外文翻译------人民币在中国：其价值、其可调节汇率和其未来发展

中文4430字
外文原文
The Chinese RMB: Its Value, Its Peg, and Its Future --TRADE IMBALANCES HAVE MORE TO DO WITH THE U.S. THAN WITH CHINA
T he valuation of the Chinese renminbi (RMB) has drawn lots of attention lately and a great deal of pressure on the part of developed nations for revaluation. In addressing the issue of valuation, this paper develops a new purchasing power parity (PPP) index of China’s exchange rate and finds that the while undervalued, the undervaluation is neither unusual nor bad policy. Moreover, China’s overall external trade balance does not seem to be that far out of equilibrium. China’s desire to join the G-7 club is likely to result in abandoning its peg, however, despite the increased risk to its economic development.
The valuation of the Chinese renminbi (RMB) has drawn lots of attention lately. The IMF, theU.S. government, and the G-7 finance ministers are urging China to revalue its currency,which is currently pegged at 8.28 to the dollar.The arguments for China to appreciate its currency roughly follow these lines:
• China’s currency is grossly undervalued;
• the undervalued RMB is attracting a flood of hot money into China, complicating the authorities’ efforts to engineer a soft-landing for an overheated economy; and • the RMB’s undervaluation and its peg to the dollar are preventing other Asian countries from allowing currencies to rise against the dollar, since appreciation would damage competiveness relative to China.
This last point is of particular concern because, it is argued , U.S. external imbalances cannot be addressed in the face of China’s and other Asian nations’historically unprecedented accumulations of U.S. dollar reserves in recent
years .There have been many studies on the RMB’s valuation with inconclusive, contradictory results (see, e.g.,Wang, 2004). To address that difficult valuation
question, this paper develops a new absolute PPP index that measures China’s PPP against the United States and other countries. The new index shows the RMB to be substantially undervalued in the context of “conventional wisdom.”However, the undervaluation is not unusual, given China’s level of economic development; and conventional wisdom does not apply to China, because by any measure it is an undeveloped nation for which a currency peg is useful to maintain domestic economic and political stability (Prasad et al., 2003). In terms of multilateral external balances, we find it hard to argue that China’s currency is contributing much to its trade and balance of payment surpluses, especially if one takes the 1997 perspective when the RMB was under tremendous depreciation pressure. Indeed, there is clear evidence that if China’s trade balance was evenly distributed among its trading partners, there would be hardly any pressure for China to appreciate its currency. Thus, the pressure is political and structural in nature, originating from the large and growing multilateral trade imbalance of the United States. Unfortunately, it is much easier to blame China than to attack the underlying structural causes of the U.S. trade deficit. We conclude that the political pressure on China to abandon the RMB’s peg to the dollar is likely to persist, and—as the most important growth market in the world today—China is more likely to move sooner rather than later to demonstrate that, in spite of the risks to its fragile financial system, it will share its global responsibilities as it eventually joins the G-7. The paper wraps up by placing the exchange issue in the broader context and discussing the longer-term prospects of the RMB.
Is the RMB Undervalued?
The RMB is undervalued in the conventional sense that there is too much demand for it relative to the supply .Fundamentally, demand for foreign currency comes from three sources:
• to buy goods or ser vices,
• to invest in physical or financial assets, and
• to speculate on moves of the exchange rate itself.
With a closed capital account, China’s currency is largely, but not entirely, immune from currency speculators and short-term portfolio investors. Recent studies at the China National Economic Research Institute (2003) indicate that much of the
so-called “hot money” inflows are not a result of foreign hedge fund activities. Rather, they are a change in borrowing and deposit behaviors of domestic firms and individuals, taking advantage of the loopholes in the current foreign exchange regulations. Thus, we can focus our attention on the trade and long term investment flows in China and look at the standard measures, such as purchasing power parity (PPP), trade balance, current account balance, balance of payments, and foreign reserves.
PPP is an ancient economic concept, dating back at least to David Hume (1752), which has been experiencing something of a revival lately .The Economist (current) defines P PP as “the exchange rate that equates the price of a basket of identical traded goods and services in two countries.” The theory is that PPP exchange rates represent the equilibrium levels among the nations and that any departure from these levels causes potentially significant and distorting trade imbalances. There are different measures of PPP: a strong version or “absolute” version that emphasizes the absolute equality of prices (sometimes called “the Law of One Price”) and a “relative” version that emphasizes the ongoing movement over time towards that equality.
