle and the damaging of crops which was the subject of detailed examination in the two preceding sections,although it may have appeared to be rather a special case, 5See Gale on Easements237–39(13th ed.M.Bowles1959).6See Fontainebleu Hotel Corp.v.Forty-Five Twenty-Five,Inc.,114So.2d357(1959).844The Journal of LAW&ECONOMICSis in fact but one example of a problem which arises in many different guises. To clarify the nature of my argument and to demonstrate its general applicability, I propose to illustrate it anew by reference to four actual cases.Let usfirst reconsider the case of Sturges v.Bridgman7which I used as an illustration of the general problem in my article on“The Federal Communi-cations Commission.”In this case,a confectioner(in Wigmore Street)used two mortars and pestles in connection with his business(one had been in operation in the same position for more than60years and the other for more than26 years).A doctor then came to occupy neighbouring premises(in Wimpole Street). The confectioner’s machinery caused the doctor no harm until,eight years after he hadfirst occupied the premises,he built a consulting room at the end of his garden right against the confectioner’s kitchen.It was then found that the noise and vibration caused by the confectioner’s machinery made it difficult for the doctor to use his new consulting room.“In particular...the noise prevented him from examining his patients by auscultation8for diseases of the chest.He also found it impossible to engage with effect in any occupation which required thought and attention.”The doctor therefore brought a legal action to force the confectioner to stop using his machinery.The courts had little difficulty in granting the doctor the injunction he sought.“Individual cases of hardship may occur in the strict carrying out of the principle upon which we found our judgment,but the negation of the principle would lead even more to individual hardship,and would at the same time produce a prejudicial effect upon the development of land for residential purposes.”The court’s decision established that the doctor had the right to prevent the confectioner from using his machinery.But,of course,it would have been possible to modify the arrangements envisaged in the legal ruling by means of a bargain between the parties.The doctor would have been willing to waive his right and allow the machinery to continue in operation if the confectioner would have paid him a sum of money which was greater than the loss of income which he would suffer from having to move to a more costly or less convenient location or from having to curtail his activities at this location or,as was suggested as a possibility,from having to build a separate wall which would deaden the noise and vibration.The confectioner would have been willing to do this if the amount he would have to pay the doctor was less than the fall in income he would suffer if he had to change his