中小企业融资【外文翻译】
中小企业融资租赁研究外文文献翻译
文献出处：Guariglia A. The Research of Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Financing Lease [J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2015，12（05）：41-51. 原文The Research of Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Financing LeaseGuariglia A.AbstractThis paper discusses the lease financing business accounting, development ofsmall and medium sized enterprises, and analyses the advantage in the financing lease.Finally, introduces small and medium sized enterprises in perfect financing lease ofcountermeasures from legal environment, taxation system, and guarantee system inorder to implement financing measures provided to small and medium -sizedenterprises, and solve financing difficulties of emergencies, thus improve to economicgrowth.Keywords: Small and Medium -sized Enterprises Financing lease；1 IntroductionFinance lease is finance transfers the ownership of the nature and characteristicsof equipment leasing business. Required by the lesser according to the lessee to buyequipment such as performance, specifications, models, and the lease to the lessee.The lesser to lease equipment, on the basis of the purchase price calculated accordingto the time length of the lessee occupy the lesser money rent, the lessee in accordancewith the agreed to pay the rent for each contract. Ownership of the contract equipmentbelongs to the lesser; the lessee has only to the right to use the equipment. After thetermination of the contract to pay the rent, the lessee has the right to according to theresidual value to buy equipment, to have the ownership of the equipment, or return theequipment to the lesser.2 The lessee financing lease accounting treatment2.1 The lease beginning date processing(1) Type of lease. (2) Calculating the lease beginning date of the minimum leasepayments, long-term accounts payable of the minimum lease payments as the entryvalue. (3) To calculate the lease beginning date the present value of the minimumlease payments, the lessee shall transfer the fair value of the leased asset on the leasebeginning date and the present value of minimum lease payment of the two lower as rent entry value of the assets. The lessee when calculating the present value of minimum lease payment, the determination of the discount rate: if the lesson’s rate implicit in the lease, with the lesson’s rate implicit in the lease as the discount rate; Otherwise, the interest rate discount rate is stipulated in the lease contract, to the bank loan interest rates for the same period as the discount rate. Lease containing rate is on the lease beginning date, makes the present value of the minimum lease receipts and the unguaranteed residual value of the sum of present value equal to the fair value of the leased asset and the lesser discount rate of the sum of the initial direct costs. (4) The initial direct costs included in the value of the asset. Initial direct costs refer to the lease negotiations and sign the leasing agreement which is in the process of happen, can be directly attributable to the cost of the leasing items. There are usually stamp duty, commissions, fees, travel expenses. (5) Calculate the unrecognized financing charges. Unrecognized financing charges = minimum lease payments - fair value of the leased asset (the present value of the minimum lease payments).Unrecognized financing charges.6. Prepare the lease beginning date accounting entries.2.2 The unrecognized financing chargesUnder a finance lease, the lessee to the lesser to pay the rent for each includes the principal and interest of the two parts. When the lessee pays the rent, on the one hand, reduce long-term payables; On the other hand, at the same time the unrecognized financing charges according to certain method to confirm the current financing costs. In accordance with the standards on the lease, the lessee shall adopt the effective interest rate method. In the case of adopting the actual interest rate method, based on the lease beginning date, the entry value of the leased asset is different, the choice of financing cost allocation rate is also different, the contribution rate of unrecognized financing charges to determine the specific divided into the following several ways.(1) the present value of the minimum lease payments as the entry value of the leased asset and the lease with interest rates as the contribution rate of unrecognized financing charges.(2) the present value of the minimum lease payments as the entry value of the leased asset, the provisions of the contract interest rate as the contribution rate ofunrecognized financing charges.(3) the present value of the minimum lease payments as the entry value of the leased asset, the bank loan interest rates for the same period as the contribution rate of unrecognized financing charges.(4) based on fair value of the leased asset costs, contribution rate shall be calculated again, the contribution rate is that the present value of minimum lease payments is equal to the discount rate of the fair value of the leased asset.2.3 Lease assets depreciation provisionsThe lessee to the financing of the rented fixed assets depreciation. Determine the leased asset depreciation period shall consider the provisions of the lease contract is concerned, if it can be reasonably determining the expiry of the lease the lessee will obtain the ownership of the leased asset, the life of the leased asset shall be on the lease beginning date as the depreciation period; If unable to reasonably determine the expiration of the lease term the lessee will obtain the ownership of the leased asset and should be in the lease term and the life of the leased asset as the depreciation period is shorter.2.4 The performance cost of processingThe performance cost is refers to the leased asset during the lease term for the payment of royalties, such as technical advice and services, personnel training, maintenance, insurance, etc. The lessee of the performance cost should be included in the current profits and losses (management cost, manufacturing cost, cost of sales and other subjects).2.5 With the rentOr have the rent is refers to the amount of uncertainty, based on factors other than the length of time (such as sales, usage) rent. Or have the rent in the actual occurs into the profits and losses of the current period.2.6 Processing when the lease term expiresThe processing of the leased asset when the lease term expires, the lessee to have three conditions: return, preferential renewals, retention.3 The advantages of financing lease analysis Small and medium-sized enterprises3.1 Leasing company is able to control the risk of small and medium-sized enterprisefinancing, and is willing to provide loans.Leasing company will be confronted with various risks in doing business, roughly the kinds of product market risk, financial risk, trade risk, economic risk, technology risk, environment pollution risks, force majored, and so on. When leasing companies with weak economic strength, low credit level of small and medium enterprises to carry out the financing lease, the risk will increase, especially small and medium-sized enterprises is the risk of the lessee cannot pay the rent on time every rental companies must focus on when doing business. Leasing companies with the characteristics of the financing lease business, can control for small and medium-sized enterprise financing risk, makes it a acceptable or tolerable risk. Leasing company risk control methods mainly include the following:(1) The ownership of the leased equipment belongs to the leasing company. An obvious feature of financing lease is Lease Company has the ownership of the leased equipment, and the lessee only has leasing the right to use the equipment. It is because the separation of ownership and use right leasing equipment makes the leasing company when tenant defaults don't pay the rent on time, with relative to bank loans and other financing more leeway. The lessee cannot accord the terms of the lease contract, pay the rent on time phenomenon mainly can be divided into the following kinds: temporarily liquidity difficulties; the lessee has enough cash flow, but deliberately rent arrears; the lessee insolvency, filed for bankruptcy. To the lessee for the first reason appears the phenomenon of the rent in arrears, leasing companies in the financial condition of a detailed study of the lessee, determine the true, can adjust the rent payment scheme with tenant, make it accord with the characteristics of the lessee's cash flow. This can help the lessee through the current situation, also is advantageous to the leasing company of the lessee and continue our cooperation. If after investigation found that the lessee is intentionally rent arrears, leasing company can communicate with tenant, told if continue to fulfill its obligation to pay the rent will face the consequences. In the case of the lessee refuses to correct, leasing company can through legal means, to exercise their rights, retrieve the lease item, and punish the rent in arrears, the point of control the losses to a minimum. Visible, simpleand flexible, low requirements for credit, financing lease affordable at the same time in the financing lease can effectively predict before, in order to avoid risks, so it is in the small and medium-sized enterprise financing can not be neglected, a kind of financing way.(2) To leasing company can control the money. Finance lease is a kind of financing and it as one of the new financing way, it is different from the general bank loans, rental company does not directly provide funds to the lessee, but according to the requirements of the lessee, the lessee the selected equipment manufacturers designated equipment purchase, to rent to the lessee to use it and reach the purpose of financing. Leasing companies to provide equipment instead of the direct funding financing can be very good to prevent enterprise change of the use of funds, the limited funds for the enterprise need productive USES, expand the production capacity of enterprises, to improve enterprise's ability to pay the rent, but also reduce the risk of the leasing company.3.2 Financing lease low cost requirementsAlthough the interest of financing lease to 2 ~ 3% higher than the same period of bank interest, but long-term bank loans often have additional constraints, such as equal pay, compensating balance on a regular basis to make small and medium-sized enterprise's actual loan interest rate increase or cannot get one hundred percent of the financing, the financing lease can provide even rather than equipment price (including freight, insurance premium, etc.) was raised, and the lessee generally enjoy the tax benefits brought by the lease. By way of financing lease, the enterprise can in the case of a small amount of money, get the right to use the equipment, saving money in early. Tenant companies at the same time can also be originally out turnover must be used for equipment use, portable, improve the utilization efficiency of the capital. Therefore, taken together, the cost of the small and medium-sized enterprises using financing lease is not higher than bank loans.3.3 Equipment selection autonomy is strongIn the process of financing lease, the lessee has the right to choose its own equipment and the supplier, do not rely on the lesson’s judgment and decision, thelesser shall not interfere in the lessee's choice of equipment and the supplier. Besides there are special provisions of the state of equipment, the lesser may recommend to the lessee and equipment manufacturer, but did not say.3.4 The rent paymentFinancial leasing is more flexible in terms of rent charge. Rent shall be according to the production nature of the lessee, the condition of capital and the sales season characteristics, in terms of reimbursement amount of time and combined with enterprise actual operating conditions, and not pay the rent in regular, fixed form. The lessee pays the rent can take the form of more, such as the payment time intervals, can be divided into annual pay, can pay half a year, quarter and monthly payment; According to whether the rent at the time of waiting for the forehead, can be divided into equal pay and equal pay. In practice, the lessee and the lesser agreed to rent payment is commonly uniform annuity to pay later.译文中小企业融资租赁研究Guariglia A.摘要本文具体探讨了融资租赁业务的会计处理方式、发展思路，分析了中小企业开展融资租赁的优势。
中小企业融资难外文翻译说课讲解
中小企业融资难外文翻译Sme financing problems related to the analysis First small and medium-sized enterprises financing status Reform and opening up china for 30 years of small and medium-sized enterprises obtained arapid development of enterprises 99 of the small and medium-sized enterprises of our countrymore than 60 GDP contribution tax over 50 provides 70 of import and export trade and80 of urban jobs. Small and medium-sized enterprises in our country is also an important powerof independent innovation 66 of invention patent 82 of new product development of smalland medium-sized enterprises from small and medium-sized enterprises has become the economicprosperity expanding employment adjusting structure promote innovation and new industriesof important strength. From 80 years since the outbreak of the international financial crisis the implementation ofthe positive fiscal policy and loser monetary policy but no small and medium-sized enterprisesfrom the proactive fiscal policy and moderate looser monetary policy benefit directly for instanceof the new 2008 225 million small loan only more than previous year but rose 1.4 only theloans increased 14.9 09 year three months of national credit increased 48 trillion includingloans to small and medium-sized enterprises increased amount only less than 5 .Current loanfinancing difficult hasbecome the bottleneck of restricting the development of small andmedium-sized enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprise production and managementfaced difficulties according to the state statistical bureau of statistics and letter until the and of2008 in the small and medium-sized enterprises of production or collapse closed accounts forabout 7.5the urban employment this situation is not only more difficult economic recoveryinfluence and directly affect the growth and development of people’s livelihood stable target .Inthis sense the international financial crisis under the impact of China’s economy could not reallylow the key is out of small and medium-sized enterprises vitality can be fully recovered. Second the sme financing reason analysis Sme loans and financing is a cosmopolitan should say see both from China and mechanismof medium and small and medium-sized enterprises there are three main reasons: first themedium and small and medium-sized enterprises small and medium-sized enterprises generallyweak awareness of honesty similar to a few of the common phenomenon may report on tax onsome less ugly statements in Banks this intersection some may form good-looking such loanspoint is reliable became a problem. But this approach is very adverse instead of enterprises thedevelopment of small andmedium-sized enterprises are not healthy we imagine if severaldepartments with all those together the first this enterprise is not sincere he will have a foothold.We manufacture and export-oriented smes in human resources technology capital marketenvironment faced financial crisis there was a huge pressure the development of it is the rootcause of the scientific and technological content of the enterprise the innovation ability of highenough to enter the market is weak the low threshold the fierce competition in the market willincrease these are not good for the development of small and medium-sized enterprises. Secondfrom the bank for small and medium-sized enterprise credit conditions stricter because we aremost Bands it is also considered commercial bank the risk of their own profits. To the end of2008 the small bad loans is higher than that of the entire banking industry relies low come mampasolving some problems bur the loans of the small and medium-sized enterprises like a bigproblem once countries will still enterprises especially those small problems once thebankruptcy nobody tube so the loan quality cannot guaranteed so in this management system toreduce the risks the bank will demand of small and medium-sized enterprises in providing enoughafter pawn dare loan. Another bank from the operation cost of small and medium-sized enterprisesdo loans will pay more manpower so also does not want to extend loans to small andmedium-sized enterprises A bank operating costs the half is labor cost small and medium-sizedenterprises especially do small very high labor workload but it is the benefit of different times.Third the sme financing channel is too narrow and small and medium-sized enterprisesin thecapital markets have direct financing ways of securities market including small plate and gemAnd private equity funds industrial investment funds venture investment funds risk investmentfunds and the bond market etc. But since the sept.25 2008 the small plate market securitiesissued after huachang chemical and closed the door just recently IPO to restart the IPO. But gemis “ten years” good sword people until now only be vivivdly portrayed. Although with gemlisting conditions but a lot of small and medium-sized enterprises to financing for manyenterprises it is still a luxury. In overseas small and medium-sized enterprises in the process ofgrowing only rely on bank loan financing many times is a venture investment risk or the help ofsmall and medium-sized enterprises in China however can grow in the basic of financingShenzhen has 3000 venture company with a registered capital of 6000 billion but no company iswilling to startup investment enterprise. Thecompany is more mature can the fancy of thesecurities market and gem. Third the sme financing difficulty in solving the problem a From the Angle of the government 1.The government should relax market access control reducing barriers let more smallerBands small and medium-sized enterprises in service for the strategic positioning og those smallBanks to bitter fleabane bitter fleabane. Dynamic development Now China is probably more thana hundred villages and towns of the bank bank established to improve the bottleneck of theeconomic investment county including improving agriculture development of small andmedium-sized enterprises and support will play a very important role. For existing fivestate-owned Banks. Should be encouraged to develop their own businesses for the financing of thespecialized agencies relax its has branches and encourage them in the land and county townshipeven closer to provide financial services and more convenient. 2.The government should help Banks to establish a credit system further reducing theirinformation cost in our country the central bank since 1998 enterprise credit system constructionwas started by the specialized agencies collection and storage sorting analysis and use ofenterprise credit information to guard against credit risks maintain stable financial marker In2006 the central bank andsmall and medium-sized enterprises credit system to establish the creditsystem hope to cover those and financial institutions have no credit relations of small andmedium-sized enterprises. Of course the credit system is not only by the government and nowhas some network company for example try to use labara. Com in online transaction informationinto small and medium-sized enterprises credit index the index of credit if out of the bank tofurther reduce the cost of information.. 3. The government should several of bank risk compensation the local interest riskcompensation mechanism and policy just compensation fund is to solve the sme financing wayand cannot be fundamentally solved. As to the end fujian province of bad loans is small loans6071 but the average level of banking is a two percent while a few risk compensation just to0.8 percent only a small part So many of bank risk compensation. As all of the loans to smalland medium-sized enterprises then according to the bank loans reduce its tax business taxincome tax reduction Countries can help enterprises to improve bank interest risk and return Ifthe loan losses the government formed by risk compensation fund to patch up it this makes bifbusiness loans and small and medium-sized enterprises loan to achieve the balance is the basicyields. 4.The government should activelypromote the multi-level capital market system in order tobetter satisfy all kinds of small and medium-sized enterprises include the financing needs ofenterprise. Different types of small and medium-sized enterprises the development stage isendless and same determines the sme financing needs is not the same So small and medium-sizedenterprises groups of differentiation determines the diversified financing needs then satisfy smefinancing demand also needs the various forms of financing mode such as bank loans bondsequity financing etc.200to 4 years in Shenzhen stock exchange medium plate founded bupromoting capital technology management and the effective factors of high quality as cultivatingboard also to promote the upgrading of industrial structure is playing a positive role. In October 2009 gem officially launched. Founded board will provide for independentinnovation promoting effective supervision mechanism of small and medium-sized enterprises inthe new development stage. But for more than for small and medium-sized enterprises are listed tosolve this kind of condition enterprise’s equity financing stock transfer to a valid theover-the-counter marker In 2006 China launched fei joint-stock company listing for trading ofsecurities companies entering the pilot work Besides the government shouldvigorously promotethe development of the bond market bond financing for small and medium enterprises to providemore convenient in the developed countries the bond market is the main financing financing inthe United States for example 2008 the company bonds is circulation stock circulation of 5 timeswith the United States Europe and other countries and regions in the bond market also has the bigdevelopment space. b From the bank angleIf rely on the existing in the banking financial products and sme loans to solve the difficulty infinancing smes is impossible we cannot change the present situation of small and medium-sizedenterprises so we would change our bank credit financial innovation is imminent. Currentlybanking is through the organization risk management technical innovation innovation andsecurity collateral product innovation so as to change the status of financing for smes. 1. Guarantee mortgage innovation Collateral shortage is small and medium-sized enterprisebiggest soft rib they could not buy a heap of the house and then prepare for security it is notrealistic to high-tdch enterprise as the core of assets should be their intellectual property righs thepatent righ and one on the market in technology creative team is the blood to support itsdevelopment as well as several pieces of the mortgagedproperty bur all need money to lendbank The small and medium-sized enterprises such an jiangsu cooperatives experiment widelywarehouse inventory impawn through a mortgage loan product Tianjing coastal rural commercialbank actively carry out enterprise sharehoulding pledge loan. benjing bank recently launchedintellectual property as a pledge from the bank for a loan. 2. Credit rating innovating Big Bnaks do business of time usually see a balance sheet anincome statement and a cash flow statement small and medium-sized enterprises have even thesthree tables are not high the bank information costs zhejiang tyrone arisen commercial Banksthey look for innovative water meter customs declaration form large large reduce cost still canmake small loans to earn enough money. Like Shenzhen development bank by focusing on theirOpponent’s credit transaction the authenticity of the enterprise chooses a new of enterprisescredit rating. For enterprises in the ctedit rating method for enterprises itself the credit ratingweight only 15. Pay more attention to the authenticity of the trading counterparty anddownstream of the raw material supply semi-finished products or services or transportation orlogistics can be easier to choose good credit are true of the enterprise trade background to provideenough goodservice mobilize various financial tools in the process of enterprise developmentshenfazhan also created the profits. 