穆迪全球航空企业信用评级方法
企业信用评级模型
企业信用评级模摘要社会信用体系是市场经济体制中的重要体系。
当前,社会中商业欺诈,制假售假,非法集资等现象屡禁不止,这些社会信用问题归根到底都是企业信用的问题,因此,科学、合理、公正、权威的企业信用评级技术是当前紧要的任务。
本文通过研究研究国内外企业信用评价方法,构建了一个企业信用评价平台。
该平台提供了信用评价,信用等级,信用反馈等功能,是一个功能非常完备的信用评价平台。
企业信用评级模型是评价企业信用等级的有效工具,随着全世界债券市场的迅猛发展、抵押品价值降低及其波动性增加,该模型将会得到更为广泛的关注,并将为我国各公司企业运用数学模型度量企业信用评级提供了重要参考意义。
关键词:数学模型企业信用等级企业信用评级模型信用评价AbstractThe social credit system is an important system of market economy system. At present, commercial fraud in the society of counterfeit goods, the phenomenon such as illegal fund-raising, the social credit problems in the final analysis are enterprise credit problems, therefore, scientific, reasonable, fair and authority of enterprise credit rating technology is the current urgent task.Through research the enterprise credit evaluation methods both at home and abroad, this paper builds a enterprise credit evaluation, credit rating, credit feedback, and other function, is a very complete credit evaluation platform. Enterprise credit rating model is an effective tool for evaluation of enterprise credit rating with the rapid development of bond markets around the world the value of collateral reduces and its volatility increases, the model will be more widespread attention, and the mathematical model for the companies in our country enterprise use metric enterprise credit rating provides an important reference significance.Key words: mathematical model Enterprise credit rating Enterprise credit rating model Credit evaluation目录摘要·················……························Abstract··········································第一章绪论 (1)1.1 选题背景和意义 (1)1.2 国内外文献综述 (2)1.2.1 国外研究现状 (2)1.2.2 国内研究现状 (5)1.3我国研究现状及存在的问题 (9)第二章信用评级主要方法与模型综述 (10)2.1 专家评估法及其优缺点 (10)2.2 财务比率分析法及其优缺点 (12)2.3 多元判别分析(MDA ) 及其优缺点 (14)2.4 logistic分析及其优缺点 (15)2.5 非参数方法 (17)2.5.1 聚类分析及其优缺点 (17)2.5.2 K近邻判别及其优缺点 (19)2.6 Z模型和Zeta模型及其优缺点 (19)2.7 基于投影寻踪和最优分割及其优缺点 (21)2.8 模糊综合评判法及其优缺点 (26)2.8.1 确定评语集 (27)2.8. 2 确定指标权重集 (28)2.8.3 确定评判矩阵 (28)2.8.4 模糊综合评判 (29)2.8.5 模糊合成算子的选择 (31)2.9 遗传算法优化BP神经网络及其优缺点 (34)2.10 基于有序分类和支持向量机方法及其优缺点 (39)2.10.1 有序分类问题与内置空间法 (39)2.11 C4.5算法建立决策树模型及其优缺点 (42)2.12 kmv公司的kmv模型及其优缺点 (44)2.13 j.p摩根的credit metrics模型及其优缺点 (45)2.14 麦肯锡公司的credit portfolio view模型及其优缺点 (46)2.15 瑞士信贷银行的credit risk+模型及其优缺点 (46)第三章现代模型在中国应用的缺陷性及改进措施 (47)3.1对于现代模型的运用还处于尝试阶段 (47)3.2 改进措施 (48)第四章对我国企业信用评级工作的建议 (50)参考文献 (52)第一章绪论1.1项目背景及意义社会信用体系是市场经济体制中的重要体系。
穆迪 评级方法
Rating Methodology Request for CommentBank Financial Strength Ratings: Revised MethodologySummaryThis report details Moody’s proposal to revise our rating methodology for assigning Bank Financial Strength Ratings (BFSRs) globally.1 This revision does not change the main factors that Moody’s considers in rating banks. However,the revised approach provides a single, global methodology instead of separate methodologies for mature and develop-ing markets. It also establishes specific ranges for each factor that relate to different rating categories. The updated methodology is intended to provide investors and issuers with a transparent set of guidelines allowing them to better understand our rating process and how we reach our decisions.T o this end, we have developed a rating scorecard that uses a common set of globally available financial metrics together with key qualitative factors that Moody’s analysts consider critical in evaluating a bank’s intrinsic financial strength and specific weights for each factor. This scorecard will be used by Moody’s analysts as the first step in deter-mining BFSRs. It should also enable investors and issuers to independently estimate a BFSR for most banks within two notches. This report describes the scorecard and discusses some of its limitations as well as some of the further adjust-ments that Moody’s analysts may employ in assigning BFSRs.The revised methodology is also intended to improve the consistency of Moody’s BFSRs. As previously announced, Moody’s intends to incorporate joint-default analysis (JDA) into our assessment of external support for banks later this year.2 We believe the updated BFSR methodology will help ensure that existing BFSRs are indeed “pure” measures of stand-alone financial strength and do not include external support. This is important in order to avoid double counting external support when we implement JDA for banks. We are requesting comments because we believe that the implementation of this methodology could lead to changes in the BFSRs for a significant number of banks, although we do not expect most of those to exceed 2 notches.Readers should note that this methodology is not an exhaustive treatment of every factor considered by Moody’s in assigning bank financial strength ratings, but it should enable our constituents to better understand how and why we arrive at a BFSR. Moody’s welcomes comments or suggestions on this proposal from market participants. Comments should be sent to cpc@ by September 29, 2006.1.Moody's current approach is outlined in the following Rating Methodology reports: "Bank Credit Risk -- An Analytical Framework for Banks in Developed Markets," April 1999 and "Bank Credit Risk in Emerging Markets -- An Analytical Framework," July 1999.2.Please see "Request for Comment: Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis for Systemic Support into Moody's Bank Rating Methodology ," October 2005; "Update to Proposal to Incorporate Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank Rating Methodology ," April 2006; and "Bank Joint Default Analysis: Rating Methodology Update," August 2006.New YorkDavid Fanger 1.212.553.1653Rosemarie Conforte Jeanne Del Casino Greg Bauer Laura Levenstein LondonLynn Exton 44.20.7772.5454Adel Satel Antonio Carballo MadridMaria Cabanyes 34.91.310.14.54TokyoMutsuo Suzuki 81.3.5408.4000Yasunobu Doi SingaporeDeborah Schuler 65.6398.8300Hong KongJerry Chien 852.2916.1121 Contact PhoneSeptember 2006About Moody’s Bank Financial Strength RatingsBank credit risk is a function of a bank’s (i) intrinsic financial strength, (ii) the likelihood that it would benefit from external support in the case of need, and (iii) the risk that it would fail to make payments owing to the actions of a sov-ereign. Moody’s assigns credit risk ratings to banks and their debt obligations using a multi-step process that incorpo-rates both a bank’s intrinsic risk profile and specific external support and risk elements that can affect its overall credit risk.Moody’s Bank Financial Strength Ratings (BFSRs) represent Moody’s opinion of a bank’s intrinsic safety and soundness. Assigning a BFSR is the first step in Moody’s bank credit rating process.Unlike Moody’s deposit and debt ratings, BFSRs do not address either the probability of timely payment (i.e. default risk) or the loss that an investor may suffer in the event of a missed payment (i.e. severity of loss). Instead, BFSRs are a measure of the likelihood that a bank will require assistance from third parties such as its owners, its industry group, or official institutions, in order to avoid a default. BFSRs do not take into account the probability that the bank will receive such external support, nor do they address the external risk that sovereign actions may interfere with a bank’s ability to honor its domestic or foreign currency obligations.In order to differentiate Moody’s BFSRs from our bank deposit and debt ratings, we use different rating symbols. Moody’s BFSRs range from A to E, with “A” for banks with the greatest intrinsic financial strength and “E” for banks with the least intrinsic financial strength. A “+” modifier may be appended to ratings below the “A” category and a “-”modifier may be appended to ratings above the “E” category to identify those banks which are placed higher (+) or lower (-) in a rating category.Moody’s introduced BFSRs in 1995, and currently assigns them to almost a thousand banks and deposit-taking financial institutions worldwide. The factors considered in the assignment of BFSRs were described in Moody’s last bank rating methodologies published in 1999, and continue to form the basis of our updated approach as described in this report. These include bank-specific elements such as financial fundamentals, franchise value, and business and asset diversification, as well as risk factors in the bank’s operating environment, such as the strength and prospective performance of the economy, the structure and relative fragility of the financial system, and the quality of banking reg-ulation and supervision.The following diagram shows how BFSRs fit into Moody’s overall approach to assigning bank credit ratings. The left side shows the principal factors that are used to determine a bank’s BFSR. This report describes how these are measured and analyzed to derive a BFSR.2Moody’s Rating MethodologyThe right side of the diagram summarizes the specific external support and risk elements that are combined with the BFSR to determine Moody’s local currency and foreign currency deposit and debt ratings. In October 2005 Moody’s proposed to incorporate joint-default analysis (JDA) into how it evaluates external support factors for banks; we published updates on this proposal in April and August 2006. We expect to publish