2012年必和必拓矿在我厂使用情况介绍

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世界煤炭协会--主要公司会员介绍

世界煤炭协会--主要公司会员介绍

世界煤炭协会(WCA)主要公司会员介绍时间:2012-5-29 23:01:11 编辑:煤炭网(世界能源及煤炭巨头)神华集团有限责任公司(Shenhua Group)神华集团有限责任公司成立于1995年,是煤、电、路、港、航、煤制油化工一体化,产运销一条龙经营的特大型国有能源企业,是全球最大的煤炭经销商,2011年位列全球财富500强第293名。

独家成立的中国神华能源股份有限公司在港、沪上市。

公司拥有1500公里自有铁路、1.5亿吨吞吐能力的港口和300万载重吨的船队,电力装机4786万千瓦,其中风电装机340万千瓦。

神华煤直接液化项目第一条年产108 万吨生产线已投运,全球最大的60万吨神华包头煤制烯烃项目投产。

集团现有总资产6350亿元。

2011年,营业收入2820亿元,利润750亿元,连续名列中国行业第一。

原煤生产4亿吨,商品煤销售5.08亿吨,铁路运量3.24亿吨,发电2080亿度,装船1.22亿吨,航运8100万吨,化工品990万吨。

“本质安全”稳步推进,电、路、港、航板块杜绝了死亡事故,原煤生产百万吨死亡率为0.018。

重视科技创新与绿色环保。

北京低碳清洁所研发工作全面启动,引进了一批世界级的科技领军人物;联合企业和高校成立了“煤炭技术开发利用技术创新”战略联盟;规模为10万吨/年的亚洲最大二氧化碳捕集封存项目成功实施。

面向未来,神华集团致力于建设具有国际竞争力的世界一流煤炭综合能源企业,与世界煤炭能源企业携手共进,保持煤炭能源行业健康、绿色、可持续发展,造福全人类。

美国博地公司(Peabody)博地公司是世界最大的私营煤炭公司,也是全球唯一一家专营煤炭投资的公司,有着125年的悠久历史。

博地能源为美国10%和全球2%的电力生产提供燃煤。

博地能源通过其子公司及遍及美国和澳大利亚的各大煤炭产区的28 家控股煤炭公司,拥有约90 亿吨的探明储量和可能储量。

2011年煤炭产量2.26亿吨,销量2.5亿吨,营业收入79.7亿美元,实现利润9.46亿美元。

2012年钢铁行业

2012年钢铁行业

我国钢材需求进入高消费、低增长阶段;钢厂面临经济需求回落和产能过剩的双重压力目前我国钢铁行业有炼钢能力的企业达452家。

其中百万吨以上规模近200家。

2011年我国粗钢产量6.83亿吨。

12月下旬日均产量已降至163万吨,创2011年以来最低。

而今年以来粗钢日产水平始终在190多万吨。

降不下来。

不过今年8月12日经济日报头版文章《开启经济强省新征程》中有一句话证实了河北省瞒报产钢量,比如,河北钢铁产量已达2亿多吨,占全国四分之一以上。

这意味着,河北省有近5000万吨产钢量没有上报。

山东、山西也存在类似现象。

这就意味着2011年我国粗钢产量已经达到7.3亿吨。

据2012年中国工业经济运行上半年报告披露,中国钢铁行业产能过剩超过1。

6亿吨,水泥产能过剩超过3亿吨,铝冶炼行业产能利用率仅为65%左右。

中国经济此轮下滑,除外需萎缩、投资回落、房地产调控外,更深层的原因是世界范围的金融经济危机和中国制造业连续几年产能过剩危机叠加作用带来的经济出现下滑趋势。

世界各国用钢消费饱和点从我国今年粗钢消费没有增长甚至出现回落的情况看,中国钢材需求已经步入高消费低增长时期。

上世纪90年代,我国13亿人口,全国用钢不过1亿吨。

今天考虑到农村人口占一半。

城镇7亿人口,消费超过6亿吨钢,人均消费多少?早超过国际人均600公斤的饱和点了。

而城镇化人口转移每年有2000万。

这是一个较长期的任务。

这就是中国的国情。

未来钢材高消费低增长,甚至不增长会持续较长时期。

问题是河北隐瞒实际产量5000万吨,实际消费接近7亿吨的后果是中国钢铁产能已经陷入严重过剩。

据中钢协统计,今年前7月,中国粗钢产量达4.19亿吨,这是7.2亿吨的产量规模。

到底比去年产量多了,还是少了,是否还有瞒产这是说不清楚的。

钢协给出的结论是,若扣除出口和钢厂库存增加部分,实际消费量同比下降了3.6%左右。

伴随钢铁高消费低增长时代的到来,在国际金融经济危机,中国经济又较长时期的持续回落,这种钢铁消0费回落是不难理解的。

必和必拓推进几内亚52亿氧化铝项目

必和必拓推进几内亚52亿氧化铝项目

中国 糟 , 工 业 21年 期 孝 00 第3
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量 7 亿 吨的 世界最大 单体铁 矿。随后 ,在大 台沟附近 的花红 出尾矿综 合利用 的基本 原则和发展 目标 。金 属尾矿 的规划治 0 沟 、鞍 山黑石砬 子 、辽 阳 弓长岭铁矿 又找到 了探 明储量 2 亿 理 对 提 高 资 源 利 用 率 , 解 决 当 前 国 内 资 源 、环 境 对 经 济 发 展 2
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澳大利亚必和必拓公司在智利发现新铜矿

澳大利亚必和必拓公司在智利发现新铜矿
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氧化铝价格低位运行

氧化铝价格低位运行

氧化铝价格低位运行朱妍; 霍云波; 郭秋影【期刊名称】《《中国金属通报》》【年(卷),期】2012(000)026【总页数】3页(P24-26)【作者】朱妍; 霍云波; 郭秋影【作者单位】北京安泰科信息开发有限公司【正文语种】中文上半年,全球氧化铝价格低位运行。

国外氧化铝生产稳定,中国氧化铝出现部分减产,但上半年全球氧化铝市场整体呈过剩状态。

下半年,供应压力仍笼罩于全球氧化铝市场,对氧化铝价格走势形成压制,国内氧化铝价格仍将维持低位运行。

1.市场概述上半年LME铝价在窄幅震荡之后便进入了不断下挫的的局面,国外氧化铝现货价格在前五个月总体运行平稳,除2月份出现小幅上涨之外,大部分时间维持稳定,运行区间310-320美元/吨。

6月份随着LME铝价大幅跳水,氧化铝现货价格开始下滑,至月末已下降到305美元/吨。

2.国外氧化铝生产上半年,由于铝价持续低迷,国外一些高成本电解铝企业开始减产,但大部分氧化铝企业生产稳定,并未随着电解铝的减产而减产。

据安泰科统计,上半年全球冶金级氧化铝产量为4781万吨,中国以外地区的产量为2772万吨。

上半年国外减产企业仅有两家:俄铝旗下几内亚Friguia氧化铝厂,该厂4月初由于工人罢工停止生产,总产能为63万吨/年,上半年减少的产量约15万吨;4月初美国铝业公司(Alcoa)宣布,计划将其氧化铝的年生产能力削减大约39万吨,估计上半年减少的产量为9.7万吨。

上半年国外并未有新的氧化铝产能投产。

一些新扩建氧化铝项目被推迟。

美铝公司将投资30亿美元的Wagerup氧化铝厂扩建项目推迟5年。

挪威海德鲁铝业公司表示,公司已推迟位于巴西Barcarena的CAP氧化铝厂(原计划于2015年投产)的建设计划。

国际铝业巨头剥离铝资产来规避风险。

2011年力拓集团宣布将对其13个铝资产于10月进行捆绑销售,并计划在今年9月底之前完成旗下法国和德国的氧化铝厂的对外转让,这意味着该集团开始退出这一高竞争性的行业。

