外文翻译--资本结构与企业绩效

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资本结构和企业价值之间的关系对公司治理的影响[外文翻译]

外文翻译The influence of corporate governance on the relation betweencapital structure and valueMaterial Source:Corporate Governance Author:Maurizio La Rocca Researches in Business Economics, and in particular, in Business economics and Finance have always analyzed the processes of economic value creation as their main field of studies. Starting from the provocative work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), capital structure became one of the main elements that following studies have shown as being essential in determining value. Half a century of research on capital structure attempted to verify the presence of an optimal capital structure that could amplify the company’s ability to create value.There is again quite a bit of interest in the topic of firm capital structure, on whether or not it is necessary to consider the important contribution offered by corporate governance as a variable that can explain the connection between capital structure and value, controlling opportunistic behavior in the economic relations between shareholders, debt holders and managers. In this sense, capital structure can influence firm value.Therefore, this paper examines the theoretical relationship between capital structure, corporate governance and value, formulating an interesting proposal for future research. The second paragraph describes the theoretical and empirical approach on capital structure and value, identifying the main threads of study. After having explained the concept of corporate governance and its connection with firm value, the relationship between capital structure, corporate governance and value, as well as the causes behind them, will be investigated.Capital structure: relation with corporate value and main research streams When looking at the most important theoretical contributions on the relation between capital structure and value, it becomes immediately evident that there is a substantial difference between the early theories and the more recent ones. Influence of corporate governance on the relation between capital structure and valueCapital structure can be analyzed by looking at the rights and attributes that characterize the firm’s assets and that influence, with different levels of intensity,governance activities. Equity and debt, therefore, must be considered as both financial instruments and corporate governance instruments. (Williamson, 1988): debt subordinates governance activities to stricter management, while equity allows for greater flexibility and decision making power. It can thus be inferred that when capital structure becomes an instrument of corporate governance, not only the mix between debt and equity and their well known consequences as far as taxes go must be taken into consideration. The way in which cash flow is allocated and, even more importantly, how the right to make decisions and manage the firm (voting rights) is dealt with must also be examined. For example, venture capitalists are particularly sensitive to how capital structure and financing contracts are laid out, so that an optimal corporate governance can be guaranteed while incentives and checks for management behavior are well established (Zingales, 2000).How corporate governance can potentially have a relevant influence on the relation between capital structure and value, with an effect of mediation and/or moderation.On one hand, a change in how debt and equity are dealt with influences firm governance activities by modifying the structure of incentives and managerial control. If, through the mix debt and equity, different categories of investors all converge within the firm, where they have different types of influence on governance decisions, then managers will tend to have preferences when determining how one of these categories will prevail when d efining the firm’s capital structure. Even more importantly, through a specific design of debt contracts and equity it is possible to considerably increase firm governance efficiency.On the other hand, even corporate governance influences choices regarding capital structure. Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) show how firm financing choices are made by management following an order of preference; in this case, if the manager chooses the financing resources it can be presumed that she is avoiding a reduction of her decision making power by accepting the discipline represented by debt. Internal resource financing allows management to prevent other subjects from intervening in their decision making processes. De Jong (2002) reveals how in the Netherlands managers try to avoid using debt so that their decision making power remains unchecked. Zwiebel (1996) has observed that managers don’t voluntarily accept the ‘‘discipline’’ of debt; other governance mechanisms impose that debt is issued. Jensen (1986) noted that decisions to increase firm debt are voluntarily made by management when it intends to‘‘reassure’’ stakeholders that its governance decisions are ‘‘proper’’.The B-C-A relation that indicates the relation between capital structure a nd value is actually explained thanks to a third variable (corporate governanc e) that ‘‘intervenes’’ (and for this reason is called an ‘‘intervening variable’’) in the relation between capital structure and value. This would create a ‘‘bri dge’’ by mediating between lever age and value, thus showing a connection th at otherwise would not be visible. It can not be said that there is no relation between capital structure and value (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), but the c onnection is mediated and, in an economic sense, it is formalized through a causal chain between variables. In other words, it is not possible to see a dir ect relation between capital structure and value, but in reality capital structure influences firm governance that is connected to firm value.Furthermore, the relation between capital structure and corporate governan ce becomes extremely important when considering its fundamental role in val ue generation and distribution (Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002). Through its interact ion with other instruments of corporate governance, firm capital structure bec omes capable of protecting an efficient value creation process, by establishing the ways in which the generated value is later distributed (Zingales, 1998); i n other words the surplus created is influenced (Zingales, 2000).Therefore, the relation between capital structure and value could be set u p differently if it were mediated or moderated by corporate governance. None theless, capital structure could also intervene or interact in the relation betwee n corporate governance and value. In this manner a complementary relationshi p, or one where substitution is possible, could emerge between capital structu re and other corporate governance variables. Debt could have a marginal role of disciplining management when there is a shareholder participating in own ership or when there is state participation. To the contrary, when other forms of discipline are lacking in the governance structure, capital structure could be exactly the mechanism capable of protecting efficient corporate governance, while preserving firm value.ConclusionThis paper defines a theoretical approach that can contribute in clearing up the relation between capital structure, corporate governance and value, whi le they also promote a more precise design for empirical research. Capital str ucture represents one of many instruments that can preserve corporate governance efficiency and protect its ability to create value . Therefore, this thread of research affirms that if investment policies allow for value creation, financing policies, together with other governance instruments, can assure that invest ment policies are carried out efficiently while firm value is protected from op portunistic behavior.In conclusion, this paper defines a theoretical model that contributes to c larifying the relations between capital structure, corporate governance and firm value, while promoting, as an aim for future research, a verification of the validity of this model through application of the analysis to a wide sample of firms and to single firms. To study the interaction between capital structure, corporate governance and value when analyzing a wide sample of firms, loo k at problems of endogeneity and reciprocal causality, and make sure there is complementarity between all the three factors. Such an analysis deserves the application of refined econometric techniques. Moreover, these relations shoul d be investigated in a cross-country analysis, to catch the role of country-spe cific factors.译文资本结构和企业价值之间的关系对公司治理的影响资料来源:公司治理作者：莫里吉奥拉罗卡在商业经济的研究中，尤其是经营经济学和金融学，总是将分析创造经济价值的进程作为他们研究的主要领域。

资本结构、股权结构与公司绩效外文翻译

资本结构、股权结构与公司绩效外文翻译中文2825字1868单词外文文献：Capital structure, equity ownership and firm performanceDimitris Margaritis, Maria Psillaki 1Abstract：This paper investigates the relationship between capital structure, ownership structure and firm performance using a sample of French manufacturing firms. We employ non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) methods to empirically construct the industry’s ‘best practice’frontier and measure firm efficiency as the distance from that frontier. Using these performance measures we examine if more efficient firms choose more or less debt in their capital structure. We summarize the contrasting effects of efficiency on capital structure in terms of two competing hypotheses: the efficiency-risk and franchise value hypotheses. Using quantile regressions we test the effect of efficiency on leverage and thus the empirical validity of the two competing hypotheses across different capital structure choices. We also test the direct relationship from leverage to efficiency stipulated by the Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency cost model. Throughout this analysis we consider the role of ownership structure and type on capital structure and firm performance.Firm performance, capital structure and ownershipConflicts of interest between owners-managers and outside shareholders as well as those between controlling and minority shareholders lie at the heart of the corporate governance literature (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976;Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). While there is a relatively large literature on the effects of ownership on firm performance (see for example, Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Himmelberg et al., 1999), the relationship between ownership structure and capital structure remains largely unexplored. On the other hand, a voluminous literature is devoted to capital structure and its effects on corporate performance –see the surveys by Harris and Raviv (1991) and Myers (2001). An emerging consensus that comes out of the corporate governance literature (see Mahrt-Smith, 2005) is that the interactions between capital structure and ownership structure impact on firm values. Yet theoretical arguments alone cannot unequivocally predict these relationships (see Morck et al., 1988) and the empirical evidence that we have often appears to be contradictory. In part these conflicting results arise from difficulties empirical researchers face in obtaining direct measures of the magnitude of agency costs that are not confounded by factors that are beyond the control of management (Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). In the remainder of this section we briefly review the literature in this area focusing on the main hypotheses of interest for this study.Firm performance and capital structureThe agency cost theory is premised on the idea that the interests of the company’s managers and its shareholders are not perfectly aligned. In their seminal paper Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasized the importance of the agency costs of equity arising from the separation of ownership and control of firms whereby managers tend to maximize their own utility rather than the value of the firm. These conflicts may occur in situations where managers have incentives to take1来源：Journal of Banking & Finance , 2010 (34) : 621–632，本文翻译的是第二部分excessive risks as part of risk shifting investment strategies. This leads us to Jensen’s (1986) “free cash flow theory”where as stated by Jensen (1986, p. 323) “the pro blem is how to motivate managers to disgorge the cash rather than investing it below the cost of capital or wasting it on organizational inefficiencies.”Thus high debt ratios may be used as a disciplinary device to reduce managerial cash flow waste through the threat of liquidation (Grossman and Hart, 1982) or through pressure to generate cash flows to service debt (Jensen, 1986). In these situations, debt will have a positive effect on the value of the firm.Agency costs can also exist from conflicts between debt and equity investors. These conflicts arise when there is a risk of default. The risk of default may create what Myers (1977) referred to as an“underinvestment”or “debt overhang”problem. In this case, debt will have a negative effect on the value of the firm. Building on Myers (1977) and Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990) develops a model in which debt financing is shown to mitigate overinvestment problems but aggravate the underinvestment problem. The model predicts that debt can have both a positive and a negative effect on firm performance and presumably both effects are present in all firms. We allow for the presence of both effects in the empirical specification of the agency cost model. However we expect the impact of leverage to be negative overall. We summarize this in terms of our first testable hypothesis. According to the agency cost hypothesis (H1) higher leverage is expected to lower agency costs, reduce inefficiency and thereby lead to an improvement in firm’s performance.Reverse causality from firm performance to capital structure But firm performance may also affect the choice of capital structure. Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) stipulate that more efficient firms are more likely to earn a higher return for a given capital structure, and that higher returns can act as a buffer against portfolio risk so that more efficient firms are in a better position to substitute equity for debt in their capital structure. Hence under the efficiency-risk hypothesis (H2), more efficient firms choose higher leverage ratios because higher efficiency is expected to lower the costs of bankruptcy and financial distress. In essence, the efficiency-risk hypothesis is a spin-off of the trade-off theory of capital structure whereby differences in efficiency, all else equal, enable firms to fine tune their optimal capital structure.It is also possible that firms which expect to sustain high efficiency rates into the future will choose lower debt to equity ratios in an attempt to guard the economic rents or franchise value generated by these efficiencies from the threat of liquidation (see Demsetz, 1973; Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). Thus in addition to a equity for debt substitution effect, the relationship between efficiency and capital structure may also be characterized by the presence of an income effect. Under the franchise-value hypothesis (H2a) more efficient firms tend to hold extra equity capital and therefore, all else equal, choose lower leverage ratios to protect their future income or franchise value.Thus the efficiency-risk hypothesis (H2) and the franchise-value hypothesis (H2a) yield opposite predictions regarding the likely effects of firm efficiency on the choice of capital structure. Although we cannot identify the separate substitution andincome effects our empirical analysis is able to determine which effect dominates the other across the spectrum of different capital structure choices.Ownership structure and the agency costs of debt and equity.The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance dates back to Berle andMeans (1932) who argued that widely held corporations in the US, in which ownership of capital is dispersed among small shareholders and control is concentrated in the hands of insiders tend to underperform. Following from this, Jensen and Meckling (1976) develop more formally the classical owner-manager agency problem. They advocate that managerial share-ownership may reduce managerial incentives to consume perquisites, expropriate shareholders’wealth or to engage in other sub-optimal activities and thus helps in aligning the interests of managers and shareholders which in turn lowers agency costs. Along similar lines, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show that large external equity holders can mitigate agency conflicts because of their strong incentives to monitor and discipline management.In contrast Demsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen (1983) point out that a rise in insider share-ownership stakes may also be associated with adverse ‘entrenchment’effects tha t can lead to an increase in managerial opportunism at the expense of outside investors. Whether firm value would be maximized in the presence of large controlling shareholders depends on the entrenchment effect (Claessens et al., 2002; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Dow and McGuire, 2009). Several studies document either a direct (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Claessens et al., 2002; Hu and Zhou, 2008) or a non-monotonic (e.g., Morck et al., 1988;McConnell and Servaes, 1995; Davies et al., 2005) relationship between ownership structure and firm performance while others (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) find no relation between ownership concentration and firm performance.Family firms are a special class of large shareholders with unique incentive structures. For example, concerns over family and business reputation and firm survival would tend to mitigate the agency costs of outside debt and outside equity (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Anderson et al., 2003) although controlling family shareholders may still expropriate minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Several studies (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Maury, 2006; King and Santor, 2008) report that family firms especially those with large personal owners tend to outperform non-family firms. In addition, the empirical findings of Maury (2006) suggest that large controlling family ownership in Western Europe appears to benefit rather than harm minority shareholders. Thus we expect that the net effect of family ownership on firm performance will be positive.Large institutional investors may not, on the other hand, have incentives to monitor management (Villalonga and Amit, 2006) and they may even coerce with management (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Claessens et al., 2002; Cornett et al., 2007). In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and La Porta et al. (2002) argue that equity concentration is more likely to have a positive effect on firm performance in situations where control by large equity holders may act as a substitute for legal protection in countries with weak investor protection and less developed capital markets where they also classify Continental Europe.We summarize the contrasting ownership effects of incentive alignment and entrenchment on firm performance in terms of two competing hypotheses. Under the ‘convergence-of-interest hypothesis’(H3) more concentrated ownership should have a positive effect on firm performance. And under the ownership entrenchment hypothesis (H3a) the effect of ownership concentration on firm performance is expected to be negative.The presence of ownership entrenchment and incentive alignment effects also has implications for the firm’s capital structure choice. We assess these effects empirically. As external blockholders have strong incentives to reduce managerial opportunism they may prefer to use debtas a governance mechanism to control management’s consumption of perquisites (Grossman and Hart, 1982). In that case firms with large external blockholdings are likely to have higher debt ratios at least up to the point where the risk of bankruptcy may induce them to lower debt. Family firms may also use higher debt levels to the extent that they are perceived to be less risky by debtholders (Anderson et al., 2003). On the other hand the relation between leverage and insider share-ownership may be negative in situations where managerial blockholders choose lower debt to protect their non-diversifiable human capital and wealth invested in the firm (Friend and Lang, 1988). Brailsford et al. (2002) report a non-linear relationship between managerial share-ownership and leverage. At low levels of managerial ownership, agency conflicts necessitate the use of more debt but as managers become entrenched at high levels of managerial ownership they seek to reduce their risks and they use less debt. Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that insider ownership by managers or families has no effect on leveragewhile King and Santor (2008) report that both family firms and firms controlled by financial institutions carry more debt in their capital structure.外文翻译：资本结构、股权结构与公司绩效摘要：本文通过对法国制造业公司的抽样调查，研究资本结构、所有权结构和公司绩效的关系。

