《劳动经济学》(作者Borjas)第九章习题答案
劳动经济学复习题及答案85016
劳动经济学第一章至第七章课后复习题及答案第一章课后练习题及答案1、如何理解劳动力需求的含义答：劳动力需求是指，在一定时期内，在某种工资率下雇主愿意并能够雇佣到的劳动力的数量。
劳动力需求和三个问题密切相关：第一，劳动力需求是派生性需求；第二，边际生产力理论是劳动力需求理论的支持理论之一；第三：劳动力需求是意愿和支付能力的统一。
2、何为劳动力需求弹性答：劳动力的需求弹性是指劳动力需求量（及供给量）的变化对工资水平变化的影响程度。
劳动力供给量大的时候，如工资下降幅度大，说明供给弹性大，如果工资不怎么变化，则说明供给弹性需求小。
按绝对值的大小，劳动力需求弹性共有5种状态。
3、工资率和产品需求的变化如何对劳动力需求产生影响答：工资上升对劳动力需求产生的影响有两种，一个是替代效应，一个是规模效应。
产品价格的上涨，会使销售额下降，产出量减少，因而企业会对劳动力的需求量下降。
4、在考察劳动力需求时通常有哪些假设条件答：生产技术的假设、组织目标的假设、市场环境的假设、劳动力是否同质的假设。
5、试分析安全竞争条件下的企业短期劳动需求。
答：完全竞争的企业是指企业所处的产品和要素市场都是完全竞争的。
在产品市场和要素市场上供求的双方人数都很多，产品与产品之间、要素与要素之间没有任何区别，产品和要素的供求双方都具有完全的信息，产品和要素可以充分自由的流动，等等。
企业使用劳动要素的原则是利润最大化，即增加一单位劳动的使用所带来的“边际收益”即劳动的边际产品价值和“边际成本”即工资相等。
公式：MPL·P ＝W单个企业的劳动需求曲线与其边际产品价值曲线重合，并且向右下方倾斜。
整个市场的劳动需求曲线可以看成是所有企业的劳动需求曲线的简单水平加总。
该曲线仍然是向右下方倾斜的，但比边际产品价值曲线要陡峭。
6、企业长期劳动力需求有哪些特点答：长期劳动力需求曲线比短期劳动需求曲线平缓，这也意味着长期劳动力需求比短期劳动需求弹性大。
劳动经济学 课后答案
第一章导言名词解释劳动——有劳动能力和劳动经验的人在生产过程中有目的的支出劳动力的活动劳动力——在早期的概念中，劳动力指从事体力劳动为主的“劳工”，即“工人”或产业工人，马克思理论把劳动力看作可变资本，知识经济时代脑力与体力劳动者的差别已不表现在劳动的本质特征上。
“员工”这一范畴被企业以及各类组织广泛使用劳动市场——劳动力供求的市场劳动经济学——劳动经济学是对劳动力资源配置的市场经济活动过程中的劳动力需求和供给的行为、及其影响因素的分析和研究。
人口经济学——人口经济学研究人口的生产与再生产的经济问题、人口自然增长的经济规律，特别是人口对物质资源消费的影响是其集中要研究的对象和任务人力资源管理——对人力资源进行有效开发、合理配置、充分利用和科学管理的制度、法令、程序和方法的总和。
实证经济学——两个假设前提：稀缺性；理性在一定的假设前提下，人们的行为是怎样的规范经济学——用互惠原则去衡量经济效益的好坏和制度政策的利弊，分析经济行为人的选择应该是什么的问题简答题1、谈谈你对劳动经济学研究对象的理解。
第一，在效用最大化假设下，劳动力资源的投入产出机理。
第二，劳动经济学研究劳动力市场的运行和结果。
第三，劳动经济学是对劳动力资源配置的市场经济活动过程中的劳动力需求和供给的行为、及其影响因素的分析和研究。
2、举例说明运用规范经济学或者实证经济学研究现实劳动经济或人力资源管理问题的价值。
实证经济学实际上是一种对人的经济行为进行研究和分析的一种理论。
它建立在两个假说之上，即稀缺性和人是有理性的。
从稀缺性方面来讲，正是由于稀缺性的存在，才产生了经济学上的“机会成本”概念。
它隐含的一个重要命题是人们对资源的使用存在着供求问题，存在着成本特别是机会成本问题。
所以，劳动力资源也是稀缺的。
而这种稀缺的程度可以通过劳动力的价格---工资反映出来。
比如，每年应届大学生的求职，在多种职业只能有一种选择，而用人单位也只能在李四或者是王五之间做出唯一的聘用选择。
《劳动经济学》(作者Borjas)第九章习题答案
CHAPTER 99-1. Suppose a worker with an annual discount rate of 10 percent currently resides in Pennsylvania and is deciding whether to remain there or to move to Illinois. There are three work periods left in the life cycle. If the worker remains in Pennsylvania, he will earn $20,000 per year in each of the three periods. If the worker moves to Illinois, he will earn $22,000 in each of the three periods. What is the highest cost of migration that a worker is willing to incur and still make the move?The worker must compare the present value of staying in Pennsylvania to the present value of moving to Illinois. A worker will move if the present value of earnings in Illinois minus the costs of moving there exceed the present value of earnings in Pennsylvania:74.710,54$)1.1(000,201.1000,20000,202=++=PA PV and82.181,60$)1.1(000,221.1000,22000,222=++=IL PVThe worker will move, therefore, ifPV IL – C > PV PA ,where C denotes migration costs. Thus, the worker moves ifC < 60,181.82 - 54,710.74 = $5,471.089-2. Nick and Jane are married. They currently reside in Minnesota. Nick’s present value oflifetime earnings in his current employment is $300,000, and Jane’s present value is $200,000. They are contemplating moving to Texas, where each of them would earn a lifetime income of $260,000. The couple’s cost of moving is $10,000. In addition, Nick very much prefers the climate in Texas to that in Minnesota, and he figures that the change in climate is worth an additional $2,000 to him. Jane, on the other hand, prefers Minnesota’s frigid winters, so she figures she would be $2,000 worse off because of Texas’s blistering summers. Should they move to Texas?Yes. The “climatic” aspects of the move exactly balance each other, so we should not take them into account. On the monetary side, the sum of Nick’s and Jane’s lifetime present value of earnings inMinnesota is $500,000. The corresponding amount in Texas will be $520,000. The difference between the two ($20,000) exceeds the cost of moving ($10,000), so the move will make the couple jointly better off.9-3. Mickey and Minnie live in Orlando. Mickey’s net present value of lifetime earnings in Orlando is $125,000. Minnie’s net present value of lifetime earnings in Orlando is $500,000. The cost of moving to Atlanta is $25,000 per person. In Atlanta, Mickey’s net present value of lifetime earnings would be $155,000, and Minnie’s net present value of lifetime earnings would be $510,000. If Mickey and Minnie choose where to live based on their joint well-being, will they move to Atlanta? Is Mickey a tied-mover or a tied-stayer or neither? Is Minnie a tied-mover or a tied-stayer or neither?As a couple, the net present value of lifetime earnings of staying in Orlando is $500,000 + $125,000 = $625,000 and of moving to Atlanta is $510,000 + $155,000 – $50,000 = $615,000. Thus, as a couple, they would choose to stay in Orlando. Thus, there can only be a tied-stayer. (There cannot be a tied-mover, because the couple is not moving.)For Mickey, staying in Orlando is associated with a net present value of $125,000, while moving to Atlanta would yield a net present value of $155,000 – $25,000 = $130,000. So Mickey would choose to move to Atlanta. Therefore, Mickey is a tied-stayer.For Minnie, staying in Orlando is associated with a net present value of $500,000, while moving to Atlanta would yield a net present value of $510,000 –$25,000 = $485,000. So Minnie would choose to remain in Orlando. Thus, Minnie is not a tied-stayer.9-4. Suppose a worker’s skill is captured by his efficiency units of labor. The distribution of efficiency units in the population is such that worker 1 has 1 efficiency unit, worker 2 has 2 efficiency units, and so on. There are 100 workers in the population. In deciding whether to migrate to the United States, these workers compare their weekly earnings at home (w0) with their potential earnings in the United States (w1). The wage-skills relationship in each of the two countries is given by:w0 = 700 + 0.5s,andw1 = 670 + s,where s is the number of efficiency units the worker possesses.(a) Assume there are no migration costs. What is the average number of efficiency units among immigrants? Is the immigrant flow positively or negatively selected?The earnings-skills relationship in each country is illustrated in the figure below. The US line is steeper because the payoff to a unit of skills is higher in the United States. All workers who have at least 60 efficiency units will migrate to the United States. Therefore, there is positive selection and the average number of efficiency units in the immigrant flow is approximately 80 (the exact answer depends on whether the person with 60 efficiency units, who is indifferent between moving or not, moves to the United States).(b) Suppose it costs $10 to migrate to the United States. What is the average number of efficiency units among immigrants? Is the immigrant flow positively or negatively selected?If everyone incurs a cost of $10 to migrate to the United States, the U.S. wage-skill line drops by $10, and only those persons with more than 80 efficiency units will find it worthwhile to migrate. The immigrant flow is still positively selected and has, on average, 90 efficiency units.(c) What would happen to the selection that takes place if migration costs are not constant in the population, but are much higher for more skilled workers?If migration costs are much higher for skilled workers, it is possible that no skilled workers will find it worthwhile to migrate. We already know that even in the absence of migration costs no worker with fewer than 60 efficiency units finds it worthwhile to migrate. If highly skilled workers find it very costly to migrate it might be the case that there is no migration to the United States.Income700660809-5. Suppose the United States enacts legislation granting all workers, including newly arrived immigrants, a minimum income floor of y− dollars.(a) Generalize the Roy model to show how this type of welfare program influences incentive tomigrate to the United States. Ignore any issues regarding how the welfare program is to be funded.(b) Does this welfare program change the selection of the immigrant flow? In particular, are immigrants more likely to be negatively selected than in the absence of a welfare program?(c) Which types of workers, the highly skilled or the less skilled, are most likely to be attracted by the welfare program?U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor MarketThe introduction of a wage floor in the United States (at y −) shifts the U.S. earnings-skill relationship to the bold line drawn in the figures. If the returns to skills are higher in the United States (left panel above), there are then two sets of workers who find it profitable to move: those who have very high skill levels (above s P ) as well as those workers who have very low skill levels (below s L ). In contrast, if the returns to skills are lower in the United States than in the country of origin (the right panel above), the introduction of the welfare program does not change the incentives to migrate for any worker (although the incentives of some workers would change if the wage floor was high enough). The welfare program, therefore, acts as a welfare magnet for workers originating in countries that generate “brain drains”, but not in countries where unskilled workers have incentives to migrate even in the absence of wage floors.α αL P Dollars αN y −α9-6. The immigration surplus, though seemingly small in the United States, redistributes wealth from workers to firms. Present a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the losses accruing to native workers and of the gains accruing to firms. Do these calculations help explain why some segments of society are emotional in their support of changes in immigration policy that would either increase or decrease the immigrant flow?The total loss in earnings experienced by workers in the United States is given by the rectangle w 0 B F w 1 in Figure 9-11. The area of this rectangle is given by:Loss to Native Workers = (w 1 - w 0) × N .We can calculate the loss to native workers as a fraction of GDP by dividing both sides by Q (national income). If we do this and rearrange terms we obtain:MN N Q M N w w w w Q +×+×−=)( Workers Native to Loss 0001.Thus, the native loss (as a fraction of GDP) equals the percentage change in the native wage caused by immigration times labor’s share of national income times the fraction of the labor force that is native born. If we continue the numerical example in the text, this calculation yields: (-.03) × (.7) × (.9) = -1.89percent of GDP. As national income is on the order of $11 trillion, the loss suffered by native workers is on the order of $208 billion. Capitalists receive this income plus the immigration surplus of $11 billion (see the text), for a total gain of about $219 billion (about 2 percent of GDP).Even though the net benefits from immigration are small, particular groups in the United States either gain or lose substantially from immigration. This explains why the debate over immigration policy is often polarized.9-7. In the absence of any legal barriers on immigration from Neolandia to the United States, the economic conditions in the two countries generate an immigrant flow that is negatively selected. In response, the United States enacts an immigration policy that restricts entry to Neolandians who are in the top 10 percent of Neolandia’s skill distribution. What type of Neolandian would now migrate to the United States?No one would migrate from Neolandia. The policy does not change the cost-benefit analysis for the most skilled Neolandians. They did not want to migrate when they could enter the country freely, and they still will not want to migrate when they are the only ones who can obtain visas. The lesson is that changes in immigration policy affect the skill composition of the immigrant flow only if changes target immigrants who wished to migrate to the United States in the first place.9-8. Labor demand for low-skilled workers in the United States is w = 24 – 0.1E where E is the number of workers (in millions) and w is the hourly wage. There are 120 million domestic U.S. low-skilled workers who supply labor inelastically. If the U.S. opened its borders to immigration, 20 million low-skill immigrants would enter the U.S. and supply labor inelastically. What is the market-clearing wage if immigration is not allowed? What is the market-clearing wage with open borders? How much is the immigration surplus when the U.S. opens its borders? How much surplus is transferred from domestic workers to domestic firms?Without immigration, the market-clearing wage is $12, at which all 120 million low-skill U.S. workers are employed. With immigration, the market-clearing wage is $10, at which all 120 million low-skill U.S. workers and all 20 million immigrants are employed. The additional surplus received by the U.S. because of the immigration equals ($12 – $10) (140m – 120m) / 2 = $20 million. The total transfer from U.S. workers to U.S. firms because of the immigration equals ($12 – $10) (120m) = $240 million.9-9. A country has two regions, the North and the South, which are identical in all respects except the hourly wage and the number of workers. The demand for labor in each region is:w N = $20 – .5E N and w S = $20 – .5E S,where E N and E S are millions of workers. Currently there are 6 million workers in the North and 18 million workers in the South.(a) What is the wage in each region?The wage in the North is $20 – .5 (6) = $17. The wage in the South is $20 – .5 (18) = $11.(b) If there were no shocks to the economy, migration over time will result in an equalization of wages and employment. What would be the long-run wage and employment level in each region?As labor demand is the same in both regions and workers are identical in their preferences, half of the workers will locate in each region in the long-run. Thus, 12 million workers will work in each region, and the hourly wage will be $14.