PPT间接言语行为理论
《言语行为的概念》课件
自我反思有助于发现自己在言语行为中存在的问题，并采取措施进行改进。反馈可以来自教师、同伴或自我评估，帮助自己了解自己的不足之处。针对性练习可以针对自己的薄弱环节进行有针对性的训练，提高言语行为的水平。
总结词
感谢观看
THANKS
《言语行为的概念》ppt课件
目录
言语行为的定义言语行为的构成要素言语行为的功能言语行为的应用场景言语行为的习得与教学
01
言语行为的定义
Chapter
总结词
言语行为是指通过语言表达和交流来传递信息和情感的行为，具有目的性、交互性和文化性等特点。
详细描述
言语行为是人类社会交流的基本方式之一，通过语言来表达思想、传递信息、沟通情感。它具有明确的目的性，即通过言语行为来达到某种目的，如请求、告知、表达情感等。同时，言语行为也是一种交互行为，需要交流双方的理解和配合，才能实现信息的有效传递。此外，言语行为还具有文化性，不同文化背景下的言语行为可能存在差异，反映了不同文化对语言和交流的认知和规范。
在会议中，言语行为可以传递信息、发表观点、提出建议等，是实现有效沟通的重要手段。
会议交流
在工作中，言语行为可以建立和维护职业形象，如向上级汇报工作、与同事协作、指导新人等。
职场互动
政治演讲中的言语行为可以传递政治理念、宣传政策、争取选民支持等，对政治选举和决策产生影响。
政治宣传
政治领袖通过公共演讲中的言语行为来发表观点、引导舆论、动员群众等，以实现政治目标。
03
言语行为的功能
Chapter
传递信息是言语行为的基本功能
人们通过言语行为来传达各种信息，如事实、知识、意见、情感等。言语行为是人们交流和沟通的主要手段，使得信息得以传递和共享。
间接言语行为理论 ppt课件
1
Introduction Austin's Speech Act Theory Searle's Indirect Speech Act Theory
--Classification of Indirect Speech Acts Its Relations with Other Pragmatic Theories
ppt课件
2
Introduction
The theory of indirect speech acts was put forward by the American philosopher of language John Searle. It originated from Austin's theory, but made some revisions. One of Searle's contributions lies in his understanding of the importance of speech acts. He regards a speech act as a basic unit in social communication, yet not a word or a sentence. This means that his theory pays much attention to the functions rather than the forms of languages.
"I nominate John to be President", “I sentence you to ten years’imprisionment",
"I promise to pay you back."
IV.间接言语行为理论Indirect Speech Acts
Pragmatics-Teaching Plan (5)IV. Indirect Speech Acts4.1 Primary and Secondary Illocutionary Acts4.2 Inferential Process of Indirect Speech Acts4.3 Searle’s Researches on Indirect Directives4.3.1 Six Groups of Indirect Directives4.3.2 Basic Ideas about Indirect Directives4.3.2.1 Idiomatic, but not Idioms4.3.2.2 Coexistence of the Indirect Directive Act and the Literal Illocutionary Act4.3.3 Interpretation of Indirect Directives in terms of Speech Acts Theory4.4 Some Problems in Searle’s Pattern of Indirect Speech Analysis4.5 An Extended Analysis of Indirect CommissivesReadings:Searle, J. R. Indirect speech acts [A]. P. Cole & J. Morgan (eds.) Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts.New York : Academic Press, 1975.Searle, J. R. Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts [M]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.Huang Yan. 2009: 4.6 Indirect Speech ActsHe Zhaoxiong, 2011: 3.3 Indirect Speech Acts涂靖. Irony言语行为的研究[J]. 四川外语学院学报, 2004, (4).丁风. 汉语请求言语行为中的性别差异[J]. 西外学报, 2002, (1): 46-50.朱晓姝. 中美学生抱怨言语行为的差异研究[J]. 西外学报, 2008, (1): 51-55.黄永红. 对言语行为“道歉”的跨文化研究[J]. 解放军外国语学院学报, 2001, (5): 33-36.吴淑琼et al. 英汉批评言语行为策略对比研究[J]. 外语教学, 2004, (2): 22-25.周启强, 白解红. 原型范畴与间接指令[J]. 外语与外语教学, 2004, (12): 1-4.刘森林. 语用策略与言语行为[J]. 外语教学, 2003, (5): 10-15.赵英玲，李洁芳. 虚假邀请(ostensible invitation)言语行为的语用研究[J]. 哈尔滨工业大学学报(社科版), 2004, (7)..Isaac, E. A. Ostensible Invitation [J]. Language in Society, 1999, (19)Song Yuan. On the Probing Speech Act in English Talk Shows —A Case Study of Oprah Show [D].South-central University for Ethnic Communities, 2010.(英语脱口秀中的打探言语行为研究—以欧普拉脱口秀为个案)IV. Indirect Speech Acts4.1 Primary and Secondary Illocutionary ActsSearle (1975: 60) initiated the notion of indirect speech act to indicate the illocutionary act which is performed indirectly by way of performing another.In some cases, what people say (locutionary act / literal meaning) are in consistence with what they do (illocutionary act), as in Example (1):(1) A: What’s your name?B: My name is Julia.B’s utterance is a direct reply to A’s question about her name. What B says is in complete agreement with what she intends to say. Indirect usage of speech is not involved here.But frequently, what people actually say do not agree with what they intend to say / what they do, as in Example (2):(2) It’s cold in here.If the speaker’s intention is only to inform the hearer of the temperature at the location and time of speaking and nothing else, his speech is direct. If, however, the speaker’s intention is, by virtue of telling the hearer of his own feelings about the temperature, to get the hearer to do something like closing the window, switching on the air-conditioner, his speech is indirect. In latter case, through this utterance, the speaker simultaneously performs two illocutionary acts: an assertive (陈述) and a directive (指令). He indirectly performs the illocutionary act of directive by means of performing the illocutionary act of assertive.Searle (1975) assigned the two terms, primary illocutionary act and secondary illocutionary act, respectively to the two illocutionary acts performed simultaneously in indirect speech acts. Primary illocutionary act, such as the directive act in (2), represents the real intention of the speaker; secondary illocutionary act, such as the assertive act in (2), is another