Should China Bow to the Pressure?
Aside from political considerations, which we will discuss later, the question of whether China should move now is a complex one, relating to several considerations. First, market expectations of the RMB’s move have already caused a significant reversal of capital flight and increased upward speculative pressure. Second, cyclical global macroeconomic developments are likely to reduce upward pressure on the RMB. Third, China is in the midst of critical structural reforms, especially in the financial sector, that require focused attention. Fourth, it is increasingly clear that the current economic overheating is sectoral in nature, which is in sharp contrast with the 1993-4 episode. These considerations suggest that it is not in China’s interest to revalue the currency at this time . Let’s take a closer look at each of these issues.
Re-pegging the RMB
Re-pegging the RMB at a value, say, 15-20 percent higher against the U.S. dollar would instantly vindicate the currency speculators, although they are mostly domestic
players. Over the last couple of years, the net errors and omissions category in China’s balance of payment has shown a large swing from persistent deficits to a surplus of $7.5 billion in 2003. The net errors and emissions category is believed to capture illegal capital movements. During much of mid- to late-90s, China’s capital flight, as a percentage of GDP, was the second worst in the world (only Russia was worse). In fact, it was worse than Mexico in 1994 and South Korea in 1997 during the height of their currency crises. Recently, however, some of this capital is finding its way back, as expectations of RMB appreciation have raised. There is also strong indication that businesses and individuals are involved in currency speculation, which has contributed to the overheating of real estate investment. Revaluing now will encourage future speculation, which could exacerbate the balance of payments pressure.
More Chinese Interest Rate Flexibility
As the Fed continues to boost U.S. interest rates, Chinese authorities have more flexibility to raise domestic interest rates without worrying about widening the interest rate gap and encouraging further hot money inflows. With global economic growth only moderating a bit lately, demand for energy and commodities remains strong, which is likely to keep oil and commodity prices high and to increase the import bill for China and other Asian countries—yet another source of reduced pressure on the RMB. Indeed, as long as oil demand remains firm and geopolitical risks persist, the negative impact on Asia’s oil importing countries and concomitant, market-driven downward pressure on its currencies will not dissipate.
China’s Shaky Fundamentals
Perhaps most important, the sharp cyclical upswing since the end of the SARS crisis is masking China’s shaky fundamentals to the outside world. Despite modern factories, spanking new airports, highways, and shopping malls, Chin a’s social and financial institutions are perhaps comparable to those of the U.S. in the late 19th century period of the “Robber Barons.” A 2003 poll conducted by Peking University of about 100 China experts shows that one third of them believe there will be a major crisis in China before 2010. What is the most likely source of crisis? The most frequently mentioned are social (21 percent), financial (19 percent), economic (12
percent), and employment (10 percent). Rapid growth over the last two decades has increased income and social inequality, environmental degradation, and regional disparity. The incomplete transition from a centrally-planned economy to a market economy under authoritarian rule has enriched the elite and economic opportunists at the cost of generating a large underclass and eroding public wealth. As some Chinese economists point out, many Chinese local governments are effectively broke and eventually will need a central government bail-out.
Reminiscent of the age of the U.S. “Robber Barons,” the widespread, systematic corruption and abuse of power is estimated to cost as much as 14 percent of China’s GDP per year. The financial system—which includes the banking, securities, and insurance sectors needs an urgent overhaul to improve efficiency and be ready for foreign competition under China’s WTO commitment. Job creation remains a daunting challenge given continued efforts at transforming the
state-owned-enterprises and improving productivity growth. Then there are long-term issues, such as the aging population; under-funded pension and social security systems; and education, health care, and infrastructure issues. As one prominent economist in Beijing observed recently, “other than the central bank, few other high level officials want to talk about the exchange rate issue—there are far more urgent things to address.” To attack the problems on multiple-fronts, the top leaders clearly need to ensure stability and focus on the most urgent tasks of strengthening the Party’s effectiveness and effic iency on one hand, and reforming the domestic financial sector on the other.
