Cognitive Grammar认知语法
认知语言学
认知语言学是语言学中的一种新范式, 它包含许多不同的理论、方法及研究课题。
认知语言学肇始于20 世纪70 年代, 80 年代中期以后其研究范围扩展到了语言学中的许多领域, 如句法、意义、音系以及语篇等。
其成熟的重要标志是1989 年春在德国杜伊斯堡召开的第一次国际认知语言学会议以及1990 年出版的5认知语言学6杂志。
自诞生之日起, 认知语言学就把自己置于认知科学这一大学科中, 与哲学、心理学、人类学、计算机科学以及神经科学等结下了不解之缘, 并逐渐成为当代语言学中的一门显学。
在过去20 多年里, 认知语言学研究在几个重要领域里已卓有成效, 如范畴化、概念隐喻、转喻、多义性、拟象性以及语法化等( 参见文旭1999, 2001) 。
尽管认知语言学家内部在具体方法、感兴趣的课题、研究的切入点等方面还存在一些差别, 但他们的研究目标和基本原则有许多共同之处。
为了进一步理解并准确把握这一新的认知范式, 本文拟对认知语言学的研究目标、基本原则、研究方法作一些解释与探讨。
认知语言学的研究目标语言是人类表达观念和思想的最明确的方式之一。
从/ 表达观念和思想0的角度来研究人类语言, 这种观点就是通常所说的/ 认知观0。
这种观点认为, 语言是认知系统的一部分, 而认知系统由感知、情感、范畴化、抽象化以及推理等组成。
这些认知能力与语言相互作用并受语言的影响, 因此从某种意义上来说, 研究语言实际上就是研究人类表达或交流观念和思想的方式。
当代语言学的一个基本特点就是对认知现实主义( cognitive realism) 的承诺, 即确认语言是一种心理或认知现象。
语言学诸多门派都以探索隐藏在大脑中具有普遍性的人类语言机制作为终极目标, 换句话说, 语言分析的目的不只是描写人们的语言行为, 而是解释引起语言行为的心理结构和心理过程, 揭示语言行为背后内在的、深层的规律。
像乔姆斯基、杰肯道夫(R. Jackendoff) 、兰格克(R. Langacker) 、雷科夫(G. Lakoff) 、比尔沃思(M. Bierwisch ) 以及赫德森(R. Hudson) 这些代表不同理论方法的语言学家, 他们的研究都具有这一目的。
R.Langacker《认知语法基础》第二卷导读
R. Langacker《认知语法基础》第二卷张辉 齐振海 导读（2004年北京大学出版社）1. 引言R.W. Langacker撰写的两卷本的《认知语法基础》是认知语法和认知语言学的发轫之作。
同其它三本认知语言学奠基著作一样(它们分别是G. Lakoff 和M. Johnson的《我们所依赖的隐喻》(1980)、G. Lakoff《女人、火和危险的事情》(1987)和M. Johnson的《心中之躯》(1987))，这两卷本是摘引率最高的认知语言学著作之一。
由于《认知语法基础》创建了一种崭新的和与众不同的研究语言和其结构的理论，其中Langacker创造了一套特殊的术语，因此这两卷都比较艰涩难懂。
第一卷主要讨论理论假设，介绍基本的理论框架和对语言结构进行最佳描写的所需的工具和概念。
除了第一卷中的详细论述外，Langacker为使语言学的读者能尽快掌握其基本理论，在不同的论文集中用较为浅显的语言构画了认知语法的基本观点，它们分别是“认知语法概述”(An Overview of Cognitive Grammar) (Rudzka‐Ostyn 1988)、“概念化、符号化和语法”(Conceptualization, symbolization and grammar) (Tomasello 1998)和“动态的以用法为基础的模式”(A dynamic usage‐based model) (Barlow and Kemmer 2000)。
读者在阅读第二卷之前，要想尽快地掌握认知语法基本思想，可参阅这些文章。
Croft 和Cruse (2004:1)指出, 认知语言学有三个基本的理论假设：(1)语言能力不是一个自主的认知能力(cognitive faculty)；(2) 语法就是概念化形成过程(conceptualization)；(3) 语言知识源起于语言的使用。
这三个理论假设的中心论题是，人的语言能力与人的一般的认知能力密切相关。
认知语言学
学科发展历程
认知语言学在20世纪70年代中期开始在美国孕育（朗 奴·兰盖克提出空间语法），80年代中期以后开始成熟， 其学派地位得以确立，其确立标志为1989年春由勒内·德 尔文(ReneDirven) 组织的在德国杜伊斯堡(Duisbury) 召 开的第一届国际认知语言学大会。此次大会宣布于1990年 发行《认知语言学》杂志, 成立国际认知语言学( ICLA) , 出版认知语言学研究的系列专著，90年代中期以后开始进 入稳步个特例。一个范 畴或类别往往有个“原型”，是用以确定类别的参照标准， 需要归类的目标与标准进行比较，符合标准所有特征的目 标例示（instantiate）这一标准，不完全符合的目标是 对标准的扩展（extension）。
经典范畴理论的如下特征 1 范畴划分由一组充分必 要条件决定 2 特征是二元 3 范畴具有清晰边界 4 范畴 成员之间地位平等。
eg2.钟书能 阮薇. 认知与忠实——汉英上下位词翻译的认知 视角『j』.韶关学院学报
3.上下位：
以基本层次范畴为中心 范畴可以向上发展为上位范畴向 下发展为下位范畴上位范畴依赖于基本层次范畴 且物体 的完形形象和大部分属性都来自基本层次范畴 因此又被 称为寄生范畴(parasiticcategory) 下位范畴也是寄生范 畴它是在基本层次范畴的基础上更进一步细致的切分。
二、认知语言学的主要概念
原型 范畴化、基本范畴、上下位 命题模式、意象模式、隐喻模式、转喻模式 意象图示
1.原型（prototype）：
是物体范畴最好、最 典型的成员, 所有其他成 员也均具有不同程度的典 型性。
eg1. 在英语的世界图景中, 鸟的原型为画眉鸟;而对于 母语为俄语的人而言则是 麻雀; 麻雀在中国人的认 知意义中也具有典型意义。
1. Cognitive Grammar
Cognitive Linguistics views linguistic knowledge as part of general cognition and thinking; linguistic behavior is not separated from other general cognitive abilities that allow mental processes of reasoning, memory, attention or learning, but is understood as an integrated part of it.
Problems: (1) circular logic (2) In the rich, the old, “rich” and “old” should be nouns.
Cognitive Grammar view of noun
3. A noun is a symbolic structure whose semantic pole profiles a thing (i.e. a thing in some domain). A thing is a set of interconnected entities which function as a single entity at a higher level of conceptual organization. E.g.: chair, man, grade
Even when the entities have been conceived as being interconnected cognitively and resulting in a region, the region may not always be expressed linguistically. Only those regions which have achieved sufficient cognitive salience and communicative utility (for further cognitive processing) will be expressed linguistically as a noun.