illocutionary act performed in order to perform the primary illocutionary act. The secondary illocutionary act coincides with the literal meaning of sentence whereas the primary illocutionary act means more than the literal meaning (The speaker performs the secondary illocutionary act by way of uttering a sentence, the literal meaning of which is such that its literal utterance constitutes a performance of that illocutionary act).4.2 Inferential Process of Indirect Speech ActsHow is it possible for the speaker to mean the primary illocution when he only utters a sentence that means the secondary illocution? And how does the hearer understand the non-literal primary illocutionary act from understanding the literal secondary illocutionary act?Searle (1975) reconstructs a series of inference steps by means of which the hearer could, from the literal meaning of the sentence, draw the speaker’s real intention, and interprets the inferential apparatuses as follows:“In indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, together with the general powers of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer” (Searle, 1979: 31-32)Specifically, the apparatus necessary to explain the indirect part of indirect speech acts are: (i) a theory of speech acts; (ii) certain general principles of cooperative conversation (not limited to Grice’s principles); (iii) mutually shared factual background information of the speaker and the hearer; (iv) an ability on the part of the hearer to make inferences.In real communication, the hearer will resort to these apparatuses unconsciously in their interpretation of indirect speech acts. Take the following verbal exchange as an example:(3) Student X: Let’s go to the movies tonight.Student Y: I have to study for an exam.X’s utterance constitutes a proposal in virtue of its meaning, in particular because of the meaning of Let’s, and the normal response to a proposal is an acceptance or rejection, but in virtue of the literal meaning, Y’s reply is neither acceptance nor rejection, it is simply a statement about Y. The questions then arise: How does X know that Y’s response is a rejection of his own proposal? And how is it possible for Y to mean his response as a rejection of the proposal?Searle’s (1979: 33-34) interpretation of the question is: the primary illocutionary act performed in Y’s utterance is the rejection of X’s proposal, and Y does that by way of performing a secondary illocutionary act of making a statement to the effect that he has to prepare for the exam. He performs the secondary illocutionary act by way of uttering a sentence, the literal meaning of which is such that its literal utterance constitutes a performance of that illocutionary act. Alternatively, the secondary illocutionary act is literal; the primary illocutionary act is not literal. Then the above questions can be re-expressed as: How does X understand the non-literal primary illocutionary act from understanding the literal secondary illocutionary act? And how is it possible for Y to mean the primary illocution when he only utters a sentence that means the secondary illocution? Searle reconstructed ten inferential steps necessary for X to derive the non-literal primary illocution from the literal secondary illocution as follows:`Step 1: I (X) have made a proposal to Y, and in response he has made a statement to the effect that he has to study for an exam (facts about the conversation).Step 2: I assume that Y is cooperative in the conversation and that therefore his remark is intended to be relevant (principles of conversational cooperation)Step 3: A relevant response must be one of acceptance, rejection, counterproposal, further discussion, etc. (theory of speech acts).Step 4: But his literal utterance was not one of these, and so was not a relevant response (inference from Step 1 and 3).Step 5: Therefore, he probably means more than he says. Assuming that his remark is relevant, his primary illocutionary point must differ from his literal one (inference from Step 2 and 4).(This step is crucial. Unless a hearer has some inferential strategy for finding out when primary illocutionary points differ from literal illocutionary points, he has no way of understanding indirect illocutionary acts.)Step 6: I know that studying for an exam normally takes a large amount of time relative to a single evening, and I know that going to the movies normally takes a large amount of time relative to a single evening (factual background information).Step 7: Therefore, he probably cannot both go to the movies and study for an exam in one evening (inference from Step 6).Step 8: A preparatory condition on the acceptance of a proposal, or on any other commissive, is the ability to perform the act predicted in the propositional content condition (theory of speech acts).Step 9: Therefore, I know that he has said something that has the consequence that he probably cannot consistently accept the proposal (inference from Step 1, 7, and 8).Step 10: Therefore, his primary illocutionary point is probably to reject the proposal (inference from Step 5 and 9).