中英文外文文献翻译资本结构理论与企业资本结构优化

本科毕业设计（论文）中英文对照翻译(此文档为word格式,下载后您可任意修改编辑!)文献出处:Ashkanasy N M. The study on capital structure theory and the optimization of enterprise capital [J]. Journal of Management, 2016, 5(3): 235-254.原文The study on capital structure theory and the optimization ofenterprise capital structureAshkanasy N MAbstractIn this paper, corporate finance is an important content of modern enterprise management decision. Around the existence of optimal capitalstructure has been a lot of controversy. Given investment decisions, whether an enterprise to change its value by changing the capital structure and the cost of capital, namely whether there is a market make the enterprise value maximization, or make the enterprise capital structure of minimizing the cost of capital? To this problem has different answers in different stages of development, has formed many theory of capital structure.Key words: Capital structure; financial structure; Optimization; Financial leverage1 IntroductionIn financial theory, capital structure due to the different understanding of "capital" in the broad sense and narrow sense two explanations: one explanation is that the "capital" as all funding sources, the structure of the generalized capital structure refers to the entire capital, the relationship between the contrast of their own capital and debt capital, as the American scholar Alan c. Shapiro points out that "the company's capital structure - all the debt and equity financing; an alternative explanation is that if the" capital "is defined as a long-term funding sources, capital structure refers to the narrow sense of their own capital and long-term debt capital, and the tension and the short-term debt capital as the business capital management. Whether it is a broad concept ornarrow understanding of the capital structure is to discuss the proportion of equity capital and debt capital relations. 2 The capital structure theory Capital structure theory has experienced a process of gradually forming, developing and perfecting. First proposed the theory of American economist David Durand (David Durand) thinks that enterprise's capital structure is in accordance with the method of net income, net operating income method and traditional method, in 1958 di Gayle Anne (Franco Modigliani and Miller (Mertor Miller) and put forward the famous MM theory, created the modern capital structure theory, on this basis, the later generations and further put forward many new theory: 2.1 Net Income Theory (Net Income going) Net income theory on the premise of two assumptions --, investors with a fixed proportion of investment valuation or enterprise's net income. Enterprises to raise debt funds needed for a fixed rate. Therefore, the theory is that: the enterprise use of debt financing is always beneficial, can reduce the comprehensive cost of capital of enterprise. This is because the debt financing in the whole capital of enterprise, the bigger the share, the comprehensive cost of capital is more c lose to the cost of debt, and because the cost of debt is generally low, so, the higher the debt level, comprehensive capital cost is lower, the greater the enterprise value. When the debt ratio reached 100%, the firm will achieve maximum value.2.2 Theory of Net Operating Income (Net Operating Income going) Netoperating income theory is that, regardless of financial leverage, debt interest rates are fixed. If enterprises increase the lower cost of debt capital, but even if the cost of debt remains unchanged, but due to the increased the enterprise risk, can also lead to the rising cost of equity capital, it a liter of a fall, just offset, the enterprise cost of capital remain unchanged. Is derived as a result, the theory "" does not exist an optimal capital structure of the conclusion.2.3 Traditional Theory (Traditional going) Traditional theory is that the net income and net operating income method of compromise. It thinks, the enterprise use of financial leverage although will lead to rising cost of equity, but within limits does not completely offset the benefits of using the low cost of debt, so can make comprehensive capital cost reduction, increase enterprise value. But once exceed this limit, rights and interests of the rising cost of no longer can be offset by the low cost of debt, the comprehensive cost of capital will rise again. Since then, the cost of debt will rise, leading to a comprehensive capital costs rise more rapidly. Comprehensive cost of capital from falling into a turning point, is the lowest, at this point, to achieve the optimal capital structure. The above three kinds of capital structure theory is referred to as "early capital structure theory", their common features are: three theories are in corporate and personal income tax rate is zero under the condition of the proposed. Three theories and considering the capital structure of the dual effects of the cost of capital and enterprise value.Three theories are prior to 1958. Many scholars believe that the theory is not based on thorough analysis.3 Related theories3.1 Balance TheoryIt centered on the MM theory of modern capital structure theory development to peak after tradeoff theory. Trade-off theory is based on corporate MM model and miller, revised to reflect the financial pinch cost (also known as the financial crisis cost) and a model of agent cost.(1) the cost of financial constraints. Many enterprises always experience of financial constraints, some of them will be forced to go bankrupt. When the financial constraints but also not bankruptcy occurs, may appear the following situation: disputes between owners and creditors often leads to inventory and fixed assets on the material damaged or obsolete. Attorney fees, court fees and administrative costs to devour enterprise wealth, material loss and plus the legal and administrative expenses referred to as the "direct costs" of bankruptcy. Financial pinch will only occur in business with debt, no liability companies won't get into the mud. So with more debt, the fixed interest rate, and the greater the profitability of the probability of large leading to financial constraints and the cost of the higher the probability of occurrence. Financial pinch probability high will reduce the present value of the enterprise, to improve the cost ofcapital.(2) the agency cost. Because shareholders exists the possibility of using a variety of ways from the bondholders who benefit, bonds must have a number of protective constraint clauses. These terms and conditions in a certain extent constrained the legal management of the enterprise. Also must supervise the enterprise to ensure compliance with these terms and conditions, the cost of supervision and also upon the shareholders with higher debt costs. Supervise cost that agency cost is will raise the cost of debt to reduce debt interest. When the tax benefits and liabilities of financial constraints and agency costs when balance each other, namely the costs and benefits offset each other, determine the optimal capital structure. Equilibrium theory emphasizes the liabilities increase will cause the risk of bankruptcy and rising costs, so as to restrict the enterprise infinite pursuit of the behavior of tax preferential policies. In this sense, the enterprise the best capital structure is the balance of tax revenue and financial constraints caused by all kinds of costs as a result, when the marginal debt tax shield benefit is equal to the marginal cost of financial constraints, the enterprise value maximum, to achieve the optimal capital structure.3.2 Asymmetric Information TheoryAsymmetric Information and found)Due to the trade-off theory has long been limited to bankruptcy cost and tax benefit both conceptual framework, to the late 1970 s, the theory is centered on asymmetricinformation theory of new capital structure theory. So-called asymmetric information is in the information management and investors are not equal, managers than investors have more and more accurate information, and managers try to existing shareholders rather than new seeks the best interests of shareholders, so if business prospect is good, the manager will not issue new shares, but if the prospects, will make the cost of issuing new shares to raise too much, this factor must be considered in the capital structure decision. The significance of these findings to the enterprise's financial policy lies in: first it prompted enterprise reserve a certain debt capacity so as to internal lack of funding for new investment projects in the future debt financing. In addition, in order to avoid falling stock prices, managers often don't have to equity financing, and prefer to use external funding. The central idea is: internal financing preference, if you need external finance, preferences of creditor's rights financing. Can in order to save the ability to issue new debt at any time, the number of managers to borrow is usually less than the number of enterprises can take, in order to keep some reserves. Ross (s. Ross) first systematically introduce the theory of asymmetric information from general economics enterprise capital structure analysis, then, tal (e. Talmon), haeckel (Heikel) development from various aspects, such as the theory. After the 1980 s, thanks to the new institutional economics, and gradually formed a financial contract theory, corporate governance structure theory of capitalstructure theory, both of which emphasize enterprise contractual and incomplete contract, financial contract theory focuses on the design of optimal financial contract, and the arrangement of enterprise governance structure theory focuses on the right, focuses on the analysis of the relationship between capital structure and corporate governance.4 the capital structure theory of adaptability analysis On the one hand, capital structure theory especially the theory of modern capital structure is the important contribution is not only put forward "the existence of the optimal capital structure" this financial proposition, and that the optimal combination of the capital structure, objectively and make us on capital structure and its influence on the enterprise value have a clear understanding. The essence of these theories has direct influence and infiltrate into our country financial theory, and gives us enlightenment in many aspects: Because of various financing way, channel in financing costs, risks, benefits, constraints, as well as differences, seeking suitable capital structure is the enterprise financial management, especially the important content of financing management, must cause our country attaches great importance to the financial theory and financial practice. Capital structure decision despite the enterprise internal and external relationships and factor of restriction and influence, but its decision-making is the enterprise, the enterprise to the factors related to capital structure and the relationship between the quantitativeand qualitative analysis, discusses some principles and methods of enterprise capital structure optimization decision. Any enterprise capital structure in the design, all should leave room, maintain appropriate maneuver ability of financing, the financing environment in order to cope with the volatility and deal with unexpected events occur at any time. In general, businesses leverage ratio is high, has an adverse effect on the whole social and economic development, easily led to the decrease of the enterprise itself the economic benefits and losses and bankruptcies, deepen the entire social and economic development is not stable, increase the financial burden, cause inflation, not conducive to the transformation of industrial structure, and lower investment efficiency. Therefore, the enterprise capital structure should be in accordance with the business owners, creditors, and the public can bear the risk of the society in different aspects.译文资本结构理论与企业资本结构优化Ashkanasy N M摘要企业融资是现代企业经营决策的一项重要内容。

资本结构与企业绩效【外文翻译】

外文翻译Capital Structure and Firm Performance Material Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemAuthor: Allen N. BergerAgency costs represent important problems in corporate governance in both financial and nonfinancial industries. The separation of ownership and control in a professionally managed firm may result in managers exerting insufficient work effort, indulging in perquisites, choosing inputs or outputs that suit their own preferences, or otherwise failing to maximize firm value. In effect, the agency costs of outside ownership equal the lost value from professional managers maximizing their own utility, rather than the value of the firm.Theory suggests that the choice of capital structure may help mitigate these agency costs. Under the agency costs hypothesis, high leverage or a low equity/asset ratio reduces the agency costs of outside equity and increases firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders. Since the seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976), a vast literature on such agency-theoretic explanations of capital structure has developed (see Harris and Raviv 1991 and Myers 2001 for reviews). Greater financial leverage may affect managers and reduce agency costs through the threat of liquidation, which causes personal losses to managers of salaries, reputation, perquisites, etc. (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1982, Williams 1987), and through pressure to generate cash flow to pay interest expenses (e.g., Jensen 1986). Higher leverage can mitigate conflicts between shareholders and managers concerning the choice of investment (e.g., Myers 1977), the amount of risk to undertake (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976, Williams 1987), the conditions under which the firm is liquidated (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1990), and dividend policy (e.g., Stulz 1990).A testable prediction of this class of models is that increasing the leverage ratio should result in lower agency costs of outside equity and improved firm performance, all else held equal. However, when leverage becomes relatively high, further increases generate significant agency costs of outside debt – including higher expected costs of bankruptcy or financial distress – arising from conflicts between bondholders and shareholders.1 Because it is difficult to distinguish empiricallybetween the two sources of agency costs, we follow the literature and allow the relationship between total agency costs and leverage to be non-monotonic.Despite the importance of this theory, there is at best mixed empirical evidence in the extant literature (see Harris and Raviv 1991, Titman 2000, and Myers 2001 for reviews). Tests of the agency costs hypothesis typically regress measures of firm performance on the equity capital ratio or other indicator of leverage plus some control variables. At least three problems appear in the prior studies that we address in our application.First, the measures of firm performance are usually ratios fashioned from financial statements or stock market prices, such as industry-adjusted operating margins or stock market returns. These measures do not net out the effects of differences in exogenous market factors that affect firm value, but are beyond management’s control and therefore cannot reflect agency costs. Thus, the tests may be confounded by factors that are unrelated to agency costs. As well, these studies generally do not set a separate benchmark for each firm’s performance that would be realized if agency costs were minimized.We address the measurement problem by using profit efficiency as our indicator of firm performance. The link between productive efficiency and agency costs was first suggested by Stigler (1976), and profit efficiency represents a refinement of the efficiency concept developed since that time.2 Profit efficiency evaluates how close a firm is to earning the profit that a best-practice firm would earn facing the same exogenous conditions. This has the benefit of controlling for factors outside the control of management that are not part of agency costs. In contrast, comparisons of standard financial ratios, stock market returns, and similar measures typically do not control for these exogenous factors. Even when the measures used in the literature are industry adjusted, they may not account for important differences across firms within an industry –such as local market conditions – as we are able to do with profit efficiency. In addition, the performance of a best-practice firm under the same exogenous conditions is a reasonable benchmark for how the firm would be expected to perform if agency costs were minimized.Second, the prior research generally does not take into account the possibility of reverse causation from performance to capital structure. If firm performance affects the choice of capital structure, then failure to take this reverse causality into account may result in simultaneous-equations bias. That is, regressions of firmperformance on a measure of leverage may confound the effects of capital structure on performance with the effects of performance on capital structure.We address this problem by allowing for reverse causality from performance to capital structure. We discuss below two hypotheses for why firm performance may affect the choice of capital structure, the efficiency-risk hypothesis and the franchise-value hypothesis. We construct a two-equation structural model and estimate it using two-stage least squares (2SLS). An equation specifying profit efficiency as a function of the firm’s equity capital ratio and other variables is use d to test the agency costs hypothesis, and an equation specifying the equity capital ratio as a function of the firm’s profit efficiency and other variables is used to test the net effects of the efficiency-risk and franchise-value hypotheses. Both equations are econometrically identified through exclusion restrictions that are consistent with the theories.Third, some, but not all of the prior studies did not take ownership structure into account. Under virtually any theory of agency costs, ownership structure is important, since it is the separation of ownership and control that creates agency costs (e.g., Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 1985). Greater insider shares may reduce agency costs, although the effect may be reversed at very high levels of insider holdings (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988). As well, outside block ownership or institutional holdings tend to mitigate agency costs by creating a relatively efficient monitor of the managers (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Exclusion of the ownership variables may bias the test results because the ownership variables may be correlated with the dependent variable in the agency cost equation (performance) and with the key exogenous variable (leverage) through the reverse causality hypotheses noted above.To address this third problem, we include ownership structure variables in the agency cost equation explaining profit efficiency. We include insider ownership, outside block holdings, and institutional holdings.Our application to data from the banking industry is advantageous because of the abundance of quality data available on firms in this industry. In particular, we have detailed financial data for a large number of firms producing comparable products with similar technologies, and information on market prices and other exogenous conditions in the local markets in which they operate. In addition, some studies in this literature find evidence of the link between the efficiency of firms and variables that are recognized to affect agency costs, including leverage andownership structure (see Berger and Mester 1997 for a review).Although banking is a regulated industry, banks are subject to the same type of agency costs and other influences on behavior as other industries. The banks in the sample are subject to essentially equal regulatory constraints, and we focus on differences across banks, not between banks and other firms. Most banks are well above the regulatory capital minimums, and our results are based primarily on differences at the margin, rather than the effects of regulation. Our test of the agency costs hypothesis using data from one industry may be built upon to test a number of corporate finance hypotheses using information on virtually any industry.We test the agency costs hypothesis of corporate finance, under which high leverage reduces the agency costs of outside equity and increases firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders. Our use of profit efficiency as an indicator of firm performance to measure agency costs, our specification of a two-equation structural model that takes into account reverse causality from firm performance to capital structure, and our inclusion of measures of ownership structure address problems in the extant empirical literature that may help explain why prior empirical results have been mixed. Our application to the banking industry is advantageous because of the detailed data available on a large number of comparable firms and the exogenous conditions in their local markets. Although banks are regulated, we focus on differences across banks that are driven by corporate governance issues, rather than any differences in-regulation, given that all banks are subject to essentially the same regulatory framework and most banks are well above the regulatory capital minimums.Our findings are consistent with the agency costs hypothesis – higher leverage or a lower equity capital ratio is associated with higher profit efficiency, all else equal. The effect is economically significant as well as statistically significant. An increase in leverage as represented by a 1 percentage point decrease in the equity capital ratio yields a predicted increase in profit efficiency of about 6 percentage points, or a gain of about 10% in actual profits at the sample mean. This result is robust to a number of specification changes, including different measures of performance (standard profit efficiency, alternative profit efficiency, and return on equity), different econometric techniques (two-stage least squares and OLS), different efficiency measurement methods (distribution-free and fixed-effects), different samples (the “ownership sample” of banks with detailed ownership data and the “full sample” of banks), and the different sample periods (1990s and 1980s).However, the data are not consistent with the prediction that the relationship between performance and leverage may be reversed when leverage is very high due to the agency costs of outside debt.We also find that profit efficiency is responsive to the ownership structure of the firm, consistent with agency theory and our argument that profit efficiency embeds agency costs. The data suggest that large institutional holders have favorable monitoring effects that reduce agency costs, although large individual investors do not. As well, the data are consistent with a non-monotonic relationship between performance and insider ownership, similar to findings in the literature.With respect to the reverse causality from efficiency to capital structure, we offer two competing hypotheses with opposite predictions, and we interpret our tests as determining which hypothesis empirically dominates the other. Under the efficiency-risk hypothesis, the expected high earnings from greater profit efficiency substitute for equity capital in protecting the firm from the expected costs of bankruptcy or financial distress, whereas under the franchise-value hypothesis, firms try to protect the expected income stream from high profit efficiency by holding additional equity capital. Neither hypothesis dominates the other for the ownership sample, but the substitution effect of the efficiency-risk hypothesis dominates for the full sample, suggesting a difference in behavior for the small banks that comprise most of the full sample.The approach developed in this paper can be built upon to test the agency costs hypothesis or other corporate finance hypotheses using data from virtually any industry. Future research could extend the analysis to cover other dimensions of capital structure. Agency theory suggests complex relationships between agency costs and different types of securities. We have analyzed only one dimension of capital structure, the equity capital ratio. Future research could consider other dimensions, such as the use of subordinated notes and debentures, or other individual debt or equity instruments.译文资本结构与企业绩效资料来源: 联邦储备系统理事会作者：Allen N. Berger 在财务和非财务行业，代理成本在公司治理中都是重要的问题。