(c) Return to the original set-up where there are 6 million workers in the North and 18 million workers in the South. As a policy maker, you decide not only to allow 2 million immigrants of working age to enter your country, but you have the authority to resettle the immigrants wherever you want. How should you distribute immigrants across the regions to maximize the country’s immigration surplus? Besides maximizing the immigration surplus in the short-run, in what other ways does your distribution of immigrants help the economy?Let I N and I S be the number of immigrants (in millions) placed in the North and in the South respectively, so that I N + I S = 2. After immigration, the new wages are:w N = $17 – .5I N and w S = $11 – .5I Sand the immigrant surpluses are:S N = 0.25(I N)2 and S S = .25(I S)2.Using that I N + I S = 2, therefore, the total immigrant surplus isS = 0.25(I N)2 + 0.25(2–I N)2 = 1 – I N + .5(I N)2.One can use calculus to solve for the optimal value for I N, but be aware that S is U-shaped, so setting the first order conditions to 0 solves for a minimum. Rather, use Excel to plot S. The data are:I N S I N S I N S I N S0.001.000.05 0.95 0.55 0.60 1.05 0.50 1.55 0.650.10 0.91 0.60 0.58 1.10 0.51 1.60 0.680.15 0.86 0.65 0.56 1.15 0.51 1.65 0.710.20 0.82 0.70 0.55 1.20 0.52 1.70 0.750.25 0.78 0.75 0.53 1.25 0.53 1.75 0.780.30 0.75 0.80 0.52 1.30 0.55 1.80 0.820.35 0.71 0.85 0.51 1.35 0.56 1.85 0.860.40 0.68 0.90 0.51 1.40 0.58 1.90 0.910.45 0.65 0.95 0.50 1.45 0.60 1.95 0.950.50 0.63 1.00 0.50 1.50 0.63 2.00 1.00 Thus, the immigrant surplus is maximized by placing all 2 million immigrants in either of the regions. It would be best, however, to place them all in the high wage region, as this will lead to a faster equalization of wages and saves natives the trouble and costs of moving.9-10. Phil has two periods of work remaining prior to retirement. He is currently employed in a firm that pays him the value of his marginal product, $50,000 per period. There are many other firms that Phil could potentially work for. There is a 50 percent chance of Phil being a good match for any particular firm, and a 50 percent chance of him being a bad match. If he is in a good match, the value of his marginal product is $56,000 per period. If he is in a bad match, the value of his marginal product is $40,000 per period. If Phil quits his job, he can immediately find employment with any of the alternative firms. It takes one period to discover whether Phil is a good or a bad match with a particular firm. In that first period, while Phil’s value to the firm is uncertain, he is offered a wage of $48,000. After the value of the match is determined, Phil is offered a wage equal to the value of his marginal product in that firm. When offered that wage, Phil is free to (a) accept;(b) reject and try some other firm; or (c) return to his original firm and his original wage. Phil maximizes the present value of his expected lifetime earnings, and his discount rate is 10 percent. What should Phil do?Phil makes decisions at the beginning of each period, and there are a variety of choices at each of these times. To reduce the number of strategies that require the numerical calculation of the expected outcome, first discard unreasonable choices. In particular, if Phil does not quit his job in period 1, he should not do so in period 2. After all, his second-period wage in a new job will be lower than in the old job, and there is no third period. Similarly, if he tries a new job in period 1 and is found to be a bad match, he should return to the old job. After all, the old job pays a higher wage than what Phil’s current employer is willing to pay and what another new firm would offer him. Finally, if he tries a new job and is found to be a good match, he should certainly accept their offer. In the end, Phil only has two potentially viable strategies.Strategy one: Keep the old job in both periods. The earnings path associated with this choice is flat and deterministic – Phil earns $50,000 in each period. The present discounted value of the outcome of this strategy is PV1 = 50,000 + 50,000/1.1 = $95,455.Strategy two: Try a new job. If it is a good match, keep it. If it is a bad match, return to the old job. If Phil adopts this strategy, he will earn $48,000 in period 1. In period 2, he will earn either $56,000 or $50,000, each with probability ½. The expected present discounted value of the outcome of that strategy is PV2 = 48,000 + ((½× 56,000) + (½ × 50,000))/1.1 = $96,182.As the second strategy generates a higher present value, this is the strategy Phil adopts.9-11. Under the recently enacted 2001 tax legislation in the United States, all income tax filers can now deduct from their total income half of their expenses incurred when moving more than 50 miles to accept a new job. Prior to the change, only tax filers who itemized their deductions were allowed to deduct their moving expenses. (Typically, homeowners itemize their deductions and renters do not itemize.) How would this change in the tax bill likely affect the mobility of homeowners and renters?The policy change has no affect on homeowners, whereas the policy change reduces the cost of moving for renters. Therefore, the policy is predicted to increase the mobility of renters.。
《劳动经济学》(作者Borjas)第十一章习题答案
CHAPTER 1111-1. Suppose the firm’s labor demand curve is given by:w = 20 - 0.01 E ,where w is the hourly wage and E is the level of employment. Suppose also that the union’s utility function is given byU = w × E .It is easy to show that the marginal utility of the wage for the union is E and the marginal utility of employment is w . What wage would a monopoly union demand? How many workers will be employed under the union contract?Utility maximization requires the absolute value of the slope of the indifference curve equal the absolute value of the slope of the labor demand curve. For the indifference curve, we have thatEw MU MU w E =.The absolute value of the slope of the labor demand function is 0.01. Thus, utility maximization requires that01.=Ew .Substituting for E with the labor demand function, the wage that maximizes utility must solve01.0100000,2=−ww ,which implies that the union sets a wage of $10, at which price the firm hires 1,000 workers.11-2. Suppose the union in problem 1 has a different utility function. In particular, its utility function is given by:U = (w - w *) × Ewhere w * is the competitive wage. The marginal utility of a wage increase is still E , but the marginal utility of employment is now w – w *. Suppose the competitive wage is $10 per hour. What wage would a monopoly union demand? How many workers will be employed under the union contract? Contrast your answers to those in problem 1. Can you explain why they are different?Again equate the absolute value of the slope of the indifference curve to the absolute value of the slope of the labor demand curve:01.0*=−=Ew w MU MU w E .Setting w* = $10 and using the labor demand equation yields:01.0100000,210=−−ww .Thus, the union demands a wage of $15, at which price the firm hires 500 workers.In problem 1, the union maximized the total wage bill. In problem 2 the utility function depends on the difference between the union wage and the competitive wage. That is, the union maximizes its rent. Since the alternative employment pays $10, the union is willing to suffer a cut in employment in order to obtain a greater rent.11-3. Using the model of monopoly unionism, present examples of economic or political activities that the union can pursue to manipulate the firm’s elasticity of labor demand. Relate your examples to Marshall’s rules of derived demand.Marshall’s rules state that the elasticity of labor demand is lower the1. lower is the elasticity of substitution;2. lower is the elasticity of demand for the output;3. lower is labor’s share of total costs; and4. lower is the supply elasticity of other factors of production.Consider two examples: innovations and picket lines. Unions are notoriously bad at allowing firms to introduce (labor saving) innovations in their factories. The long shoremen on the west coast recently struck, because they were unwilling to let cargo crates be identified with bar codes. (The union wanted a union worker to record all movements of crates with pencil and paper.) Thus, the union was pursuing a policy of limiting the supply of other factors of production (rule 4). In a similar vein, when on strike, unions picket the firm in order to decrease the ability of the firm to hire scabs (rule 1).11-4. Suppose the union only cares about the wage and not about the level of employment. Derive the contract curve and discuss the implications of this contract curve.The utility function U = U(w) implies that the union’s indifference curves are horizontal lines, so that the contract curve coincides exactly with the firm’s labor demand curve (D).11-5. A bank has $5 million in capital that it can invest at a 5 percent annual interest rate. A group of 50 workers comes to the bank wishing to borrow the $5 million. Each worker in the group has an outside job available to him or her paying $50,000 per year. If the group of workers borrows the $5 million from the bank, however, they can set up a business (in place of working their outside jobs) that returns $3 million in addition to maintaining the original investment.(a) If the bank has all of the bargaining power (that is, the bank can make a take-it or leave-it offer), what annual interest rate will be associated with the repayment of the loan? What will be each worker’s income for the year?If the bank has all of the bargaining power, it will pay each worker exactly their reservation wage, i.e., $25,000. The total cost of this is $2.5 million. Thus, the firm will claim the remaining $500,000 by imposing a 10 percent interest rate as $500,000 is 10 percent of the original $5 million.(b) If the workers have all of the bargaining power (that is, the workers can make a take-it or leave-it offer), what annual interest rate will be associated with the repayment of the loan? What will be each worker’s income for the year?If the workers have all of the bargaining power, they will pay the bank its reservation value, i.e., an interest rate of 5 percent. When it does this, the 50 workers receive $3 million less the 5 percent interest of $250,000 for a total of $2.75 million. Split evenly among the 50 workers, this leaves each worker with a yearly income of $55,000.11-6. Consider a firm that faces a constant per unit price of $1,200 for its output. The firm hires workers, E, from a union at a daily wage of w, to produce output, q, whereq = 2E½.Given the production function, the marginal product of labor is 1/E½. There are 225 workers in the union. Any union worker who does not work for the firm can find a non-union job paying $96 per day.(a) What is the firm’s labor demand function?The labor demand function, or the marginal revenue product of labor, isMRP E = MR × MP E = 1200 / E ½.(b) If the firm is allowed to specify w and the union is then allowed to provide as many workers as it wants (up to 225) at the daily wage of w, what wage will the firm set? How many workers will the union provide? How much output will be produced? How much profit will the firm earn? What is the total income of the 225 union workers?If the firm offers w < $96, no workers will be provided. This would leave the firm with no output and no profit. The workers would all receive $96 per day, making their total daily income $21,600.If the firm offers a wage of w > $96, all 225 workers will be provided. These 225 workers would produce 30 units of output. The firm would then earn a profit of 30($1,200) – 225w. Profit, therefore, is maximized when w is minimized subject to the constraint. If the union would supply all 225 workers at a wage of $96, for example, the firm would offer w = $96 and earn a daily profit of $14,400. The total daily income of the 225 workers would remain at $21,600.If the firm needs to offer strictly more than $96 per day to attract workers, it would offer a daily wage of $96.01. All 225 workers would work for the firm, making 30 units of output. The firm’s daily profit would be $14,397.75. And the total daily income of the 225 workers would be $21,602.25.(c) If the union is allowed to specify w and the firm is then allowed to hire as many workers as it wants (up to 225) at the daily wage of w, what wage will the union set in order to maximize the total income of all 225 workers? How many workers will the firm hire? How much output will be produced? How much profit will the firm earn? What is the total income of the 225 union workers?The spreadsheet looks like the following, where the union specifies the wage, labor demand comes from part (a), and everything else follows naturally:wageLaborDemandLaborCosts Output Price Revenue ProfitUnionDaily Income$96 156.25 $15,000.00 25.00 $1,200 $30,000.00 $15,000.00 $19,200.00$97 153.04 $14,845.36 24.74 $1,200 $29,690.72 $14,845.36 $19,353.04$98 149.94 $14,693.88 24.49 $1,200 $29,387.76 $14,693.88 $19,499.88$99 146.92 $14,545.45 24.24 $1,200 $29,090.91 $14,545.45 $19,640.77$100 144.00 $14,400.00 24.00 $1,200 $28,800.00 $14,400.00 $19,776.00…… ……… … … …$190 39.89 $7,578.95 12.63 $1,200 $15,157.89 $7,578.95 $22,949.58$191 39.47 $7,539.27 12.57 $1,200 $15,078.53 $7,539.27 $22,949.90$192 39.06 $7,500.00 12.50 $1,200 $15,000.00 $7,500.00 $22,950.00$193 38.66 $7,461.14 12.44 $1,200 $14,922.28 $7,461.14 $22,949.90$194 38.26 $7,422.68 12.37 $1,200 $14,845.36 $7,422.68 $22,949.60$195 37.87 $7,384.62 12.31 $1,200 $14,769.23 $7,384.62 $22,949.11 Thus, the union sets a daily wage of $192. The firm responds by hiring 39.06 workers, who produce 12.5 units of output. The firm earns a daily profit of $7,500, while the 225 union workers earn a total of $25,297.92 each day.11-7. Suppose the union’s resistance curve is summarized by the following data. The union’s initial wage demand is $10 per hour. If a strike occurs, the wage demands change as follows:Length of Strike: Hourly Wage Demanded1 month 92 months 83 months 74 months 65 or more months 5Consider the following changes to the union resistance curve and state whether the proposed change makes a strike more likely to occur, and whether, if a strike occurs, it is a longer strike. (a) The drop in the wage demand from $10 to $5 per hour occurs within the span of 2 months, as opposed to 5 months.If the union is willing to drop its demands very fast, the firm will find it profitable to delay agreement until the wage demand drops to $5. A strike, therefore, is more likely to occur. If $5 is the lowest wage the union is willing to accept, the strike would probably last 2 months.(b) The union is willing to moderate its wage demands further after the strike has lasted for 6 months. In particular, the wage demand keeps dropping to $4 in the 6th month, $3 in the 7th month, etc.If the union is willing to accept even lower wages in the future, some firms will find it optimal to wait the union out. Thus, strikes will be more likely and last longer.