清算企业的盈余管理【外文翻译】

外文文献翻译
原文：
Earnings Management Using Discontinued Operations When making firm-valuation decisions, investors place a higher value on items of income expected to be persistent in the future. Presumably to aid users’ valuation decisions, GAAP generally requires that material nonrecurring items be separately disclosed in the financial statements. However, the separation of net income into recurring and nonrecurring components also gives managers the opportunity to mislead investors, by misclassifying income and expense items. For example, a manager wanting to increase firm valuation can misclassify recurring expenses as nonrecurring, misleading investors as to the persistence of the income increase. In the accounting literature, this type of earnings management is called classification shifting.
McVay _2006_ discusses two reasons why classification shifting can be a relatively low-cost method for managing earnings. First, unlike accrual management or real activity manipulation, there is no “settling-up” in the f uture for past earnings management. If a manager decides to increase earnings using income-increasing accruals, then, at some point, these accruals must reverse. The reversal of these accruals reduces future reported earnings. If a manager decides to increase earnings by managing real activities, such as reducing research and development expenditures, then this likely leads to fewer income-producing projects and reduced earnings in the future. In contrast, classification shifting involves simply reporting recurring expenses in a nonrecurring classification on the income statement, having no implications for future earnings. Second,because classification shifting does not change net income, it is potentially subject to less scrutiny by auditors and regulators than forms of earnings management that change net income.
Discontinued operations represent the income and cash flows of a portion of a company that has been _or will be_ discontinued from the continuing operations of the company. Under SFAS No. 144, the gain or loss for discontinued operations is comprised of three amounts. The first amount is the operating income or loss from the
operations of the component being discontinued for the entire year in which the decision to discontinue is made. The second amount is the gain or loss from disposal, which is the net amount realized over the carrying value of net assets of the component. The third amount is an impairment loss on the “assets held for sale” if the component is not disposed in the same year as the decision to discontinue.5 The results of discontinued operations are reported on the income statement as a separate item _net of tax effects_ after income from continuing operations. The “below the line” reporting of disposals as discontinued operations is likely perceived to be desirable for investors, because it communicates to them the results of a firm’s operations on a “with and without” basis. However, it could be detrimental to investors if managers use their reporting discretion to manage earnings when reporting discontinued operations. For example, managers could allocate normal operating expenses to discontinued operations in order to report increased income from continuing operations. Managers have discretion over the allocation of joint costs between continuing and discontinued operations, and this information is not normally available to external investors. It is doubtful that auditors would detect this manipulation during their analytical review because the company’s financial ratios would be sim ilar to what they were previously.
The ability of asset disposals to be classified as discontinued operations has varied throughout time. Under APB Opinion No. 30 _APB 1973_, only dispositions of business “segments” were able to qualify for reporting as discontinued operations. In general, business segments were defined as a major line of business or a customer class. The FASB believed that investors would benefit from expanded application of the accounting and disclosure rules of discontinued operations and issued SFAS No. 144, Accounting for the Impairment or Disposal of Long-Lived Assets _FASB 2001a_. SFAS No. 144 reduced the threshold for recognition of discontinued operations treatment by introducing the “component of an entity” concept. A component of an entity is distinguishable from the rest of the entity because it has its own clearly defined operations and cash flows. A component of an entity can be a reportable segment, an operating segment _as defined by SFAS No. 131, FASB 1997_, a reporting unit _as defined by SFAS No. 142, FASB 2001b_, a subsidiary, or an asset group. This
reduction in the threshold for discontinued operations has allowed for more asset disposals to be classified as discontinued operations. Consequently, the FASB may have inadvertently given managers more discretion to manage earnings, potentially reducing the quality of reported earnings.
In addition to the “component of an entity” requirement, SFAS No. 144 mandated two other requirements for an asset disposal to qualify for treatment as a discontinued operation. The first requirement is that the operations and cash flows of the component being disposed are completely separable from the seller’s continuing operations. The second requirement is that the seller has no significant involvement with the component after the sale. In theory, the application of these requirements appears straightforward; however, SFAS No. 144 did not clearly define the meaning of significant involvement. In practice, many asset disposals involve contractual terms: seller financing, retained equity by the seller, royalties paid to the seller by the buyer, service agreements, etc. The inclusion of these terms in the asset-disposal contract could be interpreted as significant involvement by the seller. In order to provide better guidance on the meaning of the term “significant involvement,” the FASB issued EITF 03-13 _FASB 2004_ as a guide for determining whether an entity retains significant involvement or receives cash flows. In short, if a firm receives material direct cash flows from the discontinued operations or maintains significant continuing involvement, then the disposal does not qualify as a discontinued operation. EITF 03-13 took effect in 2005 but could be adopted as early as 2004. It should be noted that, while the recognition criteria for discontinued operations are well defined in GAAP, the costs to be allocated to the discontinued operations are not. Accounting treatment for discontinued operations is also a global accounting issue. Similar to APB No. 30, IFRS 5, Non-Current Assets Held-for-Sale and Discontinued Operations _IASB 2004_ defines a discontinued operation as a separate major line of business or geographical area of operations. IFRS 5 also requires detailed disclosure of revenue, expenses, pre-tax profit or loss, and the related income tax expense, either in the notes or on the face of the income statement. Currently, both the FASB and the IASB are working toward a converged accounting definition and treatment for discontinued operations, with both
boards issuing proposals amending SFAS No. 144 and IFRS 5, respectively.
In closing, material asset disposals are reported on the income statement as discontinued operations if they meet the requirements of SFAS No. 144 _or APB No.