Weak Link between Revaluation and Internal Adjustment Finally, based on international evidence (Rogoff, 2004) and China’s own experience, it is not at all clear that a revalued RMB will facilitate internal reform efforts. Revaluation of the RMB may not help that much in terms of cyclical macroeconomic adjustment. Despite significant increases in the headline inflation, core inflation remains low. This is a sharp departure from Ch ina’s historical overheating periods and suggests that there is no systematic price push from aggregate demand, as was the case in 1993-4 (Chu, 2003a). What is unsustainable is fixed investment growth in certain areas even while consumption and investment in other
areas still need to be encouraged. China’s gross investment as a share of GDP is running at above 40 percent, which is far beyond the 20-30 percent for most developing markets and higher than Japan’s and South Korea’s levels at a comparable stage of development. Granted, the central government is using very blunt instruments such as credit rationing and administrative orders to address the sectoral imbalances; but this does not suggest that changing the exchange rate right now would be a better alternative. On the contrary, an abrupt change in the foreign exchange regime would increase uncertainty and jeopardize the ability to fine-tune macro policies. Indeed, as Rogoff suggests, abandoning the peg to the dollar could be seen as abandoning China’s c ommitment to stable and sustainable macroeconomic growth.
The Issue Is Mostly Political
The growing U.S. external deficits are clearly unsustainable and must be addressed. It has been argued that the longer the United States waits, the higher the potential shock or damage there will be (Mann, 2004; BCA, 2004; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2004). But is revaluing the RMB part of the solution to this problem? A close look at the situation suggests that at best it may reduce the problem only marginally in the near term, while the longer-term impacts are unclear since foreign exchange policy changes can bring a host of unintended consequences. However, political reality gets in the way: politicians need to show voters and powerful lobbying groups that they are doing something. Exchange rates are a low-hanging fruit for them, even though they are a small fruit and—from the Chinese perspective—an unripe one. The really effective measures, such as addressing domestic demand imbalances and promoting U.S. goods and services exports, are unfortunately political non-starters in the United States. The perception that undervaluation of the RMB is the cause of U.S. trade deficits has also meant that China’s efforts in adjusting export competitiveness through non-foreign exchange measures have received little attention in the political debate.
Looking to the Future
The central point of this paper is that while the RMB is clearly undervalued (especially by PPP measures), there really has been no fundamental change in the valuation that warrants intensive market pressure for it to have depreciated in 1997-8
and to appreciate now. Looking at the broad picture, the relationship between the RMB’s peg to the dollar and China’s external account surpluses and rising foreign reserves is not as clear as often argued. The contribution of the RMB’s undervaluation to external imbalances in both the United States and China is insignificant in comparison with other structural factors, such as domestic demand imbalances for G3 and improving the investment environment (for Foreign Direct Investment—FDI) and export competitiveness in China relative to other countries. There are far better ways to address the imbalances with little distraction for China’s challenging domestic reform agenda. In particular, labor costs in China are rising.
China’s political capital is best invested in other areas of structural reform. Unfortunately, given its much larger influence on the global economy, China probably cannot say “no” this time to external political pressure and may move sooner than it would like. If history proves that China de-pegged before it is capable of handling the shock, the lesson would be that the G-7 failed to recognize that a stable, orderly progressing China is in the best interest of all. For the longer term, few doubt that China must adopt a more flexible exchange rate regime in this post-Breton Woods environment. A flexible RMB will allow China to conduct independent monetary policy (with an open capital account) and minimize the impact of fluctuations of major currencies, especially the U.S. dollar’s gyrations against the euro and the yen. China’s outward investment needs are growing rapidly and would benefit from a flexible RMB. But first, China needs to clean up the banking system, adjust capital accounts, and develop healthy and robust domestic financial markets. We can expect that a flexible exchange rate will improve China’s overall financial system. China has so far learned valuable lessons of the perils of opening the market too soon and allowing a currency to appreciate too fast from the experience of Japan and Southeast Asia. Going forward, it needs to study the positive lessons of liberalizing the exchange rates. The successful cases studies of Poland (from the dollar peg in 1990 to free float in 2000) and Chile (from fixed rate in 1981 to complete float in 1999) clearly show that liberalization can be accomplished without a major crisis; but it requires many gradual, cautious steps to reach the final destination.
外文翻译
人民币在中国：其价值、其可调节汇率和其未来发展————贸易不平衡对美国的影响大于对中国的影响中国人民币的估值最近已引起很多关注，同时在人民币升值方面承受着大量来自发达国家的压力。