and implement a final method-ology incorporating JDA into Moody’s bank credit ratings later this year.The BFSR will be mapped directly to the baseline credit assessment in Moody’s JDA framework. Like the BFSR, a baseline credit assessment is a measure of an issuer’s stand-alone default risk assuming there is no systemic or other external support. For banks, the baseline credit assessment reflects what the local currency deposit rating would be without any assumed external support from a government or other third party. In the October 2005 request for com-ment we published a mapping showing how Moody’s BFSRs translate into a baseline credit assessment for banks using Moody’s traditional alphanumeric rating scale.A more detailed discussion of how Moody’s evaluates the risk elements that affect foreign currency ratings for banks can be found in the 1999 bank rating methodologies, as well as in more recent publications.3About the Rated UniverseMoody’s currently assigns BFSRs to 959 financial institutions globally (as of August 21, 2006). These financial institu-tions generally fall under the category of deposit-taking institutions, including commercial banks, savings banks, build-ing societies, cooperative banks, thrifts, and government-owned banks. Moody’s BFSRs may also be assigned to other types of financial institutions such as multilateral development banks, government-sponsored financial institutions and national development financial institutions.In a number of countries Moody’s also assigns BFSRs to a variety of other financial institutions (such as mortgage banks or other specialized banks) that, although they do not take deposits, are still chartered and regulated as banks and usually obtain some funding from the interbank market.BFSRs are generally assigned to individual banks, including those that are subsidiaries or affiliates of another bank. Therefore, there are some banking groups that have a number of banks with different BFSRs.The rated universe is spread throughout the world, with the highest concentrations in Europe, followed by the Americas, Asia (excluding Japan), Japan and the Middle East. Rated banks range in size from over $1 trillion in total assets to as small as $150 million. Some may be truly diversified global institutions, while others may operate on an extremely limited scale in a small local market.Distribution of Moody’s Bank Financial Strength Ratings3.Please see "Revised Country Ceiling Policy," June 2001; "Emerging Market Bank Ratings in Local and Foreign Currency: The Implications of Country Risk and Insti-tutional Support," December 2001; "The Implications of Highly Dollarized Banking Systems for Sovereign Credit Risk," March 2003; and "Piercing the Country Ceil-ing: An Update," January 2005.Moody’s Rating Methodology3The inherent riskiness of the banking business – as characterized by high leverage (equity capital of only 5-10% of total assets), illiquid assets (loans) financed by short-term liabilities (deposits), and a cyclical business environment –makes it difficult for all but a select number of banks that are generally extremely large and diversified to achieve and maintain a BFSR in the range from A to a high B. Solid, diversified and sustainable franchises and excellent manage-ment are also necessary attributes of A and B BFSRs.However, barring systemic stress and provided there is reasonable client confidence, banking, if conservatively managed without excessive risk-taking, is also a business allowing a stable generation of interest and fee income, albeit perhaps at a lower level of overall profitability. Therefore, BFSRs in the C category are generally available to a large number of banks even if they have limited scale and franchises, and average financials. Many institutions fall under this category. BFSRs of D are generally assigned to those that either are exhibiting modest capital, earnings, or business franchise, thus limiting their ability to deal with asset quality problems or other potential balance sheet risks, or are subject to unpredictable and unstable operating environments. BFSRs of E are typically restricted to those institutions that are under pressure to maintain their capital due to external and internal factors such as a highly volatile operating environment, recurring losses and asset quality problems, or a very high risk profile. However, regulatory forbearance can allow even insolvent banks to operate for an extended period of time, until the regulatory authorities arrange for either a rescue or a restructuring, or place the bank into liquidation.Industry Overview and Current Risk CharacteristicsThe global banking industry is made up of a highly varied group of firms offering a wide range of products and pursu-ing a wide range of business models and customers. While most banks face the same fundamental risks -- credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk, interest rate risk, and operational risk -- the extent of such risks vary considerably depending upon the products sold, the bank’s funding profile, and the markets in which it operates.General vs. Specific RisksBanking risk can be broadly divided into general risks, which apply to all banks within a system and derive to a large extent from a country’s economic strength, and specific risks, which are the product of the bank itself. In mature mar-kets, it is rare for serious difficulties experienced by a bank to be solely attributable to general risks, even though such risks certainly do have an impact on the bank’s performance. In most cases, bank failure in mature markets is the result of factors such as mismanagement, risky strategies, structurally poor performance, and franchise collapse. It is, in gen-eral, the weak banks and the highly risky banks that are the first to suffer in a shrinking or increasingly competitive market.In developing markets, general risks loom larger. Not only can general risks be more severe, but it may also be dif-ficult for any bank to avoid the consequences of a severe economic shock (such as a massive currency devaluation) or a deep economic recession. Clearly, banks which are better managed and have stronger earnings, franchises, and balance sheets are better placed to cope with general risks. However, in cases where general risks present a significant threat to the banking system of the country in question, it may well be that no bank can be assigned a BFSR at the upper end of the scale.4Moody’s Rating MethodologyFive Broad Categories of BankingOverall, the diversity of the sector can be broken down into five broad categories of banking institutions. Many banks may actually pursue a combination of these models, but we believe it is useful to address each of them separately to clarify the different risks that different banks can face.1. Wholesale banks: These banks focus on serving large corporate or institutional customers. While many wholesale banks have traditionally focused primarily on lending (and, in some countries, making equity investments), they fre-quently offer a much broader array of services to their customers, including not just loans but also treasury manage-ment and transaction services, foreign exchange services, trade finance, derivatives, debt and equity underwriting and market-making, and insurance. Because their customers are often very large entities, wholesale banks, especially smaller ones, can have significant customer concentration risks; they may also have industry concentration risks, espe-cially if they operate primarily within a particular region or market. Also, while a portion of their activities may be funded with corporate customer deposits, typically such banks are heavily reliant upon wholesale funding from both the interbank and capital markets. Such funding can be highly confidence-sensitive, exposing the bank to substantial liquidity risk if it is not conservatively managed.4Since their customers tend to be concentrated in larger cities and economic regions, wholesale banks generally do not require as substantial a physical presence as most retail banks. With fewer fixed costs, this often means a more flex-ible cost structure. However, customers can develop strong relationships with individual bankers (instead of with the bank itself), making retention of personnel a critical element to long-term success.As discussed below, both globalization and the growth of local capital markets can pose significant challenges for wholesale banks, as more of their customers have the ability to tap the capital markets directly for funding. This can lead to greater earnings volatility, as wholesale banks increase their capital markets activities in order to retain their customers, and also expand into potentially riskier lending businesses to replace lost lending opportunities.2. Retail banks: These banks focus primarily on serving individuals and/or small and middle market businesses. They may offer a wide array of products, including deposit-taking and lending, asset management and insurance, cash man-agement and transaction services, and even trade finance and foreign exchange services. A defining feature of such banks is