认知语言学
认知语言学代表人物及代表作
乔治·雷可夫 (George P. Lakoff；/ˈleɪˌkɔf/，1941年-)：认知语言 学的其中一位创立者，提倡比喻(隐喻)是日常语言活动中的必须认知能 力。
马克·詹森 (Mark Johnson：
朗奴·兰盖克 (Ronald Langacker，1942年12月27日-)：认知文法的提 倡者
eg2.钟书能 阮薇. 认知与忠实——汉英上下位词翻译的认知 视角『j』.韶关学院学报
3.上下位：
以基本层次范畴为中心 范畴可以向上发展为上位范畴向 下发展为下位范畴上位范畴依赖于基本层次范畴 且物体 的完形形象和大部分属性都来自基本层次范畴 因此又被 称为寄生范畴(parasiticcategory) 下位范畴也是寄生范 畴它是在基本层次范畴的基础上更进一步细致的切分。
Gilles Fauconnier (1944年8月19日-)
Charles J. Fillmore
William Croft Michael Tomasello (1950年1月18日-)
戴浩一：台湾国立中正大学语言学研究所教授，是少数专长于认知语言 学的华人。
王士元：香港中文大学现代语言学系暨中研院院士，另一少数专长于认 知语言学的华人。
认知语言学 Cognitive linguistics
一、什么是认知语言学 二、认知语言学的主要概念 三、认知语法学 四、认知语言学的研究方法 五、认知语言学优与缺 六、认知语言学在中国
一、什么是认知语言学
认知语言学是语言学的一门分支学科它脱胎自认知心理 学或认知科学，大约在1980年代后期至1990年代开始成型。 认知语言学涉及电脑自然语言理解、人工智能、语言学、 心理学、系统论等多种学科，它针对当时仍很火热的生成 语言学，提出：语言的创建、学习及运用，从基本上都必 须能够透过人类的认知而加以解释，因为认知能力是人类
功能主义与形式主义
２００２年第２期Ｎｏ．２，Ｍａｒｃｈ２００２外国语ＪｏｕｒｎａｌｏｆＦｏｒｅｉｇｎＬａｎｇｕａｇｅｓ总第１３８期ＧｅｎｅｒａｌＳｅｒｉａｌＮＯ．１３８文章编号：１００４．５１３９（２００２）０２．０００８．０７中图分类号：Ｈ０文献标识码：Ａ功能主义与形式主义徐烈炯（香港城市大学，香港）摘要：形式语言学与功能语言学的根本区别在于对语法自主和句法自主的看法。
这一问题上不能用简单的两分法，并不是非此即彼，而是可以有各种层次，有中间立场。
功能语言学家并非一概反对任何语法自主和句法自主的观点。
以往两派缺少对话，如今正在努力消除隔阂，开始坐在一起各抒己见，相互学习。
关键词：功能语言学；形式语言学；句法自主；语法自主；系统功能语法ＦｕｎｃｔｉｏｎａｌｉｓｍａｎｄＦｏｒｍａｌｉｓｍＸＵＬｉｅ－ｊｉｏｎｇ（ＣｉｔｙＵｎｉｖｅｒｓｉｔｙｏｆＨｏｎｇＫｏｎｇ，ＨｏｎｇＫｏｎｇ，Ｃｈｉｎａ）Ａｂｓｔｒａｃｔ：Ｔｈｅｆｕｎｄａｍｅｎｔａｌｉｓｓｕｅｏｎｗｈｉｃｈｆｏｒｍａｌｌｉｎｇｕｉｓｔｉｃｓｄｉｆｆｅｒｓｆｒｏｍｆｕｎｃｔｉｏｎａｌｌｉｎｇｕｉｓｔｉｃｓｉｓｔｈｅａｕｔｏｎｏｍｙｔｈｅｓｉｓ．Ｂｕｔｔｈｅｈｙｐｏｔｈｅｓｉｓｏｆａｕｔｏｎｏｍｙｉｓｎｏｔａｔａｋｅ—ｉｔ—ｏｒ－ｌｅａｖｅ—ｉｔｃｌａｉｍ．Ｎｏｔａｌｌｔｈｅｆｕｎｃｔｉｏｎａｌｌｉｎｇｕｉｓｔｓｒｅｊｅｃｔａｌｌｔｈｅａｕｔｏｎｏｍｙｃｌａｉｍｓ．Ｔｈｅｆｕｎｃｔｉｏｎａｌｉｓｔ—ｆｏｒｍａｌｉｓｔｄｉｃｈｏｔｏｍｙｉｓａｃｏｎｔｉｎｕｕｍｔｈａｔｔｏｌｅｒａｔｅｓｖａｒｉｏｕｓｉｎｔｅｒｍｅｄｉａｔｅｐｏｓｉｔｉｏｎｓ．Ｔｈｅｒｅｗａｓｌｉｔｔｌｅｄｉａｉｏｇｕｅｂｅｔｗｅｅｎｌｉｎｇｕｉｓｔｓｆｒｏｍｔｈｅｔｗｏｔｒａｄｉｔｉｏｎｓｕｎｔｉｌｒｅｃｅｎｔｌｙ．Ａｔｔｅｍｐｔｓａｒｅｂｅｉｎｇｍａｄｅｔｏｒｅｄｕｃｅｔｈｅｍｕｔｕａｌｉｓｏｌａｔｉｏｎａｎｄｔｏｍａｋｅｉｔｐｏｓｓｉｂｌｅｆｏｒｓｃｈｏｌａｒｓｆｒｏｍｔｈｅｔｗｏｓｔｒａｎｄｓｔｏｐｒｅｓｅｎｔｔｈｅｉｒｗｏｒｋａｔｔｈｅｓａｍｅｖｅｎｕｅａｎｄｔｏｌｅａｒｎｆｒｏｍｅａｃｈｏｔｈｅｒ’Ｓｉｎｓｉｇｈｔｓ．Ｋｅｙｗｏｒｄｓ：ｆｕｎｃｔｉｏｎａｌｌｉｎｇｕｉｓｔｉｃｓ；ｆｏｒｍａｌｌｉｎｇｕｉｓｔｉｃｓ；ａｕｔｏｎｏｍｙｏｆｓｙｎｔａｘ；ａｕｔｏｎｏｍｙｏｆｇｒａｍｍａｒ；ｓｙｓｔｅｍｉｃｆｕｎｃｔｉｏｎａｌｇｒａｍｍａｒ形式主义与功能主义是当代语言学两大主要潮流，两者在我国语言学界均有反映。
Langacker认知语法与Goldberg构式语法
Langacker认知语法与Goldberg构式语法认知语言学中的语法研究有两种主要的理论模型，一种是以Langacker为代表的认知语法，另一种是Goldberg等人的构式语法。
认知语法强调用语法以外的因素来解释语法现象。
构式语法是一门研究说话者知识本质的认知语言学理论。
构式语法的起因是对一些边缘语言现象的研究，因而构式概念成了构式语法的核心，并由此引申到对全部语言现象的讨论。
标签：认知语法构式语法构式对比研究一、认知语法认知语法通常指以Langacker为代表的一派认知语言学家所从事的研究，强调用语法以外的因素来解释语法现象。
认知语法从名称上看似是对语言的认知研究范式的统称，其实是对Langakcer语言研究方法的专指。
Langacker所提倡的“认知语法”主要从人类的“认知和识解”角度研究语言结构，研究人类语言系统的心智表征，克服了传统语法过分强调客观标准、忽视主观认识的倾向，充分考虑到人的认知因素在语言结构中的反映，着重用人类的基本认知方式来识解语言的规则，开创了语法研究的全新思路。
（王寅，2007：316）Langacker的《认知语法基础》（Foundations of Cognitive Grammar）确立了认知语法的基本理论和框架。
Langacker所创建的认知语法，主要运用“象征单位”和“识解”等来分析语言的各个层面，包括词素、词、短语、分句和句子，即音系层（语言形式）象征语义层（概念内容），词汇、形态和句法构成一个象征单位的连续体。
“认知语法注重描写形式（音位、书写，但不包括语法形式）与意义（语义、语用、语篇信息功能等）相配对结合的象征单位，语法被视为是一个约定俗成的、有结构层次的象征单位的大仓库”（王寅，2007：337）。
认知语法最突出的有两点：一是句法部分不是独立的，而是与词汇、语素连为一体的符号系统的一部分；二是语义结构因语言而异，语义结构中有一层层约定俗成的映像，语义结构是约定俗成的概念结构，语法是语义结构约定俗成的符号表征。
国外认知语言学研究现状综述
国外认知语言学研究现状综述［作者：王德春张辉来源：《外语研究》2001年3期点击数：更新时间：2005-10-11 文章录入：xhzhang］【字体：】1．引言二十世纪七十年代末和八十年代，许多语言学家认识到生成语法研究范围的局限性，开始从认知的角度来研究语言现象。
八十年代末，认知语言学初步形成，其标志是第一届国际认知语言学大会（Duisburg, Germany 1989）的召开和1990 年《认知语言学》杂志(Cognitive Linguistics)的出版。
认知语言学大会每二年召开一次，至今，已举办了七届。
在整个八十年代和九十年代初，出版了一批摘引率较高的认知语言学著作。
例如Lakoff 和Johnson(1980), Talmy(1983), Fillmore(1985), Fauconnier(1985), Lakoff(1987), Langacker(1987,1991)，Talmy(1988)，Rudzka-Ostyn (1988), Lakoff 和Turner (1989)，Sweetser(1990) 和认知语言学研究系列（CLR）第一辑Langacker(1989)。
这些著作确立了认知语言学的基本研究框架。
该框架有以下五个研究主题：（1）语言研究必须同人的概念形成过程的研究联系起来。
（2）词义的确立必须参照百科全书般的概念内容和人对这一内容的解释(construal)。
（3）概念形成根植于普遍的躯体经验( bodily experience)，特别是空间经验，这一经验制约了人对心理世界的隐喻性建构。
（4）语言的方面面都包含着范畴化，并以广义的原型理论为基础。
（5）认知语言学并不把语言现象区分为音位、形态、词汇、句法和语用等不同的层次，而是寻求对语言现象统一的解释。
目前，认知语言学研究呈现出多样化并涉及到语言现象的各个方面，在本文中我们试选出几个有重要理论价值的研究，简述其来龙去脉和主要的研究成果，并指出认知语言学的一些发展趋势。
论认知语言学的概述
论认知语言学的概述现代语言学的研究表明,认知与语言有着千丝万缕的联系,但语言的认知研究作为一门独立的学科却是20世纪70年代末兴起的,80年代中期以后其研究范围扩展到了语言学中的许多领域,包括句法学、语义学、音系学、篇章分析等。
在德国召开的第一次国际认知语言学会议以及l990年创刊的《认知语言学》杂志,标志着认知语言学的学科地位得以确立。
此后,认知语言学的发展非常迅猛,越来越多的学者开始从认知的角度来研究语言。
一、认知语言学的基本观点一认知语言学是认知科学发展的产物认知语言学是认知科学的一部分,而认知科学是一门综合科学,由心理学、语言学、人类学、哲学、计算机科学等多学科组成的交叉学科,从多角度来探索思维的奥秘。
人类思维的结晶是语言,语言是人类表达观念和思想的方式之一,是认知系统的一部分,是人类体验、文化、社会、风俗、环境等因素相互作用的结果。
认知语言学一方面运用认知科学的理论和方法来探讨语言现象,另一方面又通过语言现象来揭示人的认知能力,把语言认知作为人的整体认知过程的一部分来把握。
二认知语言学研究中的范畴理论“范畴化”categoriz ation可以说是人类最重要最基本的一种认知活动,是指人类在演化的过程中对外界事物进行分类或归类,使无序的世界变成有序的、分等级的范畴体系。
这个过程即范畴化的过程就是认知,或者说是认知的第一个环节。
范畴化使人类从千差万别万事万物中看到相似性,并据此将可分辨差异的事物处理为相同的类别,从而形成概念。
在此基础上人类才能完成更复杂的认知活动,包括判断和推理。
认知的发生和发展是一个形成概念和范畴的过程,它是一种以主客互动为出发点对外界事物进行类属划分的心智过程[1]。
正如Lakoff所言:“没有范畴化的能力,我们根本不可能在外界或社会生活以及精神生活中发挥作用。
”[2]范畴化的现象很早便引起哲学家的注意,亚里士多德在《范畴篇》中系统论述了自己对范畴的观点,经典范畴观便是在此基础上形成的。
“生成语法”、“认知语法”与英语语法教学
“生成语法”、“认知语法”与英语语法教学【摘要】本文在对比认知语法与生成语法的基础上，根据两种理论的基本原理，用简单通俗的语言阐明其在英语语法教学中的实际应用，并力图模糊语言理论边界，根据有利于掌握英语语法的原则，把两种看似对立的理论统一地运用于英语语法教学之中。
【关键词】生成语法认知语法英语语法教学一、当前主流语言理论1.“生成语法”Generative grammar, (N. Chomsky)。
生成语法学不是一般人所理解的语法学。
其研究对象是内在性语言，而不是外表化语言，是指人脑对语法结构的认识以心理形式体现。
生成语法学研究范围限于人的语言知识或语言能力，而不是语言的使用。
生成语法学以描写和解释语言能力为目标，提出语法假设和理论来揭示其规律，说明其原因。
乔姆斯基说，与其把生成语法看作一种理论，不如看作一门“学科”，其性质和研究方法与以往的语言学有本质的区别，它是建立在三个基本的假设之上：（1）语言是一个自足的认知系统，语言能力独立于人的其他认知能力。
（2）句法是一个自足的形式系统，独立于语言结构的词汇和语义部分。
（3）描写语义的手段是以真值条件为基础的某种形式逻辑。
2.“认知语法”Cognitive Grammar,(Langacker，R.W)。
跟“生成语法”注重形式、从形式出发相反，“认知语法”注重意义、从意义出发。
Langacker据此提出三个与“生成语法”针锋相对的假设:（1）语言不是一个自足的认知系统；对语言的描写必须参照人的一般认知规律。
（2）句法不是一个自足的形式系统；句法(和词法)在本质上跟词汇一样是一个约定俗成的象征系统；句法分析不能脱离语义。
（3）基于真值条件的形式逻辑用来描写语义是不够用的，因为语义描写必须参照开放的、无限度的知识系统。
二、用“生成语法”指导基本语法规则教学众所周知，英语最基本的语法规则几乎都是固定的。
对于基本的语法规则，学习者几乎不可能从意义出发去掌握这些规则。
LectureLangackerCognitiveGrammar解读
[[TREE]/[tree]]]
back
2. Preliminary Conditions for the Construction of LK
先天生理条件
基本认知能力
CL, CxG Chomsky LAD
使用频率
Type Token
持“普遍语法假说”的TG学派
语言知识是人类先天具有的知识，是UG的一部分，以此为 蓝图，人类就具有了习得语言的能力，无需通过归纳获得。 习得语法就如同定制“软件包”（Jackendoff 2002）：所 有的东西都在里面，学习者只需选择合适的参数，语言的 使用则通过形式化的演算来操作。语言研究仅需处理核心 语法，异质的语言现象则统统发配到词库“大监狱”中。 (刘玉梅 2010 现代外语）
另外：
Taylor: Cognitive Grammar in 2002
总目标
认知语法对语言结构作出全面、统一的解释，具有:
直觉上的自然性being intuitively natural 心理上的现实性psychologically plausible 经验上的可行性empirically viable
会发音。（2008：8）
大量经验证据表明，语言使用者的语法知识并非UG，而是 基于使用而抽象概括出的构式，这才是语言知识在人类心
智中的基本表征形式，是必须通过后天习得的。
语言知识的概括可以从语用、信息结构、认知过程等诸多
方面得到合理的解释，绝非仅仅形式化的符号运算。
这一转变不但可以处理“核心”语法现象，更能有效地解 释被TG抛至词库“大监狱”中的“边缘”语法现象，从而 达到对所有语言现象作出统一解释的目的。
例
如
接着！厨子丢了个小木片，“这是你的粮票，领饭前先秀一下，否 则就没饭吃”。（《龙枪传奇》）
什么是认知语言学认知语言学的原则
什么是认知语言学认知语言学的原则认知语言学是语言学的一门分支学科，它以第2代认知科学和体验哲学为理论背景，那么你对认知语言学了解多少呢?以下是由店铺整理关于什么是认知语言学的内容，希望大家喜欢!认知语言学的创立者认知语言学的创立者普遍被认为是乔治·雷可夫(George Lakoff)、马克·约翰逊(Mark Johnson)及朗奴·兰盖克。
当中雷可夫及约翰逊专门研究语言中的隐喻及其与人类认知的关系;而兰盖克的专长在于认知语法。
乔治·雷可夫：认知语言学的其中一位创立者，提倡隐喻是人类日常语言活动中的必须认知能力。
戴浩一：台湾“国立”中正大学语言学研究所教授，是少数的华人专长于认知语言学。
王士元：香港中文大学现代语言学系暨中研院院士，另一少数的华人专长于认知语言学。
王寅：四川外语学院外国语文中心教授，四川大学博士生导师，是近几年国内认知语言学的领军人物。
出版了几部相关专著，其《构式语法研究》是国内首部有关构式语法的著作;并发表了几十篇相关论文。
张敏：香港科技大学人文社科学院教授。
著有《认知语言学与汉语名词短语》。
认知语言学的主要流派认知语言学不是一种单一的语言理论,而是代表一种研究范式,是多种认知语言理论的统称,其特点是把人们的日常经验看成是语言使用的基础,着重阐释语言和一般认知能力之间密不可分的联系。
这些语言理论虽不相同,但对语言所持的基本假设都大同小异,都不同程度地认可上一节提到的基本观点,只是在讨论和关注的具体语言现象上有所差别。
认知语言学主要理论方法有:Fillmore、Goldberg 等人的“构式语法”(Const ruction Grammar);Langacker 的“认知语法”(Cognitive Grammar);Lakoff、Talmy 等人的“认知语义学”(Cognitive Semantics);以及S. Lamb 的神经"认知语言学"(Neurocognitive Linguistics)等。
认知语言学的哲学基础体验哲学
认知语言学的哲学基础体验哲学一、概述认知语言学作为一门新兴的跨学科领域，旨在探究人类语言认知的内在机制和规律。
其独特的哲学基础——体验哲学，为认知语言学的发展提供了深厚的理论支撑。
体验哲学强调人类认知与身体、心智及环境的互动关系，认为语言是人类体验世界的一种认知工具，而非独立于现实世界的抽象符号系统。
在体验哲学的框架下，认知语言学关注语言与认知、感知、情感、记忆等心理过程的紧密联系，以及语言在塑造和反映人类思维方式和世界观方面的作用。
本文将深入探讨认知语言学的哲学基础——体验哲学，分析其对认知语言学理论构建和研究实践的影响，以期为读者提供一个全面而深入的理解视角。
1. 简述认知语言学的发展背景及其重要性认知语言学，作为语言学的一个新兴分支，其发展背景深深植根于人类对语言与认知关系的持续探索。
自20世纪70年代以来，随着认知科学的崛起，语言学家们开始重新审视语言与认知之间的关系，不再将语言视为孤立的符号系统，而是将其视为人类认知活动的重要组成部分。
认知语言学的发展，正是在这样的背景下应运而生。
认知语言学的重要性在于它提供了一种全新的视角来理解和研究语言。
它强调语言与认知的紧密联系，认为语言是人类认知世界、表达思想、交流情感的重要工具。
通过深入研究语言的认知过程，我们可以更深入地理解人类的思维方式和认知机制，进而揭示语言的本质和功能。
认知语言学还具有重要的实践价值。
在语言教学、语言障碍治疗、人工智能等领域，认知语言学的理论和方法都发挥着重要作用。
例如，在语言教学中，认知语言学可以帮助教师更好地理解学生的学习过程，从而设计出更符合学生认知特点的教学方法和材料。
在人工智能领域，认知语言学的理论和方法则为自然语言处理技术的发展提供了重要的支撑。
认知语言学的发展背景及其重要性在于它为我们提供了一个全新的视角来理解和研究语言，深化了我们对语言与认知关系的认识，同时也在实践领域展现出广泛的应用前景。
2. 阐述体验哲学作为认知语言学哲学基础的意义体验哲学，作为一种独特的哲学观点，对认知语言学的发展产生了深远的影响，成为其坚实的哲学基础。
认知语言学(沈家煊讲座1)
认知语言学0．“认知语言学”的范围这里所说的“认知语言学”是加引号的，有其特定的含义。
并非所有关心认知的语言研究都是“认知语言学”。
如果像“生成语言学”那样认为语言就是通过一些逻辑规则和客观的语义特征而“生成”的，而这些逻辑规则和客观的语义特征都以一定的心理表征形式储存在人的记忆中，从这一假设出发的语言研究自然也属于一般意义上的认知语言学，但是跟本文将要说明的有特定含义的“认知语言学”的基本假设却是大相径庭的。
“认知语言学”不是语言学的一个分支，而是代表语言研究近年兴起的一个学派或思潮。
“认知语言学”也不是一种单一的理论，而是语言学内部的一种研究范式，其特点是着重阐释语言和其他认知能力之间密不可分的联系。
这一研究范式发端于70年代，自80年代中以来，范围已扩展到语言学的各个领域，包括句法学、语义学、音系学、篇章分析等。
“国际认知语言学学会”每两年举行一次会议，并出版《认知语言学》杂志。
这个学派的代表人物有C. Fillmore, G. Lakoff, R. Langacker, G. Fauconnier, L. Talmy, J. Taylor, D. Geeraertgs, E. Sweetser, J. Haiman 等。
这些人各自的观点不尽相同，但对语言所持的基本假设都大同小异，只是在讨论和关注的具体语言现象上有所差别。
有的用“认知框”（frames）来描写词义（见Fillmore 1982），处于“认知框”内的概念成分跟百科知识相联系，但不一定有语词形式；有的着重研究“隐喻”（metaphor）在语义学和认知过程中的重要作用（见Lakoff & Johnson 1980）；有的集中研究一般认知能力和语言之间的具体联系，如Talmy（1988）的“动力作用”（Force Dynamics）理论；有的全面研究语法范畴所呈现的“典型效应”（Prototype Effects，如Tylor 1989）；还有的专门研究形式和意义之间的然联系或“象似”关系（iconicity，见Haiman 1985）。