mode of operation at this location,abandon his operation or move his confectionery business to some other location.The solution of the problem depends essentially on whether the continued use of the machinery adds more to the confectioner’s income than it subtracts from the doctor’s.9But now consider the situation if the confectioner had won the case.The confectioner 711Ch.D.852(1879).8Auscultation is the act of listening by ear or stethoscope in order to judge by sound the condition of the body.9Note that what is taken into account is the change in income after allowing for alterations in methods of production,location,character of product,etc.The Problem of Social Cost845 would then have had the right to continue operating his noise and vibration-generating machinery without having to pay anything to the doctor.The boot would have been on the other foot:the doctor would have had to pay the confectioner to induce him to stop using the machinery.If the doctor’s income would have fallen more through continuance of the use of this machinery than it added to the income of the confectioner,there would clearly be room for a bargain whereby the doctor paid the confectioner to stop using the machinery. That is to say,the circumstances in which it would not pay the confectioner to continue to use the machinery and to compensate the doctor for the losses that this would bring(if the doctor had the right to prevent the confectioner’s using his machinery)would be those in which it would be in the interest of the doctor to make a payment to the confectioner which would induce him to discontinue the use of the machinery(if the confectioner had the right to operate the ma-chinery).The basic conditions are exactly the same in this case as they were in the example of the cattle which destroyed crops.With costless market transac-tions,the decision of the courts concerning liability for damage would be without effect on the allocation of resources.It was of course the view of the judges that they were affecting the working of the economic system—and in a desirable direction.Any other decision would have had“a prejudicial effect upon the development of land for residential purposes,”an argument which was elaborated by examining the example of a forge operating on a barren moor,which was later developed for residual purposes.The judges’view that they were settling how the land was to be used would be true only in the case in which the costs of carrying out the necessary market transactions exceeded the gain which might be achieved by any rearrangement of rights.And it would be desirable to preserve the areas(Wimpole Street or the moor)for residential or professional use(by giving non-industrial users the right to stop the noise,vibration,smoke,etc., by injunction)only if the value of the additional residential facilities obtained was greater than the value of cakes or iron lost.But of this the judges seem to have