资本结构中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照外文翻译(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)The effect of capital structure on profitability : an empirical analysis of listed firms in Ghana IntroductionThe capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on a firm’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. The capital structure of a firm is actually a mix of different securities. In general, a firm can choose among many alternative capital structures. It can issue a large amount of debt or very little debt. It can arrange lease financing, use warrants, issue convertible bonds, sign forward contracts or trade bond swaps. It can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations; however, it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes its overall market value.A number of theories have been advanced in explaining the capital structure of firms. Despite the theoretical appeal of capital structure, researchers in financial management have not found the optimal capital structure. The best that academics and practitioners have been able to achieve are prescriptions that satisfy short-term goals. For example, the lack of a consensus about what would qualify as optimal capital structure has necessitated the need for this research. A better understanding of the issues at hand requires a look at the concept of capital structure and its effect on firm profitability. This paper examines the relationship between capital structure and profitability of companies listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange during the period 1998-2002. The effect of capital structure on the profitability of listed firms in Ghana is a scientific area that has not yet been explored in Ghanaian finance literature.The paper is organized as follows. The following section gives a review of the extant literature on the subject. The next section describes the data and justifies the choice of the variables used in the analysis. The model used in the analysis is then estimated. The subsequent section presents and discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, the last section summarizes the findings of the research and also concludes the discussion.Literature on capital structureThe relationship between capital structure and firm value has been the subject of considerable debate. Throughout the literature, debate has centered on whether there is an optimal capital structure for an individual firm or whether the proportion of debt usage is irrelevant to the individual firm’s value. The capital structure of a firm concerns the mix of debt and equity the firm uses in its operation. Brealey and Myers (2003) contend that the choice of capital structure is fundamentally a marketing problem. They state that the firm can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations, but it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes market value. According to Weston and Brigham (1992), the optimal capital structure is the one that maximizes the market value of the firm’s outstanding shares.Fama and French (1998), analyzing the relationship among taxes, financing decisions, and the firm’s value, concluded that the debt does not concede tax b enefits. Besides, the high leverage degree generates agency problems among shareholders and creditors that predict negative relationships between leverage and profitability. Therefore, negative information relating debt and profitability obscures the tax benefit of the debt. Booth et al. (2001) developed a study attempting to relate the capital structure of several companies in countries with extremely different financial markets. They concluded thatthe variables that affect the choice of the capital structure of the companies are similar, in spite of the great differences presented by the financial markets. Besides, they concluded that profitability has an inverse relationship with debt level and size of the firm. Graham (2000) concluded in his work that big and profitable companies present a low debt rate. Mesquita and Lara (2003) found in their study that the relationship between rates of return and debt indicates a negative relationship for long-term financing. However, they found a positive relationship for short-term financing and equity.Hadlock and James (2002) concluded that companies prefer loan (debt) financing because they anticipate a higher return. Taub (1975) also found significant positive coefficients for four measures of profitability in a regression of these measures against debt ratio. Petersen and Rajan (1994) identified the same association, but for industries. Baker (1973), who worked with a simultaneous equations model, and Nerlove (1968) also found the same type of association for industries. Roden and Lewellen (1995) found a significant positive association between profitability and total debt as a percentage of the total buyout-financing package in their study on leveraged buyouts. Champion (1999) suggested that the use of leverage was one way to improve the performance of an organization.In summary, there is no universal theory of the debt-equity choice. Different views have been put forward regarding the financing choice. The present study investigates the effect of capital structure on profitability of listed firms on the GSE.MethodologyThis study sampled all firms that have been listed on the GSE over a five-year period (1998-2002). Twenty-two firms qualified to be included in the study sample. Variables used for the analysis include profitability and leverage ratios. Profitability is operationalized using a commonly used accounting-based measure: the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to equity. The leverage ratios used include:. short-term debt to the total capital;. long-term debt to total capital;. total debt to total capital.Firm size and sales growth are also included as control variables.The panel character of the data allows for the use of panel data methodology. Panel data involves the pooling of observations on a cross-section of units over several time periods and provides results that are simply not detectable in pure cross-sections or pure time-series studies. A general model for panel data that allows the researcher to estimate panel data with great flexibility and formulate the differences in the behavior of thecross-section elements is adopted. The relationship between debt and profitability is thus estimated in the following regression models:ROE i,t =β0 +β1SDA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (1) ROE i,t=β0 +β1LDA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (2) ROE i,t=β0 +β1DA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (3)where:. ROE i,t is EBIT divided by equity for firm i in time t;. SDA i,t is short-term debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. LDA i,t is long-term debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. DA i,t is total debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. SIZE i,t is the log of sales for firm i in time t;. SG i,t is sales growth for firm i in time t; and. ëi,t is the error term.Empirical resultsTable I provides a summary of the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables for the sample of firms. This shows the average indicators of variables computed from the financial statements. The return rate measured by return on equity (ROE) reveals an average of 36.94 percent with median 28.4 percent. This picture suggests a good performance during the period under study. The ROE measures the contribution of net income per cedi (local currency) invested by the firms’ stockholders; a measure of the efficiency of the owners’ invested capital. The variable SDA measures the ratio of short-term debt to total capital. The average value of this variable is 0.4876 with median 0.4547. The value 0.4547 indicates that approximately 45 percent of total assets are represented by short-term debts, attesting to the fact that Ghanaian firms largely depend on short-term debt for financing their operations due to the difficulty in accessing long-term credit from financial institutions. Another reason is due to the under-developed nature of the Ghanaian long-term debt market. The ratio of total long-term debt to total assets (LDA) also stands on average at 0.0985. Total debt to total capital ratio(DA) presents a mean of 0.5861. This suggests that about 58 percent of total assets are financed by debt capital. The above position reveals that the companies are financially leveraged with a large percentage of total debt being short-term.Table I.Descriptive statisticsMean SD Minimum Median Maximum━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ROE 0.3694 0.5186 -1.0433 0.2836 3.8300SDA 0.4876 0.2296 0.0934 0.4547 1.1018LDA 0.0985 0.1803 0.0000 0.0186 0.7665DA 0.5861 0.2032 0.2054 0.5571 1.1018SIZE 18.2124 1.6495 14.1875 18.2361 22.0995SG 0.3288 0.3457 20.7500 0.2561 1.3597━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Regression analysis is used to investigate the relationship between capital structure and profitability measured by ROE. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results are presented in Table II. The results from the regression models (1), (2), and (3) denote that the independent variables explain the debt ratio determinations of the firms at 68.3, 39.7, and 86.4 percent, respectively. The F-statistics prove the validity of the estimated models. Also, the coefficients are statistically significant in level of confidence of 99 percent.The results in regression (1) reveal a significantly positive relationship between SDA and profitability. This suggests that short-term debt tends to be less expensive, and therefore increasing short-term debt with a relatively low interest rate will lead to an increase in profit levels. The results also show that profitability increases with the control variables (size and sales growth). Regression (2) shows a significantly negative association between LDA and profitability. This implies that an increase in the long-term debt position is associated with a decrease in profitability. This is explained by the fact that long-term debts are relatively more expensive, and therefore employing high proportions of them could lead to low profitability. The results support earlier findings by Miller (1977), Fama and French (1998), Graham (2000) and Booth et al. (2001). Firm size and sales growth are again positively related to profitability.The results from regression (3) indicate a significantly positive association between DA and profitability. The significantly positive regression coefficient for total debt implies that an increase in the debt position is associated with an increase in profitability: thus, the higher the debt, the higher the profitability. Again, this suggests that profitable firms depend more on debt as their main financing option. This supports the findings of Hadlock and James (2002), Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Roden and Lewellen (1995) that profitable firms use more debt. In the Ghanaian case, a high proportion (85 percent)of debt is represented by short-term debt. The results also show positive relationships between the control variables (firm size and sale growth) and profitability.Table II.Regression model results━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Profitability (EBIT/equity)Ordinary least squares━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Variable 1 2 3SIZE 0.0038 (0.0000) 0.0500 (0.0000) 0.0411 (0.0000)SG 0.1314 (0.0000) 0.1316 (0.0000) 0.1413 (0.0000)SDA 0.8025 (0.0000)LDA -0.3722(0.0000)DA -0.7609(0.0000)R²0.6825 0.3968 0.8639SE 0.4365 0.4961 0.4735Prob. (F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ConclusionsThe capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on an organization’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. This present study evaluated the relationship between capital structure and profitability of listed firms on the GSE during a five-year period (1998-2002). The results revealed significantly positive relation between SDA and ROE, suggesting that profitable firms use more short-term debt to finance their operation. Short-term debt is an important component or source of financing for Ghanaian firms, representing 85 percent of total debt financing. However, the results showed a negative relationship between LDA and ROE. With regard to the relationship between total debt and profitability, the regression results showed a significantly positive association between DA and ROE. This suggests that profitable firms depend more on debt as their main financing option. In the Ghanaian case, a high proportion (85 percent) of the debt is represented in short-term debt.译文加纳上市公司资本结构对盈利能力的实证研究论文简介资本结构决策对于任何商业组织都是至关重要的。

资本结构与绩效外文翻译

资本结构与公司绩效：来自约旦的证据最优资本结构的主题一直是许多研究的主题。

有人认为，高盈利的公司不一定比低盈利的公司拥有更高的负债比率。

也有人认为，具有高增长率的企业有较高的债务权益比率。

破产成本（代理公司规模）也被认为是一个重要的影响资本结构因素（Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973; Harris and Raviv, 1991）。

如果这三个因素被认为是资本结构的决定因素，那么这些因素可以用来确定公司绩效。

在实践中，企业经理人都能够找出最佳的资本结构，减少一家公司的融资成本，从而最大限度地提高公司的收入回报。

如果一个公司的资本结构影响公司业绩，那么它是合理的预期，该公司的资本结构会影响公司的健康和其违约的可能性。

从债权人的角度看，它是可能的，银行的债务权益比艾滋病在了解银行的风险管理策略，以及如何确定违约的可能性，陷入财务困境的企业。

总之，对于学者和从业人员来说，资本结构和公司业绩的问题是重要的。

当前文件的目的是研究资本结构对公司业绩在约旦的效果。

有一个缺乏有关资本结构的影响表现在发达国家和发展中国家的企业的经验证据。

在资本结构上以前的证据大多来自企业资产负债率的决定因素。

据作者所知，这项研究提供了第一次尝试探讨约旦的资本结构对公司绩效。

我们之所以选择约旦为例，这一主题是其独特性，我们在下面讨论。

首先，我们的研究期间约旦的经济一直受到中东地区的大量外部冲击。

在1990-1991年爆发了第一次海湾战争。

同时由于这场战争，移民工人和难民回归，增加了在约旦的贫困和失业水平。

例如，在那段时间（世界银行，2003），超过30万人从海湾国家返回约旦。

此外，在约旦河西岸和加沙地带发生的持续不断的冲突，和2003年的第二次海湾战争对约旦的旅游和投资的产生了负面影响。

此外，约旦受到于2000年9月开始的巴勒斯坦起义1的严重影响。

巴勒斯坦起义对大部分出口到这些邻国的约旦公司的公司业绩产生负面影响。

智力资本与企业财务绩效外文翻译文献

文献信息：文献标题：An Empirical Research on the Relationship between Intellectual Capital and Corporate Financial Performance on Indonesian Listed Companies（印尼上市公司智力资本与企业财务绩效之间的关系的实证研究）国外作者：Dominique Razafindrambinina，Talita Anggreni文献出处：《International Conference on accounting and business》, 2008,1263(32):590-594字数统计：英文2555单词，14475字符；中文4389汉字外文文献：An Empirical Research on the Relationship between Intellectual Capital and Corporate Financial Performance on Indonesian ListedCompaniesAbstractThe main focus of the research is to investigate the relationship between Intellectual Capital and Corporate Financial Performance of Indonesian listed companies. Intellectual Capital (IC) has gained in importance and has been increasingly viewed as a significant contributor to the process of value-creation in corporations (Sullivan, 2000). Unlike financial and physical assets, intangible assetsare difficult to emulate, which makes them a powerful source of competitive advantage.The study uses data from consumer goods firms listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange. Pulic’s Value Added Intellectual Coefficient (V AIC) model is utilized as the efficiency measure of capital employed, human capital and structural capital. The regression models explore the relationship between intellectual capital and its contribution to the financial performance of firms in both current and future years.The research reveals that Intellectual Capital does contribute to the financial performance, with the exception of revenue growth, of consumer goods firms in Indonesia. Furthermore, findings suggest that future performance is also affected by the level of intellectual capital. Finally, evidence is presented that physical/financial capital and structural capital are the most significant underlying drivers of corporate performance. Although insignificant, human capital has a positive and consistent role in revenue growth.In creating corporate value, Indonesian investors put less weight on intellectual capital potential. Improvement in understanding the importance of intellectual capital in the region, especially in Indonesia, could bring in more advantages for its economy and reinforce the competitiveness of the region as a whole in terms of attracting more investments.Key words：Intellectual Capital, Financial Performance, Consumer Goods, Jakarta Stock Exchange, IndonesiaIntroductionOver the last decade, Intellectual Capital (IC) has gained in importance. IC has been increasingly viewed as a significant contributor to the process of value-creation in corporations (Sullivan, 2000), and also to their performance.In the new “knowledge-based” economy that started to develop in the 1990s (Williams, 2000), intellectual capital, rather than physical capital, has become the key factor of a firm’s potential future performance and success. Unlike financial and physical assets, intangible assets are hard to emulate by competitors, which makesthem a powerful source of competitive advantage.Intellectual capital is generally considered to be a vital strategic asset (Mouritsen, 1988). This qualification of intellectual capital as a strategic asset rests on a potential link between intellectual capital and firm performance. Empirical research findings vary among countries due to differences in economic, political, legal, social, and cultural factors. (Firer and Williams 2003), (Belkaoui, 2003), (Chen et al. 2005; Shiu, 2006), (Zhang et al. 2006), (Tan et al. 2007).Research on intellectual capital and how it affects the profitability of Indonesian companies is significant because not only do these companies compete amongst themselves, but with foreign companies as well. Clearly, Indonesian organizations must have a strategy to compete and survive in such a dynamic international environment. One way for these Indonesian organizations to gain competitive advantage is to manage their intellectual capital.This paper aims to study whether the intellectual capital of Indonesian corporations relates to their financial performance. The sample used comprises 36 consumer goods companies listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange between 2003 and 2006. The Value Added Intellectual Coefficient (V AIC™) developed by Pulic (1998) is employed as an extent measure of intellectual capital. The corporate performance of the companies will be measured by four ratios: Return on Assets (ROA), Asset Turnover (ATO), Revenue Growth (RG), and Operating Cash Flow ratio (OCF).The contribution of this research relates to numerous groups. The study contributes to the development of literature and studies on intellectual capital by focusing in Indonesia, a developing country. Previous studies on intellectual capital have mostly focused on businesses in developed countries. For the organizations, the results may increase their awareness of the importance and advantages of effective intellectual capital management within an organization. Also, accounting regulators of the Indonesian business environment can make use of findings to determine possible necessary changes to present policies that will support developing the groundwork of the nation’s intellectual capital. Findings can help investors to gain a better understanding of the changes taking place in Indonesian businesses and to know whatto look for in a company. Academically, this study provides a basis for further research regarding intellectual capital by local as well as international academics. Therefore, more knowledge on intellectual capital may be obtained and distributed within the academic community.The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two introduces the literature review of the theoretical foundations on intellectual capital. The research method used in the study is outlined in Section three. The next section presents the findings of the empirical analysis. The last section offers final conclusions on this study.Literature reviewIntangible assets are only those intangibles that would be recognized by the financial standards and allowed to be recorded in the balance sheet (Starovic and Marr, 2003). Intellectual property is also defined as intangible assets, and includes patents, trademarks and copyrights, which can also be included in the traditional financial statement. Intellectual capital can be the knowledge that is transformed into intellectual property or the end result of the process itself. Intellectual assets are a part of intellectual capital. They are “the codified knowledge and know-how of the firm’s human capital” (Sullivan, 2000).Annie Brooking (consultant and author of Intellectual Capital: Core Asset for the Third Millennium Enterprise) describes intellectual capital (IC) as the “combined intangible assets which enable the company to function.” In other words, an enterprise is the sum of its tangible assets and its intellectual capital, as follows:Enterprise = Tangible Assets + Intellectual Capital The range of views and the number of terms used to define and describe intellectual capital are broad and ambiguous. Due to the close ties between intellectual capital, the industry and specific companies, IC implemented by one company might be different from other companies (Abdolmohammadi, 2005, p. 397). Similarly, Sullivan (2000) states that a wide range of interests and perspectives on the subject of IC cause the diversity of opinion on the definition.The elements of intellectual capital (IC) by Edvinsson have been expanded by Brinker (1997) and Stewart (1997). They stated that intellectual capital is the sum of Human Capital, Structural Capital and Customer Capital.1.Human Capital: The capabilities of the company’s employees necessary to provide solutions to customers, to innovate and to renew. In addition to individual capabilities, human capital includes the dynamics of a learning organization in a changing competitive environment, its creativity, and innovativeness.2.Structural Capital: The infrastructure of human capital, including the organizational capabilities to meet market requirements. Infrastructure includes the quality and reach of information technology systems, company images, databases, organizational concept and documentation.3.Customer Capital: The relationships with people with whom a company does business. It can mean relationships with clients and customers as well as suppliers; hence, it has also been referred to as relationship capital.It is the interaction between human, structural and customer capital that helps determine the true value of a company’s overall intellectual capital.Pulic (1998, 2000) developed the Value Added Intellectual Coefficient (V AIC) to measure the IC of companies. His model uses the concept of Skandia2 models that the market value of the company is made up of capital operation and intellectual capital. The evaluation of performance includes evaluation of the efficiency of capital employed and evaluation of the efficiency of intellectual capital. V AIC is used to measure the value added by both the efficiency of capital employed (CEE) and intellectual capital (ICE):V AIC = CEE + ICEAccording to Skandia models, intellectual capital is divided into two main parts, human capital and structural capital, thus intellectual capital efficiency coefficient is the sum of human capital efficiency (HCE) and structural capital efficiency coefficient (SCE), thus,V AIC = CEE + HCE + SCE.The use of V AIC from Pulic’s model as a measure of firm’s intellectual capital, is widely used because of its’simplicity (Pulic, 1998, 2000). It uses publicly available data (historical financial statements) and allows the comparison between companies and countries (Firer and Williams, 2003). VAIC does not generate an amount for intellectual capital however; it shows how well a company converts its intellectual capital into value added. The higher the V AIC indicator, the better is the management in utilizing the company’s potential.MethodologyThe data used in this research is taken from the annual reports of Consumer Goods companies listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange during 2003-2006. The consumer goods sector is considered to be reliant on intangible assets, such as their brand image and patents. Moreover, the sample companies were taken from one industry sector to obtain a homogenous sample.The aim of the paper is to show whether intellectual capital has an influence on the performance of companies in Indonesia. The author’s main research questions are as follows:RQ1:Does companies’intellectual capital influence their current financial performance?RQ2:Does companies’intellectual capital influence their future financial performance?RQ3: Do any of the components of V AIC (CEE, HCE, or SCE) have a more positive influence on the financial performance of the companies?The independent variables Capital Employed Efficiency (CEE), Human Capital Efficiency (HCE), and Structural Capital Efficiency (SCE) are components of the Value Added Intelle ctual Coefficient (V AIC), which is a measure of the company’s IC in this research. The V AIC will be tested for correlation with the dependent variables: ROA, ATO, RG and OCF.The four dependent variables return on assets (ROA), asset turnover (ATO), revenue growth (RG), and operating cash flow ratio (OCF) relate to the dimensions of profitability, productivity, and growth.1.Return on Assets (ROA)ROA is an indicator of how profitable a company is relative to its total assets. Intellectual capital is presumed to positively affect earnings, hence, if this assumption is true, ROA will increase as IC increases. This ratio is calculated by dividing the net income (less preference dividends) divided by book value of total assets as reported in the 2004-2006 annual report. This ratio has been used in several literatures (Chen et al. 2005; Firer & Williams, 2003; Shiu, 2006) to represent corporate performance in testing its relationship with intellectual capital. The formula used by Chen et al (2005) is used to eliminate the tax effect for the calculation of ROA.ROA = Pre-tax income / Total Assets2.Asset Turnover (ATO)The productivity level is the turnover of assets of a company. It measures a firm's efficiency at using its assets in generating sales or revenue. This variable was also used by Firer & Williams (2003) and Shiu (2006) as a proxy measure of productivity(P).P = ATO = Sales Revenue/Book Value of Total assets3.Growth in Revenue (GR)Growth in revenue measures the changes in companies’ revenues, in thi s case, from year to year. Increases in revenues signal companies’ opportunities for growth. Growth in revenue is measured by dividing firm’s revenue from the latest financial report by the previous year’s revenue. This variable was used by Chen et al. (2005) as a proxy measure of profitability and the researcher chooses to use the same variable.GR = ((Revenue t / Revenue t-1)-1) x 100%Where e.g., t = 2005 and t-1 =20044.Operating Cash Flow Ratio (OCF)Operating cash flow is the net cash generated from operations. It is produced by taking net income, adding back the amount of depreciation, and making adjustments to reflect changes in the working capital accounts, i.e. receivables, payables, inventories and other current accounts, on the balance sheet. Operating cash flow is debatably a better measure of a business's profits than earnings because a company can show positive net income on the income statement and still not be able to pay its liabilities. The formula to calculate Operating Cash Flow Ratio is as follows:OCF = Total Operating Cash Flow/ Total Assets These dependent variables will be tested for any correlation with the following independent variables: Human Capital Efficiency (HCE), Capital Employed Efficiency (CEE) and Structural Capital Efficiency (SCE)FindingsIn brief, the positive relationship between intellectual capital in one year and the return on assets, asset turnover, revenue growth, and operating cash flow in the following years suggest that intellectual capital does have a significant relationship with future financial performance. This indicates that companies will reap benefits in the future from intellectual capital invested today. Also, the relationship betweenintellectual capital invested today and future performance is more significant than that between intellectual capital and current performance. This means that it takes time to yield results from the efficiency of intellectual capital.The results of the regression analysis show that CEE and SCE have a more positive influence in the financial performance of the sample companies, both in the same period and in the following years. This indicates that physical capital (included in CEE) remains a significant fundamental resource of corporate performance in Indonesian listed companies, especially in the consumer goods industry sector. Moreover, this implies that structural capital is also a major driver of performance in the consumer goods sector. As mentioned earlier in chapter 2, Stewart (2007) stated that structural capital comprises patents, plans and trademarks. The empirical findings suggest that these brands, patents and trademarks and other intangible assets invested in the company have contributed to the increase of the companies’ performance. HCE, on the other hand, is negatively associated in most of the models. This indicates that human resources were not really capable of increasing performance.ConclusionIntellectual capital is believed to play an important role in increasing the performance of a company. Throughout this research, the components of the Value Added Intellectual Capital (V AIC) coefficient were used to measure the efficiency of IC. These components were used to investigate their relationship with financial performance in Indonesian consumer goods companies. Based on the calculations, analyses and findings discussed in previous chapters, three main conclusions can be made.First, intellectual capital positively affects the current financial performance of companies in the consumer goods sector, although revenue growth was not significantly influenced. Second, the study provides empirical evidence that companies with greater intellectual capital yield greater profitability, productivity and growth in the following years. However, intellectual capital seems to have a significant effect on revenue growth on the lagged one year result but not on thelagged two years result. Findings revealed that physical and financial assets have a short-term role in revenue growth. Third, capital employed efficiency (CEE) and structural capital efficiency (SCE) are the most influential variables in the increase of future performance of a firm, and human capital efficiency (HCE) has a weak and negative role in a firm’s profitability and productivity.Better results are obtained if the efficiency of intellectual capital is analyzed with the ROA, ATO, and OCF, which are measures of efficiency (profitability and productivity) of a company. Based on the empirical findings, it is time for Indonesia to give more importance to intellectual capital as a way of creating value to increase its potential competitive advantage. For that, companies in Indonesia should improve the quality and productivity of their human resources.中文译文：印尼上市公司智力资本与企业财务绩效之间的关系的实证研究摘要本研究的主要焦点是探讨印尼上市公司的智力资本与企业财务绩效之间的关系。