兰盖克认知语法讲座
兰盖克认知语法讲座our truest gratitude to Prof. Langacker for his line-by-lineproofreading of the transcripts. However, any errors ordiscrepancies between the printed version and the video remainour responsibility.Gao Yuan Thomas Fuyin Ligao-yuan@ thomasli@thomaslifuyin@ Lecture OneConceptual Semantics ...........................................Lecture TwoDynamicity, Fictivity and Scanning .....................Lecture ThreeSymbolic Grammar and Constructions ................Lecture FourConstructional Integration and GrammaticizationLecture FiveTopic, Subject, and Possessor ..............................Lecture SixDouble Subject Constructions ..............................Lecture SevenLocatives ..............................................................Lecture EightPossession, Location, and Existence ....................Lecture NineVoice ................................................................... :.Lecture TenImpersonals ...........................................................PrefaceThe present text, entitled Ten Lectures on Cognitive Grammarby Ronald Langacker, is a transcribed version of lectures given byRonald Langacker in Beijing in April 2006. Prof. Langacker's lecturesare part of a lecture series hosted by the Department of ForeignLanguages and the Research Institute of Foreign Languages ofBeihang University. Also, this text is one of the Eminent LinguistsLecture Series, edited by us. It is our hope that the publicationof this book--accompanied by its video-disc counterpart--willencourage cognitive linguistic studies in the Chinese mainland.It was due to Prof. Langacker's pioneering and seminalcontribution to Cognitive Linguistics that a large audience wasattracted to Beijing from various parts of China as well as froma number of neighboring countries. Prof. Langacker has done agreat deal to establish Cognitive Linguistics as a serious academicapproach to language. He was one of the main initiators ofthe Cognitive Linguistics Research series and the journal CognitiveLinguistics, both started in 1990 and published by Mouton deGruyter. Prof. Langacker has published 16 books and over 100articles, supervised 31 doctoral students, and sponsored 48 visitingscholars. He is the originator of the theory of Cognitive Grammar,which is presented most fully in the two-volume monographFoundations of Cognitive Grammar (1987, 1991).Prof. Langacker's Ten Lectures on Cognitive Grammar wassupported by Beihang Grant for International Outstanding Scientists(program number: Z0527; program organizer: Thomas Fuyin Li).The series lectures were co-sponsored by the English Departmentsof Tsinghua University, Beijing Normal University, Beijing ForeignStudies University and Beijing Language and Culture University.As editors of the Eminent Linguists Lecture Series, we express汉语导读第一讲ConceotualSemantics概念语义学作为整个系列讲座的开篇，本讲讨论的是概念语义学的基本内容。
cognitive grammar
Reference Resolution within the Framework of Cognitive GrammarSusanne Salmon-AltLaboratoire Loria, FranceLaurent RomaryLaboratoire Loria, FranceFollowing the principles of Cognitive Grammar, we concentrate on amodel for reference resolution that attempts to overcome thedifficulties of previous approaches, based on the fundamentalassumption that all reference (independent on the type of the referringexpression) is accomplished via access to and restructuring of domainsof reference rather than by direct linkage to the entities themselves.The model accounts for entities not explicitly mentioned butunderstood in a discourse, and enables exploitation of discursive andperceptual context to limit the set of potential referents for a givenreferring expression. As the most important feature, we note that ourmodel can with a single mechanism handle what are typically treatedas diverse phenomena. Our approach, then, provides a freshperspective on the relations between Cognitive Grammar and theproblem of reference.Keywords: reference, cognitive grammar, context model, noun phrasesemantics1. IntroductionThe work presented in this paper can be situated within a wider attempt to define man-machine dialogue systems that respects the fundamental communication means of their users. In particular, even when the underlying task to be achieved through such dialogue systems is limited (e.g. instructional dialogues or information querying), we make the assumption that the intrinsic richness of language may be observed and thus has to be taken into account in those systems. As a consequence, possible models for such phenomena should be both computationally valid, since they have to be implemented and integrated within real systems, but also, and foremost, linguistically sound, as they should provide a coverage asCognitive Science Quarterly (2000) 1, ..-..good as possible of the variety of cases that real observation may confront us with. In this paper, we will attempt to show how this objective can be realised in the domain of reference resolution, which is a crucial factor of success for a dialogue system with regards its user’s acceptance as a good intermediate to achieve their task. More specifically, we try to see to what extent formalising a cognitive model, namely Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar (1987, 1991) , is a way to maintain both linguistical soundness and coverage, but also computational validity.It’s a fact that the complexity of reference resolution is due, in part, to the variety of referring expressions, including pronominal reference, definite description, demonstratives, etc. The problem is made even more complex by the apparent variety of mechanisms required to deal with just one of these types of referring expression. For example, the referent of a definite description may be linked to a prior entity within the discourse, “bridged” to a prior entity from which it can be inferred, or accommodated in the discourse domain (Bos et al. 1995; Vieira and Poesio 2000).Moreover, much work on reference centres on pronominal reference (Kamp and Reyle 1993; Lappin and Laess 1994; Grosz et al. 1995; Mitkov 1998). As a result, the treatment of other types of referring expressions is typically seen as an extension of or variation on the basic co-referential mechanism involved in pronominal reference. Such an approach, however, does not predict essential differences between the use of pronouns, definite descriptions and demonstratives in contexts where human users would have clear preferences.Yet, our aim is to design a model of reference resolution to be implemented in human machine dialogue systems. Since it has been shown by psycholinguistic studies (Vivier et al. 1997) that it is very difficult and unnatural to impose restrictions on the spontaneous use of referring expressions, we need a unified model of reference, e.g. a model which handles with a single mechanism different types of referring expressions: definite descriptions, demonstratives and pronouns.One of the backbones of a model for reference resolution is the context model. It is intended to save relevant contextual information for the attribution of referents to referring expressions. Several context models for reference interpretation have already been proposed. Among the best known, Grosz and Sidner (1986) explore the relation between intentional discourse structure and limits of the referential space, modelled as a stack of focus spaces. Centering Theory (Grosz et al. 1995) proposes mechanisms for pronominal reference resolution between adjacent discourse units, based on a partially ordered list of entities introduced within them. Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp and Reyle 1993) constructs a global context,Cognitive Science Quarterly (2000) 1, ..