been unaware.Another example of the same problem is furnished by the case of Cooke v. Forbes.10One process in the weaving of cocoa-nutfibre matting was to immerse it in bleaching liquids after which it was hung out to dry.Fumes from a man-ufacturer of sulphate of ammonia had the effect of turning the matting from a bright to a dull and blackish colour.The reason for this was that the bleaching liquid contained chloride of tin,which,when affected by sulphuretted hydrogen, is turned to a darker colour.An injunction was sought to stop the manufacturer from emitting the fumes.The lawyers for the defendant argued that if the plaintiff “were not to use...a particular bleaching liquid,theirfibre would not be affected;that their process is unusual,not according to the custom of the trade, and even damaging to their own fabrics.”The judge commented:“...it appears to me quite plain that a person has a right to carry on upon his own property 10L.R.5Eq.166(1867–1868).。
《社会成本问题》 罗纳德.科斯
社会成本问题罗纳德.科斯①一、有待分析的问题本文将分析商业企业行为对旁人带来不良影响的问题。
标准例子就是，某工厂的烟尘给邻近的财产所有者带来的有害影响。
对此类情况，经济学的分析通常是因袭了庇古在《福利经济学》的处理思路，即认为问题是在于工厂的私人产品与社会产品有差异。
这些分析让大多经济学家得出以下三个结论：即要么是要求工厂主对烟尘的损害负责赔偿；要么是根据工厂排烟尘的具体量及其所致损害的相应金额标准对工厂主征税；或者最终，责令该厂迁出居民区（可能也应包括那些烟尘排放会影响到别人的区域）。
依我之见，这些解决办法并不合适，因为它们所引至的结果既非人们所需，甚至通常亦非人们所欲。
二、问题的相互性本质传统方法倾向于模糊了必须作选择的本质。
人们通常将以下两个问题视为同一：其一是A给B造成损失，其二需要决定的是：我们应如何限制A。
但这是不对的，我们分析的问题本质上具有相互性。
避免对B的损害必将会使A遭受损失。
真正必须决策的问题是：是允许A损害B，还是允许B损害A？问题的关键在于避重就轻。
我在之前的文章②中列举了糖果制造商的机器噪声和震动干扰了某医生工作的事例。
为了避免医生有损，将只能让糖果制造商受伤害。
此案例提出的问题实质上是，限制糖果制造商采用的某种生产方式以产品供给减少为代价，保证医生的正常工作是否值得。
另一例子可以看走失的牛损坏邻近土地里的谷物问题。
倘若有些牛无论如何都会走失，那么只有以谷物供给的减少为代价换取肉类供给的增加。
选择的本质简单明了：肉类抑或谷物？当然，除非知晓所得以及牺牲的代价各几何，不然这个问题的答案并不清楚。
再举一例：乔治·J·施蒂格勒教授举的河流污染例子③。
如果假定污染的有害后果是鱼类的死亡，需要抉择的问题不外乎是：鱼类损失的价值与以河流污染为代价的产品价值孰高孰低。
不言而喻，必须从总体和边际两个方面看此种问题。
三、损害责任的定价制度我想以一个案例的剖析作为分析的起点。
社会成本问题
社会的成本问题一、课堂讲解科斯在本文中列举论文许多经典案例，通过对这些案例的分析，提出了他的看法，并且批判了庇古在《福利经济学》中的处理思路。
在文章前部分，举例了牛损坏毗邻土地谷物一案，假定农夫和养牛者在毗邻的土地上各自经营，并且他们土地之间没有栅栏，随着牛群规模的扩大，可能会出现牛跑到农夫的地理损坏他的谷物的情况。
庇古以及继承了庇古处理思路的经济学家们认为有以下三种方式，要么要求养牛者对农夫的谷物损失进行赔偿，要么根据牛损坏的谷物的具体量以及所致损坏的相应金额标准对养牛者征税，或者，责令养牛者寻找别处放牧。
科斯认为以上三种方式都不合适，因为他们所致的结果并不能实现社会福利的最优化。
他认为在考虑A方行为对B方造成不良影响的问题时，必须从总体和边际两个方面思考，即使社会总产出最大化、两方交易最大化。
科斯在有交易成本和无交易成本两种情况下进行讨论。
在无交易成本的情况下，无论是A方赔偿B方，还是B方赔偿A方，总产出与边际成本都没有变化，两种方式都不会影响资源的配置。
以牛损坏农夫谷物为例，若养牛者赔偿农夫，实际赔偿不会大于两地之间建立栅栏的成本，并且取决于农夫和养牛者之间讨价还价的本领。
若养牛者无须对谷物损失负责，则农夫可能会向养牛者支付一定金额的赔偿金以使养牛者减小养牛规模，减少对谷物的破坏。
但赔偿金额将小于或等于谷物损失的价值，这里的赔偿金额计入生产谷物的成本中去。
总的来说，无交易成本时解决问题的本质在于，A的行为给A 带来的收入的增加，是否超过了给B带来的收入的减少。
无论谁赔偿谁，均衡结果均是一样的。
但在交易成本存在时，情况就大不相同。
为了进行市场交易，就必须发现交易对手、告知交易对手交易条款，通过谈判达成交易、起草交易契约并督促保证契约条款的履行等等诸如此类的交易成本。
所以无交易成本的假定是不现实的，一旦将市场交易成本纳入考虑，当收益小于其成本时，原来在无交易成本条件下的行动这时不再继续；只有当后续产值的增加大于所需成本时，重新安排才得以进行。
科斯 社会成本
社会成本问题﹡原著：科斯龚柏华、张乃根合译有待分析的问题1本文涉及对他人产生有害影响的那些工商业企业的行为。
一个典型的例子就是，某工厂的烟尘给邻近的财产所有者带来的有害影响。
对此类情况，经济学的分析通常是从工厂的私人产品与社会产品之间的矛盾这方面展开的。
在这一方面，许多经济学家都因袭了庇古在《福利经济学》中提出的观点。
他们的分析结论无非是要求工厂主对烟尘所引起的损害负责赔偿，或者根据工厂排出烟尘的不同容量及其所致损害的相应金额标准对工厂主征税，或者最终责令该厂迁出居民区（当然也指烟尘排放对他人产生有害影响的地区）。