(c) The union’s initial wage demand is $20 per hour, which then drops to $9 after the strike lasts one month, $8 after 2 months, and so on.Conditioning on a strike occurring, the length of strike will be unchanged as the resistance curve after the initial demand stays the same. Of course, the probability of a strike occurring increases when the initial demand increases.11-8. (a) Would you expect unions to be more willing to call a strike during good economic times or bad economics times? Explain.This is an open question – much empirical evidence suggests that strikes are procyclical – a conclusion that the model of job search supports. During good economic times, there are many good jobs available, searching for jobs is relatively easy, and the probability of securing a job is quite high. In short, the non-union option is quite attractive. During such times, therefore, the union may be a tough negotiator, and this tough stance may lead to more strikes being called. (This doesn’t explain, though, why the firms are also tough negotiators during such times.)The opposite happens during bad economic times. Namely, jobs are scarce, they are difficult to find, and searching is costly. The non-union option, therefore, is not very attractive. Consequently, the union leadership may be more willing to accept a deal. This softer stance, therefore, may lead to fewer strikes being called.(b) Does Table 627 of the 2002 U.S. Statistical Abstract provide evidence to support your answer to part (a)? What is the single overriding pattern in this table?There is some evidence that strikes are more prevalent in good times than bad (compare the 1960s to the early 1970s), but there was much more strike activity in the late 1970s and early 1980s than in the mid to late 1980s.The single most obvious pattern in the table, however, is that as union membership steadily fell over this time period, the level of strike activity also fell. The average percent or working time lost to a strike was about 12 percent, 10 percent, 4 percent, and 2 percent for the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s respectively.11-9. Suppose the value of the marginal product of labor in the steel industry is VMP E = 100,000 – E dollars per year, where E is the number of steel workers. The competitive wage for the workers with the skills needed in steel production is $30,000 a year, but the industry is unionized so that steel workers earn $35,000 a year. The steelworkers’ union is a monopoly union. What is the efficiency cost of the union contract in this industry?If the steel industry were to pay the competitive wage to its workers, it would employ 70,000 workers, because at this level the VMP of the last employee equals the competitive wage. Under the union wage, however, the industry only hires 65,000 workers. The efficiency cost of the union, therefore, is(½)($35,000 – $30,000)($70,000 – $65,000) = $125 million per year.11-10. Suppose the economy consists of a union and a non-union sector. The labor demand curve in each sector is given by L = 1,000,000 – 20w. The total (economy-wide) supply of labor is 1,000,000, and it does not depend upon the wage. All workers are equally skilled and equally suited for work in either sector. A monopoly union sets the wage at $30,000 in the union sector. What is the union wage gap? What is the effect of the union on the wage in the non-union sector?In a competitive economy, the wage would be the same in the two sectors, and its value would be such that the total labor demand L D = 2 × (1,000,000 – 20w C) equaled total labor supply. The solution to the equation 2 (1,000,000 – 20w C) = 1,000,000 is w C = $25,000.If the union wage is set at $30,000, the union sector employs 400,000 workers. The remaining 600,000 must be employed in the non-union sector, which will happen if the wage in the non-union sector is (1,000,000 – 600,000)/20 = $20,000.Hence, the wage gap between the union and the non-union sectors equals $10,000, or 50 percent of the non-union wage.11-11. Consider Table 628 of the 2002 U.S. Statistical Abstract.(a) How many workers were covered by a union contract in 1983? What percent of the workforce was unionized?In 1983, 20.532 million workers (23.3 percent of all workers) were covered by a union contract in the U.S.(b) How many workers were covered by a union contract in 2001? What percent of the workforce was unionized?In 2001, 17.878 million workers (14.8 percent of all workers) were covered by a union contract in the U.S.(c) Decompose the changes from part (a) to part (b) in terms of public- and private-sector workers and unions.This dramatic change in union coverage masks an even deeper pattern in union coverage – namely that public-sector unions have been growing in absolute numbers and holding their own in percent coverage, while the private-sector unions have experienced sharp decreases in their enrollments.The number of public-sector workers covered by a union contract, for example, increased from just over 7 million in 1983 to almost 8 million in 2001. The percent of public-sector workers who were members of a union held constant over this time span at roughly 37 percent, while the percent of public-sector workers covered by a union contract fell slightly from 45.5 percent in 1983 to 41.7 percent in 2001.On the other hand, the number of private-sector workers covered by a union contract decreased from 13.4 million in 1983 to only 9.9 million in 2001. The percent of private-sector workers covered by a union contract also fell drastically, from 18.5 percent in 1983 to just 9.7 percent in 2001.11-12. Consider table 618 in the 2002 U.S. Statistical Abstract.(a) Calculate the union wage effect. Calculate the union effect on total benefits. Calculate the union effect on total compensation.The union effects are simply the ratio of the union amount divided by the non-union amount:Wage effect: $19.33 / $15.38 = 1.257 percent.Benefit effect: $10.09 / $5.41 = 1.865 percentTotal compensation effect: $29.42 / $20.79 = 1.415 percent.(b) Note that for most categories, retirement and savings increases total compensation by about 60 to 80 cents per hour, with roughly two-thirds of this expense coming in defined contribution retirement plans. In contrast, retirement and savings adds $1.64 to the hourly compensation of union workers, and over 70 percent of this comes in the form of defined benefit pension plans, not defined contribution. What is the difference between defined benefit and defined contribution plans? Why might a union prefer (and be able to negotiate) more compensation in defined benefit plans than defined contribution plans?A defined benefit plan specifies the retirement benefit as a fixed dollar amount. For example, if someone receives 50 percent of their last annual income as their annual pension, this is a defined benefit plan. In contrast, a defined contribution plan specifies the amount of savings into a retirement plan the firm will make. The amount of benefit eventually received by the worker depends on how well the money is invested until retirement.It is generally thought the workers prefer DB plans (though this doesn’t need to be the case). DB plans put the risk on the part of the firm, while DC plans put the financial risk on the part of the worker. (The workers at Enron, for example, lost huge amounts of retirement savings not only because they were in a DC plan but also because they were forced to keep most of their contributions as Enron stock.) As unions tend to work in large firms, they may be more able than other workers to negotiate a DB plan.。
《劳动经济学》作者Borjas习题答案
《劳动经济学》作者Borjas习题答案CHAPTER 66-1. Politicians who support the green movement often argue that it is profitable for firms to pursue a strategy that is “environmentally correct” (for example, by building factories that do not pollute and are not noisy), because workers will be willing to work in environmentally correct factories at a lower wage rate. Evaluate the validity of this claim.If it is profitable for firms to build factories that do not pollute and are not noisy, they would have been built already. After all, firms could build these profit-maximizing factories and attract persons to work at these factories at lower wages because no compensating differential would be needed. The fact that compensating differentials exist and that governments attempt to regulate the quality of the workplace implies that providing these amenities to workers is more costly than cost-saving.6-2. Suppose wages and health insurance are the only two job characteristics workers care about. Describe the relationship between the wage level in a particular job and whether the job offers health insurance if the government does not require employers to offer health insurance to their workers. What happens to the wage structure if the government requires all firms to provide a standard package of health insurance to their workers?When the government does not require employers to offer health insurance, workers would prefer to work in those firms that offer health insurance and would be willing to pay for the right to work in such firms (assuming that all workers prefer to have health insurance). In other words, jobs that offered health insurance would pay less than jobs that did not offer such plans. When the government mandates that all employers offer health insurance to workers, the wage in those firms that had provided either no health insurance or a “substandard” package would fall and the wage would eventually be the same in all jobs. 6-3. Workers choose to work a risky or a safe job. Suppose there are 100 workers in the economy. Worker 1’s reservation price (for accepting the risky job) is $1; worker 2’s reservation price is $2, and so on. Because of technological reasons, there are only 10 risky jobs. What is the equilibrium wage differential between safe and risky jobs? Which workers will be employed at the risky firm? Suppose now that an advertising campaign paid for by the employers who offer risky jobs stresses the excitement associated with “the thrill of injury,” and this campaign changes the attitudes of the work force toward being employed in a risky job. Worker 1 now has a reservation price of -$10 (that is, she is willing to pay $10 for the right to work in the risky job); worker 2’s reservation price is -$9, and so on. There are still only 10 risky jobs. What is the new equilibrium wage differential? The supply curve to the risky job is given by the fact that worker 1 has a reservation price of $1, worker 2 has a reservation price of $2, and so on. As the figure below illustrates, this supply curve (given by S) is upward sloping, and has a slope of 1. The demand curve (D) for risky jobs is perfectly inelastic at 10 jobs. Market equilibrium is attained where supply equals demand so that 10 workers are employed in risky jobs; the market compensating wage differential is $10 since this is what it takes to entice the marginal (tenth) worker to accept a job offer from a risky firm. Note that the firm employs those workers who least mind being exposed to risk.If tastes towards risk change, the supply curve shifts down to S′ and the market equilibrium is attained when the compensating wage differential is -$1. This is the compensating differential required to hire the marginal worker (that is, the 10th worker). Note that this compensating differential implies that eventhough most workers (from worker 12 onwards) dislike risk, the market determines that risky jobs will pay less than safe jobs.6-4. Suppose all workers have the same preferences represented byU w x ,=?2where w is the wage and x is the proportion of the firm’s air that is composed of toxic pollutants. There are only two types of jobs in the economy, a clean job (x = 0) and a dirty job (x = 1). Let w 0 be the wage paid by the clean job and w 1 be the wage paid by the polluted job. If the clean job pays $16 per hour, what is the wage in dirty jobs? What is the compensating wage differential?If all persons have the same preferences regarding working in a job with polluted air, market equilibrium requires that the utility offered by the clean job be the same as the utility offered by the dirty job, otherwise all workers would move to the job that offers the higher utility. This implies that:)1(2)0(210?=?w w => .2161?=wSolving for w 1 implies that w 1 = $36. The compensating wage differential, therefore, is $20.C om pensatin gDm ent6-5. Suppose a drop in the compensating wage differential between risky jobs and safe jobs has been observed. Two explanations have been put forward:Engineering advances have made it less costly to create a safe working environment.The phenomenal success of a new action serial “Die On The Job!” has imbued millions ofviewers with a romantic perception of work-related risks.Using supply and demand diagrams show how each of the two developments can explain the drop in the compensating wage differential. Can information on the number of workers employed in the risky occupation help determine which explanation is the right one?The engineering advances make it cheaper for firms to offer safe jobs, and hence reduce the gain from switching from a safe environment to a risky one. This will shift the demand curve for risky jobs in and reduce the compensating wage differential (Figure 1). Note that the equilibrium number of workers in risky jobs goes down.The glamorization of job-related risks may make people more willing to take these risks. This shiftssupply to the right and reduces the compensating differential (Figure 2). Note that the equilibrium number of workers in risky jobs goes up.Thus, information on whether employment in the risky sector increased or decreased can help discern between the two competing explanations.Figure 1. Labor Market for Risky JobsCompensatingDifferentialE new E old Number of Workers in Risky Jobs(w 1 – w 0 )old (w 1 – w 0 )Figure 2. Labor Market for Risky Jobs6-6. Consider a competitive economy that has four different jobs that vary by their wage and risk level. The table below describes each of the four jobs.Job Risk ( r ) Wage ( w )A 1/5 $3B 1/4 $12C 1/3 $23D 1/2 $25All workers are equally productive, but workers vary in their preferences. Consider a worker who values his wage and the risk level according to the following utility function:u w r w r (,)=+12.Where does the worker choose to work? Suppose the government regulated the workplace and required all jobs to have a risk factor of 1/5 (that is, all jobs become A jobs). What wage would the worker now need to earn in the A job to be equally happy following the regulation?Calculate the utility level for each job by using the wage and the risk level: U(A) = 28, U(B) = 28, U(C) = 32, and U(D) = 29. Therefore, the worker chooses a type C job and receives 32 units of happiness. If she is forced to work a type A job, the worker needs to receive a wage of $7 in order to maintain her 32 unitsof happiness as 7 + 25 = 32.CompensatingDifferential E old E new Number of Workers in Risky Jobs(w 1 – w 0 )old (w 1 – w 0 )6-7. Consider Table 6-1 and compare the fatality rate of workers in the agricultural, mining, construction, and manufacturing industries?