外文翻译--股权结构与公司绩效 以印度为例

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出处:Srivastava A. Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance: Evidence from India[J]. International Journal of Humanities & Social Science, 2011, 7(3):209–233.
原文
Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance: Evidence from India
Author: Aman Srivastava
Abstract
Ownership structure of any company has been a serious agenda for corporate governance and that of performance of a firm. Thus, who owns the firm’s equity and how does ownership affect firm value has been a topic investigated by researchers for decades. Thus, the impact of ownership structure on firm performance has been widely tackled in various developed markets and more recently in emerging markets, but was less discussed before, in India in recent changing environment. This paper is a moderate attempt to address the relationship of ownership structure of the firm and its performance. It investigates whether the ownership type affects some key accounting and market performance indicators of listed firms. The 98 most actively listed companies on BSE 100 indices of Bombay Stock Exchange of India, which constitute the bulk of trading, were chosen to constitute the sample of the study as of end of 2009-10. The findings indicate the presence of highly concentrated ownership structure in the Indian market. The results of the regression analyses indicate that the dispersed ownership percentage influences certain dimensions of accounting performance indicators (i.e. ROA and ROE) but not stock market performance indicators (i.e. P/E and P/BV ratios), which indicate that there might be other factors (economic, political, contextual) affecting firms performance other than ownership structure. Keywords: Ownership structure, corporate performance, corporate governance, India
1. Introduction
Ownership structure of any company has been a serious agenda for corporate governance and that of performance of a firm. Thus, who owns the firm’s equity and how does ownership affect firm value has been a topic investigated by researchers for decades. Thus, the impact of ownership structure on firm performance has been widely tackled in various developed markets and more recently in emerging markets, but was less discussed before, in India in recent changing environment. Though the modern organization emphasizes the divorce of management and ownership; in practice, the interests of group managing the company can differ from the interests of those that supply the capital to the firm. Corporate governance literature has devoted a great deal of attention to the ownership structure of corporations. Shareholders of publicly held corporations are so numerous and small that they are unable to effectively control the decisions of the management team, and thus cannot be assured that the management team represents their interests. Many solutions to this problem have been advanced, as stated previously i.e. the disciplining effect of the takeover market, the positive incentive effects of the management shareholding stake and the benefits of large monitoring shareholders. A different problem, however, arises in firms with large controlling shareholders. Since a large controlling shareholder has both the incentives and the power to control the management team's actions, management's misbehavior is a second order problem when such a large shareholder exists. Instead, the main problem becomes controlling the large shareholder's abuse of minority shareholders. In other words, holders of a majority of the voting shares in a corporation, through their ability to elect and control a majority of the directors and to determine the outcome of shareholders' votes on other
matters, have tremendous power to benefit themselves at the expense of minority shareholders. Thus, the type of owners as well as the distribution of ownership stakes will undoubtedly have an impact on the performance of firms. Most of the empirical literature studying the link between corporate governance and firm performance usually concentrates on a particular aspect of governance, such as board of directors, share holders’ activism, compensation, anti-takeover provisions, investor protection etc. This paper is a moderate attempt to examine the relationship of ownership structure and performance of firms in India.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses on the literature review, where both theoretical and empirical studies on previous works are looked into. It also incorporates the corporate governance mechanism in India. In section 3, the methodology of this study is considered. Empirical results and discussions are made in section 4, while section 5 concludes the study.
2. Literature Review
