关于反倾销的论文(英文版)

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倾销与反倾销英文版

倾销与反倾销英文版

So there is no dumping it? dumping;
• Zhongxin silk, a car mat material, which belongs to the wire ring pad upgrade products, the technology from Zhongxin brand
Classification of dumping
According to different standards can be divided into different types of dumping, but the most common is based on the duration of the dumping and damage to the extent of the division. Generally divided into the following categories:
product's raw material suppliers. Zhongxin silk is used in hot melt chemical technology, mat material in the European market is generally the first mandatory requirements for environmental protection, low temperature hot melt technology can ensure the environmental performance, but on the other hand, due to long-term underfoot, so it must ensure that the pressure is not the low temperature hot melt adhesion; and to ensure its pressure. At present, only a well-known Chinese chemical enterprises in the world have the chemical technology to solve these two problems at the same time. It can be said that the success of the new wire, first of

反倾销毕业论文范文

反倾销毕业论文范文

反倾销(Anti-Dumping)是国际贸易争端解决中的一个重要工具。

针对国际贸易中的倾销行为,许多国家和地区都采用了不同的反倾销措施。

反倾销制度可以有效地防止不公平竞争,保护本国产业和市场,促进公平贸易。

本文将从反倾销的定义、原理、国际反倾销现状、反倾销对产业的影响、反倾销对中国的影响等方面,对反倾销问题进行探讨。

一、反倾销的定义和原理反倾销是指一国政府采用的,以惩罚倾销行为为目的的措施,主要包括反倾销税、反倾销限制措施和反倾销调查等。

倾销是指某些企业以低于生产成本或低于出口国市场价格的价格向其他国家出口货物。

倾销行为扰乱了国际市场的正常秩序,对其他国家和地区的产业和市场造成了不公平竞争,严重影响了市场经济的发展。

因此,引入反倾销制度可以保护公平竞争,促进市场稳定。

二、国际反倾销现状目前,世界范围内的反倾销制度主要由世界贸易组织(WTO)和各国自身反倾销法律构成。

根据WTO的规定,成员国只有在符合反倾销协议规则的情况下才能采取反倾销行为。

目前,超过100个国家和地区采取了反倾销制度,其中包括美国、欧盟、印度、中国等国家和地区。

根据WTO统计,全球反倾销调查的数量已经从1980年代的数百起,增长到了2019年的超过2500起,其中大部分是由欧盟和美国发起的。

三、反倾销对产业的影响反倾销可以有效防止倾销行为,保护本国产业和市场,促进公平经济贸易的发展。

而对于被反倾销制度影响到的企业,则需要承担一定的经济压力。

反倾销税的加征将使被征税产品的价格上涨,进口商需要支付额外的税费。

这可能增加了进口商的成本,也让本国消费者面临更高的价格。

此外,反倾销调查所涉及的律师费、调查费用等也可能对企业造成财务压力。

四、反倾销对中国的影响自加入WTO以来,中国成为了全球贸易的重要节点,也面临着来自其他站在全球贸易顶端的国家和地区的竞争和压力。

中国在国际贸易领域一度处于弱势地位,曾经遭到过许多国家的反倾销行为。

中国采取反制措施,加强国内产业改革,提高质量效率水平,逐渐走向了自主创新和产业升级的道路。

欧盟反倾销总结英文(热门3篇)

欧盟反倾销总结英文(热门3篇)

欧盟反倾销总结英文第1篇中国作为“世界工厂”的崛起,对其它国家地区,尤其是发到国家的就业、工资和企业产生了显著的负面影响。

近年来,中国受到反倾销(anti-dumping,AD)和反补贴(anti-subsidy,AS)反制次数上升,1995年至2008年,中国占全球AD和AS反制的25%,但到了2008年至2014年,这一比例上升至40%,大部分来自美国和欧盟。

虽然国际贸易政策旨在保护国内产业,但同时也造成了损失,例如消费者面临的商品价格提高,进口企业的中间投入品成本上升。

本文使用PSM-DID方法,研究了1999年至2007年,欧盟对中国AD政策,对欧盟企业的影响(这里选择了法国作为欧盟代表国家)。

在欧盟的政治语境下,好企业是那些在确定的AD政策的4位代码行业内受保护的法国企业,坏企业是于确定的AD政策的4位代码行业上出口的中国企业,丑陋企业是于确定的AD政策的4位代码行业上进口中国产品的法国企业。

研究结果表明,一方面,AD政策使得好企业的生产率和就业上升,但这只局限于那些生产率水平较低的企业;另一方面,AD政策对丑陋企业的生产率和就业产生了负面影响,那些高生产率水平企业尤为突出,且不局限于进口中国产品的企业。

AD政策虽然迫使一部分坏企业,即中国出口商退出市场,但存活的坏企业似乎通过增加R&D,提高生产率水平,经营表现变得更好了。

本文认为,AD政策作为一种贸易政策是无效率的,短期内虽然可以保护好企业,但长期反而使得存活的坏企业的竞争力更强了。

此外,应当警惕保护主义,发达国家政府需谨慎使用AD政策,因为丑陋企业通过进口“物有所值”的中间品,提高附加值和本地就业。

欧盟反倾销总结英文第2篇AD政策数据,来自世界银行的Global Anti-dumpingDatabase(GAD),该数据库提供了全球自1980年以来详细的AD措施数据,例如HS8位信息。

双边贸易流量数据来自法国海关,企业数据来自Annual French Business Survey(ABS)数据库。

反倾销、反补贴、保障和特殊情况处理等(中英文对照)

反倾销、反补贴、保障和特殊情况处理等(中英文对照)

反倾销、反补贴、保障和特殊情况处理等(中英文对照)发布时间:2011-10-24 11:30:54 翻译:李莉校对:廖纷,陈茜茜复审:薛婷婷Anti-dumping, Subsidies, Safeguards,Contingencies, etc反倾销、反补贴、保障和特殊情况处理等英文来源:/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htmBinding tariffs, and applying them equally to all trading partners (most-favoured-nation treatment, or MFN) are key to the smooth flow of trade in goods.约束关税及将其在全体贸易成员国之间平等地适用(即最惠国待遇,简称MFN)是保证商品交易过程畅通的关键。

The WTO agreementsuphold the principles, but they also allow exceptions — in some circumstances. Three of these issues are:世贸协议秉持着这些原则,但有时也有例外。

例如以下三种情况:actions taken against dumping (selling at an unfairly low price)1.反倾销(以不公平的低价出售商品的行为)措施;subsidies and special “countervailing” duties to offset the subsidies1.贸易补贴以及为抵消贸易补贴而征收的“反补贴”关税;emergency measures to limit imports temporarily, designed to “safeguard”domestic industries.1.为暂时限制进口以“保护”国内产业而采取的紧急应对措施。

中国应对国外反倾销问题探析外文翻译

中国应对国外反倾销问题探析外文翻译

一、英文原文原文:Determination of Dumping1. For the purpose of this Agreement, a product is to be considered as being dumped, i.e. introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value, if the export price of the product exported from one country to another is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country.2. When there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade in the domestic market of the exporting country or when, because of the particular market situation or the low volume of the sales in the domestic market of the exporting country(2), such sales do not permit a proper comparison, the margin of dumping shall be determined by comparison with a comparable price of the like product when exported to an appropriate third country, provided that this price is representative, or with the cost of production in the country of origin plus a reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits.(a) Sales of the like product in the domestic market of the exporting country or sales to a third country at prices below per unit (fixed and variable) costs of production plus administrative, selling and general costs may be treated as not being in the ordinary course of trade by reason of price and may be disregarded in determining normal value only if the authorities(3) determine that such sales are made within an extended period of time(4) in substantial quantities(5) and are at prices which do not provide for the recovery of all costs within a reasonable period of time. If prices which are below per unit costs at the time of sale are above weighted average per unit costs for the period of investigation, such prices shall be considered to provide for recovery of costs withina reasonable period of time.(b) For the purpose of paragraph 2, costs shall normally be calculated on the basis of records kept by the exporter or producer under investigation, provided that such records are in accordance with the generally accepted accounting principles of the exporting country and reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration. Authorities shall consider all available evidence on the proper allocation of costs, including that which is made available by the exporter or producer in the course of the investigation provided that such allocations have been historically utilized by the exporter or producer, in particular in relation to establishing appropriate amortization and depreciation periods and allowances for capital expenditures and other development costs. Unless already reflected in the cost allocations under this sub-paragraph, costsshall be adjusted appropriately for those non-recurring items of cost which benefit future and/or current production, or for circumstances in which costs during the period of investigation are affected by start-up operations.(6)(c) For the purpose of paragraph 2, the amounts for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits shall be based on actual data pertaining to production and sales in the ordinary course of trade of the like product by the exporter or producer under investigation. When such amounts cannot be determined on this basis, the amounts may be determined on the basis of:(i) the actual amounts incurred and realized by the exporter or producer in question in respect of production and sales in the domestic market of the country of origin of the same general category of products; (ii) the weighted average of the actual amounts incurred and realized by other exporters or producers subject to investigation in respect of production and sales of the like product in the domestic market of the country of origin;(iii) any other reasonable method, provided that the amount for profit so established shall not exceed the profit normally realized by other exporters or producers on sales of products of the same general category in the domestic market of the country of origin.3. In cases where there is no export price or where it appears to the authorities concerned that the export price is unreliable because of association or a compensatory arrangement between the exporter and the importer or a third party, the export price may be constructed on the basis of the price at which the imported products are first resold to an independent buyer, or if the products are not resold to an independent buyer, or not resold in the condition as imported, on such reasonable basis as the authorities may determine.4. A fair comparison shall be made between the export price and the normal value. This comparison shall be made at the same level of trade, normally at the ex-factory level, and in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time. Due allowance shall be made in each case, on its merits, for differences which affect price comparability, including differences in conditions and terms of sale, taxation, levels of trade, quantities, physical characteristics, and any other differences which are also demonstrated to affect price comparability.(7) In the cases referred to in paragraph 3, allowances for costs, including duties and taxes, incurred between importation and resale, and for profits accruing, should also be made. If in these cases price comparability has been affected, the authorities shall establish the normal value at a level of trade equivalent to the level of trade of the constructed export price, or shall make due allowance as warranted under this paragraph. The authorities shall indicate to the parties in question what information is necessaryto ensure a fair comparison and shall not impose an unreasonable burden of proof on those parties.(a) When the comparison under paragraph 4 requires a conversion of currencies, such conversion should be made using the rate of exchange on the date of sale(8), provided that when a sale of foreign currency on forward markets is directly linked to the export sale involved, the rate of exchange in the forward sale shall be used. Fluctuations in exchange rates shall be ignored and in an investigation the authorities shall allow exporters at least 60 days to have adjusted their export prices to reflect sustained movements in exchange rates during the period of investigation.(b) Subject to the provisions governing fair comparison in paragraph 4, the existence of margins of dumping during the investigation phase shall normally be established on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value with a weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions or by a comparison of normal value and export prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis. A normal value established on a weighted average basis may be compared to prices of individual export transactions if the authorities find a pattern of export prices which differ significantly among different purchasers, regions or time periods, and if an explanation is provided as to why such differences cannot be taken into account appropriately by the use of a weightedaverage-to-weighted average or transaction-to-transaction comparison.5. In the case where products are not imported directly from the country of origin but are exported to the importing Member from an intermediate country, the price at which the products are sold from the country of export to the importing Member shall normally be compared with the comparable price in the country of export. However, comparison may be made with the price in the country of origin, if, for example, the products are merely transshipped through the country of export, or such products are not produced in the country of export, or there is no comparable price for them in the country of export.6. Throughout this Agreement the term “like product” (“produits imilaire”) shall be interpreted to mean a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration.7. This Article is without prejudice to the second Supplementary Provision to paragraph 1 of Article VI in Annex I to GATT 1994.二、翻译文章译文:倾销的确定1.本协议之目的,如果一项产品从一国出口到另一国,该产品的出口价格在正常的贸易过程中,低于出口国旨在用于本国消费的同类产品的可比价格,也即以低于其正常价值进入另一国的商业,则该产品即被认为是倾销。