30 for disposals prior to 2002_ and likely reported as special items if they do not. Either income statement classification gives managers the opportunity to engage in classification shifting. Prior research provides evidence that special items are used for classification shifting. Since the recognition criteria for discontinued operations are better defined in the accounting standards than for special items, this may give managers less flexibility to manage earnings using classification shifting. For example, it may not be possible for managers to time the recognition of discontinued operations to coincide with a period during which earnings management is desired. Consequently, whether managers use discontinued operations for earnings management purposes is an empirical.
Earnings management is one of the most studied areas in financial accounting research.Previous studies document that earnings management can be carried out through accrual management_e.g., Dechow et al.1995; Payne and Robb 2000_, real activity management _e.g., Dechow and Sloan 1991; Bushee 1998; Roychowdhury 2006_,8 or classification shifting _Ronen and Sadan 1975; Barnea et al. 1976; McVay 2006; Fan et al. 2010_. However, increasing current earnings using the former two methods has the potential of reducing future earnings. Since classification shifting simply moves certain revenues, expenses, gains, and losses to different line items on the income statement, it does not actually change net income. As a result, classification shifting is likely to be less costly and less scrutinized by auditors and regulators _Nelson et al. 2002_.9 Previous studies have largely focused on earnings management using accruals and real activity management. Relatively few studies have examined earnings management through classification shifting.
Ronen and Sadan _1975_ contend that the dimensions and objects of income smoothing are closely associated. They also reason that, if the smoothing object is net income, then classification shifting is irrelevant. However, if the smoothing object is any income subtotal other than “bottomline”net income, then managers have an
incentive to engage in classification shifting. This begs the question of which income subtotals interest investors. Lipe _1986_ documents that investors understand the future earnings implications between the different earnings components reported on the income statement. Bradshaw and Sloan _2002_ provide evidence of “street earnings” _i.e., modified-GAAP earnings with noncash and nonrecurring items excluded_ replacing GAAP earnings as one of the primary determinants of stock price. Together, these studies provide evidence of investors’ interest in recurring income subtotals rather than “bottom line” net income that includes nonrecurring items. If investors value recurring earnings higher than nonrecurring earnings, then managers have an incentive to misclassify operating expenses as nonrecurring expenses, to increase recurring income subtotals. Although one cannot observe which income statement subtotals investors use, we follow McVay _2006_ in assuming that core earnings is the managed subtotal. However, using discontinued operations to increase core earnings also increases income from continuing operations and other “above-the-line” earnings subtotals.
One of the earliest studies in the area of classification shifting is Ronen and Sadan _1975_. They find evidence consistent with managers using extraordinary items to smooth earnings before extraordinary items. Barnea et al. _1976_ extend this line of research by providing evidence that managers also use extraordinary items to smooth operating income. Taken together, these studies provide evidence that managers are interested in managing multiple income statement subtotals, presumably because investors value various income statement subtotals differently. While the above studies provide evidence of earnings management using “below the line” income statement items, they do not examine the motivations behind classification shifting.
Kinney and Trezevant _1997_ investigate whether managers use special items opportunistically to manage both earnings and investors’ perceptions. They find that income-decreasing special items are more likely to be reported as line items on the income statement, presumably to call attention to the transitory nature of the earnings decrease caused by these items. They also find that income-increasing special items are more likely to be reported in the footnotes to the financial statements, presumably to
shift attention away from the transitory nature of the earnings increase caused by these items. Their findings suggest that managers behave opportunistically when disclosing special items. However, Riedl and Srinivasan _2010_ further examine managers’ reporting behavior regarding special items. They find that special items separately disclosed on the income statement have a lower persistence than special items disclosed in the financial statement footnotes. Their results are consistent with managers using financial statement presentation to assist investors in evaluating the persistence of special items. This evidence offers an alternative explanation for the managerial opportunism detected by Kinney and Trezevant _1997_.
McVay _2006_ investigates whether managers engage in classification shifting, by reporting core expenses in income-decreasing special items. She uses an expectation model to separate core earnings, defined as operating income before depreciation and amortization, into expected and unexpected components. She finds special items are positively associated with contemporaneous unexpected core earnings and negatively associated with the unexpected change in future core earnings. These results are consistent with her hypothesis that managers shift operating expenses to special items. Sh e also provides evidence suggesting that managers’ motivation for classification shifting is to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. In addition, she finds a negative stock price reaction to the reversal of unexpected core earnings, indicating that investors do not understand _or are not able to fully undo_ the earnings management. One drawback to the core earnings expectation model used by McVay _2006_ is the use of contemporaneous accruals _including accruals related to special items_ as a control for firm performance. The inclusion of special item accruals in the expectation model creates a potential bias in favor of her hypotheses. She acknowledges the reliance on an imperfect model is a limitation of her study.
Fan et al. _2010_ extends McVay’s _2006_ co re earnings expectation models by controlling for performance using returns and lagged returns rather than contemporaneous accruals, thus eliminating any potential bias. They confirm McVay’s _2006_ findings that managers shift core expenses to income-decreasing special items. Using quarterly data, they find that classification shifting using income-decreasing
special items is more prevalent in the fourth quarter than in other quarters. They also find that classification shifting is more prevalent when managers are constrained from using income-increasing accruals.
Source:Michael Power. Fair value accounting, financial economics and the transformation of reliability[J]. Accounting and Business Research 2010.11(4) :197-210
译文
清算企业的盈余管理
企业往往喜欢高估账面价值，吸引投资者对其投资。