The firm’s equity and how does ownership affect firm value has been a topic investigated by researchers for decades; however, most of the studies in this context are conducted outside of India. The study failed to document any relevant study on the topic in Indian context. Fama and Jensen (1983 a & b) addresses the agency problems and they explained that a major source of cost to shareholders is the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation. Even in developed countries, these agency problems continue to be sources of large costs to shareholders1.Demstez and Lehn (1985) argued both that the optimal corporate ownership structure was firm specific, and that market competition would derive firms toward that optimum. Because ownership was endogenous to expected performance, they cautioned, any regression of profitability on ownership patterns should yield insignificant results. Morck. (1988) by taking percentage of shares held by the board of directors of the company as a measure of ownership concentration and holding both Tobin’s Q and accounting profit as performance measure of 500 Fortune companies and using piece-wise linear regression, found a positive relation between Tobin’s Q and board ownership ranging from 0% to 5%, a negative relation for board ownership ranging from 5% to 25%, and again a positive relation for the said ownership above 25%. It is argued that the separation of ownership from control for a corporate firm creates an agency problem that results in conflicts between shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).The interests of other investors can generally be protected through contractual arrangements between the company and concerned stakeholders, leaving shareholders as the residual claimants whose interests can adequately be protected only through the institutions of corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Loderer and Martin (1997) took shareholding by the insiders (i.e., director’s ownership) as a measure of ownership. Taking the said measure as endogenous variable and Tobin’s Q as performance measure, they found (through simultaneous equation model) that ownership does not predict performance, but performance is a negative predictor of ownership. Steen Thomsen and Torben Pedersen (1997) examine the impact of ownership structure on company economic performance in the largest companies from 12 European nations. According to their findings the positive marginal effect of ownership ties to financial institutions is stronger in the market-based British system than in continental Europe. Cho (1998) found that firm performance affects ownership structure (signifying percentage of shares held by directors), but not vice versa. Jürgen Weigand (2000) documented that (1) the presence of large shareholders does not necessarily enhance profitability, and (2) the high degree of ownership concentration
seems to be a sub-optimal choice for many of the tightly held German corporations. Their results also imply ownership concentration to affect profitability significantly negatively.Their empirical evidence suggests that representation of owners on the board of executive directors does not make a difference. Yoshiro Miwa and Mark Ramseyer (2001) stated with a sample of 637 Japanese firms and confirmed the equilibrium mechanism behind Demstez-Lehn. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) investigated the relation between the ownership structure and the performance (average Tobin’s Q for five years-1976-80) of the corporations if ownership is made multidimensional and also treated it as an endogenous variable. By using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two-stage Least Squares (2 SLS) regression model, they found no significant systematic relation between the ownership structure and firm performance. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), examined the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance of Australian listed companies. Her OLS results suggest that ownership of shares by the top management is significant in explaining the performance measured by accounting rate of return, but not significant ifperformance is measured by Tobin’s Q. However, when ownership is treated as endogenous, the same is not dependent upon any of the performance measures. Lins (2002) investigates whether management ownership structures and large non-management block holders are related to firm value across a sample of 1433 firms from 18 emerging markets .He finds that large non-management control rights block holdings (having more control rights) are positively related to firm value measured by Tobin’s Q. Michael L Lemmon and Karl V Lins (2003) use a sample of 800 firms in eight East Asian countries to study the effect of ownership structure on value during the region’s financial crisis.