在解决估值问题中，本文新引用的购买力平价（PPP）包含了中国的汇率指数，并认为人民币被低估，既不是不正常的低估，也不是糟糕的政策。

此外，中国的整体外贸的平衡，似乎远远低于平衡。

中国加入七国集团俱乐部的希望很可能导致放弃联系汇率，尽管增加的风险能促进经济的发展。

最近，我国人民币的估值已经引起了广泛的关注。

就连国际货币基金组织、美国政府和金融七国的负责人都以人民币来估计他们的通货价值，人民币对美元的汇率为8.28人民币。

对于我国人民币汇率升值的讨论大约有下列几点：中国人民币被普遍的低估；被低估的人民币正在吸引大量的热通货进入中国，复杂的货币当局努力致力于过热的软着陆经济。

并且人民币被低估和它对美元的汇率是用于防止允许对美元的通货升值的其他亚洲国家的，因为人民币升值将破坏其他国家与中国的竞争关系。

竞争理念的最重要核心是因为它被过度的讨论。

近年来，美国外部失衡触及中国和其他亚洲国家的历史上前所未有的美元储备危机。

出现了许多关于人民币不确定估值的研究和自相矛盾的结果。

为了解决这一困难的估价问题，本文开发了一个对美国和其他国家来说是新的绝对购买力平价指数：中国购买力平价的措施。

新指数显示了“传统智慧”下，人民币被大幅低估的具体情况。

然而，人民币被低估是不同寻常的，鉴于中国的经济发展水平，传统智慧并不适用于中国，因为任何标准来衡量它都不是一个发达的国家，没有发达国家有较稳定的货币汇率以维持国内经济和政治稳定（普拉萨德等，2003）。

对多边外部平衡方面而言，我们觉得很难说中国的货币对其贸易和国际收支盈余有很大的促进作用，尤其是如果从1997年的角度来看，人民币承受巨大的贬值压力。

事实上，有明确的证据表明，如果中国的贸易平衡，均匀地分布在其贸易伙伴，将几乎没有任何中国的货币升值的压力。

因此，从美国发起的范围越来越大，次数越来越多的多边贸易不平衡来看，压力是政治和结构性的。

不幸的是，它是非常容易的，而不是指责中国攻击美国贸易赤字的结构性根源。

是对中国政府施加政治压力，放弃人民
币只钉住美元，并作为世界上最重要的增长市场上，迟早中国更容易证明，尽管中国有其脆弱的金融风险体系，但它最终加入了七国集团并将分担其全球责任。

本文包含更广范围内的交流问题，并讨论了人民币的长期前景。

是人民币被低估？
人民币在传统意义上被低估，从根本上讲有太多的需求相对于供应。

从根本上来说，对外币的需求来自三个方面：
•购买商品或服务，
•投资于实物或金融资产，
•要猜测汇率本身的变化。

随着封闭的、独立的资本账户的产生，中国的通货变得数量较大而重要，但对于货币投机者和短期投资者的投资组合情况来看，这一事实也不完全适用。

在中国国民经济研究所（2003）最近的科学研究表明，所谓的“热钱”流入的多少并不是国外对冲基金活动的结果。

相反，他们是利用在当前外汇汇率管制规定存在漏洞这一优势，改变当地企业和个人的借款和存款行为。

因此，我们可以着眼于对中国的贸易和投资流动的长期关注，并期待产生标准的措施，例如购买力平价（PPP）、贸易收支平衡、经常帐差额、国际收支和外汇储备。

购买力平价学说是一个古老的经济概念，至少可以追溯到大卫休谟（1752），已经经历了至少一次复兴。

经济学家（目前）将购买力平价学说定义为“汇率，相当于在两个国家的商品交易和服务中的一篮子价格相同的购买力平价的东西。

”该理论认为，购买力平价的汇率代表国家之间的均衡水平，而从这些层面出发的任何潜在的重大原因和扭曲贸易存在不平衡。

PPP有许多不同的购买力平价措施：一个强大的版本或“绝对”的版本，强调了价格的绝对平等（有时称为“单一价格法则”）和“相对”的版本，强调随着时间的推移，趋于平等运动。