以我之见，这些解决办法并不合适，因为它们所导致的结果不是人们所需要的，甚至通常也不是人们所满意的。
问题的相互性传统的方法掩盖了不得不作出的选择的实质。
人们一般将该问题视为甲给乙造成损害，因而所要决定的是：如何制止甲？但这是错误的。
我们正在分析的问题具有相互性，即避免对乙的损害将会使甲遭受损害，必须决定的真正问题是：是允许甲损害乙，还是允许乙损害甲？关键在于避免较严重的损害。
我在前文2中列举了糖果制造商的机器引起的噪声和震动干扰了某医生的工作的事例。
为了避免损害医生，糖果制造商将遭受损害。
此事例提出的问题实质上是，是否值得去限制糖果制造商采用的生产方法，并以减少其产品供给的代价来保证医生的正常工作。
另一事例是走失的牛损坏邻近土地里的谷物所产生的问题。
倘若有些牛难免要走失，那么只有以减少谷物的供给这一代价来换取肉类供给的增加。
这种选择的实质是显而易见的：是要肉类，还是要谷物？当然，我们不能贸然回答，除非我们知道所得到的价值是什么，以及为此所牺牲的价值是什么。
再举一例：乔治〃J〃施蒂格勒教授提到的河流污染问题。
3如果我们假定污染的有害后果是鱼类的死亡，要决定的问题则是：鱼类损失的价值究竟大于还是小于可能污染河流的产品的价值。
不言而喻，必须从总体的和边际的角度来看待这一问题。
对损害负有责任的定价制度我想以一个案例的剖析作为分析的起点。
【精品】科斯《社会成本问题》
科斯《社会成本问题》原著:科斯龚柏华、张乃根合译有待分析的问题1本文涉及对他人产生有害影响的那些工商业企业的行为。
一个典型的例子就是，某工厂的烟尘给邻近的财产所有者带来的有害影响。
对此类情况，经济学的分析通常是从工厂的私人产品与社会产品之间的矛盾这方面展开的.在这一方面，许多经济学家都因袭了庇古在《福利经济学》中提出的观点.他们的分析结论无非是要求工厂主对烟尘所引起的损害负责赔偿，或者根据工厂排出烟尘的不同容量及其所致损害的相应金额标准对工厂主征税，或者最终责领该厂迁出居民区（当然也指烟尘排放对他人产生有害影响的地区）。
以我之见,这些解决办法并不合适，因为它们所导致的结果不是人们所需要的,甚至通常也不是人们所满意的。
问题的相互性传统的方法掩盖了不得不作出的选择的实质。
人们一般将该问题视为甲给乙造成损害,因而所要决定的是：如何制止甲？但这是错误的。
我们正在分析的问题具有相互性，即避免对乙的损害将会使甲遭受损害，必须决定的真正问题是:是允许甲损害乙，还是允许乙损害甲？关键在于避免较严重的损害。
我在前文2中列举了糖果制造商的机器引起的噪声和震动干扰了某医生的工作的事例。
为了避免损害医生，糖果制造商将遭受损害。
此事例提出的问题实质上是,是否值得去限制糖果制造商采用的生产方法，并以减少其产品供给的代价来保证医生的正常工作。
另一事例是走失的牛损坏邻近土地里的谷物所产生的问题.倘若有些牛难免要走失，那么只有以减少谷物的供给这一代价来换取肉类供给的增加。
这种选择的实质是显而易见的:是要肉类，还是要谷物?当然，我们不能贸然回答，除非我们知道所得到的价值是什么，以及为此所牺牲的价值是什么.再举一例：乔治·J·施蒂格勒教授提到的河流污染问题。
3如果我们假定污染的有害后果是鱼类的死亡，要决定的问题则是:鱼类损失的价值究竟大于还是小于可能污染河流的产品的价值。
不言而喻,必须从总体的和边际的角度来看待这一问题。
《社会成本问题》 罗奈德科斯
社会成本问题罗纳德.科斯①一、有待分析的问题本文将分析商业企业行为对旁人带来不良影响的问题。
标准例子就是，某工厂的烟尘给邻近的财产所有者带来的有害影响。
对此类情况，经济学的分析通常是因袭了庇古在《福利经济学》的处理思路，即认为问题是在于工厂的私人产品与社会产品有差异。
这些分析让大多经济学家得出以下三个结论：即要么是要求工厂主对烟尘的损害负责赔偿；要么是根据工厂排烟尘的具体量及其所致损害的相应金额标准对工厂主征税；或者最终，责令该厂迁出居民区（可能也应包括那些烟尘排放会影响到别人的区域）。
依我之见，这些解决办法并不合适，因为它们所引至的结果既非人们所需，甚至通常亦非人们所欲。
二、问题的相互性本质传统方法倾向于模糊了必须作选择的本质。
人们通常将以下两个问题视为同一：其一是A给B造成损失，其二需要决定的是：我们应如何限制A。
但这是不对的，我们分析的问题本质上具有相互性。
避免对B的损害必将会使A遭受损失。
真正必须决策的问题是：是允许A损害B，还是允许B损害A？问题的关键在于避重就轻。
我在之前的文章②中列举了糖果制造商的机器噪声和震动干扰了某医生工作的事例。
为了避免医生有损，将只能让糖果制造商受伤害。
此案例提出的问题实质上是，限制糖果制造商采用的某种生产方式以产品供给减少为代价，保证医生的正常工作是否值得。
另一例子可以看走失的牛损坏邻近土地里的谷物问题。
倘若有些牛无论如何都会走失，那么只有以谷物供给的减少为代价换取肉类供给的增加。
选择的本质简单明了：肉类抑或谷物？当然，除非知晓所得以及牺牲的代价各几何，不然这个问题的答案并不清楚。
再举一例：乔治·J·施蒂格勒教授举的河流污染例子③。
如果假定污染的有害后果是鱼类的死亡，需要抉择的问题不外乎是：鱼类损失的价值与以河流污染为代价的产品价值孰高孰低。
不言而喻，必须从总体和边际两个方面看此种问题。
三、损害责任的定价制度我想以一个案例的剖析作为分析的起点。
科斯定理对社会成本问题的通俗解答
科斯定理对社会成本问题的通俗解答《社会成本问题》是一篇不易阅读又必须认真读一读的论文。
为了让读者用最少的精力和最快的速度最准确地把握该文的内容，这里以一个《故事新编》的形式将该文的内容归纳如下：妲己摘了比干的心，要带回宫里当美容食品烧汤吃，比干赶忙告到法院，要求妲己返还心脏并赔偿损失。
法官请来了英国的皮古（Pigou，有人译为庇古）和美国的科斯这两位著名经济学家作为陪审员一起讨论如何判决的问题。
法官说：“妲己摘了比干的心，这个问题究竟应该如何处理，法律没有明文规定，这必须由我们根据公理和传统以及判例进行判决。
现在，请你们二位充分发表意见。
”皮古说：“这个问题很好办，让妲己归还心脏并赔偿损失，如果她不愿赔偿就强行征税，并把她赶出王宫，叫她回老家。
”科斯说：“且慢！这样解决并不合适，这是一个有待分析的问题。
”（这就是《社会成本问题》第一节《有待分析的问题》的内容。
）法官接着问：“据你之见，应该如何处理这个问题呢？”科斯答曰：“妲己摘了比干的心固然是对比干的侵害，但是，如果不让妲己吃比干的心，也会使妲己遭受损害，使妲己营养不良。
所以，问题具有相互性，处理这个问题要全面权衡利害关系。
”（这就是《社会成本问题》第二节《问题的相互性》的内容。
）法官又问：“到底怎样权衡利害呢？到底要不要判决妲己返还心脏并赔偿损失呢？”科斯答曰：“要想权衡好利害关系，必须先考虑交易成本，即比干和妲己谈判的成本。
如果交易成本为零，我们随便怎么判决都没有关系，都可以使产值、利润最大化，损害最小化，资源配置最优化。
”法官大喜，曰：“愿闻其详。