资本结构与企业绩效【外文翻译】

股权结构与公司业绩外文翻译(可编辑)

股权结构与公司业绩外文翻译外文翻译Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from IsraelMaterial Source: Journal of Management and Governance Author: Beni Lauterbach and Alexander Vaninsky1.IntroductionFor many years and in many economies, most of the business activity was conducted by proprietorships, partnerships or closed corporations. In these forms of business organization, a small and closely related group of individuals belonging to the same family or cooperating in business for lengthy periods runs the firm and shares its profits.However, over the recent century, a new form of business organization flourished as non-concentrated-ownership corporations emerged. The modern diverse ownership corporation has broken the link between the ownership and active management of the firm. Modern corporations are run by professional managers who typically own only a very small fraction of the shares. In addition, ownership is disperse, that is the corporation is owned by and its profits are distributed among many stockholders.The advantages of the modern corporation are numerous. It relievesfinancing problems, which enables the firm to assume larger-scale operations and utilize economies of scale. It also facilitates complex-operations allowing the most skilled or expert managers to control business even when they the professional mangers do not have enough funds to own the firm. Modern corporations raise money sell common stocks in the capital markets and assign it to the productive activities of professional managers. This is why it is plausible to hypothesize that the modern diverse-ownership corporations perform better than the traditional “closely held” business forms.Moderating factors exist. For example, closely held firms may issue minority shares to raise capital and expand operations. More importantly, modern corporations face a severe new problem called the agency problem: there is a chance that the professional mangers governing the daily operations of the firm would take actions against the best interests of the shareholders. This agency problem stems from the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation, and it troubled many economists before e.g., Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen andMeckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983. The conclusion was that there needs to exist a monitoring system or contract, aligning the manager interests and actions with the wealth and welfare of the owners stockholdersAgency-type problems exist also in closely held firms becausethere are always only a few decision makers. However, given the personal ties between the owners and mangers in these firms, and given the much closer monitoring, agency problems in closely held firms seem in general less severe.The presence of agency problems weakens the central thesis that modern open ownership corporations are more efficient. It is possible that in some business sectors the costs of monitoring and bonding the manager would be excessive. It is also probable that in some cases the advantages of large-scale operations and professional management would be minor and insufficient to outweigh the expected agency costs. Nevertheless, given the historical trend towards diverse ownership corporations, we maintain the hypothesis that diverse-ownership firms perform better than closely held firms. In our view, the trend towards diverse ownership corporations is rational and can be explained by performance gains.2. Ownership Structure and Firm PerformanceOne of the most important trademarks of the modern corporation is the separation of ownership and control. Modern corporations are typically run by professional executives who own only a small fraction of the shares.There is an ongoing debate in the literature on the impact and merit of the separation of ownership and control. Early theorists such as Williamson 1964 propose that non-owner managers prefer their owninterests over that of the shareholders. Consequently, non-owner managed firms become less efficient than owner-managed firms.The more recent literature reexamines this issue and prediction. It points out the existence of mechanisms that moderate the prospects of non-optimal and selfish behavior by the manager. Fama 1980, for example, argues that the availability and competition in the managerial labor markets reduce the prospects that managers would act irresponsibly. In addition, the presence of outside directors on the board constrains management behavior. Others, like Murphy 1985, suggest that executive compensation packages help align management interests with those of the shareholders by generating a link between management pay and firm performanceHence, non-owner manager firms are not less efficient than owner-managed firms. Most interestingly, Demsetz and Lehn 1985 conclude that the structure of ownership varies in ways that are consistent with value imization. That is, diverse ownership and non-owner managed firms emerge when they are more worthwhile.The empirical evidence on the issue is mixed see Short 1994 for a summaryPart of the diverse results can be attributed to the difference across the studies in the criteria for differentiation between owner and non-owner manager controlled firms. These criteria, typically based on percentage ownership by large stockholders, are less innocuous and more problematic than initially believed because, as demonstrated by Morck,Shleifer and Vishny 1988 and McConnell and Servaes 1990, the relation between percentage ownership and firm performance is nonlinear. Further, percent ownership appears insufficient for describing the control structure. Two firms with identical overall percentage ownership by large blockholders are likely to have different control organizations, depending on the identity of the large stockholders.In this study, we utilize the ownership classification scheme proposed by Ang, Hauser and Lauterbach 1997. This scheme distinguishes between non-owner managed firms, firms controlled by concerns, firms controlled by a family, and firms controlled by a group of individuals partners. Obviously, the control structure in each of these firm types is different. Thus, some new perspectives on the relation between ownership structure and firm performance might emerge.3. DataWe employ data from a developing economy, Israel, where many forms of business organization coexist. The sample includes 280 public companies traded on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange TASE during 1994. For each company we collect data on the 1992?1994 net income profits after tax, 1994 total assets, 1994 equity, 1994 top management remuneration, and 1994 ownership structure. All data is extracted from the companies financial reports except for the classification of firms according to their ownership structure, which is based on the publica tions, “Holdings ofInterested Parties” issued by the Israel Securities Authority, “Meitav Stock Guide,” and “Globes Stock Exchange Yearbook”.The initial sample included all firms traded on the TASE about 560 at the time. However, sample size shrunk by half because: 1 according to the Israeli Security Authority the Israeli counterpart of the US SEC only 434 companies provided reliable compensation reports; 2 147 companies have a negative 1992?94 average net income, which makes them unsuitable for the methodology we employ; and 3 for 7 firms we could not determine the ownership structure.The companies in the sample represent a rich variety of ownership structures, as illustrated in Figure 1. Nine percent of the firms do not have any majority owner. Among majority owned firms, individuals family firms or partnerships of individuals own 72% and the rest are controlled by concerns. About half 49% of the individually-controlled firms are dominated by a partnership of individuals and the rest 51% are dominated by families. Professional non-owner CEOs are found in about 15% of the individually controlled firms.4. Methodology: Data Envelopment AnalysisIn this study, we measure relative performance using Data Envelopment Analysis DEA. Data Envelopment Analysis is currently a leading methodology in Operations Research for performance evaluations see Seiford and Thrall, 1990, and previous versions of it have been usedin Finance by Elyasiani andMehdian, 1992, for example.The main advantage of Data Envelopment Analysis is that it is a parameter-free approach. For each analyzed firm, DEA constructs a “twin” comparable virtual firm consisting of a portfolio of other sample firms. Then, the relative performance of the firm can be determined. Other quantitative techniques such as regression analysis are parametric, that is it estimates a “production function” and assesses each firm performance according to its residual relative to the fitted fixed parameters economy-wide production function. We are not claiming that parametric methods are inadequate. Rather, we attempt a different and perhaps more flexible methodology, and compare its results to the standard regression methodology Findings.The equity ratio variable represents expectation that given the firm size, the higher the investments of stockholders equity, the higher their return net income. Finally, the CEO and top management compensation variables are controlling for the managers’ input. One of our central points is that top managers’ actions and skills affect firm output. Hence, higher pay mangers who presumably are also higher-skill are expected to yield superior profits. Rosen 1982 relates executives’ pay and rank in the organization to their skills and abilities, and Murphy 1998 discusses in de tail the structure of executive pay and its relation to firm’s performance.The DEA analysis and the empirical estimation of the relative performance of different organizational forms are repeated in four separate subsets of firms: Investment companies, Industrial companies, Real-estate companies, and Trade and services companies. This sector analysis controls for the special business environment of the firms and facilitates further examination of the net effect of ownership structure on firm performance.5.Empirical Results The main results of the empirical findings reviewed above are that majority Control by a few individuals diminishes firm performance, and that professional non-owner managers promote performance. The conclusions about individual control and professional management are reinforced by two other findings. First, it appears that firms without professional managers and firms controlled by individuals are more likely to exhibit negative net income.Second, Table IV also presents results of regressions of net income, NET INC, on leverage, size, professional manager dummy, and individual control dummy.6. ConclusionsThe empirical analysis of 280 firms in Israel reveals that ownership structure impacts firm performance, where performance is estimated as the actual net income of the firm divided by the optimal net income given the firm’s inputs. We find that:Out of all organizational forms, family owner-managed firms appearleast efficient in generating profits. When all firms are considered, only family firms with owner managers have an average performance score of less than 30%, and when performance is measured relative to the business sector, only family firms with owner-managers have an average score of less than 50%.2Non-owner managed firms perform better than owner-managed firms. These findings suggest that the modern form of business organization, namely the open corporation with disperse ownership and non-owner managers, promotes performance Critical readers may wonder how come “efficient” and “less-efficient” organizational structures coexist. The answer is that we probably do not document a long-term equilibrium situation. The lower-performing family and partnership controlled firms are likely, as time progresses, to transform into public-controlled non-majority owned corporations.A few reservations are in order. First, we do not contend that every company would gain by transforming into a disperse ownership public firm. For example, it is clear that start-up companies are usually better off when they are closely held. Second, there remain questions about the methodology and its application Data Envelopment Analysis is not standard in Finance. Last, we did not show directly that transforming into a disperse ownership public firm improves performances. Future research should further explore any performance gains from the separation ofownership and control.译文股权结构与公司业绩资料来源:管理治理杂志作者:贝尼?劳特巴赫和亚历山大?范尼斯基多年来,在许多经济体中的大多数商业活动是由独资企业、合伙企业或者非公开企业操作管理的。

