Plato Essay Plan

“So the just man in his turn, simply in terms of his justice, will be no different from a just city”Evaluate the importance of this claim for Plato’s account of Justice.In this essay I shall argue that this analogy between the just man and the just city is crucial to Plato‟s account of justice, for three reasons:▪enshrined in it is Plato‟s …anatomical model‟ of justice▪it implies the understanding of justice as some sort of thing, knowledge or …technique‟ independent of environmental contingencies, an d universallyapplicable▪foreshadowed in it is the strong (arguably inseparable) connection between a city‟s justice and the justice of its rulers/of the citizenry‟s most influential section.Justice, also in its …social‟ or political dimension thus has a strong personal flavourto it.I would go as far as to hazard that Plato‟s entire account of justice, and of the Politeia which is based on it, can be understood in terms of the analogy. To illustrate this, I shall now discuss Plato‟s account of justice, making particular reference to the three points identified above. I shall further argue that his model of a just city can only be fully understood against the backgrounds of the Peloponnesian War, and of Socrates‟ death. Three themes are intertwined here: firstly, the search for what justice actually is, secondly the justification for why an individual should seek to live a just life as an end in itself(also if this has actually bad consequences, e.g. Socrates‟ execution), and thirdly why a city should be just.Justifying JusticeStrikingly, Plato‟s disputants are never in significant disagreement about what actions are to be considered unjust. 442 –443 for instance offers a broad list: embezzlement, temple-robbery, theft, treachery, adultery, neglecti ng one‟s parents, etc. Also the moral relativist Thrasymachus would have little problem with classifying these as …unjust‟. Plato is not concerned with clarifying the justice of particular actions, but with identifying the principal or …form‟ of justice. T his emphasis on principals rather than precise behavioural code seems to have been common to much contemporary Greek thought about …techniques of the self‟, into which Plato seems to fall too.Regarding the essence of justice, the dialogue rapidly discovers an astounding void –whilst all seem relatively unanimous on what actions are to be considered just, it proves remarkably difficult to define what exactly justice itself is, let alone to justify it. Overcoming this vacuum is the Republic’s central project.Books I – III rapidly discuss and demolish both traditional ideas of justice, and three alternative accounts. Both Polemarchus‟ traditional definition of justice (helping friends, harming enemies), and Thrasymachus‟ moral relativism (essentially admiration for “free-riders” who exploit general acquiescence in established norms) prove inconsistent; and Glaucon and Adaimantus‟ two contractarian accounts of social/political justice prove unsatisfactory. These are both more interesting and for the rest of the discussion more relevant than the two that went before, and so I shall quickly outline them.Glaucon offers a contractarian and consequentialist account of justice at 358 –360. It is defined as something people do “unwillingly, as something necessary, not as something good”, for “the life of an unjust person is ... much better than that of a just one” (358). Justicecomes about as a “mean between two extremes”; doing injustice without suffering the consequences (the best), suffering injustice without being able to defend oneself (the worst) (359). It is the result of people‟s need for security, they value it “not as a good, but because they are too weak to do injustice without impunity” (359). The purely consequentialist justification for just behaviou r is reiterated by Glaucon‟s brother at 363 –365. Justice, he explains, is praised chiefly for the reputation it brings, whilst the Gods‟ condemnation of it is tenuous at best – they can be easily appeased with sacrifices.The desirability of justice is thus revealed as highly circumstantial: First, Glaucon‟s account implies that should, due to special circumstances, it become feasible to live unjustly without adverse consequences, this would be preferable to living justly. Both on an individual level (e.g. a city‟s tyrant) and on a city-level (e.g. an empire-city with unrivalled regional military dominance) this is not completely unrealistic in 4th and 5th century Greece.Second, more theoretically, this leaves justice rather low on both the Adaimantian hierarchy of good things (good in themselves, good in themselves and for consequences, undesirable in themselves but necessary consequences; 367) and the Socratic hierarchy, which is developed in Book IX (intrinsically valuable, of instrumental value, of merely need-relative value).Thirdly, if goodness is only of instrumental value and as such unpleasant, as Adaimantus and Glaucon assert, then Socrates‟ assertion that the just individual is the happiest (and Plato‟s justification of his life), are flawed.A further contractarian model is hinted at in 372. Discussing the developing city, Glaucon suggests justice may be found “somewhere in the needs that ... people have of one another”, in the interdependency of human beings in any society marked by a high degree of specialisation. But Glaucon can give no clear answer about where exactly justice lies in these (inter)dependency relations. Whilst his suggestion of …justice as specialisation‟ will, in a radically reworked fashion, be central to Socrates‟ later definition, the failure to explore this concept in its initial, relatively prosaic, non-metaphysical context, is perhaps the Republic’s most unfortunate omission.However, for the moment the most important thing to note is that as of Book III all existing notions of justice have been radically deconstructed