最新试论反倾销的合理性1论文

最新试论反倾销的合理性1论文

试论反倾销的合理性(1)论文论文摘要:在提倡贸易自由化的今天,按照WTO的规定,各国不断地降低关税、取消非关税壁垒。

反倾销作为WTO协议下少数几个合法手段之一,成为最重要的一种贸易限制措施,被各国频频使用以保护本国工业。

那么,反倾销究竟是否合理呢?文章对这一问题进行分析。

论文关键词:倾销;反倾销;自由贸易;贸易保护自由贸易是WTO的宗旨,各成员国平等的限制和运用关税是自由贸易的关键。

WTO协议都是依据这一宗旨制定出来的,但有三种例外情况:一为反倾销;二为反补贴;三为安全保障措施。

按照WTO协议,各成员国不断降低关税、取消非关税壁垒,以上三种例外措施成为WTO协议下各国保护本国工业、避免外来激烈竞争的唯一合法手段,而反倾销是当前WTO成员国最常使用的方法。

WTO的反倾销协议并没有分析反倾销是否合理,它只是对各国的反倾销行为进行了规范。

那么,反倾销究竟是否合理呢? 要分析反倾销,我们首先要明白什么是倾销。

在不完全竞争的市场,有时同一家公司的同一件商品在国内和国际市场的售价却不一样,这种在不同的市场上以不同的价格销售同一种商品的行为称为价格歧视,而倾销是国际贸易中最普遍的一种价格歧视,如果一家公司某种商品在国外的售价低于其国内的售价,这家公司就是在进行倾销,这是在经济学中对倾销的定义,而在WTO反倾销协议中,对倾销的定义则为在国外市场上低于正常价值销售商品,正常价值通常为该生产商在其母国售价或在第三国售价,当以上两种价格都无法获得时则为生产成本。

一般而言,倾销有五种形式:临时性倾销、国营贸易倾销、市场扩张性倾销、侵略性倾销和持续性倾销。

当某一生产商由于季节,或是错误的生产计划,或是不可预测的国内市场的需求变化等原因而产生大量库存,为了清理库存而降价在国外市场上出售产品,这样的倾销称为临时性倾销。

国营贸易倾销是指一些发展中国家或不发达国家以极低的价格出口产品以获得硬通货。

市场扩张性倾销是指为获得国外市场份额而以低价出口产品。

东亚的反倾销问题外文翻译-精品

东亚的反倾销问题外文翻译-精品

2126单词中文3573字外文翻译East Asia’s Anti-dumping ProblemMaterial Source: Wiley Online Library Author:Thomas J.Prusa 1. INTRODUCTIONThe more things change, the more they stay the same. In the 1970s anti-dumping (AD) was the most common type of trade dispute, and East Asian countries were the leading targets of these investigations. The same was true in the 1980s. The same was also true in the 1990s. The same is still true today.For all the hue and cry about safeguards, Super 301, government-subsidized exports, etc., AD was, is, and for the indefinite future will continue to be, the undisputed king of protection. Several authors have documented the world’s growing AD problem (Miranda et al., 1998; Prusa, 2001; and Zanardi, 2004). Each study provides evidence of the growing use and proliferation of AD protection. Prusa (2005) perhaps offers the best evidence, pointing out that in terms of the quantity of trade litigation, AD has lapped the field – several times over. Between 1995 and 2000, WTO members reported 61 safeguard investigations, 115 countervailing duty investigations, and 1,441 AD investigations! Said somewhat differently, over the past 25 years there have been more disputes under the AD agreement than under all the other GATT/WTO trade statutes put together.While there is considerable disagreement whether AD levels or tilts the playing field, there can be little doubt that East Asian countries have been, and will likely continue to be, the leading targets of AD actions. Simply put, AD is a serious problem for East Asia; by almost any measure East Asian countries are subject to a disproportionate share of AD actions. The extent of the disparity has not been recognized in any previous studies. The goal of this paper is to eliminate this gap in the literature.For this paper, I review AD disputes over the past 25 years and find that East Asian economies – Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, China-Taiwan and China-PRC – are not only subject to an extraordinarilylarge number of AD actions but also account for most of the worldwide growth in AD actions. I will show that the growth of AD has largely come at the expense of East Asian countries.Another detail that this paper uncovers is that East Asian countries have largely shunned the use of AD. This is also depicted in Figure 1 where I calculate the fraction of AD cases filed by East Asian countries. As seen, East Asian countries generally account for less than five per cent of AD filings worldwide. As I will discuss, such restraint is highly unusual. It appears that East Asian countries are outliers on both perspectives – they are subject to a remarkably large number of AD actions but file remarkably few AD actions.My hope is that this paper will give readers a better understanding of the patterns of AD by and against East Asian countries over the past 25 years. Whether measured by number of cases or by cases per dollar of trade, East Asian countries look significantly different from other large economies. To a large extent, the trends and patterns are so sharp that simple tables do a good job delivering the message. But, to confirm that other factors are not behind the patterns I also use more formal statistical methods to confirm the findings. For instance, after controlling for factors that might influence filings such as the exchange rate and trade volume, I find that East Asian countries are subject to about twice as many cases as either North American or Western European countries. Moreover, I find the trend in filings against East Asian countries is increasing, by which I mean that in recent years the propensity for countries to direct their AD filings against East Asian countries is growing. One concern is that the growing intensity of AD use against East Asia is driven by China-PRC. Importantly, I find a rising propensity even if I exclude China-PRC. Looking from the other side of the dispute, I also find that North American countries file more than six times as many cases as do East Asian countries, holding other factors constant. On either side of the AD process, East Asian countries are outliers.2. A LOOK AT THE DATAa. BackgroundIn order to get a handle on the worldwide use of AD, I reviewed reports submitted to the WTO by member countries. By agreement, since 1980 all WTO members have been required to make semi-annual reports on their use of trade remedies, including AD activity. Using these reports a database of all AD actions filed by WTO members between 1980 and June 2002 was compiled; overall about4,600 AD actions have been reported to the WTO. AD actions initiated by non-WTO members are not in my database.1 The WTO reports include only basic case information, such as the filing (reporting) country, the affected country, the name of the product being investigated and the date the case was filed. For some cases I also know whether a duty was imposed, but the size of duty is almost never reported. Also, one cannot use the WTO AD reports to track the trade impact because product (tariff) codes are not reported.Before looking at the patterns in AD use, a couple of comments on the database are in order. To begin with, the country- and product-specificity of AD investigations affects the accounting. AD cases are reported by product against a particular named country. For instance, occasionally an investigation involving a single product will be broken into multiple products and consequently reported as multiple cases. More common, an investigation will name multiple foreign countries, and hence be recorded as multiple cases. Both characteristics increase the number of AD filings as domestic industries seek to widen the scope of protection.More complicated accounting issues involve EU countries and former USSR republics. First, under EU rules AD cases are not filed by individual countries but on behalf of the entire EU. By contrast, AD cases filed against EU countries name individual countries.3 For instance, a US AD action against steel beams from France and Germany would be reported as two separate cases. In order to keep the accounting consistent, I have ‘merged’ cases involving the same product filed at the same time against individual EU countries into a single EU case and have classified the affected country as the ‘EU’. This adjustment results in about 300 fewer cases. As a result, the numbers I report in this paper will differ from statistics reported elsewhere (Miranda et al., 1998; Prusa, 2001; and Zanardi, 2004). Nevertheless, I feel that combining cases against EU countries allows one a more consistent ‘balance sheet’ of worldwide AD activity.b. AD – Filing PatternsIn Table 1, I report the number of AD cases filed since 1980, including subtotals for five-year intervals. As mentioned above, I aggregate the individualSince 1980, North American countries have filed more AD cases than any other region. About 85 per cent of North American cases have been filed by the United States and Canada. Pacific/Oceania is the second heaviest AD-using region. This is almost entirely due to Australia. Western Europe’s total of 789 cases (which are primarily EU filings) makes it the third heaviest AD user. In other words, over the long run AD use has been dominated by the four traditional AD users: United States, Canada, Australia and the EU.When one looks at the filings for the individual sub-periods, however, an important dynamic pattern emerges. In particular, looking across the columns one can see the adoption of AD protection by more and more countries around the world. Early on (1980–84) all AD filing activity was confined to three regions, North America, Pacific/Oceania and Western Europe. Furthermore, the four traditional users account for 99 per cent of these filings. As pointed out by Finger (1993) for all intents and purposes, until the mid-1980s AD was an active policy instrument for only four users.Since that time AD use has progressively spread throughout the world. During the second half of the 1980s, for instance, South American and East Asian countriesbegan to use AD. By the second half of the 1990s, AD was used by nearly all parts of the world. Today, only the poorest countries in Africa and Central Asia are not active AD users. What is more, the new users have not just dabbled with AD. As discussed in Prusa (2001 and 2005) when countries begin to use AD, they typically do so in a big way. Today, many of the most aggressive AD users are new users. As a result, for the last decade the traditional users have accounted for less than 40 per cent of all AD actions (Prusa, 2005).The emergence of China-PRC is a major reason for the rising trend of AD use against East Asia. Since the 1980s AD actions against China-PRC have increased five-fold. If we exclude China-PRC from the East Asian totals, we find that between 1985 and 2002 AD actions against East Asian countries grew by 75 per cent. It appears that China-PRC is part of the explanation for the increase but not the whole story. The message is clear: East Asian countries have not only borne the brunt of AD protectionism but also the burden is increasing over time.3. MODEL AND RESULTSSpecification H, which measures the potential industry effect, clarifies this unexpected result. In this specification I allow the industry effect to vary by region. Thus, I measure a steel/industry effect for South America, an effect for South Asia, etc. Interestingly, I find that none of the industry dummies are statistically significant. This suggests that the propensity of East Asian countries to be named in AD cases is not driven by industry. If anything, the results indicate that once we control for bilateral trade there is a small propensity for steel and chemical industries to be named slightly less often than others.4. CONCLUDING COMMENTSIn this paper I have presented compelling evidence that East Asian countries are subject to far more AD investigations than any other region in the world. Whether I simply looked at the number of filings or controlled for exports, East Asia stands head and shoulders above all others. When I used statistical techniques to control for macroeconomic factors that might influence filing patterns, I found that East Asia was the only region to have a statistically significant affected intensity greater than North America. In addition, I found that unlike all other regions that have a negative time trend, the time trend for East Asia is positive. This means that over time more and more cases are aimed at East Asia, yet all other regions seem to be experiencing fewer cases.What these findings mean, of course, is open to debate. In this paper I presentno evidence on the question whether the cases against East Asia are appropriate. AD proponents such as Prestowitz (1988) and Mastel (1998) would surely argue that such filing patterns simply indicate that East Asian countries have closed home markets. This is an attractive explanation as it explains both why East Asia is subject to so many AD actions and also why East Asia files so few actions: a closed home market makes it likely that firms will dump in their export markets (meaning the AD actions against East Asia are appropriate) and also make it impossible for foreign firms to compete in Asian home markets (which means that East Asian firms need not resort to AD).Yet, there is no evidence that the Prestowitz-Mastel view is valid. In fact, given the persuasive evidence presented by Lindsey (1999) and Lindsey and Ikenson (2002), it seems far more likely that closed home markets (if such an allegation were true) have absolutely nothing to do with the AD patterns documented. More plausibly, East Asia’s AD problem first and foremost has to do with how these countries have developed. East Asian countries export manufactured goods, and AD is primarily used against manufacturing.译文东亚的反倾销问题资料来源:威利网上图书馆作者:托马斯J·普鲁萨1.介绍事情变化的越多,越保持不变。