that they are often locally or regionally focused. This reflects the retail nature of the customer base. While some functions may be centralized, direct customer interaction remains an important part of the service most retail banks provide. Given the wide dispersion of potential customers (both individuals and businesses), and their preference for local interaction, this requires a physical presence in the form of retail branches. Many retail banks also site their branches in clusters to benefit from classic network economies, although this is not always the case. (This is especially true for retail banks serving individuals; retail banks serving only small and middle market businesses may have less need for clusters of branches, but are still likely to require more branches than a wholesale bank.) As retail banks grow, they may develop more and more clusters of branches, growing from merely a local or regional presence into a national or even international one. Nonetheless, even an international retail bank can usually best be thought of as a combination of local retail banks.Given the need to have a significant physical infrastructure and to support significant daily customer transaction volumes, most retail banks have fairly inflexible cost structures. This makes stable revenue generation critical. T o address this need, most retail banks focus on generating recurring business with relationship customers and increasing the level of cross-selling of products including insurance products. Because their customers are small, retail banks do not usually have significant customer concentration risks; however, they may still have industry concentration risks since they frequently operate within a particular region.5Retail banks are often funded primarily with customer deposits. However, pressure to grow assets and earnings, especially in more mature markets, can lead to loan growth that far outstrips deposit growth. Such banks must rely more heavily upon wholesale funding, which can pressure net interest margins, reducing the bank’s profitability, while at the same time also exposing it to greater liquidity risk and interest rate risk.As discussed below, both de-regulation and technological innovation can pose a significant threat to retail banks because they provide their customers with greater access to competing products through alternative distribution chan-nels, and may also reduce competitors’ costs to provide those products. While retail banking has not traditionally pos-sessed much in the way of economies of scale, to the extent that such technological innovations create economies of scale, it may pose even greater challenges to the smaller retail providers.4.Please see discussion of Liquidity Management under Rating Factor 2.5.Please see discussion on Credit Risk Concentrations under Rating Factor 2.Moody’s Rating Methodology53. Universal banks: These banks are not so much a separate business model from either retail banks or wholesale banks, but rather are usually characterized by a combination of retail banking and wholesale banking, frequently also combined with activities such as private banking, asset management, or insurance. Universal banks often rank among the largest banks in a country. Universal banking can potentially provide greater earnings diversification as well as a more stable funding profile (to the extent that the more deposit-rich retail banking activities provide funding for some of the wholesale activities) than either retail banking or wholesale banking can provide on their own. However, the complexity of managing a universal bank can require considerable managerial resources. Furthermore, the disparate activities of a universal bank can at times pose conflicts of interest which, if not carefully managed, can cause reputation damage, harming the franchise. In some jurisdictions, the complexity of a universal bank also raises questions about the depth or effectiveness of regulatory oversight over such disparate activities.4. Policy banks: Moody’s defines policy banks as state-owned institutions that have explicit or implicit public policy mandates. Some state-owned banks have specific public policy mandates. These banks are often heavily dependent on government-directed business, which may or may not be profitable. Other state-owned banks, while not subject to specific public policy mandates, may still have to contend with bureaucratic controls and pressure from politicians that forces them to lend to certain favored industries or regions. Even though such banks may have substantial market shares, they frequently have weak earnings, lack strong management, and suffer from poor asset quality and controls. This usually translates into low BFSRs, although such banks also usually benefit from regulatory forbearance or other forms of government assistance, providing support to their deposit and debt ratings. Even when well run, policy banks usually still have substantial industry concentrations, reflecting their reason for being or the limitations of their char-ters.5. Specialized banks: These are niche players, most often specialized lenders such as mortgage banks, development banks, public-sector lenders, credit card banks, or export-finance entities. Some are the legacy of past government pol-icies and regulatory barriers that disappeared following deregulation and liberalization, while others were formed as a direct result of deregulation and technological innovation. Because they often have limited product offerings and/or a limited customer base, specialized banks can be more vulnerable to competitive pressures or changing economic con-ditions. However, some specialized banks, either by virtue of still-strong regulatory barriers or through substantial economies of scale and a dominant market share, usually combined with a focus on less volatile loan products such as public sector lending or mortgages, can still support high BFSRs. As with wholesale banks, specialized banks are typi-cally heavily reliant upon wholesale funding. Such funding can be highly confidence-sensitive, exposing the bank to substantial liquidity risk if it is not conservatively managed.Although the risks are somewhat different, we also include captive banks in this category. Captives are usually owned or controlled by an industrial corporation and are used to provide financing for customers purchasing products sold by the corporation, and/or to provide internal financing to the corporate and its affiliates, serving in essence as the corporate’s treasury function. Similar to other specialized banks, captives tend to have limited product offerings and a limited customer base. Even when they are lending to customers rather than to the corporate itself, their performance can still be significantly affected by the performance of the corporate.Key Industry Risks: Transformation Will Continue, Whether Banks are Ready or NotThe global banking industry is in the midst of a significant transformation, driven by substantial changes in the busi-ness environment. This transformation, begun in some countries well over a decade ago, is now occurring at different rates of change in most countries around the world. While much of the change is occurring in mature markets, devel-oping markets are also affected. These developments pose significant challenges and risks for all banks. Many banks are struggling to adjust to the substantial changes already underway. Moody’s expects that many banks will not succeed in making the transformation, and will either be driven to consolidate with a more successful competitor or will gradu-ally weaken as its franchise and earnings power are eroded away. Six major catalysts are driving this transformation. •Deregulation – is breaking down barriers within the banking industry in many countries and enabling banks to adopt diversification strategies and to compete against each other on a level playing field. In some countries it is also allowing for the entrance of new specialized competitors.•Disintermediation – a byproduct of deregulation, it is brought about by financial liberalization and the expansion of capital markets, allowing both borrowers and investors to bypass banks in favor of capital market products. The growing trend towards privatization of pension funds is also creating a growing pool of funds managed by invest-ment professionals, helping to fuel this trend.