(Searle, 1979: 34-35)Through these steps, any indirect illocutionary points can be drawn by the hearer, no matter what kind of literal forms they take on.4.3 Searle’s Researches on Indirect Directives4.3.1 Six Groups of Indirect DirectivesIn the field of indirect illocutionary acts, Searle shows largest interest in the area of indirect directives because, to him, ordinary conversational requirements of politeness normally make it awkward to issue flat imperative sentences (e.g. Leave the room!) or explicit performatives (e.g.I order you to leave the room!). In directives, politeness is the chief motivation for indirectness. Searle collected six categories of sentences that are conventionally used in the performance of indirect directives and indicated, with bold type,the generality of the syntactic forms of the sentences in question:Group 1: Sentences concerning H’s ability to perform A:Can you reach the salt?Can you pass the salt?Could you be a little more quiet?You could be a little more quiet.You can go now (this may also be a permission=you may go now).Are you able to reach the book on the top shelf?Have you got change for a dollar?Group 2: Sentences concerning S’s wish or want that H will do A:I would like you to go now.I want you to do this for me, Henry.I would/should appreciate it if you would/could do it for me.I would/should be most grateful if you would/could help us out.I’d rather you didn’t do that any more.I’d be very much obliged if you would pay me the money back soon.I hope you’ll do it.I wish you wouldn’t do that.Group 3: Sentences concerning H’s doing A:Officers will henceforth wear ties at dinner.Will you quit making that awful racket?Would you kindly get off my foot?Won’t you stop making that noise soon?Aren’t you going to eat your cereal?Group 4: Sentences concerning H’s desire or willingness to do A:Would you be willing to write a letter of recommendation for me?Do you want to hand me that hammer over there on the table?Would you mind not making so much noise?Would it be convenient for you to come on Wednesday?Would it be too much (trouble) for you to pay me the money next Wednesday?Group 5: Sentences concerning reasons for doing A:You ought to be more polite to you mother.You should leave immediately.Must you continue hammering that way?Ought you to eat quite so much spaghetti?Should you be wearing John’s tie?You had better go now.Hadn’t you better go now?Why not stop here?Why don’t you try it just once?Why don’t you be quiet?It would be better for you (for us all) if you would leave the room.It wouldn’t hurt if you left now.It might help if you shut up.It would be better if you gave me the money now.It would be a good idea if you left town.We’d all be a good off if you’d just pipe down a bit.This class also contains many examples that have no generality of form but obviously, in an appropriate context, would be uttered as indirect requests, e.g.:You’re standing on my foot.I can’t see the movie screen while you have that hat on.Group 6: Sentences embedding one of these elements inside another; also, sentences embedding an explicit directive illocutionary verb inside one of these contexts.Would you mind awfully if I asked you if you could write me a letter of recommendation?Would it be too much if I suggested that you could possibly make a little less noise?Might I ask you to take off your hat?I hope you won’t mind if I ask you if you could leave us alone?I would appreciate it if you could make less noise.(Searle, 1979: 36-39)4.3.2 Basic Ideas about Indirect Directives4.3.2.1 Idiomatic, but not IdiomsTo some speech act theorists, some syntactic structures can be taken as the idioms of conventionally performing certain indirect directives, just like using kick the bucket to meandie. According to them, Can you + V? / Would you please + V? / Would you mind + V-ing? are all idioms for indirect requests. An indirect request on sb. to open the door, for example, can be realized by the idiomatic forms (4), (5) and (6):(4) Can you open the door?(5) Would you please open the door?(6) Would you mind opening the door?Contrastive to this understanding, Searle’s (1979: 40-41) viewpoint is that indirect directives are idiomatic, but not idioms. To him, sentences like (7) are not idioms like kicked the bucket in (8):(7) Can you pass the salt?