公共事业管理 外文翻译 外文文献 英文文献 _公共池塘资源_中_按比例缩减_的效力与局限性

外文出处：rlocatereconbase.ht ml
(用外文写)
附件1：外文资料翻译译文
“公共池塘资源”中“按比例缩减”的效力与局限性
摘要：
本文调查了“按比例缩减”（proportional cutbacks）作为一种改进“公共池塘资源”(CPRs)性能的分配规则的优点以及局限性，并对这两个方面的案例加以分析。

对于对称的公共池塘资源，我们已经建立了提高效率的“按比例缩减”，但随之带来的各种复杂因素引起了“按比例缩减”闭联集的不对称。

这种不对称将效率提高于“纳什均衡”（Nash equilibrium）之上。

将“公共池塘资源”这个线性二次方程模型用于调整全球二氧化碳的排放，其按比例缩减——正如京都议定书中所体现的，达到了高效、合理分配的效果。

1、导言
公共池塘资源(CPRs)是一种自然或人工的资源。

但很显然，由于其中自然的或体制上的障碍，所以其排他性也是非比寻常的，并且收益将会减少。

一个普遍的假定是，适合于CPRs的个人会陷于社会意义上的两难境地，这将不可避免地造成资源的浪费与破坏(cordon, 1954; Hardin,1968)。

近几年，学者们备有大量田野设置数据，它们主要记录了个体所面对的，很多复杂的，源于CPR设置的占有问题。

尽管很多研究与这一有关过度使用的悲观假设一致，但越来越多的研究证明了资源使用者的能力，即创造并内在地维持公共机构，以便使这些资源的使用更有效率。

实验结果中出现的CPR两难境地的有限重复结构，从理论上支撑了田野调查的发现。

当主题（subject）被放置于独立做出决定的设置中时，他们的集体行为就与对资源使用的平衡预测保持一致。

另一方面，当被允许使用或沟通其他合作机制时，主题通常采用与效率和可支持的资源使用一致的维持协议(Ostrom et al., 1994; Walker et al., 1991)。

即使在参与者的资产不对称的案例中，面对面的交流也使得参与者接近最优先性。

(Hackett et al., 1994)
在很多例子中，资源使用者仅仅在超过了可忍耐的极限时才认识到他们的过度使用。

因而，一些形式上的减少是必需的。

在那些资源使用者整合他们的占有行为的情况下，一种十分简单的机制便开始实施了——这就是“按比例缩减”（proportional cutbacks）。

在这种情况下，所有的资源使用者都同意以相同的比
例减少其占有行为。

在使用者的用途相同的事例中，利益减少了，并导致支出。

这种机制具有非常强的吸引力，因为“按比例缩减”造成了积极的后果。

然而，在使用者的用途不同的事例中，这种机制会导致明显的分配冲突。

某些情况下，“按比例缩减”也会造成资源使用率的下降。

当一小部分使用者通过对所有使用者的占有水平的限制从而获得利益时，这一小部分人将会组织起以长期的共同协议，用来支持他们对一个资源的使用。

比如，他们可能愿意为了达成共识而付出大部分交易费，从而减少甚或假定他们费用的大部分。

毋庸置疑，当使用者是主权国的时候，达成共识所带来的复杂性远远比单个的、处于各自的主权国的使用者要大。

这样的情况具有先天的不对称性。

由于国际共识往往受到政治关注，同时，最近的理论工作也有很大进展，因此各种异质成分对于取得更为有效办法的影响成为了一个丰富的研究主题。

两篇重要的文章（Baland and Platteau [1997]）说明了财富的不均可能会促进或阻碍CPRs 的有效使用。

在没有规范化的设置中，用于抽样的技术是一个关键因素。

在凸起的生产技术的设置中（正如我们下面模构的那样），财富的不均会加剧效率低下。

当它们是一些的表面不凸起的技术设置（暗示着不可分割或极限现象）的时候，财富的不均会提高CPRs的使用效率。

Baland and Platteau（1998）这本书还说，当使用者中的不平衡增加时，从规则调节中所获得的效率会更低。

Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan（1998）在考察了不平衡的财富分配对于效益的影响之后，他们发现财富的不平衡与效率下降有着密切联系。