3. Business process innovation. Our country commercial bank the bank is mostly official inthe house wait for a loan to customers approval for a month three months such a kind ofmanagement such an examination result is impossible to small and medium-sized enterprisefinancial services it is impossible to improve the financing difficulties of small and medium-sizedenterprises. Banks to reduce threshold the other is to simplify the process reduce link establishexamination mechanism so as to adapt to the credit factory. The bank is factory small andmedium-sized enterprises is raw material into the line after the marketing sales and service withapproval and customer maintenance and post-loan management obtain loans. But Banks are not aperson guard line and batch production. Through the way of examination and approval proceduressimplified. Through this process to make sure that the smes credit approval from the cycle overthe past 2 3 months shorten to 3 5 days now. 4.Strengthening the training of personnel. After construction in mechanism to have a groupof people to do it and do it well it is to strengthen the training of the staff further strengthen thesme small business loans and high-tech smes job training and the loan ofcommunicationincreasing the entire product rampd efforts with the strain of new incentive and restraint measures toprofessional team and the new service. c From the Angle of enterprises 1 Enternises should strengthen management improve quality. To correctly understand thesituation face establish the risk by management effectiveness and development idea must paymore attention to technical innovation technological innovation pay attention to the new productdevelopment improve quality and brand construction and development of new products improvethe product quality improvement and win the market.. Reducing energy consumption to increaseincreasing earning. Increasing market development ability reduce” pro ducts accountsreceivable” two nbre accelerate the capital turnover. Through the development way not only bythe expansion of production of production but improve the quality of the industrial sector realizerapid growth. 2. The enterprises should strengthen the construction of credit system. Establish the standardof management system establish she transparent reliable statements the accumulation ofenterprise credit system.。
中小企业融资【外文翻译】
Financing of SMEsJan Bartholdy, Cesario MateusOriginally Published in“Financing of SMEs”.London business review.2007(9).pp.43-45AbstractThe main sources of financing for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are equity, trade credit paid on time, long and short term bank credits, delayed payment on trade credit and other debt. The marginal costs of each financing instrument are driven by asymmetric information and transactions costs associated with nonpayment. According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms will choose the cheapest source in terms of cost. In the case of the static trade-off theory, firms choose finance so that the marginal costs across financing sources are all equal, thus an additional Euro of financing is obtained from all the sources whereas under the Pecking Order Theory the source is determined by how far down the Pecking Order the firm is presently located. In this paper, we argue that both of these theories miss the point that the marginal costs are dependent of the use of the funds, and the asset side of the balance sheet primarily determines the financing source for an additional Euro. An empirical analysis on a unique dataset of Portuguese SME’s confirms that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet has an impact of the type of financing used and the Pecking Order Theory and the traditional Static Trade-off theory are For SME’s the main sources of financing are equity (internally generated cash), trade credit, bank credit and other debt. The choice of financing is driven by the costs of the sources which is primarily determined by costs of solving the asymmetric information problem and the expected costs associated with non-payment of debt. Asymmetric information costs arise from collecting and analysing information to support the decision of extending credit, and the non-payment costs are from collecting the collateral and selling it to recover the debt. Since SMEs’ management and shareholders are often the same person, equity and internally generated funds have no asymmetric information costs and equity is therefore the cheapest source.2. Asset side theory of SME financingIn the previous section we have suggested that SME’s in Portugal are financed using internal generated cash, cheap trade credits, long and short-term bank loans and expensive trade credits and other loans. In this section the motives behind thedifferent types of financing are discussed.2.1. Cheap Trade creditsThe first external financing source we will discuss is trade-credits. Trade credits are interesting since they represent financial services provided by non-financial firms in competition with financial intermediaries. The early research within this area focused on the role of trade credits in relation to the credit channel or the so called “Meltzer” effect and in relation to the efficiency of monetary policy. The basic idea is that firms with direct access to financial markets, in general large well known firms, issue trade credits to small financially constrained firms . The more recent research breaks the role of trade credits into a strategic motive and financial motive for issuing and using these credits.Strategic motivesThe first theory centers on asymmetric information regarding the firm’s products. Trade credits are offered to the buyers so that the buyer can verify the quantity and quality before submitting payments. By offering trade finance the supplier signals to the buyers that they offer products of good quality. Since small firms, in general, have no reputation then these firms are forced to use trade credits to signal the quality of their products. The use of trade credits is therefore driven by asymmetric information of the products and is therefore more likely to be used by small firms, if the buyer has little information about the supplier, or the products are complicated and it is difficult to asses their quality.The second strategic motive is pricing. Offering trade finance on favorable terms is the same as a price reduction for the goods. Thus firms can use trade credits to promote sales without officially reducing prices or use them as a tool for price discrimination between different buyers. Trade credits are most advantageous to risky borrowers since their costs of alternative financing are higher than for borrowers with good credit ratings. Thus trade credits can be used as tool for direct price discrimination but also as an indirect tool (if all buyers are offered the same terms) in favor of borrowers with a low credit standing.Trade credits are also used to develop long term relationships between the supplier and the buyers. This often manifests itself by the supplier extending the credit period in case the buyer has temporary financial difficulties. Compared to financial institutions suppliers have better knowledge of the industry and are therefore better able to judge whether the firm has temporary problems or the problems are of a more permanent nature.The last motive in not strictly a strategic motive but is based on transactions costs. Trade credits are an efficient way of performing the transactions since it is possible to separate between delivery and payment. In basic terms the truck drive r delivering the goods does not have to run around to find the person responsible for paying the bills. The buyer also saves transactions costs by reducing the amount of cash required on“hand” .Financing motivesThe basis for this view is that firms compete with financial institutions in offering credit to other firms. The traditional view of financial institutions is that they extend credit to firms where asymmetric information is a major problem. Financial institutions have advantages in collecting and analyzing information from, in particular, smaller and medium sized firms that suffer from problems of asymmetric information. The key to this advantage over financial markets lies in the close relationship between the bank and the firm and in the payment function. The financial institution is able to monitor the cash inflow and outflows of the firm by monitoring the accounts of the firm.But with trade credits non-financial firms are competing with financial institutions in solving these problems and extending credit. How can non-financial institutions compete in this market? Petersen and Rajan [1997] briefly discusses several ways that suppliers may have advantages over financial institutions. The supplier has a close working association with the borrower and more frequently visit s the premises than a financial institution does. The size and timing of the lenders orders with the supplier provides information about the conditions of the borrowers business. Notice that this information is available to the supplier before it is available to the financial institution since the financial institution has to wait for the cash flow associated with the orders. The use of early payment discounts provides the supplier with an indication of problems with creditworthiness in the firm. Again the supplier obtains the information before the financial institution does. Thus the supplier may be able to obtain information about the creditworthiness faster and cheaper than the financial institution.The supplier may also have advantages in collecting payments. If the supplier has at least a local monopoly for the goods then the ability to withhold future deliveries is a powerful incentive for the firm to pay. This is a particular powerful threat if the borrower only accounts for a small fraction of the suppliers business. In case of defaults the supplier can seize the goods and in general has a better use forthem than a financial intermediary sizing the same goods. Through its sales network the supplier can sell the reclaimed goods faster and at a higher price than what is available to a financial intermediary. These advantages, of course, depend on the durability of the goods and how much the borrower has transformed them.If asymmetric information is one of the driving forces the explanation of trade credits then firms can use the fact that their suppliers have issued them credits in order to obtain additional credit from the banks. The banks are aware that the supplier has better information thus the bank can use trade credits as signal of the credit worthiness of the firm.That trade credits are in general secured by the goods delivered also puts a limit on the amount of trade credits the firm can obtain, thus the firm cannot use trade credits to finance the entire operations of the firm.In summary the prediction is that the level of asymmetric information is relatively low between the providers of trade credit and the borrowers due to the issuer’s general knowledge of the firm and the industry. In the empirical work below the variables explaining the use of trade credit are credit risk factors and Cost of Goods Sold. Since these trade credits are secured by the materials delivered to the firm, firms cannot “borrow” for more than the delivery value of the goods and services.2.2 Bank loansBanks have less information than providers of trade credit and the costs of gathering information are also higher for banks than for providers of trade credit. Providers of trade credits also have an advantage over banks in selling the collateral they have themselves delivered, but due to their size and number of transactions banks have an advantage in selling general collateral such as buildings, machinery etc. Banks therefore prefer to issue loans using tangible assets as collateral, also due to asymmetric information, they are less likely to issue loans to more opaque firms such as small and high growth firms. Banks are therefore willing to lend long term provided that tangible assets are available for collateral. In the empirical work below tangible assets and credit risk variables are expected to explain the use of long-term bank loans and the amount of long-term bank loans are limited by the value of tangible assets.The basis for issuing Short Term Bank Loans is the comparative advantages banks have in evaluating and collecting on accounts receivables, i.e. Debtors. It is also possible to use Cash and Cash equivalents as collateral but banks do not have anycomparative advantages over other providers of credit in terms of evaluating and collecting these since they consist of cash and marketable securities. In terms of inventories, again banks do not have any comparative advantages in evaluating these. Thus, we expect the amounts of debtors to be the key variable in explaining the behaviour of Short Term Bank Loans.ConclusionsCurrently there exist two theories of capital structure The Pecking Order Theory where firms first exhaust all funding of the cheapest source first, then the second cheapest source and so on. The differences in funding costs are due to adverse selection costs from asymmetric information. The second theory is the Tradeoff Theory where firms increase the amount of debt as long as the benefits are greater than the costs from doing so. The benefits of debt are tax-shields and “positive agency costs” and the costs of debt are the expected bankruptcy costs and the “ne gative agency costs”. In both of these theories, the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet is not important and in this paper, that proposition is strongly rejected. So the main conclusion is that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet influences the composition of the liability side of the balance sheet in terms of the different types of debt used to finance the firm, or that the use of the funds is important in deciding the type of financing available.We further argue that it is asymmetric information and collateral that determines the relationship between the asset side and liability side of the balance sheet. The theory works reasonable well for Cheap Trade Credits and Long Term Bank Loans but the tests for Short Term Bank Loans are disappointing.译文：中小企业融资摘要中小企业融资的主要来源有：股权融资、按时兑现的贸易信贷融资、中长期银行信贷融资、延迟兑现的贸易信贷融资以及其他债务融资，每种融资方式的边际成本取决于与其滞纳金相关的信息不对称成本和交易成本。
中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献
中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：The areas of SME financing channels: an overview 1.IntroductionIn all countries, SMEs are an important source of economic growth and create jobs. In addition, these companies through their dynamism and flexibility, the power of innovation and development.The research method is to start from the literature to highlight the importance of the theme of our research. This paper analyzes the data and statistics based on mainly by the World Bank survey, small and medium-sized private enterprises in Romania by some empirical research. According to the method used, and pointed out the importance of financing of SMEs and enhance the public bodies concerned about, especially the measures taken to improve financial development.2.the literature on SMEs financing channelsA popular academic literature on the financing channels of SMEs, has witnessed a lot of research to solve this problem.Countless research studies have indicated that financing channels is a critical obstacle in the growth and development process, especially in small and medium enterprises.Through Baker Dumont reggae - Ke Lute, Ivan, and Marca Smokin Popovich (2004) research, reflecting the fundamental factors of 10 000 enterprises from 80 countries mainly depend on the financing of enterprises. Therefore, the relationship between the study highlights the corporate finance and its characteristics such as age, size and structure of property rights. From this perspective, the authors found that the small size of the young company, and face greater obstacles when they seek financial resources.The iResearch Dick Mei Leke and Salta (2011) analysis of macroeconomic and institutional factors affecting SME financing loans through the statistical data found. In other similar studies, the authors found a positive correlation between the overall economic development (a measure of per capita income) and financial development (measured by private lending ratio of gross domestic product), on the other hand, the level of SME financing is the opposite. In addition, the authors show that the level of financing for SMEs depends on the legal structure and overall business environment.3.in the process of SME financing in the general obstaclesIn general, access to financial products or financial services or financial inclusion assumes that there is no trade barriers to the use of financial products or services, regardless of whether these barriers or non-related pricing (Dumont reggae - Ke Lute, Baker, and Honorine root 2008:2). Therefore, to improve this means of access means increasing the degree of financial products or financial services at a fair price toeveryone.Enterprise does not use financial products or services can be divided into several categories, their identification is necessary, in order to take the necessary measures to improve their financing channels. Therefore, on the one hand, enterprises obtain financing, the financial products and services, but do not use them because they do not have a viable investment projects. On the other hand, it can distinguish between non-voluntary refuse corporate Although these business needs, but not have access to financial services. The status of independent corporate finance or financial services in some companies do not earn enough money or safeguards required by financing institutions and therefore have higher credit risk. At the same time, when some companies in need of funding, financial and banking institutions involved too costly and can not agree to financing. Finally, in the context of the enterprise refused to appear over-priced financial products or services and financial products or services that meet their requirements.Financing channels for enterprise development and the efficient allocation of funds essential. However, compared with large enterprises, SMEs seeking finance is facing many difficulties, because of several reasons, including: the judicial and legislative structure of the instability and imperfect, it does not support the enterprises in need of financing and funding the relationship between; part of the funding and corporate information is incomplete or even lack of information, which hinders the normal and efficient development of relations between enterprises and providers of finance; especially in the young company, the lack of credit history and guarantees the creditors, and sometimes limits the range of financial products that can be used.The number of surveys, especially the World Bank stressed that the financing is one of the biggest obstacle to good development and growth of the SME. For example, the World Bank in the 2006-2009 survey foundthat 31% of the worldwide study of corporate finance is a major obstacle to the current implementation, and even higher proportion of young company in the 40% of cases up to three years of experience (Chavez, kt Boer and Ireland 2010:1). In addition, a series of global surveys, including the information provided by the World Business Environment Survey show that SME financing transaction costs is the main obstacle to enterprise development.4.SME bank financing difficulties and support measuresIn most countries, especially in countries with bank-oriented financial system, the main source of external financing for SMEs by bank loans. Therefore, this type of loan is crucial to the development of SMEs. However, the survey showed, compared to the SMEs and large enterprises are using the new investment in the small extent of bank financing.As we mentioned, the use of financial products is determined by supply and demand. It is therefore important to understand why the SMEs use bank financing to a small extent only. In this regard, some studies (Banerjee and Duflo: 2004) has shown that the main reason for the supply, because every time when SMEs are able to obtain loans, they use it to increase production. This behavior is more proof of financing is an important factor in the development of enterprises. In addition, in the context of the current global financial crisis, the declining availability of bank loans and limited financing opportunities for SMEs. Therefore, it is the main problem facing small and medium enterprises.October 29, 2010, this survey of SMEs in Romania highlights the main problems faced by SMEs and banks. Therefore, 82% of the interviewed entrepreneurs obtain bank financing is very difficult, mainly because of excessive bureaucracy, unreasonable high demand, high interest rates, rigid bank credit indicators, as well as many types of commission and expenses. In addition, more than 61% of SMEentrepreneurs and managers reporting banks lack of transparency (hidden costs, lack of communication channels, etc.), there is no real consultation (using the standard contract, the bank refused to modify or complete the credit contract, etc.) and banks do not legitimate or misuse of the terms of the contract (for example, perform the unauthorized transaction accounts or bank fraud). Understanding this knowledge to take measures to support and promote SME financing.Improve SME financing is still cause for concern, but also national, European and international facing a challenge. For example, in the EU, through the implementation of the new measures established by the Small Business Administration for Europe to improve the financing channels for SMEs, by reducing the return of the structural funds requirements to promote the access of small and medium enterprises, the establishment of the Credit Ombudsman to promote small and medium-sized enterprises and dialogue between the credit institutions, to avoid the double taxation of the tax legislation, which will hinder the international venture capital plays an important role.In particular, empirical research, emphasizing the impact of the degree of financial development of a country is essential that the level of development of the SME financing. Therefore, a series of measures to support SMEs to obtain financing, to ensure the efficient development of the country's financial, which will ensure greater availability of corporate finance. Specifically, the authorities should take measures commonly used to measure the degree of financial development in the seven pillars, namely, the institutional environment, business environment, financial stability, banking and financial services, non-bank financial services, financial markets and access to finance.5 .ConclusionEffective financing for SMEs to create new business is of great significance, and existing growth and development of enterprises, whilepromoting the country's economic and social development. In addition, in the case of the economic crisis, SMEs contribute to restoring the national economy, so it is particularly important to support SME financing. However, most of the survey report stressed, always the financing channels of SMEs is one of the most important factor to affect its operation and development.SMEs trying to get the necessary financial resources to face difficulties related to the entrepreneurs and the economic environment of each country, as well as existing legal and institutional structure. To alleviate these difficulties, the measures taken by public authorities should focus on improving the financial development and to ensure that the corporate finance and economic growth, greater effectiveness.In various countries, including Romania, the decline on the availability of SME financing, or even the lack of statistical data, we believe that policy makers need to focus on and monitor a series of important indicators, depending on the size of the SMEs, experience and industry events share of its loans, which will benefit the public authorities, creditors and investors.原文来自罗马·安吉拉中小企业的融资渠道的领域:概述（奥拉迪亚大学：经济科学，2011年第一卷第一期，431-437）摘要通过中小企业在创造附加值和新的就业岗位中的贡献,使它在国家的经济和社会发展中拥有一个显著的角色。