(8) Jones kicked the bucket.Searle (1979: 41) presents two reasons, indicating why the indirect requests like (7) are not idioms:First, when these sentences are used as requests, they still have their literal meaning, so that literal responses are also appropriate (e.g. Sure, I can. Here it is. or No, sorry, I can’t.It’s down there at the end of the table.) Idioms, however, cannot be understood literally. In response to (8), it’s inappropriate to say (9):(9) Really? Did he hurt his leg?Second, a word-for-word translation of the sentences like (7) into other languages will often produce sentences with the same indirect illocutionary act potential, but a word-for-word translation of Jones kicked the bucket into other languages will not produce a sentence meaning “Jones died.”However, Searle also admits that indirect directives are idiomatic, though they are not idioms. Sentences like (4)-(7) are idiomatic or conventional ways of making requests. In general, their non-idiomatic equivalents or synonyms would not have the same indirect illocutionary act potential. Thus, the idiomatic structure “Do you want to hand me the hammer over there on the table?” can be uttered as a request, but its non-idiomatic equivalent “Is it the case that you at present desire to hand me that hammer over there on the table?”has a formal and unnatural character that would prevent it from becoming a candidate for an indirect request potential.4.3.2.2 Coexistence of the Indirect Directive Act and the Literal Illocutionary ActIn his research on indirect directives, Searle (1979: 42-43) proposes the idea that whenone of the sentences like (4)-(7) is uttered with the primary illocutionary point of a directive, the literal illocutionary act is also performed. In every one of these cases, the speaker issues a directive by way of asking a question or making a statement. The fact that his primary illocutionary point is directive does not alter the fact that he is asking a question or making a statement. In cases where these sentences are uttered as requests, they still have their literal meaning.Evidence that these sentences keep their literal meanings when uttered as indirect requests is that responses that are appropriate to their literal utterances (as demonstrated in B1 and B2) are also appropriate to their indirect speech act utterances. For example:A: Can you pass the salt?B1: No, sorry, I can’t. It’s down there at the end of the table.B2: Yes, I can. (Here it is.)Additional evidence for the existence of the literal meaning in indirect speech is that a subsequent report of the utterances can truly report the literal illocutionary act. For example, the utterance of “I want you to leave now, Bill” can be reported by an utterance of “He told me he wanted me to leave, so I left”, and the utterance of “Can you reach the salt?” can be reported by an utterance of “He asked me whether I could reach the salt”. Similarly, an utterance of “Could you do it for me, Henry; could you do it for me and Cynthia and the children?” can be reported by an utterance of “He asked me whether I could do it for him and Cynthia and the children”4.3.3 Interpretation of Indirect Directives in terms of Speech Acts TheorySearle’s categorization of indirect directives is mainly based on the felicity conditions on performing illocutionary acts, as are mentioned in the Theory of Speech Acts. Searle (1979: 44) illustrates the felicity conditions necessary for the performance of directive class of illocutionary acts as follows:Preparatory condition: H is able to perform A.Sincerity condition: S wants H to do A.Propositional content condition: S predicates a future act A of H.Essential condition: Counts as an attempt by S to get H to do A.Based on these conditions, the six groups of indirect directives collected by Searle can be reduced to three types: (1) those having to do with felicity conditions on the performance of a directive illocutionary act; (2) those having to do with reasons for doing the act; (3) those embedding one element inside another one.All of Groups 1-3 indirect directives concern felicity conditions on directiveillocutionary acts since:Group 1: The ability of H to perform A concerns the preparatory condition;Group 2: The desire of S that H perform A concerns the sincerity condition;Group 3: The prediction of A of H concerns the propositional content condition.Group 4 and 5 both concern reasons for doing A, since desire or willingness to do something (Group 4) is “a reason par excellence for doing it”. (Searle, 1979: 45) Group 6 is a special class only by courtesy, since its elements either are performative verbs or are already contained in the other two categories of felicity conditions and reasons.Group 1-6 sentences of indirect directives demonstrate that the syntactic structures for indirect directives are either statements or questions. Searle (1979: 45) generalizes four strategies of making indirect directives (primary illocutionary acts) by means of the illocutionary acts of making a statement or asking a question:Generalization 1: S can make an indirect request (or other