(a) What would the distribution of wages look like across these four industries given the compensating differential they might have to pay to compensate workers for risk?Mining would pay the highest compensating differential, followed by agriculture, then construction, and finally manufacturing.(b) Now look at the median weekly earnings by industry as reported in Table 629 of the 2002 U.S. Statistical Abstract. Does the actual distribution of wages reinforce your answer to part (a)? If not, what else might enter the determination of median weekly earnings?Median weekly earnings by industry are:$795Mining$371Agriculture$609Construction$613ManufacturingThus, the distribution of wages does not perfectly reflect the compensating differential story, though mining is the best paid and the most dangerous. It is also the unhealthiest, which workers would supposedly take into account as well. Many other factors, however, probably explain the wage structure just as much if not more than compensating differentials, including preferences (family farmers), unions (manufacturing), required skills, and the length of the average work week.6-8. The EPA wants to investigate the value workers place on being able to work in “clean” mines over “dirty” mines. The EPA conducts a study and finds the average wage in clean mines to be $42,250 and the average wage in dirty mines to be $47,250.(a) According to the EPA, how much does the average worker value working in a clean mine?The average value is $47,250 - $42,250 = $5,000.(b) Suppose the EPA could mandate that all dirty mines become clean mines and that all workers who were in a dirty mine must therefore accept a $5,000 pay decrease. Are these workers helped by the intervention, hurt by the intervention, or indifferent to the intervention?All except the marginal worker are hurt by the intervention. The workers who sort themselves into the dirty jobs are those workers that do not mind dirt, and therefore do not value working in a clean job at $5,000. (Similarly, if all of the workers in the clean jobs were forced to accept dirty jobs for $5,000 more, all of them except the marginal worker would be hurt as they all value working in a clean job at more than $5,000.)6-9. There are two types of farming tractors on the market, the FT250 and the FT500. The only difference between the two is that the FT250 is more prone to accidents than the FT500. Over their lifetime, one in ten FT250s is expected to result in an accident, as compared to one in twenty-five FT500s. Further, one in one-thousand FT250s is expected to result in a fatal accident, as compared to only one in five-thousand FT500s. The FT250 sells for $125,000 while the FT500 sells for$137,000. At these prices, 2,000 of each model are purchased each year. What is the statistical value farmers place on avoiding a tractor accident? What is the statistical value of a life of a farmer? The FT500 is associated with an extra cost of $12,000, but its accident rate is only 0.04 compared to the 0.10 accident rate of the FT250. Also, each farmer that buys the FT250 is willing to accept the additional risk in order to save $12,000. Thus, these workers are willing to receive $24 million ($12,000 x 2,000) in exchange for 200 – 80 = 120 accidents. Thus, the value placed on each accident is $200,000. Likewise, the 2,000 farmers who buy the FT250 are willing to receive $24 million in exchange for 2 – .4 = 1.6 fatal accidents. Thus, the value placed on each life is $15 million.6-10. Consider the labor market for public school teachers. Teachers have preferences over their job characteristics and amenities.(a) One would reasonably expect that high-crime school districts pay higher wages than low-crime school districts. But the data consistently reveal that high-crime school districts pay lower wages than low-crime school districts. Why?The likely reason for this is not that teachers do not care about crime – they almost certainly do – but rather that school funding is determined in large part by local property taxes. If high crime schools are located in low income cities, there is nothing (or at least very little) the local school board can do to raise more money to pay the compensating differential.(b) Does your discussion suggest anything about the relation between teacher salaries and school quality?In the end, because high crime schools cannot offer the necessary compensating differential, they will not be able to attract the highest quality workers. Therefore, one would expect that the worst schools (with the worst teachers) are located in the poorest communities with the most crime. This is the typical story of proponents of replacing the property tax scheme to fund public education with a federal program.6–11. Many employers willingly offer their employees certain benefits such as health insurance, a retirement plan, gym memberships, or even an on-site subsidized cafeteria. Why?Offering job benefits is identical to offering a job with bad characteristics such as risk. When offering a risky job, for example, the employer must buy-off the risk from the worker. The employer chooses to do this because it is profitable, i.e., because the cost of buying-off the risk is less costly than transforming the job into a safe one. The same (but opposite) argument holds for job benefits. By offering a job with benefits, the employer can pay the worker less as the worker values the benefits. The employer will find it profitable to continue to offer benefits as long as the employer can save more in reducing the wage than it costs to provide the benefits.One reason health insurance benefits are fairly popular is that firms can usually negotiate lower prices and better packages of care than individuals can do by themselves. Also, firms can deduct the cost of their benefits from their net revenue, whereas individuals cannot deduct the full amount of their healthcare expenses.。
劳动经济学课后习题答案
劳动经济学课后习题答案派生需求：是指对生产要素的需求，意味着它是由对该要素参与生产的产品的需求派生出来的，又称“引致需求”。
对一种生产要素的需求来自（派生自）对另一种产品的需求。
替代效应:劳动使用量从LA降低到LB，资本使用量从KA上升到KB，即企业用资本代替了劳动。
规模效应:由于工资率的提高，企业使用劳动的边际成本将上升，从而导致企业生产更少的数量，产量的下降将会导致使用劳动数量的下降，图中变现为从B点到C点的移动，劳动数量随之下降。
劳动需求的工资弹性：劳动需求的工资弹性是指当工资率变化一个百分率所引起的劳动需求变化的百分率的比值。
公式：ed ＝－(△L/L)/(△W/W)＝－(△L/△W)/(W/L)ed为劳动需求的工资弹性，△L和△W分别是劳动需求数量L和工资率W的变动量补性生产要素：当生产要素A的价格下降，数量增加时，对生产要素B的需求上升，则称生产要素A与生产要素B是互补。
1.替代性生产要素：当生产要素A的价格下降，数量增加时，生产要素B的数量下降，则生产要素A是生产要素B的替代性生产要素。
2.影响劳动需求的因素有哪些3.答：1、技术对劳动需求的影响2、时间长短对劳动需求的影响3、企业目标对劳动需求的影响4、社会制度安排对劳动需求的影响.补充：两种经济体制下企业劳动用工特点4.什么是派生需求定理答：在保持其他条件不变的情况下，下述情况将使得某类劳动需求曲线具有很高的劳动需求的工资弹性。
a)对利用该类劳动要素所生产的最终产品的需求弹性越大b)劳动投入与其他生产要素之间的可替代性越大c)其他生产要素的供给弹性越大d)该类劳动成本占总生产成本的比重越大。
5.试运用劳动需求原理分析最低工资对劳动市场的影响答：最低工资立法的经济学分析背景：最低工资立法是各国政府保护劳动者的一项重要法律，其中心目的是以法律形式来保证工薪劳动者通过劳动所获得的最低工资能够满足其自身及其家庭成员的基本生存需要。
19世纪末，新西兰和澳大利亚最早开始实行最低工资立法。
《劳动经济学》（作者Borjas）第四章习题答案
《劳动经济学》（作者Borjas）第四章习题答案CHAPTER 44-1. Suppose there are two inputs in the production function, labor and capital, and these two inputs are perfect substitutes. The existing technology permits 1 machine to do the work of 3 persons. The firm wants to produce 100 units of output. Suppose the price of capital is $750 per machine per week. What combination of inputs will the firm use if the weekly salary of each worker is $300? What combination of inputs will the firm use if the weekly salary of each worker is $225? What is the elasticity of labor demand as the wage falls from $300 to $225?Because labor and capital are perfect substitutes, the isoquants (in bold) are linear and the firm will use only labor or only capital, depending on which is cheaper in producing 100 units of output.The (absolute value of the) slope of the isoquant (MP E / MP K ) is 1/3 because 1 machine does the work of 3 men. When the wage is $900 (left panel), the slope of the isocost is 300/750. The isocost curve,therefore, is steeper than the isoquant, and the firm only hires capital (at point A ). When the weekly wage is $225 (right panel), the isoquant is steeper than the isocost and the firm hires only labor (at point B ).Weekly Salary = $300 Weekly Salary = $225The elasticity of labor demand is defined as the percentage change in labor divided by the percentage change in the wage. Because the demand for labor goes from 0 to a positive quantity when the wagedropped to $225, the (absolute value of the) elasticity of labor demand is infinity.LaborCapitalLaborCapital4-2. (a) What happens to the long-run demand curve for labor if the demand for the firm’s output increases?The labor demand curve is given by VMP E = MR x MP E. As demand for the firm’s output increases, its marginal revenue also increases. Thus, an increase in demand for the firm’s output shifts the labor demand curve to the right.(b) What happens to the long-run demand curve for labor if the price of capital increases?To determine how an increase in the price of capital changes the demand for labor, suppose initially that the firm is producing 200 units of output at point P in the figure. The increase in the price of capital (assuming capital is a normal input) increases the marginal costs of the firm and will reduce the profit-maximizing level of output to say 100 units. The increase in the price of capital also flattens the isocost curve, moving the firm to point R. The move from point P to point R can be decomposed into a substitution effect (P to Q) which reduces the demand for capital, but increases the demand for labor, and a scale effect (Q to R) which reduces the demand for both labor and capital. The direction of the shift in the demand curve for labor, therefore, will depend on which effect is stronger: the scale effect or the substitution effect.4-3. Union A wants to represent workers in a firm that hires 20,000 person workers when the wage rate is $4 and hires 10,000 workers when the wage rate is $5. Union B wants to represent workers in a firm that hires 30,000 workers when the wage is $6 and hires 33,000 workers when the wage is $5. Which union would be more successful in an organizing drive?The union will be more likely to attr act the workers’ support when the elasticity of labor demand (in absolute value) is small. The elasticity of labor demand facing union A is given by: η = percent ?L / percent ?w = (20,000–10,000)/20,000 ÷ (4–5)/4 = –2.The elasticity of labor demand facing union B equals (33,000–30,000)/33,000 ÷ (5–6)/5 = –5/11 ≈ –.45. Union B, therefore, is likely to have a more successful organizing drive as 0.45 < 2.4-4. Consider a firm for which production depends on two normal inputs, labor and capital, with prices w and r, respectively. Initially the firm faces market prices of w = 6 and r = 4. These prices then shift to w = 4 and r = 2.(a) In which direction will the substitution effect change the firm’s employment and capital stock?Prior to the price shift, the absolute value of the slope of the isocost line (w/r) was 1.5. After the price shift, the slope is 2. In other words, labor has become relatively more expensive than capital. As a result, there will be a substitution away from labor and towards capital (the substitution effect).(b) In which direction will the scale effect change the firm’s employment and capital stock?Because both prices fall, the marginal cost of production falls, and the firm will want to expand. The scale effect, therefore, increases the demand for both labor and capital (as both are normal inputs).(c) Can we say conclusively whether the firm will use more or less labor? More or less capital?The firm will certainly use more capital as the substitution and scale effects reinforce each other in that direction, but the change in labor employed will depend on whether the substitution or the scale effect for labor dominates.4-5. What happens to employment in a competitive firm that experiences a technology shock such that at every level of employment its output is 200 units/hour greater than before?Because output increases by the same amount at every level of employment, the marginal product of labor, and hence the value of the marginal product of labor, does not change. Therefore, as the value of the marginal product of labor will equal the wage rate at the same level of employment as before, the level of employment will not change.4-6. Suppose the market for labor is competitive and the supply curve for labor is backwardbending over part of its range. The government now imposes a minimum wage in this labor market. What is the effect of the minimum wage on employment? Does the answer depend on which of the two curves (supply or demand) is steeper? Why?Equilibrium is attained where the supply curve intersects the demand curve, and the equilibriumemployment and wage levels are E* and w*, respectively . When the minimum wage is set at w MIN , the firm wants to hire E D workers but E S workers are looking for work. As long as the downward-sloping portion of the supply curve is to the right of the demand curve, the fact that the supply curve is downward sloping creates no problems beyond those encountered in the typical competitive model. An interesting extension of the problem would consider the case where the downward-sloping portion of the supply curve recrosses the demand curve at some point above w * and the minimum wage is set above that point.4-7. Suppose a firm purchases labor in a competitive labor market and sells its product in a competitive product market. Thefirm’s elasticity of demand for labor is ?0.4. Suppose the wage increases by 5 percent. What will happen to the number of workers hired by the firm? What will happen to the marginal productivity of the last worker hired by the firm?Given the estimates of the elasticity of labor demand and the change in the wage, we have that4.0%%?=??=w E η => 4.0%5%?=?E=> %2%?=?E .Thus, the firm hires 2 percent fewer workers. Furthermore, because the labor market is competitive, the marginal worker is paid the value of his marginal product. As the product market is also competitive, therefore, we know that the output price does not change so that the marginal productivity of the marginal worker increases by 5 percent.Employment W agesw M INS D4-8. A firm’s technology requires it to combine 5 person-hours of labor with 3 machine-hours to produce 1 unit of output. The firm has 15 machines in place and the wage rate rises from $10 per hour to $20 per hour. What is the firm’s short-run elasticity of labor demand?Unless the firm goes out of business, it will combine 25 persons with the 15 machines it has in place regardless of the wage rate. Therefore, employment will not change in response to the movement of the wage rate, and the short-run elasticity of labor demand is zero.4-9. In a particular industry, labor supply is E S = 10 + w whilelabor demand is E D = 40 ? 