cognition and emotion

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The envious mind
Maria Miceli a; Cristiano Castelfranchi a
a Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council of
Italy, Rome, Italy
Online Publication Date:01 April 2007
To cite this Article:Miceli, Maria and Castelfranchi, Cristiano (2007) 'The envious
mind', Cognition & Emotion, 21:3, 449 - 479
To link to this article: DOI:10.1080/02699930600814735
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D o w n l o a d e d B y : [I n s t i t u t e o f P s y c h o l o g y , C A S ] A t : 06:58 28 M a r c h 2008 The envious mind Maria Miceli and Cristiano Castelfranchi Institute of Cogniti v e Sciences and Technologies,National Research Council of Italy,Rome,Italy This work provides an analysis of the basic cognitive components of envy.In particular,the roles played by the envious party’s social comparison with,and ill will against,the better off are emphasised.The ill will component is characterised by the envier’s ultimate goal or wish that the envied suffer some harm,and is distinguished from resentment and sense of injustice,which have often been considered part of envy.The reprehensible nature of envy is discussed,and traced back to the analysis of its components.Finally,we explore both points of overlap and distinguishing features between envy and other emotions such as jealousy or emulation,and make a few general remarks,pointing to the necessity of overcoming conceptual looseness in the notion of envy.
Envy has been regarded as one of the most widespread emotions (e.g.,Foster,1972;Schoeck,1969),and also a particularly bad one,because it is both very unpleasant and very reprehensible.There seems to be general agreement on this,as well as countless references in philosophy and literature.John Stuart Mill (1859/1999),among many others,regarded envy as the most antisocial of all passions.Chaucer observed in The Parson’s Tale that envy is the worst of all sins because it is against all virtues and goodness.In James Thomson’s words (1780/1842),‘‘base envy withers at another’s joy,and hates the excellence it cannot reach’’(Seasons ÁSpring ,p.21);that is,any kind of excellence:beauty,wealth,moral value,and so on.
Despite its alleged ubiquitousness and importance,a surprising fact,which has been often remarked on (e.g.,East &Watts,1999),is that few psychological studies have addressed envy so far.Farber (1966/2000)traces the neglect of envy back to its ‘‘protean character’’and ‘‘talent for disguise’’.
Correspondence should be addressed to:Maria Miceli,ISTC-CNR,Via San Martino della Battaglia 44,I-00185Rome,Italy.E-mail:maria.miceli@r.it
Preparation of this paper was in part supported by HUMAINE (European Project IST-507422).
We wish to dedicate this paper to the memory of John Sabini.We are grateful to Ursula Hess and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.
COGNITION AND EMOTION
2007,21(3),449Á
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2007Psychology Press,an imprint of the Taylor &Francis Group,an Informa business /cogemotion DOI:10.1080/02699930600814735
D o w n l o a d e d B y : [I n s t i t u t e o f P s y c h o l o g y , C A S ] A t : 06:58 28 M a r c h 2008 Though Salovey (1991)stresses the growing interest in investigating both envy and jealousy,it still seems true that,in comparison with other feelings (such as anger,anxiety,guilt,depression),envy is relatively neglected (whereas jealousy has received more attention).Envy seems to be a fairly complex emotion in that it implies,as we will suggest,a variety of components,and it shows close kinship to a number of other emotions,belonging to either the ‘‘longing Ágreed Ácovetousness’’family (e.g.,Berke,1989;Klein,1957;Menninger,1973;Parrott,1991),the ‘‘admiration Áemulation’’family (Neu,1980;Parrott,1991;Rawls,1971;Taylor,1988),jealousy (e.g.,Parrott &Smith,1993;Salovey &Rodin,1984,1986),the ‘‘anger Áresentment Ásense of injustice’’family (e.g.,Parrott,1991;Rawls,1971;Smith,1991),or,finally,the depression (despair,sense of inferiority)family (e.g.,Parrott,1991;Salovey &Rodin,1984;Smith,Parrott,Ozer,&Moniz,1994).It is often hard to set clear boundaries between envy and such germane feelings and to establish whether each of them can be part of envy or is just akin in some respect,but distinguishable from it.In this work we aim to provide a cognitive ‘‘anatomy’’of envy.We analyse its basic components,stressing the role played by the envious party’s social comparison with,and ill will against,the better off.Social comparison processes are typically at the core of envy.Envy stems from the human
tendency to see our own well-being overshadowed by someone else’s because our standard of reference is not its intrinsic worth,but how it compares with others’well-being (e.g.,Heider,1958;Kant,1785/1996).Ill will,the other crucial component of envy,is distinguished from such germane feelings as resentment and sense of injustice.The reprehensible nature of envy is discussed,and traced back to the analysis of its components.Finally,we explore both points of overlap and distinguishing features between envy and other emotions such as jealousy or emulation,and point to the necessity to overcome conceptual looseness in the notion of envy.