•Technological Innovation – is reducing transaction and information costs, facilitating the creation of new distri-bution channels, and allowing for innovation in retail lending (data mining), funding (securitization), and risk management (derivatives). At the same time, such technologies may also be creating potential economies of scale where none previously existed.6Moody’s Rating Methodology•Globalization – pressures banks to follow their business customers around the world, and forces them to compete with other banks globally for those customers’ business. Globalization gives banks in developing markets access to growing pools of funding due to the growth of global capital markets. However, many banks obtaining first-time access to wholesale funding have shown themselves to be ill-equipped for the liquidity risks such funding can pose. •Privatization – Governments are increasingly seeking to get out of the business of banking. While this is clearly not universal, and in some cases is being done with great reluctance, nonetheless the privatization of formerly state-owned banks could potentially reduce subsidized competition, benefiting all banks competing in the same market. However, the social or political costs of such actions may be more than some governments are willing to tolerate. And for the management of formerly state-owned banks it can be a considerable challenge to develop a credit culture based on analyzing a client’s ability to repay loans, as opposed to relying on imputed state guaran-tees.•Increased shareholder power – with more banks being owned by private investors and with more investment funds being managed by professional investors, banks globally are facing increasing pressure from powerful insti-tutional shareholders for higher returns. T o remain competitive in this more unforgiving market, banks are increasingly shifting to shareholder value-creation strategies, which may not always benefit bondholders. Framework for Assigning Bank Financial Strength RatingsMoody’s bank ratings reflect our opinion of long-term relative risk and are, of necessity, forward-looking in nature because they apply to liabilities that may pay out over long periods of time. Historical experience has shown that look-ing only at the current financial condition of a bank is not always an accurate predictor of its future financial perfor-mance and financial strength. We believe there are significant qualitative factors which play an important role in determining the stability and predictability of a bank’s financial performance over time. Thus Moody’s analytical approach includes significant qualitative analysis in addition to quantitative analysis, and incorporates the opinions and judgments of experienced analysts.As noted above, the factors considered in the assignment of Bank Financial Strength Ratings were described in Moody’s last bank rating methodologies published in 1999, and remain at the basis of the updated methodology. We focus on five key rating factors that we believe are critical to understanding a bank’s financial strength and risk pro-file. They are:1. Franchise Value2. Risk Positioning3. Regulatory Environment4. Operating Environment5. Financial FundamentalsIn the following sections we review the five key rating factors, discuss why each factor is important to our BFSRs, and explain the relevant metrics or “sub-factors” that we use to measure performance for each key rating factor. Some of the metrics that we consider important are purely quantitative, while others include elements of qualitative judg-ment or – where hard data is not reasonably accessible — educated estimates. For those involving a qualitative assess-ment, we have provided qualitative descriptions that we believe help to differentiate among risk profiles at different banks. T o dampen the cyclical nature of the industry, most of the financial metrics we use are three-year averages.For each of these factors, the methodology outlines in a summary mapping table either the range of financial met-rics or the qualitative description that would typically correspond with a given BFSR level, ranging from A to E. Evaluating OutliersIt is unlikely that every bank’s BFSR will be consistent with the rating level guidelines for every rating factor. This is because a bank typically has a variety of strengths and weaknesses which combine to reflect its overall financial risk profile. For those banks that show up as frequent outliers for their respective rating category, there could be several different explanations. The most obvious one would be that there is likely pressure on its BFSR, either up or down. But there also may be unique characteristics of the bank’s accounting, regulatory or market environment that limit the comparability of certain key factors and metrics. And finally, some elements of the bank’s business or financial profile may receive greater weight in our analysis.Moody’s Rating Methodology7。
信用评级方法
一、信用评级方法概述
一、信用评级方法的具体准则 • (四)短期分析与长期因素分析相结合 • 信用评级要分析短期的情况,但又不能拘泥于当前
的财务数据,而是要着眼长期,特别是要对一些长 期基本因素及其变化进行深入的研究并在评级中加 以应用,使得评级的结果能更为全面的反映出动态 的信用状况。 • 评级机构一般要求被评级企业必须提供至少三年的 数据,这样可以从长期的角度进行审察,而财务中 的一些趋势分析的做法在信用评级中有着广泛的应 用,通过对近几年数据趋势变化的观察,可以为未 来的走势判断提供一些参考。
一、信用评级方法概述
二、信用评级方法的分类 • (二)以数量统计为基础的方法 • 信用评级的系统是基于数理模型为理论基础,采用历史
数据为数据库,应用模型分析进行定量的测评,这样信 用评级方法可以归类为统计为基础的方法。例如,评估 机构会找出与违约概率有关的财务变量;然后,根据历 史数据算出各个变量对违约的影响。接下来,机构会将 估计值用在当期的债务数据上,算出违约概率的评分, 再根据评分体系得出信用等级。此类方法适用于小型企 业的信用分析。优点在于可以便捷、迅速的完成评级, 节约费用。另外,还能够针对企业情况变化及时调整信 用评级。公司或银行可以自行完成开发。
一、信用评级方法概述
一、信用评级方法的具体准则 • (二)注重分析未来可能发生的违约风险 • 信用评级和其他形式的财务预测存在根本区别,信
用评级的关注点不在于公司的利润潜能上,相反, 重点在于分析将来可能恶化公司财务状况和增大违 约损失可能性的风险上。例如,对于长期债务工具 的评级,国际著名评级机构特别重视影响偿债能力 的长期性因素的分析和判断。在评价宏观经济周期 和行业发展趋势的影响方面,机构一般通过综合考 虑评级对象在景气时期和不景气时期的偿付能力来 确定其信用级别,而不是随着宏观经济的波动而随 时调整期评级结果。
穆迪公司及信用评级制度(上)
田 城市寇融论坛2000.8
高,但是这并不影响辩财务实力评级(匿掰糨对鞍低)。 耀静译缀瓣差异鲡表2所示。
襄2
债务/存款评鞭
衡量银行的支付能力
翳娄嚣量磊囊量幸蒙嚣
我是否能够收回?” 使用扶A皿烈c辨评缀体蘸
财务变力评嫒 -衡量银行自身的宴由
回答“银行在未来撼番需要第三 方的支持?”
使用扶^弼E的详缓体系。
至i塞耋至羹量遘墼基尘整塞
(三)评级中数量指标与定性评价的关系 穆迪在银行惰用风险分析中使用的基本素材有两 种:数量指标和定性评价。数量搬标常常被许多入看做 楚彩嚷译缀懿最燕要嚣素,毽莛攀实上,数量籀拣对手译 缎来说是远远苓够的。穆迪在锻行摊信用分析巾使用的 指标主要有5类熬37个(见表5),其中最受关注的是银 行的盈利能力指标,因为这些指标代表了银行摆脱困境 她照体能力。她外,资产霞量措掭和资本充足攀搬标等 穗获籀垂爱浃了锻行静盈搴j糖力。 然而,对信用风险的预测是一门艺术而不怒科学。 财务比率虽然描绘了银行的基本财务状况,但遗仅仅是 评级过程的一个因素。首先,在不同的经济环境中,各种 毙睾在译徐镶行髓力时瓣终焉楚举麓戆。翻船,囊镶{亍 的舞产质量较差时,准备率(坏账准备眈不是资产)楣对 iiii言会更重要。网而,随着金融环境的变化和锻行业务 的发展,银行有可能面l临的风险也在变化,用于j煎测信用 状况的合适的比侧也会变化。其次,银行的债势评级或 酣务实嘉谭缀罴耧溅{生鹩,静赛凌主爱浚豹是豫悖瓣壤
坏张嘴备/贷款
不良贷款/贷款 辫=辩准备/不盏贷款 蒜嫩蠡撬,赞蓑 车盎赞获/(黢奉+环懿准备)
校心斑率比率 BlS资本总比率 股东权益/总资产 资本参加人权益/股索权益 内部资金增长率
数量指标本身存在的一些嗣题也决定了单纯的数量 分析远远不够。酋先,在许多地方,数据基础存程很大问 蹶。其次,比率描述的是过去的表现和当前的财务状况, 俸为预测将来的工具,统计结祭必须进行调整,以厦映经 济弼朝、暂盈绪梅变琵、曾理拽蟮变纯等嚣素懿影璃。第 三,虽然比率使同业比较变得简单。然而,必颓在银行的 艇体业务、风险状况、管理效率中来看待这些比率,比较 才是有意义的。第四,单纯使用统计数据常常会使财务 努辑裁囊舞皋,怨臻了镊稽监务不尾方面瓣联系。恻翔, 考虑盈朝数据时,净拳J差的扩夫襁为一个好豹髂号,但是 也许这个变化也是风险增高的袭现。
中外信用评级体系差异
一文了解中外信用评级体系差异同样的公司,同样的债券,中外评级公司的信用评级差异较大,中国公司给出的评级往往高于海外评级公司数个档次,主要原因在于国公司对于中国主权信用评级为AAA,大部分央企和国企也给予AAA评级,国际评级公司给予中国本币期主权信用评级分别为Aa3、AA-和A+,中国企业均不超过上述评级。
评级体系对比国信用评级由于发展较晚,较多地借鉴了国际信用评级体系,同样分为主体评级和债项评级,长期评级和短期评级,评级符号体系与标普较为接近。
评级框架与方法对比与国外评级机构的评级方法类似,中国评级机构在进行主体信用评级时,主要考察被评级主体的经营风险和财务风险。
其中经营风险主要可以通过行业状况、竞争地位、公司治理来进行评价,财务风险通过公司的资本结构、资产质量、盈利能力、现金流等方面进行评价,也会考察被评级主体的外部条件,特别是股和政府的支持。
国外评级结果对比中国公司国际评级行业分布。
从我们统计的56家拥有国际评级的中国公司的行业分布来看,银行业的公司占比最高,超过30%,其次是非银行金融业和房地产业。
国际评级受制于主权评级上限。
根据国际惯例,一国境单位发行外币债券的评级一般不超过该国长期主权信用评级。
穆迪、标普、惠誉对中国本外币长期主权信用评级分别为Aa3、AA-和A+,其所出具的中国企业评级均不超过各自给出的主权评级。
国评级较国际评级高。
国评级机构对中国的主权信用评级均为最高评级AAA,对国大部分央企和国有银行、股份制银行也给予了AAA的最高评级。
与国际评级相比,对同一家企业,国评级明显较高。
对同一家企业,相对于国际评级,国评级平均高2.5个大档,6.5个小档。
能源业、非银金融差异较小,房地产业、银行业差异较大。
石油等能源类行业以及保险等非银行金融行业的国外评级差距相对较小。
房地产业的评级差距相对较大,国未有房地产企业获国际评级机构A以上评级。
银行业的评级差异也相对较大,工农中建等国有银行较国评级较国低2个大档,兴业等股份行较国低4个大档。
国际评级机构REITs信用评级方法的研究与比较
国际评级机构REITs信用评级方法的研究与比较上海新世纪资信评估投资服务有限公司陈文沛REITs在国际上,尤其是美国已经取得长足的发展,国际三大评级机构对REITs的评级方法也在实践中趋于完善。
总体来说,标普、穆迪和惠誉的REITs 评级方法有一些相似的地方,都采用与房地产公司一致的评级方法,符合各自公司评级方法的逻辑,也都强调了REITs周期性和资本密集的天然属性。
但在具体的评级逻辑,权重分配,要素选取和具体分析方法上有着显著的差异。
一、REITs介绍(一)REITs的简介房地产信托投资基金(Real Estate Investment Trusts,REITs)是一种以发行收益凭证的方式募集特定投资者资金,由专门投资机构进行投资经营管理,并将投资综合收益按比例分配给投资者的一种信托基金制度。
简单而言,REITs就是一个拥有并运营商业性房地产的企业,它持有如公寓、酒店、商场、办公楼、医院和仓库等在内的房地产资产。
投资者通过证券市场可以进行自由的买卖,享受投资回报。
REITS的概念很简单,但是还是有很多人把它和房地产信托、上市房地产公司混淆。
首先是REITS与房地产信托的区别,在业内房地产信托又称为准REITS,在一些媒体上直接把房地产信托写成REITS,产生了误会。
REITS是标准化可流通的金融产品,国内的房地产信托计划是有若干份合同限制的集合非标准化金融产品,不能在证券交易所上市流通。
REITS投资回报是把收入的大多数分配给投资者。
REITS负责提供资金并组建资产管理公司或经营团队进行投资运营;房地产信托计划的运作方式是提供资金、监管资金或部分参与项目公司运作获取回报。
其次是REITS和上市房地产公司的区别,两者同为证券产品,在中国上市房地产公司中间有一些和REITS比较相似。
REITS在投资政策上是有限制的,比如REITS需要额外融资,须得到基金持有人的许可,且投资产业必须与投资策略一致。
中金公司—穆迪和标准普尔的信用评级方法介绍
中国固定收益证券:信用策略:2008 年 4 月 3 日
9 在投资实践中,评级公司的结果更多地并不是用于债券的实时交易,而是用于满足相关监管规则的要求和作为 资产组合构建的基础。
9 市场对评级公司的预期除了提供评级结果外,还希望评级公司在解决信息不对称性和透明化等方面发挥作用。 9 评级展望和评级观察名单是对评级结果的重要补充,如果投资者在投资时按照评级展望和评级观察对评级结果
9 评级公司的评级并不以特定的绝对违约率/预期损失率为目标,而是同一时间点对相对信用风险的排序。在同一 年或者平均来看,高评级公司的违约率/预期损失率低于低评级公司的违约率/预期损失率,但是在不同年度之间 不同级别之间的违约率/预期损失率之间并不具备绝对的可比较性。
9 对经济周期或者外部不利环境的承受能力是区分投资与投机级债券的关键,评级越低的债务,其偿还能力越依 赖于良好的外部条件;历史数据表明投资级债券对经济周期波动的抵御能力也确实远远高于投机级债券。
(如股价)波动而推出的隐含评级,在进行评级时我们主要分析和关注的仍然是影响发行人中长期信用基本面的因 素及其变化趋势。 ♦ 中金公司信用评分体系的内容和定义是什么? 9 中金公司信用评分的主要目标是区分发行人按时偿还债务能力和意愿相对风险的大小,也即发行人的违约概率。 9 中金公司信用评分目前暂分为 1 到 5 档,1 档表示信用状况最好、相对风险最低,5 档表示信用状况最差、相对 风险最高。 9 我们所指的违约率并不是特指发行人某一年的违约率,而是发行人所对应的一个违约率时间序列。因此,我们 的 5 级评级体系同时应用于短期(期限在一年以内)和长期信用产品。评级越高的债务人违约概率越低;随着 时间的增加,每个级别债务人的累积违约率都在增加,但级别低的累积违约率增加得更快。 9 我们的评级以发行人评级为基础,在确定具体债项的评级时,将分析债项的优先级和担保的具体情况,以及优 先级和担保等风险缓释条件对债项最终违约风险的影响。 ♦ 中金行业信用风险展望的定位和定义是什么? 9 国际历史经验表明不同行业的违约率存在巨大差异:政府管制、提供经济基础服务、可能引起经济系统性风险 的行业长期违约率低,而完全竞争行业的长期违约率高。 9 每个行业违约率的发生都具备“聚集性”和“传染性”的特征,并不是均匀地在每个年度发生,因此对经济周 期和行业周期的分析和展望是进行信用产品组合配置、避免绝对信用损失的关键因素之一。 9 为了给投资者提供更具前瞻性的信息,我们将对主要的行业引入“行业信用风险展望”,分为“正面”、“稳定”、 “负面”以及“发展中”四种评价结果。
传统信用评级、市场隐含评级及大数据评级方法-信用管理论文-管理学论文
传统信用评级、市场隐含评级及大数据评级方法-信用管理论文-管理学论文——文章均为WORD文档,下载后可直接编辑使用亦可打印——摘要:近年来我国金融市场上信用问题愈加严峻,信用评级对于违约预警的准确性、及时性受到市场的广泛关注。
国际上穆迪、标普、惠誉三大评级机构已建立了较为成熟的信用评级体系,而我国的信用评级业仅仅是刚刚起步。
在此背景下,本文将国际上权威评级机构(穆迪、标普、惠誉、MSCI、德勤等)的信用评级思路方法进行综述并加以对比,涵盖了传统信用评级、市场隐含评级和大数据评级三个评级类型,从评级框架、评级要素、评级方法、难点等多维度进行论述,最后将三种类型的信用评级进行对比分析,并提出了信用评级研究展望。