几内亚2012-11-8

几内亚2012-11-8
对外关系
1963年同法建交。法为几最大援助国,多年来向几提供了大量投资和援助。2011年1月,德兰古再次访几,与几方探讨重启两国合作事宜。3月下旬,孔戴总统访法,与法总统萨科齐会谈,法向几提供了500万欧元的援助。美日也是几主要援助国。
三、自然资源条件
表自然资源总体情况
自然资源总体情况
(1)几内亚资源丰富,有“地质奇迹”之称。
经济
最不发达国家。农业国,工业基础薄弱,粮食不能自给。近年受国内局势动荡影响,几经济形势持续恶化。几新政府重视发展经济,宣布实施“复兴计划”,重点保障主要城市的水、电供应,大力发展农业,加强基础设施建设。
货币
几内亚法郎(Franc guinéen)1美元=5800几内亚法郎
工业
工业基础薄弱,制造业不发达。主要工业部门是农副产品加工、纺织、家俱等。矿业是较为重要的经济部门,主要矿业公司有:博凯、弗里亚、金迪亚三大铝矿和阿雷多尔黄金钻石开采公司等。近年来,力拓、必和必拓、淡水河谷等国际矿业公司先后进入几内亚,将与几方开展铁矿开发合作。几新政府正在修订《矿业法》。
几内亚共和国(The Republic of Guinea)投资合作情况介绍
(赵大使与孔戴总统会见后合影留念)
一、自然地理条件
项目
情况
面积
245857平方公里
人口
1030万(2010年)
民族
全国有20多个民族,重要名族:富拉族又称颇尔族(40%)、马林凯族(30%)、苏苏族(20%)
官方语言
法语
宗教
重要人物
总统阿尔法·孔戴(Alpha Condé):1938年生,马林凯族,信奉伊斯兰教。早年留学法国,获法学博士学位,后长期在法国大学任教。上世纪60年代在法国留学期间投身政治运动,创建劳动党,1988年改名为几内亚人民联盟,任党主席至今。曾两次参加总统大选。1995年当选国民议会议员。1998年大选期间被当局逮捕,并被判10年监禁。2001年被提前释放,随即流亡法国。2008年几政变后返几。2010年12月当选总统。

从矿山赌徒到矿业寡头——_必和必拓的世界一流之路

从矿山赌徒到矿业寡头——_必和必拓的世界一流之路

世界一流WORLD CLASS—— 必和必拓的世界一流之路从矿山赌徒到矿业寡头综合报道/本刊主笔 李岩“做矿的企业都是赌徒”,一语道出了采矿业高投入、高回报、高风险的特性。

在这个行业摸爬滚打22年的必和必拓,“赌技”绝对是世界一流。

如今,它不仅是全球三大铁矿石供应商之一,产品线还延伸至煤、铜、精炼铝、锰铁合金、不锈钢、石油、天然气、钻石、银和钛等领域,成了名副其实的矿业寡头。

国企管理2023.780Copyright ©博看网. All Rights Reserved.素有“坐在矿车上的国家”之称的澳大利亚,采矿业在世界经济版图中有着举足轻重的地位。

必和必拓就诞生在这里。

经过多年发展,必和必拓已成为澳大利亚经济增长的主要引擎之一,是全球最大的综合矿业公司。

2022年,必和必拓在世界500强中位列第213位,成为全球第三大铜矿公司。

从矿山赌徒到矿业寡头,必和必拓走出了一条别样的世界一流之路。

多元化扩张,从未停止2001年,澳大利亚的布罗肯希尔控股公司和英国的勿里洞岛公司合并,成立了必和必拓公司,总部位于墨尔本。

合并之前,布罗肯希尔控股公司主要开采银矿和铅矿,后又涉足钢铁生产与石油开发领域;勿里洞岛公司亦是深耕采矿业多年。

两家公司都是通过收购不断做大,这也为必和必拓植入了多元化扩张的基因。

成立之初,必和必拓就野心勃勃,并不满足于称雄采矿业某个细分领域,而是要重组全球采矿业,做全球最大的综合矿业公司。

于是,必和必拓开启了急速多元化扩张模式,一场场大并购令业界瞩目。

2005年,公司以73亿美元成功收购世界第五大镍生产商、第六大铀矿生产商WMC资源。

之后的几年间,一路扩张的必和必拓接连在澳大利亚、英国、美国等国家挺进资本市场,敲钟上市。

截至2010年,公司市值已经超过2000亿美元,成为名副其实的矿业“巨无霸”。

资本加持下,必和必拓的扩张野心急速膨胀。

2010年,公司旗下的矿业公司收购了澳矿商联合矿业公司(UMC)所有股份。

铜加工费TC,RC介绍

铜加工费TC,RC介绍

铜加工费TC/RC介绍(国投中谷期货投资咨询部聂建军)TC/RC(Treatment and Refining charges for Processing concentrates),可以翻译成将铜精矿转化为精铜的处理和精炼费用。

TC就是处理费(Treatment charges)或粗炼费,而RC就是精炼费(Refining charges)。

在铜精矿国际贸易中,TC (Treatment charge的简称)和RC (Refining charge的简称)是协议中最基本、也是最重要的贸易条款。

一、TC/RC定义及计算铜精矿加工费的基本定义是:矿产商或贸易商(卖方)向冶炼厂商或贸易商(买方)支付的、将铜精矿加工成精炼铜的费用。

由于铜精矿的贸易多为买断交易,因此铜精矿加工费已经成为确定铜精矿价格的一种表现形式,即用铜价减去铜精矿加工费就是铜精矿的销售价格。

铜精矿加工费分为粗炼加工费(Treatment Charges, TC)和精炼加工费(Refining Charges,RC),统称TC/RCs。

TC以美元/吨铜精矿报价,其标的物为含铜30%的干铜精矿【30%只是举例说明,后面会作详细介绍】,RC以美分/磅精炼铜报价。

TC和RC的单位不同,但在数值比上总是10:1的关系,这是铜精矿国际贸易中惯用的表示方法。

如:TC为100美元/吨,RC则为10美分/磅。

经过换算发现,粗炼费TC通常是精炼费的1.5~2.5倍,而这一数字比例基本与目前世界铜冶炼企业平均成本的比例相吻合。

所谓铜精矿的综合加工费,即是粗炼费加上精炼费,但又不是简单的TC与RC之和,因为二者单位不同。

但只要经过换算把二者单位统一,就可以很容易算出来。

举例说明,例如:进口铜精矿含铜30%,回收率96.5%,TC 45美元/吨,RC 4.5美分/磅,计算如下:方法一:美分/磅转化为美元/磅粗炼费=1÷Cu%÷回收率%×TC =1÷30%÷96.5%×45=155.44美元/吨铜精炼费=RC×2204.62÷100=4.5×2204.62÷100=99.21美元/吨铜(1吨=2204.62磅,1美元=100美分)由此,综合加工费=粗炼费+精炼费=155.44+99.21=254.65美元/吨铜;亦可换算为:254.65×100÷2204.62=11.56美分/磅铜。