另一方面，一旦涉及到实质上不平衡的案例，一个游戏者的资产的进一步增长会将参与者推向最优先性。

一个关于资产不平衡和经济效率的曲线关系被安置。

为了更好地理解“按比例缩减”机制如何在这个领域中产生并维持，第2部分给我们提供了关于正反两个方面的案例，一是“蒙特利尔协定” (the Montreal Protocol)，在这个例子当中这一机制得到了成功的贯彻与监控；第二是“欧洲渔业缩减” (EU fishing cutbacks)，在这个例子中，这一机制的运作是否成功还有待证实。

在案例分析之后，第3部分主要分析了“按比例缩减”的理论基础，这一理论基础提高了CPR的性能。

我们建立了一系列的“按比例缩减”，以便将使用者从低效率的博弈平衡导向一个更好的结果——在某些例子中，甚至是导向一个最好的结果。

同时，对它的基本判断标准是：在我们明确给定的范围之内，“按比例缩减”的数量不能过大。

在第4部分，一个CPR的变量级模型将推导出，并且进一步
阐明以上这些结果。

我们将使用一个对于这个模型的具体校对标准，研究京都议定书这个案例当中，“按比例缩减”是如何运作的。

第5部分将我们对“一次性博弈”（one-shot games）的分析，延伸到对时效性的CPR情况的研究，在这种情况下，使用者们在利益和预先占有权等方面有很大的不同。

第6部分得出结论。

2.“按比例缩减”的应用
70年代末，卫星图像显示了最初在北极出现的，后来也在南极上空出现的臭氧层空洞。

气象学家立即着手研究它的原因，以及臭氧空洞对地球上生物的影响。

臭氧层作为对宇宙射线的屏障，其消失可造成对地球生物圈的致命影响。

更糟糕的是，据观察，臭氧空洞还在进一步扩大——在南半球的冬季，南极上空的臭氧空洞几乎覆盖了整个南极洲，然而北极上空的臭氧空洞却相对小一些了。

1985年，大气化学研究者给出了一个关于臭氧空洞的解释：当chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)作为气溶胶罐的促进物和空调、冰箱的冷冻剂使用时，这种物质就造成了臭氧空洞现象。

每一个排放到大气中的CFC分子，会在臭氧层破坏掉至少4000个臭氧分子，因此，当CFC因商业目的而广泛使用时，它在短期内就对臭氧层造成了很严重的破坏。

鉴于以上的原因，国际上开始讨论并制定限制商业CFC排放量的条约。

实质上，这种限令是“按比例缩减”局限性的一个典型事例——100%的缩减。

这种缩减增加了空调、冰箱的生产成本，其价格也相应提高了。

此外，开发出气溶胶罐促进剂的替代品又要花数以万计的金钱。

这些减缩带来的后果在发达国家体现得尤为集中，发展中国家也会受到一定影响。

条约的协商在1987年有了结果，当年125个国家签署的蒙特利尔协定旨在减少全球破坏臭氧物质的排放量，在10年之内逐步淘汰CFCs物质的生产与销售——于是氟利昂就在美国的空调与冰箱中消失了。

(UNEP,1991).
在臭氧空洞这个事例中，“按比例缩减”的应用确实是成功的。

臭氧空洞停止扩大了，尽管可能还要等一百年它才会完全消失。

这种“按比例缩减”为地球的生活基本条件所带来的利益远远大于CFC生产者和消费者付出的代价。

事实上，后者在不对大气造成危害的前提下成功替代了CFCs。

但并不是所有国际上对“按比例缩减”的使用都那么成功，欧盟的渔业政策就是一个反面例子。

欧洲海域内的过渡捕捞使得很多鱼类濒临灭绝，比如鳕鱼、鲱鱼、沙丁鱼、鲑鱼等等。

这样持续地捕捞肯定是不行的，在使这些鱼类灭绝的同时也会带来欧洲鱼类贸易的停止。

这个问题实际上牵连到很多欧盟和非欧盟国家的共同利益(UK vs. Iceland, France vs. Canada, Spain vs. Canada)，也会增加欧盟成员国的紧张关系。

