米什金货币金融学(英文)ppt课件
合集下载
- 1、下载文档前请自行甄别文档内容的完整性，平台不提供额外的编辑、内容补充、找答案等附加服务。
- 2、"仅部分预览"的文档,不可在线预览部分如存在完整性等问题,可反馈申请退款(可完整预览的文档不适用该条件!)。
- 3、如文档侵犯您的权益，请联系客服反馈,我们会尽快为您处理(人工客服工作时间：9:00-18:30)。
4. Bank Supervision: Chartering and Examination A. Reduces adverse selection problem of risk takers or crooks owning banks B. Reduces moral hazard by preventing risky activities
4. Bank Supervision: Chartering and Examination A. Reduces adverse selection problem of risk takers or crooks owning banks B. Reduces moral hazard by preventing risky activities C. New trend: Assessment of risk management
5. Disclosure Requirements A. Better information reduces asymmetric information problem
© 2005 PeMajor Banking Legislation in Canada
2. Restrictions on Asset Holdings A. Reduces moral hazard of too much risk taking
© 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
11-2
How Asymmetric Information Explains Banking Regulation
3. Bank Capital Requirements A. Reduces moral hazard: banks have more to lose when have higher capital B. Higher capital means more collateral for FDIC
A. Insufficient funds
B. Sweep problems under rug
© 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
11-3
How Asymmetric Information Explains Banking Regulation
3. Bank Capital Requirements A. Reduces moral hazard: banks have more to lose when have higher capital B. Higher capital means more collateral for CDIC
risk 2. The existence of CDIC, more opportunities for risk taking 3. Because of the lending boom, bank activities were
becoming more complicated. Regulators had neither the expertise nor the resources to monitor these activities appropriately
© 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
11-5
Major Banking Legislation in Canada
© 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
11-6
Why a Banking Crisis in 1980s?
Early Stages 1. Managers did not have the required expertise to manage
4. i , net worth of banks
A. Insolvencies B. Incentives for risk taking Result: Failures and risky loans
Later Stages: Regulatory Forbearance
1. Regulators allow insolvent banks to operate because
5. New Trend: Assessment of Risk Management 6. Disclosure Requirements
A. Better information reduces asymmetric information problem
© 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
Chapter 11
Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation
© 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
How Asymmetric Information Explains Banking Regulation
1. Government Safety Net and Deposit Insurance A. Prevents bank runs due to asymmetric information: depositors can’t tell good from bad banks B. Creates moral hazard incentives for banks to take on too much risk C. Creates adverse selection problem of crooks and risk-takers wanting to control banks D. Too-Big-to-Fail increases moral hazard incentives for big banks
4. Bank Supervision: Chartering and Examination A. Reduces adverse selection problem of risk takers or crooks owning banks B. Reduces moral hazard by preventing risky activities C. New trend: Assessment of risk management
5. Disclosure Requirements A. Better information reduces asymmetric information problem
© 2005 PeMajor Banking Legislation in Canada
2. Restrictions on Asset Holdings A. Reduces moral hazard of too much risk taking
© 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
11-2
How Asymmetric Information Explains Banking Regulation
3. Bank Capital Requirements A. Reduces moral hazard: banks have more to lose when have higher capital B. Higher capital means more collateral for FDIC
A. Insufficient funds
B. Sweep problems under rug
© 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
11-3
How Asymmetric Information Explains Banking Regulation
3. Bank Capital Requirements A. Reduces moral hazard: banks have more to lose when have higher capital B. Higher capital means more collateral for CDIC
risk 2. The existence of CDIC, more opportunities for risk taking 3. Because of the lending boom, bank activities were
becoming more complicated. Regulators had neither the expertise nor the resources to monitor these activities appropriately
© 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
11-5
Major Banking Legislation in Canada
© 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
11-6
Why a Banking Crisis in 1980s?
Early Stages 1. Managers did not have the required expertise to manage
4. i , net worth of banks
A. Insolvencies B. Incentives for risk taking Result: Failures and risky loans
Later Stages: Regulatory Forbearance
1. Regulators allow insolvent banks to operate because
5. New Trend: Assessment of Risk Management 6. Disclosure Requirements
A. Better information reduces asymmetric information problem
© 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
Chapter 11
Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation
© 2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
How Asymmetric Information Explains Banking Regulation
1. Government Safety Net and Deposit Insurance A. Prevents bank runs due to asymmetric information: depositors can’t tell good from bad banks B. Creates moral hazard incentives for banks to take on too much risk C. Creates adverse selection problem of crooks and risk-takers wanting to control banks D. Too-Big-to-Fail increases moral hazard incentives for big banks