directive) by either asking whether or stating that a preparatory condition concerning H’s ability to do A obtains. (Group 1)Generalization 2: S can make an indirect directive by either asking whether or stating that the propositional content condition obtains. (Group 3)Generalization 3: S can make an indirect directive by stating that the sincerity condition obtains, but not by asking whether it obtains. (Group 2)Generalization 4: S can make an indirect directive by either stating that or asking whether there are good or overriding reasons for doing A, except where the reason is that H wants or wishes, etc., to do A, in which case he can only ask whether H wants, wishes, etc., to do A. (Groups 4 & 5)Why is it a general tendency that people like to issue directives in an indirect way? To this problem, Searle’s (1979: 48) answer is that the chief motivation for using indirect directives is politeness. The indirect directive form Can you (pass the salt), for example, is polite in at least two aspects: First, its speaker does not presume to know about the hearer’s abilities, as he would if he issued an imperative sentence (e.g. Pass the salt, please!); second, the form gives the hearer the option of refusing, since yes-no question allows no as a possible answer. Thus, the hearer’s compliance (obedience) can be made to appear a free act rather than obeying a command.4.4 Some Problems in Searle’s Pattern of Indirect Speech AnalysisSearle (1979: 48) points out that several problems still exist in his own pattern of indirect speech analysis, even though it might be successful in many more cases.Problem 1: Why is it that some syntactical forms work better than others for indirectspeech acts, if the apparatuses by which indirect speech acts are meant and understood are perfectly general—having to do with the theory of speech acts, the principles of cooperative conversation, and shared background information, and having nothing to do with any particular syntactical form? Why can I ask you to do something by saying “Can you hand me that book on the top shelf?”, but not by saying “Is it the case that you at present have the ability to hand me that book on the top shelf?”To the first part of the problem, Searle’s answer is this: The theory of speech acts and the principles of conversational cooperation do, indeed, provide a framework within which indirect illocutionary acts can be meant and understood. However, within this framework certain forms will tend to become conventionally established as the standard idiomatic forms for indirect speech acts. While keeping their literal meanings, they will acquire conventional uses as, e.g., polite forms for requests.Searle (1979: 49) argues that there can be conventions of usage that are not meaning conventions. For instance, can you, could you, I want you to, and numerous other forms are conventional ways of making requests, but at the same time they do not have an imperative meaning. Politeness is the most prominent motivation for indirectness in requests, and certain forms naturally tend to become the conventionally polite ways of making indirect requests.To the second part of the problem, Searle (p50) also gives an explanation: In order to be a plausible candidate for an utterance as an indirect speech act, a sentence has to be idiomatic to start with. The utterance “Can you hand me that book on the top shelf?”will naturally gives the hearer an impression that he is requested to do something whereas the utterance “Is it the case that you at present have the ability to hand me that book on the top shelf?” will fail to do so. Why? This is because in general, if one speaks unidiomatically, the hearer will assume that there must be a special reason for it, and thus various assumptions of normal speech are suspended.Based on this consideration, Searle (1979: 50) suggests that besides the maxims (in Cooperative Principles) proposed by Grice, there seems to be an additional maxim of conversation: “Speak idiomatically unless there is some special reason not to.”Problem 2: Why is there an asymmetry between the sincerity condition and the others such that one can perform an indirect request only by asserting the satisfaction of a sincerity condition, but not by querying it, whereas one can perform indirect directives by either asserting or querying the satisfaction of the propositional content and preparatory conditions? For example, an utterance of “I want you to do it” can be a request, but not an utterance of “Do I want you to do it?”