-..comprising all potential referents introduced in the discourse, for which accessibility constraints are defined based on syntactic criteria.A first problem of these approaches is that linking is considered as the basic operation for referent attribution. As a result, additional mechanisms have to be introduced for other types of relations, such as bridging or accommodation (Lascarides and Asher 1993; Bos et al. 1995). However, the systematic preference for linking seems to be questionable not only from a linguistic point of view (Corblin 1987), but also from an empirical one: as shown by Poesio and Vieira (1998), it does not correctly reflect the use of definite descriptions in corpora. Following the authors, about 50% of definite descriptions in a newspaper corpus are used to introduce a new entity in the discourse, and 18% are used as bridging. This means that about 70% of definite descriptions are not actually “linked” to a prior discourse entity. Additionally, we observed through the referential annotation of task-oriented dialogue corpora that it often seems counter-intuitive to link a definite description to a discursive antecedent even mentioned far ahead, when the referent is directly accessible in the visual environment (Salmon-Alt, 2001c). Finally, the linking principle is not entirely suitable for the referential treatment of one-anaphora (the red one), other-expressions (the other triangle) and ordinals (the first triangle). These expressions seem to suppose, rather than a directly accessible entity to which they can be linked, a locally activated context set from which the referent can be extracted.A second problem concerns the internal structure of the context model. The basic entities of the context models that we have introduced are previously mentioned discourse referents. This seems to be insufficient, because reference resolution relies not only on discursive information, but equally on conceptual knowledge and visual information (Cremers 1996). Furthermore, whereas DRT provides access to all previously mentioned entities, CT considers the previous discourse unit only. However, within the list of identified potential referents, CT provides a precise account of relative salience, whereas DRT specifies only syntactic constraints to narrow the list. Some recent models attempt to apply more precise selection criteria to global discourse (Asher 1993; Hahn and Strube 1997). But they rely on some prior discourse analysis, a strategy that presupposes the ability to automatically recognise discourse structure, and implicitly assumes that discourse analysis precedes reference resolution.A third problem with these approaches is the context updating operation. We believe that context updating intended to reflect at least some cognitive mechanisms should consist of more than just introducing and linking entities. More precisely, we consider that referring is not only identifying a referent, but also, imposing a particular point of view on the referent and the manner it has been isolated within a set of potential referents. The idea thatCognitive Science Quarterly (2000) 1, ..-..“a word or an utterance, since it not only specifies the perceived referent but also the set of excluded alternatives, contains more information that the simple perception of the event itself” has already been defended by Olson (1970:265). We assume that this feature should be used to enhance the predictive power of a model of reference calculus. See for instance example (1):(1) The green block supports the big pyramid but not the red one. (Winograd 1972)Without taking into account the fact of having identified the first block based on its colour, it is indeed impossible to resolve correctly the reference for the elliptic expression the red one in example (1). In particular, a heuristic strategy consisting in choosing the nominal head of the most recent noun phrase as an “antecedent” would fail here.To summarise, the following propositions are prerequisites for any model that attempts to overcome these three problematic points:– It should take into account all the linguistic variety of referring expressions.– It should consider that the basic mechanism common to all types of reference is not linking. Rather, it is an extraction from locally activated sets of referents, which are created based on discursive, perceptual and conceptual information.– It should propose a mechanism of context restructuring which overcomes the standard operations of introducing and linking referents by keeping information about activated context sets and differentiation criteria actually used.The next section shows how these properties are related to the theoretical foundations of Cognitive Grammar. Section 3 presents the basic principles underlying a cognitive, rather than linguistic model of reference. Section 4 applies the principles to an example.2. Basics of Cognitive Grammar2.1 Some theoretical foundationsCognitive Grammar (Langacker 1986, 1991) situates linguistic competence within a more general framework of cognitive faculties by assuming that language is neither self-contained, nor describable without reference to cognitive processing. A speaker’s linguistic knowledge is characterised as a structured inventory of conventional units: phonological units combine with semantic units to form symbolic units, which may be of any size, from a morpheme to a sequence of sentences (van Hoek 1995).Cognitive Science Quarterly (2000) 1, ..-..A first fundamental assumption of Cognitive Grammar is that syntax is not an independent component of linguistic analysis. Basic grammatical categories as well as complex syntactic rules are represented by maximally schematic symbolic units - acquired and adjusted through exposure to actually occurring structures - which are used in constructing and evaluating new expressions. As a second basic assumption, sense is not represented by logical forms. The first reason for this is that semantic structures are characterised relative to knowledge systems that are essentially open-ended. Secondly, the meaning of a given expression cannot be reduced to an objective characterisation of the situation described: equally important for semantics is how the speaker chooses to construe the situation. Therefore, Cognitive Grammar assumes a conceptual rather than truth-conditional semantics, considering that meaning consists of a process of conceptualisation, i.e. activation and restructuring of conceptions in a hearers mind.More precisely, the conceptualisation of an expression is said to impose a particular image on its domain. A domain is defined as a cognitive structure that is presupposed by the semantic pole of an expression. The particular image imposed by the expression emerges through the profiling of a substructure of the domain, namely that substructure which the expression designates. The profiled subpart of a domain is hypothesised to be more prominent or more highly activated than the domain. However, the semantic value of an expression neither resides in the profile, nor in the domain, but rather in a relationship between the two.As an example, the semantics of the expression roof presupposes the conception of H OUSE and profiles a specific subpart of it (Figure 1a). The expressions parent profiles a more abstract conception, being characterised with respect to the conception of a K INSHIP N ETWORK(Figure 1b) It is important to note first that any cognitive structure can function as a domain - a concept, a conceptual complex, a perceptual experience, an elaborated knowledge system etc. Secondly, most expressions require more than one domain for their full description. The expression knife for example, is characterised, among others, by its shape specification (Figure 1c), its canonical rule in the process of cutting (Figure 1d), its inclusion in a typical place setting with other pieces of cutlery (Figure 1e).Cognitive Science Quarterly (2000) 1, ..-..Figure 1 – Profiling domains (Langacker 1991)2.2 Suitability for our purposeGiven our purpose – developing a model of reference resolution suitable for dialogue systems – the biggest problem with Cognitive Grammar is the lack of formalisation. It has, however, several nice properties with regard to the requirements we defined for a cognitive model of interpreting referring expressions (see the end of section 1). We focus here on these properties, before presenting in the next section (3) a model that integrates them into a framework sufficiently formal to have been implemented into a real dialogue system.The basic assumption about the meaning of linguistic expressions - profiling a substructure within a domain - leads to an explanation of the difficulties induced by considering linking as the basic referential operation. As we suggested before, the fundamental mechanism for interpreting referring expressions seems not to be a linking operation, but rather an extraction from a presupposed domain.If one accepts this point of view, bridging as well as one-anaphora integrate the picture without problems. Indeed, the referent of the roof in example (2) is extracted from the conceptual domain introduced by the house. In (3), the referent of the red one is extracted from a domain of coloured blocks, the same domain from which the referent of the green block has been extracted before. Additionally, linking is not excluded definitely, since it can be seen as a particular instantiation of an extraction operation. For example, the block in (4) is not considered as directly linked to the block mentioned before, but as extracted from a set introduced by the block and the pyramid.