欧洲委员会在1996提议在6年之内逐步实施40%的“按比例缩减”，以解决欧洲渔业的问题。

但这一决议受到许多国家的反对，因此委员会不得不撤销这个决议。

关于它的讨论显示出渔业强国和渔业小国的区别——西班牙、葡萄牙并不希望有任何捕捞限制，而英国则希望对上述两国有更大的限制。

1997年4月，欧洲委员会制定了一个“按比例缩减”的修正计划。

在这个计划当中，捕鱼船队将根据其过度捕捞的程度进行缩减。

对于那些“极为濒危”的鱼类，捕鱼船队将在5年内减少30% ，其中包括大西洋鲑鱼，以及大西洋旗鱼；而对于那些属于“过度捕捞”类型的鱼类，捕捞数量将减少20%；对于所有其他的鱼类，捕鱼船的尺寸被严格限制。

欧洲议会按照多数原则制定了这个修正计划。

虽然法国和英国至今还反对这一计划，但为数更多的国家所投的赞成票使得他们得以最终胜出(Pesca, 1998)。

在40余年的过度捕捞之后，现在还很难断定欧盟所采取的多种“按比例缩减”方法是否可以有效地复兴当地渔业。

在这一点上，加拿大有着类似经验。

该国也采取了类似的“按比例缩减”，以挽救其处于危险中的鳕鱼捕捞业。

尽管渔业政策已实行25年，但目前加拿大的鳕鱼捕捞业在商业上已经消亡。

(Finlayson and McCay, 1998).
从国际性的角度考虑，欧洲面临的困难比加拿大还要大。

比如，目前的国际协议已经明文规定，对濒危鱼类——大西洋旗鱼的捕捞每年不能超过13300吨，因为只有这样才能保持对这一鱼类资源的持续使用。

然而，实际的捕捞量是每年16000，其中有一半还是非欧盟成员捕捞的。

世界上相关的国家(USA, Canada, Japan, EFTA members)都在呼吁对大西洋旗鱼捕捞的“按比例缩减”，即减少30%的捕捞以使鱼的数量恢复到协议规定的指标。