. The former can take please, the latter cannot. This phenomenon may be attributed to the fact that in normal cases, it is odd to ask other people about the existence of one’s own elementary psychological states.4.5 An Extended Analysis of Indirect CommissivesThe general approach to indirect directives will also work for other types of indirect speech acts. Among them, indirect commissives constitute a good type of examples. Consider the following sentences that are conventionally used to perform indirect commissives (offers or promises):Group 1: Sentences concerning the preparatory conditions(A) that S is able to perform the act:Can I help you?I can do that for you.I could get it for you.Could I be of assistance?(B) that H wants S to perform the act:Would you like some help?Do you want me to go now, Sally?Wouldn’t you like me to bring some more next time I come?Would you rather I came on Tuesday?Group 2: Sentences concerning the sincerity condition:I intend to do it for you.I plan on repairing it for you next week.Group 3: Sentences concerning the propositional content condition:I will do it for you.I am going to give it to you next time you stop by.Shall I give you the money now?Group 4: Sentences concerning S’s wish or willingness to do A:I want to be of any help I can.I’d be willing to do it (if you want me to).Group 5: Sentences concerning (other) reasons for S’s doing A:I think I had better leave you alone.Wouldn’t it be better if I gave you some assistance?You need my help, Cynthia.(Searle, 1979: 54-55) The above analysis can be summed up by the following generalizations:Generalization 1: S can make an indirect commissive by either asking whether or stating that the preparatory condition concerning his ability to do A obtains. (Group 1A) Generalization 2: S can make an indirect commissive by asking whether, though not by stating that, the preparatory condition concerning H’s wish or want that S do A obtains. (Group 1B)Generalization 3: S can make an indirect commissive by stating that, and in some forms by asking whether, the propositional content condition obtains. (Group 3)Generalization 4: S can make an indirect commissive by stating that, not by asking whether, the sincerity condition obtains. (Group 2)Generalization 5: S can make an indirect commissive by stating that or by asking whether there are good or overriding reasons for doing A, except where the reason is that S wants or desires to do A, in which case he can only state but not ask whether he wants to do A. (Groups 4 & 5)(Searle, 1979: 56)。
【正式版】言语行为的概念PPT
• 1972年2月21日， 总统理尼克松乘专机抵达北 叶子梗在喉咙口，苦得你哭笑不得。
乡人问其子得失，山曰：‘解名尽处是孙山，贤郎更在孙山外’。
乡人问其子得失，山曰：‘解名尽处是孙山，贤郎更在孙山外’。
果说语言学主要是对语言符号系统及其 1目的性原则：人与人之间进行人际传播，总是具有这样或那样的目的，说话人通过话语来传达自己的意图。
她唱的一曲菱歌(指朱庆馀的诗歌)，价值万金。
规律进行分析和描写，那么传播学则着 重考察人类是如何运用语言符号来交流 信息的，即着重研究言语Байду номын сангаас为。
言语行为的基本原则
• 1目的性原则：人与人之间进行人际传播， 总是具有这样或那样的目的，说话人通 过话语来传达自己的意图。传播意图的 表达，方式灵活多样，但归根结底，不 外直接表达和间接表达。
• 朱庆馀《闺意献张水部》：“洞房昨夜停红烛， 待晓堂前拜舅姑。妆罢低声问夫婿，画眉深浅 入时无? ”。
行卷
言语行为的概念
语言和言语
• 语言和对语言的运用是既有联系又有区 别的两个概念，索绪尔在《普通语言学 教程》中把前者称为“语言”，而后者 称为“言语”。
• “语言”是由语汇和语法所构成的符号 系统。其中，语汇构成语言的基本材料。 语法则是语言符号组合为符号系统的抽 象规则。“言语”是指人们对语言这一 符号系统的具体运用。
意在彼
1目的性原则：人与人之间进行人际传播，总是具有这样或那样的目的，说话人通过话语来传达自己的意图。
诗人以新娘自比，以新郎比张籍，以公 语言和对语言的运用是既有联系又有区别的两个概念，索绪尔在《普通语言学教程》中把前者称为“语言”，而后者称为“言语”。
间接言语行
间接言语行摘要：一、间接言语行为的概念二、间接言语行为的功能三、间接言语行为的分类1.指令性间接言语行为2.信息性间接言语行为3.表达性间接言语行为四、间接言语行为在实际生活中的应用1.在商务场合中的应用2.在日常交流中的应用五、间接言语行为在跨文化交际中的重要性六、如何提高跨文化交际中的间接言语行为能力正文：间接言语行为是指在交流过程中，通过语言表达，实现说话人意图，而不仅仅是字面意义的行为。
它是一种言外之意，需要听话人通过推断、猜测等方式理解说话人的真实意图。
间接言语行为广泛存在于人类的交际活动中，对于沟通的有效性和顺畅性具有至关重要的作用。
一、间接言语行为的概念间接言语行为起源于英国哲学家奥斯丁（John Austin）的言语行为理论。
奥斯丁认为，言语行为分为言内行为、言外行为和言后行为。
其中，言外行为即为间接言语行为。
这种行为是通过语言表达，实现说话人的意图，而不仅仅是字面意义。
二、间接言语行为的功能间接言语行为的主要功能是提高交际效率。
在某些情况下，直接表达意图可能会显得唐突或冒犯，通过间接言语行为，可以让双方在保持礼貌的同时，达到沟通的目的。
此外，间接言语行为还可以表达言外之意，让听话人自己去体会和理解，增加交流的趣味性。
三、间接言语行为的分类间接言语行为可以根据其功能和目的进行分类，包括指令性间接言语行为、信息性间接言语行为和表达性间接言语行为。
1.指令性间接言语行为：通过暗示、反问等方式，让听话人按照说话人的意愿去行动或提供信息。
例如：“你今天看起来很精神。
”这句话实际上是要求听话人回答“谢谢，你也是。
”2.信息性间接言语行为：通过含蓄的语言表达，让听话人推测和判断说话人的意图。
例如：“今天的天气真好。
”这句话实际上是在表达“我们一起去公园吧。
”3.表达性间接言语行为：通过委婉、曲折的表达方式，传递说话人的情感和态度。
例如：“真巧，我们在这里遇见。
”这句话实际上是在表达“很高兴在这里遇见你。
言语行为理论介绍 PPT
2
基本观点
• 以奥斯汀、塞尔为代表的言语行为理论家把语言研究以句子本身 的结构为重点转向句子表达的意义、意图和社会功能。
1 • 塞尔揭示了实现言语行为的各种有效条件, 阐述了言语行为的原 则和分类标准, 提出了间接言语行为理论这一特殊的言语行为类 型。并且由此建 立比较系统的语言理论。修正了奥斯汀的“言语 行为三分法”,并提出了“说出行为,以言表意行为,以言行事行为, 以言取效行为。”塞尔在分析以言行事行为和以言取效行为时都 涉及到了说话者的说话意图、意向,所以塞尔进一步地深入到了意 向性问题的探究上。他通过将言语视为一种有意识的行动,可以赋 予许多哲学上的老问题以新的意义。
3
国内研究
1 • 1、1979--1989年：引入阶段，著名语言学家许国 璋、何自然、顾曰国和何兆熊等；
• 2、1990年至今：应用研究阶段，更多来自不同领 域的学者投入到言语行为理论的应用研究中。
4 国外研究
70年代
80年代
4 ➢70年代
国外研究
Ross(1970)注意到言语行为句中的简单陈述句和显性施为 句有着共同的句法特性,并加以讨论;
闲话，说万历朝有位景妃，最喜欢利用亲子争宠，甚至不惜让
怀中小儿发热，引皇帝注意，你怎么看？
7 案例分析1：《甄嬛传》
• 曹贵人: 臣妾若是万历帝，必定杀死景妃以正宫闱，十月怀胎一朝临产 之苦，非为人母不能体会，景妃她身为人母却害其子，除非不 是生母，景妃若不是有难言之隐，那么便是连为人都不配了，
怎还配活着？ • 皇上: 你一向温顺寡言，难得这么激愤。 • 曹贵人: 臣妾失言了，只是臣妾也身为人母，一时有感而发。 • 皇上: 怜子之心，不仅母亲有，父亲也有，难为你剥了这么久，你既
人际沟通的言语行为课件
承诺类言语行为的运用与注意事项
真实可信地做出承诺
01
• 在承诺前确保自己能够履行 承诺，避免虚假承诺。
02
• 明确承诺的内容和期限，让 对方清楚了解。
03
及时履行承诺，保持诚信
04
• 严格按照承诺的内容和期限 履行承诺。
05
• 如遇特殊情况无法履行承诺，
及时与对方沟通，解释原因
并寻求解决方案。
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意识到非言语行为在人际沟通 中的重要性，能够关注并解读 他人的非言语信息，同时运用 自己的非言语行为辅助言语沟通
深入学习言语行为理论及相关 沟通技巧，形成更为全面、系