(2) The house is nice, but the roof has to be renovated.(3) The green block supports the big pyramid but not the red one. Moreover, this manner of considering reference basically as an extraction and not as a linking operation leads to an explanation of the differences between (4) and (5): whereas (4) sounds fine, the repetition of the block in (5) seems to be sub-optimal, compared to the use of the pronoun it like in (6). The explanation for this observation is the lack, in (5), of a suitable domain from which the referent could be extracted. In this case, the use of a pronoun is preferred. Whereas this phenomenon has been repeatedly noted in linguistic work (Corblin 1987; Gaiffe et al. 1997), current implementations doCognitive Science Quarterly (2000) 1, ..-..not account for these observations. Furthermore, an explanation based exclusively on “cognitive statuses” of the referents (Ariel 1990; Gundel et al. 1993) is insufficient: it is not evident where the difference between the cognitive statuses of the block introduced in the first utterances of (4) and (5) is. Consequently, the difference between the uses of a definite description in (4) and (5) cannot be predicted correctly.(4) The block supports the pyramid. The block is big.(5) The block supports nothing. The block is big.(6) The block supports nothing. It is big.Besides the assumption that linguistic meaning is profiling a sub-structure within a given domain, a second interesting aspect of Cognitive Grammar is the fact that these cognitive domains are not essentially linguistic constructs. Rather, they are based on different knowledge systems, including encyclopaedic and visual information. This property is particularly helpful for dealing not only with bridging references like in the previous example (2), but also with reference to perceptual entities such as in (7), where the referent of the red block has not been mentioned before, but is accessible within the visual environment (Cremers 1996). Considering that cognitive domains are built from different knowledge systems allows then to integrate different uses of descriptions (anaphoric, associative, situational – see the classification of Hawkins (1978) into a unified model of reference.(7) Take the red block !Third, a fundamental claim of cognitive semantics is that the interpretation of an expression is not only the description of a given situation. An equally important fact is construal, e.g. the way that facets of the conceived situation are portrayed. This claim corresponds closely to the one made by Olson (1970:265): “An appropriated utterance indicates which cues or features are critical, while a picture does not. Therefore, there is more information in an utterance than in the perception of an event out of context.” Applied to the interpretation of referring expressions, this means that the task is not completely done with the identification of the referent. Rather, it encompasses the identification of a local reference domain and updating the structure of this domain, by profiling the entity designated by the expression. As a result, not only the referent is identified and profiled as the most prominent element of its domain, but also the entire domain is activated, and therefore more accessible for the identification of further referents.Cognitive Science Quarterly (2000) 1, ..-..3. From Cognitive Grammar to a model of referenceresolution3.1 OverviewFollowing the principles of Cognitive Grammar, we concentrate on a model for reference resolution that attempts to overcome the difficulties discussed in the introduction. The model is based on the fundamental assumption that all reference (independent on the type of the referring expression) is accomplished via access to and restructuring of domains of reference rather than by direct linkage to the entities themselves.As shown in the previous section (2.2), Cognitive Grammar underlines the need of local context structures. Indeed, an expression is said to be interpreted within a limited domain, presupposed by its semantics, rather than within a global context model containing the list of all previous discourse referents. Therefore, the context representation has to furnish such domains. The next section (3.2) presents a context model built up on domains of reference, which are identifying representations for (possibly partitioned) subsets of contextual entities. We will show in particular that these domains are not primarily linguistic constructs, since they are introduced and updated via discourse, perception or conceptual knowledge.elaboration unification restructuring Figure 2 – Overview of the model for processing a referring expression“D N”Cognitive Science Quarterly (2000) 1, ..-..Based on a context modelled by domains of reference, we describe in section 3.3 the interpretation process for referring expressions. We adopt here the hypotheses of Cognitive Grammar about the representation of meaning in terms of abstract symbolic schemas: more precisely, we assume that the semantics of a given expression can be represented by a schema which corresponds to an underspecified domain of reference. The underspecified domain itself is calculated by elaborating abstract schemas for nouns and determiners – presupposed in Cognitive Grammar – depending on the semantics of the constituents of the expression being interpreted. The interpretation process properly speaking consists of a unification of the underspecified domain with a suitable domain of reference from the context model and the profiling of a sub-structure – the referent – of this domain (Figure 2).3.2 The context model3.2.1 Basic unitsThe basic units of our context model are reference domains. Following Sanford and Garrod (1982), Johnson-Laird (1987), Langacker (1991) and Reboul et al. (1997), we consider that reference domains are mental representations for entities to which it is possible to refer, including individual objects, collections of objects, events or states. The main difference between a mental representation of an entity and a representation of the entity itself is that a mental representation is not supposed to characterise entirely the entity. This reflects the fact that an expression introducing a new referent does not exhaust the potential features of this referent. Rather, it presents the entity from one or several particular points of view for which we assume in the following that it is the most likely to be activated for referential access to the entity.Basically, a reference domain is created each time a new entity is introduced in the discourse, but it may also be created for newly perceived entities. The representation of a reference domain consists of attribute-value pairs, minimally including a unique identifier and a type. Type information is derived from a set of generic domains, organised as a type hierarchy, which include general encyclopaedic knowledge or knowledge specific to the application and is assumed to exist prior to discourse processing. Other information provided via the discourse (e.g., specific properties of the object) and via perception (e.g., shape, colour, etc. for objects viewed on a screen) may be added as necessary.The most important feature of a reference domain are zero, one or more partitions. A partition gives information about possible decompositions of the domain. It could be based on previous discourse information, perceptual information or conceptual knowledge inherited from the generic domains.Cognitive Science Quarterly (2000) 1, ..-..The elements of a partition are pointers to other representations, which represent explicitly identified sub-components of the domain. They must be distinguishable from all the other sub-components by the value of a differentiation criterion, which represents a particular point of view on the domain and therefore predicts a particular referential access to its elements. For example, a domain of two marbles (@M, Figure 3) may contain partitions on the basis of colour (a red one and a blue one), position (the one on the right and the one on the left), etc.Figure 3 – Reference domain for one blue marble (@m1) and for agroup of two marbles (@M)Within a partition, at most one element may be profiled, according to perceptual or discursive prominence. Profiling is the result of specific operations on the domains, i.e. grouping and extraction. Grouping is briefly discussed below, and extraction, as a part of referential interpretation, is presented in the next section.3.2.2 The grouping operationThe grouping operation is intended to structure the entities of the context model by grouping existing domains into more complex ones. The main goal of this operation is to create new domains and to make them available for the interpretation of referring expressions in the continuation of the discourse. The grouping operation can be triggered by discursive and perceptual factors.Cognitive Science Quarterly (2000) 1, ..