现行会计准则要求企业计入特别项目的数据应单独列报在财务报表中，避免管理者通过计入经常性开支还是非经常性开支来进行盈余管理。

例如，企业经营者将取得的收入计入非经常性收入，误导投资者认为是经常性收入，在一定程度上影响投资者的投资决策。

企业管理人员将高估的收入计入经常性收入还是非经常性收入来进行盈余管理，就是会计文献中所说的利用分类转移进行盈余管理。

麦克韦（2006）主要讨论了盈余管理的动机和方法。

首先阐述的是企业虚增当期收入进行盈余管理，如有的经营者利用收到的预收账款确认为当期收入，在发出货物后，结转收入的时候又把以前确认的收入转回，这样还是会影响那一期的会计利润。

还有的企业经营者通过少计费用的方法达到盈余管理的目的。

以上盈余管理虽然可以调节当期的会计利润，但是还是会影响未来期间的会计利润。

而利用分类转移进行盈余管理就不会影响未来期间的会计利润，因为它是当期确认为经常性收入或者非经常性收入进行盈余管理的。

判断一个企业停业的标准是：是否有持续的现金流流入和是否有持续的主营业务收入。

根据SFAS第144号，判断企业停业有三个标准：一是在经营期内一直处于亏损状态；二是被出售的资产在扣除通货膨胀率后还是明显低于其账面价
值；三是资产减值的计提将从备抵科目转出，作资产清算处理。