The crisis negatively impacted firm’s investment opportunities, raising the incentives of controlling shareholders to expropriate minority investors. The evidence is consistent with the view that ownership structure plays an important role in determining whether insiders expropriate minority shareholders. Using a sample of 144 Israeli firms, Beni Lauterbach and Efrat Tolkowsky (2004) find that Tobin's Q is maximized when control group vote reaches 67%. This evidence is strong when ownership structure is treated as exogenous and weak when it is considered endogenous. Christoph Kaserer and Benjamin Moldenhauer (2005) address the question whether there is any empirical relationship between corporate performance and insider ownership. Using a data set of 245 Germen firms for the year 2003 they find evidence for a positive and significant relationship between corporate performance, as measured by stock price performance as well as by Tobin’s Q, and insider ownership. Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) tried the model of Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) for 175 Greek firms for the year 2000 and found that higher firm profitability requires less diffused ownership structure He also provides evidence that large non management block holders can mitigate the valuation discounts associated with the expected agency problem.
3. Data and Methodology
The study aims to explore the disciplinary effect of the market in a context with concentrated ownership structure and weak investor protection. The paper aims to explore if there are dominant certain types of owners of actively listed and traded companies on Indian Stock Exchanges. Further, it investigates whether the ownership type affects some key accounting and market performance indicators of listed firms. It shows that there might be other reasons that have affected the performance of the listed companies of BSE 100, other than ownership structure.
The data set consists of detailed trading and financial information and indicators about the 98
most actively traded BSE 100 listed companies on the Bombay Stock Exchange of India (BSE) during 2009-2010. The ninety eight companies cover a broad spectrum of sectors or industries totaling 18, which are: Finance, Oil & Gas, Information Technology, Metal, Metal Products & Mining, Capital Goods, FMCG, Transport Equipments, Power, Housing Related, Healthcare, Telecom, Diversified, Chemical & Petrochemical, Miscellaneous, Media & Publishing, Transport Services, Tourism and Agriculture. The details and proportion of these sectors in BSE 100 is given in table 1.
The main financial indicators obtained from the companies financial statements included Total Revenues or Turnover, Gross Profit, Net Income or Earnings After Taxes, Current Assets, Fixed Assets, Long Term Debt and Shareholders Equity. Finally, the third subset consists of companies’ stock performance indicators obtained from CMIE PROWESS database including value traded, volume traded, number of transactions, market capitalization, market price as well as some calculated ratios using both CMIE PROWESS database as well as items reported in financial statements of sample companies such as debt to equity ratio, return on equity, return on assets, price earnings ratio and price to book value. The empirical investigation is conducted using known Ordinary Least Square Estimation methodology using both Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Investment (ROI) variables - representing accounting performance measures, and Price-Earning Ratio (P/E) and Price to Book Value (P/BV) –representing stock market performance measures; separately as dependent variables. The following formula was used for modeling:
Yij = α + xff, j + xde,j + xdph,j + xfp,j + xnpi,j + xnpni,j + ε (i)
Where ε ~ ND (0, σ2)
Yij : i corresponds to ROE, ROI, P/E or P/B for company j (j=1...98)
xff, j : represents the percentage of free float in company j capital structure,
xde,j : represents the debt to equity ratio for company j,
xdph,j and xfp,j : represents the domestic promoter and foreign promoter holding in the company
xnpi,j and xnpni,j : represents non promoter institutional and non promoter non institutional holding of the company.
The independent variables are represented by the percentage of Free Floated shares (FF), Debt to Equity ratio (D/E) and four variables representing promoters and non promoters stake representing the ownership structure in sampled companies, namely; Tables (2) and (3), (4) and (5) in the appendix summarize the regression analysis.
4. Results and analysis
The sampled companies of BSE 100 were analyzed on the basis of their free floats and the findings are given below in table 2. Table 2 clearly depict that majority of the sampled companies have less than 75% of the free float. Even 13% companies have a free float of less than 25%. Only 13% of the companies have a free float of greater than 75%. Table three gives the details about the ownership structure of the sampled firms. Data clearly depicts that the stake of Indian promoters I the sampled company varies from 0% to 99% with a average holding of 41%. That means on an average the sampled companies are dominated by Indian promoter’s holdings. While the average foreign promoters holding is just 7.51%. That clearly confirms the belief that the Indian companies are dominated by families and promoter’s stakes. Data related with debt equity profile of sampled companies is given
The results clearly indicates that majority of the sampled companies are in first category of 0-2 which clearly depicts that the majority of the sampled companies are not highly levered.