”科斯侃侃道来：“如果交易成本为零，我们判决妲己‘负有损害赔偿责任’和判决妲己‘不负损害赔偿责任’，经济结果都一样。
” “如果判决妲己败诉，妲己就会主动找比干谈判，愿意付给比干一百万美元，请求比干到心脏市场另外购买一个心脏而不要讨回原来的心脏。
这时，买一个心脏只要花费五十万美元，所以，比干肯定会觉得很合算，肯定会同意妲己的要求。
社会成本问题
产权外部性
产权：是描述人们可以对他们的财产做什么 的法律规则。它包括所有权、使用权、收益 权和转让权。 外部性又称为溢出效应、外部影响或外差效 应，指一个人或一群人的行动和决策使另一 个人或一群人受损或受益的情况。 产权外部性 应该就是由于某人的使用自己财 产权利时的动作行为等对其余人造成了损失。
外部经济产生的原因： 科斯认为，外部经济产生的根本原因 是产权界定不够明确或界定不当。所 以政府不必一定要用干预的方法来试 图消除社会收益或成本与私人收益或 成本之间的差异，政府只需界定并保 护产权，而随后产生的市场交易就能 达到帕累托最优。
原文节选—科斯不同意庇古的看法
庇古的分析怎么会得出错误的结论呢？原因 在于庇古似乎并没有注意到他的分析所针对 的是完全不同的问题。他的分析是正确的， 但他得出的具体结论却是不合逻辑的。（火车
发动机产生火星的事件）
他们的分析结论无非是要求工厂主对烟尘所 引起的损害负责赔偿，或者根据工厂排出烟 尘的不同容量及其所致损害的相应金额标准 对工厂主征税，或者最终责令该厂迁出居民 区（当然也指烟尘排放对他人产生有害影响 的地区），以我之见，这些解决办法并不合 适，因为它们所导致的结果不是人们所需要 的，甚至通常也不是人们所满意的。（关于庇
总结文章内容： 简单来说，《社会成本问题》就是讨 论解决事件外部性的方法。并通过很 多案列，如牛和谷物，糖果商和医生， 编制草席的厂和会产生二氧化硫的厂， 烟囱事件，建筑物挡风影响风车问题 等就外部性讨论事件中甲乙双方的利 益问题，如何平衡解决甲乙双方的利 益争论的一系列延伸讨论。
产权的内涵
（1）它是人与物之间的归属关系，但其实质 是依附于物上面的人与人之间的关系； （2）在资源无限供给或者零交易成本下，产 权是不起作用的； （3）产权表现为一权利束，它包括占有权、 使用权、收益权等方面。
社会成本问题―科斯
社会成本问题―科斯社会成本问题~罗纳德科斯一、尚待分析的问题1本文涉及对他人产生有害影响的那些工商业企业的行为。
一个典型的例子就是，某工厂的烟尘给邻近的财产所有者带来了有害影响。
对此类情况，经济学的分析通常是从工厂的私人产品与社会产品之间分歧的观点展开的。
在这一方面，许多经济学家都因袭了庇古在《福利经济学》中提出的观点。
他们的分析结论无非是要求工厂主对烟尘所引起的损害负责赔偿，或者根据工厂不同的烟尘排放量及其所致损害的相应金额标准对工厂主征税，或者最终责令该厂迁出居民区（当然也指烟尘排放对他人产生有害影响的地区）。
以我之见，这些解决办法并不合适，因为它们所导致的结果不是人们所需要的，甚至通常也不是人们所满意的。
二、问题的可视化性质传统的方法掩盖了不得不作出的选择的实质。
人们一般将该问题视为甲给乙造成损害，因而所要决定的是：如何制止甲？但这是错误的。
我们正在分析的问题具有交互性质，即避免对乙的损害将会使甲遭受损害，必须决定的真正问题是：是允许甲损害乙，还是允许乙损害甲？关键在于避免较严重的损害。
我在以前的文章2中列举了糖果制造商的机器引起的噪声和震动干扰了某医生的工作的事例。
为了避免损害医生，糖果制造商将遭受损害。
此事例提出的问题实质上是，是否值得去限制糖果制造商采用的生产方法，并以减少其产品供给的代价来保证医生的正常工作。
另一事例是走失的牛损坏邻近土地里的谷物所产生的问题。
倘若有些牛难免要走失，那么只有以减少谷物的供给这一代价来换取肉类供给的增加。
这种选择的实质是显而易见的：是要肉类，还是要谷物？当然，我们不能贸然回答，除非我们知道所得到的价值是什么，以及为此所牺牲的价值是什么。
再举一例：乔治j施蒂格勒教授提到的河流污染问题3。
如果我们假定污染的有害后果是鱼类的死亡，要决定的问题则是：鱼类损失的价值究竟大于还是小于可能污染河流的产品的价值。
不言而喻，必须从总体的和边际的角度来看待这一问题。
三、对侵害负有责任的定价制度我想以一个案例的剖析作为分析的起点。
科斯_经济学中的灯塔_社会成本问题
经济学中的灯塔导论灯塔出现在经济学家的著作中，是因为它可能有助于理解政府的经济功能问题。
它常被作为必须由政府提供而不是由私人企业提供的物品的一个例子。
经济学家们通常似乎认为，由于不可能向受准备于灯塔的船只的所有者收取可靠的费用，任何私人或企业建造和维修灯塔就不可能遍及赢利。
约翰·斯图亚特·穆勒在他的《政治经济学原理》一书的“自由放任或不干预原理的基础和限制”一章中写道：……为了确保航行的安全，建造和维修灯塔、设置浮标等属于政府适当的职责。
由于不可能向受益于灯塔的海上船只收取使用费，没有人会出于个人利益的动机而建造灯塔，除非由国家的强制征税给予补偿。
亨利·西奇威克在他的《政治经济学原理》一书的“生产关系中自然自由的体系”一章中这样写道：……在大量的各种各样的情况下，这一论断（即通过自由交换，个人总能够为他所提供的劳务获得适当的报酬）明显是错误的。
首先，某些公共设施，由于它们的性质，实际上不可能由建造者或愿意购买的人所有。
例如，这样的情况经常发生：大量船只能够从位置恰到好处的灯塔得到准备处，灯塔管理者却很难向它们收费。
庇古在《福利经济学》中借用了西奇威克的灯塔例子作为非补偿性服务的例子：在那里，“边际净产出小于边际社会净产出，因为它会给技术上很难向其索取报酬的第三方带来额外的服务。
”保罗·萨缪尔森在他的《经济学》一书中，比那些早期作家更直截了当。
在“政府的经济作用”这一节中，他写道：“政府提供某些无可替代的公共服务，没有这些服务，社会生活将是不可想象的。
它们的性质决定了由私人企业提供是不合适的。
”作为“简明的例子”，他列举了国防、国内法律和秩序的维持，以及公正的契约的执行，并在一个脚注中进一步写道：这是政府服务的最新例子：灯塔。
它们保全生命和货物。
灯塔管理者很难向船主收取使用费。
因此，这部高深的著作将说明：“私人利益和货币成本”（正如一个想靠建灯塔发财的人所看到的）与真正的社会利益和成本（将被保全的生命和货物与（1）灯塔的总成本和（2）让更多的船只看到警告灯塔的额外成本相比较）是存在差异的。
不可忽视的社会成本之科斯定律
不可忽视的社会成本之科斯定律经济政策制定过程中一个重要关键就是社会成本问题，只有理解了社会成本问题，才能顺应社会和市场的基本运行规律，制定出因势利导的经济政策。
那么什么是社会成本呢？我们先来看一个例子。
有一家养猪场，因为知道养猪会发生恶臭、造成污染，就在选址时把养鸡场选在了偏远的郊区。
这家养猪场经营了好几年。
但由于城镇的不断发展与扩张，因此养猪场周围就建起了许多居民区。
居民住进来发现养猪场会发出阵阵恶臭。