企业绩效管理外文翻译文献综述

企业绩效管理外文翻译文献综述企业绩效管理外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Can Performance Management Foster Intelligent Behavior?Bjarte BogsnesThe world has changed, not just in increasingly fast-changing and unpredictable ways, but also the competence and expectations of people in our organizations. Unfortunately, too few seem to understand or accept that these developments call for radically new and different ways of leading and managing. Traditional management practices do not make usthe agile organizations we need to be.The problem starts with the label, "Performance Management" implying, "If I don't manage you, there will be no performance."We need a new mindset, one that is less about managing performance and more about creating conditions for great performance to occur. We need self-regulating models, requiring less management, but more leadership from everyone.Think about traffic, where we want good performance and a safe good flow. Traffic authorities have different ways of making this happen. The traffic light is a popular choice, but those managing the process (programmers) are not in the situation; information used in their process is not fresh, which is clear as you wait in front of that red light.The roundabout is a very different alternative. Those managing are the drivers themselves. The information used isreal time, coming from own observations. While that information is also available in front of the traffic light, drivers do not have the authority to act on it. By the way, the "zipper" or "every second car through" is not a rule, but a guiding principle.The roundabout normally is more efficient than the traffic light, because of two significant differences in the decision-making process, information and authority. A third element is also required for the roundabout to be more efficient: while the traffic light is a simple-rulesbased system, the roundabout is values-based. A value-set based on, "Me first, I don't care about the rest," is not a big a problem in front of the red light, but is a serious problem in a roundabout. Here, a positive common purpose of wanting a safe and good flow is critical. Drivers must be more considerate, open about own intentions while trying to understand the intentions of peers. Instead of managing performance, traffic authorities have created conditions for self-managed performance to occur.What would the implications be for the loathed performance review? The principles and practices described at Return Path are sensible and interesting. I like the concept of horizontal commitments toward peers, instead of vertical commitments to higher management. At the same time, we need to broaden our definition of performance. In traditional performance, a commitment is too often about "hitting the number." This is too narrow. We need to ask questions such as, how are we doing compared to peers? How are we using KPIs to reflect on performance, or using hindsight and management assessment to verify results? Did we really move toward our longer-term ambitions? How sustainable are the results? Last but not least, there has to be room for values if performance systems are tofoster intelligent behavior; we need to ask, how where those results achieved?At Statoil our integrated performance management approach links ambitions to actions. Our targets reflect a broad set of ambitions,including people, health, safety, environment, operations and financial performance. Read more about our management model and how we apply a holistic and values-based approach to this broader performance agenda.The words of Dee Hock, former GEO of Visa, should guide the design of our management processes, including our performance reviews: "Simple, clear purpose and principles give rise to complex, intelligent behavior. Complex rules and regulations give rise to simple, stupid behavior."While researching my book. Talent Economics, I interviewed employees about what really motivates today's workforce. I discovered a disconnect between the performance support my interviewees wanted versus how managers recounted their contribution to these conversations.Over the last 20 years, the employee mindset has evolved faster than has the art and science of management. Nowhere is this starker than in the area of performance management practices, particularly the annual review. In both the developed and developing world, employees report that this end-of-year activity breeds stress, anxiety and mistrust. How ironic that a process aimed at improving organizational performance, is itself underperforming!It's time to "reboot" our performance management operating system, installing two specific system updates: l. The "Democracy" update. As much as we try to make theperformance appraisal a two way dialogue, we cannot run away from the fact that at its core, the conversation today is often a top-down review. My research shows that many 21st century employees are rejecting conversations that are one-way: in hot job markets today, managers must realize "who is appraising whom." With other offers readily available, many employees enter a performance dialogue privately considering if their manager is worth another year of their career. The performance management conversation now reflects a company's Employee Value Proposition, much as we learn in the lead Perspective.The Democracy update means that managers only gain the right to give feedback when they first genuinely seek the same on their own performance as leaders. Not just through 360-degree reviews, but also through authentic conversations asking, "How am I performing as your manager? " and "How can I help you succeed?" Only then can the conversation shift to, "How you can improve?"and "This is what you should focus on."2. The Success module. Greater employee autonomy and empowerment also changes the meaning of management. We have gone from a "supervisor of task and outcomes" to an "enabler of performance, innovative thinking and collective success." To make this shift, we must give up the judge's robes for the coach's uniform. If employees don't succeed, managers are on the hook, too.This is particularly relevant when coaching a team to success. People bring different skills to a team and how well they work together really matters. If team reviews work better to achieve a goal, so be it. The Return Path story illustrates how review processes can be designed and executed around what matters most, and where everyone dons the uniforms of player and coach.What if, instead of making the heart of a performance conversation the evaluation, it became a vehicle to improve success of the individual, the team and the business? What if performance feedback was paired with dialogue about transforming the business, the product or customer experience? This genuinely reboots and upgrades performance management to focus on individual and organizational success.It is indeed time to upgrade performance management practices: we can no longer manage a 21st century employee using 20th century mindsets.People & Strategy. 2013, V ol. 36 Issue 2, p12-13. 2p.译文：绩效管理能促进自我管理行为吗?Bjarte Bogsnes世界随着时间的推移而变化莫测，连那些与时变化而不可预测的通道也随之改变，与此同时组织人员的能力和期望也顺应时代潮流。

企业绩效管理外文文献翻译译文

外文文献翻译译文一、外文原文CorporatePerformanceManagementAbstractTwo of the most important duties of a chief executive officer are (1) toformulates t rat egy and(2)tomanage h i s c ompany’s p er f orm ance.Inthisa r ticlewe e xaminethe second of these tasks and discuss how corporate performance should be modeledand managed.Webeginbyconsideringtheenvironmentin whichacompanyoperates,which includes, besides outside stakeholders, the industry it belongs and the marketit supplies, and then proceed to explain how the functioning of a company can beu nder s t ood by a nex a m i nationof i ts bus i n ess,o per a ti ona landperform a nce managementmod els.Nextwedescribethestructurerecommendedby theauthorsforacorporateplanning,controlandevaluationsystem,themostimportantpartofa corp orate performance management system. The core component of theplanningsystem is the corporate performance evaluation model, the structure of which ism apped i nt o the pl anning sys t em’s da ta b ase,si m ula t ion modelsandbudgeting t ool s’structures, andalsousedtoshapeinformationcontainedinthe system’s products,besidesbeingthenucleusoft helanguageusedbythe system’s agentstotalkabout corporateperformance.Theontologyofplann ing,theguidingprinciplesofcorporate planningandthehistoryof”M ADE”,thecorporateperform ancemanagementsystem di scus s e d inthisarti c le,arere vi ew e dn e xt,before w ep ro cee d todisc us s i nde t ailt h e structural components of the corporate planning and control system introduced before.We conclude the article by listing the main steps which should be followedwhen implementing aperformance planning, control and evaluation system for a company.1.IntroductionTwo of the most important corporate tasks for which a chief executive officeris primarilyresponsibleare(1)toformulatestrategyand(2)tomanagethecompany’s p erf ormance. In thisarticle we examine the second of these tasks and discuss howcorporateperformance should be modeled andmanaged.T operfo r mistoac c ompli s h,t o a chieve(de s i r ed)r e s u ltsoroutc om es.So,whe n talkingabo utcorporateperformance,wearereferringtothedegreebywhichdesired resultsoroutcomesarea chievedbyacompany.Managingcorporateperformance involves planning, controlling, analyzing and evaluating, not only the resultsachieved bythecompany,butalsothemeansbywhichtheseresultsarereached.Amongthe re sults,orgoals,pursuedbymostcompanieswecanmentiongrowth,marketshare,profitabilityan dvaluecreation;andthemeanstoachievetheseresultsincludep roductivi ty,effect i veness,innova t iona nd c ompetiti ve nes s.T hos e a rethe t y p eofthings we should have in mind when specifying a corporate performancemanagement system.Before discussing how to model corporate performance, it is convenienttoconsider the environment in which a company operates, which includes, besides out s i de sta ke holde rs, the indust r y i t be l ongs and the marke t it suppli e s. Themain aspectsofanindustrytobelookedatwhen consideringitsinfluenceoncorporateperformancearestructureandregulation,themaincompetito rs,entrybarriers,substituteproductsand supplier’s negotiatingpower.Associatedquestionsare :How production is organized, vertically or horizontally? How much competitive isthe i ndustry and who are the m a in competitors, t h ose tha t ca pt ure th e l a rges t part oft hemarketshare?Is itunregulated,self-regulatedorregulatedbyagovernmentagency?Howstrongarebarrierstotheentryofnewcompetito rs?Canproductsfromother industries function as substitutes for the ones produced in the industry? Whataboutthe power industry suppliers have when negotiating prices and tradeconditions?At the opposite side of the industry in the corporate environment we havethe marketwherethecompanytradesitsproducts,itsmainattributesbeingsize,growth rate,segmentation,exitbarriersand consumers’negotiating power.Typicalquest ions thatshouldbeaskedwhenassessingitseffectoncorporateperformanceare:Whatis the marketsize,indollars,foreach of the company’s products?Whatarethe short-term and long-term market growth rates? Is it a wholesaleor a retailmarket?Are the sales cyclical? How can the market be segmented (by geography, purchasingpower,customerage,etc.)?Whichbarriersdoesaclientrunintowhenchangings uppli e rs? D o c l ients ha v e t he power t o impose pric e s and t ra de conditions?Wecallthepeoplewhohaveinterestinorareaffectedbya company’s performanceits“stak eholders”,andgroupthemin thecategoriesof“insiders”and“outsiders”.Theinsidersarethe company’s entrepreneursorcontr ollingshareholders and its managers and employees. The outsiders include customers, suppliers, minority shareholders, debt holders, the government in its roles of public goodssupplier,regulatorandtaxcollector,andalsothecommunitieswherethecompany doesbus i ne s s.It isim port ant t onote t hats t a kehol de rs,bes i desbeinga f fecte db y,al s oinfluencecorporateperformanceanditisoftennec essarytosearchfortheeffectsof this influencewhen appraisingperformance.That is meant to increase the depth of this brief analysis of corporatestructureand external relations.Microeconomictheory considers the company as asocial p roductionunittha t uses a certa i ntechnolo g ytop r oducea s eto f outputsfromas e tof inputs.Thefunctionthatmapsi nputquantitiesintomaximumoutputquantities obtainablefromtheinputsiscalledthe“productio n function”or“productionfrontier”.Knowledge of this function is important for measuring the technical efficiency ofaproduction unit, a very significant performance metric. Several techniques existfort hespe c ifi c at i on of pro duc tion funct i ons or fro nt iers, gr oupe d und e r the nam e so f“Data Envelopment Analysis”and“S tochasticFrontier Analysis”.Companies are created by entrepreneurs, the agents that organize andcoordinate production with the help of professional managers. Entrepreneurs play a crucialrolein shaping corporate performance. On oneside, recognized entrepreneurial capacity─and also large contact networks ─are vital for raising the financial capitalnecessary tobuildstructuralorphysicalcapital. On anotherside,the entrepreneurs’reputation and contacts are essential to attract the intellectual capital that, together withthe structural capital, is the foundation of innovation capacity.A business model is a conceptual representation of the way a companydoes business.Itsmaincomponents,are:the company’s valueproposition;thetargetedmarket segments; the distribution, marketing communications, and customerrelationshipchannels;the core competenciesneeded;operating and managementt echnol og ies;t hepar t ner s’ne tw ork;andtherevenue,costand va lue creat i on m ode ls.Understandingthe business modelis the first step to implement acorporate performancemanagementsystem.The modelshould indicate whether the company has a broad customer base or targets specific market segments, and in the secondcase,identifythesesegments.Thegoodsandservicesprovidedbythecompanyandthe com mercial conditions under which they are sold (including such things asguarantees,technicalassistance, etc.), comprise the valueproposition.The channelused forp roductdistr i buti on ca n bea di re c t-t oc ustomer s a l esc ha nnelthroughthe I nte r net,orbe comprised of bricks and mortar companyownedstores, wholesale agents,retail companies,etc.Thecompanycanuseseveralmarketingchannelstogetmessages thro ughtoitscustomers,suchasTVandprintedmedia,andemployacallcentertogive support and receive complaints and suggestions from them. Core competencies ar e t heon e sthecomp an y ne edstomas t erinorde r toga i nac om pet i tivead va nta g ei n relation to other companies in the same marketplace. These competenciesshould restonproperoperationalandmanagementtechnologies,andbe supplemented by a network of partners, if necessary. As a final point, a business model must includea revenue,acostandavaluecreationmodelinordertobeprofitabletothe company’s s hare h old e rs.We can think of the operational model of a companyasencompassinganorganizationalmodel,afunctionalmodelandacorporatedatamodel. The organizationalmodeldepicts,inaninvertedhierarchicaltree,therolesoftheagents involve dinthe company’s operation.Thefunctionalmodelportraysall theactivitiesthattogetherformthewholetowhichwereferbytheexpression“company’s operations”,structuredinlogical,sequentialsteps formingoperationalprocesses.At last, the corporate data model is an entity-relationship diagram that shows themain entitiesaboutwhichthecompanycollectsdatawithitsattributesandtherelationshipsbetw eenthem.Thelastmodelweneedtoexamineinordertounderstandthefunctioningofacorporation is the performance management model it uses, which is, ingeneral,composedoffourbuildingblocks.Thecorporategovernancesystem,thecorporatep e rfo rmanc ep la nnin g,control a nde va lua t ionsyste m,t he individual m anage r sperformance planning, control and evaluation system and the managementvariable compensation system (or bonus system). The corporate governance systemcomprises three well knownactors, the chief executive officer, the directors and theshareholders,andisdesignedtomediatetherelationsbetweenthem.Underthegovernancesyste m,we find two planning and control systems, having as its targets the performance ofthe company(asawholeandofitsdivisions)andtheperformanceofitsindividualm ana g ers,re s p e ct i vely.L i nking t heset w osyste m sw e finda com p ensa t ions y st e mthat assigns fractions of a bonus pool, which is a function of the aggregatecompany performance,toitsmanagersonthebasisoftheirindividualperformances.An e ffective management model should be forward-looking, that is, centered ontheimprovement of future performance, and focused on valuecreation.A thorough understanding o f a ll t he m od e l s des c ribed above is anec e s s ary prerequisiteforone tobeabletoplan,monitor,analyze,evaluateand controlcorporate performance.Inthenextsectionwewillexamineinmoredetailacrucial component of the management model previously described: the corporateperformance planning, control and evaluationsystem.2.The C orporate P erf o rmanc e Planni ng,C ontrolan d Eva l u at io n System.That shows the structure recommended by the authors for acorporateplanning,controlandevaluationsystem,themostimportantpartofacorporateperforma nce management system. The core component of the planning system, as can bededucedfrom its central position in the mentioned figure, is the performance evaluationmodel.Thestructureofthismodelismappedintothe system’s database,simulationm odels and budgeting tools’structures, and also used to shape information contained in the system’s products,besidesbeingthenucleusofthelanguageusedbythe system’s agentstotalkaboutcorporateperformance.Thecorporateplanningand controlprocessisformedbythecoordinatedactionsoftheplanningandcontrolagents,whoseaimist hegenerationofthe system’s outputs,which includeassumptions,goals,forecasts, plans, budgets, investment projects, performance valuations, varianceanalysis,etc.Theseproductstaketheformofpaperandelectronicdocumentsands pread s heets,a nd of PowerPointpresent a t i ons.T he a gents fol lowanagreedupontime schedule and rely on a business intelligence (BI) software to support theiractions.TheBIsoftwareimplementstheperformanceevaluationmodelforthepurposesof rep resenting and simulating corporate performance and provides the necessarytools forthe system’s agentstoproducethe system’soutputs.Datausedbythesystem comes from the accounting and other corporate databases. In the following sectionsof thisarticlewewillexamineindetaileachoftheaforementionedplanningsystemc ompon ents.Before proceeding, however, we will make a pause to discuss the ontologyof planning. One can readily identify in this figure three major structures: the strategic,the motivation and the action frameworks. In the strategic framework, which ischiefly related to the risk versus return dialectics, we can identify theexternal i nf l uence s to corporat e performa n ce, c om pris i ng both opportuni ti es a nd threats, and the internal ones, materialized by strengths and weaknesses. Suppliers and consumersnegotiatingpower,entryandexitbarriers,competitorsandsubstituteproductsarethe ma in determinants of external influences. Technological change has also apervasiveinfluence on corporate performance. Comparing the motivation (ends) andaction(means) fr a meworks, we can as s ociate v a rious levels or l ayers in w hich c or po ra t e aimsaredefinedtothecorrespondingactionclasses,thatis,visiontomission,longtermgo alstostrategy,shorttermgoalstotacticsandactualresultstoactualactions.Policy and business rules are restrictionsunder which strategy and tactics,respectively, must be formulated, and actual action carriedout.It may be convenient, at this point, to give a general definition of theterms“planning”and“control”.Corporateplanningis a processbywhichmanagement define the desired future performance of a corporation, and identify and decide onthe actionsthatneedtobetakeninordertoachievethatperformance.Themainstepscomprisingap lanningcycleareexposed.Corporatecontrol,ontheotherhand,isan operational process which aims to check whether the actual performance isinaccordance with the plannedone, and, eventually, to modify the planned actionsinordertoguaranteethatthefinaldesiredperformancewillbe met. The corporatebudg etisoneo f themostim port antoutputs o fthec orpor atepl a nninga n dcont rol proces s.Itistheprimemanagementtoolusedtoimprovecorporateperformanceand toalignmanageme ntinterests withthoseoftheshareholders.Wecanconcludethis section by stating the nine guiding principles of corporate planning and control:i.Planning is concerned in first place with results and in second placewiththe means to achieve theseresults.ii.Planning is concerned with the present value of costsand benefits to bei ncurred in the f ut u re a s a cons e quence of dec i s i ons undertaken in t he pres e nt.iii.Themainobjectiveofplanningis to createvalueforthe corporation’s shareholders.iv.Fortheabovegoal to bemet,itisnecessarytofulfill customers’expectations concerning quantity, price and quality of marketed products at the least possiblecost,and to m ai nta i n a skilled and full y m otivat ed w or k force.v.Planning and control activities should be organized through a systemwhosecomponents are the planning and control agents, process, time schedule,products,models&tools,anddatabase.vi.Thecorporatebudgetshouldbe the planningandcontrol system’s product t hat consol i dat e s t he r es ul ts w hi ch the company p lans to achi ev e i n the next period and the actions it should undertake in order to meetthem.vii.The corporate budget must contain all the information necessary forthe evaluation of the short term planned performance of the company, itsmarketing,operational, economic, patrimonial and financial aspects being dullyconsidered.viii.The corporate budget should not be viewed exclusively as a means ofcost reductionorcontrol,butmainlyasatooltoenhanceperformanceandincreasethe company’s economicvalue.ix.The planning process in itself is as important as its outputs, andshould contributetoleverage management’s knowledgeabout the company’s i nternal workings, and also to help focus its efforts on the critical areas ofcorporateperformance.S ource: Pedro Góes MonteirodeOliveira STARPLAN ConsultoriaEmpresarial Ltda.,2009.“Corporate Performance Management”.WorkingP aper,vol.41,no.4,pp.1-7..二、翻译文章译文：企业绩效管理摘要行政总裁两个最重要的职责是：制定战略和处理他的公司表现。