4w, where E is the level of employment and w is the hourly wage.(a) What is the equilibrium wage and employment if the labor market is competitive? What is the unemployment rate?In equilibrium, the quantity of labor supplied equals the quantity of labor demanded, so that E S = E D. This implies that 10 + w = 40 – 4w. The wage rate that equates supply and demand is $6. When the wage is $6, 16 persons are employed. There is no unemployment because the number of persons looking for work equals the number of persons employers are willing to hire.(b) Suppose the government sets a minimum hourly wage of $8. How many workers would lose their jobs? How many additional workers would want a job at the minimum wage? What is the unemployment rate?If employers must pay a wage of $8, employers would only want to hire E D = 40 – 4(8) = 8 workers, while E S = 10 + 8 = 18 persons would like to work. Thus, 8 workers lose their job following the minimum wage and 2 additional people enter the labor force. Under the minimum wage, the unemployment rate would be 10/18, or 55.6 percent.4-10. Suppose the hourly wage is $10 and the price of each unit of capital is $25. The price of output is constant at $50 per unit. The production function isf(E,K) = E?K ?,so that the marginal product of labor isMP E = (?)(K/E) ? .If the current capital stock is fixed at 1,600 units, how much labor should the firm employ in the short run? How much profit will the firm earn?The firm’s labor demand curve is it marginal revenueproduct of labor curve, VMP E, which equals the marginal productivity of labor, MP E, times the marginal revenue of the firm’s product. Bu t as price is fixed at $50, MR = 50. Thus, we have thatVMP E = MP E× MR = (?)(1,600/E)?(50) = 1,000 / E? .Now, by setting VMP E = w and solving for E, we find that the optimal number of workers for the firm to hire is 10,000 workers. The firm then makes (1600)?(10000)? = 4,000 units of output and earns a profit of 4,000($50) – 1,600($25) – 10,000 ($10) = $60,000.4-11. Table 616 of the 2002 U.S. Statistical Abstract reports data on the nominal and real hourly minimum wage from 1960 through 2000. Under which president did the nominal minimum wage increase by the greatest dollar amount? Under what president did the real minimum wage increase by the greatest percentage?The data are:AdministrationsYear CurrentReal(2000)percentChangeNominalChange President1960 $1.00 $5.821961 $1.15 $6.621962 $1.15 $6.561963 $1.25 $7.03 20.79percent $0.25 Kennedy 1964 $1.25 $6.941965 $1.25 $6.831966 $1.25 $6.641967 $1.40 $7.221968 $1.60 $7.92 14.12percent $0.35 Johnson 1969 $1.60 $7.51 1970 $1.60 $7.101971 $1.60 $6.801972 $1.60 $6.591973 $1.60 $6.211974 $2.00 $6.99 -6.92percent $0.40 Nixon 1975 $2.10 $6.72 1976 $2.30 $6.96 3.57percent $0.20 Ford 1977 $2.30 $6.54 1978 $2.65 $7.001979 $2.90 $6.881980 $3.10 $6.48 -0.92percent $0.80 Carter 1981 $3.35 $6.35 1982 $3.35 $5.981983 $3.35 $5.791984 $3.35 $5.551985 $3.35 $5.361986 $3.35 $5.261987 $3.35 $5.081988 $3.35 $4.88 -23.15percent $0.00 Reagan 1989 $3.35 $4.65 1990 $3.80 $5.011991 $4.25 $5.371992 $4.25 $5.22 12.26percent $0.90 Bush 1993 $4.25 $5.06 1994 $4.25 $4.941995 $4.25 $4.801996 $4.75 $5.211997 $5.15 $5.531998 $5.15 $5.441999 $5.15 $5.322000 $5.15 $5.15 1.78percent $0.90 ClintonThe nominal minimum wage increased by the greatest dollar amount ($0.90) under both President Bush and President Clinton. In percentage terms, however, the real minimum wage increased by 12.26 percent during the Bush presidency, but only by 1.78 percent during the Clinton presidency. The greatest percent increase, however, came during the Kennedy presidency, when the minimum wage increased by over 20 percent.。
劳动经济学课后题答案
劳经复习资料第一章：1、谈谈你对劳动经济学研究表述的理解：劳动经济学的研究对象：第一：在效用最大化假设下,劳动力资源的投入产出机理.第二:劳动经济学研究劳动力市场的运行和结果。
第三:劳动经济学是对劳动力资源配置的市场经济活动过程中的劳动力需求和供给的行为及其影响因素的分析和研究。
劳动经济学研究方法：第一：实证经济学分析方法:在一定的假设前提下,人们的行为是怎样的.两个假设前提：稀缺性；理性第二：规范经济学研究方法:用一定的价值观去衡量经济效益的好坏和制度政策的利弊，分析经济行为人的选择该是什么的问题劳动经济学的研究特点：第一：将问题的注意力投向了人们的工作范围第二:研究劳动经济问题的时候,不能脱离商品市场和资本市场来孤立的进行劳动经济的分析和研究。
2、举例说明运用实证经济学或规范经济学研究现实劳动经济或者人力资源管理问题的价值。
规范经济学：从本质上讲,它的根本价值尺度是以互惠原则作为基础的出发点,互惠原则有三点：第一：市场交易活动所涉及的各方均受益,无人受到损失。
例如：企业高薪聘用经验丰富,能力足够强的外籍主管，对企业方来说此人将给企业带来相当大的价值，对个人来说将获取丰厚的回报。
第二:市场交易活动中，部分人受益但无人受到损失.正如上例所说，在企业和个人双方均获得收益时，对于其他那些企业或者市场上的高管应聘者来说，并未因此受到损失.第三：最为常见的既有受益者又有损失者,但总体上来说，受益者受益的程度或数量超过损失者损失的程度或数量。
例如在很多发达国家的劳动立法反对招聘中的学历歧视，对有的企业带来招聘成本的上升，但是对总体而言提高了社会人力资源配置的效率，利大于弊。
第二章：名词解释：1.派生需求(简答题）：是指对生产要素的需求，意味着它是由对该要素参与生产的产品的需求派生出来的，又称“引致需求”，即对一种生产要素的需求来自对另一种产品的需求。
2.劳动的边际成本:使用一单位量劳动力所耗费的成本，即工资3.劳动的边际收益:增加一单位量的劳动力所增加的收益，即劳动边际产品价值4.使用劳动要素的原则：增加一单位劳动的使用所带来的“边际收益”和“边际成本”必须相等5.竞争性劳动市场：产品和要素市场上供求的双方人数都很多，产品要素之间没有区别,产品和要素的供求双方都具有完全的信息并且可以充分自由的流动6.买方垄断企业：是指企业劳动力市场是垄断者，而在产品市场上是完全竞争者7.劳动的边际产品价值（就是劳动的边际收益)8.替代效应：劳动使用量从LA降低到LB，资本使用量从KA上升到KB，即企业用资本代替了劳动。
劳动经济学(作者Borjas)第十章习题答案
CHAPTER 1010-1. Suppose blacks and whites are not perfect substitutes in production. The firm would like to minimize the costs of producing 100 units of output. Show that employers who discriminate against blacks earn lower profits. Does your conclusion depend on whether the market-determined black wage is lower than the white wage?As drawn in the figure below, the profit-maximizing position for a non-discriminating employer occurs at point P where the 100-unit isoquant is tangent to the lowest possible isocost line given by X. Discrimination against blacks implies that the utility-adjusted black wage is relatively high, and hence employers would move to a point like A, which is tangent to the utility-adjusted isocost given by line Y. Note, however, that at point A the true costs of production are given by isocost line Z, which is clearly higher than isocost line X. As a result, discrimination is costly. It is worth noting that this analysis assumes nothing about which wage, the black or the white, is higher.Capital10-2. Suppose black and white workers are complements in the sense that the marginal product of whites increases when more blacks are hired. Suppose also that white workers do not like working alongside black workers. Does employee discrimination lead to complete segregation? Does it create a wage differential between black and white workers?If blacks and whites are perfect substitutes, employee discrimination leads to complete segregation. If, however, blacks and whites are complements as in this problem, then there is an incentive for employers to employ blacks and whites together in the work place if the increase in productivity achieved by integrating the work force is higher than the extra wages employers must pay white workers to compensate them for working alongside blacks. The interpretation of the wage differential between black and white workers is more difficult. The wage differential between the two groups will reflect not only the effect of discrimination (a higher wage for whites to encourage them to work alongside blacks), but also the effect of differences in productivity. Overall, however, it is clear that whites must be paid a compensating differential.10-3. In 1960, the proportion of blacks in Southern states was higher than the proportion of blacks in Northern states. The black-white wage ratio in Southern states was also much lower than in Northern states. Does the difference in the relative black-white wage ratios across regions indicate that Southern employers discriminated more than Northern employers?Suppose employers in neither region discriminate, so that the equilibrium black-white wage differential in both regions is determined by the (relative) demand for and supply of black workers. If there arerelatively many more black workers in the South than in the North, then the black-white wage ratio will be lower in the South than in the North, as the marginal black hired in the South is less valuable than the marginal black hired in the North. Thus, the fact that blacks earn relatively less in the South need not indicate that Southern employers discriminate more than Northern employers. Rather, the large differential may simply reflect the relatively large number of black workers in the South. (This does assume that blacks and whites are not perfect substitutes.)10-4. Suppose years of schooling, s , is the only variable that affects earnings. The equations for the weekly salaries of male and female workers are given by:w m = 500 + 100sandw f = 300 + 75s .On average, men have 14 years of schooling and women have 12 years of schooling.(a) What is the male-female wage differential in the labor market?The wage differential can be written as:∆w − = w −m – w − f = 500 + 100 s −m – ( 300 + 75 s −f ) = 500 + 100(14) – 300 – 75(12) = $700(b) Using the Oaxaca decomposition, calculate how much of this wage differential is due to discrimination?The raw wage differential is4342144443444421Skills in Difference to Due al Differenti tion Discrimina to Due al Differenti )()()(f m m f f m f m s s s w −+−+−=∆βββαα700$200$500$)1214(10012)75100()300500(Skills in Difference to Due al Differenti tion Discrimina to Due al Differenti =+=−+−+−=4342144443444421.The wage differential that is due to discrimination equals $500, or 5/7ths of the raw differential.(c) Can you think of an alternative Oaxaca decomposition that would lead to a different measure of discrimination? Which measure is better?Suppose instead of adding and subtracting βm f s to the expression giving the raw wage differential, βf m s had been added and subtracted to the expression. The Oaxaca decomposition would then be given by ∆w s s s m f m f m f m f =−+−+−()()()ααβββDifferential Due to Discrimination Differential Due to Difference in Skills 1244443444412434 700150$550$)1214(7514)75100()300500(Skills in Difference to Due al Differenti tion Discrimina to Due al Differenti =+=−+−+−=4342144443444421.Under this method, $550 of the $700 wage differential is due to discrimination. The difference between methods arises because of the way in which discrimination is defined. In one, discrimination is measured by calculating how much a woman would earn if she were treated like a man (as in the text), and in the second it is measured by calculating how much a man would earn if he were treated like a woman. On the surface, neither is a better measure. It can be shown, however, that the second approach (as in part c) attributes more variation to discrimination.10-5. Suppose the firm’s production function is given byq E E w b =+10,where E w and E b are the number of whites and blacks employed by the firm respectively. It can be shown that the marginal product of labor is thenMP E E E w b=+5.Suppose the market wage for black workers is $10, the market wage for whites is $20, and the price of each unit of output is $100.(a) How many workers would a firm hire if it does not discriminate? How much profit does this non-discriminatory firm earn if there are no other costs?There are no complementarities between the types of labor as the quantity of labor enters the production function as a sum, E w + E b . Further, the market-determined wage of black labor is less than the market-determined wage of white labor. Thus, a profit-maximizing firm will not hire any white workers and will hire black workers up to the point where the black wage equals the value of their marginal product:w p MP E b E b=×=1005()which yields E b = 2,500. The 2,500 black workers produce q = 10(sqrt(2,500)) = 500 units of output, and profits are:Π = pq – w b E b = 100(500) – 10(2,500) = $25,000.(b) Consider a firm that discriminates against blacks with a discrimination coefficient of .25. How many workers does this firm hire? How much profit does it earn?The firm acts as if the black wage is w b (1 + d ), where d is the discrimination coefficient. The employer’s hiring decision, therefore, is based on a comparison of w w and w b (1 + d ). The employer will then hire whichever input has a lower utility-adjusted price. As d = 0.25, the employer is comparing a white wage of $20 to a black (adjusted) wage of $12.50. As $12.50 < $20, the firm will hire only blacks.As before, the firm hires black workers up to the point where the utility-adjusted price of a black worker equals the value of marginal product, orbE )5(10050.12=so that E b = 1,600 workers. The 1,600 workers produces 400 units of output, and profits areΠ = 100(400) – 10(1,600) = $24,000.(c) Finally, consider a firm that has a discrimination coefficient equal to 1.25. How many workers does this firm hire? How much profit does it earn?As d = 1.25, the employer compares a white wage of $20 against a black wage of $22.50. Thus, the firm hires only whites. The firm hires white workers up to the point where the price of a white worker equals the value of marginal product:wE )5(10020=so the firm hires 625 whites, produces 250 units of output, and earns profits ofΠ = 100(250) – 20(625) = $12,500.10-6. Suppose a restaurant hires only women to wait on tables, and only men to cook the food and clean the dishes. Is this most likely to be indicative of employer, employee, consumer, or statistical discrimination?If this hiring pattern is due to discrimination at all, it is most likely due to customer discrimination. It is not employer discrimination as the employer is hiring both men and women. It is further unlikely to be statistical discrimination as an employer would likely be able to determine in a short time what would happen if women became chefs or men waited on tables. The hiring pattern could result from employee discrimination as well, but this seems unlikely as wait staff and chefs/dishwashers interact on the job.10-7. Suppose that an additional year of schooling raised wages by 7 percent in 1970, regardless of the worker’s race or ethnicity. Suppose also that the wage differential between the average white and the average Hispanic was 36 percent. Finally, assume education is the only factor that affects productivity, and the average white worker had 12 years of schooling in 1970, while the average Hispanic worker had 9 years. By 1980, the average white worker had 13 years of education, while the average Hispanic had 11 years. A year of schooling still increased earnings by 7 percent, regardless of the worker’s ethnic background, and the wage differential between the average white worker and the average Hispanic fell to 24 percent. Was there a decrease in wage discrimination during the decade? Was there a decrease in the share of the wage differential between whites and Hispanics that can be attributed to discrimination?On the basis of their education, the average white worker should have earned 21 percent more in 1970 and 14 percent more in 1980 than the average Hispanic worker. The average Hispanic worker actually received 36 percent less in 1970 and 24 percent less in 1980. Thus, in 1970, 15 percentage points can be attributed to wage discrimination, while 10 percentage points can be attributed to wage discrimination in 1980. Hence, the degree of discrimination declined from 15 to 10 percent from 1970 to 1980. On the other hand, discrimination accounted for (15/36)×100 = 41.7 percent of the 1970 differential and(10/24)×100 = 41.7 percent of the 1980 differential. Thus, there was no change in the portion due to discrimination. The two findings are not contradictory. The wage differential decreased for two reasons – less discrimination and smaller educational differences – and the two channels were equally important. Hence, despite its absolute decrease, the importance of discrimination relative to other factors was unchanged.10-8. Use Table 211 of the 2002 U.S. Statistical Abstract.