于是居民就去告这家养猪场，说养猪场污染了环境，损害了居民的健康。
如果你是法官，你会怎么判？很明显，这个例子中，一方的利益伤害了另一方的利益。
问题是，是否要判伤害者做出赔偿。
通常的逻辑都是，养猪场不仅要对此事负责，而且在做出补偿的同时还要限制该养猪场的发展。
每个人都这么看，但科斯定律不这么看。
下面我们一步步为读者阐述科斯定律，最后为大家总结科斯定律：1.所有的伤害都是相互的。
很明显，案例其实不是一方在伤害另一方，而是双方为了不同的目的，在争夺相同的稀缺资源：养猪场跟居民争夺的就是新鲜空气。
该纠纷产生的原因就是争用的是未加界定产权的资源，双方在地位上平等，禁止任何一方的行为都会对另一方造伤害。
我们如何解决这个问题了？假如我们假设：养猪场和居民住宅小区同属一个人，以这个角度来考虑问题，你就会豁然开朗。
2.案例中，假如养猪场和居民区同属一个人，为了追求利益最大化，我们或者这个人会做如下考虑：养猪场当初选址在这里就是为了远离居民区避免扰民，现在是居民主动靠近污染源，是居民理亏。
但是城市的发展难以避免，具有重大价值，也是应该鼓励的。
两利相权取其重，我们觉得应该服从大局，为了迁就城市发展需要，养猪场只能搬迁。
那么遵从的准则是什么？3.谁避免意外成本最低，谁的责任就越大。
案例中，假如养猪场只需要搬离居民区就可以避免被告，而居民为了避免污染选择搬离这里，其带来的影响就是城市发展机遇的错失。
很显然，养猪场避免风险的成本低于居民搬离带来的亏损，因此，养猪场应该负责。
社会成本问题-科斯
社会成本问题-科斯《社会成本问题》读后感我找了多遍科斯的论文，发现科斯一生并没有出版系统的理论性书籍，他的主要思想均体现在自己的论文、演讲中，以及其跟随者的总结中。
这篇《社会成本问题》则比较突出体现了其对于交易成本概念的阐述，值得深入研究。
科斯在这篇文章中谈及了经济外部性、初始产权设置等问题，他认为如果社会交易成本为0，那无论产权界定给谁，其结果都能实现产出最大化，因为交易双方总能制定一个令双方都满意的价格，从而使产权得以圆满界定。
同理，经济外部性的问题也可利用这个理论来解决，甲侵害了乙的利益，并不需要政府的介入，或者对于甲的强制措施，。
甲乙双方在交易成本为零的状况下，可以自行进行磋商，甲可以支付给乙一定的补偿，而乙可以继续忍受甲的行为，前提是甲在支付补偿之后，仍然有利可图，否则他便将推出该市场。
科斯在这里为我们提出了一个全新的视角，抛开福利和道德的约束，用纯粹经济学的观点思考社会问题，这的确是充满新意的，它避免了传统说教色彩的规劝，转而引入经济人的假设进入到外部性的领域，他给予了这样一种见解，侵害别人的行为是可以被交易的，只要存在这样的市场以及为了达成这个交易的成本为零，那么问题是可以解决的，没有一方会受损。
几个比较经典的例子也说明了以上的观点但是交易费用为零的假定是很不现实的。
为了进行市场交易，有必要发现交易对象，有必要交流交易的愿望和条件，以及通过讨价还价的谈判缔结契约，特别是督促契约条款的严格履行等等。
相较于传统的福利经济学家，我认为科斯还是主张政府“守夜人”职责的，即政府应该明确其职责是使产权明晰，然后是交由私人市场去取得有效率的结果。
而只要提供给私人市场一个可以自由交易外部性的市场，那么那些看似非常复杂的问题都可以得到迅速的解决。
但在这里，我却有非常大的质疑，科斯所假设的是存在着这样的市场，使得外部性可以被交易。
但现实生活中则根本不存在这样的市场，由于信息、地域、政治、文化和经济发展条件的限制，根本不存在着这样一种可以自由交易的市场，利益相关的双方不可能得到这样一种机会平心静气的谈论问题，而且还要在完全信息的保证之下，这些条件是过于苛刻的，以至于我们可以断定不存在着这样的市场，它只可能存在于单独个人之间或偶然的简单事件中。
社会成本问题(科斯)
2.2 对损害不负责任的定价制度
基本观点
初 始
牛群数（头）
农夫赔付（＄）
2❖ 造成损害的一方3不赔偿损失保持2头
❖ 定价制度正常运行
1
5
头
0
案例
6 走失的牛损坏邻土谷物生长
养牛者获＄3，
这＄3表示增加第3 头牛所需成本的一 部分。
牛群数3（如头）果养牛农者夫必赔3须付（支＄付）赔偿，结果也一养样牛。者收额外＄3，
2.3 问题的重新说明
案例 草席制造商VS.硫酸铵制造商
经济分析与牛损害谷物的情况完全相同。
2.3 问题的重新说明
案例 邻里烟尘妨害
谁引起了烟尘妨害？ 造墙者与生火者共同引起。 （因果关系） 想达到资源的最优配置， 在判定双方当事人的行动时需考虑他 们所带来的损害影响。
产权
产权 (Property Rights)
合法权利的初 始界定，影响 经济制度的运 行效率。
替代性的经济组 织形式，低于市 场交易成本。 (企业的性质)
3 对市场交易成本的考察
市场
通过市场调整合法权利，产值增长多于带来 的交易成本。
企业
企业行政成本低于所替代的市场交易成本， 企业活动收益多于企业组织成本。
政府
当外部损害涉及多人，通过市场和企业解决 问题的成本很高时。
Ⅱ
分析的出发点定 在实际存在的情 况，来审视政策 变化的效果。
Ⅲ
生产要素是行使 一定行为的权利。
5.3 结论
只有得大于失的行为才是人们追求的。
导致某些决策改善的现有制度的变化也会导致 其他决策的恶化。
必须考虑各种社会格局的运行成本，以及转成 一种新制度的成本。
在设计和选择社会格局时应考虑总的效果。
社会成本问题
社会成本问题[英] R.H.科斯有待分析的问题本文涉及对他人产生有害影响的那些工商业企业的行为。
一个典型的例子就是，某工厂的烟尘给邻近的财产所有者带来的有害影响。
对此类情况，经济学的分析通常是从工厂的私人产品与社会产品之间的矛盾这方面展开的。
在这一方面，许多经济学家都因袭了庇古在《福利经济学》中提出的观点。
他们的分析结论无非是要求工厂主对烟尘所引起的损害负责赔偿，或者根据工厂排出烟尘的不同容量及其所致损害的相应金额标准对工厂主征税，或者最终责令该厂迁出居民区（当然也指烟尘排放对他人产生有害影响的地区），以我之见，这些解决办法并不合适，因为它们所导致的结果不是人们所需要的，甚至通常也不是人们所满意的。
问题的相互性传统的方法掩益了不得不作出的选择的实质。
人们一般将该问题视为甲给乙造成损害，因而所要决定的是：如何制止甲？但这是错误的。
我们正在分析的问题具有相互性，即避免对乙的损害将会使甲遭受损害。
必须决定的真正问题是，是允许甲损害乙，还是允许乙损害甲？关键在于避免较严重的损害。
我在前文中列举了糖果制造商的机器引起的嗓声和震动干扰了某医生的工作的事例。
为了避免损害医生，糖果制造商将遭受损害。
此事例提出的问题实质上是，是否值得去限制糖果制造商采用的生产方法，并以减少其产品供给的代价来保证医生的正常工作。
另一事例是走失的牛损坏邻近土地里的谷物所产生的问题。
倘若有些牛难免要走失，那么只有以减少谷物的供给这一代价来换取肉类供给的增加。