《资本结构与企业绩效关系研究》

《资本结构与企业绩效关系研究》摘要：本文旨在探讨资本结构与企业绩效之间的相互关系。

通过对国内外相关文献的梳理和实证研究的分析，本文总结了资本结构各组成部分如股权结构、债权结构等对企业绩效的影响，并探讨了两者之间的内在联系和作用机制。

研究结果表明，合理的资本结构能够促进企业绩效的提升，反之亦然。

本文的结论为企业在优化资本结构、提高企业绩效方面提供了理论支持和实证依据。

一、引言在市场经济环境下，企业的资本结构对其经营绩效具有重要影响。

资本结构是指企业各种资本的构成及其比例关系，包括股权结构、债权结构等。

合理的资本结构不仅能够反映企业的财务状况，还能够影响企业的经营决策和市场竞争能力，从而影响企业的绩效。

因此，研究资本结构与企业绩效的关系具有重要的理论和实践意义。

二、文献综述在过去的研究中，许多学者对资本结构与企业绩效的关系进行了探讨。

一方面，股权结构方面，学者们普遍认为合理的股权结构能够提高企业的治理效率，保护投资者利益，从而提升企业绩效。

另一方面，债权结构方面，适当的债务融资能够为企业提供资金支持，降低融资成本，同时通过债务的约束作用，促使企业更加谨慎地经营。

此外，还有学者从信息不对称、代理成本等角度探讨了资本结构与企业绩效的关系。

三、理论框架与研究假设基于前人研究，本文构建了资本结构与企业绩效关系的理论框架。

我们认为，合理的股权结构能够为企业提供稳定的治理机制，保护投资者利益，降低代理成本，从而提高企业绩效。

同时，适当的债权融资能够为企业提供资金支持，降低融资成本，提高企业的运营效率。

因此，我们提出以下假设：资本结构与企业绩效呈正相关关系。

四、研究方法与数据来源本研究采用定量研究方法，通过收集企业财务数据和资本市场数据，运用统计分析软件进行实证分析。

数据来源主要包括各大数据库、企业年报以及相关财经网站。

在变量选择上，我们选取了企业的总资产、股权集中度、债务比率等指标作为资本结构的代表变量，同时选取了企业的净利润、营业收入等指标作为企业绩效的代表变量。

【精品文档】61资本结构和公司绩效：来自约旦的证据中英文双语外文文献翻译成品

外文标题：Capital structure and corporate performance: evidence from Jordan 外文作者：Rami Zeitun and Gary Gang Tian文献出处: Australasian Accounting Business & Finance Journal, 2007英文1689单词，8276字符，中文2309汉字。

此文档是外文翻译成品，无需调整复杂的格式哦！下载之后直接可用，方便快捷！价格不贵。

Capital structure and corporate performance: evidence from JordanRami Zeitun and Gary Gang TianThe objective of the current paper is to examine the effect which capital structure has on corporate performance in Jordan. There is a lack of empirical evidence about the effect of capital structure on the performance of firms in both developed and developing countries. Most of the previous evidence on capital structure comes from the determinants of corporate debt ratio. To the best of the auth ors’ knowledge, this research provides the first attempt to investigate the effect of capital structure on corporate performance in Jordan. Our reason for choosing Jordan as a case for this topic is its uniqueness, which we discuss below.First, the Jordanian economy has been subject to a large number of external shocks in the Middle East region during the period of our study. Secondly, the banking system in Jordan also makes this study unique.Thirdly, it is worth noting that both Islamic and non-Islamic banks have a credit policy.The concept of performance is a controversial issue in finance largely due to its multi- dimensional meanings. Research on firm performance emanates from organization theory and strategic management (Murphy et al., 1996). Performance measures are either financial or organisational. Financial performance such as profit maximisation, maximising profit on assets, and maximising shareholders' benefits are at the core of the firm’s effectiveness (Chakravarthy, 1986). Operational performance measures, such as growth in sales and growth in market share.Table 1 reports summary statistics for the variables used in the study.The average return to assets for the sample as a whole is 1.2%, while the average return to equity is about - 14.2%. The two accounting measures of performance show that Jordanian companies have a very low accounting performance. The four measures of market performance show a high percentage of performance compared with the accounting measures. For example, the average v alues of Tobin’s Q and MBVR are 170% and 195%, respectively. The high ratios for the market performance measures could be as a result of the increase in firms' share price and equity without any increase in the real activities performance of the firms.The results of the estimation of the panel data models with each of the performance measures and for the full sample of observations for the period 1989-2003 are displayed in Tables 3 to 6. The regression model using price per share to earnings per share (P/E)10 is not significant using any measure of capital structure and, hence, is not reported. The regression model using return on equity (ROE) is excluded from the analysis because the ROE measure does not have any significant variable in the estimation and the R-squared value using this measure in mostcases was less than 0.1%11. The market value of equity to book value of equity (MBVE) is also excluded from the analysis as the R-squared is very small and the result is very similar to Tobin’s Q12. These results make the ROA and Tobin’s Q the most powerful measures of performance in the Jordan case. Therefore, our discussion will concentrate on these two measures of performance beside the MBVR and PROF measures.The significance of the variable TAX suggests that the better performance of Jordanian companies is related to the higher corporate income tax payment, and also to other factors such as the firm’s risk, size, and debt ratio (see Tables 3 to 6). This result indicates that firms with high tax payments have a higher performance rate. The composition of the asset structure (TANGB) has a negative and significant impact on the accounting measure of performance (ROA) and the market measure of performance (MBVR). This result indicates that firms with a high ratio of TANGB have a lower performance ratio.The economic environment and policy and regional risk affect firms’ performance. Hypothesis 7 states that Political Instability around Jordan (regional crises) affects corporate performance. Table 8 presents the results of the estimation including Y ear (time) dummy variables to control for the macroeconomic variables and economic environment and policy impact on firms' performance. The estimated coefficients on time dummies suggest a significant effect of macro economic variables on firms’ performance, implying that major changes to the overall economic environment may significantly affect corporate performance. From 1991 to 1994, time dummies had a positive and significant effect on the firm’s performance measur ed by ROA (using TDTA).This paper examines the impact which capital structure has had on corporate performance in Jordan in which we control the effect of industrial sectors, regional risk, such as the Gulf Crisis 1990-1991 and the outbreak of Intifadah in the West Bank in September 2000. This paper bridges the gap in the relevant literature as state and regional development varies from one country to another and this development could affect the validity of the theories as the environment changes.There is no single study formulated in the Middle East that investigates the impact of capital structure on a firm’s performance. This study tried to fill the gap in this field by investigating the effect of capital structure on corporate performance by taking Jordan as a case study. Furthermore, this paper employed different measures of capital structure such as short- term debt, long-term debt, and total debt to total assets in order to investigate the effect of the debt structure on corporate performance. Investigating the effect of capital structure on corporate performance using market and accounting measures could be valuable as it provides evidence about whether the stock market is efficient or not.An unbalanced panel of 167 companies are studied in this paper, of which 47 firms defaulted due to severe financial distress problems resulting in insolvency. A firm’s capital structure was found to have a significant and negative impact on the firm’s performance measures in both the accounting and market measures. An interesting finding is that the STDTA has a positive and significant effect on the market performance measure (Tobin’s Q), which could to some extent support Myers's (1977) argument that firms with high short-term debt to total assets have a high growth rate and high performance. The results also show that high performance is associated with a high tax rate. This indicates that profitable firms pay a high tax rate. Firm size was found to have a positive impact on a firm’s performance, as large firms h ave low bankruptcy costs. In other words, bankruptcy costs increases as firm size decreases and, hence, bankruptcy costs negatively affects a firm’s performance.REFERENCESAbdel Shahid, S. (2003), “Does Ownership Structure Affect Firm V alue? Evidence from The Egyptian StockMarket”, Working Paper, [online], ().ASE (2002), Amman Stock Exchange, 2002, Fourth Annual Report, (Amman, Jordan).Ang, J. S., R. A. Cole, and Lin, J. W. (2000), “Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”,Journal of Finance 55, 81-106.Barclay, M. J., and Smith, C. W. (1995), “The Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt”, Journal of Finance 50, 609-32. Bradley, M., G. A. Jarrell, and Kim, E. H. (1984), “On the Existence of an Optimal Capital Structure: Theory andEvidence”, Journal of Finance 39, 857-878.Breusch, T., and Pagan, A. (1980), “The Lagrange-Multiplier Test and its Applications to Model Specification inEconometrics”, Review of Economic Studies 47, 239–253.Brick, I. E., and Ravid, S. A. (1985), “On the Relevance of Debt Maturity Structure”,Journal of Finance 40, 1423–37.Chakravarthy, B. S., (1986), “Measuring Strategic Performance”, Strategic Management Journal 7, 437-58.Demsetz, H., and K. Lehn, (1985), “The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequen ces”,Journal ofPolitical Economy 93, 1155-1177.Durand, R., and R. Coeurderoy, (2001), “Age,Order of Entry, Strategic Orientation, and OrganizationalPerformance”, Journal of Business Venturing 16, 471-94.Fisher, F. M., and J. McGowan, (1983), “On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits”,American Economic Review 73, 82-97.Gleason, K. C., L. K Mathur, and I. Mathur, (2000), “The Interrelationship between Culture,Capital Structure, andPerformance: Evidence from European Reta ilers”, Journal of Business Research, 50, 185-191. Gorton, G., and R. Rosen, (1995), “Corporate Control, Portfolio Choice, and the Decline of Banking”,Journal ofFinance 50, 1377-420.Greene, W. H., (2003). Econometrics Analysis (Prentice Hall, New Y ork).Harris, M., A. Raviv, (1991), “The Theory of Capital Structure”, Journal of Finance 46,297–355.Hoffer, C. W., and W. R. Sandberg, (1987), “Improving new venture performance: some guidelines for success”,American Journal of Small Business 12, 11-25.Judge, George, W. E., R. Griffiths, Carter Hill, Helmut Liitkepohl, and Tsoung-Chao Lee, (1985). The Theory andPractice of Econometrics (John Wiley and Sons, New Y ork).Kraus, A., and R. Litzenberger, (1973), “A State-Preference Model of Optimal Financial Le verage”,Journal ofFinance 28, 923-931.Krishnan, V. S., and R. C. Moyer, (1997), “Performance, Capital Structure and Home Country: An Analysis of AsianCorporations”. Global Finance Journal 8, 129-143.Lauterbach, B., and A. V aninsky, (1999), “Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from Israel”,Journal of Management and Governance 3, 189-201.Long, W. F., D. J. Ravenscraft, (1984), “The Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return: Comment”, American EconomicReview 74, 494-500.Mehran, H., (1995), “Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership, and Firm Performance”, Journal of FinancialEconomics 38, 163-184译文：资本结构和公司绩效：来自约旦的证据Rami Zeitun and Gary Gang Tian本文研究的主要目的是考察资本结构对约旦公司绩效的影响。