小微企业融资外文文献翻译
小微企业融资外文文献翻译小微企业融资外文文献翻译(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Micro Enterprise Finance in Uganda: Path Dependence and Other and Determinants of Financing DecisionsDr. Winifred Tarinyeba- KiryabwireAbstractAccess to finance literature in developing countries focuses onaccess to credit constraints of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) micro enterprises because they are considered the drivers of economic growth. However, in low income countries, micro enterprises play a much more significant role than SMEs because of their contribution to non-agricultural self-employment. The predominant use of informal credit rather than formal credit shows that the manner in which micro enterprises are formed and conduct their businesses favors the former over the latter. In addition, other factors such as lengthy credit application procedures, negative perceptions about credit application processes make informal credit more attractive. On the other hand specific factors such as business diversification, the need to acquire business inputs or assets than cannot be obtained using supplier credit are associated with a tendency to use formal credit.IntroductionIt well established that in markets where access to credit is constrained, it is the smaller businesses that have the most difficulty accessing credit. Various policy interventions have been made to improve access to credit including reforming the information and contractual frameworks, macro-economic performance, competitiveness in the financial system, and regulatory frameworks that enablefinancial institutions to develop products for SMEs such as leasing and factoring. Over the past ten years, policy makers in developing and low income countries have focused on microfinance as an intervention to bridge the access to credit gap and improve access to credit for those than cannot obtain credit from mainstream financial institutions such as commercial banks. However, despite, the use of what are often termed as “innovative lending” methods that are designed to ease access to credit, such as use of group lending and other collateral substitutes, micro enterprises continue to rely heavily on informal finance as opposed to formal credit. While other studies have focused broadly on factors that inhibit access to credit, this article seeks to throw some light on specific characteristics of micro enterprises that make them more inclined to use informal credit, as well as specific factors that are more associated with use of formal credit. The former are what I term as path dependence factors.The majority of micro enterprises operate as informally established sole proprietorships. This finding is consistent with the literature on micro enterprises, particularly the fact that they operate in the informal sector. However, nearly all of the enterprises had some form of trading license issued by the local government of the area in whichthey operate. The license identifies the owner of the business and its location, and is renewable every financial year. Most respondents did not understand the concept of business incorporation and thought that having a trading license meant that they were incorporated. Several factors can be attributed to the manner in which micro enterprises are established. First, proprietors generally understand neither the concept of incorporation nor the financial and legal implications of establishing a business as a legal entity separate from its owner. Second, the majority of micro enterprises start as spontaneous business or economic opportunities, rather than as well-thought out business ventures, particularly businesses that operate by the road side, or in other strategic areas, such as telephone booths that operate along busy streets. The owners are primarily concerned with the economic opportunity that the business presents rather than with the formalities of establishing the business. Third, rule of law issues also explain the manner in which businesses generally are established and financed. Although a mechanism exists for incorporating businesses in Uganda, the process and the legal and regulatory burdens, associated with formalizing a business, create costs that, in most cases, far outweigh the benefits or even the economic opportunity created by the business.Commenting on the role of law in determining the efficiency of the economic activities it regulates, Hernando De Soto argues that if laws impede or disrupt economic efficiency, they not only impose unnecessary costs of accessing and remaining in the formal system, but costs of operating informally as well. The former include the time and cost of registering a business, taxes and complying with bureaucratic procedures. On the other hand, the costs of informality include costs of avoiding penalties, evading taxes and labor laws and costs that result from absence of good laws such as not inadequate property rights protection, inability to use the contract system, and inefficiencies associated with extra contractual law.Businesses in Uganda are registered by the Registrar of Companies under the Company’s Act. The office of the Registrar of Companies is located in the capital city of Kampala and this imposes a burden on businesses that operate in other parts of the country that would wish to be registered. However, remoteness of the business registration office was not the primary inhibitor because the tendency not to register was as pronounced in businesses close to the registration office, as it was in those that were remotely placed. In addition, the following fees are required to incorporate a company: a name search andreservation fee of Ugshs. 25,000 ($12.50), stamp duty of 0.5% of the value of the share capital, memorandum and articles of association registration fee of Ugshs. 35,000 ($17.5), and a registration fee ranging from Ugshs. 50,000 to 4,000,000 ($25 to 2000).Legal systems characterized by low regulatory burden, shareholder and creditor rights protection, and efficient bankruptcy processes are associated with incorporated businesses and increased access to finance. On the other hand, inadequate legal protection is associated with limited business incorporation, low joint entrepreneurial activity, and higher financing obstacles. These impediments are what De Soto refers to as the mystery of legal failure. He argues that although nearly every developing and former communist nation has a formal property system, most citizens cannot gain access to it and their only alternative is to retreat with their assets into the extra legal sector where they can live and do business.译文乌干达小微企业融资路径依赖和融资的决定性因素Dr. Winifred Tarinyeba- Kiryabwire摘要通过查阅发展中国家的金融文献，我们往往可以发现由于中小企业是推动发展中国家经济增长的主要动力源，其金融问趣则主要侧重于中小企业的融资受限方面。
(英文版)中小企业融资The financing problem of SMEs in China
The financing problem of SMEs in China中国中小企业融资的若干问题国际经济与贸易专业 2009-01 ×××内容简介：财政部部长谢旭人在3月5好的第五次会议第十一届全国人民代表大会的新闻发布会上指出，中国将继续加大对中小企业的发展，预计在2012年政府将为中小企业提供20亿美元的专项资金，用以支持中小企业的发展。
Key word：中小企业SMEs 融资financing 政府government 商业银行commercial banks Proactive fiscal policies will continue playing a vital part in supporting the development of smaller businesses, China's Finance Minister Xie Xuren said on March05, 2012.There was 12.87 billion yuan ($2 billion) invested in development for small and medium-sized enterprises, and the support will continue to expand this year, Xie said at a press briefing in Beijing during the National People's Congress.With the development of China's Socialist market economy. The rapid development of SMEs has become a strong driving force of economic development, especially after China's accession to the WTO in 2001 and further intensified competition in the world market, However, inconveniences in financing this global problem in our country has become the bottleneck which hinders the rapid and healthy development of SMEs1 The contribution about SMEs1.1 The contribution to GDPSome 99% of the China's the total enterprise are the SMEs . Economically, they account for 65% of the China’s gross domestic product (GDP) and contribution to the tax rate of 50%, . SMEs therefore have a key role to play in helping China emerge stronger from the finacing crisis and meet the goals of the 2011 Strategy.1.2 The contribution to employmentThe information shows that SMEs in China has more than 10 million. In recent years, industrial and commercial small and medium-sized enterprises to provide employment opportunities for about 80% of the whole society and about 65% of new patents, the vast majority of Chinese labor from the agricultural sector, employment in such enterprises in 20112 The activities of SME financing status and Problems2.1 The lack of financial support for SMEsSMEs lack financial support from the goverment, financing is very difficult, especially non-state financing of SMEs is even more prominent. It has become a major problem restricting the development of SMEs ,so 'financing' this long-standing problem is still not a fundamental solution, according to statistics, more than 90% of SMEs within the enterprise funds from the raising, family and friends, as well as various non-normal channels (eg, high-interest private loans, embrace the build, etc.) These not only increase the cost of doing business, but also disrupt the normal financial order.2.2 Financing channel is narrow, the cost is too highMainly small and medium enterprises to loans from traditional financing institutions ,mainly state-owned banks in particular are the main sources of credit is too concentrated, not conducive to the bank's risk prevention.On the other hand, the reform and opening up 20 years, the number of SMEs in China increased four times, including urban and rural credit cooperatives, including local financial institutions increased by only 1 times, demand exceeds supply is one of the reasons causing difficulties in financing.They are not willing to lend currency to the small and medium-sized enterprises makes it difficult for smaller companies to obtain finance.Small companies have difficulty borrowing from banks,so they have to lend from other larger companies for fear of bad loans.2.3 Short life cycleA statistics shows that the average life cycle of SMEs is about 3 years, which has an accelerated decline trend. According to related data, SMEs, which declare bankrupt as quickly as their birth, have made up above 90% of the totalenterprises in the country . Therefore, SMEs have been the focus of the society. To some extent, the development and strengthening of the SMEs directly relate to the energy and vitality of national economy.3 The reason of financing difficulties for SMEs3.1 Factors of the state's macroeconomic policy◆Policy support is not enough.Countries in the poor selling process, the state-owned large enterprises and enterprise groups to develop and implement a lot of progressive support policies, their funding problem has been resolved in varying degrees.However, the issue of revitalizing small and medium enterprises, although in recent years, emphasis gradually, but such factors as the market is not perfect, fit a variety of complementary measures is not enough.◆Has not attracted sufficient attention.In support of SMEs, and our government is still a lack of supporting preferential policies to provide financial services.3.2 The financial systemSmall amount of profit is thin, the lack of economies of scale.For the state-owned commercial banks, loans to SMEs do exist do not form a scale problem.As compared with large enterprises, small and medium small amount of each loan request, but the issuance of each loan program, handling areas, such as investigation, assessment, monitoring and so much the same, the results of banks and supervision unit operating cost loans costs rose.Banking supervision from the cost savings in operating costs and the Economics of starting, do not want to deal with SMEs.3.3 Their own area and the low level of financial servicesMost SMEs are small, weak, and industry low level and subject of its dominant position in the industry still is a labor-intensive industries, the various economic indicators are also a wide gap with large enterprises. Under these state their competitive is weak.The competitiveness of enterprises not only the price of the product or service, quantity, quality and other economic indicators, but also by the corporate image, social responsibility, environmental awareness, sustainable development and other factors.SMEs in these conditions is much lower than large enterprises.SMEs competitiveness and from their own social responsibility to consider, the bank can not support those weak competitive SMEs, the SMEs credit competition, difficult to get bank trust.Relative to large enterprises, small and medium small number of assets, poor quality, low credit rating, poor credit, mortgages and credit loans are more difficult.Therefore, SMEs led to strong demand for bank loans with the bank between the loanable funds is difficult to effectively integrate.But also because the state-owned commercial banks, credit rating assessment criteria there are disadvantages of SMEs credit rating, making the conflict more acute.4 The stage to solve the financing problems of SMEs4.1 To build a sound system of legal protection ,improve the laws and regulations in support of SMEsWe must seize the development of SMEs or SMEs Promotion Law, the Basic Law and other laws and regulations, so that SMEs Management on the legal track.SMEs or SME Promotion Law, the Basic Law should be established with financial institutions for SMEs, the SME financing measures such as rules, making SMEs to financial institutions and the financing of small and medium enterprises with legal status and legal requirements.On this basis, the response to small and medium banks, funds and other financial institutions to specific legislation, to regulate their responsibilities, funding sources, operational methods.4.2 To explore new forms of SME financing strategy.Most SME financing both their small size, assets less liabilities rate, weak security, the low quality of management, financial systems, credit rating is low, there are bank loans risk, high cost problems, but also the problem of insufficient government support.Therefore, the development of multi-channel for SMEs to raise capital to support the implementation of policy, government-led, based on the local, market operations, mitigate risks, increase the intensity of financing for SMEs, support the development of SMEsIn conclusion,corporate finance is a system which needs the coordination of relevant parties, with the reasonable solution is currently financing the further development of SMEs in China for an important part.March09, WORDS:1349。
中小企业融资偏好SME外文文献翻译2014年译文4500字
文献出处Mac an Bhaird C. SME Owners’ Financing P references[J]Resourcing Small and Medium Sized Enterprises., 2014,(5): 77-103.原文SME owners’ financing preferencesMac an Bhaird C. SMEAcademic studies investigating the financing of SMEs commonly examine the subject by conducting multivariate regression analysis employing panel data sets consisting of accounting and finance data (see Appendix B for a comprehensive review of this literature). Researchers adopting this approach seek to explain financing choice in terms of firm characteristics such as firm size, age, asset structure, profitability, growth opportunities, and legal organisation. This methodology, whilst beneficial in theory testing and preliminary benchmark studies, neglects one of the most important aspects of small business and entrepreneurship: the central role of the SME owner. Given the primary decision making role of the firm owner, this method excludes a fundamental element of the financing and finance provision in SMEs. The approach adopted in this chapter is to record SME owners’ views on financing their businesses, and the reasons why they choose one type of finance over another, or why they avoid some forms of financing entirely. Whilst this approach may appear self-evident or overly simplistic, it can reveal explanations for observed capital structures and how financial markets and institutions might better respond to the needs of the small business community.Respondents’ perceptions concerning issues related to funders and their lending practices are reported in Table 4.5. Almost 50% of respondents are of the perception that “banks understand their business,” with 20% disagreeing with this proposition. This result indicates that respondents generally do not perceive informationasymmetries in debt markets. This finding may be explained with reference to the age profile of respondents, thus consistent with Diamond’s (1989) reputation theory, information asymmetries lessen as firms mature and become established. Even in the event of bank switching, surviving firms have developed a credit history. A crosstabulation of the proposition “banks understand my business” with age of respondents presented in Table D.11 bears this out; those firms perceiving that banks do not understand their business are predominantly in the youngest age categories. These relationships are not statistically significant, however, as indicated by significance values for directional measures presented in Table D.12.Table 4.5 Respondents’ perception of funders and their requirementsResults explain preferences and patterns of financing reported in earlier sections. Respondents’ preference for debt when seeking external finance expressed in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 may be partly explained by firms not perceiving information asymmetries in debt markets. Greater perception of information asymmetries among firms in the youngest age categories is exacerbated by the concentration of 50% of these firms in sectors typified by a high proportion of intangible assets. This finding may also explain the high use of external equity (37% of total financing) by this group reported in Table 2.2, and partly explains the provision of personal assets to secure debt by firm owners in the youngest age category.A sectoral cross tabulation of the proposition “banks understand my business” presented in Table D.13 reveals that almost 30% of respondents perceiving information asymmetries in debt markets are in the “computer software development and services” sector. This may arise from a relatively young age profile, as over 60% of firms in this sector are under 10 years old. Another relevant factor is the technological nature of the sector, confirming the finding of Hogan and Hutson (2005), that firms in this sector do not perceive information asymmetries in venture capital markets to the same extent that they perceive asymmetries in the bank-client relationship. This may be due to the technical knowledge and specialist skills of venture capitalists in assessing technologically complicated investment projects, and the lack of specialised knowledge by loan assessors in banks.Almost 90% of respondents believe that “banks are willing to provide overdraft facilities” to their company, as shown in Table 4.5. This result is consistent with empirical evidence highlighting the reliance of SMEs on short-term bank debt (Chittenden et al. 1996), which is even greater in the Irish context (Ayadi 2008). The effect of respondents’ perception may perpetuate this reliance, as firms are more likely to apply for additional short-term debt if they perceive their application will be successful. Respondents’ perception partly explains patterns of financing reported in Table 2.2, indicating that short-term debt was the second most important source of finance after retained profits, comprising an average 22% of capital structures. Thisresult also supports the contention that financial institutions advance short-term debt facilities more readily, as they usually involve smaller amounts than long-term debt or mortgage finance, and can be recalled at short notice (Esperanca et al. 2003). Additionally, banks may seek to reduce their exposure by advancing debt with a shorter maturity. Respondents’ perception may therefore result from a combination of demand-side and supply-side factors.Respondents’ perception of the procli vity of financial institutions to seek collateral as security for debt finance is evident from responses to propositions three and four presented in Table 4.5. Eighty five per cent of respondents perceive that “providers of debt insist on collateral,” and 81% perceive that banks lend to firms with tangible assets, such as cash and fixed assets. Respondents’ perceptions may be due to experiences in contracting with financial institutions (results from multivariate models presented in Table 3.10 indicate statistically significant positive relationships between use of short-term, long-term, and total debt, and provision of collateral). Additionally, results from SUR models presented in Table 3.19 indicate statistically significant positive relationships between use of debt and provision of firm assets as collateral for all models, apart from firms in the “other” sector. These results confirm findings of previous studies emphasising the importance of lien-free collateralisable assets in securing debt finance (Heyman et al. 2008). Thus, consistent with Myers (1997), firms whose assets consist primarily of intangibles have most difficulty in accessing bank loans.Respondents’ perceptions highlight a number of issues for SME financing. Firstly, firms without access to adequate collateralisable assets may be discouraged from applying for debt capital on the basis that they believe it will be unsuccessful (Kon and Storey 2003), which may lead to underinvestment. Secondly, these perceptions may result in overreliance on short-term debt (Chittenden et al. 1996), rather than a more appropriate source, such as long-term debt. This may increase the cost of capital for the firm, as short-term debt is generally more expensive than the latter. Additionally, dependence on short-term debt exposes the firm to liquidity problems if the bank restricts or withdraws this facility at short notice. Furthermore, SMEs maybe compelled to employ more expensive sources of financing, such as debt factoring, invoice discounting or use of trade credit.Respondents’ perceptions on propositions concerning venture capital funders are also reported in Table 4.5. Venture capital comprises 5% of the capital structures of respondents (as shown in Table 2.2), and this is reflected in responses to questions on venture capital funding. Whilst 34% of respondents agreed with the proposition that “venture capitalists invest in companies with cash/fixed assets,” over 50% expressed no opinion and 15% disagreed. This result suggests that respondents are generally inexperienced with, or ambivalent about venture capital finance. Of those firms in disagreement with this statement, over 50% are in sectors typified by a lack of collateralisable assets, namely the “computer software development and services” and “other services” sectors. This finding suggests that respondents in these sectors are more acquainted or experienced in contracting with venture capitalists.Sixty five per cent of respondents agree with the statement “the availability of venture capital is su sceptible to market fluctuations,” whilst 32% express no opinion. This result indicates that respondents are aware of fluctuations in venture capital investment activity. One third of those in agreement with this proposition comprise firms in sectors typif ied by a lack of collateralisable assets, namely the “computer software development and services” and “other services” sectors. Once again, this result suggests that respondents in these sectors are more experienced in contracting with venture capitalists. Whilst respondents appear cognisant of the workings of venture capital markets in general, they do not have strong opinions about proposed statements. This may be explained by the relatively small percentage of respondents seeking venture capital. Respond ents in the “computer software development and services” and “other services” sectors appear to have more definite opinions on venture capitalists.In summary, respondents’ answers to propositions presented in Table 4.5 partially explain motivations behind observed capital structures and stated financing preferences. In general, respondents do not perceive information asymmetries in debt markets. This perception may be partly explained by the age profile of respondents, asreputation effects (Diamond 1989) overcome these asymmetries. Information asymmetries in debt markets may be higher in practice, however, because the views of non-surviving firms are not reported in this survey. The latter firms may have perceived higher asymmetries in debt markets. Respondents perceive a requirement for collateral to secure debt finance, confirming evidence from previous studies detailing financial institutions’ proclivity for collateral to overcome potential agency problems of moral hazard (Coco 2000; Heyman et al. 2008). An implication of this perception is that firms lacking adequate collateralisable assets may be reluctant to apply for debt finance. Respondents report that financial institutions are willing to advance short-term debt facilities, which may partly explain reliance on this source as the second most important means of financing. Relatively few firms in the sample employ external equity, which is reflected in the ambivalence of respondents to questions on the requirements of venture capitalists.In this chapter, agency and pecking order theories of capital structure are further explored by consideration of evidence in the form of respondents’ replies to direct questions, and statements proposed in the form of Likert scales. A number of interrelated questions are asked in addressing two primary issues; “What are the financing preferences of respondents?,” and “Why do respondents maintain these preferences?” Replies to these questions facilitate examination of the relevance of theoretical propositions in explai ning respondents’ capital structures, and stated financing preferences.Respondents’ preferred source of financing is retained profits. Almost 50% indicate a willingness to employ long-term debt finance when required. Eighty per cent of respondents indicate an aversion to raising additional external equity. These preferences are consistent with propositions of the pecking order theory (Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984), although the expressed aversion to external equity suggests that the majority of respondents may adhere to a truncated pecking order. Investigation of the perceived greatest internal growth constraints and primary considerations when raising debt emphasise the importance of profitability in financing investment, and suggest that adherence to a preferred pecking order iscontingent on the profitability of the firm.Explanations for stated financing preferences of respondents are threefold. The primary reason is desire to retain control of the firm and maintain managerial independence, which is stronger in closely held private limited firms than in firms with wider ownership. Secondly, the main financial objectives of respondents are to maximise profits and sales, which reaffirms financing preferences and emphasises respondents’ primary goal o f maintaining control of the firm. There are sectoral differences in pursuit of this objective; firms in the “computer software development and services” sector are twice as willing to relinquish control as firms in all other sectors, and they consider maximisation of the value of the firm as their primary financial objective. Thirdly, respondents generally do not perceive information asymmetries in debt markets, and believe that financial institutions are willing to provide short-term debt facilities. This is not an unexpected finding given the age profile of respondents, suggesting that information asymmetries are alleviated by reputation effects (Diamond 1989). The majority of firms perceiving information asymmetries in debt markets are in the “computer s oftware development and services” and “other services” sectors. This may be due to a combination of the age profile and technological characteristics of firms in this sector.Respondents highlighted a number of issues they consider most important when raising external finance that partly explain stated financing preferences and indicate the conditions under which they would consider raising additional finance. By taking these factors into account, funders can improve the efficiency of supply of funds to th e sector. Respondents’ primary concern when raising debt is the cost of finance, highlighting the influence of supply-side factors in the financing decision. An implication of this belief is that firm owners may avoid raising debt in times of high interest rates, resulting in underinvestment. As respondents also express an aversion to external equity, firm growth will be limited to the return on investment of retained profits, leading to lower growth rates. Additionally, as respondents do not believe in accumulating financial slack they may encounter financing problems during an economic recession, particularly if there is a credit squeeze.Another belief held by respondents is the requirement for collateral to secure debt finance. Respondents in sectors in which asset structures are typified by a high proportion of tangible assets are more likely to apply for debt finance, and are more confident in securing the finance required than respondents in sectors with asset structures typified by a high proportion of intangible assets. The practice of financial institutions in providing debt finance based on collateral rather than profitability is inefficient, and may have a number of adverse consequences for SMEs. Firstly, perception of a lack of sufficient collateralisable assets may result in a reduction of applications for long-term debt finance, leading to underinvestment. Secondly, this belief may result in over-reliance on other sources of finance which are less appropriate and more costly, such as short-term debt, for example. Investigation of respondents’ views on signalling, debt tax shields, timing considerations, and the accumulation of financial slack indicate that these issues are not primary concerns when making the financing decision. Respondents appear more concerned with the issue of raising adequate capital to finance their firm than what they may consider ancillary issues.译文中小企业融资偏好伯哈德在调查研究中小型企业融资的学术研究中，通常通过多元回归分析来审查这个主题。
中小企业融资外文翻译
SME financing in ChinaUniversité Paris X-NanterreMaison Max Weber (bâtiments K et G)200, Avenue de la République92001 NANTERRE CEDEXDocument de Travail Working Paper2007-29Chen Xiang LIUE c o n om i X http://economix.u-paris10.fr/SME Financing in ChinaLIU Chen XiangUniversité Paris X-NanterreEconomiX (CNRS-UMR 7166)Bâtiment K-115200, Avenue de la République92001 Nanterre CedexTél : 01.40.97.59.10Fax : 01.40.97.59.10Courriel : liu_chenxiang@yahoo.frSME Financing in ChinaLIU Chen XiangAbstractSMEs have a great contribution in China’s economic expansion. However, the financing predicament currently faced by SMEs constitutes a great bottleneck for their development. Banks are reluctant to lend to them, mainly due to the lack of collateral and their poor capability in pricing risk. This is the reason why credit guarantee institutions play a key role in SME financing and the perfection of the credit guarantee system is important for promoting their access to credit. In addition, the lifting of the ceiling on lending rates as well as other steps taken by banking authorities will encourage bank lending to SMEs. Finally, informal finance has a significant part in SME financing.RésuméLes PME ont une grande contribution à la croissance chinoise. Pourtant, leur difficulté de financement devient un grand obstacle dans leur développement. Les banques ne veulent pas leur prêter, principalement à cause de manque de collatéraux et la faible compétence des banques pour évaluer le risque de crédit. C’est la raison pour laquelle les organismes de garantie jouent un rôle indispensable dans le financement de PME et le perfectionnement du système de garantie est important pour augmenter leur accès aux crédits. En plus, l’enlèvement du plafond de taux d’intérêt de crédits ainsi que les autres mesures prises par les autorités bancaires vont encourager les prêts bancaires aux PME. Enfin, la finance informelle a une part significative dans le financement de PME.Key Words: SME financing, credit guarantee, informal financeJEL Classification: E26, E51, G21, O531. IntroductionThe scope of private ownership has become substantial, producing well over half of GDP and an overwhelming share of exports-imports. Private companies generate most new jobs and are improving the productivity and profitability of the whole economy. The continued re-orientation of the economy towards the private sector brings considerable gains to real incomes and macro-economic activity. It should be noted that all companies which are controlled neither by state nor by collective shareholders are considered as private companies; 98% of enterprises in non-public sector are SMEs (small and medium sized enterprises), and 98% of SMEs are in non-public sector.The changes in government polices explain importantly the emergence of a powerful private sector in the economy. In 2005, regulations that prevented privately-owned companies entering a number of sectors of the economy, such as infrastructure, public utilities and financial services were abolished. However, SMEs have always limited access to credits, which hinders heavily their businesses’ expansion and thus their healthy development. Why banks are reluctant to lend to them and how they have fallen into financing difficulties? How to resolve their financing problems and who can serve as their main supporters? This paper tries to respond to these questions and to draw the best SME financing service system.The paper begins by evaluating the position of SMEs in the real economy as a whole and highlighting issues facing SME financing. The following section discusses formal finance’s support for SMEs, emphasizing the role of credit guarantee institutions. Ultimately, the paper presents informal finance’s development and outlines its influences on SME financing.2. The private sector—a major driving force in economic expansionChina’s private sector has become its main driver of economic growth. In 2005, there were more than 40 million SMEs and sole industrial & commercial proprietorships (getihu enterprises), accounting for 99.6% of the total number of enterprises. They were responsible for as much as 59% of GDP. They accounted for 60% of sales value and represented 68.65% of imports & exports. They paid 48.2% of taxes, and occupied more than 75% of employment in urban areas. The regions with which SME cooperate have extended from Hong Kong & Macao to some developed countries, such as United States and Italy.The growth in private output has been the result of the higher productivity of most companies in this sector. The sharper incentives facing the private sector companies have resulted in them using less capital and labour to produce output than state companies. Overall, the aggregate productivity of private companies in the industrial sector is estimated to be almost twice that of enterprises controlled directly by the state. The profitability of private companies has also risen considerably, and the rate of return on physical assets was double that of state controlled companies in certain provinces in 2005. Such a high level of competitiveness has resulted in the private sector accounting for more than two-thirds of all exports in 2005. While the bulk of these exports are made by foreign-controlled companies, the domestically-owned private sector is increasing its exports, as more small and medium-sized enterprises are granted export licences. (OECD, 2005).The private sector plays a key role in a largely market-oriented economy owing to the changes in government polices. Government authorities have recognized the importance of the private sector for economic growth and job creation, and have moved to reduce a number of barriers that limit its expansion and to promote its equal treatment with publicly-owned sectors. On February 2005, the State Council issued “Guidelines on Encouraging and Supporting the Development of the Non Public Sector including Individual and Private Enterprises” that include 36 articles for improving the operating environment for private business. The new guidelines give much-improved market access to private companies in many industries that were previously restricted, including those that are dominated by state monopolies and heavily regulated sectors such as public utilities, financial services, social services and national defence. The directives also mandate equal treatment of private and public business, calling for rescinding of rules that discriminate against private companies and direct ministries and local governments to carry out implementation of the new constitutional amendment guaranteeing private property rights. In terms of access to financing, the new guidelines direct financial regulators to expand access to bank, equity and bond financing, through pro-active treatment of private companies under the interest rate liberalisation, and through impartial treatment of private companies in capital market access. A subsequent survey by the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce showed that entrepreneurs cited the new market entry and financing access articles to be the most important.3. The difficulty of SMEs to access to credit3.1 Structure of SME financing and their financing difficultiesAccording to the survey conducted by State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) in 2002, the domestic private companies, including the very small companies, have low ratios of liabilities to equity, supporting the view that they had limited access to credit.Indeed over 40% of such companies in the sample had no debt, and financed their activities from internal funds, while the remaining nearly 60% borrowed from banks or informal market (Table 1). The very smallest private industrial companies and private service sector companies rely extensively on informal credit. Bank credit, on the other hand, seems to be more accessible for larger companies. The survey also indicates that over 90% of the private companies had difficulty in obtaining bank credit. Over half of the respondents named their lack of collateral as a major barrier to bank borrowing. Ownership discrimination was cited by one-fifth of respondents followed by insufficient amount of bank loans and too short-term lending as major problems with bank financing. Much fewer firms chose too high interest rates or stringent requirements for credit rating as top reasons for not bank borrowing. While banks tend to lend short-term, the informal markets provide long-term financing. The informal sector also accepts receivables as collateral, which may help explain why some larger firms rely exclusively on the informal market for external finance.China International Capital Corporation Limited’s recent research (2006) indicates that equity and retained earning represent respectively 30% and 26% of capital resources in SMEs. Among external financing channels, equity market’s entry threshold is high, venture capital investment system isn’t complete, corporate bonds’ issuance entry is difficult, so SMEs can’t raise capital through capital market effectively. For instance, listing in the stock market in Shenzhen or Shanghai is a privilege of a handful of well-established, large and profitable private companies. Although the establishment of the second board on the Shenzhen market for high-tech SMEs may ease this need somewhat for such companies, for non-high-tech companies financing still remains a major problem. Moreover, bond financing seems to be even less accessible for private companies due to stringent criteria including industrial policy guidelines.Table 1 – Use of credit by Domestic Private Sector CompaniesSize category (Sales volume, million yuan)0-1 1-3 3-10 10-20 20-50 50+ all Access to borrowing Per cent of firmsPer cent with no credit 54.2 43.4 39.5 36.1 28.6 42.4 41.1Per cent with credit 45.8 56.6 60.5 63.9 71.4 57.6 58.9 Per cent of firm with bank finance only 13.8 23.3 28.3 34.8 43.7 36.1 29.3Per cent with informal finance only 20.2 18.3 15.0 11.6 9.6 7.6 14.0Per cent with bank and informal 11.8 15.0 17.2 17.5 18.0 13.9 15.6 Firms with any borrowing1Per cent of equityManufacturing 51.8 32.3 36.5 39.9 36.5 28.9 32.5Services 43.6 40.9 49.9 30.3 63.8 31.1 39.9 All 47.6 36.9 38.8 36.6 43.8 29.5 34.7Per cent of total borrowingShare of informal borrowing in totalborrowingManufacturing 23.3 24.3 19.5 26.4 9.4 3.9 17.6Services 44.2 35.1 8.7 12.1 11.6 8.7 21.4All 35.7 28.2 15.6 20.9 10.3 6.3 10.9Pre tax rate of return on equity 6.1 10.6 11.5 15.1 16.6 15.5 14.811.8 19.8 24.8 29.9 32.0 30.6 29.0 Investment relative to (previousyear) equity plus debt minusinvestment14.5 18.7 25.3 12.3 12.6 16.7 100.0 Proportion of firms in each sizegroupSource: the Chinese University of Hong Kong, OECD Economic Surveys: China (2005) With respect to banks, although lending by State Owned Commercial Banks (SOCB) and other banks to non-state enterprises has been growing rapidly, private enterprises still seem to have less access to credit than State-owned enterprises (SOE). Small and medium sized businesses, which account for more than half of GDP, receive only 16% of total bank loans. Only 30% of credits demanded by SMEs with a good quality have been satisfied. (Economic Daily, 14/06/2006) Another example. According to Shanghai Branch of CBRC (China Banking Regulatory Commission), up to the end of June 2005, 71 915 small enterprises had obtained credits, which accounted for 28.2% in the total number of small enterprises in Shanghai. There are at least 70%of small enterprises which have never demanded credit, in a conservative estimation. Among1 The enterprises, which have less than 1 million yuans of sales volume, have the highest ratio of borrowing to equity, because they have little equity instead of much borrowing.those which had demanded credit, only 10% of small enterprises failed due to their poor management, 45% were refused because they hadn’t acceptable properties as a pledge for banks.3.2 Why banks are reluctant to grant credit?Credit demanded by SMEs has the following characteristics: small amount, urgent and frequent demands, in short term. The control cost of such credit is much higher than the one of credit to big enterprises. The smaller scale of SME loans makes banks proportionately more expensive to monitor. Big banks prefer to do business with big enterprises. Yet there are small & medium banks which have much less capital and which grant credits to SMEs with a good