倾销与反倾销措施外文翻译(可编辑)

倾销与反倾销措施外文翻译(可编辑)

倾销与反倾销措施外文翻译(可编辑)倾销与反倾销措施外文翻译外文翻译原文Dumping and Anti-dumping MeasuresMaterial Source: international economics,July1984 Author: RichardSenti ZurichIn recent times, the number of dumping actions has shown a striking correlation with the respective level of economic activity, Thefollowing observations convey an overall picture of the dumping actions currently pending and the anti-dumping measures implemented, and lookinto the current problems faced by the international anti-dumping system.For years, dumping actions have been at the centre of discussions in the trade negotiations between the US, Canada, Japan and the member countries of the EC. At the end of 1977, there were twenty dumpingactions in progress in the USA. Tension eased in 1978 following the introduction of the trigger price system to regulate steel imports On confirmation of the modified cost criterion in the US Trade Act of 1979, the US steel firms once again took action against the EC steel producers. In 1980, the trigger price system briefly became temporarily inoperative but was applied again the same year with added force. Nevertheless, more dumpingactions followed,particularly in the years 1981 and 1982 At the beginning of 1983, the GATT Committee on Anti-Dumping Questions published a summary of theanti-dumping proceedings instituted during recent years in the USA, EC, Finland, Canada, Austria and Sweden,the provisional and definitive counter-measures and the price agreements reached cf. Table 1.The majority of actions are directed at the industrialised nations and only a few against the developing countries. Neither withdrawn actions nor those which resulted in a negative decision are included in these figures.Table 2 shows between which trade partners dumping negotiations took place during the years 1981/82, i.e. which countries instituted proceedings and which were sitting in the dock as far as was reported to GATT.US Anti-Dumping Legislation as a BasisIn 1945, immediately after the end of the war, the US State Department published the first proposals for a newworld trade order. According to these proposals, the members of an international trade organisation still to be created should, among other things,undertake "to 188 subscribe to a general definition of the circumstances under which anti-dumping and countervailing duties may properly be applied to products imported from other members".Only a year later, the Americans submitted the Charter for the Creation of an International Trade Organisation containing concretesuggestions on the anti-dumping settlement s which were later adopted by the Havana Charter s and GATT without undergoing significant alterations. Both the basic concept and many individual provisions are in line with the American antidumping legislation of that time.The first US anti-dumping provisions are to be found in the Revenue Act of 1916. 7 According to this law, the Americans imposed something akin to a fine 8 if 1 imports were offered in the USA at a lower price than in the country of origin and 2 as a result American industry was exposed to serious danger intent to destroy or injure. The two criteria "underpricing" and "infliction of damage" were later adopted by the actual anti-dumping laws of 1921 and 19309 and still apply todayfollowing the supplements and refinements made in 1974 and 1979.According to American Law of 1921 and 1930, dumping has occurred if the goods are offered more cheaply in the USA than on the home market price criterion. - Or, where there are no sales on the home market, if the goods are offered more cheaply in the USA than in a third country modified price criterion. - In case no sales are offered outside the country of destination, if the goods are exported below the costs of manufacture in the producing country cost criterion.The legal amendments of 1974 and 1979 brought with them an extension of the cost criterion to cover cases in which the domestic sales prices in the country of origin no longer cover the costs of productionOrigin of GATT Provisions and Anti-Dumping ConventionIn discussions surrounding the reshaping of the world trading system, 12 several delegates demanded going beyond the US regulation of price dumping of that time and incorporating service, exchange-rate and social dumping. Service dumping revolves around freight costs, i.e. the cheapening of exports by way of dumped transport services. Exchange-rate dumping is the cheapening of exports in the form of parity guaranteesand foreign exchange allowances. 13 Social dumping is constituted in cases where products from prison camps or prisons find their way ontothe world market at prices with which private entrepreneurs cannot compete. The negotiating delegations finally agreed on the price dumping in line with the US proposal.There were initial differences of opinion regarding the extent ofthe damage necessary for counter-measures to be taken. Must serious, material or indeterminate injury occur before counter-measures can be taken? Does the difference between domestic price and export price have to reach certain dimensions e.g. at least 5 % of the domestic price before counter-measures can be justified? Can serious injury caused be responded to with something like a punitive measure? Must the approvalof the ITO or of the contracting parties to GATT be obtained before counter-measuresare taken? The formulation finally agreed upon states thatcountermeasures may only be taken if the contracting partyestablishes "that the effect of the dumping.., is such as to cause orthreaten material injury to an established domestic industry, or is such as to retard materially the establishment of a domestic industry". TM In 1955, Article VI of GATT was supplemented the first and only amendment to the GATT wording on dumping to the effect that in cases where delay might cause "damage that would be difficult to repair", immediate measures are permitted without the need to seek the prior consent of the contracting parties to GATT. 15The dumping question experienced a revival during the Kennedy Round between 1964 and 1967. TheAmericans had tried to include also non-tariff barriers in the trade talks. Subsequently, they realised much to their annoyance that the negotiating parties werespotlighting the verybarriers to trade which applied in the USA, above all the US anti-dumping law. After brief hesitation, the Americans attempted to turn the antidumping controversy in their favour with the help of a detailed regulation. Thus emerged the Anti-Dumping Code of 1967 which, althoughit ties the Americans' hands in many a procedural question, otherwise hitsparticularly hard at Canada and Great Britain.Canada's anti-dumping legislation up to that time did not conform to GATT in that the taking of anti-dumping measures was not bound to the precondition of economic damage. Also in Great Britain - accordingto the American view- anti-dumping measures at that time were being misused for the protection of the domestic economy. From the US perspective, the advantages associated with the Anti-Dumping Codeoutweighed the resultant disadvantages which it was felt had to be accepted.The "Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Anti-Dumping Code" is dated 30th June, 1967.16 During the Tokyo Round, the 1967 Anti-Dumping Code underwent a two-fold amendment: firstly, there was the question of demarcation vis-a-vis the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties which was in the process of formation; 17 secondly, changes were made to the existing agreement in terms of ascertainment of damage Art. 3: 1-4, theprivileged position of the developing countries Art. 13 and consultations, arbitration and settlement of disputes Art. 15. 18 The currently valid agreement on anti-dumping was reached on 12th April 1979 in Geneva. ~9 Wherever the antidumping agreement is mentioned in the following, reference is being made to the currently valid version of 1979.Definition of DumpingIn imitation of the American legal system of the 20s and 30s, GATT speaks of dumping when products of the same kind "of one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the products". Hence,dumping means that the "normal" domestic value of an article exceeds its export value. How does GATT define the "normal" domestic value? When is a product "of the same kind" when compared with another? How should we interpret export value?The "normal" value of an article is undercut according to Art. VI:Iof GATT "if the price of the product exported from one country toanother a is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in theexporting country, or b in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either i the highest comparable price for the like product forexport to any third country in the ordinary course of trade, or ii the cost of proddction of the product in the country of origin plus a reasonable addition for selling cost and profit".Differences in terms and conditions of sale, varying taxation andother differentials influencing the price are to be given "due" consideration. On the other hand, however, if export prices are lower because of the reimbursement of domestic duties and taxes e.g. by way of the reimbursement of VAT, this does not, according to GATT, constitute dumping which would justify counter-measures. The "normal" domesticvalue is taken to be exclusive of duties and taxes The GATT definitionof dumping applies to all countries which are signatories to GATT -apart from one important exception. The US anti-dumping law contains divergent and partly narrower provisions than GATT in two specific areas: Should the export product come to be sold in the country of origin, GATT says that dumping is to be determined according to the pricecriterion irrespective of the extent of the costs of manufacture. According to American law, however, the costs of manufacture can also be taken into consideration as well as the domestic price. The costcriterion shall apply in cases where there is good reason to supposethat the domestic price remains lower than the costs of manufacture for substantial quantities of merchandise over a relatively long period of time In this way, the Americans succeed in shielding the market from merchandise which has been falsely priced as a result of any production cost contributions, or in taxing them with anti-dumping duties. They refute the GATT contravention of which they are accused with the argument that GATT talks in terms of "normal" domestic prices. Normal prices, however, cannot be lower than costs of manufacture over longer periods. This is why, in the case of price undercutting over longer periods, the cost criterion should be applied In applying the cost criterion, the export prices are, according to GATT, to be compared with the cost of production "plus a reasonable addition for selling cost and profit". The addition for profit "shall not exceed the profit normally realised on sales of products of the same general category in the domestic market of the country of origin". By way of contrast, the US anti-dumping law defines the costs taken as a basis for comparison as follows: 1 material andproduction costs, 2overheads of not less than 10 % of the material and production costs, 3 profit margin of not less than 8 % of the costs mentioned in points 1 and 2, and 4 packing and loading expenses as defined under the f.o.b, price.When are goods described as being of the same kind? The American proposal of 1 946 for the creation of a world trade organisation spokeof the "like" and "similar" products. 26 During the subsequent negotiations it was decided to limit the definition to "like" products, products which are identical, homogeneous In practice, however, this terminology proved to be impracticable. Slight divergences of quality or differing forms or colourings do not rule out competition nor hence the possibility of dumping. To make allowance for this fact, the Anti-dumping Code holds that such goods are also included which "although not alike in all respects, have characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration"译文倾销与反倾销措施资料来源: 国际经济学,1984年7月作者:Richard Senti Zurich在最近的时代,倾销行动的次数已经呈现出与各自的经济活动水平显着相关性,以下意见反映了目前未决诉讼和反倾销措施实施的总体情况,并查看到当前面临的国际反倾销制度问题。