公司治理对资本结构和企业价值关系的影响毕业论文外文翻译

The influence of corporate governance on the relationbetween capital structure and valueCapital structure: relation with corporate value and main research streamsWhen looking at the most important theoretical contributions on the relation between capital structure and value, as illustrated in Figure 1, it becomes immediately evident that there is a substantial difference between the early theories and the more recent ones.Modigliani and Miller (1958), who had originally asserted that there was no relationship between capital structure and value ; in 1963, instead, reached the paradoxical and provocative conclusion that a maximum level of debt would mean a maximum level of firm value, due to the fact that interest is tax deductible . Many later contributions pointed out that this effect is compensated when considering personal taxes (Miller, 1977),an eventual lack of tax capacity, due to the presence of economic loss, the effect of other types of tax shields (De Angelo and Masulis, 1980), as well as the introduction of the costs(direct and indirect) of financial distress; all these situations end up creating a trade-off between debt costs and benefits. Point L’ in Figure 1c indicates an optimal level of debt,beyond which any rise in leverage would cause an increase in the benefits of debt that would be less than proportional with respect to the costs of financial distress. Furthermore, this non monotonic relation would be modified even more when considering agency costs as well as the costs of financial distress . Finally, one last stream of research (Myers, 1984,Myers 1984) points out managerial preferences when choosing financing resources . In this case no optimal level of debt becomes ‘‘objectively’’ evident, but this is due to the various situations the manager had to deal with over time. The function of managerial preference has particular relevance due to information asymmetries, therefore the level of firm indebtedness will be determined by the tangent between the firm value function and the curve of manager indifference.Furthermore, it can be observed that debt increases in correspondence with the better the firm’s reputation is on the market (Chevalier, 1995). Research has shown similarities between firms that belong to the same sector (Titman and Wessels, 1988);in other words, capital structure tends to be industry-specific.The empirical comparison between the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory seems to be controversial. On one hand, empirical evidence shows moderate coherence with the trade-off theory, when revenue and agency problems are taken into consideration contextually; on the other hand, the negative relation between leverage and firm profit does not seem to support the trade-off theory, as it confirms a hierarchical order in financial decision making.It is, thus, clear that the topic of capital structure is anything but defined and that there are still many open problems regarding it.As many authors have noted (Rajan and Zingales, 1995) capital structure is a ‘‘hot’’ topic in finance. By analyzing international literature the main research priorities and new analytical approaches are related to:the important comparison between ‘‘rational’’ and ‘‘behavioural’’ finance (Barberis and Thaler, 2002);a lively comparison made between the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory(Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999);the attempt to apply these theories to small firms (Berger and Udell, 1998, Fluck, 2001);the role of corporate governance on the relation between capital structure and value(Heinrich, 2000, Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002, Brailsford et al., 2004, Mahrt-Smith, 2005).The behavioural approach, that considers the pecking order of financial resources in terms of ‘‘irrational’’ preferences, caused an immediate reaction from Stewart Myers in 2000 and 2001 and jointly with Shyam-Sunder in 1999 (Myers, 2000; 2001; Shyam-Sunder and Myers,1999). Stewart Myers is the founder of the pecking order theory[7]. Problems of information asymmetry, together with transaction costs, would be able to offer a rational explanation to managerial behaviour when financial choices are made following a hierarchical order (Fama and French, 2002). In other words, according to Myers and Fama, there should be a‘‘rational’’ explanation to the phenomenon observed by Stein, Baker, Wrugler, Barberis and Thaler.Moreover, studies on capital structure have also been done looking at small and medium size firms (Berger and Udell, 1998, Michaelas et al., 1999, Romano et al., 2000, Fluck, 2001),due to the relevant economic role of these firms (in Europe they are 95 percent of the total firms operating). Zingales (2000) as well has emphasizedthe fact that today ‘‘ . . . the attention shown towards large firms tends to partially obscure firms that do not have access to the financial markets . . . ’’. In one of the most interesting studies done on this topic, Berger and Udell (1998) asserted that firm financial behaviour depends on what phase of their life cycle they are in. In fact, there should be an optimal pro-tempore capital structure, related to the phase of the life cycle that the firm is in.Finally, the observations of Michael Jensen (1986), made throughout his many contributions on corporate governance, as well as those of Williamson (1988), have encouraged a line of research that, revitalized in the second part of the nineties, seems to be quite promising as a means to analyze how corporate governance directly or indirectly influences the relation between capital structure and value (Fluck, 1998, Zhang, 1998, Myers, 2000, De Jong, 2002,Berger and Patti, 2003, Brailsford et al., 2004, Mahrt-Smith, 2005). In synthesis, it is possible to affirm, as it follows, that a joined analysis of capital structure and corporate governance is necessary when describing and interpreting the firm’s ability to create value (Zingales, 2000, Heinrich, 2000, Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002). This type of consideration could help overcome the controversy found when studying the relation between capital structure and value, on both a theoretical and empirical level.Influence of corporate governance on the relation between capital structure and value.Capital structure can be analyzed by looking at the rights and attributes that characterize the firm’s assets and that influence, with different levels of intensity, governance activities. Equity and debt, therefore, must be considered as both financial instruments and corporate governance instruments (Williamson, 1988): debt subordinates governance activities to stricter management, while equity allows for greater flexibility and decision making power. It can thus be inferred that when capital structure becomes an instrument of corporate governance, not only the mix between debt and equity and their well known consequences as far as taxes go must be taken into consideration. The way in which cash flow is allocated (cash flow right) and, even more importantly, how the right to make decisions and manage the firm (voting rights) is dealt with must also be examined. For example, venture capitalists areparticularly sensitive to how capital structure and financing contracts are laid out, so that an optimal corporate governance can be guaranteed while incentives and checks for management behavior are well established (Zingales, 2000)[10].Coase (1991), in a sort of critique on his own work done in 1937, points out that it is important to pay more attention to the role of capital structure as an instrument that can mediate and moderate economical transactions within the firm and, consequently, between entrepreneurs and other stakeholders (corporate governance relations).As explicitly pointed out by Bhagat and Jefferis (2002), when they pay particular attention to the relations between cause and effect and to their interactions recently described on a theoretical level (Fluck, 1998, Zhang, 1998, Heinrich, 2000, Brailsford et al., 2004,Mahrt-Smith, 2005), a ‘‘research proposal’’ that future empirical studies should evaluate should be, how corporate governance can potentially have a relevant influence on the relation between capital structure and value, with an effect of mediation and/or moderation.The five relations identified in Figure 2 describe:the relation between capital structure and firm value (relation A) through a role of corporate governance ‘‘mediation’’ ; the relation between capital structure and firm value (relation A) through the role of capital governance ‘‘moderation’’ (relation D);the role of corporate governance as a determining factor in choices regarding capital structure (relation E).All five relations shown in Figure 2 are particularly interesting and show two threads of research that focus on the relations between:corporate governance and capital structure, where the dimensions of the corporate governance determine firmfinancing choices, causing a possible relation of co-causation Whether management voluntarily chooses to use debt as a source of financing to reduce problems of information asymmetry and transaction, maximizing the efficiency of its firm governance decisions, or the increase in the debt level is forced by the stockholders as an instrument to discipline behavior and assure good corporate governance, capital structure is influenced by corporate governance (relation E) and vice versa (relation B).On one hand, a change in how debt and equity are dealt with influences firmgovernance activities by modifying the structure of incentives and managerial control. If, through the mix debt and equity, different categories of investors all converge within the firm, where they have different types of influence on governance decisions, then managers will tend to have preferences when determining how one of these categories will prevail when defining the firm’s capital structure. Even more importantly, through a specific design of debt contracts and equity it is possible to considerably increase firm governance efficiency.On the other hand, even corporate governance influences choices regarding capital structure (relation E). Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) show how firmfinancing choices are made by management following an order of preference; in this case, if the manager chooses the financing resources it can be presumed that she is avoiding a reduction of her decision making power by accepting the discipline represented by debt.Internal resource financing allows management to prevent other subjects from intervening in their decision making processes. De Jong (2002) reveals how in the Netherlands managers try to avoid using debt so that their decision making power remains unchecked. Zwiebel(1996) has observed that managers don’t voluntarily accept the ‘‘discipline’’ of debt; other governance mechanisms impose that debt is issued. Jensen (1986) noted that decisions to increase firm debt are voluntarily made by management when it intends to ‘‘reassure’’stakeholders that its governance decisions are ‘‘proper’’.In this light, firm financing decisions can be strictly deliberated by managers-entrepreneurs or else can be induced by specific situations that go beyond the will of the management.ConclusionThis paper define a theoretical approach that can contribute in clearing up the relation between capital structure, corporate governance and value, while they also promote a more precise design for empirical research. Capital structure represents one of many instruments that can preserve corporate governance efficiency and protect its ability to create value.Therefore, this thread of research affirms that if investment policies allow for value creation,financing policies, together with other governance instruments, can assure that investment policies are carried out efficiently while firmvalue is protected from opportunistic behavior.In other words, various authors (Borsch-Supan and Koke, 2000, Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002 and Berger and Patti, 2003) point out the necessity to analyze the relation between capital structure and value by always taking into consideration the interaction between corporate governance variables such as ownership concentration, management participation in the equity capital, the composition of the Board of Directors, etc.Furthermore, there is a problem in the way to operationalize these constructs, due to multidimensional nature of these. It is quite difficult to identify indicators that perfectly correspond to theoretical constructs; it means that proxy variables, or empirical measures of latent constructs, must be used (Corbetta, 1992).Moreover, it must be considered possible that there may be distortions in the signs and entities of the connections between variables due to endogeneity problems, or rather the presence of co-variation even when there is no cause, and reciprocal cause, where the distinction between the cause variable and the effect variable are lacking, and the two reciprocally influence each other.From an econometric point of view, therefore, it would seem to be important to further investigate the research proposal outlined above, by empirically examining the model proposed in Figure 2 using appropriate econometric techniques that can handle the complexity of the relations between the elements studied. Some proposals for study can be found in literature; the use of lagged variables is criticized by Borsch-Supan and Koke(2000) that affirm that it would be better to determine instrumental variables that influence only one of the two elements of study; Berger and Patti (2003), Borsch-Supan and Koke(2000) and Chen and Steiner (1999) promote the application of structural model equations to solve these problems, that is a method appropriate for examining the causal relations between latent, one-dimensional or multi-dimensional variables, measured with multiple indicators (Corbetta, 1992).In conclusion, this paper defines a theoretical model that contributes to clarifying the relations between capital structure, corporate governance and firm value, while promoting,as an aim for future research, a verification of the validity of this modelthrough application of the analysis to a wide sample of firms and to single firms. To study the interaction between capital structure, corporate governance and value when analyzing a wide sample of firms,the researcher has to take into account the relations showed in Figure 2, look at problems of endogeneity and reciprocal causality, and make sure there is complementarity between all the three factors. Such an analysis deserves the application of refined econometric techniques. Moreover, these relations should be investigated in a cross-country analysis, to catch the role of country-specific factors.Source: Maurizio La Rocca,2007 “The influence of corporate governance on the relation between capital structure and value”. corporate gorernance,vol.7,no.3april,pp.312-325.公司治理对本钱结构和企业价值关系的影响本钱结构: 关系到公司价值及其主要研究趋向当查看关于描述本钱结构与企业价值两者之间总体关系的最重要的理论文献时，会明显感触感染到早期的理论与新近的理论有本色性的分歧。

外文翻译--股权结构与公司绩效以印度为例

中文4200字，2650单词，14800英文字符出处：Srivastava A. Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance: Evidence from India[J]. International Journal of Humanities & Social Science, 2011, 7(3):209–233.原文Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance: Evidence from IndiaAuthor: Aman SrivastavaAbstractOwnership structure of any company has been a serious agenda for corporate governance and that of performance of a firm. Thus, who owns the firm’s equity and how does ownership affect firm value has been a topic investigated by researchers for decades. Thus, the impact of ownership structure on firm performance has been widely tackled in various developed markets and more recently in emerging markets, but was less discussed before, in India in recent changing environment. This paper is a moderate attempt to address the relationship of ownership structure of the firm and its performance. It investigates whether the ownership type affects some key accounting and market performance indicators of listed firms. The 98 most actively listed companies on BSE 100 indices of Bombay Stock Exchange of India, which constitute the bulk of trading, were chosen to constitute the sample of the study as of end of 2009-10. The findings indicate the presence of highly concentrated ownership structure in the Indian market. The results of the regression analyses indicate that the dispersed ownership percentage influences certain dimensions of accounting performance indicators (i.e. ROA and ROE) but not stock market performance indicators (i.e. P/E and P/BV ratios), which indicate that there might be other factors (economic, political, contextual) affecting firms performance other than ownership structure. Keywords: Ownership structure, corporate performance, corporate governance, India1. IntroductionOwnership structure of any company has been a serious agenda for corporate governance and that of performance of a firm. Thus, who owns the firm’s equity and how does ownership affect firm value has been a topic investigated by researchers for decades. Thus, the impact of ownership structure on firm performance has been widely tackled in various developed markets and more recently in emerging markets, but was less discussed before, in India in recent changing environment. Though the modern organization emphasizes the divorce of management and ownership; in practice, the interests of group managing the company can differ from the interests of those that supply the capital to the firm. Corporate governance literature has devoted a great deal of attention to the ownership structure of corporations. Shareholders of publicly held corporations are so numerous and small that they are unable to effectively control the decisions of the management team, and thus cannot be assured that the management team represents their interests. Many solutions to this problem have been advanced, as stated previously i.e. the disciplining effect of the takeover market, the positive incentive effects of the management shareholding stake and the benefits of large monitoring shareholders. A different problem, however, arises in firms with large controlling shareholders. Since a large controlling shareholder has both the incentives and the power to control the management team's actions, management's misbehavior is a second order problem when such a large shareholder exists. Instead, the main problem becomes controlling the large shareholder's abuse of minority shareholders. In other words, holders of a majority of the voting shares in a corporation, through their ability to elect and control a majority of the directors and to determine the outcome of shareholders' votes on othermatters, have tremendous power to benefit themselves at the expense of minority shareholders. Thus, the type of owners as well as the distribution of ownership stakes will undoubtedly have an impact on the performance of firms. Most of the empirical literature studying the link between corporate governance and firm performance usually concentrates on a particular aspect of governance, such as board of directors, share holders’ activism, compensation, anti-takeover provisions, investor protection etc. This paper is a moderate attempt to examine the relationship of ownership structure and performance of firms in India.The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses on the literature review, where both theoretical and empirical studies on previous works are looked into. It also incorporates the corporate governance mechanism in India. In section 3, the methodology of this study is considered. Empirical results and discussions are made in section 4, while section 5 concludes the study.2. Literature ReviewThe firm’s equity and how does ownership affect firm value has been a topic investigated by researchers for decades; however, most of the studies in this context are conducted outside of India. The study failed to document any relevant study on the topic in Indian context. Fama and Jensen (1983 a & b) addresses the agency problems and they explained that a major source of cost to shareholders is the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation. Even in developed countries, these agency problems continue to be sources of large costs to shareholders1.Demstez and Lehn (1985) argued both that the optimal corporate ownership structure was firm specific, and that market competition would derive firms toward that optimum. Because ownership was endogenous to expected performance, they cautioned, any regression of profitability on ownership patterns should yield insignificant results. Morck. (1988) by taking percentage of shares held by the board of directors of the company as a measure of ownership concentration and holding both Tobin’s Q and accounting profit as performance measure of 500 Fortune companies and using piece-wise linear regression, found a positive relation between Tobin’s Q and board ownership ranging from 0% to 5%, a negative relation for board ownership ranging from 5% to 25%, and again a positive relation for the said ownership above 25%. It is argued that the separation of ownership from control for a corporate firm creates an agency problem that results in conflicts between shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).The interests of other investors can generally be protected through contractual arrangements between the company and concerned stakeholders, leaving shareholders as the residual claimants whose interests can adequately be protected only through the institutions of corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Loderer and Martin (1997) took shareholding by the insiders (i.e., director’s ownership) as a measure of ownership. Taking the said measure as endogenous variable and Tobin’s Q as performance measure, they found (through simultaneous equation model) that ownership does not predict performance, but performance is a negative predictor of ownership. Steen Thomsen and Torben Pedersen (1997) examine the impact of ownership structure on company economic performance in the largest companies from 12 European nations. According to their findings the positive marginal effect of ownership ties to financial institutions is stronger in the market-based British system than in continental Europe. Cho (1998) found that firm performance affects ownership structure (signifying percentage of shares held by directors), but not vice versa. Jürgen Weigand (2000) documented that (1) the presence of large shareholders does not necessarily enhance profitability, and (2) the high degree of ownership concentrationseems to be a sub-optimal choice for many of the tightly held German corporations. Their results also imply ownership concentration to affect profitability significantly negatively.Their empirical evidence suggests that representation of owners on the board of executive directors does not make a difference. Yoshiro Miwa and Mark Ramseyer (2001) stated with a sample of 637 Japanese firms and confirmed the equilibrium mechanism behind Demstez-Lehn. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) investigated the relation between the ownership structure and the performance (average Tobin’s Q for five years-1976-80) of the corporations if ownership is made multidimensional and also treated it as an endogenous variable. By using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two-stage Least Squares (2 SLS) regression model, they found no significant systematic relation between the ownership structure and firm performance. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), examined the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance of Australian listed companies. Her OLS results suggest that ownership of shares by the top management is significant in explaining the performance measured by accounting rate of return, but not significant ifperformance is measured by Tobin’s Q. However, when ownership is treated as endogenous, the same is not dependent upon any of the performance measures. Lins (2002) investigates whether management ownership structures and large non-management block holders are related to firm value across a sample of 1433 firms from 18 emerging markets .He finds that large non-management control rights block holdings (having more control rights) are positively related to firm value measured by Tobin’s Q. Michael L Lemmon and Karl V Lins (2003) use a sample of 800 firms in eight East Asian countries to study the effect of ownership structure on value during the region’s financial crisis.The crisis negatively impacted firm’s investment opportunities, raising the incentives of controlling shareholders to expropriate minority investors. The evidence is consistent with the view that ownership structure plays an important role in determining whether insiders expropriate minority shareholders. Using a sample of 144 Israeli firms, Beni Lauterbach and Efrat Tolkowsky (2004) find that Tobin's Q is maximized when control group vote reaches 67%. This evidence is strong when ownership structure is treated as exogenous and weak when it is considered endogenous. Christoph Kaserer and Benjamin Moldenhauer (2005) address the question whether there is any empirical relationship between corporate performance and insider ownership. Using a data set of 245 Germen firms for the year 2003 they find evidence for a positive and significant relationship between corporate performance, as measured by stock price performance as well as by Tobin’s Q, and insider ownership. Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) tried the model of Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) for 175 Greek firms for the year 2000 and found that higher firm profitability requires less diffused ownership structure He also provides evidence that large non management block holders can mitigate the valuation discounts associated with the expected agency problem.3. Data and MethodologyThe study aims to explore the disciplinary effect of the market in a context with concentrated ownership structure and weak investor protection. The paper aims to explore if there are dominant certain types of owners of actively listed and traded companies on Indian Stock Exchanges. Further, it investigates whether the ownership type affects some key accounting and market performance indicators of listed firms. It shows that there might be other reasons that have affected the performance of the listed companies of BSE 100, other than ownership structure.The data set consists of detailed trading and financial information and indicators about the 98most actively traded BSE 100 listed companies on the Bombay Stock Exchange of India (BSE) during 2009-2010. The ninety eight companies cover a broad spectrum of sectors or industries totaling 18, which are: Finance, Oil & Gas, Information Technology, Metal, Metal Products & Mining, Capital Goods, FMCG, Transport Equipments, Power, Housing Related, Healthcare, Telecom, Diversified, Chemical & Petrochemical, Miscellaneous, Media & Publishing, Transport Services, Tourism and Agriculture. The details and proportion of these sectors in BSE 100 is given in table 1.The main financial indicators obtained from the companies financial statements included Total Revenues or Turnover, Gross Profit, Net Income or Earnings After Taxes, Current Assets, Fixed Assets, Long Term Debt and Shareholders Equity. Finally, the third subset consists of companies’ stock performance indicators obtained from CMIE PROWESS database including value traded, volume traded, number of transactions, market capitalization, market price as well as some calculated ratios using both CMIE PROWESS database as well as items reported in financial statements of sample companies such as debt to equity ratio, return on equity, return on assets, price earnings ratio and price to book value. The empirical investigation is conducted using known Ordinary Least Square Estimation methodology using both Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Investment (ROI) variables - representing accounting performance measures, and Price-Earning Ratio (P/E) and Price to Book Value (P/BV) –representing stock market performance measures; separately as dependent variables. The following formula was used for modeling:Yij = α + xff, j + xde,j + xdph,j + xfp,j + xnpi,j + xnpni,j + ε (i)Where ε ~ ND (0, σ2)Yij : i corresponds to ROE, ROI, P/E or P/B for company j (j=1...98)xff, j : represents the percentage of free float in company j capital structure,xde,j : represents the debt to equity ratio for company j,xdph,j and xfp,j : represents the domestic promoter and foreign promoter holding in the companyxnpi,j and xnpni,j : represents non promoter institutional and non promoter non institutional holding of the company.The independent variables are represented by the percentage of Free Floated shares (FF), Debt to Equity ratio (D/E) and four variables representing promoters and non promoters stake representing the ownership structure in sampled companies, namely; Tables (2) and (3), (4) and (5) in the appendix summarize the regression analysis.4. Results and analysisThe sampled companies of BSE 100 were analyzed on the basis of their free floats and the findings are given below in table 2. Table 2 clearly depict that majority of the sampled companies have less than 75% of the free float. Even 13% companies have a free float of less than 25%. Only 13% of the companies have a free float of greater than 75%. Table three gives the details about the ownership structure of the sampled firms. Data clearly depicts that the stake of Indian promoters I the sampled company varies from 0% to 99% with a average holding of 41%. That means on an average the sampled companies are dominated by Indian promoter’s holdings. While the average foreign promoters holding is just 7.51%. That clearly confirms the belief that the Indian companies are dominated by families and promoter’s stakes. Data related with debt equity profile of sampled companies is givenThe results clearly indicates that majority of the sampled companies are in first category of 0-2 which clearly depicts that the majority of the sampled companies are not highly levered.Performance measures in the paper are represented by two sets of variables accounting measures are ROA and ROE while the market measures are P/E and P/BV ratio. Table five depicts that average ROE, ROA, P/E and P/BV values are 17.36%, 12.77%, 34.8 and 3.8 respectively.The results of OLS regression analysis are given in table 6 below. The empirical results reflect at 5% level of significance the ownership characteristic does not reflect any relationship with either accounting performance measures ROA and ROE or show any significant relationship between ownership structure and stock market indicators P/E and P/BV ratios, as shown in Table (6) below. But at 10% level of significance all sampled variables shows significant relationship with ROA, ROE, P/E and P/BV for performance of any company. Insert table (6) about here5. Findings and ConclusionThe significance of ownership characteristics and accounting performance measures i.e. ROA and ROE could be explained by the fact that the fundamental evaluation of companies, measured by, its financial indicators such as (ROA and ROE) are the most important factors used by investors in India to assess company’s performance. In India, althou gh earlier investors have culturally placed more emphasis on accounting performance measures, not stock market indicators, due to the inactivity and stagnation of the stock market for a long period (till early 1990’s). Furthermore, Indian investors always favored payment of dividends rather than stock price appreciation, due to inactivity of market. Accordingly, the dividends yield paid by Indian companies are always very high (10%-13%) compared to other emerging and developed markets (3%-5%). Thus the author did not consider dividend yield in the stock market indicators since it will be a distorted measure since issuers in India always pay a high dividends yield, sometimes, irrespective of earnings, since they are valued by investors according to dividends not price appreciation. Furthermore, the type of ownership had an insignificant impact on stock market performance measures, which might imply that the stock performance was mainly affected by economic and market conditions rather than ownership concentration. Furthermore, the results could be related to the market inefficiency of the Indian stock market, given its small and thin characteristics, as well as the lack of prompt disclosure by listed companies, even the active ones, at the Indian stock market. Stock prices therefore may not appropriately reflect the costs and benefits of diversification as shown.References[1]Beni Lauterbach, and Efrat Tolkowsky, 2004, “Market Value Maximizing Ownership Structure when Investor Protection is Weak”, Discussion Paper No. 8-200[2]Cho M H (1998), “Ownership Structure, Investment, and the Corporate Value: An Empirical Analysis”,Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 103-121.[3]Demsetz H and Lehn K (1985), “The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences”,Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 93, No. 6, pp. 1155-1177[4]Demsetz H and Villalonga B (2001), “Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance”, Journal of Corporate Finance, V ol. 7, No. 3, pp. 209-233.[5]Erik Lehmann en Jurgen Weigand, Does the governed corporation perform better Governance structures and corporate performance in Germany, European Finance Review, 2000, no. 4, p. 157–195.[6] Fama, E and Jensen, M, 1983a, 1983b. Separation of ownership and control, Journal ofLaw &Economics 26, 301-325 and 327-349.[7]Jensen, M and Meckling, W, 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.[8]Kapopoulas P and Lazaretou S (2007), “Corporate Ownership Structure and Firm Performance:Evidence from Greek Firms”, Corporate Governance: An International Review,V ol. 15, No. 2, pp. 144-158.[9]Kaserer Christoph, and Benjamin Moldenhauer, 2005, “Insider Ownership and Corporate Performance -Evidence from Germany”, Working Paper”, Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS) and Department for Financial Management and Capital Market[10]Lins, K, 2000, Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets, Working paper, University of Utah.[11]Loderer C and Martin K (1997), “Executive Stock Ownership and Performance Tracking Faint Traces”,Journal of Financial Economics, V ol. 45, No. 2, pp. 595-612.[12]Michael L Lemmon, and Karl V Lins, 2003, “Ownership Structure, Corpora te Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis” The Journal of Finance, Vol LVIII No. 4, August 2004[13]Miwa Yoshiro, and Mark Ramseyer, 2001, “Does ownership matter?” Discussion Paper, University of Tokyo[14]Morck, R, Shleifer, A, and Vishny, R, 1988. Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, Journal of Financial Economic 20, 293-315.[15]Pedersen,T and Thompson, S, 1997, European Patterns of Corporate Ownership: A twelve country study, Journal of International Business Studies, 759-778[16]Shleifer, A and Vishny, R, 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 52, 737-783.译文股权结构与公司绩效: 以印度为例资料来源: 人文和社会科学国际性杂志作者: Monir Zaman摘要任何一家公司的股权结构已经成为公司监管与公司绩效的重要事项。