清算企业的资产处理，APB30号是这样规定的，出具企业停业证明后，才可处置企业的资产。

FASB2001对企业停业的定义为，企业的主要资产被出售，即可认定该企业是停业了。

规定中的主要资产并不是指价值量特别大的资产，而是指维持企业正常运营不可或缺的资产。

对上述规定，会计准则委员会认为存在许多会计准则漏洞和政策的真空地带，若被企业利用进行盈余管理，会降低了财务报告中会计信息的质量。

会计准则第144号规定，根据资产处置来判定企业停业有两个标准，一是大多数资产出售，并且出售的资产直接导致企业无法维持正常的生产，二是出售资产方不具有售后收益权。

但是在实际业务处理中，许多资产处置后有合同条款约束，如有的售后合同中规定，出售的资产属于卖方的融资，卖方拥有该资产的股权等。

财务会计准则对企业停止运营时处置资产是这样规定的：如果被处置资产作为特殊项目列示在报表中的，对该资产需要进行详细地批注。

详细批注可以缩小企业盈余管理的空间。

在此前的许多研究表明，管理者或者经营者均有把一些资产计入特殊项目，即利用分类转移的会计手段进行盈余操纵，达到修饰公司报表的目的。

盈余管理方面的研究还有很多，如佩恩和罗布在2000年发表的实际经济活动管理一书对实际案例的研究，麦克韦2006的发表关于分类转移理论的研究等。

其中麦克韦的分类转移理论主要阐述的是：利用分类转移进行盈余管理的操作方法，即在不影响当期净收入的情况下，将某些收入、费用、损失计入不同的科目类别。

采用分类转移进行盈余管理的主要优势在于，它的成本非常低，而且风险比较小，风险小表现在不易被审计人员和有关监管部门发现。

目前利用分类转移进行盈余管理的相关理论研究还是比较少的。

罗蒙等（1975）研究认为平滑收入项目与金额大小密切相关。

他们认为如果平滑的是净收入则对会计信息影响不大，但是平滑的是其他收入，则有理由认为管理者进行了盈余管理。

罗蒙等的研究认为管理人员通过记入特殊项目，或者计入非经常性项目进行盈余管理。

斯巴尼亚认为管理人员利用特殊项目平滑营业收入进行盈余管理。

总
的来说，管理人员一般利用利润表中的相关项目进行盈余管理，影响投资者的决策。

特雷兹万特研究认为：管理者利用特殊项目平滑各期收益进行盈余管理。

他的研究还发现：收入增加的特殊项目，管理者会在附件中有详细地说明，似乎想把投资者的注意力吸引到这些项目上，而忽略收入减少的特殊项目。

麦克韦（2006）的预期利润模型对折旧、摊销等数据分析后得出这样的结论：盈余管理与特殊项目成正相关。

虽然他的预期利润模型存在一定的局限性，但特殊项目与盈余管理存在一定关联这一点是可以证明的。

范韦等（2010）对麦克韦（2006）提出的预期利润模型进行修正，他们认同麦克韦的研究结果，并从他研究的数据得出这样的结论：管理者利用特殊项目进行分类转移进行盈余管理的现象比较普遍。

其他文献中也有利用分类转移进行盈余管理的研究，主要归纳为以下三种方法，一是零收入法，二是以前年度损益法，三是分析师预期利润法。

基于上述的方法及有关其他学者的理论，我们得出以下三个结论：
H2a：停止运营的企业，管理人员进行盈余管理，主要是美化财务报表，期望给潜在投资者正面的盈利期望，减少负面损失影响。

H2b:停止运营的企业，管理人员进行盈余管理，主要使报表财务数据美化，使潜在投资者认为企业当期的会计利润比前一期的会计利润高，希望潜在投资者认为企业的盈利水平是逐年增长的。

H2c:停止运营的企业，管理人员进行盈余管理，美化财务报表，超出潜在投资者的评估师的预期，吸引潜在投资者对其投资。

本章主要讨论的是清算企业利用分类转移进行盈余管理。

研究的资料是财务报表中的利润表，其中的特殊项目的收益比正常项目平均收益低很多，对此的解释是特殊项目的核算管理人员有自由裁量权。

由此可以得出管理人员对特殊项目的开支有很大的自主权。

从而推断出管理人员是有机会通过特殊项目的调整来进行盈余管理的。

此外，清算企业还利用营业费用来调增主营业务收入，但是清算企业即使利用营业费用修饰报表也不太可能在吸引投资者对其投资了。

企业若要停业清算，首先需要管理层决定停业，之后企业才进入清算环节，再讨论针对相关的营业费用等进行分类转移的问题。

我们是假设了管理人员先做
停止运营的决定，再决定如何分类转移企业的营业费用。

并且，我们认为这两个决策是互相独立的。

我们这么认为的理由如下：理由一是停止企业运营决定是一项非常重要的决定，需要管理人员提交一份关于企业停止运营的报告，再送达董事会批准，才可以认定企业停止运营。

理由二是企业停止运营需要支付一些必要的费用，如遣散费、鉴定费、律师费等。

理由三是停止运营的决定可能会导致该公司的经营业绩改善，如果预期会发生这种情况，那么该企业在转卖的时候需要将未来收益的折现额作为当期的收益。

理由四是，我们认为停业这个过程是一个漫长的过程，需要董事会的批准、需要评估相关资产、需要对潜在购买者
进行选择等一系列程序。

出处：Michael Power. Fair value accounting, financial economics and the transformation of reliability[J]. Accounting and Business Research 2010.11(4) :197-210。