quality. These banks are less competitive but know very well SMEs in their regions.Likewise, poor management, complex related transactions, non transparent accounting and weak anti-risk capability have aggravated their difficulties to get credits from banks. Banks don’t want to lend to them owing to information asymmetry and high costs of transaction and control.Banks’ efforts to avoid incurring new non-performing loans reduce the access of SMEs, state owned and non-state, to bank credit, while larger SOEs (State Owned Enterprises) backed by central or local governments are able to get loans largely because of the implicit guarantee that backing confers. Non performing loans granted by big four SOCBs (State owned commercial banks) to SOEs can be written off or transferred to AMCs (Asset Management Corporation). The State has infinite responsibility. But those granted to SMEs can’t benefit this advantage. The personnel who grant credits are always responsible for them. Generally, SMEs are considered to have a relatively high default risk. In 2003, average NPL ratio of lending to SMEs in principal commercial banks was 32.11%, 15.7 points more than the average NPL ratio in commercial banks. For this reason, the Big-Four which want to lessen NPL ratio in order to satisfy the regulatory rules defined by CBRC (3%-5%) will be very prudent to SME lending.Due to high risk in SME lending, banks demand SMEs to put enough properties in pledge, or to look for a guarantee as an indispensable condition to grant credit. Nonetheless, most of SMEs haven’t enough acceptable assets as a pledge. This is a great handicap in their financing. So a fully developed credit guarantee system is strongly needed.The present dependence on collateral and guarantee is indicative of the fact that banks now have limited capabilities to assess, process, and price loans to smaller customers. Improvement of these capabilities is the ultimate key to ensuring adequate access to credit for SMEs and will require substantial upgrading of internal systems for assessing and managing risk and considerable training of staff. However, it is particularly important that lenders have necessary flexibility to charge lending rates that adequately compensate for risks and costs of their loans. The SMEs have a relatively higher business failure rate than larger borrowers. Risks of lending to SMEs are further increased by their relatively poor information systems, which makes it difficult for banks to assess their creditworthiness. Official restrictions on bank’s flexibility in setting lending rates were an increasing impediment to SME lending as banks became more conservative in the effort to avoid further non performing loans.Empirical analyses by MOLNAR and TANAKA (2007) show that private firms have difficulties in obtaining financing from the formal banking system and their access to bank loans depends on their credit history, size and rating that can’t easily be manipulated through creative accounting. Loan decisions irrelevant of the financial health of the company may suggest that banks, especially the largest ones, don’t have appropriate incentives to develop monitoring and risk pricing skills as they mainly engage in lending to SOEs (i.e. they are not able to distinguish between genuine and manipulated performance indicators). Firms in manufacturing sector are more likely to get loans, probably due to the fact that manufacturing firms are more likely to possess assets that can be used as collateral compared to firms in service industries.4. Enlarging access to credits for dynamic sectors—Formal finance’s support for SME4.1 Credit guarantee Schemes (CGSs)As described above, lack of collateral is the chief difficulty in obtaining bank loans for SMEs. Collateral or loan guarantee, or both, have become an essential precondition for most SME lending in China.Improving financing for SMEs undergoing substantial expansion has become a main concern for government. The central government has taken many steps to improve the flow of credits to SMEs in urban areas. Besides urging banks to penetrate that market, the government has promoted the establishment of credit guarantee schemes for smaller firms. The largest component of such schemes is the government-sponsored credit guarantee institutions established by municipalities and provinces. In addition, there are a smaller number of member-SME-funded mutual guarantee funds and private-sector invested commercial guarantee companies, both forms of which pre-date the establishment of government credit guarantee institutions.Nearly all provincial governments have established credit guarantee institutions. Following a pilot programme starting in 1998, 30 provinces established credit guarantee institutions. There were more than 20 in 1997, more than 300 in 2000, 848 in 2002 (one third were private credit guarantee institutions), more than 3 500 in 2004 (more than 2 000 were private credit guarantee institutions), and the number of such institutions reached more than 4 000 in 2005, with the amount of loans carrying guarantees amounting to about 400 billion RMB. According to the statistics, there are 1 200 credit guarantee institutions which serve especially for SMEs (for credits and shares issue), which account for 32.28% in all of credit guarantee institutions. (The People’s Bank of China & China Finance, 23/01/2006)The credit guarantee institutions are highly diverse: some are funded from the government budgets, others by fees on participating businesses, or by private investors, or a mixture of these sources. More than 70% of the funds of the institutions originate from non-government sources. In lots of such institutions, the capital invested by private enterprises and individuals is more than 60% (Financial News, 07/09/2005). The organisational form of the institutions varies from public service units, to state or privately controlled shareholding enterprises, to fund management companies. Further, they can be non-profit or profit institutions and their business scope can be limited to guaranteeing firm borrowing or can cover a wider range of activities.The remainder of this section is organized as follows. 4.1.1 analyses guarantee business operation; 4.1.2 presents the establishment of guarantee system; 4.1.3 discusses risk managementand puts forward some proposals for reform; and finally, 4.1.4 outlines the importance of private credit guarantee institutions’ development.4.1.1 Guarantee contractThe enterprises which demand guarantee should satisfy the following conditions:-They should register in State Administration for Industry & Commerce.-They should have been created three years ago at least, and shown good performance in the three previous years.-The ratio of liabilities to assets can’t exceed 70%.-The domain in which enterprises work should be supported by State (for example, industrial policies, environmental protection policies, etc). If the domains are restrictedby State, credit guarantee institutions won’t accept their demands.Generally, credit guarantee institutions charge a price less than a half of bank’s lending interest rate2. The prices vary across different credit guarantee institutions, amounting to 0.8%-3% of guaranteed credits. In addition to this guarantee price, SMEs should also pay a guarantee fee which is calculated per year and is paid only once3. The guarantee fees vary with credit amounts and the risk level of SME. Guarantee fee rate is defined on the basis of credit risk degree, and it’s a floating rate. Guarantee fee rate is limited to 50% of banks’ lending rate in the same term at most4.Credit guarantee institutions often demand counter-guarantee as an essential condition for granting the guarantee. There are various forms of counter-guarantee, such as mortgages on land use rights and real estate; means of transportation, equipment, and other movables; cashable2The floor of bank’s lending interest rate is 6.12% for one year. There is no ceiling.3For the guarantee in short term (3 months, 6 months), the guarantee fee is calculated per month (annual guarantee fee rate/12).4 Target lending rate (adjusted by the People’s Bank of China, effective from August 19, 2006)Credits in short termduration<= 6 months: 5.58%6 months<duration<=1 year: 6.12%Credits in medium and long term1 year<duration<=3 years: 6.30%3 years<duration<=5 years: 6.48%duration>5 years: 6.84%saving instrument, actions, bills of exchange; pledges on transferable stocks, patents, and trademarks; the guarantee granted by another person or institution, the enterprise chief’s unlimited responsibility, etc.Most of guaranteed credits are in short term (<=one year). The guarantee covers normally the principal and the interests, eventually with loss undergone by creditors in certain guarantee contracts. This depends on the negotiation between bank, enterprise and credit guarantee institution. After granting the guarantee, the credit guarantee institutions should control the enterprises continuously.In case the enterprise can’t repay credit to bank on the maturity of contract, the bank will hold caution deposited by credit guarantee institution, which is called “substitutive refunding”. If the enterprise has a cash shortage, and she can refund credit later, we call it “temporary relay”. In contrast, if the enterprise hasn’t the capability to refund it, we call it “default credit”. Normally, credit guarantee institutions assume all of implied responsibility, i.e. they refund credits to banks, and then they demand enterprises to refund them. Certain banks give a time limit (for example, 3 months after the expiry of credit contract). If the enterprise can’t yet repay credit, the credit guarantee institution will repay it for the enterprise.The substitutive refunding ratio relies on the credit guarantee institutions’ risk management. It can be zero in certain credit guarantee institutions, with contrast that others will go bankrupt owing to only one substitutive refunding. Most of enterprises are responsible for their engagements, and so the substitutive refunding ratio is low.After refunding credit to the bank, the credit guarantee institution requires the enterprise to repay it, and all of interests (not only those paid to the bank, but also interests for the period after substitutive refunding), eventually with loss and fees for creditor. The interest rate demanded by credit guarantee institution for the period after repayment to bank can be the same as the one demanded by bank, or even higher than the bank’s lending interest rate. In case of no refunding, the credit guarantee institution will sell pledges. The pledges are sufficient for refunding credit generally, so the credit guarantee institution has little loss.The guarantee law (promulgated on June 30, 1995 by permanent committee National People’s Congress and effective from October 1, 1995) and the new bankruptcy law (voted in the 23rd meeting of 10th permanent committee National People’s Congress on August 27, 2006 and effective from June 1, 2007) protect well-functioning guarantee businesses and priority of guaranteed credits’ repayment.4.1.2 Guarantee systemNational Development and Reform Commission is organizing to establish a SME guarantee system. There are “one body, two wings, four levels” in this system: one body is mode body (different resources of capital, market-oriented operation, corporate governance, support for the best); two wings are commercial guarantee institutions and mutual guarantee institutions which are considered as supplementary (agricultural credit guarantee institutions included). There are four levels in credit guarantee system which have different functions-national, provincial, prefectoral and county.According to plan, the county and prefectoral credit guarantee institutions give guarantee for SMEs in their proper regions. The provincial credit guarantee institutions grant re-guarantee for these credit guarantee institutions at lower levels, and supervise them with the People’s Bank of China. They can also grant guarantee directly to SMEs. The national credit guarantee institutions are being established and will work as guarantors of last resort and grant re-guarantee to the credit guarantee institutions at lower levels.4.1.3 Risk managementIn most of guarantee businesses, the credit guarantee institutions have joint obligation5, i.e. banks transfer the whole credit risk to credit guarantee institutions. The only risk for banks is the substitutive refunding risk which comes from credit guarantee institutions. Credit guarantee institutions can also have an ordinary obligation6 or assume the risk proportionately with banks5 After the expiry of the contract, the banks can demand enterprises or credit guarantee institutions to repay credits.6After the expiry of the contract and before trial or arbitration, credit guarantee institutions can refuse to assume guarantee responsibility. After adjudication, banks use properties put in pledge to refund credits. The credit guarantee institutions bear loss with banks proportionately. The proportion is negotiated by them.together7. In a mature credit guarantee system, credit guarantee institutions should assume the risk proportionately with banks. The objective is to avoid moral hazard on any side. Banks or credit guarantee institutions can collude with enterprises to damage another side’s interest.SMEs should put their properties in pledge either in banks or in credit guarantee institutions as an indispensable condition for obtaining credits. The value of properties put in pledge covers the principal and the interests normally.Credit guarantee institutions should deposit a caution in banks as a basis of cooperation with them, which is also a precaution against risk in banks. If the enterprises can’t repay their credits at the term of the contract, banks will hold the caution. The caution rate in banks varies from 10% to 20% of the guaranteed credit amount, i.e. the credit granted by banks can’t exceed 10 times the caution deposited by credit guarantee institutions. For example, credit guarantee institution deposit 10 million yuans in a bank, this bank will lend a sum of 100 million yuans in maximum guaranteed by this institution8. Certain credit guarantee institutions are demanded a higher caution rate, at around 20%--33%. Others are demanded nothing.Sometimes, the banks demand also the enterprises to deposit a caution, which differs from the one deposited by credit guarantee institutions. These two cautions can coexist.The caution deposited by enterprises in credit guarantee institutions serves as a counter-guarantee. Some credit guarantee institutions demand enterprises to pay a caution. Most don’t do so. The caution is 2%--10% of guaranteed credit amount. If the enterprise can’t repay its credit according to the contract, credit guarantee institutions will hold part of the caution deposited by the enterprise. This part of the caution will increase along with time. Six months later, the credit guarantee institution will hold the whole caution. It’s punishment for the enterprise. Enterprises can’t require to refund the caution. This punishment differs from the substitutive refunding. The substitutive refunding is done with credit guarantee institutions’ ownership, that is the caution deposited in banks by credit guarantee institutions.7 e.g. banks bear 30% of risk.。
中小企业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献
中小企业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Financing of SMEsJan Bartholdy, Cesario MateusOriginally Published in“Financing of SMEs”.London business review.AbstractThe main sources of financing for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are equity, trade credit paid on time, long and short term bank credits, delayed payment on trade credit and other debt. The marginal costs of each financing instrument are driven by asymmetric information and transactions costs associated with nonpayment. According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms will choose the cheapest source in terms of cost. In the case of the static trade-off theory, firms choose finance so that the marginal costs across financing sources are all equal, thus an additional Euro of financing is obtained from all the sources whereas under the Pecking Order Theory the source is determined by how far down the Pecking Order the firm is presently located. In this paper, we argue that both of these theories miss the point that the marginal costs are dependent of the use of the funds, and the asset side of the balance sheet primarily determines the financing source for an additional Euro. An empirical analysis on a unique dataset of Portuguese SME’s confirms that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet has an impact of the type of financing used and the Pecking OrderTheory and the traditional Static Trade-off theory are For SME’s the main sources of financing are equity (internally generated cash), trade credit, bank credit and other debt. The choice of financing is driven by the costs of the sources which is primarily determined by costs of solving the asymmetric information problem and the expected costs associated with non-payment of debt. Asymmetric information costs arise from collecting and analysing information to support the decision of extending credit, and the non-payment costs are from collecting the collateral and selling it to recover the debt. Since SMEs’ management and shareholders are often the same person, equity and internally generated funds have no asymmetric information costs and equity is therefore the cheapest source.2. Asset side theory of SME financingIn the previous section we have suggested that SME’s in Portugal are financed using internal generated cash, cheap trade credits, long and short-term bank loans and expensive trade credits and other loans. In this section the motives behind the different types of financing are discussed.2.1. Cheap Trade creditsThe first external financing source we will discuss is trade-credits. Trade credits are interesting since they represent financial services provided by non-financial firms in competition with financialintermediaries. The early research within this area focused on the role of trade credits in relation to the credit channel or the so called “Meltzer” effect and in relation to the efficiency of monetary policy. The basic idea is that firms with direct access to financial markets, in general large well known firms, issue trade credits to small financially constrained firms . The more recent research breaks the role of trade credits into a strategic motive and financial motive for issuing and using these credits.Strategic motivesThe first theory centers on asymmetric information regarding the firm’s products. Trade credits are offered to the buyers so that the buyer can verify the quantity and quality before submitting payments. By offering trade finance the supplier signals to the buyers that they offer products of good quality. Since small firms, in general, have no reputation then these firms are forced to use trade credits to signal the quality of their products. The use of trade credits is therefore driven by asymmetric information of the products and is therefore more likely to be used by small firms, if the buyer has little information about the supplier, or the products are complicated and it is difficult to asses their quality.The second strategic motive is pricing. Offering trade finance on favorable terms is the same as a price reduction for the goods. Thus firms can use trade credits to promote sales without officially reducing prices or use them as a tool for price discrimination between different buyers.Trade credits are most advantageous to risky borrowers since their costs of alternative financing are higher than for borrowers with good credit ratings. Thus trade credits can be used as tool for direct price discrimination but also as an indirect tool (if all buyers are offered the same terms) in favor of borrowers with a low credit standing.Trade credits are also used to develop long term relationships between the supplier and the buyers. This often manifests itself by the supplier extending the credit period in case the buyer has temporary financial difficulties. Compared to financial institutions suppliers have better knowledge of the industry and are therefore better able to judge whether the firm has temporary problems or the problems are of a more permanent nature.The last motive in not strictly a strategic motive but is based on transactions costs. Trade credits are an efficient way of performing the transactions since it is possible to separate between delivery and payment. In basic terms the truck drive r delivering the goods does not have to run around to find the person responsible for paying the bills. The buyer also saves transactions costs by reducing the amount of cash required on“hand” .Financing motivesThe basis for this view is that firms compete with financial institutions in offering credit to other firms. The traditional view offinancial institutions is that they extend credit to firms where asymmetric information is a major problem. Financial institutions have advantages in collecting and analyzing information from, in particular, smaller and medium sized firms that suffer from problems of asymmetric information. The key to this advantage over financial markets lies in the close relationship between the bank and the firm and in the payment function. The financial institution is able to monitor the cash inflow and outflows of the firm by monitoring the accounts of the firm.But with trade credits non-financial firms are competing with financial institutions in solving these problems and extending credit. How can non-financial institutions compete in this market? Petersen and Rajan [1997] briefly discusses several ways that suppliers may have advantages over financial institutions. The supplier has a close working association with the borrower and more frequently visit s the premises than a financial institution does. The size and timing of the lenders orders with the supplier provides information about the conditions of the borrowers business. Notice that this information is available to the supplier before it is available to the financial institution since the financial institution has to wait for the cash flow associated with the orders. The use of early payment discounts provides the supplier with an indication of problems with creditworthiness in the firm. Again the supplier obtains the information before the financial institution does. Thus the supplier maybe able to obtain information about the creditworthiness faster and cheaper than the financial institution.The supplier may also have advantages in collecting payments. If the supplier has at least a local monopoly for the goods then the ability to withhold future deliveries is a powerful incentive for the firm to pay. This is a