毕业设计论文-鞋类和玩具反倾销的受害者【外文翻译】

毕业设计论文-鞋类和玩具反倾销的受害者【外文翻译】

本科毕业论文外文翻译外文题目:Shoes and Toys: Victims of Anti-Dumping出处:CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE, 2009, (12): 30-31作者:Guo Liqin原文:Shoes and Toys: Victims of Anti-DumplingGuo Liqin The anti-dumping duties imposed on China have long been a subject of intense dispute. According to statistics released by the WTO, China is the country most frequently targeted by other countries for anti-dumping investigation against its exports.Analyzed by Lehman Lee&Xu, the third largest corporate commercial law firm in China, foreign anti-dumping measures against Chinese goods has the following characteristics. The variety of Chinese goods brought under anti-dumping measures is increasing. Since the first anti-dumping case against Chinese exports, most Chinese goods under anti-dumping investigations go to labor-intensive products or easily processed products, involving textile products, clothing, light industry products, home electric appliances, hardware, chemical products, mineral products, medicine and agricultural products.Many countries have filed anti-dumping lawsuits against China, such as Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, South Africa, Nigeria, South Africa, Nigeria, India, South Korea, New Zealand and Turkey. Some countries impose duties at a very high rate on Chinese exports. In 1993, Mexico launched large-scale anti-dumping investigations against Chinese exports, imposing temporary anti-dumping duties 315% percent on toys and 1,105% on footwear, the highest rate ever set.More and more countries are also beginning to bring re-exports under the scope of anti-dumping investigations. This means that exports originally made in China anddirectly or indirectly exported through Hong Kong or other regions to the target country are also becoming their anti-dumping investigation targets as more countries are adopting the rule of the origin of products as being the target of anti-dumping suits.Toys, pressure also from developing countries India’s Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry said on June 14 a survey of 110 small-and medium-sized manufacturers found that about two-thirds had suffered a serious erosion of their Indian market share over the past year, because of cheaper Chinese products. In its statement, FICCI said the Chinese imports were between 10 and 70 percent cheaper than comparable Indian products, a price differential that it said was “huge and difficult to explain”. Amit Mitra, the FICCI’s secretary-general, said Indian industries were being hurt by “typical Chinese predatory pricing” intended to drive rivals out of business so that Chinese companies could capture the market–and then raise prices to more normal levels.Indian manufacturers face serious competitive disadvantages in comparison with China, including poor infrastructure and rigid labor laws that perversely discourage companies from growing and instead promote inefficient fragmentation. China exported US$8.4 billion to India in the first four months this year, 13 percent decline compared with the last year, according to the data from China’s Ministry of Commerce. Meanwhile, statistics from India’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry also show that its import from China still remain stable, taking up over one tenth of its total import, despite of the context of global economic crisis. In January, New Delhi announced a six-month ban on the import of Chinese toys, citing concerns about their safety, after Indian toymakers complained that such playthings had grabbed the lion’s share of the country’s US$2.5bn toy market. However, the ban was lifted after just two months, after Beijing threatened to take the issue to the WTO.India’s small and medium enterprises have warned that they are suffering because of cheap imports from China. They are urging New Delhi to accelerate antidumping investigations and impose tougher safety and quality checks on Chinese products. The appeal for greater government protection came amid rising tensions between New Delhi and Beijing over trade, after a high-profile dispute over an Indianban on Chinese made toys.Not only India, increased protectionism in the US and the EU, where most of Guangdong’s toys have been exported, Russia, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina have for the time being introduced anti-dumping measures against toy imports from China, citing various excuses, according to Li Zhuoming, deputy chairman of the Guangdong Toy Association. Actually, starting from 2006, Chinese toy manufactures had felt the pinch from diverse-edged pressures. “We have worries every year. We worried about the short supply of workers last year and now we are concerned about the foreign market shrinking due to trade protectionism in many western countries,” Lin Ru orong, owner of a toy factory in the city of Zhongshan said. His factory manufactures stuffed toys for export to Europe and the United States. “The US’s toy imports from China have been decreasing over the past couple of years and the European Union has raised its market threshold for China’s toy products,” he said. “That means my business is hardly able to survive.” What was worse, Li said, was that the price rise of raw materials and the rise in workers’ wage would further narrow profit. There is consensus that tapping into domestic market and resort to innovation of the whole industry is the only way out. To China’s delight, many toy manufacturers in Shantou, Guangdong province have successfully upgraded their products and even thrive during the international financial crisis.Footwear, price advantage encounters challenges Chinese leather shoes are for long time the victim of EU anti-dumping sanctions, and the relevant barriers take place frequently. On October 7, 2006, the European Union on Chinese shoes anti-dumping sanctions on Chinese leather shoes originating in the introduction of the product for a period of 2 years of 16.5 percent antidumping duties, despite MOFCOM spokesman Chong Quan said that there was no dumping in export of Chinese shoes, and the exported shoes did not cause essential damage to EU industry. It is remarkably discrimination to refuse recognizing the economic status and legal basis of all Chinese enterprises who responded to the anti-dumping case and decided to implement “all others rate” to all involved enterprises. At the same time, Pakistan, Peru, Venezuela, Canada and other countries also have been on China’s footwear has taken anti-dumping measures.Right now, Chinese shoes manufacturers are facing severe challenges to its traditional price advantage in the international market. The first is the rising costs squeezing corporate profits. During the year 2008, with the rising international oil prices, plastic raw materials prices also rose sharply. According to the plastic monthly report, from May 26 to May 30 week period in 2008, the prices of plastic raw materials market as a whole rose up to RMB 300-800 / ton. In addition, the continued appreciation of the yuan, the export tax rebate rate cut, as well as the new “Labor Contract Law” and other factors have started to make shoes enterprises gradually lost their cost advantage, increasing the pressure on survival. The second is the lack of independent brands and R&D, wholesale capacity, weak anti-risk capability. At present, the domestic shoe-making enterprises or most of the materials belongs to, or has been on behalf of Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea, Europe and the United States, and so did export orders from overseas customers, not their own brands and marketing, because shoe-making technology is not easy to copy. Once the costs of many customer orders had shifted to lower-cost Southeast Asia, companies go down the tubes. According to the Asia Footwear Association by the end of 2007 statistics, of more than 5,000 shoe-making enterprises in Guangdong, more than 1,000 were in the closure in 2007, when the industry didn’t fully feel the pinch of financial crisis.Take Argentina as an example, it initiated anti-dumping investigation on footwear originating in or imported China. On February 26, 2009, the Argentine Ministry of Economy issued Resolution No. 42/2009, decision on the originating in or imported footwear from China initiated anti-dumping cases. If the survey confirmed the existence of dumping practices indeed, will imports from China of such products be imposed punitive anti-dumping duties. Argentina “national newspaper”reported that the investigation carried out from the beginning of last year. Argentina Footwear Association submitted their applications to the Government, accusing dumping phenomenon is prevailing in footwear products imported from China; the footwear industry in Argentina resulted in serious injury, it is necessary for the Government to launch an anti-dumping investigations. Cheap Chinese shoes give a competitive advantage; it is also regarded as the harm by these countries. EU anti-dumping at the renewal period, Russia and Canada, Argentina also took the opportunity to initiateanti-dumping investigations. Because of cheap Chinese footwear industry has become the “target”.Active response to anti-dumping, only way out Sun Ya, Deputy General Manager of Cixi Jiangnan Chemical Fiber Co. Ltd. In Ningbo City, South China’s Jiangsu province said, “In front of dumping investigations, we must but be more familiar with international rules. Giving up one market means to give up more.”In the anti-dumping cases against Chinese polyester staple in 2007, only 34% of the enterprises involved entered an appearance. This means other the other enterprises have lost their USA market. “Entry or lose the market. Only if an enterprise has an awareness to protect its legal rights, can it keep its market.” This has become a common view of many enterprises of Ningbo. One in charge in Sanqin Chemical Fiber Company said that they have spent RMB 100,000 in the lawsuit. However, they have avoided a loss of RMB 2 million every year. This input-output ratio of 1:20 is really a profiting trade. Many enterprises that took a wait-and-see attitude now are taking active measures to improve their financial management system to prepare for possible anti-dumping investigations.译文:鞋类和玩具:反倾销的受害者长期以来,反倾销税的征收在中国一直是一个争议激烈的话题。

反倾销外文文献翻译

反倾销外文文献翻译

文献出处:Prusa T J. On the spread and impact of anti‐dumping [J]. Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 2001, 34(3): 591-611.原文On the Spread and Impact of AntidumpingThomas J. PrusaAbstractThis paper documents two key costs of AD protection. First, once AD has been adopted countries often have a difficult time restraining its use. In recent years ―new‖ users have accounted for half of the overall world total. Many of the heaviest AD users are countries who did not even have an AD statute a decade ago. Second, I will show that that on average AD duties cause the value of imports to fall by 30–50%. I find that trade falls by almost as much for settled cases as those that result in duties. Interestingly, I also find that even for those cases that are rejected imports fall. The spread and impact of AD protection most surely implies that AD will continue to be a key negotiating item in the next WTO round.Keywords: Antidumping law; protection1. IntroductionOf all the issues negotiated under the Uruguay Round, antidumping was perhaps the most contentious. Broadly stated, the debate pitted antidumping’s traditional users, essentially industrialized countries such as the US and EC, against tradi- tionalnon-users, primarily developing countries. Thanks to demands by the US and EC the Uruguay Round achieved only mixed success at tightening the rules governing antidumping (AD) actions. The strengthening of deminimis rules and the addition of sunset reviews should make AD protection less burdensome for small producers. Unfortunately the agreement also endorsed the cumulation provision, codified the concept of the AD duty as a cost, and did little to restrain the use of price undertakings. All things considered, there is every reason to believe not only that AD disputes will continue to flourish but also that AD policy will be a key item for the next WTO round.2. The Spread of AntidumpingUntil relatively recently AD actions were not particularly common. For instance, in the 1960s all GATT members filed only about ten antidumping petitions per year (Schott, 1994). During the 1970s, however, a small set of users began to more actively initiate AD actions, primarily as a way to protect declining in- dustries. Even as recently as the late-1980s AD law was essentially only enforced by five territories—Canada, New Zealand, Australia, United States and the Euro- pean Community. Over the decades of the 1980s, more than 1600 AD cases were filed worldwide (Finger, 1993). As a group, the ―traditional‖ users accounted for more than 95% of all AD cases during the 1980s.Demand for AD protection has continued to grow during the 1990s. Over the past ten years, almost 2200 AD cases have been filed worldwide, a filing rate about 25% greater than during the 1980s (see Table 1). While the overall usage hasincreased, the most noticeable trend is the change in who is using the law. The once exclusive club has now opened its doors. Countries of all stages of development and industrialization have joined the ranks of active AD users. And, it is the dozens of new users that have fueled AD’s continued growth.Over the 1987–1997 period 29 countries initiated antidumping complaints, about triple the number during the prior ten years. Over the past ten years there has been a five-fold increase in AD filings by ―new‖ users. More impressively, as compared with the early 1980s, there has been a fifty-fold increase.New users are not only filing more cases than they had previously, but they are also accounting for an increasing share of total complaints. Between 1987–1992 new users filed about 20% of the AD cases in each year. By contrast, over the last five years new users account for well over half of AD complaints. The trend is even more striking in comparison with trends during the 1980s, when new users accounted for fewer than 5% of AD cases.It is also striking how quickly AD is embraced once legislation is enacted. Mexico, for instance, signed the GATT/WTO antidumping code in 1987 and filed more than 30 cases within three years. Argentina filed its first AD case in 1991 and has since averaged almost 20 cases per year. Likewise, South Africa has initiated more than 20 cases per year since it adopted an AD statute. Similar patterns of use—a rush to invoke the new law—are evidenced by India, Indonesia, Turkey, Malaysia, Peru, Israel, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela. The evidence is overwhelming that AD is not a statute which grows dusty from disuse.The widespread adoption of AD law has also impacted which countries are targeted. In Table 2 I detail AD actions by targeted country. Several interesting trends are evidenced. First, note that over the entire period almost 99 countries were investigated—about twice as many as were investigated during the 1980s. Apparently, AD’s expanding reach can be measured equally well by either the number of active users or the number of investigated countries.Second, note that during the 1980s almost all dumping charges were made by a small number of countries and most targeted a very small set of countries. In particular, during the 1980s two-thirds of AD investigations targeted another traditional user (Finger, 1993). By comparison, over the past decade only about one-third of the cases targeted a traditional AD user. In this sense, AD’s reach has expanded.In another sense, however, the targets of AD investigations are much the same as they were during the 1980s. Note that during the 1980s two-thirds of AD investigations involved countries who were fellow AD users. Interesting, during the 1990s virtually the same percent of AD cases (1498 of 2196) were filed against fellow AD users. In other words, AD is still a policy largely wielded within the club of AD users; the big difference is that now the club is bigger than it was before.3. Impact of AntidumpingThe filing trends presented indicate that the AD genie is out of the bottle. A multitude of countries have only recently enacted AD statutes and these new users are now filing a larger and larger number of cases. What do these filings mean for themarkets affected? Under the best case scenario I could estimate the impact of AD for each country and sector that has used the law. Unfortunately, the data are not available to perform such an exercise. Instead, I will estimate the effect of AD actions using data from the largest AD user, the United States.For a couple of reasons the US is an excellent candidate for understanding the effects of AD protection. First of all, the US has filed more AD cases than any other user. Therefore, we have a large sample of cases. US industries filed over 700 AD petitions between 1980 and 1994. About a quarter of the cases were settled; of the remaining cases, about half were rejected and half resulted in duties. Second, as the world’s most prominent AD user, the US statute has served as the basis for many countries newly adopting AD law. The GATT AD rules are quite broad and countries have significant latitude in implementing their AD statute, but most have chosen to follow US procedures. Thus, even though the estimates are based on US data, they should reasonably approximate what we can expect for countries with similar AD statutes. Third, the quality of US trade data is excellent. Machine-readable import statistics are available for the entire period and the data is reported at the line-item level.译文反倾销的扩散与影响托马斯·普鲁撒摘要本文记载了文档反倾销保护的两个关键成本。