and found inconsistent or unsatisfactory. The following account of justice thus takes place against the background of a dramatic moral vacuum. The text emphasises the urgency of their discussion and topic –it “concerns no ordinary topic, but the way we ought to live.” (352)A Model of JusticeAlternative to the definitions discussed above, Socrates then goes on in Book IV to develop an own model of political/social/civic justice, from which individual justice would be derivable. Suggesting that it might be easier to discover justice in something …larger‟ than an individual, and then apply it to the …smaller‟ and see if they correspond (368), he develops a model of an ideal city.The “four [criteria that] make the city good” are identified in 433: Rulers and subjects share a common belief and agreement about who is and who is not to rule; the soldiery holds certain beliefs about what is and what is not fearful which make it act bravely, the “wisdom and guardianship of the rulers”, and “above all, the fact that every child, woman, slave, freeman, craftsman, ruler, and ruled each does his own work and doesn‟t meddle with what is other people‟s”. It is this last fact that makes the city just (e.g. 441).What Plato/Socrates in effect proposes is a sort of anatomical model of justice, paralleled in the human soul: Just as in the individual reason, helped by spirit/emotion, shouldrule over and direct the appetites, so in the ideal city the Guardians (who as philosophers are alone in possession of knowledge of goodness), helped by the less-intellectually gifted but …spirited‟ auxiliaries, should rule and direct the producer-class; “[t]hey will watch over [the appetitive part of city and soul] to see that it isn‟t filled with the so-called pleasures of the body and that it doesn‟t become so big and strong that it no longer does its own work but attempts to enslave and rule over the classes it isn‟t fit to rule” (442). Justice, political and individual, lies in a particular relationship and hierarchy between a city‟s/an individual‟s three constitutive elements. Justice in the individual is thus defined as a kind of psychic harmony in which the appetites are moderated; …civic justice‟ similarly leads to a moderation of appetites: “the desires of the inferior many are controlled by the wisdom and desires of the superior few. ... Therefore if any city is ... in control of itself and of its pleasures and desires, it is this one.” (431). It is in this sense that “the jus t man ... simply in terms of his justice, will be no different from a just city”.Several points should be stressed here. Firstly, the importance of knowledge. The close connection between moderation (sophrosyne) and justice was already suggested at 430: “Is there a way we could find justice so as not to have to bother with [identifying] moderation?”, Socrates asks, and Glaucon replies: “I don‟t know of any...” What reason, aided by spirit, does to man and city is ensure they remain in control of their appetites. Moderate behaviour is the action-consequence of justice. This is why Plato can define justice as psychic harmony –a definition that does not intrinsically relate the concept …justice‟ to good behaviour towards others –yet remain assured that his definition will have action-consequences congruent with common conceptions of just behaviour (about which, as stated above, there is broad agreement).However, for Plato the action-consequences do not suffice. It is not enough that particular immoderate behaviour is not indulged in. What is important is that moderateness comes about because of knowledge of right and wrong, not out of unexamined moral beliefs (as held by the auxiliaries). The philosophers/guardians‟ knowledge of the form of Goodness (i.e. its true essence) is what ensures the goodness of their rule and of their individual behaviour. The (ascetic) behaviour of Plato‟s just man will be discussed below, in the context of the argument for why the just man alone is happy. What interests me here is, first, Plato‟s conception of the Form of Goodness, understanding of which is prerequisite to being just; second, the way in which Adaimantus‟ quasi-contractarian theory of social justice –that justice lies in each person (or class) sticking to the work it is especially suited to (372) –is reworked by Socrates.The somewhat mysterious entity termed …Form of Goodness‟ appears to be closely tied to mathematical conceptions of order and harmony. J. M. Cooper suggests it might be conceivable as “a perfect ex ample of rational order, conceived in explicitly mathematical terms: a complete, ordered whole, whose orderliness is due to the mathematical relationships holding among its parts.”This is implied by the mathematical nature of the higher education outlined, which leads up to study of the dialectic and eventual knowledge of the Good. The last stage of this mathematical education involves the study of mathematical harmonics –i.e. of numerical relationships in themselves harmonious, and whose harmony is explicable in themselves. Socrates recommends the study of music for just this reason, for it makes it “useful for the investigation of the beautiful and the good.” (This interpretation also ties with a report of a lecture Plato apparently gave On the Good – which to the surprise of his listeners was almost exclusively about mathematics.) Similarly, Socrates speaks of the (true) philosopher-guardians as “study[ing] things that are ordered and always the same, that neither do injustice to each other nor have it done to them, but are all ordered rationally; and they imitate them and try to become like them so far as possible” (500, my emphases). Contemplation of theForm of Goodness –the perfect entity, the highest good –is what for Plato gives complete happiness (it cannot but do so, being perfect); no worldly thing or interest can compete with it –hence the philosopher-king‟s