WHAT IS ENVY
A commonsense,mild notion of envy refers to the desire of having what someone else has but one does not,and the consequent suffering.However,mere greed or craving for a certain good might account for this state of affairs,with the specification that the craving has been instigated or favoured by the sight of that good in another.When one covets something that someone else has,one not only suffers for its lack,but the suffering is also likely to be increased by the sight of the other possessing it.But should the desire for something,together with the wish of being in another’s shoes,be equated with envy?
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D o w n l o a d e d B y : [I n s t i t u t e o f P s y c h o l o g y , C A S ] A t : 06:58 28 M a r c h 2008 According to Parrott and Smith (1993,p.906),‘‘envy occurs when a person lacks another’s superior quality,achievement,or possession,and either desires it or wishes that the other lacks it’’.But,why should the envious person (from now on,the ‘‘envier’’)wish the advantaged person (the ‘‘envied’’)to lack the desired object?Often the envied’s loss of that object doesn’t increase the likelihood of having it for the envier.Still,the latter seems very likely to harbour such a wish.We view this feature as very informative about the real object of envy.What is envied The object of envy can be any type of object or state of affairs,from material goods to spiritual gifts,from social positions to psychological states.Even more than that:in some cases,the specific goal (or resource)achieved (or possessed)by the envied may become one of the envier’s goals a posteriori ,once the envied has been seen to obtain it and to derive satisfaction or prestige from its acquisition.In this way one may come to envy another because,for example,the latter has won a sailing regatta,which the envier never had the slightest desire to take part in.Both Aristotle (1991)and
Heider (1958)stress this aspect up to the point of considering the desire of what another has just because the latter has it as a necessary requirement for being envious.Y oung (1987)also claims that this feature allows us to distinguish mere longing for what someone else has from envy.
However,the meaning of this ‘‘just because’’appears either too loose or too strict as a requirement for being envious.On the one hand,suppose one comes to desire some good ‘‘just because’’one’s appreciation of it is aroused by seeing it possessed by another:we view this as still insufficient to allow for true envy to arise.If one’s appreciation of the good is only occasioned by the fact that another possesses it,one might still have wanted to possess it regardless of the other.To allow for a distinction between ‘‘longing-occasioned-by-another’s-possessing-the-good’’and envy,the meaning of ‘‘just because’’should imply that what matters is not the intrinsic value of the good,but the mere fact that someone else possesses it.On the other hand,this seems too restrictive a requirement for envy.It would imply ruling out those cases in which one already desires and appreciates the good per se,before and independently of another’s possessing it:in our view,here too,true envy may arise,provided that one’s longing for the good is complemented by other ingredients,such as *as we shall see *one’s unfavourable comparison with,and one’s ill will against the other.