中华人民共和国反倾销(英文版)

中华人民共和国反倾销(英文版)

反倾销条例(英文版)Anti-dumping Regulation of T he People’s Republic of ChinaDecree [2001] No.328 of the state CouncilThe Anti-Dumping Regulation of the People’’s Republic of China, which were adopted at the 46th executive meeting of the State Council on October 31, 2001, are hereby promulgated, and shall come into force on January 1, 2001. Premier of the State Council: Zhu RongjiNovember 26, 2001Attachment:Anti-dumping Regulation of the People’’s Republic of ChinaChapter I General ProvisionsArticle 1The present Regulation has been enacted in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Foreign Trade Law of the People’’s Republic of China with a view to maintaining foreign trade order and fair competition.Article 2In case that imported products enter the market of the People’’s Republic of China by way of dumping, and cause material damage or constitute a threat of material damage to an already established domestic industry, or cause a material impediment to the establishment of a domestic industry, an investigation shall be conducted and anti-dumping measures shall be taken in accordance with the present Regulation.Chapter II Dumping and DamageArticle 3The term "dumping" shall refer to the entry of imported products into the market of the Peo ple’’s Republic of China, in the ordinary course of trade, with their export price lower than their normal value. The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (hereinafter referred to as the MOFTEC) shall be responsible for the investigation on and determination of dumping.Article 4The normal value of imported products shall be determined in the following ways on the basis of different circumstances: (1) in case that the products of the same category as that of the imported products have a comparable price in the domestic market of the exporting country (region) in the ordinary course of trade, that comparable price shall be the normal value;(2) in case that the products of the same category as that of the imported products are not sold on the domestic market of the exporting country (region) in the ordinary course of trade, or the price or quantity of the products of the same category cannot be used as a basis for fair comparison, the normal value shall be the comparable price at which the products of the same category are exported to a proper third country (region) or shall be the production cost of the products of the same category in the country (region) of origin plus reasonable expenses and profits.Where the imported products do not directly come from the country (region) of origin, the normal value shall be determined in accordance with Item (1) of the preceding paragraph; however, if the products are transported only through the exporting country (region) or the products are not produced in the exporting country (region) or no comparable price exists in the exporting country (region), etc., the price of the said products of the same category in the country (region) of origin may be regarded as the normal value.Article 5The export price of the imported products shall be determined in the following ways according to different circumstances: (1) in case the imported products have an actual payment price or a payable price, such price shall be the export price;(2) in case the imported products do not have an export price or its price is not reliable, the price presumed on the basis of the price at which the imported products are re-sold for the first time to an independent buyer shall be regarded as the export price; however, if the imported products are not re-sold to an independent buyer or not re-sold in the status when they are imported, the price presumed by the MOFTEC on a reasonable basis may be regarded as the export price. Article 6The margin between the export price of imported products which is lower than their normal value shall be the dumping margin.The export price of the imported products and the normal value shall be compared in a fair and reasonable manner by taking the various comparable factors which may impact the price into consideration.The dumping margin shall be determined with the weighted average normal value and the weighted average price of all the comparable export transactions being compared, or with the normal value and the export price being compared transaction by transaction.Where the export prices are considerably different between different buyers, regions or periods, and thus are difficult to be compared in the ways provided in the preceding paragraph, the weighted average normal value may be compared with the price of a single export transaction.Article 7The term "damage" shall refer to the fact that dumping has caused material damage or constitute a threat of material damage to an already established domestic industry, or caused a material impediment to the establishment of a domestic industry.The State Economic and Trade Commission (hereinafter referred to as the SETC) shall be responsible for the investigation on and determination of damage; while the anti-dumping investigation on the damage to a domestic industry relating to agricultural products shall be conducted by the SETC in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture.Article 8When determining the damage caused to a domestic industry by dumping, the following items shall be examined:(1) the quantity of the dumped imports, including a sharp increase in the absolute quantity of the dumped imports or the quantity as compared with the production or consumption of the domestic products of the same category, or the possibility of a sharp increase in the quantity of the dumped imports;(2) the price of the dumped imports, including the price cuts of the dumped imports or the impacts such as great restraint or reduction, etc. to the price of the domestic products of the same category;(3) the impacts of the dumped imports upon the relevant economic factors and targets of the domestic industry;(4) the production capacity, export capability of the exporting country (region) and the country (region) of origin on the dumped imports as well as the inventory of the investigated products;(5) other factors which cause damage to the domestic industry. The threat of material damage shall be determined on the basis of the facts instead of the accusation, presumption or minor possibility.The damage caused by dumping to a domestic industry shall be determined on the basis of affirmative evidence, and no factor other than dumping which causes damage shall be attributed to dumping.Article 9Where the dumped imports come from two or more countries (regions), and meanwhile meet the following conditions, a cumulative evaluation may be conducted upon the impacts caused by the dumped imports to a domestic industry:(1) the dumping margin of the dumped imports from each country (region) shall be no lower than 2%, and the import volume of the products may not be negligible;(2) it is proper to conduct a cumulative evaluation on the basis of the competition conditions between the dumpedimports as well as between the dumped imports and the domestic products of the same category.The term "to be negligible" shall refer to the fact that the proportion of the quantity of the dumped imports from a country (region) to the total import volume of products of the same category shall be lower than 3%; except where the total import volume lower than 3% from some countries (regions) exceeds 7% of the total import volume of the products of the same category.Article 10The evaluated impacts on the dumped imports shall be separately determined with regard to the production of the domestic products of the same category; where they may not be separately determined with regard to the production of the domestic products of the same category, the production of the narrowest product group or scope which includes the products of the same category shall be examined.Article 11Th e term "domestic industry" shall refer to all the manufacturers within the People’’s Republic of China of the domestic products of the same category or the manufacturers within the People’’s Republic of China whose total output accounts for the major part of the aggregate output of the domestic products of the same category; however, if a domestic manufacturer is associated with an export business operator or import business operator, or he himself is an import business operator of the dumped imports, he may be excluded from the domestic industry.Where, under particular circumstances, the domestic manufacturers in a regional market sell the whole or nearly the whole of the products of the same category in the said market, and the products of the same category in the said market are not mainly supplied by the domestic manufacturers of other places, they may be regarded as a separate industry. Article 12The term "products of the same category" shall refer to the products identical to the dumped imports; where there are no identical products, the products which are most similar to the features of the dumped imports shall be the products of the same category.Chapter III Anti-Dumping InvestigationsArticle 13A domestic industry or a natural person, legal person or relevant organization representing a domestic industry (hereinafter uniformly referred to as the applicant) may file a written application on anti-dumping investigation to the MOFTEC in accordance with these Rules.Article 14The application letter shall contain the following contents:(1) name, address and relevant information of the applicant;(2) complete specifications on the imported products under application for investigation, including product name, the exporting country (region) or country (region) of origin involved, the known export business operator or manufacturer, information on the price of the products when they are consumed in the domestic market of the exporting country (region) or country (region) of origin, information on export price, etc.;(3) a statement on the quantity and value of the domestic products of the same category;(4) the impacts of the quantity and price of the imported products under application for investigation on the domestic industry;(5) other contents which the applicant considers it necessary to state.Article 15The application letter shall be attached with the following evidence:(1) the existence of dumping of the imported products under application for investigation;(2) the damage to domestic industry;(3) the causal link between the dumping and damage.Article 16The MOFTEC shall, within 60 days as of its receipt of the application letter and the relevant evidence submitted by the applicant, examine whether the application is filed by the domestic industry or filed by representing the domestic industry, the contents of the application letter and the evidence attached to it, etc., and shall, upon consultation with the SETC, decide to initiate an investigation or not.The MOFTEC shall, before deciding to initiate an investigation, notify the government of the relevant exporting country (region).Article 17Where, among the manufacturers in a domestic industry who are in favor or disfavor of the application, the output of those who are in favor accounts for 50% or more of the total output of those who are in favor and disfavor, it shall be deemed that the application is filed by the domestic industry or filed by representing the domestic industry, and the anti-dumping investigation may be initiated; however, if the output of the domestic manufacturers who support the application is less than 25% of the total output of the domestic products of the same category, the anti-dumping investigation shall not be initiated.Article 18Where, under particular circumstances, the MOFTEC does not accept the written application for anti-dumping investigation, but has sufficient evidence to believe that there exist a dumping and damages and there is a causal link between the dumping and damages, it may, upon consultation with the SETC, decide to initiate an investigation.The MOFTEC or the SETC is hereinafter uniformly referred to as the investigation organ.Article 19The decisions on initiating an investigation shall be announced by the MOFTEC, and shall be notified to the applicant, the known export business operators and import business operators, the government of the exporting country (region) as well as other interested organizations or individuals (hereinafter uniformly referred to as the interested parties).Once the decisions on initiating an investigation is announced, the MOFTEC shall provide the known export business operators and the government of the exporting country (region) with a copy of the application letter.Article 20The investigation organ may obtain information from the interested parties and conduct the investigation by means of questionnaires, samples, hearings and on-the-spot checks, etc..The investigation organ shall provide the relevant interested parties with opportunities for stating their viewpoints and grounds of argument.The MOFTEC may, when considering it necessary, send functionaries to the relevant country (region) for conducting the investigation, except where the relevant country (region) concerned objects to the investigation.Article 21When the investigation organ is conducting an investigation, the interested parties shall tell the truth and provide relevant materials. Where the interested parties fail to tell the truth or fail to provide relevant materials, or fail to provide necessary information within a reasonable time limit, or seriously hamper the investigation in other forms, the investigation organ may make an adjudication on the basis of the already obtained facts and the best available information.Article 22Where the interested parties consider that the divulgence