但即使欧洲把他们的捕捞减少30%，也就是8000至5600吨，对大西洋旗鱼的保护问题依然得不到完全的解决。

附件2：外文原文
The power and limitations of proportional cutbacks in common-pool resources Abstract
This paper examines the success and limitations of proportional cutbacks as an alloca-tion rule for improving the performance of common-pool resources_CPRs.. Two fieldcases, one success and one failure, motivate the analysis. For symmetric CPRs, we establish the existence of efficiency-enhancing proportional cutbacks. We then introduce complications that arise in the presence of asymmetries, which induce a continuum of proportional cutbacks that raise efficiency above Nash equilibrium. Calibrating a linear–quadratic CPR model to global carbon dioxide emissions, the efficiency anddistributional consequences of proportional cutbacks like those embodied in the Kyoto Protocol are derived. q2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Common-pool resources_CPRs.are natural or man-made resources in which_a. exclusion is nontrivial due to significant physical or institutional barriers and_b. yield is subtractable _Ostrom et al., 1994.. The general presumption is that individuals appropriating from CPRs are trapped in social dilemmas, leading inevitably to overuse and destruction of those resources _Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968.. In recent years, scholars have documented a large number of field settings in which individuals face complex appropriation issues arising in CPR settings. Although many of these studies are consistent with the pessimistic presumption of overuse, a growing number of studies document the capabilities of resource users to create and maintain institutions endogenously in order to facilitate more efficient use of the resources they use in common.1 The results from laboratory experiments, with the structure of finitely repeated CPR dilemmas, support the findings from the field. When subjects are placed in settings in which decisions are made in isolation, with minimal institutional structure, their aggregate behavior is generally consistent with equilibrium predictions of inefficient resource use. On the other hand, when allowed to communicate or use other coordinating mechanisms, subjects often adopt and maintain agreements consistent with efficient and sustainable resource use_Ostrom et al., 1994; Walker et al., 1991.. Even in cases where the assets of participants are asymmetric, face-to-face communication allows
participants to approach optimality_Hackett et al., 1994.. In many cases, resource users recognize their overuse only after the total of all of their withdrawals exceeds a sustainable level. Thus, some form of cutback is needed. In situations in which groups of resource users have coordinated their appropriation activities, a very simple institution has frequently been implemented —proportional cutbacks. Under such an institution, all resource users agree to reduce their appropriation activities by the same proportion. In cases where users are homogeneous in current usage, benefits received, and costs incurred, such an institution has strong appeal because a proportional cutback exists that leads to an optimal outcome. However, in cases in which users are heterogeneous with respect to important attributes related to use _current appropriation levels, benefits, costs, etc.., such an institution can lead to significant distributional conflict. In some circumstances, a proportional cutback can also lead to a decrease in efficiency in resource use. When a few users obtain major benefits from restrictions on the appropriation levels of all users, the few face strong incentives to organize agreements to achieve long-term sustainable use of a resource. As such, they maybe willing to bear most of the transaction costs of achieving an agreement to cutback andror even assume a large proportion of the costs of a cutback themselves.Needless to say, when the users are sovereign nation states, the complicationsinvolved in reaching and sustaining any agreement are even greater than when the users are all individuals living within a single sovereign state. Such situations are inherently asymmetric. The impact of various kinds of heterogeneities on the likelihood of achieving more efficient results is now becoming a rich topic for analysis, both because of major policy concerns related to international agreements, but also because of recent theoretical work. In a pair of important articles, Baland and Platteau_1997. demonstrate that wealth inequality may promote or discourage efficient use of CPRs. In unregulated settings, the technology used for extraction is a key factor.In settings with convex production technologies_as we model below., wealth inequality is likely to exacerbate inefficiencies. When there are nonconvexities _implying indivisibility or threshold phenomena., wealth inequality can promote efficient use of the CPR. Baland and Platteau_1998.also demonstrate that the efficiency gains from regulation will be lower as inequality among users increases.
Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan_1998.examine the impact of unequal distribution of assets on the efficiency of outcomes. They find that increasing asset inequality is associated with increased inefficiency. On the other hand, once substantial inequality is the case, still further increases in the assets of one player may push participants closer to optimality. A curvilinear relation between asset inequality and economic efficiency is posited. To better understand how a proportional cutback institution can arise and be maintained in the field, Section 2 provides a summary of two field cases, one _the Montreal Protocol. in which such an institution was successfully implemented and monitored, and another_EU fishing cutbacks.in which the success of the institution is yet to be proven. Moving from the case studies, Section 3 examinesm the theoretical basis for proportional cutbacks to improve CPR performance. In particular, we establish the existence of a range of proportional cutbacks to move users from an inefficient game equilibrium to an improved outcome —in some cases, even an optimum. The basic criterion is that the proportional cutback be not too large, for which we give an explicit bound. Section 4 develops a model for a parametric class of CPR situations to illustrate these results. We apply a specific calibration of the model to study the workings of proportional cutbacks in the Kyoto Protocol. Section 5 extends our analysis of one-shot games to time-dependent CPR situations, where users are heterogeneous in benefits and prior appropriation rights to the CPR are present. The Section 6 offers concluding comments.