这种选择的实质是显而易见的：是要肉类，还是要谷物？当然，我们不能贸然回答，除非我们知道所得到的价值是什么，以及为此所牺牲的价值是什么。
再举一例：乔治·J·施蒂格勒教授提到的河流污染问题。
如果我们假定污染的有害后果是鱼类的死亡，要决定的问题则是：鱼类损失的价值究竟大于还是小于可能污染河流的产品的价值。
不言而喻，必须从总体的和边际的角度来看待这一问题。
对损害负有责任的定价制度我想以一个案例的剖析作为分析的起点。
科斯 《社会成本问题》 中文版
社会成本问题[英] R. H. 科斯原载《法律与经济学杂志》第3卷（1960年10月）有待分析的问题本文涉及对他人产生有害影响的那些工商业企业的行为。
一个典型的例子就是，某工厂的烟尘给邻近的财产所有者带来的有害影响。
对此类情况，经济学的分析通常是从工厂的私人产品与社会产品之间的矛盾这方面展开的。
在这一方面，许多经济学家都因袭了庇古在《福利经济学》中提出的观点。
他们的分析结论无非是要求工厂主对烟尘所引起的损害负责赔偿，或者根据工厂排出烟尘的不同容量及其所致损害的相应金额标准对工厂主征税，或者最终责令该厂迁出居民区（当然也指烟尘排放对他人产生有害影响的地区），以我之见，这些解决办法并不合适，因为它们所导致的结果不是人们所需要的，甚至通常也不是人们所满意的。
问题的相互性传统的方法掩盖了不得不做出的选择的实质。
人们一般将该问题视为甲给乙造成损害，因而所要决定的是：如何制止甲？但这是错误的。
我们正在分析的问题具有相互性，即避免对乙的损害将会使甲遭受损害。
必须决定的真正问题是，是允许甲损害乙，还是允许乙损害甲？关键在于避免较严重的损害。
我在前文中列举了糖果制造商的机器引起的嗓声和震动干扰了某医生的工作的事例。
为了避免损害医生，糖果制造商将遭受损害。
此事例提出的问题实质上是，是否值得去限制糖果制造商采用的生产方法，并以减少其产品供给的代价来保证医生的正常工作。
另一事例是走失的牛损坏邻近土地里的谷物所产生的问题。
倘若有些牛难免要走失，那么只有以减少谷物的供给这一代价来换取肉类供给的增加。
这种选择的实质是显而易见的：是要肉类，还是要谷物？当然，我们不能贸然回答，除非我们知道所得到的价值是什么，以及为此所牺牲的价值是什么。
再举一例：乔治·J·施蒂格勒教授提到的河流污染问题。
如果我们假定污染的有害后果是鱼类的死亡，要决定的问题则是：鱼类损失的价值究竟大于还是小于可能污染河流的产品的价值。
不言而喻，必须从总体的和边际的角度来看待这一问题。
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还是政府部门）的操作成本。在设计和选择社会安排时，我们应考虑总的效果。——研究方法的改变
启示 &
“决定迁移到工厂附近的人们并不考虑他们迁来所导致的产值的下降，这种不考虑给他人带来成本的缺陷与工厂主不考虑其 烟尘污染给别人造成的损害的性质是一样的。”
1 方法的改变——社会成本 0
• 经济学家未能对解决有害效果问题得出正确结论，这并不简单地是由于 分析方法上的欠缺，而是根源于目前福利经济学的方法中存在的基本缺 陷。需要的是研究取向的改变。
两种组织： 1.企业取代市场；在企业内部，要素组合中的讨价还价被取消，行政指令取代了市场交易，企业活动的重新安 排不再是用契约对权利进行调整的结果，而是行政决定的结果。 2.政府直接管制；这不是制定可由市场调整权利的法律，而是强制规定人们必须做什么和不许做什么，并要求 人们必须服从。政府作为“超级企业”所拥有的权威可以减除不少麻烦，但这种办法也有成本，只有在其他办 法无效时才会被采用。 第三种。。。。。。
例子：糖果制造商的机器引起的噪声和震动干扰了某医生的工作、走失的牛损坏邻近土地里的
谷物所产生的问题、乔治·J·施蒂格勒教授提到的河流污染问题（简单提及，尚未分析）
科斯的想法：必须从总体的和边际的角度来看待这一问题
分析起点：案例分析 以往经济学观点：当造成损害的一方赔偿所有损失，并且定价制度是正常运 行时（定价制度的运行不需成本），就足以解决问题。
2019/09/17
0 问题的重新说明 5
为了阐明论点的本质，并表明其普遍适用性，进一步分析了四个实际案例
案例1：“斯特奇斯诉布里奇曼案”（Sturges v. Bridgman），糖果制造商使用的机器对隔壁医生造成损害 案例2：“库克诉福布斯案”（Cooke v. Forbes），会产生硫酸氨气体的制造厂 .vs. 可可果纤维草席制造商 案例3：“布赖恩特诉勒菲弗案”（Bryant v. Lefever），被告的新房使得原告在生火时室内会产生烟 案例4：“巴斯诉格雷戈里案”（Bass v. Gregory），两个通过地下管道互通的公寓，被告因为酿酒的气味倾向 于关闭庭院里的井
例子：某工厂的烟尘给邻近的财产所有者带来了有害影响
常见的经济学分析思路：赔偿、征税、迁走
科斯的想法：这些方法并不合适，因为它们所导致的结果并不是人们所需要的，通常也不能
让别人满意
0 问题的交互性——权利的冲突 2
以往人们认为的问题：甲给乙造成损害，因而所要决定的是：如何制止甲？×
交互性质：避免对乙的损害将会使甲遭受损害。 真正问题是：是允许甲损害乙，还是允许乙损害甲？关键在于避免较严重的损害。
思考
பைடு நூலகம்
产权界定的清晰、自由市场交易的有效性、讨论真实的市场而非用一套逻辑体 系高度抽象地刻画竞技世界、合法权利的初始界定是市场交易的前提、政府干 预不一定是最有效的……
1.对社会总产出的持续性还需要进一步思考？ 2.考虑社会成本时并不能只是简单的考虑经济成本——“以人为本”的发展理念
Thank you
• 通过对自由放任状态和一些理想世界的比较来进行分析，这种方法最终 导致了思维的松散，因为所比较的替代对象的性质从来就不清楚。
• 关于生产要素的错误概念。生产要素所有者实际拥有的是实施一定行为 的权利，对个人权利无限制的制度实际上就是无权利的制度，权利也是 生产要素，在设计经济运行制度时，应该考虑总成本和总效果。
0 对市场交易成本的考察 6
本节核心问题：权利的初始界定和进行既定市场交易的成本；如何选择合适的社会安排来解决有害的效应
3、4、5节中都假定交易成本不存在，这是很不现实的假定
首先，发现交易对象，交流交易愿望和方式，谈判、缔约和履约都有成本； 其次，如果这些成本大于权利调整带来的产值增加，禁令或赔偿就可能使权利的市场调整停止或不发生，因此， 合法权利的初始界定会对经济运行的效率产生影响； 再次，这时有利的权利调整也要由法律来确定，不然，转移和合并权利的高成本会使最佳配置和最大产值无法 实现； 最后，经济组织能以低于市场的成本获得有效的结果。
“在市场交易成本为零时，法院关于损害责任的判决对资源的配置没有影响”，“应该记住，法院面临的迫切 问题不是谁做什么，而是谁有权做什么。通过市场交易修改最初的合法界定通常是可能的。当然，如果这种市 场交易是无成本的，那么通常会出现对权利的重新安排，假如这种安排会导致产值增加的话”