Performance measures in the paper are represented by two sets of variables accounting measures are ROA and ROE while the market measures are P/E and P/BV ratio. Table five depicts that average ROE, ROA, P/E and P/BV values are 17.36%, 12.77%, 34.8 and 3.8 respectively.
The results of OLS regression analysis are given in table 6 below. The empirical results reflect at 5% level of significance the ownership characteristic does not reflect any relationship with either accounting performance measures ROA and ROE or show any significant relationship between ownership structure and stock market indicators P/E and P/BV ratios, as shown in Table (6) below. But at 10% level of significance all sampled variables shows significant relationship with ROA, ROE, P/E and P/BV for performance of any company. Insert table (6) about here
5. Findings and Conclusion
The significance of ownership characteristics and accounting performance measures i.e. ROA and ROE could be explained by the fact that the fundamental evaluation of companies, measured by, its financial indicators such as (ROA and ROE) are the most important factors used by investors in India to assess company’s performance. In India, althou gh earlier investors have culturally placed more emphasis on accounting performance measures, not stock market indicators, due to the inactivity and stagnation of the stock market for a long period (till early 1990’s). Furthermore, Indian investors always favored payment of dividends rather than stock price appreciation, due to inactivity of market. Accordingly, the dividends yield paid by Indian companies are always very high (10%-13%) compared to other emerging and developed markets (3%-5%). Thus the author did not consider dividend yield in the stock market indicators since it will be a distorted measure since issuers in India always pay a high dividends yield, sometimes, irrespective of earnings, since they are valued by investors according to dividends not price appreciation. Furthermore, the type of ownership had an insignificant impact on stock market performance measures, which might imply that the stock performance was mainly affected by economic and market conditions rather than ownership concentration. Furthermore, the results could be related to the market inefficiency of the Indian stock market, given its small and thin characteristics, as well as the lack of prompt disclosure by listed companies, even the active ones, at the Indian stock market. Stock prices therefore may not appropriately reflect the costs and benefits of diversification as shown.
References
[1]Beni Lauterbach, and Efrat Tolkowsky, 2004, “Market Value Maximizing Ownership Structure when Investor Protection is Weak”, Discussion Paper No. 8-200
[2]Cho M H (1998), “Ownership Structure, Investment, and the Corporate Value: An Empirical Analysis”,Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 103-121.
[3]Demsetz H and Lehn K (1985), “The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences”,Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 93, No. 6, pp. 1155-1177
[4]Demsetz H and Villalonga B (2001), “Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance”, Journal of Corporate Finance, V ol. 7, No. 3, pp. 209-233.
[5]Erik Lehmann en Jurgen Weigand, Does the governed corporation perform better Governance structures and corporate performance in Germany, European Finance Review, 2000, no. 4, p. 157–195.
[6] Fama, E and Jensen, M, 1983a, 1983b. Separation of ownership and control, Journal of
Law &Economics 26, 301-325 and 327-349.
[7]Jensen, M and Meckling, W, 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.
[8]Kapopoulas P and Lazaretou S (2007), “Corporate Ownership Structure and Firm Performance:Evidence from Greek Firms”, Corporate Governance: An International Review,V ol. 15, No. 2, pp. 144-158.
[9]Kaserer Christoph, and Benjamin Moldenhauer, 2005, “Insider Ownership and Corporate Performance -Evidence from Germany”, Working Paper”, Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS) and Department for Financial Management and Capital Market
[10]Lins, K, 2000, Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets, Working paper, University of Utah.
[11]Loderer C and Martin K (1997), “Executive Stock Ownership and Performance Tracking Faint Traces”,Journal of Financial Economics, V ol. 45, No. 2, pp. 595-612.
[12]Michael L Lemmon, and Karl V Lins, 2003, “Ownership Structure, Corpora te Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis” The Journal of Finance, Vol LVIII No. 4, August 2004
[13]Miwa Yoshiro, and Mark Ramseyer, 2001, “Does ownership matter?” Discussion Paper, University of Tokyo
[14]Morck, R, Shleifer, A, and Vishny, R, 1988. Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, Journal of Financial Economic 20, 293-315.
[15]Pedersen,T and Thompson, S, 1997, European Patterns of Corporate Ownership: A twelve country study, Journal of International Business Studies, 759-778
[16]Shleifer, A and Vishny, R, 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 52, 737-783.
译文
股权结构与公司绩效: 以印度为例
资料来源: 人文和社会科学国际性杂志作者: Monir Zaman
摘要
任何一家公司的股权结构已经成为公司监管与公司绩效的重要事项。