Going back to Parrott and Smith’s (1993)definition,the envier’s wish that the envied lacks a certain good (or fails to achieve a given goal)indicates that what characterises envy and its implied suffering is not the envier’s mere lack THE ENVIOUS MIND
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D o w n l o a d e d B y : [I n s t i t u t e o f P s y c h o l o g y , C A S ] A t : 06:58 28 M a r c h 2008 of that good,but his perceived inferiority to the envied.(From now on,we will refer to the envier as a he,and to the envied as a she.)Any disadvantage between two people can be filled by either the disadvantaged party’s acquiring the lacking good or the advantaged party’s losing it.The latter option is viewed as more plausible than the former by the envier if he has acknowledged his own helplessness with regard to acquiring the good or achieving the goal in question.Thus,the specific good or goal is often a mere opportunity for social comparison.It is one’s own inferiority,resulting from one’s comparison with the advantaged party,that is the basic route to envy (Parrott,1991).Therefore,we suggest that the object of envy is ‘‘superiority’’,or ‘‘non-inferiority’’to a reference group or individual.Actually,what counts in social life is being endowed with substantial resources,skills,competence,and so on,in comparison with those of others,in that one’s ability to achieve one’s own goals is comparative in nature.As Foster (1972)observes,this is apparent in ‘‘deprivation societies’’,where ‘‘life is played as a zero-sum game,in which one player’s advantage is at the expense of the other’’(p.168).However,as Foster remarks,envy flourishes even in wealthier societies,because it is bred by their competitive nature,and the consequent desire to surpass others,or not to be surpassed by them.Moreover,here also ‘‘much of the game is played according to the rules of the zero sum’’,because
‘‘in every hierarchically structured organization ...one person’s success ...prejudices that of others’’(p.169).
Further,it is important not only to possess comparatively sufficient resources,skills,and so on,but also that others belie v e this to be the case.It is how others evaluate us that determines whether they will prefer to interact with us,accept our offers of co-operation and exchange,comply with our requests,and be influenced by our judgement and behaviour.Thus,people are interested both in knowing how others evaluate them and in receiving positive evaluations from them.One’s position in the social hierarchy stems from such shared comparative evaluations (merits,reputation,prestige,and so on).Hence the importance of having a good social image.Thus,the goal of attaining superiority,or at least non-inferiority,is connected to the goals of having a good image and self-image.Y et,a good image is a comparative concept.It means having an image that is better (or not worse)than the image of others.
The role of perceived inferiority in envy,and its relationship with negative self-appraisal is indeed stressed by many authors,starting with the first to have addressed envy from a psychological perspective.Sullivan (1953)refers to invidious comparisons as provoking insecurity and a sense of inferiority and views envy as typical for a person with customarily low self-esteem.Heider (1958),in agreement with Scheler (1915/1961),relates envy to a doubtful sense of self-worth and to social comparison as a constitutive element in one’s own concept of value.Farber (1966/2000)states that:‘‘envy arises from a person’s
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D o w n l o a d e d B y : [I n s t i t u t e o f P s y c h o l o g y , C A S ] A t : 06:58 28 M a r c h 2008 apprehension of another’s superiority and his consequent critical evaluation of himself’’(p.239).Farber is echoed by Foster (1972),Salovey and Rodin (1984)as well as Parrott (1991),to mention just a few.Thus,the answer to our question about the object of envy is:superiority (or non-inferiority)and the associated positive (self-)appraisal.Who is envied As Aristotle (1991)has already observed,we envy those who are close to us in terms of time,space,age and reputation.On the one hand,such ‘‘closeness’’may imply the fact of knowing the advantaged other (her goals and qualities,skills,resources)and of frequenting her,which allows for recurrent social comparisons.On the other hand,it may denote the perceived similarity between one’s own and her goals (aspirations,values)and enabling conditions.Such similarity not only provides more opportunities for social compar-ison,it also makes the comparison actually possible and diagnostic.From Festinger (1954)on,the social comparison literature has stressed the diagnostic value of the common tendency to select similar standards for
comparison (Goethals &Darley,1977;Wheeler,Martin,&Suls,1997;Wood,1989).Self-evaluation motives typically drive such comparisons,in that they favour the accuracy and stability of one’s self-evaluations (e.g.,Radloff,1966;Wilson,1973).