-..Grouping on discursive factors is defined parallel to the assembly (or elaboration) of complex expressions: in Cognitive Grammar, complex symbols are created by integrating elements at both the semantic and phonological poles. Let us focus on the semantic composition of an example – the line on the left of the circle. Figure 4a shows the abstract schema or prototypical meaning of the preposition on the left of. It profiles a relationship between two things arranged in a horizontally oriented space. In Cognitive Grammar, relational predications involve an additional prominence asymmetry: the most prominent entity is termed the trajector (tr), and a less prominent one the landmark (lm).In our example, the abstract schema for on the left of is successively elaborated by the representations for the circle and the line, leading to a composite conception, with the line as the landmark, and therefore the most prominent element (Figure 4b).Parallel to Cognitive Grammar, the grouping operation of our model maintains the main characteristics of this assembly: it takes two or more domains as the arguments and returns a complex domain with a partition for the grouped elements. Figure 5a diagrams the grouping operation for the same example. Triggered by a discursive factor – here the preposition – the representations for the line (@L) and the circle(@C) are grouped into a complex domain, partitioned by two properties of the elements: their type and their position. The prominent element of the partition – the representation for the line – is the focused element of the domain (indicated by grey background).Additionally to discursive triggers (preposition, co-ordination, enumeration, arguments of the same predicate), grouping may be triggered by perceptual factors. We consider for instance that perceptual criteria such as similarity or proximity lead to the grouping of contextual entities. Algorithms for grouping visual entities following the principles of the Gestalt-Theory (Wertheimer 1923) can for example be found in Thorisson (1994). Depending on the type of the grouping trigger, at most one element of a complex domain may be prominent. The treated example – grouping triggered by the preposition on the left of – gives indeed raise to a domain containing a focused entity (Figure 5a). However, grouping does not automatically lead to a focused domain: if the operation is triggered by co-ordination, the resulting domain does not contain any prominent entity (Figure 5b).To sum up, the context model contains domains of reference, which represent referents or sets of referents. A domain is characterised at least by type information and partitions, providing access to other domains. Partitions are either inherited from generic representations (for example the partition of an entity H OUSE into a R OOF, W INDOWS etc.), or the result of aCognitive Science Quarterly (2000) 1, ..-..grouping operation, triggered by discourse or perceptual information. The three fundamental structural characteristics of domains – important to keep in mind for the interpretation process – are the following:– domain without any partition (@m1, Figure 3) ;– domain with a partition, but without any prominent item (Figure 5b);– domain with a partition containing a prominent item (Figure 5a).tr lmFigure 4 – Assembly of complex expressions in Cognitive Grammar:“the line on the left of the circle”Figure 5 – Grouping operation, triggered by a preposition (a) and by aco-ordination (b)Cognitive Science Quarterly (2000) 1, ..-..3.3 Interpretation of referring expressionsThe context model presented in the previous section provides domains with one of the three fundamental structures mentioned before. Given this context representation, we consider that the role of a referring expression is to select one (or more, in case of ambiguity) of these domains and to restructure it by profiling the referent. The selection operation is constrained by the requirement of compatibility between the selected contextual domain and the underspecified domain construed for the expression being interpreted. In the following sections, we successively present:– the principles for calculating the underspecified domain depending on the semantics of a given expression (section 3.3.1);– the selection and unification procedure (section 3.3.2);– the restructuring operation, leading to the identification of the referent and to an updated and activated domain of reference (section 3.3.3).The three steps can be considered as going – from left to right – through the diagram of Figure 2.3.3.1 Calculus of the underspecified domain of referenceThe underspecified domain associated with a referring expression being interpreted is calculated on the basis of its semantics and depends on two criteria:– the abstract semantic schema for determiners, elaborated by the semantics of the current determiner;– the abstract semantic schema for nouns (Figure 6), elaborated by the semantics of the components of the current expression.The semantics of the determiner associated to the noun then combines with the schema for the noun in order to elaborate a composite representation.。
Cognitive Grammar认知语法
A Brief Analysis on Cognitive GrammarIn recent years, the concept of “fictivity” has caught our attention more often and become a popular research topic in each study areas. And “Fictive motion” has been a common research topic of both cognitive linguistics and psycholinguistics. Talmy first noticed the interesting and essential linguistic phenomenon and he thought that the language and the perception system have close relationship. According to Talmy, fictive motion verbs whose basic reference is to motion, but which actually describe stationary situations. One same object in sight has two different images, namely the actual one and the fictive and virtual one which is associated with cognitive ability. Other scholars also gave definitions to fictive motion. Langacker believes that fictive motion is a semantic transformation caused by human’s subjective construal on objective scene and a grammaticalization. In terms of our life experiences, the motion in fictive motion cannot take place. Let’s take these three sentences for example:(a)The balloon rose quickly.(b)The path rose quickly as we climbed.(c)The path rises quickly near the top.The first sentence is actual motion. The balloon can actually produce the movements “rise”. The second one is perfective virtual motion. The path makes a static scene and the object’s motion is realized by the sentence’s language forms virtually. As we know the path can’t motion itself. On account of the verb “rise”, the whole sentence could have the psychological fictive motion. The third sentence is inperfective virtual motion because the tense is the present tense and the motion didn’t finish.One of the first scholars who have dealt with fictive motion within the framework of cognitive linguistics is Leonard Talmy, who coined the term fictive motion in 1996. In order to account for this phenomenon, he proposed the pattern of general fictivity, a framework dealing with cognitive representation of nonveridical phenomena, especially form of motion. From his point of view, there exists a majorcognitive pattern: a discrepancy within the conceptualization of a single object. This discrepancy is between two different cognitive representations of the same entity, of which one representation is assessed to be more veridical than the other based on our general knowledge. On the other hand it’s important to note that these two discrepant representations of the same object are just alternative perspectives. Therefore, the conceptualizer needn’t have to experience any sense of contradiction or clash.Fictive motion constructions, in the view of conceptual metaphor theory, are licensed by the motion metaphor. They are regarded as particular linguistic instances of the conceptual metaphor whereby our understanding and verbalization of certain spacial scenes rest upon particular ways of moving. In other words, the locational use of motion patterns is explained as