因此,谁拥有公司的股权和股权是如何影响公司价值的已经成为这几十年来学者们的人们话题。

在很多成熟市场,股权结构对公司绩效的影响已被解决,但是在像印度等这样的新兴市场,却很少被提及。

本文是一个适中的尝试,以提出股权集中度与公司绩效之间的关系的重要性。

本文研究股权结构是否会对公司的财务指标和上市公司的市场表现。

本文选从BSE的100家公司,来自Bombay 证券交易市场选择98家。

数据的截止日期为2009 年10月。

研究结果表明,高度集中的所有权存在在印度市场结构中。

回归分析的结果表明,分散的所有权百分比影响会计绩效指标(即ROA 与ROE),但并不一定股票市场表现指标(即P / E 和P / Bv 的比率),这表明可能有其他因素,如经济,政治,上下文) 影响公司的业绩比其他所有制结构。

关键词:所有制结构,企业绩效,公司治理,印度
1.简介
任何公司的所有权结构一直是公司治理议程和性能的重要参考指标。

因此,谁拥有公司的股权和所有权如何影响公司价值一直是话题研究人员调查了几十年的热门话题。

因此,股权结构对公司绩效的影响已经广泛解决各种发达市场和新兴市场最近更多,但不讨论之前,在印度最近改变环境。

虽然现代组织强调离婚经营权与所有权,在实践中,管理公司的集团的利益,不同于利益的那些提供资本的公司。

公司治理文献中已投入了大量的重视对公司的所有权结构。

公众持有公司的股东是如此之多, 但是小股东,他们都对管理团队决策未能起到有效控制,从而不能得到保证他们的管理团队所代表的利益。

对于这个问题已经提出了许多解决方案,如前所述即约束作用收购市场,积极的管理持股的股权激励效应和大的好处监测股东。

一个不同的问题,但是,出现在大控股股东的公司。

由于一个大型的控股股东既有激励和权力控制的管理团队的行动,管理层的不当行为是一个二阶问题时,存在这样一个大股东。

相反,主问题成为大股东控制的少数股东滥用。

换言之,一个在公司有表决权股份的多数股东通过选举和能力控制了大多数董事,并确定了关于其他事项的股东的投票结果,有巨大的力量来造福于少数股东的牺牲自己。

因此,业主的类型以及作为拥有股权分布将无疑会对公司业绩的影响。

大部分实证文献研究公司治理与公司绩效之间的联系通常是集中在某一方面的治理,如董事会,股东的积极性,补偿,反收购规定,对投资者的保障等。

本文的其余部分组织如下: 在文献回顾,其中既有理论第2节讨论和以前的作品等实证研究。

它还采用了印度公司治理机制。

在第3节,主要讨论研究方法。

实证结果和讨论在第4,第5节总结。

2.文献回顾
公司的股权和股权是如何影响公司价值已经是这几十年来研究人的热门话题,然而,在这方面的研究,大部分都在印度以外国度进行研究的。

该研究未能在印度进行任何有关研究方面的话题研究。

法玛和詹森(1983 A 和B) 提出了代理问题,他们解释说,费用的主要原因是股东的所有权和控制权的分离现代企业。

即使在发达国家,这些机构的问题仍然是很大的成本来源Demstez 和莱恩(1985) 认为双方,企业所有制结构的优化是公司具体的要求,市场的竞争会促使公司朝着最佳的方面发展。

因为所有权是内源性预期的表现,他们警告,任何盈利能力回归分析所有制形式都应产
生显著的效果。

Morck(1988 年),采取由持有的股份比例对该公司董事会董事作为衡量和控股股权集中都托宾Q和会计利润作为衡量性能的标准,500 强企业使用分段线性回归,发现在托宾Q 和董事会的所有权成正相关关系,从0%至5%,为负相关董事会持股比例从5%至25%,并呈正相关再次就上述股权超过25%。

这次争辩,从企业牢牢控制权分离产生的代理问题,结果在股东和经理之间的冲突(Jensen 和Meckling,1976)。

其他投资者的利益一般都可以通过公司之间的与利益相关者的合同安排得到保护,把股东当作是剩余索取者,其利益通过公司治理(Shleifer 和Vishny,1997) 的机构能够得到充分保护。