particular powerful threat if the borrower only accounts for a small fraction of the suppliers business. In case of defaults the supplier can seize the goods and in general has a better use for them than a financial intermediary sizing the same goods. Through its sales network the supplier can sell the reclaimed goods faster and at a higher price than what is available to a financial intermediary. These advantages, of course, depend on the durability of the goods and how much the borrower has transformed them.If asymmetric information is one of the driving forces the explanation of trade credits then firms can use the fact that their suppliers have issued them credits in order to obtain additional credit from the banks. The banks are aware that the supplier has better information thus the bank can use trade credits as signal of the credit worthiness of the firm.That trade credits are in general secured by the goods delivered also puts a limit on the amount of trade credits the firm can obtain, thus the firm cannot use trade credits to finance the entire operations of the firm.In summary the prediction is that the level of asymmetric information is relatively low between the providers of trade credit and the borrowers due to the issuer’s general knowledge of the firm and the industry. In the empirical work below the variables explaining the use of trade credit are credit risk factors and Cost of Goods Sold. Since these trade credits are secured by the materials delivered to the firm, firms cannot “borrow” for more than the delivery value of the goods and services.2.2 Bank loansBanks have less information than providers of trade credit and the costs of gathering information are also higher for banks than for providers of trade credit. Providers of trade credits also have an advantage over banks in selling the collateral they have themselves delivered, but due to their size and number of transactions banks have an advantage in selling general collateral such as buildings, machinery etc. Banks therefore prefer to issue loans using tangible assets as collateral, also due to asymmetric information, they are less likely to issue loans to more opaque firms such as small and high growth firms. Banks are therefore willing to lend long term provided that tangible assets are available for collateral. In the empirical work below tangible assets and credit risk variables are expected to explain the use of long-term bank loans and the amount of long-term bank loans are limited by the value of tangibleassets.The basis for issuing Short Term Bank Loans is the comparative advantages banks have in evaluating and collecting on accounts receivables, i.e. Debtors. It is also possible to use Cash and Cash equivalents as collateral but banks do not have any comparative advantages over other providers of credit in terms of evaluating and collecting these since they consist of cash and marketable securities. In terms of inventories, again banks do not have any comparative advantages in evaluating these. Thus, we expect the amounts of debtors to be the key variable in explaining the behaviour of Short Term Bank Loans.ConclusionsCurrently there exist two theories of capital structure The Pecking Order Theory where firms first exhaust all funding of the cheapest source first, then the second cheapest source and so on. The differences in funding costs are due to adverse selection costs from asymmetric information. The second theory is the Tradeoff Theory where firms increase the amount of debt as long as the benefits are greater than the costs from doing so. The benefits of debt are tax-shields and “positive agency costs” and the costs of debt are the e xpected bankruptcy costs and the “negative agency costs”. In both of these theories, the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet is not important and in this paper, thatproposition is strongly rejected. So the main conclusion is that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet influences the composition of the liability side of the balance sheet in terms of the different types of debt used to finance the firm, or that the use of the funds is important in deciding the type of financing available.We further argue that it is asymmetric information and collateral that determines the relationship between the asset side and liability side of the balance sheet. The theory works reasonable well for Cheap Trade Credits and Long Term Bank Loans but the tests for Short Term Bank Loans are disappointing.译文：中小企业融资摘要中小企业融资的主要来源有：股权融资、按时兑现的贸易信贷融资、中长期银行信贷融资、延迟兑现的贸易信贷融资以及其他债务融资，每种融资方式的边际成本取决于与其滞纳金相关的信息不对称成本和交易成本。
中小企业融资难外文翻译
附录Financing small and medium-sized problem is not unique to China. In the United States, the existence of such an economic phenomenon of the same, the difference is that the U.S. government measures to support a market-oriented SMEs.China's very rapid development of SMEs, currently has more than 430 million small and medium enterprises, SMEs can be seen in economic activity in China to occupy more and more of the components already. In order to help the development of SMEs in China, the central government has promulgated a number of policies in recent years. However, as funding is concerned, the majority of domestic small and medium enterprises are still everywhere, "meet with a rebuff." Because of shortage of funds in many small and medium enterprises, development has been limited. Perhaps, the U.S. government to encourage small and medium-sized ways and means of financing is worth learning from.Similarly the United States there are difficulties in SME lendingAlthough the U.S. companies the proportion of bank financing through external financing accounted for about 61.8 percent, but small and medium-sized view, because of the existence of relatively high credit risk, leading financial institutions, commercial loans to small and medium-sized lack of impact on the financing of small and medium enterprises.U.S. commercial well-developed financial system, but the prevalence of small and medium-sized small scale, lack of credit, the reasons for poor business environment, small and medium-sized financial institutions are not commercial loans the preferred target. Development and stability that only those products with market and credit conditions favorable to small and medium-sized commercial banks to obtain loans. This point and treat China's commercial banks loans to SMEs with little difference between the attitudeTypically, the United States the amount of long-term financing of SMEs and 25%~ 85% from the accumulation of the enterprise. 90 In the mid-20th century, the total internal sources of funds financing the proportion rose to 61.5 percent from 82.8 percent, which shows that the United States to obtain commercial financing of small and medium-sized proportion was not high.The difference is that the U.S. government has never been to the commercial financial institutions to "issue" administrative indicators, but mainly through government policy on small and medium-sized financial institutions to provide the Guarantee Fund, and guide financial institutions in commercial lending to SMEs. In addition, the SME Credit Guarantee in the United States, the commercial banks also have a larger initiative, to decide whether or not the loan, whether to apply for government guarantees.In addition, the U.S. government and the local small and medium-sized foreign banks have not provided any financing and loan services. Would like to obtain financing unless the business has been successfully registered in the United States, and the owner of this business is a U.S. citizen or permanent residence of the U.S. federal taxpayers.Contrast, the financing structure of SMEs in the United StatesU.S. small and medium-sized and large enterprises through equity financing and debt financing to fund access to business development. Equity financing for SMEs in the United States accounted for 49.63% of total assets, debt financing for SMEs accounted for 50.37% of total assets. Financing structure of the United States through the analysis and comparison, we get the following revelation:In improving the financial industry specialization to develop at the same time small and medium-sized financial institutions, the financing of small and medium-sized changes in the status of the system also depends on the arrangements for non-financial innovation. On the one hand, including large enterprises, including the system of innovation is to broaden the financing channels for SMEs in an important way. On the other hand, the effectiveness of innovation in the financial system, also depends on the real economy to create the system.With the West is relatively sound financial system countries, China's small andmedium enterprises financing difficulties faced by SMEs in Western countries than in more difficult, not only is China's financial institutions, the impact of preferences, there are many reasons for their own financial institutions. At the same time, the market system, interest rates and charges, mortgages and guarantees, and other aspects of integration of the financial sector, China's market and the need to improve the system.China started the development of SMEs with foreign capital compared to less than significant in the development of the industry are often subject to restrictions on the adjustment. In fact, China's small and medium enterprises in the Credit Ratings in the lower grades, it is difficult to obtain the trust of financial institutions, which directly affect their lending. China's small and medium-sized to the development process in the future to address the financing difficulties, the most important issues is to establish good faith.Let's look at private financing. Although our country has been to broaden the financing channels for civil society, but still very smooth. Market-oriented operation of the informal or semi-formal financial financing models have not yet fully developed, even if the development in some areas and did not embark on the track of normal operation.The United States is encouraging the development of supporting measures for SMEsAs a result of the national economy of a country SMEs are the most active ingredient, which the governments of the world on the development and financing of small and medium enterprises attach great importance to the issue, the United States is no exception. In order to encourage the development of SMEs, the U.S. government to take a lot of ways to be used for reference.Establish and improve laws and regulations to support SME financing. The U.S. federal government to support the development of SMEs for the development of the regulations, the adoption of legislative norms in the form of financing small and medium-sized service system, including: "small and medium-sized law", "small and medium-sized investment law", "Economic Policy Act of SMEs", "small andmedium-sized Enterprise Technology Innovation Promotion Law, "" Small Business Investment Incentive Act, "" Small Business Development Center Act "and so on.The establishment of special funds. Special fund is the U.S. government to make small and medium enterprises in the national economy and social development and give full play to the role of certain aspects of the financial assistance given. In the U.S. There are two major categories: the Government's financial results for the special science and technology research and development funds, product procurement funds, small and medium-sized start-up fund, employment fund, such as the unemployed population can encourage small and medium-sized product innovation and creating jobs; risk compensation fund, the Financial special funds (as distinct from direct financial subsidies, it has strict regulatory requirements, the need for funds of funds must be clear before the number, purpose, targets, methods of payment and subsidies), special industries, such as re-insurance fund to help small and medium-sized to reduce market risks.The establishment of specialized agencies, to provide financing for small and medium-sized security and assistance. The United States to manage small and medium-sized sector is the Federal Small Business Administration (SBA), has sent in the state institutions, the role is to fight for small businesses a level playing field conditions, to serve the small business economic groups.The U.S. government's policy towards SMEs only a small number of loans, the Government mainly through the federal Small Business Administration to develop macro-control policies to guide the private capital investment to small and medium enterprises. In the United States nearly 45 years of history, Small Business Investment Company (under the federal Small Business Administration) through the investment projects 140,000 to about 90,000 small businesses provided 40 billion U.S. dollars of funds, the creation of about one million new jobs.U.S. Small Business Investment Company, former head of the Tang Christensen • A view that "China should learn from the United States or some experience in grafting, if small businesses can give full play to the role of investment companies, then, China's small enterprises will be developed into a medium-sized enterprises . "U.S. small and medium enterprises financing structureEquity financing:The main owner of the assets of the owner's equity accounted share of 2 / 3, representing approximately 31.33% of total assets.Assets are the rights and interests "other options", accounting for about 12.86 percent of total assets. This part of the shares of the owner is mainly relatives and friends. They neither have the majority of shares, nor is it a major business decision-makers.There is also a known as the "angel funding" equity, total assets of the enterprises accounted for about 3.95 percent. "Angel capital" refers to small and medium enterprises in the start-up period for the development of small and medium-sized to provide a direct personal or family funds, but also to provide certain management advice and experience.In addition, the "venture capital", this type of investment, mainly to vote for small, medium and high-tech enterprises. True in the development of small and medium enterprises have access to this type of venture capital, the amount accounted for only 1.58% of total assets. The proportion of foreign capital is not high, about 2.69 percent, but very clearly the purpose of investment is to encourage and promote the development of small and medium-sized high-tech enterprises.Debt Financing:From financial institutions:Bank credit accounted for 8.75% of total assetsFinancial companies accounted for 4.91% of total assetsOther financial institutions (including non-financial institutions) accounted for 3% of total assetsFrom non-financial institutions and government funding:15.78% for commercial credit1.74% for other enterprises0.49% GovernmentParticipation by the private investment funds, accountingfor 5.71%United States Government to provide loans to small and medium-sized security modelLoan guarantees for small and medium-sized federal Small Business Administration is an important task, and its security as follows: to the Federal Small Business Administration's reputation as a small business loan guarantees to commercial banks, under normal circumstances, the Federal Small Business Administration loans the total amount of 75% ~ 80% of the guarantee, the rest of the commercial banks. Federal Small Business Administration loans up to a maximum of 750,000 U.S. dollars. The risk of loss of loan guarantee by the Government as a risk management budget. Federal Small Business Administration in accordance with financial institutions, small business lending experience and performance, to participate in the secured loan lending institutions are classified based on different procedures.中小企业融资难的问题不是中国所特有。
中小企业融资外文文献翻译
外文文献：Financing of SMEsAbstractThe main sources of financing for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are equity, trade credit paid on time, long and short term bank credits, delayed payment on trade credit and other debt. The marginal costs of each financing instrument are driven by asymmetric information and transactions costs associated with nonpayment. According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms will choose the cheapest source in terms of cost. In the case of the static trade-off theory, firms choose finance so that the marginal costs across financing sources are all equal, thus an additional Euro of financing is obtained from all the sources whereas under the Pecking Order Theory the source is determined by how far down the Pecking Order the firm is presently located. In this paper, we argue that both of these theories miss the point that the marginal costs are dependent of the use of the funds, and the asset side of the balance sheet primarily determines the financing source for an additional Euro. An empirical analysis on a unique dataset of Portuguese SME’s confirms that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet has an impact of the type of financing used and the Pecking Order Theory and the traditional Static Trade-off theory are rejected.For SME’s the main sources of financing are equity (internally generated cash), trade credit, bank credit and other debt. The choice of financing is driven by the costs of the sources which is primarily determined by costs of solving the asymmetric information problem and the expected costs associated with non-payment of debt. Asymmetric information costs arise from collecting and analysing information to support the decision of extending credit, and the non-payment costs are from collecting the collateral and selling it to recover the debt. Since SMEs’ managementand shareholders are often the same person, equity and internally generated funds have no asymmetric information costs and equity is therefore the cheapest source.2. Asset side theory of SME financingIn the previous section we have suggested that SME’s in Portugal are financed using internal generated cash, cheap trade credits, long and short-term bank loans and expensive trade credits and other loans. In this section the motives behind the different types of financing are discussed.2.1. Cheap Trade creditsThe first external financing source we will discuss is trade-credits. Trade credits are interesting since they represent financial services provided by non-financial firms in competition with financial intermediaries. The early research within this area focused on the role of trade credits in relation to the credit channel or the so called “Meltzer” effect and in relation to the efficiency of monetary policy. The basic idea is that firms with direct access to financial markets, in general large well known firms, issue trade credits to small financially constrained firms . The more recent research breaks the role of trade credits into a strategic motive and financial motive for issuing and using these credits.Strategic motivesThe first theory centers on asymmetric information regarding the firm’s products. Trade credits are offered to the buyers so that the buyer can verify the quantity and quality before submitting payments. By offering trade finance the supplier signals to the buyers that they offer products of good quality. Since small firms, in general, have no reputation then these firms are forced to use trade credits to signal the quality of their products. The use of trade credits is therefore driven by asymmetric information of the products and is therefore more likely to be used by small firms, if the buyer has little information about the supplier, or the products are complicated and it is difficult to asses their quality.The second strategic motive is pricing. Offering trade finance on favorable terms is the same as a price reduction for the goods. Thus firms can use trade credits to promote sales without officially reducing prices or use them as a tool for pricediscrimination between different buyers. Trade credits are most advantageous to risky borrowers since their costs of alternative financing are higher than for borrowers with good credit ratings. Thus trade credits can be used as tool for direct price discrimination but also as an indirect tool (if all buyers are offered the same terms) in favor of borrowers with a low credit standing.Trade credits are also used to develop long term relationships between the supplier and the buyers. This often manifests itself by the supplier extending the credit period in case the buyer has temporary financial difficulties. Compared to financial institutions suppliers have better knowledge of the industry and are therefore better able to judge whether the firm has temporary problems or the problems are of a more permanent nature.The last motive in not strictly a strategic motive but is based on transactions costs. Trade credits are an efficient way of performing the transactions since it is possible to separate between delivery and payment. In basic terms the truck drive r delivering the goods does not have to run around to find the person responsible for paying the bills. The buyer also saves transactions costs by reducing the amount of cash required on“hand” .Financing motivesThe basis for this view is that firms compete with financial institutions in offering credit to other firms. The traditional view of financial institutions is that they extend credit to firms where asymmetric information is a major problem. Financial institutions have advantages in collecting and analyzing information from, in particular, smaller and medium sized firms that suffer from problems of asymmetric information. The key to this advantage over financial markets lies in the close relationship between the bank and the firm and in the payment function. The financial institution is able to monitor the cash inflow and outflows of the firm by monitoring the accounts of the firm.But with trade credits non-financial firms are competing with financial institutions in solving these problems and extending credit. How can non-financial institutions compete in this market? Petersen and Rajan [1997] briefly discussesseveral ways that suppliers may have advantages over financial institutions. The supplier has a close working association with the borrower and more frequently visit s the premises than a financial institution does. The size and timing of the lenders orders with the supplier provides information about the conditions of the borrowers business. Notice that this information is available to the supplier before it is available to the financial institution since the financial institution has to wait for the cash flow associated with the orders. The use of early payment discounts provides the supplier with an indication of problems with creditworthiness in the firm. Again the supplier obtains the information before the financial institution does. Thus the supplier may be able to obtain information about the creditworthiness faster and cheaper