中国会屈服于这些压力吗
除了政治上的考虑，我们将在后面讨论，人民币是否流动现在变成一个复杂的问题，涉及到几个因素。

首先，人民币的移动市场预期已经造成了重大逆转资本外逃，并且增加了更多的投机压力。

第二，周期性的全球宏观经济发展有可能减少对人民币升值的压力。

第三，中国正处于重要的结构改革中期，尤其是在金融行业部分需要重点关注。

第四，人们越来越清楚，目前的经济过热的现象是暂时的，这与1993-4事件形成鲜明对比。

这些因素表明这个时候不是中国货币升值的关注点所在。

让我们来逐一看看这些问题的讨论。

重新盯住人民币汇率变动
在一定水平上重新盯住人民币价值，也就是说，货币对美元的汇率变动15%-20%时投机者会立即平反货币，但它们大多是国内的投资者。

在过去几年中，净误差与遗漏在中国的国际收支类别都出现了持续的赤字，最大的变动则为2003年盈余的75亿元。

净误差和排放类被认为是非法获取的资金流动。

在90年代中后期，大部分的中国的资本外逃，国内生产总值的百分比是世界倒数第二（只有俄罗斯是更糟）。

事实上，在货币危机期间，它比1997年的墨西哥和1997年的韩国还差。

但最近，由于人民币升值预期已经提高，这部分资本也在寻找升值的路。

也有强烈的迹象表明，企业和个人都参与货币投机活动，这促成了不动产投资过热的现象。

现在人民币升值看好未来的预期收益，这可能加剧国际收支平衡的压力。

加大中国利率的浮动幅度
更由于美联储继续提高美元利率，中国当局无需担心利率差距拉大，有更大的灵活性来提高人民币利率，并鼓励进一步的热钱流入国内利率。

随着全球经济增长放缓，近来，对能源和大宗商品的需求依然强劲，这很可能使石油和商品价格居高不下，从而对中国和其他亚洲国家增加进口费用，又减少了对人民币的压力来源。

的确，只要长期石油需求和政治风险仍然存在，对亚洲的石油进口国的负面影响将随之而来，以市场为导向的货币压力不会消失。

中国摇摇欲坠的基础
在SARS危机结束后，也许中国最重要、尖锐的周期性回升是掩盖中国对于外部世界的摇摇欲坠的基础问题。

尽管现代化的厂房、崭新的机场、公路和商场，中国的社会和金融机构可以与美国的19世纪的中后期“Robber Barons”时期相比。

2003年的北京大学进行的约100名中国专家的民意调查中显示，他们其中有三分之一相信在2010年之前中国有重大危机。

危机的最可能的来源是什么？最常提到的有社会（21%）、金融（19%）、经济（12%）和就业（10%），在过去两十年收入的快速增长和社会不平等、环境恶化、地区差距等。