2. Proportional cutbacks in the field
In the late 1970s, satellite photos revealed for the first time the presence of ozone holes in the earth’s atmosphere over the North and South Poles. Atmo spheric scientists immediately began researching probable causes for the ozone holes, as well as their likely implications for life on the planet. Since atmospheric ozone shields life on the planet from lethal radiation from space, the complete disappearance of ozone from the atmosphere would have catastrophic consequences for the biosphere. Even worse, the ozone holes were observed to be expanding — with the ozone hole over the South Pole covering almost the entire continent of Antarctica during the Southern Hemisphere’s winter, and the hole over the North Pole somewhat smaller. By 1985, atmospheric
chemists had provided a causal explanation for the ozone holes beyond any reasonable doubt: chlorofluorocarbons_ed as propellants in aerosol cans and as coolants in air conditioners and refrigerators were the culprits. Each molecule of CFC, released at the earth’s surface, had the capacity to rise to the ozone layer and chemically unbind over 4000 molecules of ozone. CFCs, which had come to commercial prominence in this century, had in a short time created the ozone holes. In response to the ozone situation, negotiations began on an international treaty to ban the commercial production of CFCs by all countries. In essence, this ban represents the limiting case of a proportional cutback — a 100% cutback. Such cutbacks would certainly increase costs of refrigeration and air conditioning, both for producers and consumers. Moreover, new propellants would have to be developed for the multibillion-dollar aerosol-can industry worldwide. The costs of these cutbacks would be concentrated in the developed countries, but they would also be felt in the developing countries. Treaty negotiations moved swiftly, culminating in the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, adopted by over 125 countries in 1987. The Montreal Protocol phases out the production and distribution of CFCs over a 10-year period — freon is just now disappearing from refrigerators and air conditioners in the United States _UNEP, 1991.. In the case of the ozone holes, the use of proportional cutbacks must be counted a considerable success. The holes themselves have stopped growing, although it is estimated it will take at least a century before they disappear altogether. The benefits to the quality of life on earth outweigh the losses to CFC producers and consumers. Indeed, the latter have succeeded in developing close substitutes for CFCs without serious atmospheric consequences. Not all international attempts to use proportional cutbacks are as successful as the Montreal Protocol. To cite just one example, consider the common fisheries of the European Union_EU.. Persistent overfishing of EU waters has led to serious declines in the population of species such as cod, herring, mackerel, sole, sardines, and salmon. Fishing at current levels is clearly unsustainable, and could lead to commercial extinction of all the above species in EU waters. Indeed, the problem has been so severe as to lead to international incidents involving EU member countries and other countries _UK vs. Iceland, France vs. Canada, Spain] vs. Canada., as well as tensions between EU members.
In an attempt to address the situation, the European Commission in 1996 proposed a proportional cutback of 40% in the fishing fleets of all EU member countries, to be phased in over 6 years. These cutbacks were attacked by various countries, and the Commission withdrew the plan rather than see it vetoed. The discussion exhibited a sharp difference between rich and poor fishing countries — with Spain and Portugal wanting little if any reduction in their fleets, while the UK wanted even larger reductions in Spanish and Portuguese fleets. In April of 1997, the European Commission brought forward a revised proportional cutbacks plan. Under this plan, fishing fleets are to be differentially reduced, depending on the severity of the overfishing. For species in the category ‘‘most endangered,’’ fishing fleets are to be cut back by 30% over the next 5 years. This category includes Atlantic salmon and Atlantic swordfish. For species in the category ‘‘overfished,’’ fleets are to be cut back by 20% over that same period. For all other species, the size of the fishing fleet is frozen. The European Council decided this revised plan by weighted majority rule. France and the UK, both still opposed to the revised plan, were out-voted by the rest of the member states _Pesca, 1998.. It is still too early to tell if the EU’s adoption of a variety of proportional cutbacks, after 40 years of overfishing, will lead to a comeback in commercial fish populations. In this regard, the experience of Ca nada, which used similar cutbacks in an attempt to save its ‘‘most endangered’’ cod fishery, is hardly cause for optimism. The Canadian cod fishery, despite 25 years of fisheries policy that attempted to sustain it, is now commercially extinct_Finlayson and McCay, 1998.. The difficulties facing the EU are even greater, given the international dimension. Consider the most endangered Atlantic swordfish. The current international agreement calls for only 11,300 tons to be taken in a given year — a rough estimate of sustainable use. By contrast, the actual harvest is 16,000 tonsryear —half of which is taken by EU members. Proportional cutbacks on the part of all countries involved in this fishery_USA, Canada, Japan, EFTA members.of roughly 30% are called for to restore the agreed level. Even if the EU were to cut its harvest back by 30%, from 8000 to 5600 tons, that would still only go halfway to solving the Atlantic swordfish problem. These cases illustrate situations in which resource users have adopted proportional cutback institutions in an attempt to reduce overall appropriation levels. The
theoretical results of the next two sections examine the extent to which such a simple institution as proportional cutbacks can lead to desirable efficiency and distributional consequences.。