赴必和必拓考察报告

赴必和必拓考察报告

赴必和必拓考察报告必和必拓(BHP)是世界领先的资源公司之一,主要从事煤炭、铁矿石、铜、铝、石油天然气等资源的开采、生产和销售。

作为一家跨国企业,BHP在世界各地都有大量的项目和工厂。

在此次考察中,我们将重点介绍BHP位于澳大利亚的矿山项目,并进行全面的考察报告。

BHP的矿山项目位于澳大利亚西部的内陆地区,主要开采铁矿石和铜矿。

这些矿山项目不仅规模庞大,还具备世界一流的设备和技术,能够高效地进行开采和生产。

通过我们的考察,我们发现BHP的矿山项目具有以下几个突出的特点。

首先,BHP的矿山项目注重环境保护。

在矿山开采过程中,BHP采取了一系列措施来减少环境污染,包括严格的废水处理、排放控制和植被恢复等。

此外,BHP还致力于推动可持续发展,积极开展节能减排和资源回收利用等工作。

他们与澳大利亚政府、当地社区和环保组织合作,共同推动环境保护事业的发展。

其次,BHP的矿山项目注重安全生产。

在矿山开采过程中,BHP始终把安全放在首位,致力于创造一个安全、健康的工作环境。

他们采取了严格的安全规范和培训措施,并不断完善安全管理体系,确保员工的安全。

此外,BHP还注重职工福利,提供良好的员工待遇和福利,吸引和留住了一大批优秀的人才。

再次,BHP的矿山项目注重社区发展。

作为一家跨国企业,BHP深知自己的社会责任,积极投身当地社区,为当地居民提供就业机会和经济支持。

他们与当地政府、社区组织合作,开展社会公益活动,改善当地人民的生活条件。

此外,BHP还注重与当地居民的沟通和合作,听取他们的意见和建议,共同推进社区的可持续发展。

最后,BHP的矿山项目注重科技创新。

作为一家领先的资源公司,BHP一直致力于引进和应用先进的技术,提高矿山开采和生产效率。

他们与世界各地的科研机构合作,不断研发新的技术和工艺,为资源开发和利用提供了有力支持。

在我们的考察中,我们看到BHP的矿山项目采用了先进的自动化设备和智能化管理系统,大大提高了生产效率和工作质量。

炼铁麦克块矿(MACTM)在唐钢1号高炉的工业试验应用

炼铁麦克块矿(MACTM)在唐钢1号高炉的工业试验应用

麦克块矿(MAC TM)在唐钢1号高炉的工业试验应用摘要近几年中国钢铁工业迅猛发展,对进口炼铁原料的强劲需求促进了澳大利亚开发新的铁矿资源,马拉曼巴类矿资源被称为下一代矿将成为世界钢铁用户又一重要铁矿原料。

从原料战略上考虑和实际增长的需求出发,唐钢在国内率先加强了对澳大利亚马拉曼巴矿资源的研究使用。

本文介绍了在唐钢No.1高炉对必和必拓公司生产的马拉曼巴矿-麦克 (MAC TM) 块矿的工业试验应用情况。

三个月的生产操作实践表明麦克块可以在高炉高比例的使用。

关键词马拉曼巴矿麦克(MAC TM) 块矿铁矿高炉工业试验INDUSTRIAL TRIAL ON MAC TM LUMP AT THE NO.1 BLAST FURNACEOF TANGGANGLiu Lianji1 Zhao Yong1 Song Runping1 Sun Qi2 Tim Sylow2(1Tangshan Iron & Steel Ltd Co., Ironmaking Plant 2BHP Billiton) ABSTRACT The Chinese iron and steel industry has been booming in recent years. Unprecedented demand for import ironmaking raw materials our products has accelerated Australian iron ore providers in the development of new iron resources. Marra mamba ore called the next generation will be one of important iron ore resources of worldwide steel mill. With the perspectives of strategy and actual increasing demand, Tanggang is pioneering in research and utilisation on Australian marra mamba resource. This article is introducing industrial test on MAC TM lump-BHP Billiton’s marra mamba lump at its No.1 blast furnace. Three months blast furnace practice showed that MAC TM lump can be charged at high level of lump burden.KEY WORDS marra mamba ore, MAC TM lump, iron ore, blast furnace, industrial trial1 前言澳大利亚生产主要为赤铁矿为主的布鲁克曼(Brockman)矿和河床豆状褐铁矿( Pisolite )。

必和必拓将斥资18.5亿美元提高澳洲铁矿石产能

必和必拓将斥资18.5亿美元提高澳洲铁矿石产能

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2012年铁矿石行业分析报告

2012年铁矿石行业分析报告

2012年铁矿石行业分析报告2012年4月目录一、铁矿石简介 (5)二、全球铁矿石行业概览 (5)1、全球铁矿石资源分布 (5)2、全球铁矿石需求情况 (6)3、全球铁矿石供给情况 (7)4、国际贸易和铁矿石价格情况 (8)(1)铁矿石国际贸易 (8)(2)国际铁矿石定价机制 (8)(3)长协价格情况 (8)三、中国铁矿石行业 (9)1、我国铁矿石储量、分布与品位 (9)2、我国铁矿石需求情况 (10)(1)我国粗钢表观消费量保持增长且高位运行 (10)(2)我国铁矿石消耗量持续增长 (11)3、我国铁矿石供应情况 (12)(1)我国铁矿石原矿产量持续增长 (12)(2)铁矿石进口依存度高 (12)4、国内铁矿石价格 (14)(1)国内铁矿石价格形成机制及变动情况 (14)(2)影响国内铁矿石价格的主要因素 (15)四、本行业与上下游行业的关联性 (16)五、行业利润水平的变动趋势及变动原因 (17)六、行业的周期性、区域性和季节性特征 (17)七、影响行业发展的因素 (18)1、影响行业发展的有利因素 (18)(1)我国宏观经济良好,铁矿石下游行业需求稳步增长 (18)(2)工业化、城镇化为我国铁矿石需求持续增长提供了可能 (18)(3)国家产业政策支持我国铁矿石行业长期可持续发展 (19)2、影响行业发展的不利因素 (20)(1)全球铁矿石供应市场处于相对垄断状况 (20)(2)我国铁矿石资源的特点制约行业发展 (20)(3)国内铁矿石行业集中度低 (20)八、行业技术水平 (21)1、勘探技术 (21)2、采矿技术 (21)3、选矿技术 (21)九、行业监管情况 (22)1、行业主管部门和监管体制 (22)(1)投资主管部门 (22)(2)行业主管部门 (22)(3)安全生产主管部门 (23)(4)环境保护主管部门 (23)(5)行业协会 (23)2、行业法律法规 (24)(1)投资核准方面 (24)(2)矿产资源方面 (24)(3)安全生产方面 (25)(4)环境保护方面 (25)3、产业政策 (26)(1)综合性产业政策 (26)(2)产业结构规划与调整 (26)十、进入铁矿石行业的主要障碍 (27)1、行政许可壁垒 (27)2、资源禀赋壁垒 (28)3、资金壁垒 (28)4、人才壁垒 (28)十一、行业主要企业简况 (29)1、国际主要铁矿石生产商 (29)(1)淡水河谷(VALE) (29)(2)力拓(Rio Tinto Group) (29)(3)必和必拓(BHP) (29)(4)澳大利亚福特斯克金属集团(FMG) (29)2、国内主要铁矿石生产商 (30)(1)金岭矿业 (30)(2)中国铁钛 (31)(3)海南矿业 (31)一、铁矿石简介铁矿石是指含有铁元素或铁化合物的矿石。

中国在成为铝业大国

中国在成为铝业大国

2012年10月11日06:23 AM中国在成为铝业大国英国《金融时报》杰克•法尔基报道萨扬诺戈尔斯克(Sayanogorsk)是个因铝而兴的城镇,位于西伯利亚腹地,距离莫斯科2000多英里,这里一片片的苏式风格住宅区都围绕着一个目的:为当地冶炼厂服务。

叶夫根尼•谢尔贝科夫(Yevgeny Sherbakov)在冶炼厂里负责管理一个车间,这个车间里安放着许多陶瓷内衬的铁“罐”,它们就是用来生产铝的,他说:“很多当地人都是靠这间厂活着。