However,it has also been pointed out that people are likely to compare with slightly upward (e.g.,more skilled,capable,successful)targets,more than with ‘‘objectively’’similar ones (Dakin &Arrowood,1981;Gruder,1977;Nosanchuk &Erikson,1985;Wood,1989).This tendency *counter-balanced by the opposite tendency towards downward comparison (e.g.,Pyszczynski,Greenberg,&LaPrelle,1985;Wills,1981),which is particularly likely when one’s self-esteem is under threat (e.g.,Aspinwall &Taylor,1993)*has been traced back to a variety of motives (Collins,1996).On the one hand,upward comparison may still serve self-evaluation in that it provides positive instances of the attributes that one wants to evaluate (Thornton &Arrowood,1966).On the other hand,it may serve self-improvement because it provides both precious information about what is required (skills to acquire,strategies to learn,goals to pursue)for obtaining the superior position (e.g.,Major,Testa,&Bylsma,1991),and the ‘‘inspiration’’and encouragement to strive for it (e.g.,Lockwood &Kunda,1997).Finally,upward comparison may even serve self-enhancement (e.g.,Collins,1996;Wheeler,1966).In fact,as testified by a host of studies in the comparison processes domain (e.g.,Mussweiler,2003),an initial,holistic similarity assessment between one’s own and the standard’s attributes is THE ENVIOUS MIND
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D o w n l o a d e d B y : [I n s t i t u t e o f P s y c h o l o g y , C A S ] A t : 06:58 28 M a r c h 2008 likely to activate a selective accessibility process:If the original screening brings about a broad perceived similarity,the subsequent hypothesis testing will focus on similarity (rather than dissimilarity)with the standard.Consequently,the following search for relevant information will be biased towards the confirmation of the hypothesis,thus leading to an assimilation effect.Conversely,dissimilarity testing leads to contrast.If similarity testing leads to assimilation to the standard,there are indeed some chances that by comparing oneself with a similar,but slightly superior standard,one ends up with an enhanced self-view.In fact,as suggested by Wheeler (1966),one may come to view oneself as almost as good as the better ones.More precisely (slightly)upward comparison might serve to confirm one’s enhanced view of oneself,rather than actually enhance it.Some evidence (e.g.,Nosanchuk &Erikson,1985)actually suggests that while choosing objectively superior standards for comparison,people perceive themselves as similar (not inferior)to them.However,despite all of those possible advantages,upward comparison is risky in that the comparer’s success in assimilating oneself to the standard is not warranted (e.g.,Collins,1996).If significant discrepancies emerge,which cannot be minimised or disregarded,one’s expectations of similarity may be painfully disappointed.One might start with an assimilation attempt
(elicited by the broad perceived similarity),but *despite the typical bias to confirm the selected hypothesis *end up with a contrast effect,thus concluding that one is inferior to the standard.We surmise that envious comparison implies a process of this sort:that is,an expectation of similarity,which is finally disappointed.Maybe the experience of envy is so painful especially because of this disappointment.A contrast effect,which occurs despite an original positive expectation of similarity,is likely to exert a very negative impact on the comparer’s feelings.
But what are those ‘‘significant discrepancies’’that cannot be minimised or disregarded?One crucial factor influencing the significance of a discrepancy is the perceived controllability and,more generally,the perceived attainability of the standard’s standing (e.g.,Buunk,Collins,Taylor,VanYperen,&Dakof,1990;Lockwood &Kunda,1997;Taylor,Wayment,&Carrillo,1996;Testa &Major,1990).If the standard’s position is perceived as unattainable,one comes up against a contrast effect;that is,the comparer perceives himself or herself as hopelessly inferior to the standard.As a consequence,rather than self-enhancement or inspiration,he or she is likely to experience discourage-ment and self-deflation,and possibly envy.