motivated by a conceptual metaphor where motion is mapped onto form or shape.There are lots of discussions about the interesting linguistic phenomenon. Talmy may have given the most elaborated discussion of it, in which he proposes a unified account of the cognitive representation of the nonveridical phenomenon. He points out that our cognitive systems (like language, reasoning and perception) share some fundamental properties. He proposes that there is a discrepancy between two different cognitive representations of a same entity, and the two representations are the products of the two different cognitive subsystems. He then characterized the two representations as the factive and fictive. The cognitive pattern of veridically unequal discrepant representations of the same entity in general, is called “general fictivity”. Under this pattern,there are several dimensions, one of which is the state of motion, in which the more veridical representation includes stationariness while the less veridical representation includes motion. The sentence like “The fence goes from the Plateau to the Valley” has two representations. The factive representation assumes that the fence is static, while the fictive representation assumes that the fence can move. Fictive here is adopted for its references to the imaginary capacity of human cognition, and fictive motion is to be considered as a linguistic phenomenon in which “the less palpable visual representation is generally of stationariness.”In other words, fiction motions verbs are those whose basic reference is to motion, but which actually describestationary things.Generally speaking, most studies are aiming at discussing the similarity between fictive motion and actual motion. Lakoff thinks that the metaphorical ability of thinking is a creative ability of thinking with human’s cognition processing. A man’s thinking is metaphorical essentially. The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing or experience in terms of another. In the sentence “The path rose quickly as we climbed.”, the word “rise”should be used to express the meaning of upward movement. In fact it the verb’s real subject is humans. Humans can move upward instead of the static path. The study of metaphor can help explore the relationship between the objective external world and the brain thinking, therefore reveal the essential relationship between the external manifestation and inner sense.Talmy (2000) reckons the fictive motion as a special reflect of “overlapping systems”in cognitive system. One object has different authenticity in cognitive system. The higher one is called factive cognitive performance and the lower one is called fictive cognitive performance. We can often find fictive motion in our language. In fictive motion sentences, the real static scene virtualizes the object’s motion due to the use of motion verb. Let’s take another sentence for instance. “The road runs along the coast.” As the common sense, the road and the coast are both static but the the verb “Run” leads to a movement in cognition.Another important linguist who has devoted herself to the study of fictive motion in cognitive linguistics is Matlock. According to her studies, she argued that we construct mental models that resemble physical space and simulate movement of objects in this model in order to understand and process fictive motion expressions. She also argued that our ability to simulate motion motivate the use and behavior of fictive motion constructions, including what is generally seen as being linguistically acceptable. Matlock’s typology of fictive motion has been controversial. Some linguists argued that the distinction between bare motion verbs and manner motion verbs is not a determinant factor in the establishment of such a typology, since both types of verbs can appear in both types fictive motion constructions.Matlock has noted that the purpose of fictive motion is functional. Simulating themotion allows the language user to infer or convey the information about the physical layout of a scene. A fictive motion construction has the following constituents:subject noun phrase, motion verb, and either a prepositional phrase or a direct object. The subject noun phrase represents the trajector and the motion verb specifies a change in location. The prepositional object or direct object corresponds to a landmark or set of landmarks.Talmy’s account of fictive motion considers similarities between two cognitive systems:language and visual perception. The two discrepant representations of the same entity reveal a correspondence between the two systems, which implies that it cannot be too bold to say any linguistic example can have an analogue in a visual system. Talmy’s explanation is based on his general fictivity pattern, while other scholars analyze fictive motion from a different dimension, which brings dynamicity and subjectivity as fundamental elements in linguistic representation.Lakoff’s view though offering a seemingly sound account of the phenomenon in terms of metaphorical mappings, can not explain why fictive motion expressions generate certain inferences. For example, from The road runs along the coast, we can infer information about the spacial layout of the depicted layout: the road is near and parallel to the coastline. From The road winds through the mountain, we automatically conjure up a road that is long, narrow and winding. We don’t imagine a short and straight road. However, these inferences cannot arise only from the mappings between two domains.Matsumoto adopts the term “subjective motion”to refer to the phenomenon on discussion. He categorizes subjective motion expressions into two semantic types in the light of specificity of the motion involved. His classification aims to clarify the distinctions between English and Japanese fictive motion expressions rather than to pose a comprehensive framework of different categories of fictive motion in one particular language. As a result, it seems that the two-type classification ignores some specific values of the fictive motion expressions.Langacker’s view couldn’t account for these inferences either. Moreover, though accounting for fictive motion by mental scanning is reasonable, it’s very likely thatthis is only part of the story. The mental scanning may be parasitic on some other basic mental processes and serves as the final state of these processes which might be involved in processing fictive motion.The establishment of the cognitive grammar theory mainly gives a analysis and description to the relationship between semantics and symbols. This cognitive theory is much different from the linguistic theories in the past. The emergence of cognitive grammar signifies that the focus of the grammar study changes from form-focus to sense focus. Language is not a separate cognitive system and one’s linguistic competence has inseparable relationship with his general cognitive ability. The cognitive grammar offers an systematic and strict explanation of linguistic structure rather than a scrappy and arbitrary one, which makes great contribution in this respect.。
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A Brief Analysis on Cognitive GrammarIn recent years, the concept of “fictivity” has caught our attention more often and become a popular research topic in each study areas. And “Fictive motion” has been a common research topic of both cognitive linguistics and psycholinguistics. Talmy first noticed the interesting and essential linguistic phenomenon and he thought that the language and the perception system have close relationship. According to Talmy, fictive motion verbs whose basic reference is to motion, but which actually describe stationary situations. One same object in sight has two different images, namely the actual one and the fictive and virtual one which is associated with cognitive ability. Other scholars also gave definitions to fictive motion. Langacker believes that fictive motion is a semantic transformation caused by human’s subjective construal on objective scene and a grammaticalization. In terms of our life experiences, the motion in fictive motion cannot take place. Let’s take these three sentences for example:(a)The balloon rose quickly.(b)The path rose quickly as we climbed.