在20世纪90年代它就像是小镇的救星。

”铝为当地带来了繁荣,也让冶炼厂的老板、现年44岁的奥列格•杰里帕斯卡(Oleg Deripaska)成为了俄罗斯巨富。

当年正是在这里,25岁的他开始打造现在名为俄铝联合公司(UC Rusal)的铝业王国。

俄铝现在是世界上最大的铝生产商,杰里帕斯卡任首席执行官。

墙壁上就挂着他青年时期的照片。

然而铝业的繁荣景象正在逐渐消退。

铝是继钢铁之后世界上应用最广泛的金属,从飞机到易拉罐都会用到铝。

由于中国需求的猛增,铜、铁矿石等大宗商品给采矿业带来了巨大财富,而铝却差不多完全错过了这轮“超级周期”。

现在一吨铝约为2100美元,与1980年的时候相差无几,这在国际货币基金组织(IMF)跟踪的采矿类大宗商品中是表现最差的。

同期内,铜价涨了将近三倍,铁矿石价格涨了八倍。

行业巨头们已不复往日风光。

俄铝3年前重组了总额168亿美元的债务,如今又在与银行洽商延长协议宽限期。

杰里帕斯卡承认:“我们现在的确处于困难时期,整个行业都面临一系列挑战。

”整个行业都在重复同样的故事。

业内产量最高的五家生产商——俄铝、美国铝业(Alcoa)、伦敦上市的力拓(Rio Tinto)、中国国有的中铝(Chalco)以及挪威的海德鲁公司(Norsk Hydro)——的估值总和从5年前的近2000亿美元缩水到650亿美元左右。

分析师与高管们认为,盈利能力下滑将改写行业格局,迫使传统生产商削减成本或者合并,同时将更加突显出中国发展为铝业大国的趋势。

浅谈中国矿企海外并购

浅谈中国矿企海外并购

浅谈中国矿企海外并购付霞【摘要】@@ 中国企业到海外投资主要有两种方式,即新建和并购,虽然新建方式的经济风险相对较小,但由于并购具有可以实现企业快速发展的优势,近年来,通过跨国并购以达到海外投资目的的中国企业越来越多,从而为中国企业海外投资闯出了一条新路.2009年上半年,中国已宣布的海外并购交易额已高达147亿美元.【期刊名称】《中国金属通报》【年(卷),期】2009(000)032【总页数】2页(P34-35)【作者】付霞【作者单位】山西华泽铝电有限公司【正文语种】中文并购是企业海外发展的有效方式之一,利于企业迅速做强做大。

矿产这样开采投资周期长、投资涉及环节较多和限制条件较多的资源类行业,更适宜于选择并购方式。

当前全球经济受到金融危机的负面影响,中国矿企应在国家“走出去”战略背景下,及时布局,把跨国并购当成企业国际化的快速通道。

中国企业到海外投资主要有两种方式,即新建和并购,虽然新建方式的经济风险相对较小,但由于并购具有可以实现企业快速发展的优势,近年来,通过跨国并购以达到海外投资目的的中国企业越来越多,从而为中国企业海外投资闯出了一条新路。

2009年上半年,中国已宣布的海外并购交易额已高达147亿美元。

企业并购是市场经济发展的必然要求,是企业资本运营和组织调整的重要方式。

近几年,全球矿业领域的并购呈现出愈演愈烈态势。

目前,各大矿业公司凭借雄厚的实力参与国际并购,通过并购获得新的发展空间。

全球前10大矿业公司占全球矿业公司总市值的50%以上,单体市值多在百亿美元以上。

2007年,全球矿业领域并购交易总额达1060亿美元;而2008年,尽管次贷危机不断扩大,前7个月全球矿业并购金额已高达2242亿美元。

通过研究世界一流矿业集团的发展历程,可以清晰地看到通过并购实现做大做强这一成长路径贯穿其发展历史。

2000年后,淡水河谷公司通过频繁的兼并收购,迅速做大做强,尤其是2006年11月,以177亿美元的价格收购了加拿大国际镍业公司75.66%的股份,是淡水河谷公司建立64年来的最大规模的并购案,也是迄今为止世界矿业领域金额最大的收购案。