Loderer 和马丁(1997 年) 把所有权作为衡量一个内部人(即董事的所有权) 的股权。

以作为内生变量和绩效指标托宾的Q 措施,他们发现(通过同步方程模型),所有权并不能预测性能,但性能是所有权的一种消极的预测因子。

施特恩汤姆森和托尔彼得森(1997) 通过12 个欧洲国家中最大的公司研究股权结构对公司的影响经济。

根据他们的调查结果显示所有权关系对金融机构在以市场为基础的英国的制度比欧洲大陆更有积极的边际效应。

Cho(1998) 发现,公司业绩影响所有制结构(股权所占比例),而不是相反的。

于尔根韦根(2000) 文件:(1) 大股东的存在并不一定提高盈利能力,(2) 德国公司所有权的高度集中程度。

他们的研究结果也意味着所有权的集中,影响盈利能力显负相关关系。

他们的经验证据表明执行董事会主席对公司绩效的影响没有显著的差别。

郎三轮和马克拉姆齐尔(2001) 指出了以637 家日本公司进行的抽样调查,并确认Demstez-莱恩平衡机制。

德姆塞茨和比利亚隆加(2001) 研究的关系所有制之间的结构和性能(平均托宾的五年,1976 年至80 年问) 如果企业的所有权是由多方面的,也被视为内生变量。

通过使用常法(OLS) 和两阶段最小二乘法(2 SLS) 的最小二乘回归模型,他们没有发现任何重大系统之间的关系,所有制结构和企业绩效。

德姆塞茨和比利亚隆加(2001),研究了澳大利亚上市公司股权结构与公司绩效的关系。

她的OLS 的结果表明,由最高管理层股份所有权在解释重要的会计回报率测量的性能,但如果不显著性能是由托宾Q 值产生的: 但是,所有权同样表现出不依赖任何措施。

林氏(2002) 研究管理部门是否拥有结构和大型非管理模块持有人与公司价值之间的1433公司的抽样调查,从18 大新兴markets.He 认为,非管理控制权控股(有更多的控制权利) 成正相关,公司价值的托宾的Q: 迈克尔L 莱蒙和卡尔V 林斯(2003 年计) 使用八个东亚国家和地区的800 名公司的抽样调查以研究该地区的金融危机时所有制结构的影响。

这场危机对公司的投资机会产生了负面影响,用少数投资者来提高控股股东的激励机制。

其证据表明这样一个观点,即所有制结构起着重要的作用,业内人士是否侵吞中小股东的决定与利益。

样品采用了以色列144 家公司,贝尼劳特巴赫和埃弗拉特Tolkowsky(2004) 发现,托宾的Q 值最大化时,对照组投票达到67%。

克里斯托夫Kaserer 和本杰明Moldenhauer(2005) 认为,任何企业绩效与内部人持股的实证关系。

使用数据集245 企业对2003 年他们找到一个与企业业绩重要的关系的证据表现,作为衡量股票价格表现,以及托宾的Q和内部的所有权。

Kapopoulos 和Lazaretou(2007) 175 希腊试图为企业和比利亚隆加的德姆塞茨(2001) 模型2000 年,发现公司的盈利能力较高的扩散需要较少的所有制结构,他还提供了证据表明,大型非持股人可以减轻管理模块和以相关的估值折扣预计的所产生的代理问题。

3.数据和方法
本研究旨在探讨在以集中的所有制结构的公司在市场规范方面对中小投资者的保障的作用。

本文旨在探讨某些在印度证券交易所上市的公司其业主的积极主导对公司绩效产生的影响。

此外,它调查了是否如所有制类型等一些关键因素的对上市公司的会计和市场表现指标的影响。

这表明除了股权结构比例不同的原因,可能还有其他原因影响100 家上市公司
的股市情况。

在2009-2010年印度孟买证券交易所(BSE) 成立上市的100 家公司,该数据集由交易最活跃的贸易和金融的详细信息和指标,在其中的98 家公司涵盖了18 个行业部门:金融,石油与天然气,信息技术,金属,金属制品及采矿,资本货物,快速消费品,运输设备,电力,房相关,保健,电信,多元,化学和石化,媒体及出版社,运输服务,旅游和农业。