than the financial institution.The supplier may also have advantages in collecting payments. If the supplier has at least a local monopoly for the goods then the ability to withhold future deliveries is a powerful incentive for the firm to pay. This is a particular powerful threat if the borrower only accounts for a small fraction of the suppliers business. In case of defaults the supplier can seize the goods and in general has a better use for them than a financial intermediary sizing the same goods. Through its sales network the supplier can sell the reclaimed goods faster and at a higher price than what is available to a financial intermediary. These advantages, of course, depend on the durability of the goods and how much the borrower has transformed them.If asymmetric information is one of the driving forces the explanation of trade credits then firms can use the fact that their suppliers have issued them credits in order to obtain additional credit from the banks. The banks are aware that the supplier has better information thus the bank can use trade credits as signal of the credit worthiness of the firm.That trade credits are in general secured by the goods delivered also puts a limit on the amount of trade credits the firm can obtain, thus the firm cannot use trade credits to finance the entire operations of the firm.In summary the prediction is that the level of asymmetric information is relatively low between the providers of trade credit and the borrowers due to theissuer’s general knowledge of the firm and the ind ustry. In the empirical work below the variables explaining the use of trade credit are credit risk factors and Cost of Goods Sold. Since these trade credits are secured by the materials delivered to the firm, firms cannot “borrow” for more than the delive ry value of the goods and services.2.2 Bank loansBanks have less information than providers of trade credit and the costs of gathering information are also higher for banks than for providers of trade credit. Providers of trade credits also have an advantage over banks in selling the collateral they have themselves delivered, but due to their size and number of transactions banks have an advantage in selling general collateral such as buildings, machinery etc. Banks therefore prefer to issue loans using tangible assets as collateral, also due to asymmetric information, they are less likely to issue loans to more opaque firms such as small and high growth firms. Banks are therefore willing to lend long term provided that tangible assets are available for collateral. In the empirical work below tangible assets and credit risk variables are expected to explain the use of long-term bank loans and the amount of long-term bank loans are limited by the value of tangible assets.The basis for issuing Short Term Bank Loans is the comparative advantages banks have in evaluating and collecting on accounts receivables, i.e. Debtors. It is also possible to use Cash and Cash equivalents as collateral but banks do not have any comparative advantages over other providers of credit in terms of evaluating and collecting these since they consist of cash and marketable securities. In terms of inventories, again banks do not have any comparative advantages in evaluating these. Thus, we expect the amounts of debtors to be the key variable in explaining the behaviour of Short Term Bank Loans.2.3. Expensive trade credit and other loansAfter other sources of finance have been exhausted firms can delay payment on their trade credits. However, this is expensive since it involves giving up the discount and maybe incurs penalty payments. Also the use of this type of credit can havereputational costs and it may be difficult to obtain trade credit in the future. The nature of the costs, of course, depends on the number of suppliers, if there is only one supplier then these costs can be rather high whereas if the firm can obtain the same goods and services from other suppliers then these costs are not particularly high.Other debt is composed of credit card debt, car loans etc. that are dearer than bank loans. Again, the variables determining this type of debt are financial health and performance. Below, however, we do not have any good information regarding these types of loans and what they consists of thus we pay little attention to them in the empirical work.ConclusionsCurrently there exist two theories of capital structure The Pecking Order Theory where firms first exhaust all funding of the cheapest source first, then the second cheapest source and so on. The differences in funding costs are due to adverse selection costs from asymmetric information. The second theory is the Tradeoff Theory where firms increase the amount of debt as long as the benefits are greater than the costs from doing so. The benefits of debt are tax-shields and “positive agency costs” and the costs of debt are the expected bankruptcy costs and the “negative agency costs”. In both of these theories, the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet is not important and in this paper, that proposition is strongly rejected. So the main conclusion is that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet influences the composition of the liability side of the balance sheet in terms of the different types of debt used to finance the firm, or that the use of the funds is important in deciding the type of financing available.We further argue that it is asymmetric information and collateral that determines the relationship between the asset side and liability side of the balance sheet. The theory works reasonable well for Cheap Trade Credits and Long Term Bank Loans but the tests for Short Term Bank Loans are disappointing.中文译文：中小企业融资摘要中小企业融资的主要来源有：股权融资、按时兑现的贸易信贷融资、中长期银行信贷融资、延迟兑现的贸易信贷融资以及其他债务融资，每种融资方式的边际成本取决于与其滞纳金相关的信息不对称成本和交易成本。
中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献
中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献Title: Financing Channels for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises: A Comparative Analysis of Chinese and English LiteratureIntroduction:Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play a crucial role in driving economic growth, job creation, and innovation. However, they often face challenges in accessing finance due to limited assets, credit history, and information transparency. This article aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of financing channels for SMEs, comparing existing literature in both Chinese and English.1. Overview of SME Financing Channels:1.1 Bank Loans:Traditional bank loans are a common financing option for SMEs. They offer advantages such as long-term repayment periods, lower interest rates, and established banking relationships. However, obtaining bank loans may be challenging for SMEs with insufficient collateral or creditworthiness.1.2 Venture Capital and Private Equity:Venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE) attract external investments in exchange for equity stakes. These financing channels are particularly suitable for high-growth potential SMEs. VC/PE investors often provide not only financial resources but also expertise and networks to support SMEs' growth. However, SMEs may face challenges in meeting the stringent criteria required by VC/PE firms, limiting accessibility.1.3 Angel Investment:Angel investors are wealthy individuals who provide early-stage funding to SMEs. They are often interested in innovative and high-potential ventures. Angel investments can bridge the funding gap during a company's initial stages, but SMEs need to actively seek out and convince potential angel investors to secure funding.1.4 Government Grants and Subsidies:Governments offer grants and subsidies to support SMEs' business development and innovation. These resources play a pivotal role in ensuring SMEs' survival and growth. However, the application process can be cumbersome, and the competition for these funds is usually high.1.5 Crowdfunding:Crowdfunding platforms allow SMEs to raise capital from a large poolof individual investors. This channel provides opportunities for SMEs to showcase their products or services and engage directly with potential customers. However, the success of crowdfunding campaigns depends on effective marketing strategies and compelling narratives.2. Comparative Analysis:2.1 Chinese Literature on SME Financing Channels:In Chinese literature, research on SME financing channels focuses on the unique challenges faced by Chinese SMEs, such as information asymmetry, high collateral requirements, and insufficient financial transparency. Studiesemphasize the importance of government policies, bank loans, and alternative financing channels like venture capital and private equity.2.2 English Literature on SME Financing Channels:English literature encompasses a broader range of financing channels and their implications for SMEs worldwide. It highlights the significance of business angel investment, crowdfunding, trade credit, factoring, and peer-to-peer lending. The literature also emphasizes the role of financial technology (fintech) in expanding SMEs' access to finance.3. Recommendations for SMEs:3.1 Enhancing Financial Literacy:SMEs should invest in improving their financial literacy to understand different financing options and strategies. This knowledge will help them position themselves more effectively when seeking external funding.3.2 Diversifying Funding Sources:To mitigate financing risks, SMEs should explore multiple channels simultaneously. A diversified funding portfolio can help SMEs access different sources of capital while reducing dependence on a single channel.3.3 Building Relationships:Developing relationships with banks, investors, and relevant stakeholders is crucial for SMEs seeking financing. Strong networks and connections can provide valuable support and increase the likelihood of securing funding.Conclusion:Access to appropriate financing channels is crucial for the growth and development of SMEs. This analysis of financing channels for SMEs, comparing Chinese and English literature, highlights the diverse options available. By understanding the strengths and limitations of each channel, SMEs can make informed decisions and adopt strategies that align with their unique business requirements. Governments, financial institutions, and other stakeholders should continue to collaborate in creating an enabling environment that facilitates SMEs' access to finance.。
小微企业融资外文文献翻译
小微企业融资外文文献翻译the XXX credit to small and medium enterprises (SMEs)。
However。
micro enterprises (MEs) which are smaller than SMEs。
have been XXX。
using a path XXX finance。
such as family and friends。
due to the lack of access to formal finance。
Path dependence is also evident。
XXX finance.翻译：乌干达的小微企业融资：路径依赖和其他融资决策的决定因素XXX：Winifred XXX-XXX博士摘要：发展中国家的融资文献主要关注正规金融机构向中小型企业（SMEs）提供信贷的角色。
然而，小微企业（MEs）比SMEs更小，却被忽视了。
本文使用路径依赖框架，研究了乌干达小微企业的融资决策，识别了影响它们获得融资的因素。
研究发现，由于缺乏正规融资渠道，小微企业严重依赖非正规融资来源，如家人和朋友。
路径依赖也很明显，过去的融资决策和与非正规融资来源的关系影响了当前的融资决策。
本研究建议政策应着重改善小微企业获得正规融资的渠道，并促进金融素养，减少对非正规融资来源的依赖。
Access to credit is crucial for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and micro enterprises。
as they are considered to be the main drivers of economic growth。
In e countries。
XXX role than SMEs。
XXX-agricultural self-XXX。
XXX due to the way they are XXX。
中小企业的融资问题外文翻译（可编辑）
中小企业的融资问题外文翻译外文翻译the Financing problems of Small and medium sized enterprisesMaterial Source: ////0>. Author: ModiglianiA thriving SME sector is crucial to spurring growth and reducing poverty in developing and transition economies. But financial institutions often avoid small and medium sized enterprises, sensing?understandably?that the transaction costs of financing them will be excessively high. What Small and medium sized enterprises need is not to be left without access to capital, but approached on a new model that combines early-stage equity investment and performance-enhancing technical assistance, writes Bert van deer Avert, CEO of Small Enterprise Assistance Funds SEAF. This US- and Dutch-based NGO manages a network of 14 commercially driven investment funds worldwide with total assets of $140 million, and has developed a unique “equity plus assistance” approach to Small and medium sized enterprises investing.Small and medium sized enterprises Sara widely credited with generating the highest rates of revenue and employment growth in virtually all economies. In transition and developing countries open to foreign direct investment, they also tend to pay disproportionately more in taxesand social security contributions than either their larger and smaller counterparts. Larger enterprises, especially multinationals, often find a way to reduce their tax obligations through transfer pricing, royalty payments, and negotiated tax holidays. Microenterprises, on the other hand, often fall in the informal sector, neither paying taxes nor making social security contributions.Yet if Small and medium sized enterprises constitute a critical dimension of growth and development and are often well positioned to achieve high revenue and profit growth, why have private and public financing institutions alike tended to avoid investing in them?The reasons are multiple and, for the most part, understandable. For private investors, the amount of work required to invest relatively small sums into several SMEs seems unattractive compared to the work needed to support fewer investments in larger companies. Moreover, investing in local Small and medium sized enterprises also often involves working with entrepreneurs who are less familiar with conventional financing relationships, business practices, and the English language than principals of larger firms. Accordingly, most private capital would much prefer to invest in a few large-asset There are broader issues to be considered as well, including the lack of transparency in local legal systems and governments that make investing in these countries difficult at best. enterprises in fields such as pharmaceuticals,telecommunications or privatized industry rather than in smaller companies with relatively few assets, low capitalization and a perceived greater vulnerability to market conditions. Public development institutions can also encounter high administrative costs in making small and medium sized enterprises investments. These can be coupled with perceptions that local Small and medium sized enterprises entrepreneurs may not be trustworthy, and that working with them might bring fewer visibly “developmental” benefits than targeting more poverty-focused fields such as microfinance Local commercial banks too are often biased in favor of large corporate borrowers with considerable assets. This has meant that even the lines of credit local banks receive from development institutions for on-lending to Small and medium sized enterprises are often under-utilized. Small and medium sized enterprises entrepreneurs’ lack of experience in accounting and other areas of financial documentation make it difficult for banks or other potential sources to assess their creditworthiness and cash flows, again hindering the provision of financing. Combined, these factors have largely left what should be the most dynamic sector of the economy in developing countries lacking the capital it needs to realize its potential.SEAF believes that the investment levels it takes, coupled with its focused efforts on increase value after investments, and allows it to invest at relatively attractive multiples. This offers an array ofpotential exit possibilities. By contrast, many conventional Emerging market private equity investors have had disappointing records in achieving exits over the last four years. SEAF’s approach to early-stage investing in SMEs thus may one day be seen as one of the more appropriate means of investing in developing countries. In the meantime, SEAF is achieving its developmental objectives by rapidly increasing the revenues, productivity, and employment growth of its investee Small and medium sized enterprises.The financial sector infrastructure will need to change to accommodate the substantial financing requirements of new activities and industries. Going forward, while financial institutions would need to transform to remain innovative and responsive to demands of their customers, efforts need to be directed to facilitate financing by non-banks for high-risk ventures. These include financing for knowledge-intensive and technology-intensive start-up enterprises where only ideas intangible collateral are principal assets. As such, these knowledge-intensive and technology-intensive enterprises will need alternative forms of financing to complement traditional financing sources. These alternative modes of financing include among others, venture capital and credit enhancements such as financial guarantee insurance and agriculture insurance.The financial infrastructure that supports Small and medium sizedenterprises in Serbia is undeveloped. Up to now, small and medium sized enterprises and entrepreneurs have financed their operations out of their own resources because financial markets in Serbia were isolated and lacked the support of international financial institutions. The local financial sector in the former Yugoslavia was designed to support large scale, socially owned enterprises ? otherwise known as the “Pillars of Development.” B anks, especially large-scale socially owned banks, had a redistributive function imposed on them by the state, and they dealt solely with large-scale, socially owned enterprises. In addition, the Fund for Development of the Republic of Serbia disbursed its funds to the same target group. Capacity to repay the banks or the Fund was not a criterion for credit approval.Economists have not always fully appreciated the importance of a healthy financial system for economic growth or the role of financial conditions in short-term economic dynamicsAs a matter of intellectual history, the reason is not difficult to understandDuring the first few decades after World War II, economic theorists emphasized the development of general equilibrium models of the economy with complete markets; that is, in their analyses, economists generally abstracted from market "frictions" such as imperfect information or transaction costsBut without such frictions, financial markets have little reason to existFor example, with complete markets and if we ignore taxes, we know that whether acorporation finances itself by debt or equity is irrelevant the Modigliani-Miller theorem.The former economic and political system did not support the development of financial instruments for Small and medium sized enterprises. Cooperation with SMEs focused on a few selected companies, while sole traders were almost completely excluded from credit transactions with the banking sector. SME owners and citizens completely lost their trust in the banks and channeled their savings into the grey economy, to banks abroad, or kept their savings at home. Only payments effected through the National Payment Bureau functioned properly for Small and medium sized enterprises.译文中小企业的融资问题资源来源:////. 作者:詹姆斯?沃尔芬森中小企业的蓬勃发展对促进经济增长,减少发展中国家的贫穷和经济转型具有重要意义。
2019年中小企业融资外文翻译文献
文献信息：文献标题：Financing in SMEs: Case of the Baltic States（中小企业融资：以波罗的海国家为例）国外作者：Ramona Rupeika-Apoga文献出处：《Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences》,2014, 150:116-125字数统计：英文2177单词，11410字符；中文3954汉字外文文献：Financing in SMEs: Case of the Baltic States Abstract Access to finance represents one of the most significant challenges for SMEs’ entrepreneurs. To ensure SMEs creation, existence and growth it is vitally important to understand the financing needs of SMEs and entrepreneurs, the main obstacles to finance availability and accessibility. The study indicates the difficulties in SMEs financing for the three Baltic States and provides the governments and other stakeholders with a tool to understand SMEs’ financing needs. The study results highlight importance of alternative resources of external financing for small developing countries such as the Baltic ones and the need to support the design and evaluation of policy measures and to monitor the implications of financial reforms on SMEs’ access to finance.Keywords: SMEs financing, access to finance, alternative finance recourses, the Baltic States1.Introduction2008-2009 financial crises has effected availability of external financing for SMEs more dramatically than large enterprises, in the form of higher interest rates, shortened maturities and increased request for collateral. As a result nowadays access to finance represents one of the most significant challenges for SMEs’ entrepreneurs. In the Baltic States SMEs form the largest part of companies, providing the majorityof jobs. Nevertheless, SMEs commonly follow “niche strategies,” using high product quality, flexibility, and responsiveness to customer needs as a means of competing with large-scale mass producers (see, for example, Hallberg, 2000 and Snodgrass, 1996), many researchers have highlighted the shortage of financial resources and access to finance as one of the main barriers to SMEs innovation capacity. Baltic companies find difficult to obtain commercial bank financing, especially long-term loans, for a number of reasons, including lack of collateral, difficulties in proving creditworthiness, small cash flows, inadequate credit history, high risk premiums, underdeveloped bank-borrower relationships and high transaction costs.Over the past two decades, the Baltic exchanges have strived to address their clients’needs by employing the latest developments and innovations, and in taking the lead in reforming the securities market. This process has been accelerated by integrating with one of the world’s largest exchange operator and technology supplier across six continents, NASDAQ OMX Group. Altogether, above eighty companies are listed on two Baltic equities lists, which had a market cap of around EUR 5.8 billion in July 2013. The biggest equity market is in Lithuania, then in Estonia and the smallest in Latvia. For SMEs the equity market is more available than the bond market. Unfortunately, the choice of making company shares available for public purchase is in most cases only possible for already well known and with good reputation as well with high growth potential ones. Only in such cases companies can attract investors and to raise public interest. There are strict entry requirements imposed on companies wishing to go ahead with this process. Nevertheless such small listed company quantity and market cap shows that capital market availability is even more problematic than banking loans.2.Literature Review And Hypotheses2.1.Access to finance as a challenge for SMEs’existenceOver 2007-2010 in most countries, SMEs faced more severe credit conditions that did large enterprises, in the form of higher interest rates, shortened maturities and