(a) How much does the average female worker earn for every 1 dollar earned by the average male worker?$23,551 / $40,257 = $0.59(b) How much does the average black worker earn for every 1 dollar earned by the average white worker?$24,979 / $33,326 = $0.75.(c) How much does the average Hispanic worker earn for every 1 dollar earned by the average white worker?$22,096 / $33,326 = $0.66.10-9. Repeat each of the three comparisons in Problem 8, except now condition on education level. In other words, calculate the wage ratios separately for all workers who have not graduated high school, have only a high school degree, have a Bachelor’s degree, and have a Master’s degree. Does the degree of labor market inequality decrease or increase after conditioning on education? Why? Men & Women:No High School Degree: $12,145 / $18,855 = $0.64.High School Degree: $18,092 / $30,414 = $0.59.Bachelor’s Degree: $32,546 / $57,706 = $0.56.Master’s Degree: $42,378 / $68,367 = $0.62.Whites & Blacks:No High School Degree: $13,569 / $16,620 = $0.82.High School Degree: $20,991 / $25,270 = $0.83.Bachelor’s Degree: $37,422 / $46,894 = $0.80.Master’s Degree: $48,777 / $55,622 = $0.88.Whites & Hispanics:No High School Degree: $16,106 / $16,620 = $0.97.High School Degree: $20,704 / $25,270 = $0.82.Bachelor’s Degree: $36,212 / $46,894 = $0.77.Master’s Degree: $50,576 / $55,622 = $0.91.In every case, the wage gap closes when education attainment is taken into account except the gap stays the same between men and women with a high school degree and the gap worsens between men and women with a Bachelor’s degree.10-10. After controlling for age and education, it is found that the average woman earns $0.80 for every $1.00 earned by the average man. After controlling for occupation to control for compensating differentials (i.e., maybe men accept riskier or more stressful jobs than women, and therefore are paid more), the average woman earns $0.92 for every $1.00 earned by the average man. The conclusion is made that occupational choice reduces the wage gap 12 cents and discrimination is left to explain the remaining 8 cents.(a) Explain why discrimination may explain more than 8 cents of the 20 cent differential (and occupational choice may explain less than 12 cents of the differential).Discrimination may occur during the process of choosing an occupation (i.e., occupational crowding). As students, for example, girls may be encouraged to take a different set of courses than boys. Later, discrimination may preclude women from being hired into the higher paying occupations. Put differently, accepting the statistics at face value requires there to be wage discrimination but no employment discrimination.(b) Explain why discrimination may explain less than 8 cents of the 20 cent differential.The labor supply curve of women and men could be different, because they have different preferences when it comes to leisure and consumption. Thus, wage differences might come about to account for gender-based preferences and not discrimination. Put differently, other factors chosen by the employee, such as hours worked or work experience, have yet to be controlled for and could explain at least some of the remaining 8 cent differential.10-11. Consider a town with 10 percent blacks (and the remainder is white). Because blacks are more likely to work the night shifts, 20 percent of all cars driven in that town at night are driven by blacks. One out of every twenty people driving at night is drunk, regardless of race. Persons who are not drunk never swerve their car, but 10 percent of all drunk drivers, regardless of race, swerve their cars. On a typical night, 5,000 cars are observed by the police force.(a) What percent of blacks driving at night are driving drunk? What percent of whites driving at night are driving drunk?The percent of drivers who are drunk is identical across races – 5 percent of all drivers regardless of race are drunk.(b) Of the 5,000 cars observed, how many are driven by blacks? How many of these cars are driven by a drunk? Of the 5,000 cars observed at night, how many are driven by whites? How many of these cars are driven by a drunk? What percent of nighttime drunk drivers are black?Of the 5,000 cars driven at night, 20 percent (or 1,000) are driven by blacks. As one out of every twenty people are drunk, there are 50 black drunk drivers. Similarly, 4,000 of the cars are driven by whites, and there are 200 drunk white drivers. Thus 20 percent (50 out of 250) of the drunk drivers are black, just like20 percent of all drivers are black.(c) The police chief believes the drunk-driving problem is mainly due to black drunk drivers. He orders his policemen to pull over all swerving cars and one in every two non-swerving cars that is driven by a black person. The driver of a non-swerving car is then given a breathalyzer test that is 100 percent accurate in diagnosing drunk driving. Under this enforcement scheme, what percent of people arrested for drunk driving will be black?One-tenth of white drunk drivers will be arrested as they were swerving. This totals 20 drivers. Likewise one-tenth of black drunk drivers will be arrested as they were seen swerving. This totals 5 drivers.Of the remaining 4,975 drivers, 995 are black with 45 being drunk. As one in every two blacks is pulled over on suspicion, 22.5 additional blacks will be arrested for drunk driving as they will fail the breathalyzer test. Therefore, at the end of the night, 47.5 people will be arrested for drunk driving, 27.5 of which are black. Therefore, even though only 20 percent of all drunks are black, the percent of drunks arrested who are black is almost 50 percent (27.5/47.5).10-12. Suppose 100 men and 100 women graduate from high school. After high school, each can work in a low-skill job and earn $200,000 over his or her lifetime, or each can pay $50,000 and go to college. College graduates are given a test. If someone passes the test, he or she is hired for a high-skill job paying lifetime earnings of $300,000. Any college graduate who fails the test, however, is relegated to a low-skill job. Academic performance in high school gives each person some idea of how he or she will do on the test if they go to college. In particular, each person’s GPA, call it x, is an “ability score” ranging from 0.01 to 1.00. With probability x, the person will pass the test if he or she attends college. Upon graduating high school, there is one man with x = .01, one with x = .02, and so on up to x = 1.00. Likewise, there is one woman with x = .01, one with x = .02, and so on up to x = 1.00.(a) Persons attend college only if the expected lifetime payoff from attending college is higher than that of not attending college. Which men and which women will attend college? What is the expected pass rate of men who take the test? What is the expected pass rate of women who take the test?Both groups are identical, so the answers are identical. The expected value requirement for attending college is:$300,000 x + $200,000 (1 – x) – $50,000 > $200,000$100,000 x > $50,000x > 0.50.Thus, the 50 men and 50 women with x = .51 to x = 1.00 all go to college and take the test. The number of test takers expected to pass is then the sum of expected pass rates: .51 + .52 + … + 1.00 = 37.75. Thus, 75.5 percent (37.75 of the 50) of men and 75.5 percent of the women who take the test are expected to pass the test.(b) Suppose policymakers feel not enough women are attending college, so they take actions that reduce the cost of college for women to $10,000. Which women will now attend college? What is the expected pass rate of women who take the test?The expected value requirement for attending college for women has changed to:$300,000 x + $200,000 (1 – x) – $10,000 > $200,000$100,000 x > $10,000x > 0.10.Thus, the 90 women with x = .11 to x = 1.00 attend college and take the test. The number of female test takers expected to pass is the sum of expected pass rates: .11 + .12 + … + 1.00 = 49.95. Thus, 55.5 percent (49.95 of the 90) of the women who take the test are expected to pass the test.。
劳动经济学课后习题参考答案完整版
劳动经济学课后习题参考答案集团标准化办公室：[VV986T-J682P28-JP266L8-68PNN]《劳动经济学》课后思考题参考答案第一章绪论二、思考题1．如何理解劳动经济学的价值（1）劳动经济学研究的是社会经济问题。
例如，民工荒、政府要求增加最低工资、劳动生产率下降、农民工工资急剧上升、工资增长不均等、工作培训、国有企业高管人员的高工资受到质疑、收入分配不平、农村移民增加、劳动力市场全球化扩大等等。
（2）数量上的重要性。
在西方经济中，大部分国民收入并不是来源于资本收入（利润、租金和利息），而是来源于工资。
绝大多数居民户的主要收入来源是提供劳务。
从数量上看，劳动才是我们最重要的经济资源。
（3）独有的特性。
劳动力市场的交易完全不同于产品市场的交易。
劳动力市场是一个极有意义和复杂的场所。
劳动力市场的复杂性意味着供给和需求概念在应用于劳动力市场时必须做出重大的修改和调整。
在供给方面，劳动者“出售”给雇主的劳务与该劳动者不可分离。
除了货币报酬，工人还关注工作的健康和安全性、工作难度、就业稳定性、培训和晋升机会等，这类非货币因素也许与直接收入同样重要。
这样，工人的供给决策要比产品市场的供给概念复杂得多。
（4）收益的广泛性。
无论是个人还是社会，都可以从劳动经济学中得到许多启示和教益。
从劳动经济学得到的信息和分析工具有助于人们做出与劳动力市场有关的决策。
从个人角度看。
大量内容将直接与我们有关，如工作搜寻、失业、歧视、工资、劳动力流动等。
对于企业管理者来说，从对劳动经济学的理解中所得到的知识背景和分析方法，对做出有关雇用、解雇、培训和工人报酬等方面的管理决策也应该是十分有用的。
从社会角度看，了解劳动经济学将使人们成为更有知识、更理智的公民。
2．劳动经济学的研究方法有哪些首先要明确劳动经济学的基本假设。
劳动经济学的假设主要表现在以下四个方面：（1）资源的相对稀缺性。
如同商品和资本是稀缺的一样，劳动力资源也是有限的。
9劳动经济学第九章课后参考答案 贾东 王亮亮劳动经济学(人大三版)
1.什么是人力资本？人力资本是一种与物质资本相对相应的资本形式，它表现为能为任何个人带来永久性经济收入的能力和知识等。
2.人类资本的特点是什么？（1）人力资本是寓寄在劳动者身上的一种生产能力（2）人力资本的所有权不具有转让或者继承的属性3.人力资本投资的形式有哪些？（1）各级正规教育（2）职业技术培训（3）健康保健（4）人们从一个地区向另一个地区的流动4.教育投资的理性依据是什么？5.怎样进行培训的成本效益分析？6.劳动力流动的条件是什么？（1）劳动力的个人所有权（2）不同地区和工作之间存在着经济福利方面的差异（3）社会对劳动者就业给予充分的自主权（4）社会分工所造成的劳动技巧和工作能力的专门化7.影响劳动力流动的因素有哪些？（1）年龄（2）家庭（3）教育（4）流动的距离（5）失业率（6）职业许可制度（7）国家和地方政策将影响劳动力的流动（8）环境（9）公会（10）流动地的环境质量和气象状况人力资本：人力资本是一种与物质资本相对相应的资本形式，它表现为能为任何个人带来永久性经济收入的能力和知识等。
人力资本投资：是通过增加人的资源而影响未来的货币和物质收入的各种活动。
职业技术培训：职业技术培训投资是人们为获得与发展从事某种职业所需要的知识、技能与技巧所发生的投资支出。
这类投资方式主要侧重于人力资本构成中的职业、专业知识与技能存量。
其表现是人力资本构成中的专业技术等级。
健康保健：用于健康保健、增进体质的费用也是人力资本投资的主要形式，这方面的投资效果主要变现为人口语气寿命的提高和死亡率的降低。
正规教育：这种投资形式增加了人力资本的知识存量，表现为人力资本构成中的普通教育程度，即用学历来反映人力资本存量。
教育投资净现值：教育这种人力资本投资在未来一定量的价值相当于现在的价值教育投资供给曲线：教育投资需求曲线：劳动力流动：是指劳动者相对于劳动力市场条件的差别，在地区之间、行业之间、产业之间、职业之间、和岗位之间的自愿选择和迁移。
《劳动经济学》(作者Borjas)第十二章习题答案
CHAPTER 1212-1. Suppose there are 100 workers in an economy with two firms. All workers are worth $35 per hour to firm A but differ in their productivity at firm B. Worker 1 has a value of marginal product of $1 per hour at firm B; worker 2 has a value of marginal product of $2 per hour at firm B, and so on. Firm A pays its workers a time-rate of $35 per hour, while firm B pays its workers a piece rate. How will the workers sort themselves across firms? Suppose a decrease in demand for both firms’ output reduces the value of every worker to either firm by half. How will workers now sort themselves across firms?Workers 1 to 34 work for firm A as a time rate of $35 is more than their value to firm B, while workers 36 to 100 work for firm B. Worker 35 is indifferent. More productive workers, therefore, flock to the piece rate firm. After the price of output falls, firm A values all workers at $17.50 per hour, while worker 1’s value at firm B falls to 50 cents, worker 2’s value falls to $1 at firm B, etc. The key question is what happens to the wage in the time-rate firm. Presumably this wage will also fall by half to $17.50 per hour. If it falls by half, then the sorting of workers to the two firms remains unchanged.12-2. Taxicab companies in the United States typically own a large number of cabs and licenses; taxicab drivers then pay a daily fee to the owner to lease a cab for the day. In return, the drivers keep their fares (so that, in essence, they receive a 100 percent commission on their sales). Why did this type of compensation system develop in the taxicab industry?Imagine what would happen if the cab company paid a 50 percent commission on fares. The cab drivers would have an incentive to misinform the company about the amount of fares they generated in order to pocket most of the receipts. Because cab companies find it almost impossible to monitor their workers, they have developed a compensation scheme that leaves the monitoring to the drivers. By charging drivers a rental fee and letting the drivers keep all the fares, each driver has an incentive to not shirk on the job.12-3. A firm hires two workers to assemble bicycles. The firm values each assembly at $12. Charlie’s marginal cost of allocating effort to the production process is MC = 4N, where N is the number of bicycles assembled per hour. Donna’s marginal cost is MC = 6N.(a) If the firm pays piece rates, what will be each worker’s hourly wage?As the firm values each assembly at $12, it will pay $12 for 1 assembly, $24 for 2 assembly’s, etc. when offering piece rates. As Charlie’s marginal cost of the first assembly is $4, the second is $8, the third is $12, and the fourth is $16; Charlie assembles 3 bicycles each hour and is paid an hourly wage of $36. Likewise, as Donna’s marginal cost of the first assembly is $6, the second is $12, and the third is $18; Donna assembles 2 bicycles each hour and is paid an hourly wage of $24.