必和必拓集团

必和必拓集团

必和必拓集团必和必拓集团简介必和必拓集团(BHP Group)是一家全球领先的综合性资源公司,总部位于澳大利亚墨尔本。

公司前身是由澳大利亚必和必拓公司和英国拓必赫公司于2001年合并而成。

公司主要从事矿产勘探、开采和加工、原油、天然气生产和销售、以及强有力的全球营销和物流网络。

作为全球最大的矿业公司之一,必和必拓集团拥有丰富的矿产资源,包括铁矿石、铜、锌、镍、煤炭、钛等。

公司在全球范围内开展业务,包括澳大利亚、巴西、智利、美国等地,其多元化的矿业项目使其成为全球资源行业的领导者之一。

必和必拓集团的核心价值观是卓越、关心、合作和责任。

公司致力于在经济、社会和环境可持续发展方面发挥积极作用,通过提供有竞争力的产品和服务,为客户创造价值。

在矿业勘探和开发方面,必和必拓集团拥有多个矿产资源丰富的项目。

其中,该集团在澳大利亚的西澳大利亚州铁矿石项目是其最重要的资产之一。

这个项目是全球最大的铁矿石开发项目之一,为全球提供了大量的高品质铁矿石。

除了矿产资源开发外,必和必拓集团还在原油和天然气领域有着强大的业务布局。

公司在美国、墨西哥、巴西、澳大利亚等地拥有多个油气项目。

此外,必和必拓还开展天然气液化业务,并在澳大利亚和加拿大建立了相应的天然气液化厂。

必和必拓集团还在全球范围内从事营销和物流业务,公司拥有庞大的全球销售网络和物流渠道,为客户提供高效的产品供应链管理。

在可持续发展方面,必和必拓集团积极推动环境保护、社会责任和企业道德的实践。

公司致力于减少温室气体排放、水资源管理、土地保护和社区发展等方面的工作。

此外,公司还重视员工的安全和福利,并致力于提供安全和健康的工作环境。

作为全球资源行业的领导者,必和必拓集团在全球范围内有着广泛的影响力。

公司的高品质产品和可持续发展的实践赢得了客户和投资者的信任和认可。

必和必拓集团将继续致力于推动资源行业的创新和发展,为客户、员工和社会创造更大的价值。

必和必拓,矿业

必和必拓,矿业

China’s Outward FDI andResource-Seeking Strategy:A Case Study on Chinalco and Rio TintoShujie Yao a*, Dylan Sutherland a and Jian Chen aa University of NottinghamAbstractThe scale and frequency of foreign direct investment (FDI) in foreign mining companies by China’s large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is still not well explained by existing investment or international business theories. This paper advances and verifies two important theoretical propositions. First, the efforts of China’s big businesses to “go global” can be thought of as being part of a national power-building globalisation strategy. Second, facilitated by extended protection from the state, reaching beyond China’s national boundaries, China’s large SOEs raise investment capital and take risks that their foreign competitors do not. This paper uses Chinalco as a case study to illustrate these propositions.JEL Classifications:F21, D21, L53Keywords:OFDI, Chinese big business groups, global financial crisis, globalisation, resource-seeking1. BackgroundChinalco’s failed strategic investment in Rio Tinto attracted worldwide attention and provoked sharp criticism of Rio Tinto back in China for its role in unilaterally scrapping the deal, initially struck at a time when Rio Tinto was on the verge of collapse. This was because Rio Tinto had accumulated huge debts immediately prior to the outbreak of the financial crisis. Its share price reflected its dire situation. It had dropped to less than £10/ share in early 2009, from a peak of over £70/share only several months earlier in 2008. After investing $14 billion in February 2008, approximately 9% of Rio Tinto’s equity, Chinalco had incurred more than $10 billion in paper losses. However, in February*Corresponding author: Shujie Yao, School of Contemporary Chinese Studies, the University of Nottingham, Jubilee Campus, the University of Nottingham, Nottingham, NG8 1BB, UK. Tel: 0044-115 84 66179. Fax: 0044-115 84 66324. Email: shujie.yao@. We thank the anonymous reviewers for the valuable comments.Shujie Yao, Dylan Sutherland and Jian ChenAsia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics 17 (2010) 313–3263142009 Chinalco went on to agree with a further $19.5 billion injection in Rio Tinto. This investment would have substantially reduced Rio Tinto’s large debts. For Rio Tinto, it secured a life line for its survival. For Chinalco, it would have helped secure China’s steel industry a secure, stable and cost-effective supply of iron ore, as well as allowing it to become a more truly global company. At the time when the deal was struck, therefore, it was an attractive proposition to both parties. (Table 1)Table 1: Reasons for and against strategic partnershipRio-Tinto ChinalcoBenefits and Reasons for Partnership Mounting debts of $34 billion frombuying Alcan makes it a target fortakeover. Partnership with Chinalcoprevents this from happening.Securing stable supply of raw ma-terials at reasonable prices. HelpingChina to own strategic resourcesoverseas.Costs and Reasons against Partnership China exerts influence on board andprice setting. Partial loss of ownershipof some mines. Resentment by politi-cians and shareholders to sell strategicassets to Chinese companies.First investment of $14 billion lost70% of value. Total debt costs of$33.5 billion cannot be justifiedon commercial basis given profitsdropping by 99% in 2008.Four months after the initial agreement the proposed deal had cleared most of the legal and administrative hurdles. It still, however, needed the final approval of the Australian Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) and Rio Tinto’s shareholders. But only one week before the FIRB meeting, on June 5, 2009, Rio Tinto withdrew from the deal and announced an alternative plan. This involved a $15.2 billion right issues as well as a joint venture with its arch rival BHP Billiton in its crucial iron ore mines in Western Australia. This came as an unexpected blow to both Chinalco and China’s self-esteem (Yao, 2009).Despite the failure of Chinalco in this deal, China’s relentless effort to acquire foreign assets is unlikely to diminish. Instead, its future forays may in fact become more tactical and forceful. Indeed, the Chinalco story highlights how the on-going global financial crisis and subsequent downturn presents new opportunities for China’s big business groups to actively seek substantial stakes in large foreign resource companies, often backed by China’s state-owned banks. It is most striking, in particular, that the terms of credit offered to Chinese companies making these foreign acquisitions are often very generous. This arguably raises important challenges for existing theories of international business.To address this puzzle, we use the Chinalco-Rio Tinto case as a study to investigate certain theoretical propositions. The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an introduction and background to the Chinalco-Rio Tinto case study, including consideration of world mining industry consolidation. Section 3 explains in more detail the national strategies of Chinese policy-makers and businesses and their aspirations to become global giants. Section 4 investigates two theoretical propositions regarding resource seeking strategies in the Chinese context. Section 5 concludes.Shujie Yao, Dylan Sutherland and Jian Chen315 Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics 17 (2010) 313–3262. Consolidation of the world mining industry and Chinese OFDIChina’s OFDI has now risen from only several billion dollars to around $50 billion by 2008. Chinalco’s proposed investment in Rio Tinto, if successful, would have been the largest outward investment of a Chinese company to date. Table 2 summarises some of the most important aspects of their engagement.Table 2: Chinalco, Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton’s struggle for controlImportant dates EventsOct 2007Rio Tinto bought Alcan for $38.6bn, but did so incurring $34bn of debts towards the very peak of the long commodity boom.Nov 2007BHP attempted to buy Rio on a 3:1 all-share swapFeb 2008Chinalco, along with the US’s Alcoa as a strategic partner, invested $14bn to buy 9% of Rio’s shares.Aug 2008Chinalco raised its stake in Rio to 11 per centNov 2008BHP abandoned its plans to buy Rio due to Chinalco’s intervention, which was there-fore hailed as a success at the time.Feb 2009Chinalco agreed to invest another $19.5bn in Rio: $12.3bn for minority stakes in iron ore, copper and aluminium assets and $7.2bn for convertible bonds to take its equitystake in Rio to 18 per cent and two non-executive seats in Rio’s board.5 Jun 2009Rio unilaterally abandoned its deal with Chinalco and proposed an alternative, to raise$15.2bn through right issues and $5.8bn from BHP Billiton by forming a joint venturewith the latter in western AustraliaSource: Yao and Sutherland (2009).Chinalco’s huge bid, and subsequent failure, is in the first instance representative of the fact that in general a large share of all global FDI has been carried out by a relatively small number of the very largest TNCs (UNCTAD, 2007). China’s OFDI is also concentrated in hands of a small number of large business groups (Morck, Yeung and Zhao, 2008; Sutherland, 2009). In this regard, the considerable concentration of China’s OFDI in a comparatively small number of big business groups mirrors international patterns. Despite its rapid growth, however, China’s total OFDI still accounted for only a small share of the global total. This was partly because prior to the onset of the global financial crisis the world had experienced an unprecedented wave of transnational consolidation (Nolan, 2001). In 2007, for example, global FDI (mostly M&A activity) exceeded the two trillion dollar mark (World Bank, 2009).1This merger wave was caused by numerous factors and has been referred to as a “global big business revolution” (Nolan, 2001). The metals and mining industries was no exception to this general trend. It too experienced rapid global consolidation. Between 1995 and 2006, 17 “mega-mergers” (deals exceeding one billion US$) took1 The real U.S. dollar price of commodities has increased by some 109% since 2003, or 130% since the earlier cyclical low in 1999. By contrast, the increase in earlier major booms never exceeded 60% (ibid.).Shujie Yao, Dylan Sutherland and Jian Chen316Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics 17 (2010) 313–326place in the metals and mining industries (UNCTAD 2007: 241). As a result the degree of concentration also increased significantly. Interestingly, the degree of concentration rose fastest in areas such as iron ore (from 44% to 52%) and copper (from 51% to 58%) – some of the very areas important to China.2Large TNCs from the UK, the USA, Australia and Canada, however, dominated most of these deals. This consolidation wave, moreover, was also strongly driven by the very largest TNCs, including Rio Tinto, BHP Billiton, Alcan (subsequently taken over by Rio Tinto) and Vale (also known as CVRD). In theory this increased the gap that China’s large groups faced in order to “catch up” with their global competitors.By late 2007, as the global credit crisis was beginning to unfold, the merger wave (and accumulation of debt) was