从公司的财务报表中获得的总收入,营业额,利润总额,净利润或税后收入,流动资产,固定资产,长期负债和股东权益等主要财务指标。

最后,公司的股票表现为获得指标CMIE 的数据库,主要包括交易额,交易量,市值数,市场价格以及一些使用这两种CMIE 的数据库,以及以的财务报表的报告项目为样本计算比例而获得的数值,如资产负债率,净资产收益率,资产报酬率,市盈率和帐面价值。

实证调查得到代表股市性能指标,即投资回报率(ROI)变量; 代表会计绩效措施和价格收益比(P / E) 和价格与账面值(P / BV) 的比。

分别为如下,下面的公式被用于建模:
Yij = α+ xff, j + xde,j + xdph,j + xfp,j + xnpi,j + xnpni,j + ε (i)
其中ε~ ND (0, σ2)
Yij: 对应的净资产收益率,投资回报率的P / E 或P / B 为公司J(十= 1 ... 98)
xff: 代表在J 公司资本结构的自由浮动的比例,
XDE: 指以J 公司股本负债比率,
xdph 和XFP: 代表国内和国外企业在公司控股xnpi 和xnpni: 代表非机构的公司和非控股的公司体制。

自变量所代表的股份比例自由浮(法郎),债务与权益比率单(D / E) 和四个变量,代表发起人股份非发起人代表在本公司的所有制结构。

4. 结果与分析
调查100家样本公司的自由浮动,该样本公司大部分低于75%的自由浮动。

其中13%的公司有一个小于25%的自由浮动的。

只有13%的公司有一个自由浮动值大于75%的。

数据清楚地描绘了股份制印度公司发起人对公司持有的股份变化从0%至99%变化,其平均持有为41%的股份,平均外汇发起人持有只是7.51%。

这清楚地证实了,印度公司以家庭集团和发起人的股份为主导地位。

结果清楚地表明,该样本公司中,大部分属于第一类。

提高公司绩效的措施是提高两个变量集ROA 和净资产收益率,而提高市场竞争的措施是提高P / E 和P / BV 的比率。

由平均净资产收益率的描述为: 资产报酬率为17.36%,12.77%,而市盈率P / E 和P / BV 的值分别为34.8 和3.8。

实证结果反映在以5%为显著性水平为前提的所有权,其变化特征与无论是会计绩效措施或ROA 与ROE 之间的任何所有制结构和股市显著关系指标的P / E 和P / BV 的比值,都不反映任何关系。

但在10%的显著性水平下,任何公司的所有抽样变量如净资产收益率,市盈率P / E 和P / BV 的值都与股权结构存在一定关系。

5.结果和结论改善所有制结构的措施对于提高会计绩效存在着一定的意义,即以ROA 与ROE 可解释的事实为,公司的基本评估,并由该国如财务指标来衡量(ROA 与ROE) 是投资者在印度用于评估公司的业绩的最重要的因素。

在印度,尽管早些时候投资者对会计文化定义为是能更好反映公司绩效的措施,而不是股市的指标,那时因为由于股市(至1990 年的早期) 长时间的停滞。

此外,由于市场不活跃,印度的投资者总是青睐的是股息,而不是股价增值付款。

因此,与其他新兴市场和(3%-5%) 开发市场相比以股息收益率支付印度公司一直非常高(10%-13%)。

因此,笔者不认为以股市股息收益率为指标,因为这将是一个扭曲的措施,因为在印度,不论收入,发行人总是付出高股息,因为它们是根据投资者的红利价值而不是价格升值判断的。

此外,各种经济类型在对于完善股票市场表现的措施,主要是受经济和市场条件的影响,而不是股权集中度。

此外,由于其市场小而薄弱的特点,以及作为上市公司不能及时披露信息
的不足,结果可能会涉及到对印度股市的低效率市场,在印度的股市,股票价格因此可能无法适当反映成本和多样化的所带来的好处。

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