(b) Suppose the firm pays a time rate of $15 per hour and fires any worker who does not assemble at least 1.5 bicycles per hour. How many bicycles will each worker assemble in an 8 hour day?As working is painful to workers, each will work as hard as necessary to prevent being fired, but that is all. Thus, each worker assembles 1.5 bicycles each hour, for a total of 12 bicycles in an eight hour day. 12-4. All workers start working for a particular firm when they are 20 years old. The value of each worker’s marginal product is $18 per hour. In order to prevent shirking on the job, a delayed-compensation scheme is imposed. In particular, the wage level at every level of seniority is determined by:Wage = $10 + (.4 × Years in the firm).Suppose also that the discount rate is zero for all workers. What will be the mandatory retirement age under the compensation scheme? (Hint: Use a spreadsheet.)To simplify the problem, suppose the workers works 1 hour per year. (The answer would be the same regardless of how many hours are worked, as long as the number of hours worked does not change over time). Some of the relevant quantities required to determine the optimal length of the contract are:Age Yearson theJob VMPAccumulatedVMPContractWageAccumulatedContractWage21 1 $18 $18 $10.00 $10.0022 2 $18$36 $10.40 $20.4023 3 $18$54 $10.80 $31.2024 4 $18$72 $11.20 $42.4040 20 $18$360 $17.60 $276.0041 21 $18$378 $18.00 $294.0042 22 $18$396 $18.40 $312.4043 23 $18$414 $18.80 $331.2060 40 $18$720 $25.60 $712.0061 41 $18$738 $26.00 $738.0062 42 $18$756 $26.40 $764.40The VMP is constant at $18 per year. The accumulated VMP gives the total product the worker has contributed to the firm up to that point in the contract. The wage in the contract follows from the equation, and the accumulated wage is the total wage payments received by the worker up to that point. Until the 20th year in the firm, the worker receives a wage lower than her VMP; after the 21st year the worker’s wage exceeds the VMP. The contract will be terminated when the total accumulated VMP equals the total accumulated wage under the delayed compensation contract, which occurs on the worker’s 41st year on the job. So the optimal retirement age is age 61.12-5. Suppose a firm’s technology requires it to hire 100 workers regardless of the wage level. The firm, however, has found that worker productivity is greatly affected by its wage. The historical relationship between the wage level and the firm’s output is given by:Wage Rate Units of Output$8.00 65$10.00 80$11.25 90$12.00 97$12.50 102What wage level should a profit-maximizing firm choose? What happens to the efficiency wage if there is an increase in the demand for the firm’s output?The data in the problem can be used to calculate the elasticity of the change in output with respect to the change in the wage. The efficiency wage is determined by the condition that this elasticity must equal 1. This elasticity is 1 when the firm raises the wage from $10 to $11.25 an hour: (90-80)/80 ÷ (11.25-10)/10 = 1. The efficiency wage, therefore, is $11.25. Note that this efficiency wage is independent of any labor market conditions, and particularly does not depend on the demand for the firm’s output.12-6. Consider three firms identical in all aspects except their monitoring efficiency, which cannot be changed. Even though the cost of monitoring is the same across the three firms, shirkers at Firm A are identified almost for certain; shirkers at Firm B have a slightly greater chance of not being found out; and shirkers at Firm C have the greatest chance of not being identified as a shirker. If all three firms pay efficiency wages to keep their workers from shirking, which firm will pay the greatest efficiency wage? Which firm will pay the smallest efficiency wage?In this example, there is no connection between the cost of monitoring and the efficiency of monitoring. Moreover, the value of unemployment is the same for workers regardless of their employer. Focusing just on the probability of being caught shirking, therefore, workers in Firm A have the least incentive to shirk (as they are most likely to get caught) while workers in Firm C have the greatest incentive to shirk (as they are least likely to get caught). The idea of efficiency wages is to use wages to buy-off the incentive to shirk. Therefore, Firm A will pay the lowest efficiency wage, while Firm C will pay the greatest efficiency wage.12-7. Consider three firms identical in all aspects (including the probability with which they discover a shirker), except that monitoring costs vary across the firms. Monitoring workers is very expensive at Firm A, less expensive at Firm B, and cheapest at Firm C. If all three firms pay efficiency wages to keep their workers from shirking, which firm will pay the greatest efficiency wage? Which firm will pay the smallest efficiency wage?In this example, there is no connection between the cost of monitoring and the efficiency of monitoring. The efficiency wage, therefore, is determined by the incentives of the workers, not the costs of the firms. (The decision of whether to monitor workers, of course, will depend on the cost of monitoring.) Thus, all three firms will offer the same efficiency wage.12-8. Why will a firm be more likely to pay its factory workers according to a time rate, but be more likely to pay its sales people a piece rate?Each factory worker has a place on an assembly line and must do a certain task for each unit of theproduct made. Thus, the production process requires very little monitoring of workers, as they are more or less forced to do their job or else the assembly line will breakdown, with the factory manager knowing who is at fault. This is the ideal situation in which to pay a time rate.In comparison, sales persons are likely paid a piece rate, because monitoring their efforts is much more difficult. By paying a piece rate, the sales people have an incentive to work hard to make as many sales as possible.12-9. Suppose a worker only cares about her wage (a “good”) and how much effort she exerts on the job (a “bad”). Graph some indifference curves over these two goods for the worker.With the wage on the horizontal axis, any shaped indifference curves as long as they are upward sloping and increasing in the direction of higher wages and less effort fulfill the requirements that wages are a good thing and effort is a bad thing.12-10. Why would a firm ever choose to offer profit-sharing to its employees in place of paying piece rates?Piece rates can be very difficult to pay in some situations. For example, in a situation in which a group of workers is responsible for producing the good, determining who made what may be impossible. Consider Southwest Airlines, which is known to have a wonderful profit sharing program. To pay a flight attendant a piece rate, the airline would have to survey passengers as they depart the plane, and then, from the passengers’ opinions, pay the appropriate piece rates. Clearly this is unreasonable. Profit sharing, on the other hand, is a convenient way to approximate the piece rate system. Since all workers are covered by profit sharing at Southwest Airlines, all workers have a continuous incentive to do their job very well. EffortWageIndifference Curves: Wages and Effort12-11. Describe the free riding problem in a profit-sharing compensation scheme. How might the workers of a firm “solve” the free riding problem?When all workers are covered by a profit sharing plan, an individual worker has the incentive to shirk his responsibilities as his direct effect on profits is tiny. If all workers do this, however, the total profit created by the firm will be much smaller than it would be if workers were paid a piece rate.One way to “solve” the free rider problem is with social pressure. If the atmosphere of the workers is that everyone works and shirkers will be punished somehow – socially, annual reviews, being fired, etc. – then the incentive to shirk is diminished.。
劳动经济学课后答案
名词解释：1、派生需求：是由阿弗里德·马歇尔在其《经济学原理》一书中首次提出的经济概念，是指对生产要素的需求，意味着它是由对该要素参与生产的产品的需求派生出来的，又称“引致需求”。
对一种生产要素的需求来自（派生自）对另一种产品的需求。
其中该生产要素对这一最终产品会作贡献，如对轮胎的需求派生自对汽车运输的需求。
1.短期：在短期内可变的生产要素只有劳动力，技术和资本都是不变生产要素。
2.长期：在长期内，劳动力和技术是可变生产要素，只有资本是不变生产要素。
3.卖方垄断企业：指企业在产品市场上市垄断者，但在劳动市场上市完全竞争。
4.买方垄断企业：是指企业劳动力市场是垄断者，而在产品市场上是完全竞争者。
5.替代效应:劳动使用量从LA降低到LB，资本使用量从KA上升到KB，即企业用资本代替了劳动。
6.规模效应:由于工资率的提高，企业使用劳动的边际成本将上升，从而导致企业生产更少的数量，产量的下降将会导致使用劳动数量的下降，图中变现为从B点到C点的移动，劳动数量随之下降。
7.互补性生产要素：当生产要素A的价格下降，数量增加时，对生产要素B的需求上升，则称生产要素A与生产要素B是互补。
8.替代性生产要素：当生产要素A的价格下降，数量增加时，生产要素B的数量下降，则生产要素A是生产要素B的替代性生产要素。
9.劳动需求的工资弹性：a)劳动需求的工资弹性是指当工资率变化一个百分率所引起的劳动需求变化的百分率的比值。
b)公式：ed ＝－(△L/L)/(△W/W)＝－(△L/△W)/(W/L)1.ed为劳动需求的工资弹性，△L和△W分别是劳动需求数量L和工资率W的变动量。
10、劳动的边际产品价值：VMP=MP•P，指的是增加额外一单位劳动要素的投入所带来的收益。
（三）1.劳动力：是人的劳动能力，即人在劳动过程中所运用的体力和智力的总和。
在现代劳动经济学体系中，劳动力又特指在一定年龄范围内，具有劳动能力和劳动要求。
劳动经济学课后答案
劳动经济学课后答案第一章导言名词解释劳动——有劳动能力与劳动经验得人在生产过程中有目得得支出劳动力得活动劳动力——在早期得概念中，劳动力指从事体力劳动为主得“劳工”，即“工人”或产业工人，马克思理论把劳动力瞧作可变资本，知识经济时代脑力与体力劳动者得差别已不表现在劳动得本质特征上。
“员工”这一范畴被企业以及各类组织广泛使用劳动市场——劳动力供求得市场劳动经济学——劳动经济学就是对劳动力资源配置得市场经济活动过程中得劳动力需求与供给得行为、及其影响因素得分析与研究。
人口经济学——人口经济学研究人口得生产与再生产得经济问题、人口自然增长得经济规律，特别就是人口对物质资源消费得影响就是其集中要研究得对象与任务人力资源管理——对人力资源进行有效开发、合理配置、充分利用与科学管理得制度、法令、程序与方法得总与。
实证经济学——两个假设前提：稀缺性；理性在一定得假设前提下，人们得行为就是怎样得规范经济学——用互惠原则去衡量经济效益得好坏与制度政策得利弊，分析经济行为人得选择应该就是什么得问题简答题1、谈谈您对劳动经济学研究对象得理解。
第一，在效用最大化假设下，劳动力资源得投入产出机理。
第二，劳动经济学研究劳动力市场得运行与结果。
第三，劳动经济学就是对劳动力资源配置得市场经济活动过程中得劳动力需求与供给得行为、及其影响因素得分析与研究。
2、举例说明运用规范经济学或者实证经济学研究现实劳动经济或人力资源管理问题得价值。
实证经济学实际上就是一种对人得经济行为进行研究与分析得一种理论。
它建立在两个假说之上，即稀缺性与人就是有理性得。
从稀缺性方面来讲，正就是由于稀缺性得存在，才产生了经济学上得“机会成本”概念。
它隐含得一个重要命题就是人们对资源得使用存在着供求问题，存在着成本特别就是机会成本问题。
所以，劳动力资源也就是稀缺得。
而这种稀缺得程度可以通过劳动力得价格---工资反映出来。
比如，每年应届大学生得求职，在多种职业只能有一种选择，而用人单位也只能在李四或者就是王五之间做出唯一得聘用选择。
劳动经济学课后习题参考答案
《劳动经济学》课后思考题参考答案第一章绪论二、思考题1．如何理解劳动经济学的价值？（1）劳动经济学研究的是社会经济问题。
例如，民工荒、政府要求增加最低工资、劳动生产率下降、农民工工资急剧上升、工资增长不均等、工作培训、国有企业高管人员的高工资受到质疑、收入分配不平、农村移民增加、劳动力市场全球化扩大等等。
（2）数量上的重要性。
在西方经济中，大部分国民收入并不是来源于资本收入（利润、租金和利息），而是来源于工资。
绝大多数居民户的主要收入来源是提供劳务。
从数量上看，劳动才是我们最重要的经济资源。
（3）独有的特性。
劳动力市场的交易完全不同于产品市场的交易。
劳动力市场是一个极有意义和复杂的场所。
劳动力市场的复杂性意味着供给和需求概念在应用于劳动力市场时必须做出重大的修改和调整。
在供给方面，劳动者“出售”给雇主的劳务与该劳动者不可分离。
除了货币报酬，工人还关注工作的健康和安全性、工作难度、就业稳定性、培训和晋升机会等，这类非货币因素也许与直接收入同样重要。
这样，工人的供给决策要比产品市场的供给概念复杂得多。
（4）收益的广泛性。
无论是个人还是社会，都可以从劳动经济学中得到许多启示和教益。
从劳动经济学得到的信息和分析工具有助于人们做出与劳动力市场有关的决策。
从个人角度看。
大量内容将直接与我们有关，如工作搜寻、失业、歧视、工资、劳动力流动等。
对于企业管理者来说，从对劳动经济学的理解中所得到的知识背景和分析方法，对做出有关雇用、解雇、培训和工人报酬等方面的管理决策也应该是十分有用的。
从社会角度看，了解劳动经济学将使人们成为更有知识、更理智的公民。
2．劳动经济学的研究方法有哪些？首先要明确劳动经济学的基本假设。
劳动经济学的假设主要表现在以下四个方面：（1）资源的相对稀缺性。
如同商品和资本是稀缺的一样，劳动力资源也是有限的。
时间、个人收入和社会资源的稀缺性构成了经济学分析的基本前提。
（2）效用最大化。
由于劳动资源的稀缺性，人类社会进行生产经营活动时，必须研究劳动资源的合理配置和利用。
劳动经济学课后答案
劳动经济学课后答案劳动经济学课后答案第一章：劳动经济学的研究范围和方法1. 什么是劳动经济学？答：劳动经济学是研究劳动力市场、劳动力供给和需求、劳动生产力以及劳动报酬等与劳动有关的经济现象的一门学科。
2. 劳动经济学研究的主要内容有哪些？答：劳动经济学研究的主要内容包括劳动力市场的运作机制、劳动力供给的决定因素、劳动力需求的决定因素、劳动生产力的影响因素以及劳动报酬的决定等。
3. 劳动经济学研究的方法有哪些？答：劳动经济学研究的方法主要包括经验研究法、实证研究法、理论分析法、比较研究法、实证研究法和实证研究法等。
第二章：劳动力市场的供给与需求1. 劳动力供给的决定因素有哪些？答：劳动力供给受到人口规模、劳动年龄人口比例、劳动参与率、教育水平、家庭观念等因素的影响。
2. 劳动力需求的决定因素有哪些？答：劳动力需求受到经济增长率、技术进步、劳动力生产率、劳动力成本等因素的影响。
3. 劳动力市场的运作机制是什么？答：劳动力市场的运作机制是通过劳动力供给与需求的相互作用，决定劳动力的数量和价格，从而实现劳动力的合理配置。
第三章：劳动生产率与工资水平1. 什么是劳动生产率？答：劳动生产率是单位劳动投入所能创造的单位产出或价值。
2. 劳动生产率的影响因素有哪些？答：劳动生产率受到生产工艺技术的进步、劳动者的技能水平、资本投入等因素的影响。
3. 工资水平如何决定？答：工资水平是由劳动力市场供求关系决定的。
当劳动力供给大于需求时，工资水平下降；当劳动力需求大于供给时，工资水平上升。
第四章：劳动收入的分配与再分配1. 劳动收入的分配方式有哪些？答：劳动收入的分配方式主要包括市场分配、政府分配和家庭分配。
2. 劳动收入再分配的目的是什么？答：劳动收入再分配的目的是通过税收制度、社会保障和福利机制等手段，调节社会收入差距，实现财富公平和社会公正。
3. 劳动收入再分配的方法有哪些？答：劳动收入再分配的方法主要包括纳税制度、福利补贴、收入调节机制等。
劳动经济学(第四版)第09章失业与通货膨胀
目录
9.1 通货膨胀的含义及类型 9.2 菲利普斯曲线 9.3 菲利普斯曲线面临的挑战
9.1 通货膨胀的含义及类型
9.1.1通货膨胀的含义及衡量 1.通货膨胀的含义 2.通货膨胀的衡量 （1）价格指数 （2）国民生产总值平减指数
9.1 通货膨胀的含义及类型
9.1.2通货膨胀的类型 1.需求拉动型通货膨胀 （1）凯恩斯主义者的解释 （2）货币主义者的解释
9.3 菲利普斯曲线面临的挑战
9.3.1经济滞胀现象
9.3.2新经济的“两低一高”现象
9.2 菲利普斯曲线
2.菲利普斯曲线的移动
3.短9.2.3理性预期的菲利普斯曲线
9.2 菲利普斯曲线
9.2.4自然失业率 自然失业率的水平主要受以下因素的影响： 其一，技术进步的速度。 其二，劳动力人口构成的变化。 其三，工资刚性增强。 其四，劳动力市场中介组织的服务功能与水平， 职业技术培训事业的发展规模与水平，获得新技 术的费用与组织等。
9.1 通货膨胀的含义及类型
2.成本推动型通货膨胀
9.1 通货膨胀的含义及类型
3.混合型通货膨胀
9.1 通货膨胀的含义及类型
4.结构型通货膨胀 5.预期型通货膨胀 6.惯性通货膨胀
9.2 菲利普斯曲线
9.2.1早期菲利普斯曲线
9.2 菲利普斯曲线
9.2.2附加预期的菲利普斯曲线 1.通货膨胀预期
劳动经济学习题
劳动经济学习题劳动经济学(埃伦堡)1。
术语解释第一章。
公共产品第2章2。
劳动力市场3。
失业4。
名义工资5。
工资总额6。
实际工资7。
低(高)薪8。
经济租金9。
留用工资10。
市场清算工资率第三章11。
买方独家垄断12。
劳动力的边际产品第四章13。
劳动力需求的自我工资弹性。
劳动力需求的跨工资弹性。
希克斯-马歇尔导数需求定理第五章25。
员工福利26。
准固定成本。
特殊培训30。
内部劳动力市场第6章31。
劳动力参与率32。
收入效应。
替代效应第7章34。
附加劳动效果。
隐性失业36。
沮丧的劳动效果第八章11。
补偿性工资差异第九章8。
人力资本投资。
超龄第X章38。
单一价格规则39。
临时解雇第14章XI。
绩效工资15。
促销竞赛。
绩效加薪41。
效率工资第12章6。
积极的反歧视行动。
拥挤效应XXXX年龄(岁)假设在对另一组员工执行相同的回归分析后获得以下估计等式:wi =3+0.3 AI-0.01(AI)2对不起:(1)基于第一个估计，XXXX人年龄之间的相关性如下:wi = 1+0.3 i (0.1)标准偏差由公式下面的括号表示打扰一下:你能肯定工资率肯定会随着年龄增长而上升吗？第二章1。
假设成年人口为2.1亿，其中1.3亿就业，500万失业。
请计算失业率和劳动力参与率2.假设教师的劳动力供给曲线是Ls=XXXX年级的学生，现在准备再增加两名教师来缩小班级规模如果田纳西的研究普遍适用于其他地方，那么增加两名教师的劳动力的边际产出是什么？4。
锯木厂的边际劳动收入产品是MRPL=XXXX年收入他现在有两个工作机会可供选择。
一个工作机会的年收入是4万美元，没有短期解雇的问题。
另一个工作机会可能有短期解雇的问题。
大约有一半的年份是不景气的，所以工人将被暂时解雇，这将使工人的年收入减少到22500美元，而其他年份是好年份。
我可以问一下，在好年景里，托马斯需要挣多少年收入来弥补他被短期解雇的高风险吗？2。
一位研究人员发现，水下结构工人的工资函数为:wi = 100.5±0.5Di，其中w为每小时工资率(单位:美元)，d为工作工人的水下深度(单位:米)请根据以上信息描述雇主的报价曲线和工人a和工人b之间可能的无差异曲线:工人a在水下工作3米；工人乙在水下5米处工作。
- 1、下载文档前请自行甄别文档内容的完整性，平台不提供额外的编辑、内容补充、找答案等附加服务。
- 2、"仅部分预览"的文档,不可在线预览部分如存在完整性等问题,可反馈申请退款(可完整预览的文档不适用该条件!)。
- 3、如文档侵犯您的权益，请联系客服反馈,我们会尽快为您处理(人工客服工作时间：9:00-18:30)。
CHAPTER 99-1. Suppose a worker with an annual discount rate of 10 percent currently resides in Pennsylvania and is deciding whether to remain there or to move to Illinois. There are three work periods left in the life cycle. If the worker remains in Pennsylvania, he will earn $20,000 per year in each of the three periods. If the worker moves to Illinois, he will earn $22,000 in each of the three periods. What is the highest cost of migration that a worker is willing to incur and still make the move?The worker must compare the present value of staying in Pennsylvania to the present value of moving to Illinois. A worker will move if the present value of earnings in Illinois minus the costs of moving there exceed the present value of earnings in Pennsylvania:74.710,54$)1.1(000,201.1000,20000,202=++=PA PV and82.181,60$)1.1(000,221.1000,22000,222=++=IL PVThe worker will move, therefore, ifPV IL – C > PV PA ,where C denotes migration costs. Thus, the worker moves ifC < 60,181.82 - 54,710.74 = $5,471.089-2. Nick and Jane are married. They currently reside in Minnesota. Nick’s present value oflifetime earnings in his current employment is $300,000, and Jane’s present value is $200,000. They are contemplating moving to Texas, where each of them would earn a lifetime income of $260,000. The couple’s cost of moving is $10,000. In addition, Nick very much prefers the climate in Texas to that in Minnesota, and he figures that the change in climate is worth an additional $2,000 to him. Jane, on the other hand, prefers Minnesota’s frigid winters, so she figures she would be $2,000 worse off because of Texas’s blistering summers. Should they move to Texas?Yes. The “climatic” aspects of the move exactly balance each other, so we should not take them into account. On the monetary side, the sum of Nick’s and Jane’s lifetime present value of earnings inMinnesota is $500,000. The corresponding amount in Texas will be $520,000. The difference between the two ($20,000) exceeds the cost of moving ($10,000), so the move will make the couple jointly better off.9-3. Mickey and Minnie live in Orlando. Mickey’s net present value of lifetime earnings in Orlando is $125,000. Minnie’s net present value of lifetime earnings in Orlando is $500,000. The cost of moving to Atlanta is $25,000 per person. In Atlanta, Mickey’s net present value of lifetime earnings would be $155,000, and Minnie’s net present value of lifetime earnings would be $510,000. If Mickey and Minnie choose where to live based on their joint well-being, will they move to Atlanta? Is Mickey a tied-mover or a tied-stayer or neither? Is Minnie a tied-mover or a tied-stayer or neither?As a couple, the net present value of lifetime earnings of staying in Orlando is $500,000 + $125,000 = $625,000 and of moving to Atlanta is $510,000 + $155,000 – $50,000 = $615,000. Thus, as a couple, they would choose to stay in Orlando. Thus, there can only be a tied-stayer. (There cannot be a tied-mover, because the couple is not moving.)For Mickey, staying in Orlando is associated with a net present value of $125,000, while moving to Atlanta would yield a net present value of $155,000 – $25,000 = $130,000. So Mickey would choose to move to Atlanta. Therefore, Mickey is a tied-stayer.For Minnie, staying in Orlando is associated with a net present value of $500,000, while moving to Atlanta would yield a net present value of $510,000 –$25,000 = $485,000. So Minnie would choose to remain in Orlando. Thus, Minnie is not a tied-stayer.9-4. Suppose a worker’s skill is captured by his efficiency units of labor. The distribution of efficiency units in the population is such that worker 1 has 1 efficiency unit, worker 2 has 2 efficiency units, and so on. There are 100 workers in the population. In deciding whether to migrate to the United States, these workers compare their weekly earnings at home (w0) with their potential earnings in the United States (w1). The wage-skills relationship in each of the two countries is given by:w0 = 700 + 0.5s,andw1 = 670 + s,where s is the number of efficiency units the worker possesses.