reaching its zenith.3 The value of announced mining takeovers more than tripled to $199 billion in the first five months of 2008, when compared with 2007 (Choudhury and Foley, 2008). Some firms from emerging economies also tried to take part in this merger frenzy. The largest, such as CVRD, for example, failed in a takeover bid for Xstrata Plc. Chinalco and Sinosteel, among China’s largest groups, also bought significant stakes in mining assets worldwide to diversify their sources of raw materials.3. China’s national champions and the thorny path to become global championsAgainst the backdrop of impressive global consolidation, China has also been trying to push its own domestic consolidation process, not just in non-ferrous metals, but across a wide range of different industries, so as to catch up with the leading TNCs (SASAC, 2007). Indeed, going as far back as 1991, China’s State Council selected a batch of trial business groups to undergo trial reforms (Nolan and Zhang, 2002). Despite debate emerging in China concerning the significance of these large groups to her economic reforms, in the end the group strategy was accepted (Macro-economic Research Institute of the Chinese National Plan Commission, 1996; Pei, 1998). Indeed, the centrality the Chinese leadership attached to large business groups in China’s opening to trade and investment was aptly summarized in a speech by the then vice-premier Wu Bangguo in 1997:In reality, international economic confrontations show that if a country has several large companies or groups it will be assured of maintaining a certain market share and a position in the international economic order. America, for example, relies on General Motors, Boeing, Du Pont and a batch of other multinational companies.Japan relies on six large enterprise groups and Korea relies on 10 large commercial groupings. In the same way now and in the next century our nation’s position in the international economic order will be to a large extent determined by the position of our nation’s large enterprises and groups (Yao and Sutherland, 2009).2Iron ore and copper are the most important metal commodities globally. They account for close to around one half of the total value of all metallic minerals produced globally (UNCTAD 2007: 109).3 The start of the credit crunch is heralded by bad news from French bank BNP Paribas, which triggered a sharp rise in the cost of credit.Shujie Yao, Dylan Sutherland and Jian Chen317 Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics 17 (2010) 313–326Following from this strategy a wide variety of measures have been taken, and business groups (as opposed to stand alone firms, more commonly found in the Anglo-Saxon model), have rapidly emerged.4In 1991, 57 large groups were selected in a number of key industries. By 1997, this batch of business groups was further increased, from 57 to 120. Chinalco is among these national champion business groups, making it interesting as a case study.Although many of the Chinese national champions may appear large in terms of size, they cannot match their western counterparts in terms of technology, management, logistics, human resources and marketing. These deficiencies become more marked when they start to go expand beyond China’s national boundary. Beyond this point, they no longer enjoy the monopolistic positions and the market power held within their domestic market. This, in part, may explain why China has been unable so far to invest heavily in manufacturing and services industries in developed economies. Further, it also suggests that, for these champions to succeed overseas, they may also require extended state support. Chinalco is itself a large industrial corporation with many subsidiaries in China, enjoying significant monopolistic power in the aluminium industry. Due to its sheer size and market power, it has become a natural monopoly in its key product areas. This has allowed the group to rapidly increase its revenue, profits and assets (Table 3). This successful growth encouraged Chinalco to become ever more aggressive, leading to its involvement with Rio Tinto.Table 3: Chinalco’s key financial indicators (2002-1Q 2009, billion RMB)20022003200420052006200720081Q2009 Revenue16.8 23.3 32.3 37.1 61.9 76.2 76.7 13.9 Profits(gross) 3.4 6.8 10.9 12.3 20.0 19.0 6.7 -2.3 Assets31.9 35.1 49.0 59.0 78.0 94.3 135.5 132.6 Profit before tax 1.6 4.6 8.6 9.7 16.8 14.4 0.1 -2.3 number ofemployees n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.8,8000 94,269 10,7887 n.a. Sources: /.Chinalco’s first investment in Rio Tinto, in February 2008, was made near the peak of the commodity market boom. The sharp market downturn (caused by the financial crisis and the subsequent drop in metal prices in the world market), as noted, reduced the share price of Rio Tinto from over £70/share in late 2007 to less than £10/share by February 2009. As a result, Chinalco’s first investment in Rio Tinto lost more than 70% of its value on paper. The second proposed investment in February 2009 looked to recoup some of the losses incurred by the first investment. Out of £19.5 billion, $7.2 billion was proposed to buy convertible bonds bearing 9% interest rate per annum. The bonds could be converted to shares at a price substantially lower than that of the initial investment, made in two tranches at $45/share and $60/share, respectively.5 The other4 For the definition and discussion of “business groups” in China, please see Hussain and Chen (1999).5 The price Chinalco paid to Rio Tinto was about $120/share (or £60/share) in February 2008.Shujie Yao, Dylan Sutherland and Jian Chen318Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics 17 (2010) 313–326 $12.3 billion would have been used for buying up to 49% of the shares in a number of important copper, aluminum, and iron ore mines in Australia.One critical advantage of the proposed deal to Rio Tinto was that it could pay off its immediate debts incurred after the purchase of Alcan and stop its share price from falling precipitously during late 2008 and early 2009, a difficult time for markets. The disadvantages, however, were also serious. In particular, the high interest rates attached to the convertible bonds and the eventual conversion of these bonds to share equity at a less favorable rate would lead to diluted ownership rights of many important mines, and the influence of the two Chinese Communist Party members as its board directors. For Chinalco, the failed deal was a serious blow, not only for itself as a commercial company but also for China’s national image and self-esteem. For Rio Tinto, on the other hand, the decision to reject Chinalco’s offer appeared to be primarily the result of shareholders drive for better returns. It was thus driven by private interests, rather than national interests. The failure of Chinalco to press home its advantage when Rio Tinto was most vulnerable also reflects the naivety and lack of familiarity of its senior management in making foreign acquisitions.4. Theories of OFDI in the Chinese contextAcademic literature suggests that FDI should generate mutual benefits for both the investing and host economies. For host economies, their incentives to attract FDI may include the transfer of new technologies, managerial skills and access to international markets. For investing economies, the key incentives may include resource-seeking, market penetration, exploitation of scale economies at the global level and lower costs. In most cases, FDI involves a significant component of technological transfer and spill-overs, as inferred from the new theory of endogenous growth (Romer, 1986; Sala-I-Martin, 1996). Export-orientation forces producers to respond to international competition. In the Asian newly industrialised economies (NIEs), Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore, the outward looking strategy has been associated with relatively free labour and capital markets (Balassa, 1988).Empirically, many recent econometric analyses have focused on understanding the causality between the dependent and independent variables. For example, does FDI cause GDP to grow, or vice versa? Most empirical results support the argument that FDI can promote output growth. Yao and Wei (2007) demonstrate that FDI into China explains up to one-third of economic growth and technological progress during the 1978-2004 period. Chuang and Hsu (2004) show that FDI has the biggest impact on the productivity of those industries that import appropriate technologies rather than the most advanced technologies. Among the OECD countries, Choi (2004) shows that per capita income disparity tends to decline as a result of rising bilateral FDI flows. Wang, Siler and Liu (2002) show that foreign firms are more productive than domestic firms in the UK.Many recent studies also suggest that market size, labor cost, location and timing are important determinants of FDI (Chakraborty and Basu, 2002; Filippaios, Papanastassiou and Pearce, 2003; Deichmann, Karidis and Sayek, 2003). Park (2003) and Love (2003)Shujie Yao, Dylan Sutherland and Jian Chen319 Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics 17 (2010) 313–326try to explain the motives of Japanese and US firms to invest abroad. Japanese firms experienced three stages of their investment strategies, natural resource-seeking (1950s and 1960s), market penetration (1970s and 1980s), and the combination of cost-saving and market expansion from the 1990s (Park, 2003).Although existing literature may provide some insights as to why China has geared up its OFDI in recent years, the special characteristics of its OFDI in the form of resource-seeking have not been well considered. Based on existing theories of international business, firms making OFDI must possess some kind of advantages over their host-country competitors. These advantages can be technology, brand, or management skills. The key objective of any TNC is to maximize profits and increase their international competitiveness. However, if we compare Chinalco with Rio Tinto, the former does not appear to have any such advantages. It is actually smaller and less