increased request for collateral (OECD, 2012). After a slight improvement in 2010,credit conditions tightened in most countries in 2011, possibly triggered by an increased awareness of risk on the part of lending institutions. In the Euro area, trends in nominal interest rates reflected tensions on sovereign debt, which increased at the end of 2011, as the interest rate on national debt is usually a lower threshold for the cost of financing in the remaining sectors. A broad range of studies based on various surveys have highlighted that access to finance is one of the main challenges in the way of companies’growth and development, especially in the case of small and medium enterprises (Peachey, 2004; Beck, 2006; Beck, 2008; ECB, 2012). Numerous studies that use firm-level survey data demonstrate that access to finance and the cost of credit pose barriers to SME financing (Scholtens, 1999; Schiffer, 2001; Galindo, 2003; IADB, 2004; Beck, 2006(a); Beck, 2006 (b)). Similar results were found also in other studies: access to credit is one of the biggest constraints for SMEs in Colombia (Stephanou, 2008); lack of access to finance together with management, labour skills and regulation are the main constraints to growth of SMEs in the UK (Binks, 1997); inability to raise external finance in Slovenia is one of the main obstacles for the SME sector underdevelopment (Hutchinson, 2006); lack to access of external finance is one of the main problems in most of Central and Eastern Europe (Anderson, 1997; Budina, 2000; Gros, 2000; Konings, 2003).Conducted literature and surveys review shows that importance of access to finance significantly differs by country development level, business environment and economic prospects.H1: Access to finance is one of the main challenges for SMEs to doing business in the Baltic States2.2.Alternative finance resourcesWhen a company wants to raise money, one of its first decisions is whether to do so by bank lending or by issuing bonds and shares. In the 20th century, most company finance, apart from share issues was raised by bank loans. But since about 1980 there has been an ongoing trend for disintermediation, where large and credit worthy companies have found they effectively have to pay out less in interest if they borrow from the capital markets rather than banks. The tendency for companies to borrowfrom capital markets instead of banks has been especially strong in the US, whereas in Europe the most popular external resources of finances are bank loans, bank overdrafts, trade credits, when other resources as securities, venture capital and other funds are seldom used.H2: The importance of alternative financing for the Baltic States is growing3.Methodology3.1.Research GoalIn this study the author aims to highlight importance of alternative funds as a source of external financing for the Baltic States SMEs. The research indicates the difficulties in SMEs financing and provides the governments and other stakeholders with a tool to understand SMEs’ financing needs that helps to improve the access to financing for companies and to support the design and evaluation of policy measures an d to monitor the implications of financial reforms on SMEs’ access to finance.During development of the paper the generally accepted qualitative and quantitative methods of economic research were used including comparative analysis and synthesis, graphical illustration methods.3.2.Sample and Data CollectionThe analysis conducted in this paper is based on data and statistics provided mainly by the Baltic States Central banks, Venture Capital funds and grants programmes, by certain empirical studies and by the World economic forum data base.3.3.Analyses and ResultsSurvey on the access to finance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the euro area conducted by ECB has highlighted that in 2013 “Access to finance” was second ranked most pressing problem faced by SMEs in the Euro Area (16%), with a wide divergence across countries, with similar results in previous years (see Fig 1).On the high side, 32% of the SMEs in Greece, 23% in Spain and 20% in Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands mentioned access to finance as the most pressing problem, compared with around 8% of the SMEs in Germany and Austria on the low side (see Fig. 2).Finding customers is the main concern for euro area SMEs (24% of euro area SMEs), whereas availability of skilled staff or experienced managers (14%) and cost of production or labour were mentioned as other very important obstacles for doing business.Across euro area countries, when asked how pressing “access to finance” is as a problem in their current situation, a very large percentage of firms in Greece (61%), Spain and Italy (both 50%) and, to a lesser extent, Portugal (40%) reported that this is a very pressing problem (scale 7-10), while the corresponding percentage in Germanyand Belgium is around 30% and in Finland it drops to 24%. At the same time, 55% of firms in Finland, 45% in Belgium, and 43% in Germany and Austria considered access to finance a not pressing problem (scale 1-3) (ECB, 2013).In accordance with SME Finance forum data, access to finance is the major problem for ¼ of all SMEs in Latvia and Lithuania (see table1) and mostly companies are using loans (about 20% of all companies) or overdrafts (about 10% ). Almost half of the companies have stated that they don’t need credit and companies that received loans had gotten them from private commercial banks (about 80%).Table 1 Access to finance as major/ severe barrier in the Baltic States SMEs (SME Finance forum data)The results of the conducted analysis support H1- Access to finance is one of the main challenges for SMEs to doing business in the Baltic States as well in Europe and that importance of access to finance significantly differs on country development level, business environment and economic prospects.In table 2 the author reflected her personal knowledge of financial resources availability in the Baltic markets. The summary is general, and of course shifts in both directions are possible.Table 2 Access to finance for new and small/ unknown companiesAvailability of financial funds strongly depends on company development level, the bigger and familiar you are the broader choices you have. What is important, that for new companies alternative funds are more available: business angels, venture capital funds, different government support programs and seed funding. This field for Baltic States is rather new, but it’s new also for other countries as a result all countries (more or less) are in the same conditions and as showed previous analysis the Baltic States so far showed rather good results and hopefully this market segmentwill be the way for Baltic states to become innovative driven economies.Analysing availability of financial services in the Baltic States in general, the author concluded that in Estonia companies and individuals have better access than in Latvia and Lithuania, ranking Estonia in 43 place (2012), within 45 best countries, at the same level as Slovak Republic and Czech Republic, and not far from Japan’s and Israel’s levels. Whereas Latvia’s and Lithuania’s positions are 65 and 74 respectively, placing Latvia at the same level as Jamaica and Colombia, and for Lithuania - Uganda and Zambia. Whereas access to finance is significantly better in Estonia, the affordability of financial services is rather similar in the all Baltic countries, placing Latvia and Estonia in 58 and 59 places out of 144 countries, and Lithuania in 73rd place. By evaluating the positions of the Baltic States in the world countries ranks, Latvia shows an improved affordability of financial services when compared with access to services, whereas in Estonia the situation is opposite, as for Lithuania in both determinants situation is the same.Conducted analysis supports H2 by emphasising the importance of alternative financing for the Baltic States.4.ConclusionConducted empirical analysis proves that SMEs’ access to finance in the Baltic States is one of the major obstacles to doing business in the Baltic States as well as in the rest of Europe and availability of alternative financing for the Baltic States is improving. As a result H1 (access to finance is one of the main challenges for SMEs to doing business in the Baltic States) and H2 (the importance of alternative financing for the Baltic States is growing) are fully supported.Availability of financial funds strongly depends on company development level, the bigger and familiar you are the broader choices you have. What is important, that for new companies alternative resources: business angels, venture capital funds, different government support programs and seed funding are more available than bank loans. This field for the Baltic States is rather new, but it’s new also for other countries as a result all countries (more or less) are in the same conditions andhopefully this market segment will be the way for the Baltic states to become innovative driven economies.The Baltic States Governments responded to the global financial crisis and its effects on SME financing with a variety of instruments. The most popular measure was loan guarantee programmes, which expanded substantially over 2007-2011. Furthermore, new elements were added to these programmes, or new instruments were created outside of the traditional guarantee programmes. Other public instruments to enhance SME finance included direct loans, micro loans, export guarantees, and support for risk capital (equity) either in the form of co-financing or tax credits for investors.中文译文：中小企业融资：以波罗的海国家为例摘要获得融资是中小企业企业家面临的最大挑战之一。
- 1、下载文档前请自行甄别文档内容的完整性，平台不提供额外的编辑、内容补充、找答案等附加服务。
- 2、"仅部分预览"的文档,不可在线预览部分如存在完整性等问题,可反馈申请退款(可完整预览的文档不适用该条件!)。
- 3、如文档侵犯您的权益，请联系客服反馈,我们会尽快为您处理(人工客服工作时间：9:00-18:30)。
本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文：Financing of SMEsAbstractThe main sources of financing for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are equity, trade credit paid on time, long and short term bank credits, delayed payment on trade credit and other debt. The marginal costs of each financing instrument are driven by asymmetric information and transactions costs associated with nonpayment. According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms will choose the cheapest source in terms of cost. In the case of the static trade-off theory, firms choose finance so that the marginal costs across financing sources are all equal, thus an additional Euro of financing is obtained from all the sources whereas under the Pecking Order Theory the source is determined by how far down the Pecking Order the firm is presently located. In this paper, we argue that both of these theories miss the point that the marginal costs are dependent of the use of the funds, and the asset side of the balance sheet primarily determines the financing source for an additional Euro. An empirical analysis on a unique dataset of Portuguese SME’s confirms that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet has an impact of the type of financing used and the Pecking Order Theory and the traditional Static Trade-off theory are rejected.For SME’s the main sources of financing are equity (internally generated cash), trade credit, bank credit and other debt. The choice of financing is driven by the costs of the sources which is primarily determined by costs of solving the asymmetric information problem and the expected costs associated with non-payment of debt. Asymmetric information costs arise from collecting and analysing information to support the decision of extending credit, and the non-payment costs are fromcollecting the collateral and selling it to recover the debt. Since SMEs’ management and shareholders are often the same person, equity and internally generated funds have no asymmetric information costs and equity is therefore the cheapest source.2. Asset side theory of SME financingIn the previous section we have suggested that SME’s in Portugal are financed using internal generated cash, cheap trade credits, long and short-term bank loans and expensive trade credits and other loans. In this section the motives behind the different types of financing are discussed.2.1. Cheap Trade creditsThe first external financing source we will discuss is trade-credits. Trade credits are interesting since they represent financial services provided by non-financial firms in competition with financial intermediaries. The early research within this area focused on the role of trade credits in relation to the credit channel or the so called “Meltzer” effect and in relation to the efficiency of monetary policy. The basic idea is that firms with direct access to financial markets, in general large well known firms, issue trade credits to small financially constrained firms . The more recent research breaks the role of trade credits into a strategic motive and financial motive for issuing and using these credits.Strategic motivesThe first theory centers on asymmetric information regarding the firm’s products. Trade credits are offered to the buyers so that the buyer can verify the quantity and quality before submitting payments. By offering trade finance the supplier signals to the buyers that they offer products of good quality. Since small firms, in general, have no reputation then these firms are forced to use trade credits to signal the quality of their products. The use of trade credits is therefore driven by asymmetric information of the products and is therefore more likely to be used by small firms, if the buyer has little information about the supplier, or the products are complicated and it is difficult to asses their quality.The second strategic motive is pricing. Offering trade finance on favorable terms is the same as a price reduction for the goods. Thus firms can use trade credits topromote sales without officially reducing prices or use them as a tool for price discrimination between different buyers. Trade credits are most advantageous to risky borrowers since their costs of alternative financing are higher than for borrowers with good credit ratings. Thus trade credits can be used as tool for direct price discrimination but also as an indirect tool (if all buyers are offered the same terms) in favor of borrowers with a low credit standing.Trade credits are also used to develop long term relationships between the supplier and the buyers. This often manifests itself by the supplier extending the credit period in case the buyer has temporary financial difficulties. Compared to financial institutions suppliers have better knowledge of the industry and are therefore better able to judge whether the firm has temporary problems or the problems are of a more permanent nature.The last motive in not strictly a strategic motive but is based on transactions costs. Trade credits are an efficient way of performing the transactions since it is possible to separate between delivery and payment. In basic terms the truck drive r delivering the goods does not have to run around to find the person responsible for paying the bills. The buyer also saves transactions costs by reducing the amount of cash required on“hand” .Financing motivesThe basis for this view is that firms compete with financial institutions in offering credit to other firms. The traditional view of financial institutions is that they extend credit to firms where asymmetric information is a major problem. Financial institutions have advantages in collecting and analyzing information from, in particular, smaller and medium sized firms that suffer from problems of asymmetric information. The key to this advantage over financial markets lies in the close relationship between the bank and the firm and in the payment function. The financial institution is able to monitor the cash inflow and outflows of the firm by monitoring the accounts of the firm.But with trade credits non-financial firms are competing with financial institutions in solving these problems and extending credit. How can non-financialinstitutions compete in this market? Petersen and Rajan [1997] briefly discusses several ways that suppliers may have advantages over financial institutions. The supplier has a close working association with the borrower and more frequently visit s the premises than a financial institution does. The size and timing of the lenders orders with the supplier provides information about the conditions of the borrowers business. Notice that this information is available to the supplier before it is available to the financial institution since the financial institution has to wait for the cash flow associated with the orders. The use of early payment discounts provides the supplier with an indication of problems with creditworthiness in the firm. Again the supplier obtains the information before the financial institution does. Thus the supplier may be able to obtain information about the creditworthiness faster and cheaper than the financial institution.The supplier may also have advantages in collecting payments. If the supplier has at least a local monopoly for the goods then the ability to withhold future deliveries is a powerful incentive for the firm to pay. This is a particular powerful threat if the borrower only accounts for a small fraction of the suppliers business. In case of defaults the supplier can seize the goods and in general has a better use for them than a financial intermediary sizing the same goods. Through its sales network the supplier can sell the reclaimed goods faster and at a higher price than what is available to a financial intermediary. These advantages, of course, depend on the durability of the goods and how much the borrower has transformed them.If asymmetric information is one of the driving forces the explanation of trade credits then firms can use the fact that their suppliers have issued them credits in order to obtain additional credit from the banks. The banks are aware that the supplier has better information thus the bank can use trade credits as signal of the credit worthiness of the firm.That trade credits are in general secured by the goods delivered also puts a limit on the amount of trade credits the firm can obtain, thus the firm cannot use trade credits to finance the entire operations of the firm.In summary the prediction is that the level of asymmetric information isrelatively low between the providers of trade credit and the borrowers due to the issuer’s general knowledge of the firm and the industry. In the empirical work below the variables explaining the use of trade credit are credit risk factors and Cost of Goods Sold. Since these trade credits are secured by the materials delivered to the firm, firms cannot “borrow” for more than the delivery value of the goods and services.2.2 Bank loansBanks have less information than providers of trade credit and the costs of gathering information are also higher for banks than for providers of trade credit. Providers of trade credits also have an advantage over banks in selling the collateral they have themselves delivered, but due to their size and number of transactions banks have an advantage in selling general collateral such as buildings, machinery etc. Banks therefore prefer to issue loans using tangible assets as collateral, also due to asymmetric information, they are less likely to issue loans to more opaque firms such as small and high growth firms. Banks are therefore willing to lend long term provided that tangible assets are available for collateral. In the empirical work below tangible assets and credit risk variables are expected to explain the use of long-term bank loans and the amount of long-term bank loans are limited by the value of tangible assets.The basis for issuing Short Term Bank Loans is the comparative advantages banks have in evaluating and collecting on accounts receivables, i.e. Debtors. It is also possible to use Cash and Cash equivalents as collateral but banks do not have any comparative advantages over other providers of credit in terms of evaluating and collecting these since they consist of cash and marketable securities. In terms of inventories, again banks do not have any comparative advantages in evaluating these. Thus, we expect the amounts of debtors to be the key variable in explaining the behaviour of Short Term Bank Loans.2.3. Expensive trade credit and other loansAfter other sources of finance have been exhausted firms can delay payment on their trade credits. However, this is expensive since it involves giving up the discountand maybe incurs penalty payments. Also the use of this type of credit can have reputational costs and it may be difficult to obtain trade credit in the future. The nature of the costs, of course, depends on the number of suppliers, if there is only one supplier then these costs can be rather high whereas if the firm can obtain the same goods and services from other suppliers then these costs are not particularly high.Other debt is composed of credit card debt, car loans etc. that are dearer than bank loans. Again, the variables determining this type of debt are financial health and performance. Below, however, we do not have any good information regarding these types of loans and what they consists of thus we pay little attention to them in the empirical work.ConclusionsCurrently there exist two theories of capital structure The Pecking Order Theory where firms first exhaust all funding of the cheapest source first, then the second cheapest source and so on. The differences in funding costs are due to adverse selection costs from asymmetric information. The second theory is the Tradeoff Theory where firms increase the amount of debt as long as the benefits are greater than the costs from doing so. The benefits of debt are tax-shields and “positive agency costs” and the costs of debt are the expected bankruptcy costs and the “negative agency costs”. In both of these theories, the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet is not important and in this paper, that proposition is strongly rejected. So the main conclusion is that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet influences the composition of the liability side of the balance sheet in terms of the different types of debt used to finance the firm, or that the use of the funds is important in deciding the type of financing available.We further argue that it is asymmetric information and collateral that determines the relationship between the asset side and liability side of the balance sheet. The theory works reasonable well for Cheap Trade Credits and Long Term Bank Loans but the tests for Short Term Bank Loans are disappointing.Source: Jan Bartholdy,Cesario Mateus,“Financing of SMEs”.London business review. 2007(9).pp.43-45译文：中小企业融资摘要中小企业融资的主要来源有：股权融资、按时兑现的贸易信贷融资、中长期银行信贷融资、延迟兑现的贸易信贷融资以及其他债务融资，每种融资方式的边际成本取决于与其滞纳金相关的信息不对称成本和交易成本。