However,the perceived unattainability of the standard’s standing is not the sole factor that impacts on the significance of a discrepancy and its consequences in terms of lowered self-esteem and negative feelings.The self-relevance of the goal or domain under comparison also plays a remarkable role.As stressed by Tesser and colleagues (Tesser &Collins,1988;Tesser,
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D o w n l o a d e d B y : [I n s t i t u t e o f P s y c h o l o g y , C A S ] A t : 06:58 28 M a r c h 2008 Millar,&Moore,1988),as well as by Salovey and colleagues (Salovey &Rodin,1984;Salovey &Rothman,1991),for one’s self-esteem to be seriously threatened it is often insufficient that one is outperformed on some task by a psychologically close other (which implies both perceived similarity and a personal relationship with the other).The task should also be self-relevant,that is,accomplishing it and possessing the required means for accomplish-ing it should be perceived as self-definitional.(Otherwise,a ‘‘reflection’’process is likely to occur,implying a form of identification with the outperforming other,and possibly a consequent increase in self-esteem.)Thus,if the superior other is psychologically close and the comparison domain is self-relevant,one’s self-esteem is seriously threatened and a variety of negative emotions are likely to be experienced *most notably envy.This is precisely what has been shown by Salovey and Rodin (1984)in their classic study on ‘‘social-comparison jealousy’’.However,the self-relevance issue is in need of further specifications.First of all,Salovey and Rodin (1984)themselves discuss the necessity of the three supposed conditions eliciting social-comparison jealousy:negative feedback,a similar successful ‘‘rival’’,and self-relevance of the feedback.They draw the conclusion that whereas the absence of any one of those variables allows the prediction that no envy will be experienced,the ‘‘low’’condition of any
of the three does not warrant the same prediction.Thus,the comparison domain might not be very self-relevant,and still one might experience some envy.Also Lockwood and Kunda (1997)tone down the weight of self-relevance when they observe that ‘‘if there are enough other similarities between the self and the superstar,the superstar may affect one’s self-view even if he or she excels in an irrelevant domain’’(p.92).In our view,this is indeed possible.The envier’s comparison may occur at any level,from that of a specific and circumscribed goal to very abstract classes of goals.Thus,supposing a global perceived similarity as a background condition,one might compare oneself with another on a general and abstract goal like,for example,‘‘social prestige’’,or ‘‘happiness in life’’,which by themselves are generally self-relevant.In the course of such a comparison,one may meet with more specific tasks or goals,and view them as representative of the accomplishment of the general goal,or as adequate means for it.At this point,such sub-goals acquire self-relevance,even though the comparer had no interest in them before.This is,in our view,the reason why one can envy another even with respect to goals that originally were not self-relevant:such goals acquire self-relevance a posteriori ,provided the envier sees a means Áend relationship between them and other self-rele v ant superordinate goals.The abovementioned case of the sailing regatta exemplifies this process:John,who is originally comparing himself with Mary with respect to the goal of social prestige,learns that winning a regatta is a subgoal for it.He thus comes to harbour such a goal,attaches self-definitional value to it,and THE ENVIOUS MIND
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D o w n l o a d e d B y : [I n s t i t u t e o f P s y c h o l o g y , C A S ] A t : 06:58 28 M a r c h 2008 envies Mary not only because she has greater social prestige,but also,more specifically,because she is the winner of a regatta.Basic components of envy So far we have dwelt mainly on the following necessary components of envy:first,the envier should compare himself with the envied as regards a certain (class of)goal(s),and believe she is superior to him.Second,the envier should suffer from this perceived inferiority and the implied loss of self-esteem.There is a weak notion of envy,which consists essentially in the ingredients above.This is called ‘‘good’’or ‘‘benign’’envy,as distinct from ‘‘malicious’’envy (Farrell,1989;Neu,1980;Roberts,1991;Taylor,1988;Y oung,1987),and can be readily confessed.A declaration of such envy to the addressee conveys a sort of appreciation of the person and her achievements:‘‘I envy you’’is better translated into ‘‘I would like to be in your shoes because I regard what you have (or are)as valuable’’.As remarked by Heider (1958),a person who makes a compliment of this sort is unlikely to be regarded as really envious.By contrast,‘‘malicious’’envy,which we consider to be envy proper,implies something more.In our view,it implies not only the envier’s suffering
for the unfavourable social comparison and consequent sense of inferiority,but also his painful feelings of helplessness and hopelessness with regard to overcoming his inferiority,as well as his ill will towards the envied.Ill will in turn implies the envier’s goal or wish that the envied should not achieve (some of)her goals (not necessarily limited to the original one).Let us address these further ingredients in greater detail.