profitable. If, however, Chinese policy makers are seen as using Chinalco as a vehicle for national security and development, the high degree of asset specificity – China’s total dependence on iron ore to develop – may explain its desire to vertically integrate with Rio Tinto.Chinalco was selected as one of a few Chinese national champions to seek natural resources overseas through investments and acquisitions of large foreign TNCs. In this way it could guarantee that foreign resource supplies would be available to China’s large and growing metals industries. This was why Chinalco was allowed to become a large and monopolistic industrial group in China and to make such large investments abroad, which could not have been justified based on its own financial strength alone. As illustrated in Table 3, the company’s performance deteriorated sharply after its listing on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2007. Indeed, if Chinalco were a western TNC, it would have been close to bankruptcy and not launching a massive investment plan to acquire foreign assets. Banks would have called in their loans rather than putting them forward. Even despite its poor performance, however, four of the biggest Chinese state-owned banks agreed to lend Chinalco US$21 billion. These banks, moreover, charged very low interest rates, only 94.5 basis points above the six-month London inter-bank offered rate (LIBOR). Further, they did not set a time for Chinalco to pay back the loans. By comparison, BHP Billiton at the same time issued ten-year bonds which had to bear interest at 390 basis points above the six-month LIBOR.6This type and scale of lending activity is possible only in China, where state-owned banks and businesses are treated as the left and right arms of the state in order to achieve its national long-term development objectives (Yao, 2009). As a result, the OFDI of China’s national champions, such as Chinalco, cannot be well explained by existing theories. Instead an understanding of aspects of the political economy of OFDI is also required (Yao and Sutherland, 2009).To further understand the motivation and behavior of Chinese big businesses making OFDI, we propose two theoretical propositions.Proposition 1: The efforts of China’s big businesses to “go global” and undertake OFDI are part of the country’s power-building and globalisation strategy.6 Zhen Yang, “Easier loans lead to more M&As,” China Daily, 20th April 2009, p.4.Shujie Yao, Dylan Sutherland and Jian Chen320Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics 17 (2010) 313–326 Proposition 2: Soft budget constraints and extended protection by the government beyond the nation’s boundary are the key policy instruments compensating for the technological and managerial deficiencies of China’s national champion groups undertaking OFDI. This policy support enables these companies to outstrip their foreign competitors in taking risks and raising investment capital.These propositions can be illustrated in Figure 1 below. They have generally not been considered in the existing literature on management and international business. This may be because they are especially applicable to emerging economies such as China.Figure 1: Evolution of China’s business champions going globalNotes: (1) The top 3 squares show how state-owned enterprises are supported by soft budgets and monopo-listic power to become domestic giants. (2) The middle 3 squares show how these domestic giants are further supported by state banks and government protection to go global. (3) The bottom 3 squares show two key national objectives (power building and security) that these business giants are expected to achieve.Figure 1 implies that Chinese business champions undertaking OFDI cannot be regarded as isolated commercial entities. Their development has also been supported by the state and they are also tasked to achieve two important national objectives: world-power building and national security. However, the extent to which the government is prepared to support these champions and the extent to which these champions will respond to the country’s development ambitions through maximizing and balancing private (company interests) and social (national interests) benefits are two important questions that need to be addressed.These questions can be answered through a simple model, explained below. It is assumed there exist two utility functions, one for the state, denoted by U s, the other for a particular company, say Chinalco, denoted by U p.Shujie Yao, Dylan Sutherland and Jian ChenAsia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics 17 (2010) 313–326321In U s, the level of utility is determined by the state’s ability to gain power in the world economy, denoted by WP, and to raise the level of national security, denoted by NS, as a result of any OFDI made by the company but supported by the state, as shown in equation 1.In U p, the level of utility is determined by the company’s ability to increase profit (π) and world market share (MS) as a result of outward investment, as shown in equation 2. For simplicity, market risk and price volatility are not considered in the following model and discussion, although the model could potentially be elaborated to include the effects of price changes and market uncertainty.U s = f (WP, NS) (1)U p = f (π, MS) (2)WP, NS, πand MS are themselves non-declining functions of OFDI.However, whether the state needs to support or subsidize the outward investments made by the company depends on the returns to investments. Assuming the marginal return per unit of investment (e.g. $1 billion) in the domestic market is fixed as µand the return to thesame amount of investment made overseas is denoted by ∂U p∂O FDI , then, there are twopossible outcomes.First, if the return to overseas investment is equal to or greater than the fixed return in the domestic market, there is no need for state support. This is shown in equation 3. Second, if the return to foreign investment is than that from the domestic market, the company will need state support, as shown in equation 4.7 The first scenario is a possibility but it is not the focus of our interest. Instead, we focus on the case where state support is required.∂U p∂O FDI≥, no need for state support (3)∂U p ∂O FDI <, need for state support (4)The next question is how to determine the optimum level of support for a given amount of OFDI. In theory, the amount of support to the company should be equal tothe difference between µ and ∂U p∂O FDI, or denoted by dπ*. This level of support leaves the company indifferent as to whether it makes the same investment at home or abroad. The7 Equation 4 may also suggest that if the government can effectively reduce the return in the domestic market, the company will have incentives to invest abroad. We preclude this as a realistic possibility however, as all the evidence we find points to the alternative: namely that increased domestic returns have been consistently promoted by the state in its efforts to promote larger business groups that can compete internationally. We therefore assume that the state is constrained to act only in a positive manner towards the profitability of the companies it wishes to support.Shujie Yao, Dylan Sutherland and Jian ChenAsia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics 17 (2010) 313–326322state, however, may or may not provide this support, depending on the additional utility that the state can derive from supporting this investment. As a result, the equilibrium condition triggering state support is dictated by the condition in equation (5), namely the amount of support should be equal or smaller than the additional utility accrued to the state as a result of the company making that investment.dπ*=(∂U p∂O FDI)≤dU s=df(WP,NS)–(5)The additional state utility can be decomposed into two parts: the marginal utility of increased world market share (or increased world power), and the marginal utility of the increased national security as a result of OFDI. This decomposition can be shown in equation (6).dU s=df(WP,NS)=∂U s∂W P∂W P∂OFD I dNS+∂U s∂N S∂N S∂OFD I dWP(6)With (6), the equilibrium condition for state support can be re-arranged in (7).dπ*≤∂U s∂W P∂W P∂OFD I dNS+∂U s∂N S∂N S∂O FDI dWP(7)It implies that the amount of state support to satisfy the condition that additional investment should achieve equal returns in both domestic and foreign markets to an individual company. This support should be equal to or smaller than the total derivative of the state utility function with respect to world power and national security. The total derivative of the state utility function can be decomposed into two parts: (1) the state’s marginal utility of world power resulting from making OFDI multiplied by the additional national security, and (2) the state’s marginal utility of national security resulting from making OFDI multiplied by the additional world power. These two components are shown on the right hand side of equation (7).This model can be applied to analyse Chinalco’s proposed second investment in Rio Tinto (of $19.5 billion). The state support can be quantified by the amount of possible interest subsidies for its proposed bank loans, which at about 3 percentage points amounts to an implicit subsidy of $585 million annually. State support can also be implied by the fact that, in the event that Chinalco made an absolute loss, the state would also act as its guarantor. Such soft budget constraints are seldom available to western private companies.The benefits to the state may not be easily quantified, but the fact that the state-owned banks were happy to provide the loans implies that the total benefits should be greater than the amount of implied subsidies. These benefits include the ability of China to increase the secure supply of iron ore, a key strategic resource, and the ability to negotiate for a lower price of seaborne iron ore with the large oligopolistic suppliers. In 2008, China imported about $60 billion of iron ore. Reducing the import price of iron ore by one percentage point would save $600 million annually for its steel industry.。