incorruptibility (at least regarding classic corrupters; money, sex, etc.).Justice in this account seems to remain a particular relationship between constitutive elements of psyche and city, which has …moderate‟ (just, good) action-consequences. But the keystone to this construction of justice is supplied by a metaphysical (arguably transcendental) knowledge of Goodness‟ essence. It is this which allows reason to take its directing role in the hierarchy of social and psychological building-blocks. And it is this abstract conception of goodness, as a metaphysical entity above and outside the world, that makes possible its universalist application to individuals and social entities (e.g. cities). This is why the just man, in terms of his justness, is like the just city. Goodness ceases to be an essentially inter-personal matter (though it continues to have interpersonal action-consequences), but has become an abstract, non-human and arguably non-worldly…thing‟. From Plato‟s perspective this is presumably advantageous –Goodness (and justice, which flows from it, basically implements it) has been securely grounded outside and above the human world where, as the Books I – III made clear, goodness/justice had at best a tenuous and contingent position.What is very interesting in this context is the reworking of Adaimantus‟ quasi-contractarian theory of social/political justice. At 372 this idea appears more as a principle of good city management, to ensure efficiency: a good shoemaker is unlikely to make a good cobbler, so he should remain with shoemaking. It remains consequentialist and inter-personal, on principal open to circumstance-specific renegotiation.At 434 the concern is no longer about ensuring that cobblers do not fail at making shoes. The point is explicitly to limit and control access to the commanding heights of the state – someone suited to being a producer should not try to be an auxiliary (he would make a bad one), for the same reason an auxiliary must not be a ruler – these would endanger the state, both by practically weakening it (wrong policy decisions could be made) and by threatening its justness if appetite comes to dominate reason. Justice remains concerned with inter-personal and inter-class relations, but its ultimate point of reference has been radically removed from these relations, and placed above them.Importantly, this model makes the justice of the good city a result of the virtue of its rulers. It is clear from the definitions and assumptions that whilst the “vulgar many” may behave in a more moderate (i.e. good, i.e. just) fashion in the good city, they themselves cannot be just, as they –like all who are not philosophers –will lack the knowledge that is a prerequisite to possessing the psychological state that is justice (if they possessed it, the complex division of political and economic responsibilities would be unnecessary). As the quotations above illustrate, Plato clearly hopes that they will behave more moderately than in other cities, and optimistically suggests that some measure of equality amongst the citizens may result from this –but at the same time strongly implies that the lower orders‟ great er moderation will to some degree be brought about by coercion: “it is better for everyone to be ruled by divine reason, preferably within himself ... otherwise imposed from without, so that as far as possible all will be alike and friends, governed by the same thing” (590, emphases mine. For coercion also note the violent language of 431, 442).It is presumably also in this sense, that the good city‟s population is more moderate than that of others, that Plato-Socrates‟ can claim that the good city is hap pier than others. For according to Plato-Socrates moderation equals happiness. That is why he can assert that the just man‟s life – also if marked by extreme asceticism, see Phaedo(…life as death‟) – precisely because it is ascetic, is the happiest. Desire is ultimately highly unsatisfactory, as desires are insatiable, and the more they are indulged the stronger they become, whilst their satisfaction becomes produces decreasing amounts of pleasure –making life more and more miserable.The most miserable man is the tyrant, because his appetites are all constantly sated. The relatively desireless just man is the happiest.However, it should also be noted that Socrates is avowedly not concerned with individual happiness, or even class happiness –just as for a statue to be beautiful it is not imperative for each of its parts in itself to be beautiful, so for the just city to be happy, the happiness of its individual parts is unnecessary. On one level, this claim can be made simply via the analogy to the soul (the soul is moderate, thus it is happy; thus if city and soul correspond and the city is moderate, it is happy). This form of argument, as Aristotle would point out, is invalid. What I think Plato may mean, is that a city not tyrannised by its appetites will not engage in and have to suffer the consequences, of war. At 373 Socrates is remarkably upfront about desire for luxury being the origin of war. Reading the text against the background of Athens‟ recent, and utterly disastrous, imperial history (and t he description of the “luxurious city” is strongly reminiscent of Thucydides‟ descriptions of imperial Athens, just as the Republic’s staging is meant to recall the period) the claim that the moderate city, which will not have to suffer the ravages of war, will be the happier, sounds valid. BibliographyCooper: The Psychology of JusticeFoucault: History of Sexuality Vol. IILaks: Legislation and Demiurgy: on the relationship between Republic and LawsLane: Plato and SocratesNehamas: The RepublicNußbaum: The Republic: true value and the standpoint of perfectionPlato: The RepublicScholfield: Approaching the RepublicWilliams: The Analogy of City and Soul in Plato‟s Republic。