What we view as typical of envy is not only the envier’s sense of inferiority to the envied,but also his negative expectations about overcoming this inferiority.Here we are in disagreement with Lazarus (1991,p.255)who states that:‘‘if our future expectations about what we yearn for are hopeful ...then envy is sustained’’.Conversely,we suppose that if such expectations are positive,envy will be weakened,and possibly change into emulation (as we will argue later on),whereas envy will persist in the case of negative expectations.In fact,we suppose that ill will is sustained by one’s helplessness and hopelessness.But why should helplessness favour ill will?More specifically,why should the helplessness typical of envy favour ill will,rather than mere depression?
Envious helplessness and ill will
To start with,it might be argued that any frustration,be it accompanied by negative expectations or not,provokes angry feelings.However,such a view *typically held within the frustration Áaggression outlook,especially its
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D o w n l o a d e d B y : [I n s t i t u t e o f P s y c h o l o g y , C A S ] A t : 06:58 28 M a r c h 2008 modern version in which anger is assigned the mediating role of a motivator of aggression (e.g.,Berkowitz,1989)*is quite controversial.For instance,Lazarus (1991)points out that goal frustration can provoke any negative emotional reaction,such as anxiety,sadness,guilt,shame,and envy.Both Averill (1982)and Weiner (1985a)stress the role of attributional antecedents,claiming that frustration provokes anger only when the negative event is ascribed to controllable factors.(However,as we are going to argue,we do not view controllability attributions as strictly necessary for anger to arise.)One might suppose that,apart from different individual dispositions to one reaction or another,the helplessness implied by envy is not so complete and devastating as that implied by depression.That is,the envier might still perceive some control over the situation and harbour some hope to obtain the envied good or to meet the standard in some other way.This might reconcile our position with Lazarus’view about the envier’s hopefulness,in that ‘‘mild’’helplessness and hopelessness might favour envious ill will,whereas hopefulness would favour ‘‘inspiration’’and emulation,and utter helplessness induce depression.1Without ruling out this plausible explana-tion,however,we suggest a different view.First of all,it is worth remarking that envy (and its implied ill will)may coexist with depressive reactions.In fact,depression is not incompatible with
hostile feelings.Though the increased self-focused attention that characterises depression reduces responsiveness to external stimuli (e.g.,Kendall &Ingram,1987),this does not prevent the depressed from feeling irritable and hostile (e.g.,Fava,Abraham,Pava,Shuster,&Rosenbaum,1996;Mao,Bardwell,Major,&Dimsdale,2003;Wiebe &McCabe,2002).Moreover,envious hostility may be a ‘‘passive’’feeling,meaning that it does not necessarily imply a great motivating power or action readiness,which would induce overt aggression.The aggressive goal may maintain the status of a mere (helpless)wish for a variety of reasons (self-blame;impossibility of giving free rein to one’s hostility without retaliation;need to conceal one’s inferiority,which might be betrayed by such hostility).Incidentally,the perceived impossibility of giving vent to one’s hostility may in turn favour depressive feelings.Finally,envy itself has been found to imply both depressive and hostile components (e.g.,Salovey &Rodin,1984;Smith et al.,1994).According to Smith et al.(1994),however,a sense of inferiority predicts depressive reactions,whereas an objective sense of injustice predicts hostile reactions,and a subjective sense of injustice predicts both depressive feelings and hostility.We will address the issue of the envious ‘‘sense of injustice’’in the next section.Here,we must anticipate that we do not share the view that envy implies a sense of injustice.How to explain,then,envious ill will?
1We owe this suggestion to an anonymous reviewer.THE ENVIOUS MIND
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