自动化(无人驾驶)矿用卡车技术

自动化(无人驾驶)矿用卡车技术

自动化(无人驾驶)矿用卡车技术地表采矿的自动化卡车(无人驾驶)是矿山自动化运行的主要组成部分,在受到采矿行业越来越多的关注,它可以在一定程度上改善安全健康业绩指标,还能降低运行成本和提高生产率等,本帖大家来一起讨论一下这项技术(应用)。

“没有什么比看到这样一辆无人驾驶的巨型卡车更让人惊奇了”生产者、进程、技术特点和使用自动化卡车的基本概念简单点说就是:在无驾驶人员的情况下,能按特定路线行驶和装载、卸载,自动地完成工作循环,有意外情况时能减速或停车——就是用控制装置、GPS导航、无线通信技术和软件来取代原来坐在驾驶室内的司机。

现在的自动化卡车是在现有的车型上改装的——驾驶室仍然保留——将来进一步发展成熟后,它们的样子会不会改变全副武装、无人驾驶的930E市场需求是制造商开发和生产的动力,在此领域,世界排名前两位的工程巨头美国CAT和日本KOMATSU走在了前面,白俄罗斯的BELAZ最近也展示了其产品。

使用自动化卡车的矿山比例还很小,当前模式为工程机械制造商与矿业公司合作并为后者提供解决方案——最主要的是卡特与必和必拓,小松和力拓。

小松的Autonomous Haulage System(自动运输系统,AHS,名为FrontRunner)无人驾驶卡车方面的研究已经有大约20年的历史了,当时是同时可控制50-100辆车的系统。

小松自动化卡车现在是AHS的组成部分。

关于AHS:小松的AHS是一个综合性的矿山车队管理系统,此系统下每一台卡车都安装有车辆控制器、一个高精度GPS(全球定位系统)、一个障碍物侦测系统和一个无线网络系统(由小松、小松美国和Modular Mining Systems公司联合开发),由一个装备了高精度定位能力GPS系统的车队监测中心管理,为每辆车指定运输目的地,车辆通过接收无线指令以合适的速度按照目标路线运行,卡车由GPS、控制中心无线指令(信息)和其它导引装置来确定车辆在矿山的准确坐标以及周围的情况,使得自卸车能在无人操作的情况下实现复杂的装载、运输和卸载循环的自动运行。

Umetal澳大利亚铁矿石资源和生产现状

Umetal澳大利亚铁矿石资源和生产现状

澳大利亚是一个铁矿资源大国,根据澳大利亚农业与资源经济局(ABARE)的统计,截至2008底,探明的铁矿石资源储量为160亿吨,占世界总量的l0.4%;折算成铁金属资源储量为100亿吨,排名世界第二,仅次于俄罗斯。

就资源分布而言,澳洲已探明的铁矿石资源90%都集中在西澳州,主要分布在两大地区:皮尔巴拉(Pilbara)地区和中西部(Midwest)地区。

皮尔巴拉地区的铁矿石主要是高品位的铁矿石,具体品种包括低磷、高磷布鲁克曼矿、马拉曼巴矿、河床矿等。

中西部地区的铁矿石主要是低品位的磁铁矿、少量的赤铁矿及混合矿等。

澳大利亚铁矿石资源开采现状澳大利亚是一个铁矿石生产大国,低磷布鲁克曼铁矿已经服务于西澳大利亚州铁矿业36年以上。

然而,这类富矿日趋枯竭,低品位和高磷铁矿资源正在被逐渐开发。

1990年西澳的铁矿石的产量结构中布鲁克曼矿占73%,豆石矿占22%,而马拉曼巴矿占2%,其它矿种占3%。

随着西安吉拉斯、Mac C矿区的开发,马拉曼巴矿的比例在不断增加。

2002年,皮尔巴拉地区的铁矿产量由10%马拉曼巴矿、40%以上布鲁克曼矿和略低于50%的豆石矿组成。

目前,由于Hope Downs项目和FMG项目的投产,西澳铁矿产量中马拉曼巴矿的比例又有所提高,同时Rio Tinto已停止出售布鲁克曼矿,改为生产Pilbara Blend(皮尔巴拉混合矿,简称PB粉),质量已接近马拉曼巴矿。

因此,有分析指出,到2010年马拉曼巴矿将占到澳大利亚铁矿石产量的25%,未来将增加到40%左右。

这些低品位矿石有望导致在中期内进一步降低实际的平均铁矿石价格。

2008年澳大利亚铁矿石产量为3.50亿吨,从2008年开始澳大利亚铁矿石产量超过巴西成为全球最大的铁矿石生产国(除中国外)。

图1显示了近年来澳大利亚的铁矿石产量。

图1 2000-2010年澳大利亚铁矿石产量及占世界产量比重澳大利亚现有铁矿石的生产主要集中在皮尔巴拉地区,约占全澳总产量的95%,主要生产企业有RioTinto(力拓)、BHP(必和必拓)和FMG等。

必和必拓将出售YABULU镍矿

必和必拓将出售YABULU镍矿

必和必拓将出售YABULU镍矿
杨晓菲
【期刊名称】《《中国金属通报》》
【年(卷),期】2009(000)026
【摘要】[安泰科讯]全球最大的矿商必和必拓进一步撤出高成本的镍矿业务,于7月3日宣布出售其位于澳洲的Yabulu冶炼厂给当地一家矿业巨头Billionaire Palmer。

【总页数】1页(P11)
【作者】杨晓菲
【作者单位】
【正文语种】中文
【中图分类】TD56
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6、杨迪粉的价格相对于其它同品质矿粉价格偏低,性价比优。
5
汇 报 完 毕
6
4
三.矿粉使用情况汇报
5、杨迪粉矿属褐铁矿,结晶水较高,气孔率高,混合制粒所需水分要求较高,
结构疏松,易熔化,烧结同化性和反应性较好,液相流动性好,其晶粒小,
有利于与熔剂发生反应;亲水性好,但由于其堆积密度小,直接影响烧结利 用系数,还需要采取相应的工艺手段提高烧结利用系数——比如提高烧结料
层厚度,延长点火时间等。
2012年 BHP矿粉 在我厂使用情况介绍
一.
船名 费城(杨迪粉) 新旺海(杨迪粉) 皇家赞美(麦克粉) 皇家赞美(杨迪粉) 新旺海(纽曼块)
使用数量
数量(吨) 110000 100000 90000 80000 70000
合计
450000
2
二.
费城 杨迪粉 57.38 5.56
矿粉指标汇总
皇家赞美 麦克粉 60.42 4.6 皇家赞美 杨迪粉 57.36 5.67 新旺海 杨迪粉 57.74 5.3 新旺海 纽曼块 63.46 3.78
品质 Fe SiO2
Al2O3
P S
MOISTURE
1.34
0.040 0.028
2.36
0.078 0.032
1.45
0.043 0.012
1.36
0.04 0.012
1.46
0.063 0.012
8.67
7.03
9.48.94Fra bibliotek3.623
三.矿粉使用情况汇报
1、从以上矿粉成分可以看出费城和新旺海都属于BHP公司的杨迪粉。 2、2012年通才原料场混匀料中使用费城和新旺海,使用比例10%、12%、27%、36% 、38%;近日高炉配用了15%的纽曼块。 3、杨迪粉Tfe较低、SiO2含量中等、Al2O3低、有害元素含量少、烧损高,属于高
结晶水高烧损的褐铁矿,其它微量元素都在规定的范围内。
4、杨迪粉在混匀料配用15%左右时,烧结垂直速度快,烧结产能较大,日产11000 吨,烧结矿转鼓指数基本上均能达79%以上,入炉吨烧固体燃耗大约在65kg左
右,烧结成品率大约在68%以上。当杨迪粉在混匀料中配用了27~38%,由于杨
迪粉结晶水含量大,生石灰供应不足,燃料粒度偏大,目前一直没有安装压料 辊而对料面不能进行压料等原因,致使烧结料料温低,出点火器的烧结料表层 几乎全是返矿,影响了烧结矿强度及成品率。
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