of the materials provided by them will cause seriously bad effects, they may apply to the investigation organ for treating the materials as confidential.Where the investigation organ considers the application for confidentiality is justified, it shall treat the materialsprovided by the interested parties as confidential, and meanwhile request the interested parties to provide a copy of non-confidential outline of the materials.The materials treated as confidential materials shall not be divulged without the consent of the interested parties who provide them.Article 23The investigation organ shall permit the applicant and the interested parties to have access to the relevant materials of the case, except where the materials are treated as confidential.Article 24The MOFTEC and the SETC shall, upon the investigation result, make separate an initial award on dumping and damage as well as on whether the causal link between the dumping and damage is tenable, which shall be announced by the MOFTEC.Article 25Where the initial award affirms the dumping and damage as well as the causal link between the dumping and damage, the MOFTEC and the SETC shall continue the investigation on the dumping, the dumping margin, the damage and its extent, and shall make separate a final award upon the investigation result, which shall be announced by the MOFTEC.Before the making of the final award, the MOFTEC shall notify all the known interested parties of the basic facts upon which the final award is made.Article 26An anti-dumping investigation shall be ended within 12 months as of the date of announcement of the decision on initiating the investigation; under particular circumstances, the time limit may be extended, provided that the extension shall not exceed 6 months.Article 27Under any of the following circumstances, the anti-dumping investigation shall be terminated and be announced by the MOFTEC:(1) the applicant revokes the application;(2) there is not enough evidence to prove the existence of dumping, damage or the causal link between the dumping and damage;(3) the dumping margin is lower than 2%;(4) the actual or potential import volume of the dumped imports or the damage is negligible;(5) the MOFTEC and the SETC both consider it is not appropriate to continue the anti-dumping investigation.Where the investigated products from one or more countries (regions) are under any of the circumstances listed in Items (2), (3), and (4) of the preceding paragraph, the anti-dumping investigation with regard to the involved products shall be terminated.Chapter IV Anti-Dumping MeasuresSection 1 Provisional Anti-Dumping MeasuresArticle 28Where the initial award affirms the dumping and the consequent damage to a domestic industry, the following provisional anti-dumping measures may be taken:(1) to levy provisional anti-dumping tariffs;(2) to request the provision of cash deposits, guaranty letter or other forms of guaranty. The amount of the provisional anti-dumping tariffs, the cash deposits, the guaranty letter and other forms of guaranty shall not exceed the dumping margin ascertained in the initial awards.Article 29The levy of the provisional anti-dumping tariffs shall be proposed by the MOFTEC and be decided on by the Tariff Policy Committee under the State Council upon the proposition of the MOFTEC, and shall be announced by the MOFTEC. The request for the provision of cash deposits, guaranty letter or other forms of guaranty shall be decided on and announced by the MOFTEC. The customs shall implement the decision as of the date provided in the announcement. Article 30The time limit for the provisional anti-dumping measures shall not exceed 4 months as of the date of entry into force of the announcement of the decisions on provisional anti-dumping measures; however, such time limit may be extended to 9 months under particular circumstances.No provisional anti-dumping measure shall be taken within 60 days as of the date when the decisions on initiating an anti-dumping investigation is announced.Section 2 Pricing CommitmentsArticle 31The export business operators of the dumped imports may, during the period of anti-dumping investigation, make pricing commitments to the MOFTEC on changing the price or ceasing export at a dumping price.The MOFTEC may propose suggestions on pricing commitments to the export business operators.The investigation organ may not force the export business operators to make pricing commitments.Article 32The export business operators’’ refusal to make pricing commitments or to accept the suggestions on pricing commitments shall not hamper the investigation of and determination on the anti-dumping cases. Where the export business operators continue dumping the imported products, the investigation organ shall have the right to determine that the threat of damage is more possible to arise.Article 33Where the MOFTEC considers the pricing commitments made by the export business operators are acceptable, it may, upon consultation with the SETC, decide to suspend or terminate the anti-dumping investigations, instead of taking any provisional anti-dumping measure or levying anti-dumping tariffs. The decisions on suspending or terminating the anti-dumping investigation shall be announced by the MOFTEC.Where the MOFTEC does not accept the pricing commitments, it shall state the reason to the relevant export business operators.The investigation organ shall not, before making an affirmative initial award on dumping and damage caused therefrom, seek or accept pricing commitments.Article 34After suspending or terminating the anti-dumping investigation in accordance with Paragraph 1 ofArticle 33 of the present Regulation, the investigation organ may, upon request by the export business operators or if considering it necessary, continue investigating the dumping and damage.Upon the investigation result as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, if a negative award on dumping or damageis made, the pricing commitments shall automatically become invalid; while if an affirmative award on dumping or damage is made, the pricing commitments shall continue to be valid.Article 35The MOFTEC may require the export business operators to regularly provide the relevant information and materials for implementing the pricing commitments, and may verify such information and materials.Article 36In case any export business operator violates its pricing commitments, the MOFTEC may, upon consultation with the SETC, immediately decide to resume the anti-dumping investigation in accordance with the present Regulation; and may,upon the best available information, decide to take the provisional anti-dumping measures, as well as retrospect to the levy of the anti-dumping tariffs on the products imported within 90 days before the provisional anti-dumping measures were taken, except where the products were imported before the pricing commitments are violated.Section 3 Anti-dumping tariffsArticle 37Where the final adjudication decisions establish the dumping and the consequent damage caused to the domestic industry, the anti-dumping tariffs may be levied.Article 38The levy of the anti-dumping tariffs shall be proposed by the MOFTEC and be decided on by the Tariff Policy Committee under the State Council upon the proposition of the MOFTEC, and shall be announced by the MOFTEC. The customs shall execute such levy as of the date provided in the announcement.Article 39The anti-dumping tariffs shall be applicable to the products imported after the final award has been announced, exceptfor the circumstances provided inArticle s 36, 43 and 44 of the present Regulation.Article 40The taxpayers of the anti-dumping tariffs shall be the import business operators of the dumped imports.Article 41The anti-dumping tariffs shall be separately determined on the basis of the dumping margins of different export business operators. Where the anti-dumping tariffs needs to be levied upon the dumped imports of the export business operators beyond the scope of examination, the applicable anti-dumping tariffs shall be determined in a reasonable method.Article 42The amount of anti-dumping tariffs shall not exceed the dumping margin determined in the final adjudication decision. Article 43Where the final award affirms the existence of the material damage, and prior to which a provisional anti-dumping measure has been taken, the anti-dumping tariffs may be levied in retrospect to the period of the provisional anti-dumping measure.Where the final award affirms the existence of the threat of material damage, and a provisional anti-dumping measure has been taken under the circumstance that an adjudication of material damage will be made if no provisional anti-dumping measure has been taken in advance, the anti-dumping tariffs may be levied in retrospect to the period of the provisional anti-dumping measure.Where the anti-dumping tariffs determined in the final award is higher than the paid or payable provisional anti-dumping tariffs or the amount valuated for the sake of guaranty, the difference shall not be collected; where it is lower than the paid or payable provisional anti-dumping tariffs or the amount valuated for the sake of guaranty, the difference shall be refunded upon the specific circumstance or the amount of the duty shall be re-calculated.Article 44Where the following two circumstances coexist, the anti-dumping tariffs may be retrospectively levied upon the products imported within 90 days before the provisional anti-dumping measures were taken, except for the products imported prior to the initiation of the investigation:(1) the dumped imports has a record of dumping causing damage to the domestic industry, or the import business operators of the products know or ought to know that the export business operators are dumping products and that dumping would lead to damage to domestic industry;(2) the dumped imports are massively imported within a short period, and are possible to seriously destroy the remedialeffect of the anti-dumping tariffs to be levied immediately.Article 45Where the final award determines not to levy the anti-dumping tariffs or not to retrospectively levy the anti-dumping tariffs, the levied provisional anti-dumping tariffs and the collected cash deposits shall be refunded, and the guaranty letter or other forms of guaranty shall be cancelled.Article 46Where an import business operator of dumped imports has evidence to prove that the amount of paid anti-dumping tariffs exceeds the dumping margin, he may apply to the MOFTEC for refund of the tariffs levied; after the MOFTEC has examined and verified the application and proposed the refund, the Tariff Policy Committee under the State Council may, upon the proposition of the MOFTEC, make the decision on the refund, and the customs shall execute the refund. Article 47Where, after the anti-dumping tariffs has been levied upon the imported products, a new export business operator who has not exported such products to the People’’s Republic of China within the period of investigation but could prove the irrelevance between he himself and the export business operator against who anti-dumping tariffs were levied, he may apply to the MOFTEC for separate determination of the dumping margin. The MOFTEC shall make a rapid examination and make a final award. It may, during the period of examination, take the measures provided in Item (2) of Paragraph 1 ofArticle 28 of the present Regulation, provided it shall not levy the anti-dumping tariffs upon these products.Chapter V Time Limit for and Re-examination of Anti-dumping tariffs and Pricing CommitmentsArticle 48Neither the time limit for levying the anti-dumping tariffs nor that for implementing the pricing commitments shall exceed 5 years; however, where it is re-examined and determined that the termination of the levy of the anti-dumping tariffs is possible to lead to the continuance or re-occurrence of the dumping or damage, the time limit for levying the anti-dumping tariffs may be appropriately extended.Article 49After the anti-dumping tariffs has taken effect, the MOFTEC may, with a justifiable reason and upon consultation with the SETC, decide to re-examine the necessity of continuing the levying of anti-dumping tariffs; it may also, after a reasonable period of time, upon the request of the interested parties and after having examined the corresponding evidence provided by the interested parties, decide to re-examine the necessity of continuing the levying of anti-dumping tariffs.After the pricing commitments have taken effect, the MOFTEC may, with a justifiable reason, decide to re-examine the necessity of continuing to implement the pricing commitments; it may also, after a reasonable period of time, upon the request of the interested parties and after having examined the corresponding evidence provided by the interested parties, decide to re-examine the necessity of the continuing to implement the pricing commitments.Article 50The reservation, amendment or cancellation of the anti-dumping tariffs shall be proposed by the MOFTEC upon the re-examination result and in accordance with the present Regulation, shall be decided by the Tariff Policy Committee under the State Council upon the proposition of the MOFTEC, and shall be announced by the MOFTEC. The MOFTEC may also, in accordance with the present Regulation and upon consultation with the SETC, make the decision on reserving, amending or canceling the pricing commitments and shall announce such decision.Article 51The re-examination procedures shall be followed with reference to the relevant provisions in the present Regulation on anti-dumping investigations.The time limit for re-examination shall not exceed 12 months, commencing from the date when the re-examination。