统的人际沟通知识体系。
在实际沟通中多加练习，将所 学的言语行为理论与技巧应用 到实际工作中，提高沟通效果。
承诺类言语行为
定义
承诺类言语行为是表达说 话者对未来的某种行为的 承诺或保证。
例子
包括许诺、保证、誓言、 义务、责任等。
特点
它们表达了一种将来的行 为，说话者承诺在未来完 成某种行为，通常涉及到 一种责任感和义务感。
表达类言语行为
定义
表达类言语行为是表达说话者情感或感受的言语行为。
例子
包括感谢、道歉、祝贺、哀悼、欢迎等。
特点
它们通常表达说话者的主观感受和情感，而不是客观事实，这类言 语行为通常带有一定的情感色彩和情感语气。
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言语行为在人际沟通中的 应用与技巧
有效运用断言类言语行为
清晰明了地表达自己的观点和立场
01
02
• 使用客观、准确的语言，避免模糊和含糊 不清的表述。
• 确保言语行为与沟通目标一致，不偏离 主题。
表达类言语行为的时机与方式
选择适当的时机和场合进行表达
言语行为
❖
但真实条件语义学的这一意义观存在一定的
缺陷，它不能对日常言语交际中某些话语的非陈述
功能，比如行事功能进行解说。
❖ 言语行为理论(Speech ActTheory) 理论 是在20世纪50年代末由哲学家约翰·奥斯丁 (John L． Austin)首先提出的，在此后的20、 30年间，在语言学界产生了巨大的影响。语 言学家们先后对其合理性、理论意义和实际 应用价值作了大量的考究，在语言学界一度 出现了一个言必称“行为”的局面。如今对 这一理论曾经有过的争议已渐渐平息，言语 行为理论在语言研究中的地位已经确立，并 被广泛运用。
❖ B某些结构后的不定式如果是施为动词，其实施行 为的功能仍然存在。
❖ 很高兴通知你得到了提拔。 ❖ 让我首先向你表示祝贺 ❖ 受党委的委托，宣布你为优秀党员。
❖ 被动施为句：实际上是被动形式的显性施为句。多 出现于书面通知或告示中。
❖ 穿越铁路线时，旅客请走行人天桥。 ❖ 禁止践踏草坪。 ❖ 乘客请系上安全带。
以言成事涉及说话者在听话者身上所达到的效果，如：
使之高兴、振奋、发怒、恐惧、信服，促使对方做某
事或放弃原来的打算等
四、塞尔的言语行为理论
❖ 1实施言语行为的规则和条件
❖ 语言使用是一种受规则制约的行为。
❖ 两种规则：调节性规则：礼仪规则，交通规
第五章
言语行为
一、言语行为理论的主要内容
❖ 言语行为理论认为人们在以言行事。 此理论认为：人类交际的基本单位不是
句子或其他任何表达手段，而是完成一定的 行为。比如：陈述、请求、命令、提问、道 歉、祝贺等行为。同时还存在间接言语行为。
言语行为的特点是说话人通过说一句话或者若干句话来 执行一个或者若干个行为，而且，这些行为的实现还可能给 听者带来某些后果。Austin认为，说任何一句话时，人们同 时要完成三种行为：言内行为、言外行为、言后行为（顾芸 英，1986），也有学者把它们称作话语行为（或说话行为） 即以言指事（the locutionary act）、语现行动（或施事行为） 即以言行事（the illocutionary act）、语导行动（或取效行 为）即以言成事（the perlocutionary act）。在研究了格莱 斯的观点以后，美国哲学家塞尔还提出了间接言语行为。
第六章 言语行为(课堂PPT)
奥斯汀（Austin）是英国牛津大学哲学教授，后继 者是奥斯汀的学生塞尔，在美国加利福利亚大学伯 克利分校执教。
从1952年开始，奥斯汀在牛津讲授题为“言与行” （Words and Deeds）的课程。
1955年，他被邀到哈佛作讲座，把讲稿题目改成 了“怎样用词做事”(How to Do Things with Words).。
我要学习认字了。”我和父亲都吃了一惊，
5
言语行为
言语行为就是人类行为中使用语言进行交际的行为。
世界由一系列的事件组成，其中有一种事件具有如 下的构成：一个发话者处于某种意图构建和发出了
一段口头或书面语的话语，另有一个或一些受话者
接受并理解了这一话语，从而作出与发话者意图一
致或不一致的反应，这样的事件就是一个言语行
3
你能把窗子关一下吗？ 你能把声音关小一点儿吗？
——请求 我保证星期五之前交论文。
—— 许诺 那个院子里有一条很凶的狗。
——警告
4
我劝你还是把心胸放宽一点儿。 别以为你干得很巧妙，我早就认清你是什么人了。
我提醒你，你这么下去很危险。 方英达说：“我警告你，如果你在第三阶段不用
尽全力，我要处分你。” 晚饭时，母亲突然说：“我宣布，从今天开始，
11
奥斯汀认为，要使“言”成功地有所“为”，必须 满足三个 “恰当条件”： 第一、说话人必须是具备实施某一行为的条件的人。 第二、说话人对自己要实施的行为必须抱有诚意。 第三、说话人对自己所说的话不能反悔。 奥斯汀把“有所为之言”的句子叫做施为句，施为句 的功能就Fra bibliotek“以言行事”。
12
2、施为句
施为句主要有两种：显性施为句和隐性施为句 显性施为句直接表明言有所为，采用陈述句的形式，带有施为动
第四节 言语行为理论(共23张PPT)
那个戒指真漂亮！ （断定或感叹——请求：我要那个戒指。）
别忘了，你还有一个上小学的儿子。
（提醒——威胁：你儿子的命还要不要？）
甲：我要减肥。
乙：我就喜欢你现在这个样子。 （宣告——劝阻：不用减肥。）
你真好！ （断定——表达）
丈夫：老婆，门铃响了，快去开门。 妻子：我没听见。 （可能1：断定——拒绝。可能2：断定。） 丈夫：真响了。 妻子：没看见我在做面膜吗？ （询问——断定：我没空开门；指令：你去开门。）
我不是好欺负的。
（断定——承诺：我一定会报复的。）
你真是一个好人。
（断定——感谢：太谢谢你了。） 我再也不要看到你了。（拉开房门）（ 断定——表情，命令：你快走！） 你做了这样的事，我还会容忍你吗？（拉开房门） （询问——表情，命令：你快走！）
（2）医生：你以后不能吸烟了。 （3）大家以后出校门时要带着学生证。 （4）要是再不听话就打屁股。
塞尔（John R．Searl）将言语行为分为以下五种类型：
1、断言类或阐述类。这类以言行事行为表示说话人对某事做出 一定程度的表态，对话语所表达的命题内容做出真假判断。表示 这种行为的动词有声称，陈述，声明，断定，否定，澄清等。
与客观现实之间的一致。表达宣告的动词主要有声称、 任命、指定、宣布等。
为了使行事行为的功用分类能够适应分析语言交际话动的需 要，应该对塞尔的分类进行适当的补充。为此可以在塞尔的 五种类别之后增加如下三个类别：
6.询问，这是说话者要求听话者提供某些特定信息的行事行为 。例如：“你能否告诉我……”
奥斯汀提出了“行事句”（performatives）的概念， 它指那些实施行事行为的句子。一般行事句都有行事动 词。所谓的行事动词是指示了行事行为的动词。
宏观语用学-言语行为理论
a. I'm really sorry!
b. Congratulations!
c. Oh,yes,great,mmm,ssahh!
In using an expressive,the speaker makes words fit the world(of feeling).
(5)Declaration
act
air in here.
Illocutionar A request of the hearer
y act
to open the window.
Perlocution The hearer's opening the
ary act
window or his refusal to
do so.
What speech act theory is most concerned with is illocutionary acts.It attempts to account for the ways by which speakers can mean more than what they say.It also designed to show cohereence in seemingly incoherent conversations.
（宣告类） Those utterances that the speaker uses to change a situation .In the following examples,the speaker has to have a special institutional role ,in a special context ,in order to perform a declaration appropriately.
第六章 言语行为PPT课件
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Searle为实施“许诺”制定了9个条件： 条件1 存在正常的语言输入或输出的条件 条件2 说话人通过所说的话X表达一个命题P 条件3 在表达命题P时，说话人S表述了他将要实施某一行
为A 条件4 听话人H希望说话人S实施而不是不实施行为A，并且
说话人S相信听话人H希望他实施而不是不实施行为A 条件5 S和H都不认为在事件的正常过程中S会实施行为A 条件6 S打算实施行为A 条件7 S认为他说出的话语X就意味着他有义务实施行为A
1969年，塞尔以其1959年的博士论文为基础，出 版了《言语行为——一篇语言哲学论文》一书。从 此“言语行为理论”成了该理论的正式名称。
.
8
一、Austin的言语行为理论
1、“言有所述”和“言有所为” 言有所述是有的话语来描写或陈述某一客观存在
的事态或事实，有或真或假的意义区别。
奥巴马宣布本·拉登已被击毙。 “王老师”说2011年5月11日台湾要发生大地震。 雅安地震了。 我们明天就考《语用学》了，我给你们每人打
造成了伤害或者不良影响。 3、说话人对自己的举止行为承认负有责任。 4、说话者传递出某种遗憾的信息。
.
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4、塞尔对言外行为的分类
1、断言行为（阐述类、裁决类） 2、指令行为（指令类、行使类） 3、承诺行为（承诺类） 4、表态行为（表态类） 5、宣告行为（宣告类）
.
32
言外行为 言外之的 （根本条件）
B说话人相信听话人曾经实施这一行为
3、诚意规则——说话人想使否定行为得以 实现
4、本质规则——说话人通过他对听话人所 具有的权威来否定他曾经的某一行为
.
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“撒谎”言语行为：
1、说话人言及一个命题P。 2、说话人相信P是虚假的。 3、但是说话人要让听话人相信命题P 是真实
《言语行为的概念》PPT课件
• （1）传播环境制约言语行为：
• （2）传播环境补充言语行为：利用 传播环境使言说取得更为充分的表 达效果
精选课件ppt
18
例如，可以利用时间因素来巧妙地组织言 语形式。
• 比如郭沫若在1978年全国科学大会上的 书面发言——《科学的春天》中，就恰 当地结合当时特定自然节气来组织言语 形式，作了这样的结尾：“春分已经过 去，清明即将到来。‘日出江花红胜火， 春来江水绿如蓝’，……这是人民的春 天，这是科学的春天” 。
人际传播的言语行为 何为“言语行为”?