(c)The path rises quickly near the top.The first sentence is actual motion. The balloon can actually produce the movements “rise”. The second one is perfective virtual motion. The path makes a static scene and the object’s motion is realized by the sentence’s language forms virtually. As we know the path can’t motion itself. On account of the verb “rise”, the whole sentence could have the psychological fictive motion. The third sentence is inperfective virtual motion because the tense is the present tense and the motion didn’t finish.One of the first scholars who have dealt with fictive motion within the framework of cognitive linguistics is Leonard Talmy, who coined the term fictive motion in 1996. In order to account for this phenomenon, he proposed the pattern of general fictivity, a framework dealing with cognitive representation of nonveridical phenomena, especially form of motion. From his point of view, there exists a majorcognitive pattern: a discrepancy within the conceptualization of a single object. This discrepancy is between two different cognitive representations of the same entity, of which one representation is assessed to be more veridical than the other based on our general knowledge. On the other hand it’s important to note that these two discrepant representations of the same object are just alternative perspectives. Therefore, the conceptualizer needn’t have to experience any sense of contradiction or clash.Fictive motion constructions, in the view of conceptual metaphor theory, are licensed by the motion metaphor. They are regarded as particular linguistic instances of the conceptual metaphor whereby our understanding and verbalization of certain spacial scenes rest upon particular ways of moving. In other words, the locational use of motion patterns is explained as motivated by a conceptual metaphor where motion is mapped onto form or shape.There are lots of discussions about the interesting linguistic phenomenon. Talmy may have given the most elaborated discussion of it, in which he proposes a unified account of the cognitive representation of the nonveridical phenomenon. He points out that our cognitive systems (like language, reasoning and perception) share some fundamental properties. He proposes that there is a discrepancy between two different cognitive representations of a same entity, and the two representations are the products of the two different cognitive subsystems. He then characterized the two representations as the factive and fictive. The cognitive pattern of veridically unequal discrepant representations of the same entity in general, is called “general fictivity”. Under this pattern,there are several dimensions, one of which is the state of motion, in which the more veridical representation includes stationariness while the less veridical representation includes motion. The sentence like “The fence goes from the Plateau to the Valley” has two representations. The factive representation assumes that the fence is static, while the fictive representation assumes that the fence can move. Fictive here is adopted for its references to the imaginary capacity of human cognition, and fictive motion is to be considered as a linguistic phenomenon in which “the less palpable visual representation is generally of stationariness.”In other words, fiction motions verbs are those whose basic reference is to motion, but which actually describestationary things.Generally speaking, most studies are aiming at discussing the similarity between fictive motion and actual motion. Lakoff thinks that the metaphorical ability of thinking is a creative ability of thinking with human’s cognition processing. A man’s thinking is metaphorical essentially. The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing or experience in terms of another. In the sentence “The path rose quickly as we climbed.”, the word “rise”should be used to express the meaning of upward movement. In fact it the verb’s real subject is humans. Humans can move upward instead of the static path. The study of metaphor can help explore the relationship between the objective external world and the brain thinking, therefore reveal the essential relationship between the external manifestation and inner sense.Talmy (2000) reckons the fictive motion as a special reflect of “overlapping systems”in cognitive system. One object has different authenticity in cognitive system. The higher one is called factive cognitive performance and the lower one is called fictive cognitive performance. We can often find fictive motion in our language. In fictive motion sentences, the real static scene virtualizes the object’s motion due to the use of motion verb. Let’s take another sentence for instance. “The road runs along the coast.” As the common sense, the road and the coast are both static but the the verb “Run” leads to a movement in cognition.Another important linguist who has devoted herself to the study of fictive motion in cognitive linguistics is Matlock. According to her studies, she argued that we construct mental models that resemble physical space and simulate movement of objects in this model in order to understand and process fictive motion expressions. She also argued that our ability to simulate motion motivate the use and behavior of fictive motion constructions, including what is generally seen as being linguistically acceptable. Matlock’s typology of fictive motion has been controversial. Some linguists argued that the distinction between bare motion verbs and manner motion verbs is not a determinant factor in the establishment of such a typology, since both types of verbs can appear in both types fictive motion constructions.Matlock has noted that the purpose of fictive motion is functional. Simulating themotion allows the language user to infer or convey the information about the physical layout of a scene. A fictive motion construction has the following constituents:subject noun phrase, motion verb, and either a prepositional phrase or a direct object. The subject noun phrase represents the trajector and the motion verb specifies a change in location. The prepositional object or direct object corresponds to a landmark or set of landmarks.Talmy’s account of fictive motion considers similarities between two cognitive systems:language and visual perception. The two discrepant representations of the same entity reveal a correspondence between the two systems, which implies that it cannot be too bold to say any linguistic example can have an analogue in a visual system. Talmy’s explanation is based on his general fictivity pattern, while other scholars analyze fictive motion from a different dimension, which brings dynamicity and subjectivity as fundamental elements in linguistic representation.Lakoff’s view though offering a seemingly sound account of the phenomenon in terms of metaphorical mappings, can not explain why fictive motion expressions generate certain inferences. For example, from The road runs along the coast, we can infer information about the spacial layout of the depicted layout: the road is near and parallel to the coastline. From The road winds through the mountain, we automatically conjure up a road that is long, narrow and winding. We don’t imagine a short and straight road. However, these inferences cannot arise only from the mappings between two domains.Matsumoto adopts the term “subjective motion”to refer to the phenomenon on discussion. He categorizes subjective motion expressions into two semantic types in the light of specificity of the motion involved. His classification aims to clarify the distinctions between English and Japanese fictive motion expressions rather than to pose a comprehensive framework of different categories of fictive motion in one particular language. As a result, it seems that the two-type classification ignores some specific values of the fictive motion expressions.Langacker’s view couldn’t account for these inferences either. Moreover, though accounting for fictive motion by mental scanning is reasonable, it’s very likely thatthis is only part of the story. The mental scanning may be parasitic on some other basic mental processes and serves as the final state of these processes which might be involved in processing fictive motion.The establishment of the cognitive grammar theory mainly gives a analysis and description to the relationship between semantics and symbols. This cognitive theory is much different from the linguistic theories in the past. The emergence of cognitive grammar signifies that the focus of the grammar study changes from form-focus to sense focus. Language is not a separate cognitive system and one’s linguistic competence has inseparable relationship with his general cognitive ability. The cognitive grammar offers an systematic and strict explanation of linguistic structure rather than a scrappy and arbitrary one, which makes great contribution in this respect.。