关键词:传统信用评级;市场隐含评级;大数据评级;作者简介:李鸿禧中央国债登记结算有限责任公司博士后科研工作站、中国人民银行金融研究所博士后流动站;信用是以还本付息为目的的借贷活动,信用评级的本质是挖掘债务人能够如期如额偿还本息的可能性。
因此,信用评级的核心是针对债务人进行信用评分、准确地刻画其违约风险,从而有效地区分开违约高危企业和健康企业,避开债务违约的雷区,为银行、证券公司、基金等广大投资者进行贷款、投资等金融活动提供信用风险管理的技术支持。
信用评级直接影响到资产定价的合理性、风险管理和金融监管,乃至整个金融系统的稳定性。
2018年以来我国金融市场上的债务违约问题愈加严峻。
2018年全年违约债券125只、违约规模高达1160亿元,超过2014年至2017年之和。
从行业分布上来看,违约企业由原先仅分布在钢铁、机械等几个产能过剩行业,扩散到医药、信息科技等全行业。
可见我国金融市场的信用风险形势愈加严峻,这就需要建立有效识别信用风险的信用评级体系。
国际上穆迪、标普、惠誉三大评级机构一直处于评级行业中的垄断地位,而我国的信用评级研究仅是刚起步,与国际三大评级机构存在很大差距。
国内信用评级机构亟需提升自己的信用评级核心技术。
国际三大评级机构
国际三大评级机构Moody's 穆迪公司创始人是约翰·穆迪,他在1909年首创对铁路债券进行信用评级。
1913年,穆迪开始对公用事业和工业债券进行信用评级。
目前,穆迪在全球有800名分析专家,1700多名助理分析员,在17个国家设有机构,股票在纽约证券交易所上市交易(代码MCO)。
在全球占有40%的份额。
Berkshire Hathaway和Davis Selected Advisers为穆迪的最大持股者。
穆迪于2001年7月在北京设立代表办事处,开拓中国业务。
STANDARD&POOR'S 标准普尔由亨利·瓦纳姆·普尔(Mr Henry Varnum Poor)于1860年创立。
标准普尔由普尔出版公司和标准统计公司于1941年合并而成。
标准普尔为投资者提供信用评级、独立分析研究、投资咨询等服务,其中包括反映全球股市表现的标准普尔全球1200指数和为美国投资组合指数的基准的标准普尔500指数等一系列指数。
1966年麦格罗·希尔公司(McGraw-Hill)兼并标准普尔公司FitchRatings 惠誉国际1913年由约翰·惠誉(John K.Fitch)创办。
1997年惠誉国际并购了另一家评级机构IBCA,2000年并购了DUFF & PHELPS,随后又买下了Thomson Bankwatch,目前,公司97%的股权由法国FIMALAC公司控制。
-------------------------------------------*1975年美国证券交易委员会SEC认可惠誉国际、标准普尔、穆迪为“全国认定的评级组织”或称“NRSRO”(Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization)。
惠誉评级是与标普、穆迪齐名的全球三大评级公司之一。
在三大评级公司里,惠誉是最早进入中国的。
穆迪内部评级系统介绍
穆迪内部评级系统介绍由世界上最大的资信评级公司之一穆迪公司所研发设计的信用风险评估系统,是在欧美多家跨国银行被广泛应用的电子化信用风险管理系统。
该系统完全依据欧美银行的需求设计,因此在违约概率的测量、公司情况的评估、抵押物抵押价值的确定及信贷额度等级划分等方面并不一定适合于我国的实际情况。
但这一系统吸收了欧美银行多年来的信用风险控制经验,同时贯彻了新巴塞尔协议的相关要求,其内在的风险控制理念对我国商业银行信用风险控制体系的设计与完善具有相当强的借鉴意义。
故本文即对该系统作以下介绍。
穆迪系统的核心为如下公式:EL%=PD×LGD公式一这个公式涵盖了信用风险控制的全部内容。
EL%指预计损失率,PD指违约概率,LGD指违约损失率。
一、违约损失率(LGD)违约损失率(LGD)用于衡量银行在每一单位的名义风险敞口下,当借款人违约时所实际暴露的风险敞口。
它是一种与借款工具因素(即债项)相关的违约比率,其大小完全只与银行信贷额度所安排的借款工具相关,而与借款人的信用等级没有任何关系。
即对于任何一个借款人而言,如果使用的借款工具是完全相同的,那么计算出的违约损失率也必然相同;对于同一借款人而言,当其使用不同的借款工具时,违约损失率也可能会不同。
其计算公式是:违约损失率=违约敞口/名义风险敞口公式二其中,名义风险敞口指银行某一融资项目总的信贷额度风险敞口;违约敞口则是指扣除了抵押物的价值因素后的风险敞口,即当借款人出现违约时,银行实际风险暴露的数量。
违约损失率的计算步骤如下:(一)确定名义风险敞口的大小。
穆迪系统将名义风险敞口划分为表内金额和表外金额两种作区别对待。
前者即被视为实际借出的金额;后者则只是可能借出的金额,是一种或有风险。
对于表内金额,穆迪系统将其全额计算为名义风险敞口;对于不同种类的表外金额,则按照不同的比例(100%、75%、50%、20%)确定其名义风险敞口。
比如:银行保函和备用信用证等,将按照100%全额计算,因为一旦被要求,银行就必须无条件地进行全额偿付;而开立信用证等,则按照20%计算,因为银行拥有货权凭证,从而大大降低了损失可能性。
穆迪评级
穆迪评级流程解密评级分析师们通常依赖于公司的信用评级模型来评估风险,“他们很少做额外的信贷风险分析”,美国永久委员会的调查如此评价。
根据穆迪披露的公开信息,一个企业债券的初次评级过程通常会包括以下的程序。
首次评级的初次评级会议通常是在穆迪公司的总部举行,时间从半天到一天不等,穆迪可能还会作实地访问。
讨论的议题包括公司的债务结构、财务状况及流动资金来源等。
会议后,穆迪分析师会继续进行分析,通常还会与发行人进一步讨论,以获得及证实跟进资料。
结束分析后,穆迪分析师会向穆迪评级委员会作评级建议。
穆迪评级委员会相当于一个把关人的角色,在首次为某机构评级时,主管分析师会在完成所有分析后召开一次评级委员会会议,会议上讨论的因素包括债务发行的规模、信用的复杂性及新工具的引进。
穆迪的评级过程从初步讨论到公布评级,大约需要60到90天。
然而,这其中也有例外,穆迪透露,他们可以根据发行人的需要及时间安排,尽可能“灵活地”进行相应调整,以“配合”更紧凑的融资时间表及其他要求。
在授予及公布评级后,穆迪至少每年会与管理层会面一次,分析师会通过电子邮件及电话与发行人保持定期联络。
在最初评级之后,穆迪会发布季度或年度报告,并据此及时的作出评级调整。
以中新地产集团为例,其三年间的评级调整达到了10次。
而更为神秘的结构性金融产品的评级,则与传统的企业债券评级有所不同。
根据美国永久委员会的调查显示,在结构性金融产品的评级过程中,首先由发行商向评级机构提供相关的RMBS(住房抵押资产支持证券)和CDO(担保债务权证)的数据信息,包括相关抵押贷款和其他资产在内的资产池信息。
接下来则由评级机构分析师研究相关的结构性金融产品。
评级分析师们通常依赖于公司的信用评级模型来评估风险,“他们很少做额外的信贷风险分析”,美国永久委员会的调查如此评价。
以RMBS证券的信用评级为例,在穆迪,其相应的分析模型被称为M3,在标普则被称为LEVELS。
这两种模型都是基于大量按揭贷款的实际表现来收集数据,以做出预测。
国外地方政府评级方法及启示——以穆迪、标普为例
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穆迪评级分类
穆迪评级分类全文共四篇示例,供读者参考第一篇示例:穆迪评级是全球著名的信用评级公司之一,成立于1909年。
穆迪评级对各种金融产品和实体进行信用评级,帮助投资者更好地了解风险和回报。
穆迪评级主要根据债务人的偿债能力和风险来对其进行评级,评级范围从高到低依次为Aaa、Aa、A、Baa、Ba、B、Caa、Ca、C。
Aaa级为最高评级,表示债务人的偿债能力非常强,风险非常低。
一般来说,具有Aaa评级的债务证券属于最安全的投资品种,投资者购买这类债务证券一般来说不会面临太大的风险。
Aa级和A级则依次降低,Baa级为中等评级,表示债务人的偿债能力一般,风险较低。
Ba级、B级和C级则是高风险的评级,投资者购买这类债务证券可能面临债务人不履行还款承诺的风险。
C级为最低评级,表示债务人已经违约或者即将违约,投资者购买这类债务证券基本上已经不存在回收本金的可能性。
穆迪评级对于投资者来说非常重要,因为它可以帮助投资者更好地理解债务证券的风险和回报,从而做出更明智的投资决策。
穆迪评级也可以为债务人提供一个参考,帮助债务人提高债务信用质量,从而降低融资成本。
除了单项评级之外,穆迪评级还提供组合评级,即将不同债务证券组合在一起进行综合评级。
这种评级方法可以更好地反映债务人整体的偿债能力和风险水平,对于投资组合管理和风险控制非常有帮助。
最近几年,随着全球金融市场的不断发展和变化,穆迪评级也在不断创新和完善评级体系,例如引入ESG(环境、社会和治理)因素进行评级,以更好地反映债务人的全面风险。
穆迪评级还在不断加强与监管机构、投资者和债务人之间的沟通和合作,确保评级工作更加公正和透明。
穆迪评级在全球金融市场中扮演着重要的角色,为投资者提供了全面、专业的信用评级服务,帮助他们更好地管理风险、把握机会。
在未来,随着全球金融市场的不断发展和变化,穆迪评级将继续发挥其重要作用,为金融市场的稳健发展贡献力量。
第二篇示例:穆迪评级分类是指由国际知名的信用评级机构穆迪投资者服务(Moody's Investors Service)所进行的对各种金融产品、企业和政府的信用评级分类。
关于世界三大信用评级机构标普、惠誉、穆迪评判
海峡理工学院财务管理题目:关于世界三大信用评级机构标普、惠誉、穆迪评判专业:市场营销班级:10市场营销学生姓名:黄新文张春林李良栋邱晨章永垦钟辉汉刘斌河游泳完成时间:10小时目录一、引言 (3)(一)标普评级 (3)(二)穆迪评级 (3)(三)惠誉评级 (3)二、中、美、西、希、意近几年的主权信用评级 (4)三、世界三大信用评级机构标普、惠誉、穆迪评判 (4)(一)世界三大信用评级机构是否客观公正? (5)(二)三家垄断弊端多多 (5)四、综合论述 (5)(一)评价体系“硬伤”明显 (5)(二)中国是否合适建立评级机构? (6)(三)根据国际评级机构的这些弊端,中国应做出如下改进 (7)(四)在谈及中国信用评级体系的发展时,成思危提出四点意见。
(7)关于世界三大信用评级机构评判一、前言(一)标普评级标普的长期评级主要分为投资级和投机级两大类,投资级的评级具有信誉高和投资价值高的特点,投机级的评级则信用程度较低,违约风险逐级加大。
投资级包括AAA、AA、A 和BBB,投机级则分为BB、B、CCC、CC、C和D。
信用级别由高到低排列,AAA级具有最高信用等级;D级最低,视为对条款的违约。
从AA至CCC级,每个级别都可通过添加“+”或“-”来显示信用高低程度。
例如,在AA 序列中,信用级别由高到低依次为AA+、AA、AA-。
(二)穆迪评级穆迪长期评级针对一年期以上的债务,评估发债方的偿债能力,预测其发生违约的可能性及财产损失概率。
而短期评级一般针对一年期以下的债务。
穆迪长期评级共分九个级别:Aaa、Aa、A、Baa、Ba、B、Caa、Ca和C。
其中Aaa级债务的信用质量最高,信用风险最低;C级债务为最低债券等级,收回本金及利息的机会微乎其微。
在Aa到Caa的六个级别中,还可以添加数字1、2或3进一步显示各类债务在同类评级中的排位,1为最高,3则最低。
通常认为,从Aaa级到Baa3级属于投资级,从Ba1级以下则为投机级。
【信用管理】全球三大信用评级机构的分析比较
【信⽤管理】全球三⼤信⽤评级机构的分析⽐较源点credit来源于源点⽂章来源于⽂章导读:标准普尔、穆迪和惠誉作为全球三⼤评级机构已有⼀百多年的历史,在国际⾦融市场上拥有举⾜轻重的地位。
导读下⽂对三⼤机构的创⽴时间、信⽤等级划分标准和信⽤评级⽅法进⾏差异性分析,并从中借鉴经验。
创⽴时间年创办,是普尔出版公司和标准统计公司1941年合并⽽成世界权威由亨利·⽡纳姆·普尔先⽣在1860年创办,标准普尔标准普尔:由亨利⾦融分析机构,总部位于美国纽约市。
提供信⽤评级、独⽴分析研究、投资咨询等服务。
年创办,位于美国纽约曼哈顿,该公司是著名的债券评级机构。
穆迪投资服务公司穆迪:由由John Moody在1900年创办穆迪最初是邓⽩⽒的⼦公司,2001年邓⽩⽒公司和穆迪公司两家公司分拆,成为独⽴上市公司。
年创办,起初是⼀家出版公司,1924年就开始使⽤AAA到D级的评级系统对⼯业 惠誉国际由约翰·惠誉在1913年创办惠誉国际:由约翰证券进⾏评级。
穆迪侧重于机构融资⽅标普侧重于企业评级⽅⾯,穆迪标普成⽴时间早于其他两家评级机构,三家评级机构各有侧重:标普惠誉则更侧重于⾦融机构的评级。
⾯,⽽惠誉惠誉在美国市场上的规模要⽐其他两家评级公司⼩,但在全球市场上,尤其在对新兴市场上惠誉的敏感度较⾼,视野惠誉⽐较国际化。
信⽤等级标准的划分标准普尔的信⽤等级标准,从⾼到低可划分为⼗级,其中,可以在AA级⾄CCC级加上加号和减号,表⽰评级在各 标准普尔主要评级分类中的相对强度。
惠誉的信⽤等级标准划分为⼗⼀级,其中,AAA级是最⾼级,表⽰最低的信贷风险。
D是最低级,表明⼀个实体或 惠誉国家主权已对所有⾦融债务违约。
穆迪的信⽤等级标准划分为九级,其中Aaa级是最⾼级别,表⽰信⽤质量最⾼,信⽤风险最低。
其中C级是最低 穆迪级,代表前途⽆望,不能⽤来做真正的投资。
相同点:都划分投资级别和投机级别。
其中,标普的投资级是从AAA级到BBB-,穆迪的投资级是从Aaa级到Baa相同点:级。
五大评估机构
五大评估机构五大评估机构是指国际上最权威的评估机构,主要负责对国家、企业、金融产品等进行评估和信用评级。
这五大评估机构具有国际影响力,对于资本市场和金融行业具有重要作用。
以下是对这五大评估机构的简介。
一、标准普尔全球评级(Standard & Poor's, S&P)标准普尔全球评级成立于1860年,总部位于美国纽约。
该机构是全球最大的信用评级机构之一,主要从事对国家、企业、金融机构、证券等进行信用评级工作。
标准普尔全球评级以AAA为最高评级,D为最低评级。
二、穆迪评级(Moody's Investors Service)穆迪评级成立于1909年,总部位于美国纽约。
该机构是全球最早的信用评级机构之一,也是最著名和最具权威性的评级机构之一。
穆迪评级对国家、企业、金融产品等进行信用评级,最高评级为Aaa,最低评级为C。
三、惠誉全球评级(Fitch Ratings)惠誉全球评级成立于1913年,总部位于美国纽约。
该机构是全球著名的信用评级机构之一,与标准普尔全球评级、穆迪评级并称为“三大评级机构”。
惠誉全球评级主要从事对国家、企业、金融产品等进行评级,最高评级为AAA,最低评级为D。
四、道琼斯全球评级(Dow Jones Credit Rating)道琼斯全球评级成立于1973年,总部位于美国纽约。
该机构是全球知名的评级机构之一,其评级主要涵盖企业、金融机构和证券等领域。
道琼斯全球评级的最高评级为AAA,最低评级为D。
五、中国联合评级(China Chengxin Credit Rating Group, CCXI)中国联合评级成立于1992年,总部位于中国北京。
该机构是中国领先的信用评级机构,也是亚洲最大的信用评级机构之一。
中国联合评级主要从事对中国境内市场的政府债券、企业债券、中长期信贷等进行信用评级,最高评级为AAA,最低评级为D。
以上就是五大评估机构的简介。
这五大评估机构是国际上最权威和有影响力的评估机构,其评级结果对于资本市场和金融行业具有重要的指导和参考价值。
人保财险穆迪评级
人保财险穆迪评级(原创版)目录1.人保财险概述2.穆迪评级的概念和作用3.人保财险的穆迪评级情况4.穆迪评级对人保财险的影响5.结论正文【人保财险概述】人保财险,全称中国人民保险集团股份有限公司,成立于 1949 年,是中国最大的综合性保险金融集团之一。
其业务范围涵盖财产保险、人寿保险、健康保险、意外保险、再保险等领域。
多年来,人保财险一直致力于为广大客户提供优质的保险产品和服务。
【穆迪评级的概念和作用】穆迪评级,是由国际著名评级机构穆迪公司进行的信用评级。
穆迪评级主要针对各国政府、金融机构、工商企业等进行信用等级评定,以评估其违约风险。
穆迪评级对于投资者、金融机构以及政府部门具有重要的参考价值,可以帮助各方更好地了解和评估投资风险。
【人保财险的穆迪评级情况】根据公开信息,人保财险曾获得穆迪评级机构的 A2 评级,这是穆迪评级体系中的较高评级,表明人保财险具有较强的偿债能力和较低的违约风险。
这一评级结果不仅证明了人保财险的财务实力,也为投资者提供了信心。
【穆迪评级对人保财险的影响】穆迪评级对人保财险的影响主要体现在以下几个方面:首先,评级结果能够提升人保财险在国际金融市场的声誉和地位,吸引更多海外投资者关注和投资。
其次,评级结果有助于人保财险拓展业务,提高竞争力。
与同行业的其他保险公司相比,较高的穆迪评级结果使人保财险在市场竞争中具有一定优势。
最后,评级结果对人保财险的融资成本也有一定影响。
通常情况下,评级较高的企业融资成本相对较低,有利于降低人保财险的财务成本。
【结论】总的来说,人保财险的穆迪评级对其在金融市场的发展具有积极意义。
穆迪公司的评级体系
穆迪公司的评级体系
穆迪公司是全球最大的评级机构之一,其评级体系包括信用评级、国家评级和行业评级等。
其中,信用评级是最为常见和重要的评级类型,其评级对象包括企业、银行、政府及其他债务发行者。
穆迪公司的信用评级体系从最高到最低分别为Aaa、Aa、A、Baa、Ba、B、Caa、Ca和C。
其中,Aaa代表极高的信用质量,C代表极低
的信用质量,而其他等级则在这两个极端之间。
在评定信用等级时,穆迪公司会考虑多种因素,包括债务偿还能力、流动性、经济环境、行业前景等。
评级结果会对债务发行者的融资成本和市场声誉产生影响。
除了信用评级,穆迪公司还对国家和行业进行评级。
国家评级主要考虑政治稳定性、经济实力和货币政策等方面,而行业评级则从行业前景、竞争格局和监管环境等方面进行评估。
总的来说,穆迪公司的评级体系在全球范围内具有重要的影响力,其评级结果被广泛应用于金融市场、企业融资和投资决策等领域。
- 1 -。
三大评级机构
三大评级机构目前国际公认的专业信用评级机构只有三家,分别是穆迪、标准普尔和惠誉国际。
1、穆迪(Moody)公司的创始人是约翰·穆迪,他在1909年出版的《铁路投资分析》一书中发表了债券资信评级的观点,使资信评级首次进入证券市场,他开创了利用简单的资信评级符号来分辨250家公司发行的90种债券的做法,正是这种做法才将资信评级机构与普通的统计机构区分开来,因此后人普遍认为资信评级最早始于穆迪的铁道债券资信评级。
1913年,穆迪将资信评级扩展到公用事业和工业债券上,并创立了利用公共资料进行第三方独立资信评级或无经授权的资信评级方式。
穆迪评级和研究的对象以往主要是公司和政府债务、机构融资证券和商业票据,最近几年开始对证券发行主体、保险公司债务、银行贷款、衍生产品、银行存款和其他银行债以及管理基金等进行评级。
目前,穆迪在全球有800名分析专家,1700多名助理分析员,在17个国家设有机构,2003年评级和分析的债券总额超过30兆美元,其股票在纽约证交所上市交易(代码MCO)。
2、标准普尔(S&P)由普尔出版公司和标准统计公司于1941年合并而成。
普尔出版公司的历史可追溯到1860年,当时其创始人普尔先生(Henry V. Poor)出版了《铁路历史》及《美国运河》,率先开始金融信息服务和债券评级。
1966年标准普尔被麦克劳希尔公司(McGraw Hill)收购。
公司主要对外提供关于股票、债券、共同基金和其他投资工具的独立分析报告,为世界各地超过22万多家证券及基金进行信用评级,目前拥有分析家1200名,在全球设有40家机构,雇用5000多名员工。
3、惠誉国际(Fitch)是1913年由约翰·惠誉(John K.Fitch)创办,起初是一家出版公司,他于1924年就开始使用AAA到D级的评级系统对工业证券进行评级。
近年来,惠誉进行了多次重组和并购,规模不断扩大。
1997年公司并购了另一家评级机构IBCA,2000年并购了DUFF & PHELPS,随后又买下了Thomson Bankwatch,目前,公司97%的股权由法国FIMALAC公司控制,在全球有45个分支机构,1400多员工,900多评级分析师,业务主要包括国家、地方政府、金融机构、企业和机构融资评级,迄今已对1600家金融机构、1000多家企业、70个国家、1400个地方政府和78%的全球机构融资进行了评级。
穆迪信用评级体系
穆迪信⽤评级体系穆迪信⽤评级体系穆迪信⽤评级级别由最⾼的Aaa级到最低的C级,⼀共有⼆⼗⼀个级别。
评级级别分为两个部分,包括投资等级和投机等级。
投资级别评定说明Aaa级优等信⽤质量最⾼,信⽤风险最低。
利息⽀付有充⾜保证,本⾦安全。
为还本付息提供保证的因素即使变化,也是可预见的。
发⾏地位稳固。
Aa级(Aa1,Aa2,Aa3)⾼级信⽤质量很⾼,有较低的信⽤风险。
本⾦利息安全。
但利润保证不如Aaa级债券充⾜,为还本付息提供保证的因素波动⽐Aaa级债券⼤。
A级(A1,A2,A3)中上级投资品质优良。
本⾦利息安全,但有可能在未来某个时候还本付息的能⼒会下降。
Baa级(Baa1,Baa2,Baa3)中级保证程度⼀般。