“中性的科斯定理”（Neutrality Version of Coase Theorem）——科斯第二 定理
The Problem of Social Cost
R. H. Coase Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 3. (Oct., 1960), pp. 1-44.
关于本文
罗纳德·哈里·科斯（Ronald H. Coase）——新制度经济学的鼻祖，美国芝加哥大学教授、芝加哥经济 学派代表人物之一，1991年诺贝尔经济学奖的获得者。 科斯是法律经济学的创始人之一，曾提出“科 斯定理（Coase Theorem）” 科斯对经济学的贡献主要体现在他的两篇代表作《企业的性质》和《社会成本问题》之中，科斯首次 创造性地通过提出“交易费用”来解释企业存在的原因以及企业扩展的边界问题。科斯还认为，一旦交 易费用为零，而且产权界定是清晰的，那么法律不会影响合约的结果。瑞典皇家科学委员会因此说一 门新的科学——法律经济学应运而生。 科斯发现，一旦假定交易成本为零，而且对产权（指财产使用权，即运行和操作中的财产权利）界定 是清晰的，那么法律规范并不影响合约行为的结果，即最优化结果保持不变。换言之，只要交易成本 为零，那么无论产权归谁，都可以通过市场自由交易达到资源的最佳配置。芝加哥大学经济学家乔 治·斯蒂格勒（1982年诺贝尔经济学奖得主）将科斯的这一思想概括为“在完全竞争条件下，私人成本等 于社会成本”，并命名为“科斯定理”。科斯被认为是新制度经济学的鼻祖。
第三种方式：法院直接影响经济行为；法院在判决时就应该了解和考虑判决对经济的影响。这样做能减 少交易成本和节约资源，但应明白，法院做出的实际上是关于资源使用的经济判决，这就启示人们，在 界定权利这种属于法律范畴的问题上，经济学也大有用武之地。
0 庇古在《福利经济学》中的研究 8
渊源：本文讨论问题所采用的现代经济学分析方法之渊源是庇古的《福利经济学》，尤其是第二部分中的章节，研究有关社
目录
1.有待分析的问题 2.问题的交互性 3.对损害负有责任的定价制度 4.对损害不负责任的定价制度 5.问题的重新说明 6.对市场交易成本的考察 7.权利的法律界定和经济问题 8.庇古在《福利经济学》中的研究 9.庇古传统 10.研究方法的改变
0 有待分析的问题 1
问题：对他人产生有害影响的那些工商业企业的行为
案例：走失的牛损坏邻近土地的谷物生长
0 对损害负有责任的定价制度 3
分析假定：
令养牛者对损害负责任，也就是说，农夫有谷物不受损 害的权利，养牛者没有让牛损害谷物的权利，不然，就 要赔偿全部损失。
案例分析：在这种情况下，只要付费，奶牛能吃谷，牛
群的规模应是牛多吃谷物增加的价值恰好等于谷物的边 际损失。
0 权利的法律界定和经济问题——总产出的视角处理妨害问题 7
主要议题：界定合法权利过程中的若干经济问题
大量的案例分析
我们在处理有妨害后果的行为时所面临的问题，并不简单地限制那些有责任者。必须决定的是，防止妨 害的收益是否大于作为停止产生该损害行为的结果而在其他方面遭受的损失。在由法律制度调整权利需 要成本的世界上，法院在有关妨害的案件中，实际上做的是有关经济问题的判决，并决定各种资源如何 利用。
会净产品与私人净产品之间差别，
例子：“火车发动机产生的火星”、“博尔斯顿案”—庇古的兔子案、
庇古的不足：对各种事实的看法似乎存在着缺陷，在经济分析方面他似乎也有错误
（原因：庇古似乎并没有注意到他的分析所针对的是完全不同的问题，得出的具体结论不合逻辑。当经济学家在比较互替的 社会安排时，适当的做法是比较这些不同的安排产生的总社会产品。而私人产品与社会产品之间的比较则是题外之话。）
庇古对问题的研究是极为模糊的，对他的观点的讨论产生了几乎无法克服的解释困难
0 庇古传统 9
议题：社会产品 vs 私人产品
倾向：倾向于使用机会成本概念和通过比较各种要素在不同的用途或安排中产生的产品价值来研究问题。
批判： 1.引起侵害效应的企业应对受损害者提供赔偿，这一信念显然不是将可获得的总产品与可供选择的社会安排进行比较后得出的。 2.以税收或奖励的方法解决侵害效应的问题这一建议中，可发现同样的缺陷。Eg：对工厂的烟尘污染征税。
0 对损害不负责任的定价制度 4
分析假定：
虽然假设定价制度运行顺利（即成本为零），但是引起 损害的企业对损害结果并不承担责任。
案例分析：养牛者对损害不负责任，也就是说，他有让
牛吃谷物的权利，不必赔偿由此造成的损害。在这种情 况下，由于农夫可将谷物损失的价值转移给养牛者，所 以牛群的规模不会增加。
通过简化的算术例子，科斯引出了以下结论：“有必要知道损害方是否对引起的损失负责，因为如果没有这种权利的 初始界定，就不存在权利转让和重新组合的市场交易。但是，如果定价制度的运行毫无成本，最终的结果（产值最大 化）是不受法律状况影响的。”换句话说，如果交易成本为零，那么在引起损害的企业对损害结果不承担责任情况下 的资源配置就同该企业承担责任时的情况一样。