反倾销外文文献翻译

反倾销外文文献翻译

本科毕业设计(论文)外文文献翻译学生姓名:学号:专业班级:指导教师:2015年 6月16日欧盟反倾销政策欧盟部署的传统贸易政策措施为保护本国工业产品的市场中的重要性正在下降。

关税的总体水平相当低,将会开始在关贸总协定的乌拉圭回合之后进一步实施。

对进口的数量限制由关贸总协定的合作伙伴国家根据该协议禁止,对于仍然存在的限制,在纺织部门,一个计划尽管是长期的,撤销已获通过。

甚至在著名的所谓的“灰色地带”的措施,如“自愿”出口限制协议,这使不良进口在减少,关贸总协定所规定的规则,面对的是更严格处罚,世界贸易组织(世贸组织)。

正是在这种背景下,反倾销作为一种合法的战略打击的政策日益引起关注,迈向自由贸易的趋势。

在一多边贸易最惠国地位和平等对待所有会员国为基础的系统的背景下,反倾销政策,为使“法律障碍,不公平的方法”合法化,使一个国家,以提高价格,从而阻碍,给一个不受欢迎的进口国非常恰到好处的,差别待遇的风格。

人们越来越多地宣称,欧盟反倾销政策正在越来越少的使用的不公平贸易做法而不是作为保护主义的工具。

反倾销程序的先决条件从一开始关贸总协定条约作出了规定(第六条)把反倾销规则作为一种对不公平贸易做法的追索权的手段。

这个条件适用于反倾销程序,在乌拉圭回合里被进一步指定。

为了提高立法的一致性,“游戏规则”已变得更为精确。

在这项修正案后,欧盟反倾销条例也做出了变化。

跟以前的情况一样,它严格面向关贸总协定文本。

一个重要因素在程序里发挥作用,尽量公平尽量透明;欧盟注意到出版的所有阶段,这项规定的帐户诉讼。

如果欧盟委员会取认为,反倾销措施的应用程序包含足够的证据证明倾销与损害由此产生,它启动了反倾销调查。

这是必须指出的是,公布这些案件中,反倾销调查实际执行,而不是那些它已拒绝的个案。

为了征收反倾销措施委员会必须表明:1.发生在进口倾销价格2.造成或有威胁造成实质性损害在进口国一个行业3.干预是社会的利益。

至于最后一点,新规例明确国家所有的利益都被认为是“包括国内产业的利益和用户和消费者”(第21条)。

WTO规则中英文教程第八章 反倾销

WTO规则中英文教程第八章 反倾销

三、Definition of Injury
• The definition of injury under WTO anti-dumping rules is of broad one. It is taken to mean material injury to a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of establishment of such an industry. WTO反倾销规则所定义的“损害”是一 个广义上的“损害”。它是指对一个国内产业 造成严重损害、严重损害威胁,或实质性地阻 碍这样一个国内产业的建立。
Article 56 of Anti-Dumping Regulations 2002 /2004
• “Where a country (region) discriminatorily imposes anti-dumping measures on the exports from the People’s Republic of China, China may, on the basis of the actual situations, take corresponding measures against that country (region).”(emphasis added)
3、Like Product
• According to Article 2.6 of WTO AntiDumping Agreement, like product means a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration.

反倾销外文文献翻译

反倾销外文文献翻译

文献出处:Prusa T J. On the spread and impact of anti‐dumping [J]. Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 2001, 34(3): 591-611.原文On the Spread and Impact of AntidumpingThomas J. PrusaAbstractThis paper documents two key costs of AD protection. First, once AD has been adopted countries often have a difficult time restraining its use. In recent years ―new‖ users have accounted for half of the overall world total. Many of the heaviest AD users are countries who did not even have an AD statute a decade ago. Second, I will show that that on average AD duties cause the value of imports to fall by 30–50%. I find that trade falls by almost as much for settled cases as those that result in duties. Interestingly, I also find that even for those cases that are rejected imports fall. The spread and impact of AD protection most surely implies that AD will continue to be a key negotiating item in the next WTO round.Keywords: Antidumping law; protection1. IntroductionOf all the issues negotiated under the Uruguay Round, antidumping was perhaps the most contentious. Broadly stated, the debate pitted antidumping’s traditional users, essentially industrialized countries such as the US and EC, against tradi- tionalnon-users, primarily developing countries. Thanks to demands by the US and EC the Uruguay Round achieved only mixed success at tightening the rules governing antidumping (AD) actions. The strengthening of deminimis rules and the addition of sunset reviews should make AD protection less burdensome for small producers. Unfortunately the agreement also endorsed the cumulation provision, codified the concept of the AD duty as a cost, and did little to restrain the use of price undertakings. All things considered, there is every reason to believe not only that AD disputes will continue to flourish but also that AD policy will be a key item for the next WTO round.2. The Spread of AntidumpingUntil relatively recently AD actions were not particularly common. For instance, in the 1960s all GATT members filed only about ten antidumping petitions per year (Schott, 1994). During the 1970s, however, a small set of users began to more actively initiate AD actions, primarily as a way to protect declining in- dustries. Even as recently as the late-1980s AD law was essentially only enforced by five territories—Canada, New Zealand, Australia, United States and the Euro- pean Community. Over the decades of the 1980s, more than 1600 AD cases were filed worldwide (Finger, 1993). As a group, the ―traditional‖ users accounted for more than 95% of all AD cases during the 1980s.Demand for AD protection has continued to grow during the 1990s. Over the past ten years, almost 2200 AD cases have been filed worldwide, a filing rate about 25% greater than during the 1980s (see Table 1). While the overall usage hasincreased, the most noticeable trend is the change in who is using the law. The once exclusive club has now opened its doors. Countries of all stages of development and industrialization have joined the ranks of active AD users. And, it is the dozens of new users that have fueled AD’s continued growth.Over the 1987–1997 period 29 countries initiated antidumping complaints, about triple the number during the prior ten years. Over the past ten years there has been a five-fold increase in AD filings by ―new‖ users. More impressively, as compared with the early 1980s, there has been a fifty-fold increase.New users are not only filing more cases than they had previously, but they are also accounting for an increasing share of total complaints. Between 1987–1992 new users filed about 20% of the AD cases in each year. By contrast, over the last five years new users account for well over half of AD complaints. The trend is even more striking in comparison with trends during the 1980s, when new users accounted for fewer than 5% of AD cases.It is also striking how quickly AD is embraced once legislation is enacted. Mexico, for instance, signed the GATT/WTO antidumping code in 1987 and filed more than 30 cases within three years. Argentina filed its first AD case in 1991 and has since averaged almost 20 cases per year. Likewise, South Africa has initiated more than 20 cases per year since it adopted an AD statute. Similar patterns of use—a rush to invoke the new law—are evidenced by India, Indonesia, Turkey, Malaysia, Peru, Israel, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela. The evidence is overwhelming that AD is not a statute which grows dusty from disuse.The widespread adoption of AD law has also impacted which countries are targeted. In Table 2 I detail AD actions by targeted country. Several interesting trends are evidenced. First, note that over the entire period almost 99 countries were investigated—about twice as many as were investigated during the 1980s. Apparently, AD’s expanding reach can be measured equally well by either the number of active users or the number of investigated countries.Second, note that during the 1980s almost all dumping charges were made by a small number of countries and most targeted a very small set of countries. In particular, during the 1980s two-thirds of AD investigations targeted another traditional user (Finger, 1993). By comparison, over the past decade only about one-third of the cases targeted a traditional AD user. In this sense, AD’s reach has expanded.In another sense, however, the targets of AD investigations are much the same as they were during the 1980s. Note that during the 1980s two-thirds of AD investigations involved countries who were fellow AD users. Interesting, during the 1990s virtually the same percent of AD cases (1498 of 2196) were filed against fellow AD users. In other words, AD is still a policy largely wielded within the club of AD users; the big difference is that now the club is bigger than it was before.3. Impact of AntidumpingThe filing trends presented indicate that the AD genie is out of the bottle. A multitude of countries have only recently enacted AD statutes and these new users are now filing a larger and larger number of cases. What do these filings mean for themarkets affected? Under the best case scenario I could estimate the impact of AD for each country and sector that has used the law. Unfortunately, the data are not available to perform such an exercise. Instead, I will estimate the effect of AD actions using data from the largest AD user, the United States.For a couple of reasons the US is an excellent candidate for understanding the effects of AD protection. First of all, the US has filed more AD cases than any other user. Therefore, we have a large sample of cases. US industries filed over 700 AD petitions between 1980 and 1994. About a quarter of the cases were settled; of the remaining cases, about half were rejected and half resulted in duties. Second, as the world’s most prominent AD user, the US statute has served as the basis for many countries newly adopting AD law. The GATT AD rules are quite broad and countries have significant latitude in implementing their AD statute, but most have chosen to follow US procedures. Thus, even though the estimates are based on US data, they should reasonably approximate what we can expect for countries with similar AD statutes. Third, the quality of US trade data is excellent. Machine-readable import statistics are available for the entire period and the data is reported at the line-item level.译文反倾销的扩散与影响托马斯·普鲁撒摘要本文记载了文档反倾销保护的两个关键成本。