• 瑞士语言学家索绪尔认为，“思想”在 没有被语言表达之前，“只是一团没有 定形的、模糊不清的浑然之物”，或者 说，“思想本身好像一团星云”，只有 当人们运用语言将“思想”（即要传播 的内容）组织为语言符号序列的时候， 才清晰可见，才能为他人所感知和理解。 因此，人们在传播过程中始终不离对于 语言的运用。
•
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朱元璋的故事2
• 和朱元璋一见面，他就直通通的说：“我主万
岁！还记得吗？从前，你我都替人家看牛，有
一天，我们在芦花荡里，把偷来的豆子放在瓦
罐里煮着。还没等煮熟，大家就抢着吃，把罐
子都打破了，撒下一地的豆子，汤都泼在泥地
里。你只顾从地下满把的抓豆子吃，却不小心
连红草叶子也送进嘴里。叶子梗在喉咙口，苦
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2
“行为”
• “行为”一词通常只是用来表示外在的身 体动作或活动。“言语行为”这个术语 的基本含义就是指在传播过程中人们运 用语言来表情达意的活动，它是一种以 交流信息为基本功能的传播行为。如果 说语言学主要是对语言符号系统及其规 律进行分析和描写，那么传播学则着重 考察人类是如何运用语言符号来交流信 息的，即着重研究言语行为。
间接言语行为
• 在交际中，实施间接言语行为，多为了 保留面子，也有可能出于其他目的：避 讳、含蓄、生动有趣等。例如：
• （2）1988年，他给一个倾心于他的姑娘发了 封“情报”——123456890。聪明的姑娘一下 子译破了这一“情报”：缺“7”（妻）。姑 娘表示，只要你休假回趟家，说啥也不会让你 缺“7”。（薛晓康：《驼路》，《人民文 学》）
思考与练习
（6）一位首长到部队视察，下属列队欢迎。 首长边检阅边向战士们致意。首长说： “同志们好！”战士们齐答：“首长 好！”首长说：“同志们辛苦了！”战 士们齐答：“为人民服务！”前排一个 胖墩墩的战士吸引了首长的目光，首长 走到这个战士身边，用力拍了拍他的肩 膀，说：“小伙子真胖！”那个战士随 口回答：“首长胖！”引来一阵大笑。
• (3A) 句中的“询问”言语行为和 (3B) 句中的 “陈述”言语行为，都被理解成了“请求”这 一规约性间接行为。
2）非规约性的间接言语行为
• 非规约性间接言语行为是指依据交际双方共知 的信息和所处的语境推断出来的间接言语行为。 如 • （4）甲：能告诉我你的电话号码吗？ • 乙：对不起，我记不清了。 • 乙的答话就字面用意而言，是一种“告知”行 为，但实际上是间接地“拒绝”甲的“请求”， 这一间接用意就是依据双方共知的信息和语境 通过推断来实现的，这当中包含着一个较为复 杂的推理过程（详后）。
• （1）A、Can you pass me the salt? • B、I request that you pass me the salt.
• C、Pass me the salt. • 这三句话，礼貌等级逐渐降低。
• 根据交际意图的实现方式的不同，可以把言语行为分 为直接言语行为和间接言语行为。 • 1、直接言语行为是说话人采用某种行事行为的表达 方式来实现其自身预期所能实现的意图。 • 2、间接言语行为是一种行事行为的形式表示另一种 行事行为。 • 间接言语行为可以分成规约和非规约两种类型。
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1. I christen/name this ship the Princess Elizabeth. 2. I now pronounce you man and wife. 3. I sentence you to ten years in prison. 4. I promise to come back by 6pm. 5. I command you to surrender immediately. 6. I apologize for being late.
Locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary speech acts
• Three facets of a speech act: Three facets of a speech act:
• locutionary act (phonic, phatic, rhetic): the production of a meaningful linguistic expression • illocutionary act: the action intended to be performed by a speaker in uttering a linguistic expression, by virtue of the conventional force associated with it. the con entional force associated ith it • perlocutionary act: the bringing about of consequences or effects on the audience through the uttering of a linguistic g g g expression, such consequences or effects being special to the circumstances of the utterance.
Pragmatics (Lecture on Language Education (Lecture on Language Education and Linguistic Information I)
Speech Acts
D. Y. Oshima Second Semester, AY 2010‐2011 DICOM‐GSID‐Nagoya University
Locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary speech acts
• An illocutionary act refers to an action that An illocutionary act refers to an action that the speaker accomplishes (or intends to accomplish) in the course of an utterance; accomplish) in the course of an utterance; e.g., accusing, apologizing, blaming, congratulating, giving persmission, joking, congratulating giving persmission joking nagging, naming, promising, ordering, refusing, swearing, and thanking. refusing swearing and thanking • illocutionary force, illocutionary force indicating device, illocutionary act potential indicating device illocutionary act potential
4. I ll come to the party. 4 I’ll come to the party
Felicity conditions on performatives
• felictity conditions vs truth conditions felictity conditions vs. truth conditions • Certain conditions must be met for a performative to be successful (or felicitous ). performative to be successful (or ‘felicitous’) • misfire, abuse
Felicity conditions as constitutive rules
• Searle’s view: the felicity conditions are not Searle s view: the felicity conditions are not only ways in which a speech act can be (in)appropriate, but they also jointly (in)appropriate but they also jointly constitute the illocutionary act/force. • In other words the felicity conditions are the In other words, the felicity conditions are the constitutive rules, i.e., rules that create the activity itself. activity itself
Speech Act Theory Speech Act Theory
• Initiated by John L Austin developed by John Initiated by John L. Austin, developed by John R. Searle. • saying & doing words & deeds saying & doing, words & deeds
1. Snow is white.
• Some sentences do not state: d
2. Good morning! 3. Is she a vegetarian? 4. Close the window, please.
Performatives vs. constatives Performatives vs. constatives
Performatives vs. constatives Performatives vs. constatives
• Background: Logical positivism; the key Background: Logical positivism; the key function of language is to make true or false statements. statements
• The ‘performativity’ can be made explicit by The performativity can be made explicit by the use of a performative verb and the adverb hereby. hereby • A performative verb typically (i) has a first‐ person singular subject, and (ii) is in the person singular subject and (ii) is in the simple present tense, the indicative mood, and the active voice. and the active voice
• Performatives:
• Explicit (with a performative verb)
3. I promise to come to the party. 3 I promise to come to the party
• Implicit (without a performative verb)
Performatives vs. constatives Performatives vs. constatives
• Constatives:
1. It is raining outside. 2. He will come to the party. He will come to the party. 3. I promised to come to the party.
Locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary speech acts
• Perlocutionary acts/effects (i) are not always Perlocutionary acts/effects (i) are not always intentional, (ii) are not under the speaker’s full control, (iii) and are less conventionally full‐control (iii) and are less conventionally tied to linguistic forms. • consequence by product consequence, by‐product
Locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary speech acts