上市公司资本结构与公司绩效分析

上市公司资本结构与公司绩效分析摘要：资本结构与公司绩效的相互联系一直是分析资本结构问题的重要方向,从20世纪50年代MM理论提出以后,企业资本（Corporate Finance）的结构以及它的价位的分析成果就一直得到进步。

在考虑所得税及其他原因后，国外专家利用多个方向证明了企业具有最优的资本结构。

构造有效的资本结构，对上市企业的业绩效率有着巨大作用，是实现公司价值的重大步骤。

关键词：资本结构；公司绩效；相关性Analysis of capital stucture and performance of listing corporationAbstract: The relationship between capital structure and corporate performance has been analysis of the problem of capital structure is an important research direction, since the fifties of the 20th century, MM theory and enterprise (corporate finance capital structure and its price analysis of the results has been improved. After considering the income tax and other reasons, foreign experts have proved that the enterprise has the best capital structure. The construction of effective capital structure has great significance to the operating performance of listed companies, and it is an important step to realize the value of the company.Keywords:Capital structure; Corporate performance; Correlation.1引言随着经济全球化愈演愈烈，企业间的竞争压力也日渐增加，如何增强企业实力，扩大市场份额是每个企业所要考虑的问题。

外文翻译---所有权组织和企业绩效

所有权组织和企业绩效Kang, David L.; Sørensen, B..Annual Review of Sociology, 1999, Vol.25: p121.最近，组织社会学的工作，对如何理解现代公共机构中治理系统的某些功能对公司的重要成果的影响取得了相当大的进展。

企业人员的功能背景，局外人的董事比例，主席及行政总裁职位分离，和在公司发现的社会网络已被用来预测结果，如企业多样化政策，以及使用多部门组织形式。

这项研究已普遍淡化在公司治理中所有权的作用，和假设所有权和控制权得到有效的分离。

相比之下，金融经济的研究继续所有权在控制公司中的作用，尽管这种研究的传统已就组织之间的所有权与经营绩效关系产生非常不同的结果。

所有制组织研及其对工作成果影响的研究不能完全交由财政经济研究。

关于谁控制了资金的使用和这个控制如何影响社会创造和分配财富的研究，一直是知识探索的重要防线，始发于马克思。

运用更广泛和更灵活的方法对个人和企业的财产关系进行研究，也许能对现代资本主义企业的分配效率和结果提供重要的见解。

目前，社会学对这一调查线索的实际和潜在的贡献就显得尤为重要，并因此及时地评估什么是已知的什么是未知的，关于所有制组织对公司绩效的影响。

我们提出了一种基于所有制类型的方法，在决定公司的所有权成果中作为一个主要的组织变量。

在组织社会学和经济学文献中，现代企业往往被看作是一个具有四个主要演员的大机构：股东，董事，高层管理人员和其他管理人员和职工。

股东们认为是业主。

他们提供金融资本和接收来自公司的业务合同的经济回报的承诺。

董事作为该公司的受托人，可以批准一定的策略和投资决策，但其主要责任是雇用和解雇高层管理人员的受托人。

企业经营管理人员，他们行使大多数商业决策并监督和聘请工人。

职工开展活动，创建企业的产量。

这个现代企业形象准确地反映了许多大型的美国经济中占主导地位的公营机构组织。

然而，许多其他公司的方式是进行合并两个或多个组织：业主可同时投资和管理，工人可能是业主，管理人员有可能获得较大份额的所有权等等。

资本结构与公司绩效的研究进展

Review of Capital Structure and Corporate
Performance
作者：王世杰[1];杨欣[1]
作者机构： [1]华东交通大学经济管理学院,江西南昌330013
出版物刊名：石家庄经济学院学报
页码： 79-84页
年卷期： 2014年第4期
主题词：资本结构;公司绩效;互动关系
摘要：国内外诸多学者对上市公司资本结构与公司绩效的关系进行了大量实证分析,且大部分以某一行业或地区的公司状况为研究对象,或从诸如内部的成长性等不同的角度分析资本结构与公司绩效之间的关系。

论文梳理了国内外对两者间的关系的最新研究成果,并对已有的研究成果进行了评述;在此基础上,展望了两者间关系的研究趋势,以期为后续研究提供参考。

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Capital Structure and Firm Performance1. IntroductionAgency costs represent important problems in corporate governance in both financial and nonfinancialindustries. The separation of ownership and control in a professionally managed firm may result in managersexerting insufficient work effort, indulging in perquisites, choosing inputs or outputs that suit their ownpreferences, or otherwise failing to maximize firm value. In effect, the agency costs of outside ownership equalthe lost value from professional managers maximizing their own utility, rather than the value of the firm. Theory suggests that the choice of capital structure may help mitigate these agency costs. Under theagency costs hypothesis, high leverage or a low equity/asset ratio reduces the agency costs of outside equity andincreases firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders. Sincethe seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976), a vast literature on such agency-theoretic explanations ofcapital structure has developed (see Harris and Raviv 1991 and Myers 2001 for reviews). Greater financialleverage may affect managers and reduce agency costs through the threat of liquidation, which causes personallosses to managers of salaries, reputation, perquisites, etc. (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1982, Williams 1987), andthrough pressure to generate cash flow to pay interest expenses (e.g., Jensen 1986). Higher leverage canmitigate conflicts between shareholders and managers concerning the choice of investment (e.g., Myers 1977), the amount of risk to undertake (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976, Williams 1987), the conditions under which thefirm is liquidated (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1990), and dividend policy (e.g., Stulz 1990).A testable prediction of this class of models is that increasing the leverage ratio should result in loweragency costs of outside equity and improved firm performance, all else held equal. However, when leveragebecomes relatively high, further increases generate significant agency costs of outside debt –including higherexpected costs of bankruptcy or financial distress –arising from conflicts between bondholders andshareholders.1 Because it is difficult to distinguish empirically between the two sources of agency costs, wefollow the literature and allow the relationship between total agency costs and leverage to be nonmonotonic.Despite the importance of this theory, there is at best mixed empirical evidence in the extant literature(see Harris and Raviv 1991, Titman 2000, and Myers 2001 for reviews). Tests of the agency costs hypothesistypically regress measures of firm performance on the equity capital ratio or other indicator of leverage plussome control variables. At least three problems appear in the prior studies that we address in our application.In the case of the banking industry studied here, there are also regulatorycosts associated with very high leverage.First, the measures of firm performance are usually ratios fashioned from financial statements or stockmarket prices, such as industry-adjusted operating margins or stock market returns. These measures do not netout the effects of differences in exogenous market factors that affect firm value, but are beyon d management’scontrol and therefore cannot reflect agency costs. Thus, the tests may be confounded by factors that areunrelated to agency costs. As well, these studies generally do not set a separate benchmark for each firm’sperformance that would be reali zed if agency costs were minimized.We address the measurement problem by using profit efficiency as our indicator of firm performance.The link between productive efficiency and agency costs was first suggested by Stigler (1976), and profitefficiency represents a refinement of the efficiency concept developed since that time.2 Profit efficiencyevaluates how close a firm is to earning the profit that a best-practice firm would earn facing the sameexogenous conditions. This has the benefit of controlling for factors outside the control of management that arenot part of agency costs. In contrast, comparisons of standard financial ratios, stock market returns, and similarmeasures typically do not control for these exogenous factors. Even when the measures used in the literature areindustry adjusted, they may not account for important differences across firms within an industry – such as localmarket conditions – as we are able to do with profit efficiency. In addition, the performance of a best-practicefirm under the same exogenous conditions is a reasonable benchmark for how the firm would be expected toperform if agency costs were minimized.Second, the prior research generally does not take into account the possibility of reverse causation fromperformance to capital structure. If firm performance affects the choice of capital structure, then failure to takethis reverse causality into account may result in simultaneous-equations bias. That is, regressions of firmperformance on a measure of leverage may confound the effects of capital structure on performance with theeffects of performance on capital structure.We address this problem by allowing for reverse causality from performance to capital structure. Wediscuss below two hypotheses for why firm performance may affect the choice of capital structure, theefficiency-risk hypothesis and the franchise-value hypothesis. We construct a two-equation structural model andestimate it using two-stage least squares (2SLS). An equation specifying profit efficiency as a functi on of the2 Stigler’s argument was part of a broader exchange over whether productive efficiency (or X-efficiency) primarily reflectsdifficulties in reconciling the preferences of multiple optimizing agents –what is today called agency costs –versus “true” inefficiency, or failure to optimize (e.g., Stigler 1976, Leibenstein 1978). firm’s equity capital ratio and other variables is used to test the agency costs hypothesis, and an equationspecifying the equity capital ratio as a function of the firm’s profi tefficiency and other variables is used to testthe net effects of the efficiency-risk and franchise-value hypotheses. Both equations are econometricallyidentified through exclusion restrictions that are consistent with the theories.Third, some, but not all of the prior studies did not take ownership structure into account. Undervirtually any theory of agency costs, ownership structure is important, since it is the separation of ownership andcontrol that creates agency costs (e.g., Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 1985). Greater insider shares may reduceagency costs, although the effect may be reversed at very high levels of insider holdings (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988). As well, outside block ownership or institutional holdings tend to mitigate agency costs bycreating a relatively efficient monitor of the managers (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Exclusion of theownership variables may bias the test results because the ownership variables may be correlated with thedependent variable in the agency cost equation (performance) and with the key exogenous variable (leverage)through the reverse causality hypotheses noted aboveTo address this third problem, we include ownership structure variables in the agency cost equationexplaining profit efficiency. We include insider ownership, outside block holdings, and institutional holdings.Our application to data from the banking industry is advantageous because of the abundance of qualitydata available on firms in this industry. In particular, we have detailed financial data for a large number of firmsproducing comparable products with similar technologies, and information on market prices and otherexogenous conditions in the local markets in which they operate. In addition, some studies in this literature findevidence of the link between the efficiency of firms and variables that are recognized to affect agency costs,including leverage and ownership structure (see Berger and Mester 1997 for a review).Although banking is a regulated industry, banks are subject to the same type of agency costs and otherinfluences on behavior as other industries. The banks in the sample are subject to essentially equal regulatoryconstraints, and we focus on differences across banks, not between banks and other firms. Most banks are wellabove the regulatory capital minimums, and our results are based primarily on differences at the mar2. Theories of reverse causality from performance to capital structureAs noted, prior research on agency costs generally does not take into account the possibility of reversecausation from performance to capital structure, which may result in simultaneous-equations bias. We offer twohypotheses of reverse causation based on violations of the Modigliani-Millerperfect-markets assumption. It isassumed that various market imperfections (e.g., taxes, bankruptcy costs, asymmetric information) result in abalance between those favoring more versus less equity capital, and that differences in profit efficiency move theoptimal equity capital ratio marginally up or down.Under the efficiency-risk hypothesis, more efficient firms choose lower equity ratios than other firms, allelse equal, because higher efficiency reduces the expected costs of bankruptcy and financial distress. Under thishypothesis, higher profit efficiency generates a higher expected return for a given capital structure, and thehigher efficiency substitutes to some degree for equity capital in protecting the firm against future crises. This isa joint hypothesis that i) profit efficiency is strongly positively associated with expected returns, and ii) thehigher expected returns from high efficiency are substituted for equity capital to manage risks.The evidence is consistent with the first part of the hypothesis, i.e., that profit efficiency is stronglypositively associated with expected returns in banking. Profit efficiency has been found to be significantlypositively correlated with returns on equity and returns on assets (e.g., Berger and Mester 1997) and otherevidence suggests that profit efficiency is relatively stable over time (e.g., DeYoung 1997), so that a finding ofhigh current profit efficiency tends to yield high future expected returns.The second part of the hypothesis –that higher expected returns for more efficient banks are substitutedfor equity capital –follows from a standard Altman z-score analysis of firm insolvency (Altman 1968). Highexpected returns and high equity capital ratio can each serve as a buffer against portfolio risks to reduce theprobabilities of incurring the costs of financialdistressbankruptcy, so firms with high expected returns owing tohigh profit efficiency can hold lower equity ratios. The z-score is the number of standard deviations below theexpected return that the actual return can go before equity is depleted and the firm is insolvent, zi = (μi +ECAPi)/σi, where μi and σi are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of the rate of return on assets, andratios for those that were fully owned by a single owner-manager. This may be an improvement in the analysis of agencycosts for small firms, but it does not address our main issues of controlling for differences in exogenous conditions and insetting up individualized firm benchmarks for performance.ECAPi is the ratio of equity to assets. Based on the first part of the efficiency-risk hypothesis, firms with higherefficiency will have higher μi. Based on the second part of the hypothesis, a higher μi allows the firm to have alower ECAPi for a ven z-score, so that more efficient firms may choose lower equity capital ratios.文章出处：Raposo Clara C. Capital Structure and Firm Performance .Journal ofFinance.Blackwell publishing.2005, (6): 2701-2727.资本结构与企业绩效1.概述代理费用不管在金融还是在非金融行业，都是非常重要的企业治理问题。

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