(a) Assume there are no migration costs. What is the average number of efficiency units among immigrants? Is the immigrant flow positively or negatively selected?The earnings-skills relationship in each country is illustrated in the figure below. The US line is steeper because the payoff to a unit of skills is higher in the United States. All workers who have at least 60 efficiency units will migrate to the United States. Therefore, there is positive selection and the average number of efficiency units in the immigrant flow is approximately 80 (the exact answer depends on whether the person with 60 efficiency units, who is indifferent between moving or not, moves to the United States).(b) Suppose it costs $10 to migrate to the United States. What is the average number of efficiency units among immigrants? Is the immigrant flow positively or negatively selected?If everyone incurs a cost of $10 to migrate to the United States, the U.S. wage-skill line drops by $10, and only those persons with more than 80 efficiency units will find it worthwhile to migrate. The immigrant flow is still positively selected and has, on average, 90 efficiency units.(c) What would happen to the selection that takes place if migration costs are not constant in the population, but are much higher for more skilled workers?If migration costs are much higher for skilled workers, it is possible that no skilled workers will find it worthwhile to migrate. We already know that even in the absence of migration costs no worker with fewer than 60 efficiency units finds it worthwhile to migrate. If highly skilled workers find it very costly to migrate it might be the case that there is no migration to the United States.Income700660809-5. Suppose the United States enacts legislation granting all workers, including newly arrived immigrants, a minimum income floor of y− dollars.(a) Generalize the Roy model to show how this type of welfare program influences incentive tomigrate to the United States. Ignore any issues regarding how the welfare program is to be funded.(b) Does this welfare program change the selection of the immigrant flow? In particular, are immigrants more likely to be negatively selected than in the absence of a welfare program?(c) Which types of workers, the highly skilled or the less skilled, are most likely to be attracted by the welfare program?U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor MarketThe introduction of a wage floor in the United States (at y −) shifts the U.S. earnings-skill relationship to the bold line drawn in the figures. If the returns to skills are higher in the United States (left panel above), there are then two sets of workers who find it profitable to move: those who have very high skill levels (above s P ) as well as those workers who have very low skill levels (below s L ). In contrast, if the returns to skills are lower in the United States than in the country of origin (the right panel above), the introduction of the welfare program does not change the incentives to migrate for any worker (although the incentives of some workers would change if the wage floor was high enough). The welfare program, therefore, acts as a welfare magnet for workers originating in countries that generate “brain drains”, but not in countries where unskilled workers have incentives to migrate even in the absence of wage floors.α αL P Dollars αN y −α9-6. The immigration surplus, though seemingly small in the United States, redistributes wealth from workers to firms. Present a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the losses accruing to native workers and of the gains accruing to firms. Do these calculations help explain why some segments of society are emotional in their support of changes in immigration policy that would either increase or decrease the immigrant flow?The total loss in earnings experienced by workers in the United States is given by the rectangle w 0 B F w 1 in Figure 9-11. The area of this rectangle is given by:Loss to Native Workers = (w 1 - w 0) × N .We can calculate the loss to native workers as a fraction of GDP by dividing both sides by Q (national income). If we do this and rearrange terms we obtain:MN N Q M N w w w w Q +×+×−=)( Workers Native to Loss 0001.Thus, the native loss (as a fraction of GDP) equals the percentage change in the native wage caused by immigration times labor’s share of national income times the fraction of the labor force that is native born. If we continue the numerical example in the text, this calculation yields: (-.03) × (.7) × (.9) = -1.89percent of GDP. As national income is on the order of $11 trillion, the loss suffered by native workers is on the order of $208 billion. Capitalists receive this income plus the immigration surplus of $11 billion (see the text), for a total gain of about $219 billion (about 2 percent of GDP).Even though the net benefits from immigration are small, particular groups in the United States either gain or lose substantially from immigration. This explains why the debate over immigration policy is often polarized.9-7. In the absence of any legal barriers on immigration from Neolandia to the United States, the economic conditions in the two countries generate an immigrant flow that is negatively selected. In response, the United States enacts an immigration policy that restricts entry to Neolandians who are in the top 10 percent of Neolandia’s skill distribution. What type of Neolandian would now migrate to the United States?No one would migrate from Neolandia. The policy does not change the cost-benefit analysis for the most skilled Neolandians. They did not want to migrate when they could enter the country freely, and they still will not want to migrate when they are the only ones who can obtain visas. The lesson is that changes in immigration policy affect the skill composition of the immigrant flow only if changes target immigrants who wished to migrate to the United States in the first place.9-8. Labor demand for low-skilled workers in the United States is w = 24 – 0.1E where E is the number of workers (in millions) and w is the hourly wage. There are 120 million domestic U.S. low-skilled workers who supply labor inelastically. If the U.S. opened its borders to immigration, 20 million low-skill immigrants would enter the U.S. and supply labor inelastically. What is the market-clearing wage if immigration is not allowed? What is the market-clearing wage with open borders? How much is the immigration surplus when the U.S. opens its borders? How much surplus is transferred from domestic workers to domestic firms?Without immigration, the market-clearing wage is $12, at which all 120 million low-skill U.S. workers are employed. With immigration, the market-clearing wage is $10, at which all 120 million low-skill U.S. workers and all 20 million immigrants are employed. The additional surplus received by the U.S. because of the immigration equals ($12 – $10) (140m – 120m) / 2 = $20 million. The total transfer from U.S. workers to U.S. firms because of the immigration equals ($12 – $10) (120m) = $240 million.9-9. A country has two regions, the North and the South, which are identical in all respects except the hourly wage and the number of workers. The demand for labor in each region is:w N = $20 – .5E N and w S = $20 – .5E S,where E N and E S are millions of workers. Currently there are 6 million workers in the North and 18 million workers in the South.(a) What is the wage in each region?The wage in the North is $20 – .5 (6) = $17. The wage in the South is $20 – .5 (18) = $11.(b) If there were no shocks to the economy, migration over time will result in an equalization of wages and employment. What would be the long-run wage and employment level in each region?As labor demand is the same in both regions and workers are identical in their preferences, half of the workers will locate in each region in the long-run. Thus, 12 million workers will work in each region, and the hourly wage will be $14.(c) Return to the original set-up where there are 6 million workers in the North and 18 million workers in the South. As a policy maker, you decide not only to allow 2 million immigrants of working age to enter your country, but you have the authority to resettle the immigrants wherever you want. How should you distribute immigrants across the regions to maximize the country’s immigration surplus? Besides maximizing the immigration surplus in the short-run, in what other ways does your distribution of immigrants help the economy?Let I N and I S be the number of immigrants (in millions) placed in the North and in the South respectively, so that I N + I S = 2. After immigration, the new wages are:w N = $17 – .5I N and w S = $11 – .5I Sand the immigrant surpluses are:S N = 0.25(I N)2 and S S = .25(I S)2.Using that I N + I S = 2, therefore, the total immigrant surplus isS = 0.25(I N)2 + 0.25(2–I N)2 = 1 – I N + .5(I N)2.One can use calculus to solve for the optimal value for I N, but be aware that S is U-shaped, so setting the first order conditions to 0 solves for a minimum. Rather, use Excel to plot S. The data are:I N S I N S I N S I N S0.001.000.05 0.95 0.55 0.60 1.05 0.50 1.55 0.650.10 0.91 0.60 0.58 1.10 0.51 1.60 0.680.15 0.86 0.65 0.56 1.15 0.51 1.65 0.710.20 0.82 0.70 0.55 1.20 0.52 1.70 0.750.25 0.78 0.75 0.53 1.25 0.53 1.75 0.780.30 0.75 0.80 0.52 1.30 0.55 1.80 0.820.35 0.71 0.85 0.51 1.35 0.56 1.85 0.860.40 0.68 0.90 0.51 1.40 0.58 1.90 0.910.45 0.65 0.95 0.50 1.45 0.60 1.95 0.950.50 0.63 1.00 0.50 1.50 0.63 2.00 1.00 Thus, the immigrant surplus is maximized by placing all 2 million immigrants in either of the regions. It would be best, however, to place them all in the high wage region, as this will lead to a faster equalization of wages and saves natives the trouble and costs of moving.9-10. Phil has two periods of work remaining prior to retirement. He is currently employed in a firm that pays him the value of his marginal product, $50,000 per period. There are many other firms that Phil could potentially work for. There is a 50 percent chance of Phil being a good match for any particular firm, and a 50 percent chance of him being a bad match. If he is in a good match, the value of his marginal product is $56,000 per period. If he is in a bad match, the value of his marginal product is $40,000 per period. If Phil quits his job, he can immediately find employment with any of the alternative firms. It takes one period to discover whether Phil is a good or a bad match with a particular firm. In that first period, while Phil’s value to the firm is uncertain, he is offered a wage of $48,000. After the value of the match is determined, Phil is offered a wage equal to the value of his marginal product in that firm. When offered that wage, Phil is free to (a) accept;(b) reject and try some other firm; or (c) return to his original firm and his original wage. Phil maximizes the present value of his expected lifetime earnings, and his discount rate is 10 percent. What should Phil do?Phil makes decisions at the beginning of each period, and there are a variety of choices at each of these times. To reduce the number of strategies that require the numerical calculation of the expected outcome, first discard unreasonable choices. In particular, if Phil does not quit his job in period 1, he should not do so in period 2. After all, his second-period wage in a new job will be lower than in the old job, and there is no third period. Similarly, if he tries a new job in period 1 and is found to be a bad match, he should return to the old job. After all, the old job pays a higher wage than what Phil’s current employer is willing to pay and what another new firm would offer him. Finally, if he tries a new job and is found to be a good match, he should certainly accept their offer. In the end, Phil only has two potentially viable strategies.Strategy one: Keep the old job in both periods. The earnings path associated with this choice is flat and deterministic – Phil earns $50,000 in each period. The present discounted value of the outcome of this strategy is PV1 = 50,000 + 50,000/1.1 = $95,455.Strategy two: Try a new job. If it is a good match, keep it. If it is a bad match, return to the old job. If Phil adopts this strategy, he will earn $48,000 in period 1. In period 2, he will earn either $56,000 or $50,000, each with probability ½. The expected present discounted value of the outcome of that strategy is PV2 = 48,000 + ((½× 56,000) + (½ × 50,000))/1.1 = $96,182.As the second strategy generates a higher present value, this is the strategy Phil adopts.9-11. Under the recently enacted 2001 tax legislation in the United States, all income tax filers can now deduct from their total income half of their expenses incurred when moving more than 50 miles to accept a new job. Prior to the change, only tax filers who itemized their deductions were allowed to deduct their moving expenses. (Typically, homeowners itemize their deductions and renters do not itemize.) How would this change in the tax bill likely affect the mobility of homeowners and renters?The policy change has no affect on homeowners, whereas the policy change reduces the cost of moving for renters. Therefore, the policy is predicted to increase the mobility of renters.。