利息⽀付和本⾦安全现在有保证,但在相当长远的⼀些时间内具有不可靠性。
缺乏优良的投资品质。
投机级别评定说明Ba级(Ba1,Ba2,Ba2)具有投机性质的因素不能保证将来的良好状况。
还本付息的保证有限,⼀旦经济情况发⽣变化,还本付息能⼒将削弱。
具有不稳定的特征。
B级(B1,B2,B3)缺少理想投资的品质还本付息,或长期内履⾏合同中其它条款的保证极⼩。
Caa级(Caa1,Caa2,Caa3)劣质债券有可能违约,或现在就存在危及本息安全的因素。
Ca级⾼度投机性经常违约,或有其它明显的缺点。
C级最低等级评级前途⽆望,不能⽤来做真正的投资。
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CORPORATES MAY 24, 2012Each of the factors (except the Financial Policy factor) also encompass a number of sub-factors that weexplain in detail. Since an issuer’s scoring on a particular grid factor often will not match its overallrating, in the Appendix we include a discussion of “outliers” – companies whose grid-indicated ratingfor a specific sub-factor differs significantly from the actual rating.This rating methodology is not intended to be an exhaustive discussion of all factors that Moody’sanalysts consider to be pertinent for ratings in the passenger airline sector. We note that our analysisfor ratings in this sector covers factors that are common across all industries (such as ownership,management, liquidity, legal structure in the corporate organization, corporate governance) as well asfactors that can be meaningful on a company-specific basis. Our ratings consider qualitativeconsiderations and factors that do not lend themselves to a transparent presentation in a grid format.The grid represents a compromise between greater complexity that would result in grid-indicatedratings that map more closely to actual ratings, and simplicity that enhances a transparent presentationof the factors that are most important for ratings in this sector most of the time.Highlights of this report include:»An overview of the rated universe» A summary of the rating methodology» A description of the key factors that drive rating quality»Comments on the grid assumptions and limitations, including a discussion of ratingconsiderations that are not included in the grid.The Appendices show the full grid (Appendix A), tables that illustrate the application of themethodology grid to the covered issuers with explanatory comments on some of the more significantdifferences between the grid-implied rating for each sub-factor and our actual rating (Appendix B)1.About the Rated UniverseWe presently rate fourteen passenger airlines using this methodology, covering approximately $30billion of rated debt. These companies represent a diverse group of issuers with ratings (seniorunsecured rating or Corporate Family Rating) ranging from Baa3 to Caa1.Seven of the rated airlines are based in the US; three are from Europe and the remainder come fromeither Australia, Brazil, Canada or New Zealand. Of the rated airlines, only three are investment gradebeing; Qantas, Air New Zealand and Southwest Airlines. The median rating for the industry issituated at B1.2 The relatively low ratings for the sector reflect the effect of high fuel prices on thesecompanies ability to generate earnings and free cash flow at levels that would lead to more supportivefinancial leverage measures. Additionally, sustained pressure on non-fuel costs, particularly labor as thework force becomes more tenured and the need to replace older, less fuel-efficient aircraft should limitthe extent of any improvement in credit profiles in upcoming years.1In general, the actual rating utilized for comparison to the grid-implied rating is the Corporate Family Rating (CFR) for speculative-grade issuers and senior unsecured rating for investment-grade issuers.2For the purposes of comparability in this methodology, Moody’s compares individual corporate family ratings (CFR) and senior unsecured ratings. As both Air New Zealand (ANZ) and Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) are partially owned by their respective governments, their corporate family ratings reflect implied government support. However for the purpose of grid outliers, we will refer to the Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA) of these airlines, which represents an assessment of their credit standing excluding government support. ANZ’s BCA is 11, equivalent to Ba1, and SAS’ BCA is 18, equivalent to Caa2.The following table illustrates the distribution of ratings in the passenger airline industry.FIGURE 1Table of Passenger Airline RatingsC ompany Name Moody’s RatingOutlookDomicileRated DebtInstruments (US$ millions)1 Qantas Airways Ltd Baa3 Stable Australia 1,2852 Air New Zealand Limited Baa3 Negative New Zealand - 3 Southwest Airlines Co Baa3 Stable United States 2,6774 Deutsche Lufthansa Ba1 Stable Germany 2,755 5 Allegiant Travel Company Ba3 Stable United States 1256 British Airways Plc B1 Positive United Kingdom 9857 Continental Airlines, Inc B2 Stable United States 10,6618 Delta Air Lines, IncB2 Stable United States 8,2829 United Continental Holdings, Inc B2 Stable United States - 10 Gol Linhas Aereas Inteligentes B3 Stable Brazil - 11 JetBlue Airways Corp B3 Stable United States 793 12 Air CanadaCaa1 Stable Canada 1,100 13 U.S Airways Group Inc. Caa1 Stable United States 1,168 14Scandanavian Airline SystemCaa1StableSweden138About This Rating MethodologyThis report explains the rating methodology for global passenger airlines in six sections, which are summarized as follows. The first three sections are embedded in the rating factor discussions. The fourth section (Mapping Issuers to the Grid and Discussion of Grid Outliers) is in Appendix B. The last two sections follow the rating factor discussions.1. Identification and Discussion of the Key Grid FactorsThe grid in this rating methodology focuses on four broad rating factors and weightings. The four broad factors are further broken down into eight sub-factors.FIGURE 2:Global Passenger Airline IndustryBroad Rating factorsFactor WeightingsRating Sub FactorSub-Factor WeightingCost Structure 16%Fleet Age (average in years) 8%EBITDA Margin 8% Market Conditions 28%Business Profile 20%Geographic Diversity8%Coverage and Leverage 36%EBIT/Interest12%RCF/Net debt 12%Debt/EBITDA 12% Financial Policy 20% Financial Policy 20% Total100%100%2. Measurement or Estimation of the Key Grid FactorsWe explain below how the sub-factors for each grid factor are calculated or estimated for the grid and the weighting for each individual sub-factor. We also explain the rationale for using each particular factor, and the ways in which we apply them during the rating process. The information used in scoring the sub-factors in the grid is found in or calculated from information in company financial statements, derived from other observations or estimated by Moody’s analysts.Moody’s ratings are forward-looking and incorporate our expectations for future financial and operating performance. We use both historical and projected financial results in the rating process. Historical results help us understand patterns and trends for a company’s performance and facilitates peer comparisons under a particular set of industry conditions. We utilize historical data (in most cases, the last 12 months of reported results) in this methodology publication to illustrate the application of the rating grid. All of the quantitative credit metrics incorporate Moody’s standard adjustments to income statement, cash flow statement and balance sheet amounts for restructuring, impairment, off-balance sheet accounts, receivable securitization programs, under-funded pension obligations, and recurring operating leases.For definitions of most common ratio terms please see Moody’s Basic Definitions for Credit Statistics, User’s Guide (June 2011, document #78480). For a description of Moody’s standard adjustments, please see Moody’s Approach to Global Standard Adjustments in the Analysis of Financial Statements for Non-Financial Corporations (December 2010, document #128137). These documents can be found at .3. Mapping Grid Factors to the Rating CategoriesAfter estimating or calculating each sub-factor, the outcomes for each of the eight sub-factors are mapped to a broad Moody’s rating category (Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, Caa, or Ca).4. Mapping Issuers to the Grid and Discussion of Grid OutliersIn this section (Appendix B), we provide a table showing how each company maps to grid-indicated ratings for each rating factor and sub-factor. The weighted average of the sub-factor ratings produces a grid-indicated rating for each factor. We highlight companies whose grid-indicated performance on a specific sub-factor is two or more broad rating categories higher or lower than its actual rating and discuss (also in Appendix B) general reasons for such positive and negative outliers for a particular sub-factor.5. Assumptions and Limitations and Rating Considerations Not Included in the GridThis section discusses limitations in the use of the grid to map against actual ratings, additional factors that are not included in the grid that can be important in determining ratings and limitations and assumptions that pertain to the overall rating methodology.6. Determining the Overall Grid-Indicated RatingTo determine the overall grid-indicated rating, we convert each of the eight sub-factor ratings into a numeric value based upon the scale below.Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Ca1 3 6 9 12 15 18 20The numerical score for each sub-factor is multiplied by the weight for that sub-factor with the results then summed to produce a composite weighted-factor score. The composite weighted factor score is then mapped back to an alphanumeric rating based on the ranges in the table below. For example, an issuer with a composite weighted factor score of 11.7 would have a Ba2 grid-indicated rating.Grid-Indicated RatingGrid-Indicated Rating Aggregate Weighted Total Factor ScoreAaa x < 1.5Aa1 1.5 ≤ x < 2.5Aa2 2.5 ≤ x < 3.5Aa3 3.5 ≤ x < 4.5A1 4.5 ≤ x < 5.5A2 5.5 ≤ x < 6.5A3 6.5 ≤ x < 7.5Baa1 7.5 ≤ x < 8.5Baa2 8.5 ≤ x < 9.5Baa3 9.5 ≤ x < 10.5Ba1 10.5 ≤ x < 11.5Ba2 11.5 ≤ x < 12.5Ba3 12.5 ≤ x < 13.5B1 13.5 ≤ x < 14.5B2 14.5 ≤ x < 15.5B3 15.5 ≤ x < 16.5Caa1 16.5 ≤ x < 17.5Caa2 17.5 ≤ x < 18.5Caa3 18.5 ≤ x < 19.5Ca x ≥ 19.5Discussion of the Key Grid FactorsMoody’s analysis of passenger airlines focuses on four broad factors:»Cost Structure»Market Conditions»Coverage and Leverage»Financial PolicyRating Factor 1: Cost StructureWhy it mattersOperating costs are an important factor in the ratings of most issuers, and particularly so in the airline industry, given the usually high operating leverage and the continued growth of LCC’s (Low Cost Carriers) with lower cost structures.The increased presence of LCCs focusing on lower operating costs and competing on price has prompted legacy airlines, with higher cost bases and less operating flexibility, to react by attempting to reduce costs or operate their own low cost carriers. LCC’s have benefitted from economic downturns in recent years relative to legacy carriers with their higher cost structures, but their inroads into the market have changed the structure of the industry. LCCs also tend to focus on point-to-point routes, which are simpler to schedule than the routes of legacy carriers. The latter tend to have a hub-and–spoke network, which has more complicated schedules and connections. This difference results in lower costs for LCCs.Airlines tend to lease a high proportion of their fleet, which we capitalize as debt in our debt metrics (including Debt/EBITDA and RCF/Net Debt). Airlines have been able to terminate certain leases to adjust to changes in demand, although this can be a slow process while demand can fluctuate much more rapidly. I n addition, airlines are frequently reluctant to give up slots at airports during a downturn, meaning that certain routes operate at sub-optimal capacity. Finally, a substantial portion of an airline’s costs are partially out of its control, such as fuel prices and landing charges, or are subject to regulatory requirements, such as maintenance and mandated sizes for flight crews. These characteristics make it challenging to adjust the cost base to changes in demand.Fleet ageWe use fleet age as a proxy indicator for operating efficiency. More specific data, such as operating and maintenance costs, are not transparently and consistently disclosed by the airlines.A young fleet has several advantages:»Younger fleets need less maintenance (in the near term), which in some cases is covered by manufacturers warranties, and thus are generally cheaper to operate in the early years;»Newer aircraft are more fuel efficient, also decreasing operating costs; and»Newer aircraft are better matched to the near-term needs of the airline, as opposed to older fleets.The latter may have outlived the needs prevailing at the time of their purchase and are now used sub-optimally.»An airline with a younger fleet has more time before major capital expenditures are required for re-fleeting, whereas an older fleet implies greater capex over the near to medium termFleet age doesn’t encompass all fleet characteristics that are important to credit quality. Our ratings also consider other fleet characteristics on a qualitative basis. Some other characteristics that can result in credit differentiation are:More homogeneous fleets (as exhibited by some LCCs) are cheaper to maintain as there is less demand for maintenance staff to become qualified across different aircraft types, and such fleets require lower parts inventories and can be advantageous when routes are of similar distance. Airlines that operate onregional, short-haul and long-haul routes will require a number of different types of aircraft due torange considerations, passenger demand on certain routes and differing airport infrastructures; andDifferences in the way an airline finances its fleet. Some airlines own large portions of their fleet,financed with retained cash flow, equity and unsecured debt, others enter into operating or financeleases to finance particular aircraft, while others enter into wet leases3 which have more flexibility, butwill generally be subject to more price variability than either of the two other options;EBITDA MarginPersonnel, fuel costs and maintenance account for most of the individual elements of the operatingcosts of any airline. EBITDA margin is an indicator of overall cost efficiency.An airline’s EBI TDA margin captures the relationship between the revenue gained from all airlinerevenue-generating activities (both passenger and non-passenger) and the costs of operations. I tillustrates the airline’s cost discipline and flexibility in line with its revenue-generating opportunities.The ratio reflects the changes in a number of underlying variables (including revenue yield, loadfactors and cost structure). Such variables are also considered in isolation.I n addition, most larger airlines tend to be members of one of the major global airline alliances(Oneworld, Star Alliance, SkyTeam), which enables them to codeshare or maintain virtual networks,share airport lounges, and other facilities and services and provides a cost advantage.Cost Structure - How We Measure or Estimate It For The Grid:Fleet ageAverage age of the fleet in yearsEBITDA MarginEBITDA divided by net revenueFACTOR 1Cost StructureFactor Sub-Factor Moody'sWeight Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Ca1 3 6 9 12 15 18 20COST STRUCTURE Fleet Age (averagein years)8% <3, with oneaircraft type<3, with more thanone aircraft type3-5 5-8 8-11 11-15 15-18 >= 18EBITDA Margin 8% >= 40% 35% - 40% 30% -35%25%-30%20%-25%15%-20%10-15% <10%3 A wet lease is generally a short-term lease under which an airline leases aircraft and crew.Rating Factor 2: Market ConditionsWhy it MattersThe business profile and geographic diversity sub-factors consider how differences in an airline’s operating model affect its ability to preserve its credit standing over the course of the economic cycle.We typically consider diversification, be it product, service line, or geography, as a positive factor for an issuer’s credit strength. The more exposure to multiple markets, the greater the ability for the results of the consolidated company to withstand an adverse event isolated to a specific market.We also consider the diversity of an airline’s network within a given geographic market. For example, while lacking diverse international networks, Southwest Airlines and Gol Linhas Aereas have diverse domestic networks and strong market penetration within their respective countries. We score each of these issuers’ geographic diversity at “B” using the Grid. However, the high market share within their respective geographies reflects positively in our deliberations of the rating we assign to each of these companies.In assessing diversity, we also take into account the percentage of revenue an issuer derives from its largest market. A company with a diversified network that derives no more than 50% of revenue from one continent can score in the investment-grade range for geographic diversity.The business profile sub-factor considers how well a carrier can withstand a downturn in demand in order to manage and reduce volatility in earnings. Recent years have been volatile even by airline industry standards due to high fuel prices and the global financial crisis of 2008. Fuel represents the largest single cost for most, if not all airlines.Challenging fundamentals caused airline management teams to abandon the market share strategies that the industry had executed for many years. Capacity discipline, fare increases and a sharp focus on non-fuel costs are the primary levers that the airlines have to pull when facing high fuel costs or weak demand in the current environment where airline companies are trying to improve generally very weak returns on invested capital.At about sixty to seventy percent of total operating expenses, fuel and labor comprise the majority of operating expenses. The airlines have little flexibility on each of these cost lines, which compounds the need for extreme diligence on managing the remainder of its operating expenses to help reduce the extent of operating losses during cyclic troughs or periods of high fuel. Operating losses or modest operating profit margins in recent years because of the inability to completely offset higher fuel prices highlights the challenges the industry has in maintaining profitability. However, the prioritization of returns on invested capital ahead of market