博弈分析实施反倾销价格承诺协议纠纷外文翻译

博弈分析实施反倾销价格承诺协议纠纷外文翻译

中文3210字本科毕业论文外文翻译外文题目:Game Analysis of Implementing Price UndertakingAgreements in Anti-dumping Disputes出处:Journal of Donghua University, 2008 , (1): 65-68 作者:Xi Jun-fang , Cang Ping , Zhong Gen-yuan原文:Game Analysis of Implementing Price Undertaking Agreements in Anti-dumping DisputesXi Jun-fang , Cang Ping , Zhong Gen-yuan AbstractThe Price Undertaking Agreement is one of the strategies a company accused of dumping often adopts in dealing with anti-dumping disputes.Using static game analysis,this paper compares the impact that anti-dumping duties and price undertaking agreements may have on an importing country’s social welfare and an accused company’s market performance.We conclude that,compared with anti-dumping duties,price undertakings improve the importing country’s social welfare and reduce the accused company’s market share in the import country.We also note that,in addition to the financial benefit,price undertakings can prevent escalation of trade disputes in international trade negotiations.Key words:anti-dumping;price undertaking;anti-dumping dutyIntroductionA price undertaking is a commitment in international trade to raise prices or to stop exporting goods at a price the importing country considers to be a dumping price.Such an agreement,when accepted by the importing country,typically terminates any anti-dumping (AD) investigation and exempts the investigateddumping products from temporary or permanent AD duties.Price undertakings may be initiated by the exporting firm or by the importing country.Typically,an undertaking’s specified increase in price does not entirely eliminate the exporting company’s price advantage;rather,it is set at a level to eliminate a perceived dumping margin.According to the WTO Anti-Dumping (AD) Agreement and worldwide AD laws,exporting firms can come to agreements with importing countries by raising exporting prices or by ceasing exports at prices the importing country considers to be dumping.WTO data show that,among the 2 160 AD cases filed by WTO members from 1995 to 2002,1 258 were settled with AD duties or price undertakings,with price undertaking cases representing 41.76% of all the settlements.Therefore, China and Chinese companies will more effectively deal with future trade disputes when they understand the history and effect of price undertakings, specifically the relative effects of price undertakings and AD duties on importing and exporting countries.Zanardi’s study demonstrated a big difference in implementing price undertakings among countries or regions with many AD case.Between 1981 and 2001, in EEC and South Korea, 41% of ECC and 40% of S.Korean AD disputes were settled with price undertakings, while only 5% of U.S.cases were.Stegemann and Palmeter compare the theory and filing process of the commitment of price undertakings with that of imposing AD duties.In regards to the growing trade disputes against China,Du introduced and analyzed the basic concepts,actual effects and specific operations of price undertakings,and concluded that price undertakings could be widely implemented in Chinese AD cases as an alternative strategy.Yu and Ding analyzed the pros and cons of price undertakings vs.AD duties, and suggested China-specific options.However,these studies have neither quantitatively compared the impact of price undertaking commitments with that of AD duties, nor have they used economic principles to suggest decision-making mechanisms for importing and exporting countries considering price undertakings or AD duties.In this paper,we use static game analysis to compare the effects of price undertakings vs.AD duties on both country and firm welfares.We conclude with a decision-making mechanism forchoosing solutions to trade disputes.1 ModelingIn order to make the analysis simple, we assume two countries,named home and foreign respectively,in each of which there is only one firm who produces homogenous products.Both the home firm and the foreign firm compete in quantity in their domestic market with complete information, in order to maximize their profits.Thus, these two firms become duopoly in a complete information market.We suppose the marginal costs of the home firm and the foreign firm as c and c’respectively.which are constant;the quantity of the sales in their domestic markets as x and y,respectively;price in home and foreign market as Pd and Pf,respectively.Meanwhile,we assume a linear demand function of the importing-country (home) market as p=a–bQ , in which p and Q denote the price and total quantity in the home market;a and b are positive constants,a is the highest price consumers are willing to pay, b is the slope of the demand curve.We also assume home country products can not be sold in the foreign market.In other words,the foreign firm dominates the foreign market ( this assumption simplifies the analysis and does not affect the results ),with the supply quantity y’.We also assume a linear demand function in the foreign market as p’=a’-b’Q’,in which p’and Q’ denote the price and total quantity in the foreign market;a’and b’are positive constants.Dumping is defined as the practice that the exporter in one country or region sells goods at a price lower than either the price in its domestic market or the production cost, in order to defeat to competitors and capture the market,which must cause material injury to a competing industry in the importing country.It means if Pf>Pd ,the home country can file AD petitions.If dumping is finally convicted,there are two solutions:(a) the home country imposes AD duty on the foreign firm which is equivalent to the dumping margin;(b) the foreign firm implements price undertakings to raise the exporting price so as to counteract the dumping margin.In the following parts,we will analyze the two solutions based on the above assumptions and compare welfare effects under the two different solutions.1.1 Imposing anti-dumping dutiesWe assume that home and foreign firms simultaneously decide their output intheir own domestic markets.However,the home country government imposes an AD duty with the rate t on foreign firm’s products in the importing market ( assuming zero tariff for the import goods, which does not affect the analysis ).Therefore,these two firms become duopoly with complete information under the supervision of importing-country’s government.Consequently,the home country firm,the foreign country firm and the home country government will be the three players in a static game with complete information to make their decisions.The profit functions of the foreign and home firms are:兀f = (a’–b’y’)y’+[a–b(x+y)]y-c’(y+y’)-ty兀d = x[a-b(x+y)]-cx (1)In Eq.(1),兀f and兀d represent the profit of the foreign and home firm respectively.Because both firms decide their output simultaneously.The reaction functions of the home firm and the foreign firm (respectively) are:a-bx-2by-t-c’=0a-2bx-by-c=0 (2)From Eq.(2),we can derive the Cournot-Nash equilibrium output in the static game of imposing AD duties with complete information:y=(a+c-2c’-2t)/3bx=(a+c’-2c+t)/3b (3)Total home country social welfare (Wt) is equal to the sum of cs, profit of the home firm and AD duties T(based on specific duty).The above function demonstrates that when imposing AD duties, the home country’ s total social welfare is relevant to a,a’,c,c’,t.Parameters a and a’ are the highest prices consumers in home and foreign market are willing to pay.They also represent the size of the home and foreign market respectively.The bigger a and a’,the larger the size of the home and foreign market.1.2 Foreign firm implementing price undertakingsWe assume that under the commitment of price undertaking,the foreign firm will set its price as Pc;total profit of the foreign firm in both home and foreign markets is 兀f.Firstly,we work out the market price Pf in the foreign market.In the foreignmarket,the foreign firm is the only supplier,with its output y’.The demand function in the foreign market is P’=a’-b’Q’,and the profit function of the foreign firm is 兀f =(a’-b’y’)y’+[a-b(x+y)]-c’(y+y’) (7)Where Pf is the minimum price under the price undertaking commitment.That is,the price Pc, the foreign firm set under price undertaking commitment, has to be equal to or higher than Pf.Otherwise dumping still exists.Secondly,implementing price undertakings forces the foreign firm to raise its price to Pc. Based on the principle of fair competition under price undertakings commitment,the home firm also needs to increase its price to Pc.In this case,sales in the home country market of the foreign firm and the home firm are y,and x, respectively.Now we have2a-3a’+2c-c’>0t>=2(a-c”)/3b (17)Therefore if Eq.(17) is satisfied,it is better for the home firm to accept foreign firm’s price undertaking commitment than to impose AD duties against the foreign firm,and the whole social welfare of the importing country increases accordingly.By analyzing the above inequation,factors that are involved include home and foreign market sizes,which are represented by a and a’ respectively,marginal costs of home and foreign firms(c and c’), and the anticipated AD duty t which the importing country may impose against the foreign firm.Generally speaking,when home market size is relatively larger,the marginal cost of the home firm is bigger,the anticipated rate of AD duty is higher,it is rational for the importing country to accept foreign firm’s price undertaking commitment than to impose AD duties,which will also increase the total social welfare of the home country.2 ConclusionFirstly,we conclude from the dumping firms’perspective by analyzing the difference of their sales in the home country market between implementing price undertakings and being imposed AD duties.By Eqs.(3) ,we see that by implementing price undertaking the foreign firm enjoys a bigger sale,with the gap 2t/3b.This means for a dumping firm,the loss of market share is less whenimplementing price undertakings than being imposed AD duties.This conclusion is of positive and profound significance for Chinese companies to choose the right strategy when facing frequent AD petitions.Until Dec.31,2005,there have been 726 AD investigations against Chinese companies.According to the W TO’s statistics,China has been the No.1 AD target country for 11 years from 1995 to 2005.Recentlv,Chinese companies are able to overcome the fears they had and positively confront AD petitions.When facing AD files,we should take initiative to negotiate on price undertakings in order to make our counter-partners accept price undertakings and stop AD investigations.This will help Chinese companies to retain market share as much as possible in the importing country.Secondly,from the perspective of AD filing countries,in certain conditions, for example condition Eq.(17),filing countries can choose to accept price undertakings of dumping firms to increase the total social welfare of the filing countries.Thirdly,price undertakings can prevent further trade disputes caused by imposing AD duties, beeause price undertakings can give the plaintiff country a proactive impression in solving trade dispute problems.In conclusion, under certain conditions implementing price undertakings instead of imposing AD duties can increase the total social welfare of the filing countries,help dumping firms to some degree retain their market share in the importing countries, and prevent escalation of trade disputes.译文:博弈分析实施反倾销价格承诺协议纠纷摘要价格承诺协议是被指控倾销的公司往往采取的一种应对国外反倾销纠纷的策略。

国外对华反倾销现状分析及对策思考

国外对华反倾销现状分析及对策思考

国外对华反倾销现状分析及对策思考作者姓名:张建专业班级:国贸系3班指导教师:胡兰摘要改革开放以来,我国对外贸易不断增长,在国际贸易舞台上的地位日益上升。

但同时国际上一些国家也将我国的出口商品作为反倾销的主要目标。

因此,了解和掌握有关国际贸易的反倾销理论和法规,研究分析国外对华反倾销的现状及原因,并提出相应的对策建议,对于消除对外贸易障碍、促进经济发展,具有十分重要的现实意义。

关键词:反倾销国际现状原因建议Anti-dumping measures to analyze the current situation and thinking Abstract:Since the reform and opening up, China's foreign trade has grown in international trade status on the stage is increasing day by day. But at the same time some countries will international of our country export commodities as anti-dumping's main goal. Therefore, to understand and grasp the relevant international trade theory and regulations, the anti-dumping analysis of the present situation of anti-dumping and the reasons, and puts forward some countermeasures to eliminate barriers, foreign trade, and promoting economic development, has very important practical significance.Key words:anti-dumping The international status reason suggest目录第1章前言 (3)1.1 问题的提出和意义 (3)1.1.1 倾销的含义 (3)1.1.2 我国外贸现状 (4)第2章我国反倾销特点 (5)第3章我国出口商品屡遭国外反倾销指控的原因分析 (6)结论 (9)致谢 (9)第1章前言1.1 问题的提出和意义1.1.1 倾销的含义倾销是一种人为地将产品以低于正常价值的价格在它国进行销售,并且给它国带来和将要带来实质性危害的行为。

倾销英文版

倾销英文版
Dumping
Contents
1.Introduction of dumping
1.1. Definition of dumping 1.2.Classification of dumping
1.2.1. Sporadic dumping(偶发性倾销) 1.2.2. Intermittent dumping (间隙性倾销) 1.2.3. Persistent dumping (持续性倾销)
3. Case study
• 3.2 case analysis ❖ The solutions of anti-dumping
To impose the anti-dumping duties on the exporter. ("the EU
Commission approved to impose anti-dumping duties on Chinese-made leather shoes")
根据世界贸易组织反倾销协定第21条dumpingexportpricenomalvalue12classificationofdumping121sporadicdumping偶发性倾销anoccasionalactivityofinventoryliquidatingscarveupoverseasmarket12classificationofdumping122intermittentdumping间隙性倾销monopolizationbyincreasingthepricelatterlyoccupymarketmonopolization12classificationofdumping123persistentdumping持续性倾销exportstheproductinthelongtermwithapricelowerthanitsvalueexpandthescaleofproductionandmaintainthedomesticpricestructure
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