从中央计划经济过渡到一个不完全的独裁统治下的市场经济，丰富了产生大量下层，侵蚀着社会财富精英和经济成本机会主义。

正如一些中国经济学家指出，许多中国的地方政府有效地打破了平衡，最终将需要一个中央政府救市。

回想美国的“Robber Barons”时代的广泛的腐败和滥用权力每年所花费的费用估计是中国国民生产总值的14%。

包括银行、证券、保险业的金融系统迫切
需要改革来提高效率，并在中国的入世承诺下应对国外的竞争。

创造就业机会，提高生产率仍然是给予改造国有企业的一个艰巨的挑战，需要相关当局继续努力。

同时有长期的问题存在，如人口老化、较低的退休金和不完善的社会保障系统，以及教育、卫生保健和基础设施问题。

正如在北京的一位著名经济学家最近观察到，“比起中央银行，其他一些高级官员更想谈谈汇率问题，还有更迫切的事情要处理。

”对多战线的问题的冲击，高层领导人显然需要确保稳定和集中一方面加强党的有效性和效率，在其他方面改革国内金融各个部分。

重估之间的薄弱环节和内部调整
最后，在国际经验（罗格夫，2004年）和中国本身的经验的基础上，人民币升值是否将促进内部改革的努力仍是不太确定的事。

人民币升值可能无助于宏观经济的周期性调整。

尽管在整体通胀率显示上升，但核心通货膨胀率仍然很低。

这是从中国的历史过热时期急剧离境，并且从总需求中显示不出系统价格的推动作用，正如在1993-4的案例（楚，2003年）。

不可持续现象是指在一些领域的固定的投资增长，而在其他领域的消费和投资仍然需要鼓励的情况。

中国的投资情况体现在GDP上是40%以上的增长，远远超出了大多数发展中国家市场的20%-30%，也超过了发展水平较好的日本和韩国。

中央政府正在使用诸如信贷配给和行政命令以解决各部门的不平衡，但这并不表明，改变现在的汇率将是一个更好的选择。

相反，外汇制度突然变化会增加不确定性和损害微调的宏观政策。

的确，正如罗格夫建议，放弃盯住美元可以作为对中国的承诺来迎接稳定和可持续的宏观经济增长出现。

主要是政治的问题
日益增长的美国的对外赤字是不可持续的，并且必须清楚地加以解决。

据讨论认为，美国不再等待，因为较高的潜在冲击或损害会存在（曼，2004年;基本能力评估，2004年Obstfeld和Rogoff，2004）。

但是，重估人民币对这个问题的解决方案的一部分？在密切关注有关情况表明，它可能会减少，充其量只能勉强该问题在短期内存在，而长期影响目前还不清楚，因为外汇政策的变化可以带来意想不到的后果。

然而，政治现实的方式获取：政客需要显示针对时间价值和强大的游说团体他们正在采取措施。

汇率为他们唾手可得，即使是一个小水果，从中医角度，一个不成熟的、真正有效的措施，如解决国内需求的不平衡和促进美国商品和服务出口，这不幸的政治并非在美国首发。

人们认为，人民币低估是造成美国贸易赤字的元婴。

也意味着，通过非竞争力调整出口方面，中国的外汇
措施的努力已经收到了政治辩论的重视。

展望未来
本文的中心观点是，迫于1997年8月贬值和现在升值的估值激烈的市场压力，人民币明显被低估（特别是购买力平价措施），但确实在估值上没有太大的根本性改变。

总体状况看，人民币盯住美元，中国的对外账户盈余和外汇储备增加三者之间的关系，不是像经常讨论的那么容易说清楚。

人民币的低估对美国和中国外部失衡的贡献是体现在其它结构性因素上，如国内需求的不平衡，改善投资环境（外商直接投资—FDI）与中国相对于其他国家的出口竞争力。

将来有更好的方式来解决中国的国内改革议程挑战的不平衡，特别是如今中国的劳动力成本正在上升。

在其他地区的结构改革中，中国的政治资本是最好的投资典范。

不幸的是，中国对全球经济的影响还有待加强，中国可能就不会对这个时期外部政治压力说“不”并可能更快到来。

如果历史证明如此，中国就会在冲击发生之前取消不合理制度，这将是世界7国集团没有认识到，一个稳定、有序的国际化进展，是中国的最佳利益。

长远而言，毫无疑问中国必须采取在后布雷顿森林环境中更加灵活的汇率制度。

灵活的人民币将使中国进行独立的货币政策（以开放的资本帐户），减少对主要货币，尤其是美元兑欧元和日元波动波动的影响。

中国的对外投资需求快速增长，并受益于一个灵活的人民币。

但首先，中国需要清理银行系统，调整资金账户，并发展健康，强劲的国内金融市场。

我们可以预期，一个灵活的汇率制度将提高中国的整体金融体系。

中国迄今已从日本和东南亚开放市场的太快，让货币升值过快中吸取宝贵的教训。

展望未来，中国需要研究开放、积极的汇率制度。

波兰的成功案例研究（从1990年的关联汇率到2000年的自由浮动汇率）和智利（从1981年的固定利率在1999年实现浮动利率）清楚地表明，没有出现大的危机时自由化可以完成，但它需要许多渐进谨慎的步骤以达到最终目的地。