share, if maintained, should help to lessen the amplitude of swings in profits over the course of the economic cycle.Allegiant Travel Company scores higher than its much larger network peers because of its differentiated business model. Providing non-stop service to certain leisure destinations with mainline aircraft from smaller cities with no direct competition helps Allegiant demonstrate less volatility in earnings. The company’s fleet strategy of operating MD-80 aircraft that require capital investment of below $5 million per aircraft is a key factor of its operating profit advantage.Airlines with younger fleets could also benefit in the scoring of this sub-factor if they can demonstrate lower volatility of earnings. Additionally, carriers with other operations, such as maintenance and orfood service segments, could also demonstrate lower earnings volatility because of relateddiversification benefits.Market Conditions - How We Assess It For The Grid:Business ProfileThis sub-factor is assessed by considering the variability in an airline’s earnings, the relative positioningof its non-fuel unit operating costs, the structure of its fleet and its market and competitive positions.Geographic DiversityThis sub-factor considers the breadth of an airline’s route network across the globe. We typicallyestimate geographic diversity by the revenues derived from an issuer’s various markets. Because ofvariations in the level of detail the airlines provide in their financial reports, we may make estimatesscoring this sub-factor.FACTOR 2Market ConditionsSub-Factor Moody'sWeight Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Ca1 3 6 9 12 15 18 20Business Profile 20% Expectedvolatility inresults isalmost non-existent.Supported by acommandingmarketposition.Entrenchedstructural costadvantages. Very lowexpectedvolatility inresults.Supported by aleading andhighlydefensiblemarketposition. Verystrong anddurable costadvantages.Low expectedvolatility inresults.Supported by astrong marketposition andvisiblecompetitiveadvantages.Strong costadvantages.Moderateexpectedvolatility inresults.Supported by asolid marketposition and atleast one clearcompetitiveadvantage.Costefficiencies aregood comparedwith theindustry.Results arevulnerable toperiods ofheightenedvolatility. Suchexposure istempered by anestablishedmarketposition. Costadvantages areunlikely to bedurable.Results areexpected to behighly volatile.Market positioncould quicklyerode. Weakcostadvantages.Results areexpected to beextremelyvolatile. Highexposure toemerging andnewtechnology.Volatileoperating costs.Near termresults aredifficult topredict withany degree ofconfidence.Geographic Diversity 8% Extensivelydiversifiednetwork withno continentaccounting formore than 20%of revenueHighlydiversifiednetwork withno continentaccounting formore than 30%of revenueDiverse rangeof destinationson differentcontinents withno singlecontinentaccounting formore than 40%of revenueWell diversifiednetwork.Reliant on onecontinent formore than 40%of revenueDestinationsare located onat least threedifferentcontinents, butone continentaccounts formore than 50%of revenueDestinationsareconcentratedwithin one ortwo continentsRegional/localnetworkFragmentedregionalnetworkRating Factor 3: Coverage and LeverageWhy it mattersWe use various financial metrics to compare the financial strength of one airline with that of anotherand to assess performance over time. A period of several years is usually more significant, given thelevel of volatility in earnings in the airline sector . Financial metrics used in the grid are adjusted as perMoody’s Global Adjustments in the Analysis of Financial Statements for Non-FinancialCorporations4. These metrics are often used in our analysis of issuers in other industries and providethe basis for comparing airlines with each other and other rated entities.Notes on measurement criteriaWe include three fundamental credit ratios in the grid: EBIT/Interest, RCF/Net Debt, andDebt/EBITDA. We focus on both gross and net debt (debt less cash) ratios. While cash holdings canbe used to support the business by funding operating costs or capital expenditures, or for retiring debt,cash can also be paid-out to shareholders.Interest CoverageInterest coverage is one indication of a company’s ability to fund the cost of its borrowed capital.Weak interest coverage can indicate elevated default risk as well as limited ability to generate sufficientcash flow to fund capital expenditures which are significant in the airline sector.Leverage and cash flowDebt-to-EBITDA is an indicator for the degree to which a company has borrowed against earnings. Alower level of adjusted debt relative to EBITDA is indicative of a company’s ability to service debt andits degree of flexibility to incur additional debt to maintain and improve its competitive positionthrough investing in new aircraft or routes.Retained Cash Flow to Net Debt is an indicator for a company’s cash generation ability relative to itsdebt burden, and its potential to pay down debt after payments of dividends (depending on its capitalexpenditure requirements). The comparison of this metric between the majority of airline and non-airline companies can be skewed because many airlines no longer pay dividends (or pay materiallyreduced dividends) on account of weak industry earnings.An investment grade rating is consistent with a low, and sustainable, adjusted gross leverage ratio in theairline industry. In recent years, even the strongest airlines have seen significant volatility in their ratios.Coverage and Leverage - How We Measure Or Estimate It For The Grid :»EBIT/InterestLTM5 EBIT divided by LTM total interest expense»RCF/Net DebtRatio of LTM Retained Cash Flow (funds from operations minus dividends) to consolidated netdebt»Debt/EBITDARatio of consolidated debt to LTM EBITDA4Moody's Approach to Global Standard Adjustments in the Analysis of Financial Statements for Non-Financial Corporations – December 20105“LTM” : last twelve monthsFACTOR 3Coverage and LeverageFactorSub-FactorMoody's WeightAaaAaABaaBaBCaaCa1 3 6 9 12 15 18 20 COVERAGE AND LEVERAGEEBIT/Interest12% >= 8x 6.0x - 8.0x 4.5x - 6.0x 3.5x - 4.5x2x - 3.5x1x - 2x 0-1x <0x RCF/Net Debt 12% >= 55% 45% - 55% 35% - 45% 25% - 35% 15% - 25%5% - 15%3%-5%< 3%Debt/EBITDA12%<1.0x1.0x -2.0x 2.0x –3.0x 3.0x -4.0x 4.0x to 6.0x 6.0x - 8.0x 8.0x - 10.0 x >= 10.0 xRating Factor 4: Financial PolicyWhy it mattersManagement and board tolerance for financial risk is an important indicator for credit risk, as it influences leverage and financial stability over time.Financial Policy - How We Assess It For The Grid:We consider the company’s desired capital structure, its financing, liquidity and hedging strategies and its proclivity for strategic changes, including acquisitions. We assess previous adherence to statedcommitments, how cash flow has been used in the past, including the record of balancing shareholder and debtholder interests and level of caution in management of the company’s liquidity profile. Based on our understanding of past actions, the incentives and pressures on management and its strategic goals, we form a subjective forward looking view about likely future performance.FACTOR 4Financial PolicyFactor Moody's WeightAaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Ca13 6 9 12 15 18 20 FINANCIAL POLICY20% Expected tohave a highly conservative financial policy with an ability and willingness to fund all requirements from internal sources and alwayssubstantially FCF positive. Commitment to highest credit quality.Expected to have a very conservative financial policy with an ability and willingness to fund all requirements from internal sources and always FCF positive.Commitment to very high credit quality.Expected to have aconservative and balanced financial policy with an ability and willingness to fund all requirements from internal sources and consistently FCF positive through the cycle.Commitment to high credit quality.Expected to have a balancedfinancial policy however with potential for rating migration followingacquisitions. An ability to fund allrequirements from internal sources with a solidcommitment to metrics that are consistent withinvestment grade levels.Expected to have a financial policy that favorsshareholder returns;elevated event risk related to acquisitions or capital structure change. Likely to be largely FCF neutral: able to fund all requirements, including some portion of growth capex from internal sources. Bank credit facilities are secured; substantial covenant room.Expected to have a financial policy that is very focused on shareholder returns; FCF is frequently negative. Alternate sources of liquidity are limited; bank credit facilities maybe be fully secured with modest covenant cushion.Expected to have a financial policy that is unfavorable to creditors; ability tointernally fund working capital andmaintenance capex is highly uncertain, alternate sources of liquidity are not available; debtrestructuring likely.Expected to have financial policies that couldcontribute to a high likelihood of default although one that isovershadowed by the severity of credit metrics.。